Consequentialism vs Taoism
[Quote=Taoism]Maybe
There is a Taoist story of an old farmer who had worked his crops for many years. One day his horse ran away. Upon hearing the news, his neighbors came to visit. "Such bad luck," they said sympathetically. "May be," the farmer replied.
The next morning the horse returned, bringing with it three other wild horses. "How wonderful," the neighbors exclaimed. "May be," replied the old man.
The following day, his son tried to ride one of the untamed horses, was thrown, and broke his leg. The neighbors again came to offer their sympathy on his misfortune. "May be," answered the farmer.
The day after, military officials came to the village to draft young men into the army. Seeing that the son's leg was broken, they passed him by. The neighbors congratulated the farmer on how well things had turned out. "May be," said the farmer.[/quote]
The story seems to be a damning report on consequentialism as a moral theory.
What do you think?
There is a Taoist story of an old farmer who had worked his crops for many years. One day his horse ran away. Upon hearing the news, his neighbors came to visit. "Such bad luck," they said sympathetically. "May be," the farmer replied.
The next morning the horse returned, bringing with it three other wild horses. "How wonderful," the neighbors exclaimed. "May be," replied the old man.
The following day, his son tried to ride one of the untamed horses, was thrown, and broke his leg. The neighbors again came to offer their sympathy on his misfortune. "May be," answered the farmer.
The day after, military officials came to the village to draft young men into the army. Seeing that the son's leg was broken, they passed him by. The neighbors congratulated the farmer on how well things had turned out. "May be," said the farmer.[/quote]
The story seems to be a damning report on consequentialism as a moral theory.
What do you think?
Comments (57)
:D
Seriously, what do you think?
Yes, because the chain the causation doesn't stop...it continues unto the end of the universe itself.
How is it damning to consequentialism? It is more like a confirmation of causal determinism and the best thing to do is pretty much say 'you never know' and letting go of holding onto the need to control; by doing so, you will find that both wrong and right, good or bad are united in a certain flow with nature.
Quoting Purple Pond
Indeed, one would have to be dealing with foreseeable consequences, but not necessarily probable ones. Thus drunk driving is an offence even though most times no accident occurs.
I think we operate consequentially when the immediate effects of our actions are clear and determinate, which covers a lot of our actions. When effects of actions are not easy to determine we rely on our what we have learn't and what we believe to be correct...and act conscientiously.
For commentary on the Taoist quote, I like what Professor Charles Anderson Edward Berry had to say on the subject - "C'est la vie say the old folks. It goes to show you never can tell."
What I want to say is that we have no way of knowing the consequences of our actions. The May be story brings that out very clearly. And Consequentialism is based on knowledge of the effects of our actions. So, doesn't the story undermine Consequentialism?
Quoting Purple Pond
That's a nice way to look at it but the punchline of the May be story is that it's impossible to know both the effects and their magnitude of our actions. Isn't this a fatal blow to consequentialist moral theory?
Quoting unenlightened
You're right. Consequentialism should be based on, as you put it, foreseeable effects of our actions BUT the point of the story is that effects don't stop at a point in time; the chain of causation continues onwards. There's no reason to prefer immediate effects over remote effects because as per conequentialism. Time isn't a feature of moral theory, at least not in the prescriptive sense. Look at how people blame the US for al qaeda - terrorism has its seeds in US involvement during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. What do you think?
Quoting Wayfarer
Thanks for spotting the error. Will correct it ASAP.
Quoting Cavacava
As I said in my response above, consequentialism doesn't have a time frame for effects of our actions. Most importantly, one can't deny the fact that causation never stops. The causal web is too complex for consequentialism to be a sound moral theory.
Quoting T Clark
Exactly.
Quoting Rich
So, is consequentialism dead in the water?
There is an argument to had, and it is had: some say it is wrong to beat your child because it hurts them, and others say that to spare the rod will spoil he child. But both sides are consequential. I can imagine a panglossian argument that the Holocaust was a good thing because it fixed in the mind the depths of degradation to which for ever after man will strive to avoid. It's a poor argument and there's little truth in it, nor that the atomic bombing of Japan has served to keep the nuclear peace.
