On Doing Metaphysics
What do you think of the following claim?
“Metaphysical disquiet.—It seems to me that a metaphysical system is nothing if not the act by which a disquiet is defined and succeeds partially—as well as mysteriously—if not abolishing, at least in transposing or transmitting, itself into an expression of self that, so far from paralyzing the superior life of the spirit, on the contrary, strengthens and maintains.”
Gabriel Marcel, Metaphysical Journal
“Metaphysical disquiet.—It seems to me that a metaphysical system is nothing if not the act by which a disquiet is defined and succeeds partially—as well as mysteriously—if not abolishing, at least in transposing or transmitting, itself into an expression of self that, so far from paralyzing the superior life of the spirit, on the contrary, strengthens and maintains.”
Gabriel Marcel, Metaphysical Journal
Comments (126)
(Although in practice, and on Forums, what metaphysics usually does is result in interminable and irresolvable debate.)
Ah, but does such debate "strengthen and maintain" spirit?
Sounds like a French philosophy quote to me. Marcel probably needs bouts of metaphysical disquiet to de-paralyze his superior spirit.
(Y)
Asserts the distinction between 'reality' and 'existence' that I have been going on about ever since joining forums.
The problem, then, is how are we to think and talk about God? I am reminded of the early Wittgentstein's Boy, Christians would not like that.
The problem with what Marcel writes in the above quoted passage is twofold:
These considerations lead inexorably to Wittgenstein's "whereof..." unless we adopt an immanent, 'process' account of God. For this see Whitehead's groundbreaking Process and Reality.
Well, that is why I make the point of the nature of the difference between numbers and objects.
Objects - the paradigmatic chairs and apples of philosophical debates - demonstrably exist. They come into existence, they are composed of parts, and they cease to exist. In other words, they're temporal and compound.
Whereas, numbers are not like that. Numbers don't come into, or go out of, existence, and prime numbers are not composed of parts. But they're nevertheless real - if I ask you for 5 apples, and you give me 4 or 6 apples, then you've got it wrong. And there's something you're wrong about.
So, I make the argument that numbers are real, but not existent in the same sense that phenomena are existent. They're real in an intelligible sense, i.e. real to an intelligence capable of counting. But they're not phenomenal.
Obviously, in the case of the nature of 'the supreme being', then it's another matter altogether and I'm not trying to compare God to numbers. However, I think in the Augustinian tradition of metaphysics it is understood that there are different degrees or levels of reality, of which the above is one example. That comes out in the passage I frequently cite on Augustine and intelligible objects.
@Mitchell - the above passage is related to Feser's 'Augustinian argument for God', although I don't really like Feser's analysis of it.
Quoting Mitchell
Wittgenstein's approach was also apophatic, and apophatisism has its place, but sometimes too much can be left unsaid! Have a look at this page on apophaticism for an explanation.
Rhetoric: language designed to have a persuasive or impressive effect, but which is often regarded as lacking in sincerity or meaningful content.
"We only think when we are confronted with a problem"
You will always have endless debates on these subjects, so what matters, at least for me, is, am I satisfied with what I've discovered. The tendency is for people to think that because one cannot resolve these problems with others, that that means they are not resolvable. Even if you (Wayfarer) had all the answers on these subjects, you would still have just as many disagreements.
There is a coherent difference to be made between existence and being which can be made from understanding the history of these terms. "Being" goes way back to very ancient times. In the Eleatic school, of Parmenides, where it gets opposed to "not-being" as a logical principle. But at the same time, the Greek philosophers of nature, like Thales and Heraclitus, observing a world of change, adopted "becoming" as a first principle.
Plato noticed a fundamental inconsistency between these two ways of looking at reality, 1)what is, is, and what is not is not; 2) All is becoming. Aristotle demonstrated that the two are inherently incompatible, and sophists could abuse this incompatibility to produce logical arguments with absurd conclusions. But Plato introduced "the good", as the means by which all things become intelligible. And Aristotle posited "substance" as consisting of both matter (becoming) and form (what is and is not).
"Existence" is a term which was developed in Latin, in later philosophies. In its development it was conceived so as to include both 1) and 2), under that name, "existence". In Christian religion it is compatible with Plato's "good", as what is given by God, and it is also compatible with Aristotle's "substance". "Existence" included both 1) and 2).
So I think that in its early development the category of "existing" was produced as a wider category which could include both the categories of "being/not-being" and "becoming". Both of these categories, which are inherently inconsistent, are allowed to be real under the category of existing, which is therefore the more general category. The scholastics though, then produced a dichotomy between existence and essence, and in this way they re-introduce the incompatibility. "Essence", is now the category of what is, and what is not (1), while "existence" is relegated to the material realm of becoming (2).
If we are to compare the modern concept of existence, to the concepts of antiquity, we see that in modern times existence generally refers to material existence, and this would be associated with the ancient "becoming". The ancient concept of being/not being, what is and is not, based in the logical principles of non-contradiction and excluded middle, is associated with essence.
Quoting Wayfarer
There is no denying that numbers have a different kind of existence than spatio-temporal objects. But there are many things apart from number that don't "come into existence". If the world is material then matter doesn't come into existence any more than number does. Nor do form or process. So, what you have written sheds no light on a purported difference between being and existence, as far as I can tell.
.Quoting Wayfarer
I'm still not clear as to whether you actually believe in the existence of God; it seems that you have said many times that you are agnostic. In any case, I am not arguing that things are not real in different ways. Love is real in a different way than a chair, and beauty is real in a different way than food. There are countless different kinds of real things, complexes, processes and qualities.
To return to the example, I believe number is inherent in nature; its existence is a kind of subsistence. If existence began at the Big Bang, then it would seem to be entirely incoherent to say that number subsisted or was real in any sense prior to that.
From what you have written here I take it that you think 'existence' is a broader conception that includes both 'being' and 'becoming', and that the modern conception of existence allows only for material existence (which is becoming) and not being. I don't think of 'being' as a univocal term, but as both noun and verb. It includes becoming. Anything that exists materially, changes continuously, however minutely, it always becoming.
On the other hand materiality itself is ever-present; and in that sense does not change. Beings both remain themselves, and are continually changing. This is even the case with number; fiveness remains ever the same, and yet its instantiations are constantly changing. If "time is the moving image of eternity" as Plato avers, then all things are both changeless and eternal and ever-changing and temporal; eternality and temporality constitute the two Janus-faces of reality; and this would apply even to the greatest entity, God.
What Aristotle demonstrated is that "continuous change" is incompatible with the logical principles of what is and what is not, being and not being.
So for instance, if X changes and becomes Y, then if we posit a 'becoming" or change, between x and Y, we need to allow that this condition between X and Y is describable. If we allow that this condition of becoming is describable as A, then we have X becomes A and A becomes Y. Then we need to posit a describable condition between X and A, and A and Y. This would continue infinitely and we'd never get an adequate description of the becoming which occurs between two describable states. The point is that there is a fundamental incompatibility between "what is" (being) which is a describable state, and "change", or becoming, which is an activity.
Between two contiguous determinate states of being of any entity there is a seamless transition which does not consist in a determinate state of being (it does not because if it did this would lead to infinite regress).
There is either nothing at all between two determinate states of being of any entity or else there are other determinate states of being. But if there are other determinate states of being between two determinate states of being of any entity then those two states of being are not contiguous; which would deflate our explanations.
A "seamless transition" cannot consist of determinate entities, but must that mean it is "nothing at all"?
Whatever the case may be the change from one determinate state to another is a becoming, so becoming is either nothing at all (or in other words it is merely formal) or it is 'something' real (a seamless transition) which does not consist of determinate entities.
Where does Aristotle do this?
The problem with this perspective is that the two determinate states cannot be contiguous, because change occurs between one and the other, and change takes time. So if they are contiguous then there is nothing between the two states, and no such thing as change
Quoting Janus
OK, so let's say that the change from state X to state Y is either nothing at all, or a seamless transition. I think we can assume that it is not nothing at all, change is something real. So what's a "seamless transition"? We can't saying that X ceases to be, and then Y begins being, because that implies a point of nothing, so this would not be seamless. On the other hand, X cannot overlap Y temporally or this would be contradiction.
Quoting Mitchell
I believe there is a couple different spots where he argued this, one in his Metaphysics. I paraphrased the argument, above.
What if change from one state to another is instantaneous? Do you have an argument for why it could not be so?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Then we can just say instead "It is X, and then it is Y". 'Transition' is the wrong word then, and there is no "process of change" between the two states. The change then is nothing other than the difference between the two states.
In this connection think of cinematography. There is nothing in between the different still frames, but as watchers we perceive continuous change and movement.
However notice also your triadic resolution of the dichotomistic categories...
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
So existence was the more generic category that could subsume being~becoming as a dialectical possibility. You had two contradicting extremes of metaphysical possibility. And they could be resolved by the unity of becoming one within a higher order abstraction. Being and becoming became merely two forms of the same basic thing - existing.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
But then scholasticism buggered this up because of the need to bolster Christian dualism. Existence became about material/effective cause alone - the world experienced through the senses. The world of material accidents. And essence - the formal/final cause of being - became split off and associated with the separate realm of mind, spirit, nous, the ideal. The world known through the human intellect. And then ultimately through beatific vision. Men could know God just as directly and surely as they knew the world.
