A criticism of Benatar's asymmetry: an abuse of counterfactuals
I was recently directed by an individual elsewhere on the internet to a philosophical paper written by Julio Cabrera, which aims to criticize the antinatalistic asymmetry of David Benatar.
At first, I was a bit skeptical, because there have been numerous attempts to attack Benatar's asymmetry, and all of them have failed miserably. But to my surprise, I found this paper to be extremely compelling, and I realized that many of the points that Cabrera brought up had been subconsciously mulling around in the back of my mind but I hadn't been able to piece the problems together in the way that Cabrera has done.
There are many points that Cabrera brings up. The most striking and important is that he claims that there is no asymmetry at all.
A refresh of Benatar's argument: pleasure for the existing is good, pain for the existing is bad, absence of pleasure for the non-existent is not-bad, and absence of pain for the non-existent is good. Therefore, it is claimed, birth is always a harm.
Cabrera finds fault, though, in Benatar's apparent use (or abuse) of counterfactuals (if...then). Benatar applies the counterfactual to the potential, non-existent person in the case of the absence of pain, but in the absence of pleasure, he does not apply the counterfactual. Instead, in the case of the absence of pleasure, he uses an "empty" placeholder for a potential, non-existent person.
It is this misuse of counterfactuals that makes Cabrera argue that there is actually no asymmetry at all, and that if Benatar is going to use counterfactuals for the absence of pain, he must use counterfactuals for the absence of pleasure as well. Therefore, the absence of pain is good, while the absence of pleasure is bad, and therefore, there is a symmetry instead of an asymmetry.
There are other points brought up in the paper that are not, in my opinion, as important, but are still legitimate issues against the antinatalism of Benatar. It should be said, however, that the author himself seems to be a kind of antinatalist himself.
Anyway, I thought this might make to be an interesting discussion, as there is currently a war going on in another thread about antinatalism and what better way to quench the fires than to spread them elsewhere...wait... :P
At first, I was a bit skeptical, because there have been numerous attempts to attack Benatar's asymmetry, and all of them have failed miserably. But to my surprise, I found this paper to be extremely compelling, and I realized that many of the points that Cabrera brought up had been subconsciously mulling around in the back of my mind but I hadn't been able to piece the problems together in the way that Cabrera has done.
There are many points that Cabrera brings up. The most striking and important is that he claims that there is no asymmetry at all.
A refresh of Benatar's argument: pleasure for the existing is good, pain for the existing is bad, absence of pleasure for the non-existent is not-bad, and absence of pain for the non-existent is good. Therefore, it is claimed, birth is always a harm.
Cabrera finds fault, though, in Benatar's apparent use (or abuse) of counterfactuals (if...then). Benatar applies the counterfactual to the potential, non-existent person in the case of the absence of pain, but in the absence of pleasure, he does not apply the counterfactual. Instead, in the case of the absence of pleasure, he uses an "empty" placeholder for a potential, non-existent person.
It is this misuse of counterfactuals that makes Cabrera argue that there is actually no asymmetry at all, and that if Benatar is going to use counterfactuals for the absence of pain, he must use counterfactuals for the absence of pleasure as well. Therefore, the absence of pain is good, while the absence of pleasure is bad, and therefore, there is a symmetry instead of an asymmetry.
There are other points brought up in the paper that are not, in my opinion, as important, but are still legitimate issues against the antinatalism of Benatar. It should be said, however, that the author himself seems to be a kind of antinatalist himself.
Anyway, I thought this might make to be an interesting discussion, as there is currently a war going on in another thread about antinatalism and what better way to quench the fires than to spread them elsewhere...wait... :P
Comments (6)
For if counterfactuals are used, then we are left in the odd dilemma of potentially being obligated to bring people into existence, for their lack of pleasure would be a bad thing. This is absurd. Neither the absence of pleasure or pain have any moral weight for an unborn, potential person.
However, I would argue that this does not mean that antinatalism as a philosophy is wrong. There are alternate formulations that still lead to an antinatalistic conclusion: it could be argued that the initiation of suffering by birth is immoral (as is any non-consented infliction of suffering), and that nothing is gained nor lost by abstaining from birth. Or, at the very least, birth is unnecessary, at the worst, birth is a highly dangerous and reckless act of liberty-violation. Or perhaps if someone is concerned about the suffering on the planet as a whole, they might argue that stopping the suffering at its source, birth, is to be recommended.
Additionally, perhaps some version of Benatar's asymmetry can be salvaged. Perhaps it is not that the absence of pain is good, but that the proactive avoidance of pain is to be recommended while the initiation of pleasure is good if and only if there is not a sufficient amount of pain that comes along with it.
I contend, however, that the most plausible and obvious argument for antinatalism can be seen if one simply opens their eyes to the suffering in the world. If the world was blissful, and the only pain known was a stubbed toe or a pinprick, birth really wouldn't be immoral. But the fact is that life is completely unpredictable and filled with a lot of suffering.
https://www.nationalreview.com/2019/05/anti-natalism-argument-david-benatar-wrong/
To whom? Good/bad have to be to someone. They're the way that someone feels about the situation in question.
By the same token, re "absence of pleasure for the non-existent is not-bad," that's not necessarily the case. It depends on whose opinion we're referring to.
Heck, I still lob critical challenges at Plato when I read him. ;-)