But again, these are consequential arguments, that bad things can lead to good, or in your example, the reverse - well no, in that case, there was nothing good in the first place that I can see.
The chain of consequences disappears into the unforeseeable future - we can agree. And perhaps we can agree too, that moral action is invariably motivated by foreseen consequences - one is not usually motivated to break one's leg on the off chance that the military will be recruiting, but only if it is foreseen, just as the farmer works his crops foreseeing a harvest. I suspect that even Abraham set out to sacrifice his son foreseeing blessings from God.
But then we arrive at the Platonic argument that every man is motivated by foreseen good of some sort. Even Hitler foresaw a world without Jews, and thought it good. But I want to say that Hitler's actions were evil, and that his motives were evil.
Well we distinguish the conscientious objector from the coward in terms of their motives, as unselfish and selfish, respectively, and this is the other factor that has to be accounted for. But it modifies, rather than negates consequentialism, just as foreseeability modifies but does not negate it. And just as a coward may pretend even to himself to be a conscientious objector, so Hitler convinced himself that he was acting unselfishly for the good of the thousand year Reich.
And I suppose, from the difficulty of discerning even one's own motivation, one might arrive at virtue ethics, where the cultivation of good habit is the best bet, but the bet still concerns consequences.
Here you've led me into the fog that's been bothering me but I've kept it on the backburner coz I thought it might clear up on its own.
As you have correctly pointed out and if I've understood it, all moral theories are, well, consequentialist in nature. Even Kant's theories and his categorical imperative are consequence based. But there must be a difference between the two, deontology which is, purportedly, not about consequences and consequentialism which is wholly about consequences. So, what's the difference between deontology and consequentialism?
The point of the Taoist story seems to be that there can be no workable moral theory based on consequences no matter how we may try to find one. Consequences are simply beyond our control.
But they're not; not simply, anyway. Simply, if you chuck a brick at someone's window, you know what to expect; an broken window and an angry resident. So don't do it. Now we could make up some scenario where you managed by doing so to distract him from murdering his wife, and if you saw him doing that through the window, then that would justify breaking the window. But don't go breaking windows on the off chance. The Taoist still works his land with the maybe harvest in mind, rather than the maybe someone will murder him for his harvest.
I didn't read the story as having anything to do with morality or moral theory. I also don't think it's a rejection of science generally, which would follow your same logic since science depends entirely upon reproducible results.
If the fable were an actual representation of a typical course of events, then we'd have really big problems navigating our world, sure. It's not though. It's just a fable. It's not even an actual counter example of an predictable world. It's a made up story.
If you told a rocket scientist he shouldn't expect his rocket to make it to the moon because according to the "maybe" story a gale force wind might divert it, I think he might point out that he makes his predictions on actual prior results and not ancient fables.
I agree that consequences, their anticipation and manipulation, form 99.99% of our daily activity; much as @Hanover said.
However, my issue is not with what you and Hanover said. I'm talking about the moral ambiguity of the consequences of our actions. As the story clearly demonstrates. Any action can be good AND bad in so many different permutations that it's impossible to use it as a principle to guide our actions. Again, you did say that we're only responsible to the extent that an effect is foreseeable. I agree but my point is that the moral consequences of an action are just not foreseeable and so we should, by that reason, give up on consequentialism.
Suppose you were a British agent (& latter an actual Don in Philosophy) in France working with the French resistance during the time of WWII and you have to interview a prisoner. The French have explained that they plan to kill the prisoner regardless of what he might say.
You question the prisoner, who informs you that he will not say a thing unless you can guarantee he will not be killed.
Do you lie to him?
or
Do you tell him that you can't make that guarantee?
The "story" cannot be used to demonstrate anything. It's not empirical evidence. It's a made up story. As I said, if the story were an accurate portrayal of the typical course of reality, then we could consider it as evidence of the futility of making any plans for the future due to the absolute unpredictability of it. Fortunately, the story describes an extreme, but not something we should typically expect.
[I]Something is always better than nothing[/i] but that puts consequentialism on the backfoot. I shouldn't be happy I got sushi if the only thing on the menu is sushi, right?