So an actually logical metaphysics - one that treated reality as individuated being - became one based on the acceptance of an actualised contradiction. A dualised or disconnected ontology of matter and mind.
A philosophy of the supernatural replaced a philosophy of nature.
I like that you cash out the formal half of the story in terms of "what is and what is not". But that itself then says that becoming has to apply to the becoming of what is not, as well as the what is. So when we are considering "states of existence", we have to explain why they are failing to change and so partake in the "what is not". So that anti-becoming is happening continuously while actual change is failing to take place.
While things are changing, the mystery would seem to be how one state of non-change becomes the next state of non-change. But a non-changing state then has a matching (ie: dichotomous) mystery on this score. There is the puzzle of how it is continually expressing its "what is" by preventing the actualisation, or maintaining as potentia, its "what is not".
Then, as you say change is nothing. There is one state, then the next state. This is not change. Change is the act of becoming different. But in this description we have difference with no act of becoming different, and therefore no change. To describe things in this way is to say that change is not real.
Quoting Janus
Right, under this description change, becoming, is not real.. That's the point Aristotle was making, if we describe the world in terms of states, then becoming (change) is not real. And if we describe the world in terms of becoming (change), then the states of being are not real. the two are incompatible.
Quoting apokrisis
I think dualism was already inherent in the premise of "existence". To exist was to be a duality of being and becoming, (form and matter in Aristotelian terms). What "buggered this up", was the Neo-Platonist, and Christian, principle that Form (essence) is prior to existence. This principle dictates that there is a pure Form, or pure essence, without becoming (or matter), which is existence in a non-temporal, eternal sense. This pushes the need for a more radical dualism. The real problem is that being and becoming are so fundamentally incompatible, that it was a mistake to attempt to put them in the same category under the name existence, in the first place.
Quoting apokrisis
I wouldn't call being "anti-becoming", it is simply different. These are two distinctly different ways of describing reality. We can describe reality in terms of what is, and what is not, or we can describe reality in terms of activity (becoming). What is not, is anti-what is (being), but this is categorically different from becoming, which is activity. So being is not anti-becoming, it is anti-not being. That becoming and being are two distinctly different ways of describing reality indicates that reality consists of these two distinct aspects. We need this categorical separation to allow that a thing which stays itself, as that thing, through time, such as myself, is also changing. It is not the case that part of me is not-becoming (anti-becoming), and therefore does not change, while another part of me can change. What is the case is that I refer to distinct aspects of reality, and relative to one aspect or principle, I stay the same as myself, but relative to another aspect or principle, I change. These two principles, one that allows me to say that I am the same person as I was, and one that allows me to say that I have changed, are completely different, and are validated by completely different aspects of reality.
If the two states are not exactly the same, then there is, by definition, change, I would say.
Maybe the two what you term "incompatible" ways of looking at things, in terms of either states or processes; are logically incompatible, and cannot be combined in one view. But it would seem, nonetheless, that we need both to understand how things are in the world. If this is so, then it would seem to be a dialectic with thesis and antithesis, but lacking a unitary synthesis. Perhaps the synthesis consists in holding in one's mind two seemingly incompatible views, and valuing each for their own unique insights, while refraining from demanding that either one or the other must be absolutely the case.
But that's not what "change" means. It means that one state becomes another. To have two distinct states is to have two distinct states, and this does not imply change. "Change" indicates that there is a certain type of relationship between the two states, a relationship of becoming, which is not indicated if the word is not used.
Quoting Janus
This is why I believe that dualism provides the only coherent approach toward understanding reality.
Hence the Peircean process view. Now being is emergent and so an eternal state of becoming. You only have degrees of definiteness.
Matter and form now become the hylomorphic triadic relation in which chance is opposed to necessity (Peircean firstness and thirdness, or tychism and synechism), and then their interaction results in substance or actuality (Peircean secondness).
So the Peircean view fixes things with a hierarchical structure. You have two opposed limits on being - material spontaneity or local degrees of freedom and formal necessity, or global constraints. Then definite being emerges as the concrete action that arises between these two bounds.
Being and becoming must have some relationship. You can't have it both ways - that as "different categories" they are related and they are not related.
It is pretty clear that if something can change to become something else, then something can stay the same by not becoming that something else.
If there is a causal relationship between the two states then they will obviously share common features. Think of yourself; as we conceive it, now you are in one state and the next moment you are in another state. You have changed but you have not become totally different; the change may be very insignificant or of greater significance, and the most significant change would be that you died and then 'you' would cease to exist and only your decomposing body would remain to eventually dissipate, returning to the environment.
The point I made before, though, is that there may be no intermediate state between two contiguous states of yourself. Indeed, how could there be; if there were intermediate states or even just one intermediate state between contiguous states then there would have to be infinitely many intermediate states between any contiguous states. This would mean that contiguous states are impossible. If that were true then we cannot understand the world at all, because our understanding of the world is always in terms of contiguous states and the causality that is implied in that understanding.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Re this see my conversation with Agustino: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/137449#Post_137449
As Spinoza said the apparent dualism is not substantive, and as Agustino points out there, and in line with what apokrisis has been saying here; mind and matter are two poles of a continuum, not separate substances. So, mind and matter are not really separate, but in our accounts and explanations we just cannot look at both poles simultaneously. Only God can do that.
It is nevertheless the case that the predominant conception of the nature of reality in a secular-scientific culture is that it is something ultimately physical and therefore understandable in terms of the natural sciences; 'immanent' is the word often used on this forum. The mainstream consensus is that the mind has evolved in the same way as other organs, i.e. through the processes of evolution, as an output of the physical brain. Those who don't agree would necessarily uphold some form of dualism regarding mind.
And that conception is the consequence of an historical process the development of which can be traced over the centuries. The hallmark of the scientific attitude is that the ultimate constituent/s of the Universe can be understood in objective terms, as objects or as forces or a form of physical energy. But where I take issue with that, is that it over-estimates human intellectual and sensory capacity; it basically takes science as potentially capable of being all knowing.
Quoting apokrisis
I don't think scholastic philosophy ever said that. Orthodox Christians (in the sense of the mainstream congregations, not 'Eastern orthodox') said that knowledge of God was primarily given by revelation. 'Theosis' as a state of union with the Divine, was indeed possible, but at the cost of complete self-abnegation; it was not 'profane knowledge' in the way that natural knowledge could be. And there is a long-standing prohibition in all forms of Christianity, that God can be known in the way that the objects of perception are known - 'no man can look upon My face and live (Ex 33:20)'.
Quoting apokrisis
And that is what 'naturalism' has attempted to reverse - by seeking to understand the world as self-originating, as grounded in processes that are ultimately understandable from the naturalist viewpoint. But it seems to me that within this attitude, there is no room for any intelligence higher than the human, is there? The human sciences are then the sole arbiter of reality, of what is real and what isn't, according to their understanding of nature.
I think it is unarguable that minds have not evolved just as other organs have. You only have to look at the apparent differences between the minds of different animals and humans to see that.
Most Christians think they can talk about God, so they wouldn't understand the Wittgenstein quote.
It's only theists who define God in purely negative terms for which that would apply.
You make a distinction between Christians and Theists that I don't recognize. On my understanding Christians are Theists.
It's because reality has (at least) two attributes: the mental and the physical. Consequently, we understand things in two ways; in terms of causes and in terms of reasons. Nature is mostly understood in terms of causes, although animal behavior may be understood in terms of reasons as well; and notably, there is much intentional language used in biological explanations. It has not been possible to combine these kinds of explanations, but semiotics may achieve a synthesis. It don't think it will ever be possible to fully understand matters of quantity in qualitative terms or matters of quality in quantitative terms, though: but who knows?
That's a good way of putting it - the distinction between 'cause' and 'reason', especially. I think overall that in Aristotelian thinking, 'cause' and 'reason' were unified by the 'four causes' doctrine, so that the formal and final cause of something, was also a reason for it.
Whereas in modern thought, efficient and material causes are regarded as sufficient. As we have learned, semiotics has sought to re-introduce the notions of formal and final causes, although I am still a bit unclear how you can have a 'final cause' in the sense of a 'reason for existence' with respect to sentient beings, without something towards which they are evolving (which is generally ruled out by the antipathy towards 'orthogenesis'.)
These statements I take to be contradictory:
Quoting apokrisis
The problem being that Peirce's "eternal becoming" as you describe, renders definiteness incomplete. Therefore things cannot be properly fixed, and the claim that the Peircean view "fixes things" must be contradictory. This is the problem with vagueness as a first principle, it is intelligibility compromised.
Quoting apokrisis
You've already constrained definiteness to degrees, such that you cannot validly refer to anything as "definite being", you only have degrees of being.
Quoting apokrisis
I don't deny that there is a relationship between being and becoming. What I would say is that the nature of this relationship is not well known. It is a deficiency in our knowledge, just like the relationship between the past and future is not well known, it is a deficiency. Still, we know enough to say that the past is categorically different from the future, like we know that being is categorically different from becoming.
Quoting apokrisis
This is not as clear as you might think. If that thing doesn't become that particular "something else", it might still change to become a different something else. That is the nature of possibility. So "not becoming that particular something else" does not necessitate that the thing stays the same. Therefore staying the same is not related to becoming something else in the way that you suggest here.