I have a real world example. USA supported the Taliban, calling them freedom fighters during the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Taliban were the good guys. Fastforward a couple decades and now the Taliban=Terrorists, the evil guys. Who knows what'll happen another couple of decades later. This is a true story but, thematically, ditto to the Taoist tale.
That may be a problem with consequentialist epistemology but not consequentialist ontology.
Is this out of the Tao? :-O
It reinforces consequentialism rather than undermines it; determinism implies that only one result will occur out of a number of probable outcomes - this outcome being the consequence - and since there is no (clear) way one can with either facts or even awareness of the probable outcomes change this, there is no way one can control that outcome. The statement is trying to show the yin and yang between positive and negative irrelevant to consequences.
Objectively yes. Subjectively is all we have and it is filled with all kinds of problems.
Wherever the shoe pinches, you still can't walk.
Quoting TimeLine
I just thought of something.
The causal web consists of two kinds of factors:
1. Free agents: people, like us, who have free will (controversial but widely believed to be true). We can, sort of, insert ourselves in the causal web and make changes.
2. Non-free agents: non-human factors like animals, the weather, etc. These have no free will and so can't be said to insert themselves into the causal web.
So, to be fair to consequentialism, we're responsible for only type 1 effects, where we, as free agents, insert ourselves in the causal web. How does that sound?
:D. Any objections?
There is no escaping determinism except through consciousness (transcendence) where we have the capacity to become aware of ourselves, our person-hood as separate to the external world and it is what we do with this capacity that enables us to exercise free-will as autonomous agents. Consciousness is like the algorithm that sets the universe in motion.
Taoists see nature as a harmony between destructive (death) and peaceful (life) and consciousness mirrors the same process we see in nature, only we have the capacity to use it effectively. So, whilst we are a part of the causal web in every other way, moral responsibility (life) is the necessary balance against the destructive qualities we possess (violence, hatred, ignorance, evil) and once we go beyond good and evil, we become one with 'nature' or the ebb and flow of this monism. If the trajectory of your will is attuned to this moral outlook, you are taking those necessary steps towards enlightenment.
Quoting TheMadFool
I actually practised this, not always successfully but as an example, several weeks ago my place got flooded after a storm raged through my city and I was not at all phased by it, no stress or anxiety. My landlord then told us that we all had to leave and because of the emergency situation my housemates and I decided to share elsewhere, so I moved in with a friend. This friend has a housemate who is related to one of my favourite writers and she put me in touch with him; he has offered to mentor me during my writing. It has also given me the opportunity to save more money because the rent is exponentially cheaper and it is only for six months so I can adequately prepare to find my own place during that period. It turned out for the way better.
I am steadily learning this process and it quite literally why I often feel happy and at peace. There is a balance between bad and good that almost cancels itself out, leaving only peace.
Very interesting. I was just thinking on determinism and free will. My thoughts aren't clear enough to deserve a post though.
Quoting TimeLine
Peace, different from happiness. Another interesting thing you've said.
I need some time to think over what you've said. Thanks.
But if consciousness is simply a product of the physical brain, there is no separation--our consciousness is part of "the external world" just like everything else, and so we have no free will. This is something I've been struggling with ever since I started studying Taoism a few years back. There was about a year where I was very satisfied with things and the Taoist philosophy brought me so much peace, but eventually I could no longer ignore the dissonance between my newfound philosophy and my previously-held beliefs about the nature of consciousness.
I truly love Taoist philosophy and wish I could embrace it fully, but my lack of belief in free will won't allow me. Can you offer any sort of help with this issue?
There is no real definitive answer as to what consciousness exactly is and whether the mind is material or non-physical and even if there is a dualism or not, free-will can still be exercised either way i.e., agent-causal libertarianism. While randomness is an issue, if we picture the world from a Kantian lens, are we perceiving something physical (noumenal) or is experience only in our mind (phenomenal)? While accessibility to the external world is reliant on the phenomenal, the latter is really about how we process information between the two as we regulate and filter this information. So, how we perceive the world is caused by this interaction - this 'determinism' so to speak - without which it would be impossible for our minds to understand the noumenal world or pure information. What you need to remember is that we organise this information conceptually, through spatial and temporal concepts. The problem here is that if we order information that way, does that mean that the external world has no time or space? Do we create causality in the brain, an arrow of time only to make sense of all this information?
Kant never really went that far, but his point was that we have reason or the ability to reason and this enables us to exercise a type of manoeuvrability of these perceptions, to challenge them, to filter them willingly rather than the number of schema in our brain that does it for us. So, while the brain determines much of what we understand of the external world, there is still one small part in that where there is autonomy in our ability to alter our perceptions of the external world. This is the 'free-will' that I am discussing; free-will and determinism are not mutually exclusive, but rather free-will is a natural extension of determinism.
So, you are struggling just like the OP because you assume a free-will Vs. determinism scenario. There is no Vs between them.
Quoting JustSomeGuy
I have never embraced any belief fully, because I trust myself enough to take what I find in anything as part of my study of the world. Nothing is ever entirely right and so to follow something completely is to limit your capacity, which only breeds weakness. I only believe in God - a non-anthropomorphic, non-dogmatic, non-religious - as an unknowable reality, and my own moral trajectory, to perfect virtue as a practice in order to enable it primacy over my understanding of the external world that I experience. All you need to embrace is a willingness to better yourself, basically.
This has nothing to do with consequentialism.
The Farmer is not damning anything. No one is justifying an action because of its consequences.
Each time a something happens (consequence), people are congratulating or consoling the farmer as the case may be. This is consequentialism, no?
The farmer, on the other hand, is indifferent to the people because he knows consequences are immaterial to morality.
This has more to do with fate, against determinism. It's a text against the idea of "luck". From the farmer's point of view, all the things that happen are of of his influence and so nothing he has done has anything to do with them.
Those remarking on these happening as assuming by their comments that 'fate' has had a hand in the fortunes of the farmer; that there is some sort of karmic balance which favours or disadvantages the farmer, accordingly. The farmer knows better. He knows that things will unfold regardless of his needs or interests.
(Pardon me, busy with other stuff I'm slow at picking up on threads that are interesting)
I don't think virtue ethics relates in this way to 'consequences'. The rare escapees from Nazi concentration camps precipitated dreadful consequences in vengeance reprisals, but they were still right to escape. Or so I see it. Or, for example, hopeless unconditional love is more virtuous than despondent realism. As I see it. From the Aristotelian and indeed the MacIntyre view, virtue and vice and the other options are embedded in a good polity. Sometimes the good polity can only be in one's head, and among one's imagined moral colleagues, still, the right thing to do at the right time for the right reasons may be to love - or escape - or make some pointless heroic gesture.
What sometimes bewilders me about this view of determinism is that 'the causal web', the way that determinism is supposed to actually work, is largely unknown. I have broad theories but little detailed idea how things came to be thus and so, and I only have intelligent guesses about the likely consequences of various courses of action. In such situations what is it to 'escape' a determinism whose workings are pretty much a mystery to me? It seems like an imaginary exercise by people with a hubristic belief in their own rationality.
I'm not quarrelling with where your later words explain you end up, seeking a balance etc.; I just don't seem to find in myself an understanding of this intermediate step. But I often feel I must be missing something, as other people seem to find it so obvious :)
No need to struggle. Consciousness is not a byproduct of the brain, and you do have Choice. Since you have a choice, just drop the notion. In so doing you will notice you do have Choice (you are not determined to believe you are determined) and you can happily continue your studies in Daoism free of this notion.
I agree with your conclusion, but dispute your premise. Vengeance reprisals are not the consequence of resistance, that is to accept the warped logic of the tyrant.
But one can still ask what makes the virtue of resistance to tyranny a virtue in the first place. Is it not that virtuous acts, a good polity is what has positive consequences in general and overall?
I don't see how this is self-evident. First off, what exactly is "reason"? Our brains just process information in a certain way based on many factors--some that we understand, but likely more that we don't. Your ability to reason is not the same as mine because our brains are different, thanks to things like our DNA, our environment in which our brains developed, even our nutrition, and many other factors.
I don't see how our aptitude for "thinking" more deeply than other creatures necessarily implies a free will. It just means our information processors are more/differently developed than theirs.
Quoting TimeLine
I absolutely agree with this, I just chose my words poorly. I simply want to be able to fully appreciate the wisdom contained within Taoism, not follow it dogmatically or anything like that.