In reality, when we talk about a thing staying the same thing, it does so despite changing. So I stay the same person despite undergoing changes. It might be that some aspects of me stay the same while others change. This brings us back to the issue of unity.
Quoting Janus
Yes, I understand this point that you made. The point I made is that if there is no intermediate state, then there is no such thing as "change", as we commonly use, and understand the word. That is because two distinct states, does not constitute change.
Quoting Janus
Yes, we went through this, that's why Aristotle concluded that it is necessary to consider that change is something completely different from a describable state, to avoid having to describe it as an intermediary "state", thus leading to the infinite regress. If we remove the nature of "intermediary" from change, then how can we relate it to being?
Rest easy, MU. As usual, dichotomies rule. Stability is relative to plasticity. So we are talking here about the approach to a limit. If there is vagueness, then already there is also its "other" of the crisp.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Well we do know the nature of the relationship. It is a dichotomy. We arrive at it via dialectical reasoning. Metaphysics has been operating this way since it began.
A categorical difference is one in which two categories stand absolutely opposed. To each other. And so therefore they are also absolutely related.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Again, already accounted for. Constraints regulate dynamism. The purpose of a thing maintains its identity despite all material changes it might undergo. You can't pretend this is a great mystery.
A dichotomy is a separation. The nature of how the two separate things relate to each other is not described by "dichotomy". To arrive at the conclusion "there is a dichotomy" is only the beginning of the metaphysical procedure. It is how the two elements of the dichotomy are related, which becomes the basis for classifying the type of metaphysics. For instance a monist would say that the two elements of the dichotomy are fundamentally the same, while a dualist would say that they are fundamentally different.
Quoting apokrisis
I believe that this is incorrect. two things which are opposed are necessarily in the same category, as defining each other. You'll see this with any opposing terms negative/positive, hot/cold, large/small, etc. The two opposing terms may be seen as defining the limits of the same category. A categorical separation is a separation between types of thing.
Quoting apokrisis
Actually that's very mysterious to me. You have a categorical separation here between "constraints" and "dynamism", two distinct categories. You have mentioned a relationship between the two with "regulate". This is mysterious in the sense of what is a constraint. Is it a rule, is it a law, is it a physical barrier, or is it just another dynamism? If it is the latter, then the dichotomy dissolves. I don't think it is a physical barrier, because I do not sense such a barrier to activity. I don't think it's a rule or a law, because then dynamism would have to know how to interpret rules to be able to act according to constraints. So "constraint" appears to be something you just made up, a word which has nothing underneath it, no substance, just mystery.
Then, you enhance the mystery by mentioning "purpose". Are you suggesting that constraint is equivalent to purpose? Then you would be saying that dynamism is regulated by purpose. The problem I have with this is that I see purpose in the activities of living things. And, I see a categorical separation between living and inanimate such that the inanimate is excluded from acting with purpose. But the inanimate is still active, it still contains dynamism, and that dynamism is also constrained. So I can understand how purpose regulates dynamism in human beings to the extent that they use their power of free will. And also to some extent it is evident that there is purpose in the activities of other living things. But I think the claim that purpose controls dynamism in inanimate things is unjustified. So this appear to be nothing more than a monist attempt to dissolve the categorical separation between animate and inanimate. Mystery solved.
The Tao that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao.
And nicely, a triadicist would say a dichotomy is how the same becomes the different. That is why the relation can be described in terms of a reciprocal action.
The discrete becomes different from the continuous by breaking it. The continuous becomes different from the discrete by connecting it. So a differencing that begins in the sameness of an indeterminancy - a vague potential which is neither the one nor the other - proceeds in mutual fashion towards its naturally opposed extremes.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
These examples you've chosen are weak and easily reversed differences. They are symmetry-breakings of the same scale - anti-symmetries - and so can quickly erase each other. A metaphysical dichotomy is a full-blown asymmetry. The outcomes look to be orthogonal and as unrelated as possible. The relationship is reciprocal or inverse, not merely additive/subtractive.
So to move from hot to cold, you just have to subtract some heat. But to get from the continuous to the discrete, you must understand the continuous as "absolutely broken". It is the antithesis which is the least possible amount of continuity, or 1/continuity.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
No. It is the separation that produces the familiar list of metaphysically opposed types.
Aristotle's categories were a bunch of dichotomies - quality~quantity, active~passive, time~space, symmetry~symmetry-breaking, particular~universal.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It's just a normal, well understood, word in science.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Another thing I've explained so many times now. There are semiotic grades of telos. Minds have purposes, life has functions, and physics has tendencies.
Never stops anyone here :-)
Quoting apokrisis
From Wikipedia entry on E F Schumacher's book, A Guide for the Perplexed, slightly edited.
But this contradicts experience and common sense. We are all constantly changing and may be said to be in different states from one moment to the next. This is enough to satisfy the definition of change. Whether or not there are intermediate states in between what I am at one moment and what I am at the next has no bearing on the fact that I have changed from one moment to the next.
Final cause could be understood as something not imposed from "outside" but as the most universal 'global' conditions that determine what possible forms can evolve. If nature were deterministic, then everything that comes to be would be absolutely necessary in just the way it comes to be. This is Spinoza's view, thinking as he did under the aegis of Newtonian mechanics.
On this view, if you 'replayed' the cosmos from the Big Bang, everything down to the minutest detail would happen precisely as it has. If nature is indeterministic, probabilistic, then it would not replay the same, but differently each time you replayed it, nonetheless the same most general formal constraints would still determine the alternative ways in which it could evolve. I think this would fulfill the idea of final cause.
Thomas Nagel floated a similar idea in Mind and Cosmos, where he explores the question of whether life and mind arise solely as consequence of material necessity (i.e. materialism) or because of an agency (i.e. theism) or - his tentative view - that there is a natural tendency towards them:
I have often contemplated the idea that humans are in some sense the cosmos become self-aware; it's not something explicitly stated in the Western tradition, although you do find such ideas amongst the Hermetics, with the notion of 'man as microcosm'. But it is very different to the typically neo-Darwinian view that the mind is the output of the physical brain, which in turn is the consequence of an essentially physical process directed by a kind of algorithm. There's no purpose other than to survive in any of it, and to ask the question 'what is the meaning of survival' is regarded as a sign of sentimentality or weakness; it's very Nietzschean in that respect.
Quoting Janus
Something that is easily overlooked in all this was that Spinoza and Newton both were ardent believers in God - it never would have occurred to them to entertain the idea of a self-originating cosmos. 'Indwelling in every dewdrop as in the innumerable host of heaven, in the humblest flower and in the mind of man, Spinoza found the living spirit of God, setting forth the Divine glory, making the Divine perfection and inspiring with the Divine love'. Why Spinoza was depicted as being atheist (which he strongly denied) was because he sought to understand the Divine outside the strictures of orthodox religion, not because he didn't believe in God.
Spinoza's God did nothing by fiat, but by the necessity of his own nature. And in fact Spinoza equated God with Nature. Spinoza's works were anathematized because it was readily seen at the time by intellectuals who adhered to the Faith that Spinoza's ideas lead inexorably to atheism.
Quoting Wayfarer
IF we are the only self-aware beings then this would be self-evidently true.
Quoting Wayfarer
Under either determinsim or indeterminism life can be understood to be physically inevitable. As I already said if the universe was replayed it would be exactly the same down to the most minuscule detail under determinism. Under indeterminism it is arguable that forms of life would have inevitably appeared; albeit in different forms. This is would be a telos from global conditions as I already pointed out.
I was just going by what you said. You said a categorical difference is a difference of opposition. Orthogonal is a completely different concept from opposition.
Quoting apokrisis
But none of these differences are differences of opposition. How can you call quality~quantity a difference of opposition?
This is your typical mode of argument. You'll insist that dichotomies are oppositions. I'll say that they are categorical differences. You'll give a bunch of examples, like this, which clearly demonstrate that dichotomies are not oppositions, but categorical differences. Then you'll go back to talking about dichotomies as oppositions, ignoring everything we've discussed.
Quoting apokrisis
So if minds have purpose, and physics has tendencies, how do you get to your principle, that purpose regulates dynamism?
LOL. You don't say. You mean like ... an opposition so complete it is a total and complete asymmetry, not merely a weak-ass negation? >:O
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Hmm. I dunno. [Scratches head.] Grades of purpose?
It's very difficult to have any rational discussion with you because you show no respect for conventional use of the English language. Asymmetry is as simple lack of symmetry. It is nothing other than a weak-ass negation. Therefore, there's no sense to your claim that you're talking about something other than a weak-ass negation.
This is what I meant in the last post. You keep insisting that you are talking about something beyond negation. So I suggest category difference. You agree, yes we're talking about category difference. But instead of proceeding to talk about category difference, you attempt to bring category difference down and stuff it into a category of negation (asymmetry). So you continue to insist that you're beyond weak-ass negation, while all you do you is use terms of weak-ass negation, instead of using terms of category difference, which would indicate that you actually were thinking beyond weak-ass negation.
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Nope, doesn't help.
I caught your reference to "weak-ass" symmetry and symmetry breaking. I also saw it as a dichotomy between distinctness and continuity (to refer it back to some earlier discussions).