Quoting Rich
This isn't solving the problem, though, it's just ignoring it. If determinism is true, if I do not have free will, then whether I "choose" to believe in free will or not, either way that "choice" was determined and was not truly a choice.
It seems to me that free will requires "me" to be an outside agent, separate from the rest of the physical world, because the rest of the physical world is entirely deterministic. When an event occurs, it occurs as a result of every single other event which preceded it, and it is the only possible event that could have happened because of that. When I make a "choice", it occurs as a result of every single thing that has happened to me in my life, and with everything being the same there's no possible way I could have made any other choice but the one I make. At least that seems to me to be the case.
You choose to believe this then believe it until your life gets so boring and meaningless you decide to believe otherwise. It's your mind that is playing the Deterministic game, no other. However, just remember, there is not one scintilla of evidence that anything is determined. It is all just a fabricated story, not even supported by physics.
So the only reason to believe in free will is because you get tired of not believing in it?
Quoting Rich
Will you share with me the evidence that nothing is determined, then? The only way to change a mind about something is to be presented with new information. The information I have accumulated in regards to this topic forces me to believe in determinism, but I would absolutely welcome new information that challenges and changes my belief.
There is only one theory that speaks to the physical world, and it is Quantum Physics, and it is probabilistic. I don't know what information you gathered, but it is nothing but stories. Determinism has zero evidentiary support.
I don't mean to be dismissive but you really seem to simply be in denial and have no actual argument, evidence, or reason to believe in free will other than that you just want to. Quantum Physics doesn't support free will at all, it supports randomness. I genuinely would like to know if you have some actual support for free will, but I'm starting to lose hope that you do.
Believe what you want, but there is zero evidence for Determinism and Quantum Physics says it ain't so. Go ahead, and continue struggling if you want. When your tired of Determinism just move on to a more sensible philosophy of the universe. The Daoist had lots of insights worth studying and actually meaningful to leading ones life.
Quantum Physics doesn't destroy determinism. QP isn't a straightforward subject with clear implications, there are many interpretations of QP. Some interpretations may lead to a lack of determinism, but many don't. The best QP can do is tell us that there is randomness in the universe. Randomness does not imply free will. A lack of determinism in any form does not prove free will--the inability to predict the future does not imply the ability to change it.
Quoting Rich
The only thing I'm struggling with is trying to reason with you. You still haven't actually said anything of significance. But that's fine, you are entitled to your beliefs. I'll stop questioning you since we don't seem to be getting anywhere.
Really? There is only one interpretation, which is totally fantastical , the Infinitely Growing Infinite Number of Universe Interpretion, that would be deterministic if one could leap out of our Universe, but still keeps this universe probabilistic as must every other interpretation. There is no deterministic interpretation of QM. There can't be because the Schrodinger Equation is probabilistic.
Determinism is pure faith. Nothing more. There is zero evidence to support it and hundred years of physics that says it ain't so. Choice is observed by everyone, everyday in their lives. One is free to choose what they believe. You just said so in your message. No one really believed in Determinism. It's just a game.
Are you referring to the Many Worlds Interpretation? In addition to that there is also the de Broglie-Bohm Interpretation, so there are at least two prominent theories which leave determinism intact. I'm not an expert on the subject so there may be more I am unaware of.
But as I said already, even a lack of determinism does not equate to free will. If that is your only line of reasoning, I'm sorry but it's invalid.
Quoting Rich
This is not an argument. A world ruled by determinism would appear to have choice.
A simple example: I am sitting in my house on a winter night, when suddenly I hear the furnace turn on. I did not turn the furnace on, the furnace chose to turn on at that moment. Of course, this choice wasn't the result of free will. It was caused by the programming of the computer that controls the furnace, as well as the current temperature conditions. There are certain specifications in the computer ("brain") of the furnace, so that in certain conditions it will make certain choices (turn on/turn off). This is obviously a simplification, but we have every reason to believe that this is exactly the same way our own brains operate, only on a much more complex level. They are "programmed" a certain way based on factors we don't fully understand, so that in certain situations they will make certain choices.