Symmetry-breaking is clearly categorically different from symmetry. But asymmetry is nothing other than a weak-ass negation of symmetry.
So the metaphysical question would be what kind of a thing is "symmetry-breaking", which allows it to be completely different from both symmetry and asymmetry?
Well, you could... I don't know - maybe explain better.
The argument is over what kind of mathematical relation defines a logical dichotomy - a dichotomy being a relation that is mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive.
MU wants to treat is as simple negation. A and not-A. The presence of some thing, and then its absence or its erasure. But that is question-begging as it doesn't go to any mutuality that could form the two poles of being, nor to the way the two poles then demonstrably exhaust all other possibilities.
So a dichotomy is about taking a difference - an asymmetry or symmetry-breaking - to an extreme. It must begin in sameness and wind up looking orthogonally opposed. You don't just have chance and its absence, you have chance and necessity - an opposition of two poles of being that then encompass everything else that could be "somewhere in-between" these complementary extremes.
So likewise every metaphysical-strength category. You don't just imagine discreteness and its absence. You can only imagine discreteness in terms of the absence of something else, its exact opposite of continuity. Stasis makes no sense unless understood in terms of being antithetical to flux. Oneness is not a meaningful concept except to the degree it contradicts multiplicity.
Then seeking a mathematical model of this relation, the best understanding is an inverse or reciprocal one.
MU's weak-arse negation is like addition and subtraction. Count up three places, then erase those three places to end up back where you started. It is like a mirror symmetry. Flip the image over to break the symmetry. Then flip it again and you are back where you started. It is a symmetry-breaking, but nothing much has really changed as it is so easy to return to unbrokenness by a single step reversal of your path. An A-sized step gets negated by a second A-sized step - just now in the other direction.
Mathematically, it is the symmetry-breaking of a zero. 1 + -1 = 0. It is about the least amount of symmetry-breaking you can get away with. It is the symmetry breaking that remains as close to nothing actually happening as possible.
A dichotomy then represents the opposite end of the symmetry-breaking scale - one that is as extreme or asymmetric as possible. And a reciprocal relation models this well as each move in one direction causes a matching move in the other. If one end of the relation grows, the other actually shrinks to the same degree. Two poles of being are in play, each acting on the other in mutual and exhaustive fashion.
Now the mathematics is a yo-yo around 1, not 0. It is a relation anchored on an actual unity - a foundational sameness - that then gets broken in two complementary directions. Hence it is a triadic or developmental relation being modelled.
So consider the development of a reciprocal in the form of a fraction - a numerical inverse.
We start with 1. This 1 is 1/1 (Aha, the latent symmetry breaking which so far has changed nothing!) Then we get 2, and so 1/2. Then keep counting. We get 3, and thus 1/3 as its reciprocal. Guess where this is going next. We get 3 and its formal inverse, 1/3. Every time one number gets bigger, it forces its partner number - anchored by this particular form of opposition - to get smaller. The values are being driven apart.
Extremetise the relation and we get infiinities and infinitesimals. The infinitesimal is 1/infiinity. The infinite is 1/infinitesimal. Every actual number - fractional or whole - is then contained within the limits of this canonical relation. The infinite and the infinitesimal emerge as the limits on the breaking of the symmetry represented by the ur-somethingness of the 1.
A relation has to relate things. A self-relation is tautologous. Just counting up or down is simply to add the minimal claim that "a something" exists to break the ultimate symmetry of a zero-ness. There is at least 1 thing now, and you can then imagine 1-1 to recover the initial symmetry from which this one-ness must have mysteriously arisen, or 1+1+1+1... as the operation to keep breaking this zero-ness in the vain hope of finding its other limit.
You can see all the usual metaphysical dilemmas that flow from this sound of one hand clapping. How did something arise from nothing? How could we have creatio ex nihilo?
But a reciprocal/dichotomistic logic derives complementary limits of difference from an initial absolute sameness. Now we do start with something - but it an undefined oneness, a vagueness, a firstness. It is as much everything as it is nothing. It needs no stronger definition than the claim that it is a unity, an unbroken symmetry.
And then we can imagine a fundamental division in mutually definitional directions. If this symmetry starts to show some discreteness, some discontinuity, then matchingly, there is the new-found definiteness in the continuity that it claims to be moving away from. If the action reverses its course, it will be heading back towards its actual opposite, not simply negating its existence.
If we say something is becoming more fractional - 1/3 is now 1/333 - then it is not just shrinking towards nothingness as one of the limits on oneness. It is moving ever further away from its own inverse, 333/1. It is expressing its tendency towards infinitesimality in terms of the countering possibility of the infinite.
So it boils down to monism vs triadicism.
Monism claims there is either nothing or, instead, the one thing. (So it is in fact reliant on a metaphysical dichotomy, but understands it as a dualism - a simple presence vs absence distinction).
Triadicism fixes this by seeing presence and absence as relative to the third thing of a vagueness or apeiron. There is the unity of an unbroken symmetry which is neither A nor not-A. The principle of contradiction does not yet apply. 1 = 1/1. And turn 1/1 upside down, multiply it how you like, and you see no difference.
But as soon as you allow the possibility of a difference, a symmetry-breaking, then you get a separation to opposing poles of being. If you can have 2/1, then you can have 1/2. A single step now causes a break in the actual scale of being. Growth is matched by shrinking, not merely by not-growth. The difference is a real one, not merely the unplaced notion of one hand clapping - an event with no context by which to measure itself against.
Wow, I see you really don't read my posts.
One thing that there's too much of in these discussions of metaphysics is vague criticism, unspecified disagreement, expression of emotional feelings about what others say, instead of specific objections that you can answer for and justify.
But, sure, there's much metaphysical confusion here. Some think that it's completely indeterminate and speculative. Maybe that notion comes from Western academic philosophers, who use the supposed indeterminacy, relativism, speculativeness, to the hilt, to ensure that their debates, discussions, issues will go on forever, ensuring that there will always be something to publish, in keeping with "Publish or Perish".
On the contrary, metaphysics isn't a vague, speculative, relativist subject. Definite uncontroversial statements can be made. Definitions need to be well-specified and consistently-used. Statements need to be supported.
Yes, metaphysical "debate" here is interminable and without progress. It resembles the Democrat convention, in its seriousness and objectiveness.
In proposing my metaphysics, I made a point of only saying things that no one would disagree with.
Though a lot of people here have made angry-noises about my metaphysical proposal, no one has expressed disagreement with a statement in that proposal.
Michael Ossipoff
I have come to the view that I am at odds with most of the contributors here, because in my view philosophy has a spiritual or religious aspect which is generally excluded in secular philosophies. When I say 'spiritual or religious', I definitely don't mean uncritical belief in religion. The problem is that much of Greek philosophy became intertwined with religion over the course of history. Then in the Enlightenment rejection of religion and metaphysics, a lot of what was fundamental to that spiritual - or really 'sapiential' dimension- was also rejected. The baby was thrown out with the bathwater.
There are a few scholars who understand this, notably Pierre Hadot who has written extensively on 'philosophy as a way of life', and the sense in which philosophy used to be a spiritual practice. And of course it is kept alive in neo-Thomism, but at the price of being Catholic, which I'm not. For most people, philosophy is now either about language, or about science. 'Sapience', or 'the wisdom of sophia' is completely unknown to modern Western culture. Philosophy is nowadays about rationalising the normal condition, not about transcending it. There a palpable hostility towards talk of the transcendent here.
So, that is all by way of saying, I am taking an extended break from Philosophy Forum. I am going to concentrate on Buddhism in 2018. I am considering enrolling in some online courses on metaphysics and if I do, then I might come back to discuss some of the contents. Happy New Year to everyone here and bye for now.
Ahhh...New Year resolutions...we'll see... >:)
Yes, this is a problem isn't it? There is wholesale rejection of religion, and along with that, a rejection of the spirituality and metaphysics which supported the religion.
Quoting Michael Ossipoff
I think the problem is that metaphysics is a very specific field of study, which like any other field of study requires proper training. The trend today is to have people with little or no training in metaphysics venturing into metaphysical speculations, so many of these speculations, though they may appeal to the whims of the public, have very little real metaphysical value. This appears to coincide with the phenomenon of mathematicians and physicists who can't make sense of the reality of quantum mechanics, seeking metaphysical principles in an undisciplined way.
Quoting Janus
Wayfarer says stuff like:[quote="Wayfarer;138575"...]I am taking an extended break from Philosophy Forum....[/quote]all the time
sounds like an offense though untargeted. Do you think any where else especially forums there aren't pros and cons?
Don't you mean you believe in an afterlife? The question is whether you want to call that afterlife transcendent, i.e. supernatural, and what you would mean by that, and what you might think it would entail; or whether you want to call it a part of nature we do not, or even cannot, fully understand.
Yes, I do believe that we survive bodily existence, and yes I do believe in an afterlife; which is what I mean by transcendent. Some of what I believe is spelled out in this thread...
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/1980/evidence-of-consciousness-surviving-the-body#Item_225
I generally agree with that claim. Of course (?) the disquiet can return and the system is then discarded or adjusted. It also seems possible that a strengthening at one time point can be related to a weakening at another time point. The idea that was meat can become poison (and the reverse).
Quoting sime
Great quote, even if it is an exaggeration. Sometimes (in my experience) there is a relaxed state of mind (emotionally neutral or vaguely positive) in which thoughts and imaginings pass in a quiet stream. Perhaps problems force a direction on this stream. The threat or promise holds thinking to the calculation of interactive possibilities in a particular context.
Quoting Bitter Crank
Well said. There are things one writes when one is in a certain mode/mood. Who hasn't looked back on recent optimism or pessimism (or complacency or angst) and been embarrassed or disgusted? Writing and other recordings are good for this kind of self-knowledge. Who was I when I said that? Who did I think I was? Was he right or am I? Or neither of us?
Yes, most metaphysicses seem speculative, or to need assumptions.
The metaphysics that I've been proposing isn't speculative, and neither makes nor needs any assumptions, and doesn't post any brute-fact.
And it doesn't say anything that anyone would disagree with. Though several people have expressed vague grumbling disapproval, no one has named any statement in that metaphysical proposal that they disagree with.
Michael Ossipoff
I can't even "name any statement in that metaphysical proposal" that I could either agree or disagree with. :-}
How about you present a 'keystone' statement and I will tell you whether I agree or disagree, and why?
Fine. Then feel free to "name any specific statement in that metaphysical proposal" that you don't agree with. That should be easy, since you've just said that you don't agree with any of them.
First, how about you present a definition of " 'keystone' statement". I searched the Internet for a definition, and didn't find one.
Michael Ossipoff
You need to try harder. First read more carefully; I didn't say I disagree with all the statements on your "system", I said I cannot find any that I could either agree or disagree with.
Second, use you imagination; "keystone" is a metaphor. A key stone is one without which an arch will collapse.
Actually, I think that all metaphysics is by definition speculative, so I don't know what you're talking about here. I haven't seen your proposal, but judging by what you say about it (it isn't speculative, has no assumptions, and no brute facts), I assume it's a little bit of nothing.
Yes, you said that you cannot find any statement in that metaphysics-proposal hat you could agree with.
Yes, and that's why I said you should feel free to specify one that you don't agree with.
Then I said, "That shouldn't be hard, because you said that you don't agree with any of the statements in my metaphysical proposal."
You also said that the statement of my metaphysics has unfounded assumptions. I invited you to feel free to specify one.
You also said that it has statements that I didn't support (but which need support). I invited you to specify one..
I'd expect that an arch wouldn't support anything if you removed any one of its stones.
The function of the keystone at the top of the arch, is to direct downward force longitudinally along the arch's row of stones.
You're asking me which particular statement, if falsified or brought into question, would discredit my proposal. Any of them, I'd say. Falsify one of them, or bring one of them into question.
Michael Ossipoff
Out of curiosity, what metaphysical proposal? There doesn't seem to be one in this thread from you. So a link would be helpful.
I'm talking, here, about the fact that you can't name a speculative statement in my metaphysical proposal.
And please note that I didn't say that the objectively, "concretely", fundamentally existent physical world that Materialists believe in doesn't exist. Such a statement isn't in my metaphysics.
All I said about that was that I can't prove that the objectively, "concretely", fundamentally existent physical world that Materialists believe in doesn't superflously exist, as a brute-fact, unverifiable and unfalsifiable, alongside, and duplicating the evens and relations of, the inevitable logical system that my metaphysics describes.
So I'm not speculating about whether that Materialist world exists or not. I'm merely saying, about it, what I said in the paragraph before this one.
Yes, you think that all metaphysics is speculative, Stating what you think, and telling specifying which statement in my metaphsycal proposal is speculative, aren't quite the same thing.
Yes you have. I've posted a long version of it in these discussions with you. You acknowledged how long it was. Remember?
...because you believe that a metaphysics that's "something" must be speculative, or have assumptions, or have brute-facts? :D
In other words, your pre-judged, faith-based belief that a metaphysics must be nothing, or speculative, or have assumptions, or have brute-facts.leads you to a firm conclusion, even though you admit that you can't specify a speculative statement, or an assumption, or a brute fact in my metaphysical proposal.
...or is "nothing".
Well, the statement that there's inevitably a complex system of inter-referring abstract if-then facts about hypotheticals, that comprises a story whose events and relations are those of your experience,
...and that there's therefore no need to ask why there's something instead of nothing...
...and my statement that, if the objectively, "concretely", fundamentally existent physical world that Materialists believe in exists, then it superflouslys exist, as a brute-fact, unverifiable and unfalsifiable, alongside, and duplicating the evens and relations of, the inevitable logical system that my metaphysics describes--
You're saying that all that's nothing?.
It's a statement of what metaphysically is, and what it metaphysically consists of. That's all that a metaphysics needs to specify
Michael Ossipoff
I don't see how this is a metaphysical statement. You have stated that you are incapable of proving something.
Quoting Michael Ossipoff
Oh now I remember, I couldn't make sense of your metaphysical proposal.
Quoting Michael Ossipoff
This is a speculative assumption. And I disagree with it.
I'll find it elsewhere and paste into a posting to this thread.
Michael Ossipoff
It was part of a metaphysical proposal. ...in the sense that it's a clarification about something that the proposal doesn't say.
It's a statement that my proposal doesn't say anything about whether or not the objectively, "concretely", fundamentally existent physical world that Materialists believe in might superfluously exist, as a brute-fact, unverifiable and unfalsifiable, alongside, and duplicating the evens and relations of, the inevitable logical system that my metaphysics describes.
Then feel free to specify which statement, term, word or phrase you didn't understand the meaning of. If you do, I'll clarify what I meant. What more should I offer?
On what grounds do you disagree with it and claim that it's speculative?
As I've pointed out, anything that can be said about this physical world can be said as an if-then fact.
"There's a traffic-roundabout at the intersection of 34th & Vine."
"If you go to 34th & Vine, then you'll encounter a traffic-roundabout."
The world can be described in conditional grammar. We're used to declarative, indicative, grammar, and of course it's convenient, but we're unjustifiably believing our grammar.
Additionally, a statement, a hypothetical maybe-fact, about the physical world is also a hypothetical comprising either the "if " premise or the "then" conclusion of an if-then fact. ...or both, with respect to different if-then facts. ...in other words, a part of one or more if-then facts.
As I've mentioned, a set of hypothetical physical quantity values, and a hypothetical relation among them (called a "physical law"), are parts of the "if " premise of an if-then fact.
...except that one of those physical quantity values can be taken as the "then" conclusion of that if-then fact.
Michael Ossipoff
You've described the world as consisting of statements of fact (if-then facts). I don't think that the world consists of statements. I think that a statement is a representation of how people perceive the world, and there is a lot more to the world than what we perceive.
No. I didn't describe the world as statements of if-then facts.
I described the world as if-then facts.
An if-then fact's "if " premise and its "then" conclusion are hypothetical propositions which may or may not be facts.
What I said about statements was that any fact about our world can be stated as an if-then fact.
I didn't say that every fact about our world is a statement. A statement is an utterance about a fact, and I never said that the world consists of utterances.
Michael Ossipoff
All discourse consists entirely in/of statements of thought and belief. Doing metaphysics consists entirely of discourse. Doing metaphysics consists entirely in/of making statements of thought and belief. Thought and belief consists entirely of an agent's drawing mental correlations between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or itself; it's own 'state of mind'(when applicable). Statements of thought and belief set out and/or report upon the aforementioned correlations. Doing metaphysics consists entirely in/of an agent's drawing and subsequently setting out and/or reporting upon mental correlations drawn between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or itself;it's own state of mind(when applicable).
The question "What am I?" is existentially contingent upon language use. An adequate metaphysical framework can properly account for all thought and belief. Not all thought and belief is existentially contingent upon language use. An adequate metaphysical framework must be able to properly take account of thought and belief, especially that which is not existentially contingent upon language use.
The crucial distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief comes to the forefront here...
Doing metaphysics is a metacognitive endeavor. That is, doing metaphysics is existentially contingent upon thinking about thought and belief. Thinking about thought and belief is existentially contingent upon pre-existing thought and belief and the ability to isolate it. Isolating thought and belief is existentially contingent upon identifying it. Identifying and isolating thought and belief is existentially contingent upon language use. Thus, thinking about thought and belief is existentially contingent upon pre-existing thought and belief and language use. Doing metaphysics is existentially contingent upon the same.
However, not all thought and belief is existentially contingent upon language use. Humans consist, in part at least, in and/or of thought and belief about the world and/or ourselves. Some of that thought and belief existed prior to language use. Failing to draw and maintain the crucial distinction between thought and belief and thinking about thought and belief will guarantee an emaciated worldview... metaphysical frameworks notwithstanding.
Sorry, it was in other threads that I posted it. Here, below, I've pasted an account of it that I recently posted in a different thread, to answer a question. I've quoted the question, but not the name of the person who asked the question:
This question was asked:
When I was born, how did 'nature' conjure up my perspective into this body? Why and how did it decide that my perspective is the right one? These were questions that I asked myself since I was 9 years old. Why am I me? Why am I not my brother? How did 'I' happen to be?
Anyway, this is the thought I never had the chance to discuss with anyone. I tried raising it with my friends but none of them had any good answers. Would really like to gain some insight from someone who has delved very deep into this subject matter
My reply:
Sometimes a seemingly difficult question like that is just the result of metaphysical assumptions that aren't valid. For example, the metaphysics of Materialism has been hammered into us from elementary-school on.