As I said, the so-called Many World's Interpretation (my description is accurate, because it is entirely fantastical in what it is suggesting) is probabilistic in this Universe (as it would be in each of the infinite number of universes that it posits). The Bohm Interpretation is real, causal but non-deterministic. He says so in his own book. It has to be because it is equivalent to the Schrodinger Equation and contains the probabilistic variable. It is impossible for any Interpretation of QM to support determinism in the Universe we live in.
We are not computers. If you really believe that everything is an illusion, then your appropriate position in any discussion is that particles are determining everything you are thinking, you can't help it, it's all meaningless, and its the Laws of Nature that are creating the illusion that we are discussing and thinking. Why particles would want to start creating illusions of discussion is beyond me, but it's not myth it's the Determinist's myth, so I let them deal with trying to explain discussions in a universe of bouncing particles.
As I said, no one on this forum really believes their discussions are illusions but they like pretending they do. Rather interesting.
This is essentially a straw man; neither I nor anyone else (in regards to this topic) claims that anything is an illusion. Given what we know about our brains and the universe, it is perfectly reasonable to believe that the choices we make are a result of many preceding causal factors as opposed to some outside unseen force controlling our brains. You call determinism fantastical, and yet your belief is the one which requires an immaterial entity which resides in and is connected to and controlling our brain functions from another plane of existence. You cannot have free will in the closed system of the universe, it would have to come from outside.
You seem to know a decent amount about Quantum Theory, but for some reason you throw all logic out the window when you speak about determinism and free will. You still have yet to give a single argument in favor of your position, instead restating the same phrases and unsupported claims over and over. Give me your actual argument for free will.
So you think there really is a mind?
Quoting JustSomeGuy
What is the"we" and "our"? You mean the bouncing particles don't you? The brain isn't doing anything, right?
Quoting JustSomeGuy
The brain isn't doing anything under Determinism. It's all determined by some bouncing particles governed by the mystical and undefined Laws of Nature. No particle holds any privileged position. Everything related to thinking it's just an illusion. Determinism is actually quite a hoot when it is all thought through.
There is no free will. Just a mind making choices in action. That is all real and observable. Very simple. Exactly what the Daoists observed.
The argument in my favor is exactly where I started. There is zero evidence for Determinism. No bouncing particle is making us believe in it. One chooses to believe in it despite all contrary evidence.
You really don't seem to understand what determinism actually means.
As for everything else you've said, despite my best efforts it really seems as though it's impossible to have a reasonable conversation about this with you, and I'm tired, so I'll have to end it here. At least for now.
This is a biggie. Kant divided reason into two - pure and practical - and he distinguished pure reason from understanding, the latter is sensual experience or sense-data and the information we get from actual experience. In addition, we are divided by two types of consciousness; consciousness of our own empirical inner state and so psychological (a unity of self - that you are) as well as what he referred to as transcendental apperception. Pure reason does not partake in this sensual experience but rather it allows us the capacity to think about concepts that are beyond the physical - such as thinking about God, the universe, what might happen to you tomorrow etc. Further still, there is practical reason that enables as to think of moral issues - a type of moral consciousness - where we consider things as being either right or wrong. We are capable of regulating pure reason by using practical reason - to judge our judgements according to right or wrong - so it is somewhat cyclic so to speak. If we think about ghosts, for instance, practical reason should tell us that there is no moral rightness about it and so it is in the domain of the nonsensical or unreasonable.
Descartes stated that we contain properties that are material - i.e. the brain, the body etc - or what he called corporeal or extended substances, as well as thinking substances that give us this consciousness, the capacity to think hence the cogito. Kant thought that thinking substance was codswallop, because there is no unity in this; does having multiple personality disorder mean that the person is actually two or three separate forms of consciousness? There is no longer any meaning in our identity, nothing that separates us in order to actually be conscious of an 'I'. Thus returning back to reason where possibilities need to be restricted to be aligned with experience that is likely and where the transcendental unity of apperception is the very restriction of what is or is not possible. We need to draw the line and say that there is a spatial reality that we experience through Kantian intuition, otherwise it is not actually a real experience. So you actually exist and this existence is meaningful because you become aware of your identity as a part of this spatial world full of objects. You are a part of that 'determinism' but aware that you are.