Materialism has several aliases. A currently fashionable one is "Naturalism". Also, the word "Nominalism" is often, currently fashionably, used to refer to what is really another way of wording Materialism.
Sometimes, answering questions such as the ones that you expressed, requires a completely different metaphysics.
I'll answer that in terms of the inevitable and uncontroversial metaphysics that I've been proposing here.
I've posted the whole proposition at so many discussions in these forums, that I shouldn't repeat it all here.
But, to just summarize:
All that you know about the physical world is from your experience, in fact all of it is your experience. That's all there is, for you.
There are abstract if-then facts. There couldn't have not been abstract if-then facts. And, just as inevitably, there are complex inter-referring systems of inevitable abstract if-then facts about hypotheticals.
In fact, there are infinitely-many such complex logical systems.
In fact, there's one whose events and relations are those that you encounter in your experience,
There's no reason to believe that your life-experience is other than that, or that the world you live in is other than the hypothetical setting for that hypothetical life-experience possibility-story consisting of a complex system of inevitable abstract if-then facts about hypotheticals.
That complex system of inter-referring inevitable abstract logical facts about hypotheticals is your life-experience possibility-story,
Let me re-quote your question:
When I was born, how did 'nature' conjure up my perspective into this body? — Susu
Your perspective is prior to this life. Your perspective consists of your inclinations, predispositions, etc.
Those are attributes of the protagonist of one of the infinitely-many life-experience possibility-stories.
So, why are you in a life? Because you, someone with your perspective, is the protagonist of one of the infinitely-many life-experience possibility-stories.
Being in a life is part of the your nature, as the possessor of your perspective, the protagonist of a life-experience possibility-story.
So it's no surprise that you're in a life. That's why this life started.
Your perspective is what it started from. ...your perspective and the life-experience possibility-story whose protagonist has that perspective.
So there's really no question of why it's the right perspective for you. It is you, and it's the reason why this life started.
Michael Ossipoff
Seems standard...
Quoting Michael Ossipoff
...but then no idea what this could mean.
Is this saying that an assumption of intelligibility - as in the laws of thought - are a precondition to cognition, or something Kantian like that?
No, I didn't mean anything other than what I said.
I don't think anyone denies that there are abstract facts. Even if you say that they're inextricably bound up with us experiencers, you don't say that there aren't abstract facts. So that seems a completely uncontroversial statement.
But likewise there are abstract facts that refer to eachother, and there are complex systems of them. Since you don't deny that there are abstract facts, you aren't likely to deny that there are complex systems of inter-referring abstract facts.
For example, there's a complex system of hypothetical physical quantity-values, and hypothetical relations (physical laws) among them, For any particular such hypothetical relation, a hypothetical proposition, and the set of hypothetical quantity-values that it relates, that hypothetical proposition and those hypothetical quantity values are parts of the "if " premise of an abstract if-then fact.
Obviously there's an intricate and complex system of such physical laws and quantities, and if-then facts about them.
I'm saying that there's one such complex system of abstract if-thens that has the events and relations of your experience. And that there's no reason to believe that the world of your experience consists of other than that.
Of course facts about this physical system are what physicists find when they investigate and examine the physical world. It enters your experience when they report it and you read it. But also, in various ways, in your direct physical experience.
But, in general, any fact about our physical world implies and corresponds to an if-then fact. If you examine some particular thing, then you'll find a certain thing about it.
What your life-experience possibility-story requires is self-consistency, non-contradiction, because it's a story consisting of facts. Mutually contradictory propositions can't all be facts.
Michael Ossipoff
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I don't see how there could be a fact without a statement as to what that fact is. What is an "if-then fact" without the "if" and the "then". It doesn't make sense that there could be an if-then fact without the "if-then", and these are utterances. Since I conceive of a statement of the fact as necessary for the existence of any fact, then what you say, to me, necessarily implies that the world consists of utterances.
Sure there were, before there were humans on the Earth. There were facts, but there were no utterances made about facts, because there were no animals with speech.
Sure, you can say that, for any fact, there's a potential statement of that fact. I don't deny that.
Nothing, of course. It wouldn't be an if-then fact.
Agreed. An if-then fact relates two hypothetical propositions The if-then fact is a fact that one hypothetical proposition is true if the other is. An if-then statement must have those two parts, consisting of those two hypothetical propositions.
No, they're just propositions. Of course any proposition is something that there could be a statement about, if there's someone to make that statement, and if s/he chooses to make it.
Again, you could truly say that, for any proposition, there's a potential statement. I don't deny that.
I agree that, for any fact, there's a potential statement of that fact. But I'm talking about facts instead of statements.
A fact is a state-of-affairs, or an aspect of the way things are.
A statement is an utterance about a fact.
The physical world consists of facts, and I agree that, for every fact, there's a potential utterance about that fact.
But the facts are what the world consists of.
Michael Ossipoff
A "fact" is a thing known to have occurred, and this implies a knower. What makes you think that there was a knower before there was animals with speech?
Quoting Michael Ossipoff
A proposition is a statement. There is no such thing as a proposition which is not a statement.
Quoting Michael Ossipoff
Sorry, but a proposition is an actual statement, not a potential statement, and a fact is an actual thing known, not a potential thing known. You are using words in an unacceptable way, and that's why I disagree with your metaphysics.
Quoting Michael Ossipoff
As far as I know, there are two principle ways that "fact" is used. One is to refer to a thing known, and this requires a knower. The other is to refer to a truth, and a truth is something which is true. True means to correspond with reality. If you are using "fact" to refer to something which corresponds with reality, rather than to refer to something which is known to have occurred, then how is this not a statement?
I’ll again look up “fact”, “proposition”, “statement” and “utterance”. This time I’ll check many sources.
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For now, I’ll just tell you how I use those words:
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A fact is a state of affairs, an aspect of the way things are.
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A proposition is a maybe-fact. It’s like a fact, except that it might not be a fact. A hypothetical “fact” that might not really be a fact. My definition of a proposition doesn’t require that it be uttered. For example, an if-then fact relates two hypothetical propositions, one of which is true if the other is true. …none of which need be uttered.
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A statement is an utterance that claims a fact. A statement is an (not necessarily true) utterance about a fact. A statement expresses a proposition, which may or may not be a fact. A statement can be a true statement or a false statement. A proposition could be called a potential statement.
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An utterance is something that’s actually said.
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Things are what can be referred to. Things are what facts are about.
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[end of definitions]
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Definitions need only to be reasonable, clearly-specified, and consistently-used.
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But if any of the above-stated definitions are wrong, in the sense of being strongly-contradicted by standard philosophical usage, then of course I’ll use the standard definitions instead.
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Of course we should all use the standard definitions, for clarity of meaning.
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I didn’t intentionally violate standard philosophical usage. As I said, if some of my definitions are definitely wrong, then I’ll change them.
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But, in the meantime, all that’s needed is that they be reasonable, clearly-specified, and consistently-used (by the person who uses them).
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As long as they’re well-specified and consistently-used, they certainly don’t invalidate a metaphysics that’s stated in terms of them.
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Now, I’ll post these definitions, to clarify what I’ve meant by what I’ve said.
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Then (maybe today, maybe tomorrow morning) I’ll reply to the rest of your message.
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Then I’ll check on the philosophical definitions of those terms (fact, proposition, statement, utterance), at many sources, and then post what I find.
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Michael Ossipoff
There is a big problem with this definition. "The way things are", refers to a moment of time at the present. But time is passing, and things are changing. So there is really no such thing as "the way things are", because this would require a stoppage of time, and that would create an unreal situation.
Quoting Michael Ossipoff
Your definition of "fact" is not only wrong in the sense that it is inconsistent with the standard definitions, that I gave in my last post, but it is also wrong in the sense that it describes something which appears to be physically impossible, (the way things are), as I explained above.
Incorrect.
Your confusion is linguistic.
Abstract facts are timelessly true. An abstract fact can be defined as an aspect of the way things (timelessly) are.
Likewise "A state of affairs" needn't mean a state of affairs at one particular time. It can refer to a timeless state of affairs, which is what an abstract fact is.
You're insisting that the "is" and "are" refer to the present, but abstract facts are timeless facts. They're timelessly true.
The abstract fact that If the additive associative axiom is true, then 2+2=4 (by an obvious definition of 1, 2, 3 & 4 in terms of the multiplicative identity and addition), is a timeless abstract if-then fact.
Likewise, my abstract if-then fact about Slitheytoves & Jabberwockeys is a timeless abstract fact.
It isn't only true today, for example. One could insert the word "timelessly" in front of "is" and "are" where needed, and I sometimes do. But often its understood.
In logical discussions and articles, in mathematical theorems and proofs, "are" and "is" are often understood to have timeless meaning.
Only if you think that "is" and "are" must always only refer to the present, or that a state of affairs can only mean a state of affairs at one particular time.
See above.
And if the definition of a fact as a state of affairs is wrong, then you'd better inform SEP that they're wrong too.
Anyway, as I said, after replying to your latest message of yesterday, I'll check on the definitions of the terms that you dispute, at a lot of sources., and will post what I find.
Michael Ossipoff
There's no consensus to that effect. it's a contentious issue. But it needn't be an issue here, because my metaphysics is about individual subjective experience. If you say that a fact is only meaningful with respect to an experiencer, that isn't an objection to my metaphysical proposal.
The fact that nonhuman animals aren't language-speakers doesn't mean that they aren't knowers.
I've told the definitions that explain what i meant when I used those words.
As I said, I'll check on the listed definitions of the terms that you dispute.
I'd said:
So you're saying that a proposition is an utterance, and requires a speaker. If that's how it's defined, then maybe there's another word for what might or might not be a fact, but which hasn't been uttered.
I'll check the published definitions.
So then, if there's a wiring short-circuit in a building, but no one knows about it, until later, when the fire-inspectors examine the scene, it can be truly be said that was no fact of a wiring short-circuit before the building burned down?
...and a building owner can assure his employees that there isn't a wiring-fault in his old dilapidated building, because no one knows of one (and no one has looked for one).
You're grasping at straws.
You're confusing the metaphysics with the definitions that you dispute. I've stated the metaphysics in terms of a set of definitions that I've specified. I have nothing against the use of standard definitions, when I find out what they are.
I'd said:
You replied:
It's a state of affairs, which may or may not be the subject of an utterance. A statement is an utterance that claims a fact.
By the definitions that I've been using. But,as I said, I'll check many sources, for the standard definitions of those terms.
Michael Ossipoff
The idea of an "abstract if-then fact" is redundant. '2+2=4' is true by definition; there is no "if-then" about it. Facts are facts, what we may think are facts in the domain of empirical speculation may or may not be facts, but a mathematical fact, if it is proven and thereby becomes a matter of definition, is a mathematical fact, period.
Incorrect. 4 isn't defined as 2+2.
4 is defined (most obviously at least) as 3+1
As you might guess, 3 is defined as 2+1.
2 is defined as 1+1
1 is the symbol for the multiplicative identity referred to in the multiplicative identity axiom.
It is unnecessary to define every counting number from 2 to 9, multiple times, as every sum of lower counting-numbers that it's equal to.--when one obvious sum would do.
But, given those definitions that I stated:
If the additive associative axiom is true, then 2+2=4.
That's a timeless abstract if-then fact.
All abstract facts are timeless.
In general, a proved and correct mathematical theorem is an if-then fact whose "if " premise includes (but isn't necessarily limited to) a set of mathematical axioms (algebraic or geometric).
Michael Ossipoff
The point is that within a system it is redundant to specify "if the axioms are true, then..." . The system. and any truth within it, does not exist without the axioms which are simply taken to be self-evident and fundamental. The alternatives of truth and falsity cannot be applied to the axioms. So your formulation is ill-formed. It cannot constitute an adequate starting point for any thought.
When you prove a theorem, you show that, if the relevant axioms are true (and maybe of certain other propositions are true too), then the conclusion that you want to prove is true.
In other words, you prove an if-then fact.
You said:
Quoting Janus
...and it's because the axioms are taken to be self-evident and fundamental (for a certain set of elements, under certain operations*), that the if-then statement that you prove establishes the truth of the conclusion that you want to prove.
*The multiplicative inverse axiom isn't true with the Integers, for example, and so,, unlike the real numbers and the rational numbers, the integers aren't a field (They're a ring). So, you see, there's an instance in which the multiplicative inverse axiom is false.
Of course there are numerous other examples in which an axiom, or several axioms, are false with respect to some set of elements, under certain operations.
But it's well-understood, and often said, that what you're proving is that your desired conclusion is true if the axioms (and whatever other propositions) are true.
Yes they can be an are. See above*.
Michael Ossipoff
If you want to say that something could be true or false, then you must be able to give an account of what difference that would make in either case.
You want to say that the axioms of mathematics could be either true or false, so you need to give an account of what differences we would find in either case.
Or, put it another way, you need to give an account of how we might, at least in principle, be able to discover that the axioms of mathematics are true or false. I don't believe you will be able to give any such accounts; and if I am right, and you can't give any such accounts, your claim that the axioms of mathematics could be either true or false is an empty one.
I refer you to my most recent post.
Various axioms of mathematics are false for various sets of elements with respect to various operations.
In the example i gave, the multiplicative inverse axiom is false with respect to the Integers.
Michael Ossipoff
Quoting Janus
The fact that axioms might be limited in their applicability does not speak to their truth or falsity, but to their relationship with context.
Yes, in some contexts they're false.
Michael Ossipoff
You are just playing with words and clutching at straws. The challenge for you is to show how an axiom could be false in a context where it is applicable. The salient point is, that it makes no sense to say that something is true in some context, if it could not be, even in principle, false in that context.
Oh, ok, all you're asking is that i show how an axiom could be false in a context in which it is true :D
How could it be false, even in principle, in a context in which it is true?
I'd say that you're asking a lot :D
But I'm not saying that the multiplicative inverse axiom is or could be false for the real numbers or the rational numbers. I'm just saying that it's false for the integers.
Maybe this is the kind of answer you're asking for:
How would the rational numbers have to change in order for the multiplicative inverse axiom to become false for them? Delete every rational number that isn't also an integer, The multiplicative inverse axiom will then be false for the (thus modified) rational numbers.
In fact, don't do that much. Just delete one well-chosen rational number such as 1/37.
Then the multiplicative inverse axiom will be false for the (thus slightly modified) rational numbers.
Michael Ossipoff
An axiom typically isn't defined only for a particular set of elements and operations, Various axioms are true for, various sets of elements and operations. So it's meaningful to speak of an axiom's truth or falsity over various sets of elements and operations.
Michael Ossipoff
Alright, the multiplicative inverse axiom is applicable to the integers, in the (perfectly meaningful) sense that we can apply it to them by evaluating them by it, and asking "Do the Integers meet the multiplicative inverse axiom? Is that axiom true for the Integers?"
So the multiplicative inverse axiom is applicable to the integers, and is false in their context.
Michael Ossipoff
I don't agree with this principle. That's Platonic Realism and I do not agree with it. I believe in an ever changing world where human beings have free will, and if there is anything which is outside of time (timeless), it is not abstract facts.
Quoting Michael Ossipoff
That's right. You and I use the same words in completely different ways, so I haven't the capacity to really comprehend what you are saying. I understand enough to get a gist of what you are saying, and I disagree with it.
"If that is so, then why the need to state a conditional as you did earlier
"The abstract fact that If the additive associative axiom is true, then 2+2=4 (by an obvious definition of 1, 2, 3 & 4 in terms of the multiplicative identity and addition), is a timeless abstract if-then fact."
if the "additive associative axiom" could not be false even in principle. The fact is that you want to make 2+2=4 seem to be a "timeless if-then abstract fact" rather than merely a timeless abstract fact, because the former fudge enables you to develop your whole purportedly "non-speculative" metaphysics. This shows clearly the way in which your thinking is based on a superfluous conditional. Of course, I don't expect you to admit that, being as obviously wedded to your "system" as you are. :-}
Michael Ossipoff
Again you are merely playing with words; equivocating on the sense of "applicable".
From Cambridge Philosophy Notes:
Michael Ossipoff
I’d said:
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— Michael Ossipoff
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You replied:
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Yes, I’ve discussed this before, but let me say it again here:
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Absolute Anti-Realism is out of the question. I’ll get back to that later, below.
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For now:
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Fine, that needn’t be an issue for my metaphysical proposal, because my proposal is stated in terms of our individual experience, described as a life-experience possibility-story.
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So, if you want to say that facts are only meaningful with respect to an experiencer, that doesn’t contradict my metaphysical proposal.
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Instead of saying that the abstract facts are independently true, you want to say that the facts and their experiencer are true together, as part of the experience, which is more fundamental. Fine, because my metaphysical proposal is an Anti-Realism, stated in terms or our experience.
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But yes, I did say what you quoted above:
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Does that seem to contradict the Anti-Realist character of my proposal?
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It doesn’t, because I don’t advocate absolute Anti-Realism.
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As I said, I propose that, for you, the world around you is just the setting for your (more fundamental) life-experience possibility-story. You, the experiencer, are primary and central to that story, as its protagonist.
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The complex system of inevitable abstract if-then facts that is your life-experience possibility-story is just as valid as any other abstract fact, or system of them. And it and its validity are self-contained, and quite independent of anything outside it, such as other abstract facts or systems of them. The only reality that it has or needs is in its own inter-referring context.
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Like any system of inter-referring abstract if-then facts, your life-experience possibility-story doesn’t and needn’t have objective reality or existence in some global context, or in any outside context or medium.
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But obviously, on the other hand, the abstract if-then facts that constitute your life-experience possibility-story aren’t really different from all the other abstract facts.
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That’s why I say that it would be animal-chauvinist to say that the only abstract facts that are valid are the ones that are in someone’s experience. That would only be so if you define validity as “experienced by someone”. That would be distinctly un-objective, It would also be something made true only by a special definition that says that it’s true.
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I’ve previously said that that would be reminiscent of the following (only roughly quoted) passage from Kenneth Patchen:
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“Alright”, said the Giraffe, “then let’s just say that the one with the longest neck gets all the jellybeans.”
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That’s why I say that absolute Anti-Realism is out of the question.