Quoting JustSomeGuy
I absolutely agree, but I see this capacity as somewhat epistemic and what I mean by that is that there needs to be the right conditions for free will to be fully functional. A baby does not have the capacity to act freely because they do not yet have the cognitive capacity; it may exist in their brain like a switch or a device that is dormant as it waits for the right conditions to be activated. The problem here is that when and if this is activated, when a person reaches a certain level of cognitive maturity, they are still capable of irrational or unreasonable judgements and why we become responsible - hence pure and practical reason - to filter out the nonsense and indeed this is where things get complicated. It is also the reason why humanity is destructive.
I personally believe that some people are exempt from this responsibility, such as persons with an intellectual disability, brain damage and other factors including illness etc, because they do not have the cognitive capacity to become aware of how their actions or choices can effect causality. I also believe any species aside from humanity are also exempt because - whilst they share the same biological or physical relationship to us and also instinctual impulses - they do not have the consciousness to become aware of themselves or their environment. A cat may look at a person, but it does not see a person, not like how we do despite us projecting that somehow they are aware. Epistemic freedom takes into account the limitations of the human mind and because we are able to say that we do not know what the future holds is enough to prove in this freedom, this ability to stand in front of the mirror of determinism and see the causal matrix in the reflection behind you.
We all have intelligent guesses, I guess, but many people assume free-will as a separation from this determined landscape of causal connectivity and therefore exempt from the natural laws that give experience. I think the biggest difficulty is the randomness problem, namely how synthetic a priori judgments are even possible and where the spontaneity of Kant' causality in reason is difficult to explain, but our choices still remain restricted by nature' causal rules. It is not independent, but all causality starts from somewhere and we have the capacity to throw the stone into the lake and cause a ripple. We impose onto the causal web. I don't see that as any hubristic belief in our own rationality, as shown below:
So, Kantian causality is really the conceptual model of schema that is fundamental to the possession of all knowledge and so we are making sense of the causal web itself and therefore a unity between our understanding of causality and freedom. There is no real empirical randomness, it is reason working in unison with understanding; so spatial or temporal or causal are not actual objects per se that we experience, but are conditions that enable us to understand experience and pure information.
Quoting mcdoodle
I would much prefer a quarrel. But, we don't get what we want sometimes.
You like your struggle, have it.
Determinism is a religious belief system, similar to Calvinism, and some people simply want to believe their lives are fated despite all evidence to the contrary. That is the nature of a religion.
(a) I think a justification for vengeance reprisals could be that exemplary punishment will prevent others in future acting in the way that the one punished acted. This justification isn't in my view 'warped logic'. I don't agree with it, but it has a logic to it and is not an uncommon rationale in liberal law courts. Retribution isn't wrong in principle, and nor even is exemplary retribution.
(b) What does make something a virtue? I agree that if more people acted virtuously, or indeed if just less people acted viciously or with akrasia, then for a neo-Aristotelian the world would become a better place. I still feel this is different from the 'consequences' in 'consequentialism', which are about the act itself and its repercussions. For the virtue ethicist it's about doing the right thing in the right way at the right time for the right reasons, one of which will be 'consequences'. (But not all of which.)
Oh all right then.
Quoting TimeLine
I did have a Kantian summer a couple of summers ago but I didn't get as far as I'd hoped among Critiques so you may have left me behind here. I think 'reason' 'unity' and 'natural law' are indeed interlocked in a nexus. After my Kantian summer I got to reading Hamann a little, and to my mind he's an ancestor of a Wittgensteinian point of view: he pokes suspictiously at this 'reason' business and criticizes Kant for not seeing that it rests on assumptions about 'language' which Kant doesn't explore. Not that he (Hamann) could come up with as systematic a view as Kant's (so he ends up with a more religious view to give himself a comforting unity) but that's part of the point. Once you think unity, natural law and reason are locked together, you presume System and Determinism, you don't demonstrate it. Whereas you can be pluralist, scientific in method, but open to the arts or religion for instance as having something equal to say about fundamentals, something that might not have the same unified Systematic causal outlook.
I don't know why I had an outbreak of Capitals there but that was the impulse so I'll leave 'em in. Hope I'm not talking rubbish here.