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Another thing:
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I’ve given a few examples of inevitable abstract if then facts. One was about Slitheytoves and Jaberwockeys. Another was about “if the additive associative axiom is true for the real numbers, the rational numbers, the integers, the positive integers, and the non-negative integers, then 2+2=4.”
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The point is that these inevitable abstracts are absolutely, timelessly, true for anyone anywhere. …true now or in ancient Greece, true for someone on a different planet, or in a different galaxy, or in a different sub-universe of a physically-inter-related multiverse of which our Big-Bang Universe (BBU) is a part….or even in an entirely different self-consistent possibility-world
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(All possibility-worlds are self-consistent, or they’d be impossibility-worlds. Possibility-worlds and possibility-stories are built on inevitable abstract if-then facts. Mutually-contradictory propositions aren’t facts.)
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So, since the inevitable abstract if-then facts are true for anyone, anywhere or anywhen, even in an entirely different possibility-world, they’re universally, timelessly true. …not just locally true in some particular person’s experience.
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That’s another reason why I say that absolute Anti-Realism is out of the question, and that abstract if-then facts are inevitably timelessly true.
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You said:
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We needn’t get into the free-will issue here.
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As I mentioned above, my metaphysical proposal doesn’t need for abstract facts to be true independent of an experiencer.
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But I told, above, why inevitable abstract facts have independent validity, and why absolute Anti-Realism has problems.
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I’d said:
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You replied:
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Yes indeed. You use “is” and “are” to refer exclusively to the present, meaning that you disagree with their timeless meaning frequent used in mathematics and logic.
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…then at least comprehend that your meaning for “is” and “are” contradicts a meaning for them that is routine and standard in mathematics and logic.
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If you don’t speak the language that I and others speak, then we can’t talk.
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…and I’ve been answering your disagreements.
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Whether they’ve been adequately answered isn’t for you, me, or any advocate of a position on the matter, to judge. It’s for outside observers of the discussion to judge.
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Michael Ossipoff
I’d said:
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You replied:
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If you know that the additive associative axiom is true for the real numbers, the rational numbers, the integers, the positive integers, and the non-negative numbers; and if you know that if that’s so, then 2+2=4, then that tells you that 2+2=4.
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As I’ve already explained, mathematical theorems are proved by showing that if an axiom is true (and maybe if other propositions are true as well), then a certain desired conclusion is true.
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I’d said:
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"The abstract fact that If the additive associative axiom is true, then 2+2=4 (by an obvious definition of 1, 2, 3 & 4 in terms of the multiplicative identity and addition), is a timeless abstract if-then fact."
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You replied:
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An axiom can be false with respect to some systems of elements and operations on the elements. The multiplicative inverse axiom is false for the integers. The commutative axiom is false for many groups, though there’s a class of groups for which it’s true.
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In case you want to say that it isn’t the same associative axiom or commutative axiom, when applied to different systems, then let me clarify a bit.
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It’s true that a group is only defined with respect to one operation. And that operation isn’t usually addition or multiplication. But a group’s operation is often similar to addition, where the elements are things that are done, and the binary operation on those elements consists of doing one thing, and then doing a different thing. ..which could be regarded as adding one thing to another.
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Anyway, the “+” sign is often used to stand for a group’s operation.
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Suppose, just for the moment, we let “+” stand in for addition or multiplication (for numbers), or for whatever operation a group is defined with respect to.
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So, the associative axiom, (a+b) + c = a + (b+c) is true for groups, just as it’s true for the integers with respect to addition and multiplication.
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And likewise, the commutative axiom, a+b = b+a, is false for many groups, while true for Abellian groups, and for the integers with respect to addition and multiplication.
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No, I don’t.
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2+2=4 isn’t an if-then fact.
If the additive associative axiom is true for the real numbers, the rational numbers, the integers, the positive integers, and the non-negative integers, then 2+2=4 (by an obvious definition of 1, 2, 3, & 4, based on the multiplicative identity and addition).
That's an inevitable abstract if-then fact.
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As you said, 2+2= 4 is a timeless abstract fact.
You can experimentally show yourself that 2+2=4, by sitting on the floor with four apples, and experimenting. But the proof in terms of the number-definitions and axioms shows that 2+2=4 is indeed a timeless abstract fact. …given the associative axiom, which we all know to be true for the real numbers, the rational numbers, the integers, the positive integers, the non-negative integers (under the addition and multiplication operations), and for all groups.
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See above.
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???
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See above.
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Michael Ossipoff
None of this addresses my central criticism of your position, which is that "if-then" conditionals are relevant only to the future; and that the notion of "if-then abstract facts" is incoherent.
Bulk is not a substitute for quality of response.
When you demonstrate that animals other than human beings understand abstract facts, then we might proceed in this direction. Regardless though, this wouldn't help support your assumption that the world prior to the existence of life consisted of abstract facts.
Quoting Michael Ossipoff
Mathematicians and logician who use "is" and "are" use it to refer to what is the case, now. It is only metaphysicians who extend this principle, through extrapolation, to make the claim that what mathematicians and logicians assume to be true right now, is an eternal truth. That is Platonic Realism, which I do not agree with. I think that mathematical truths are principles invented by the human mind, which are dependent on the human mind for existence, and therefore cannot be eternal.
Quoting Michael Ossipoff
You answer my disagreements by reasserting the things I disagree with.
Quoting Michael Ossipoff
I disagree. If the person cannot interpret the symbols, or misinterprets the symbols, then the abstracts are not true for that person. And even if they were true for anyone anywhere, this does not make them eternal, which would require that they are true when there is no people, or anything to interpret the symbols. Since the abstracts are expressed as symbols, and symbols require interpretation, and truth is attributed to the interpretation, then there can be no truth without interpretation.
That's nonsense.
Timeless if-then facts are routinely spoken of in logic and mathematics.
The relation between ifs and thens needn't have anything to do with the future, this physical world, or its time..
It isn't possible to talk to you, and the pointlessness of answering you couldn't be more obvious than it is now.
I wanted to show others that I wasn't evading answering your claims.
As for "quality of response" or the matter of who has supported what they've said, that's a matter for others to judge for themselves. What you, I, or any other participant or advocate on the matter say about that is irrelevant.
We've both had our say about this, and I suggest that there would be no point in continuing this conversation.
Michael Ossipoff
They are propositions, not facts. If there is an "if' then it is a proposition; there can be no "if" about a fact.
Incorrect. When proven, they're established as facts.
Yes the "if" premise is a proposition, not necessarily a fact. Likewise the "then" conclusion, which isn't a fact unless the "if" premise is fact.
But when an if-then proposition, itself, has been proven to be a fact, and then it's not just a proposition. It's then known to be a fact.
I'd said:
If all Slitheytoves are brillig, and all Jaberwockeys are Slitheyitoves, then all Jaberwockeys are brillig.
My Jaberwockeys and Slitheytoves if-then proposition is obviously a (timeless) fact, even if none of the Slitheytoves are brillig, and/or none of the Jaberwockeys are Slitheytoves. ...and even if there are no Slitheytoves and no Jaberwockeys.
The proposition "If the associative axiom is true for addition of integers, then 2+2=4 (given the definitions I stated)" is provably a fact, A provable timeless abstract if-then fact.
I have no criticism of, or impatience with you when you ask questions, ask for clarification, or express your opinion.
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Michael Ossipoff
When proven they are no longer "if-then" possibilities; they become actualities. You are just playing with words as usual, as I see it. "Pouring from the empty into the void".
Think of this way: "if-thens" have only semantic reality; they therefore have no metaphysical relevance beyond showing that semantics, possibility, is an ineliminable aspect of reality. They cannot undergird any comprehensive metaphysics.
Sure they are My Slitheytoves & Jaberwockeys if-then proposition is obviously a fact. But, though it's true, it's still an if-then fact.
That's because, though the Slitheytoves & Jaberwockeys if-then proposition is a fact, its "if" premise isn't an established fact. It hasn't been proven that all Jaberwockeys are Slitheytoves and that all Slitheytoves are brillig. Therefore, its "then" conclusion (that all Jaberwockeys are brillig) likewise isn't established as a fact.
But the Slitheytoves & Jaberwockeys if-then remains an obvious timeless if-then fact.
You're welcome to express your opinions on these matters (limiting those opinions to the topic itself) or ask for clarification. But you need to refrain from expressing opinions about who's right or wrong,
As I said, that's a matter for others to judge.
Michael Ossipoff
I disagree, if anything I think it's merely a semantic tautology which has no meaning or provenance outside human discourse. I don't think it's helpful to think of tautologies as facts; facts must be substantive. I do admit that insofar as they are expressed in languages all facts have a tautologous dimension to them, though.
I’d said:
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— Michael Ossipoff
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You replied:
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No, I didn’t say that animals other than humans understand abstract facts. But some animals understand abstract facts. Humans are the animals that are known to understand abstract facts.
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“Animal chauvinism” referred to a belief by animals (human ones) that only what’s experienced by animals (like us) is valid. …an unnecessary and unwarranted over-generalization of Anti-Realism.
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You continued:
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1. I emphasize that that issue or assumption isn’t important for my metaphysical proposal, which is about individual experience. Though I disagree with absolute Anti-Realism, it doesn’t contradict my proposal.
2. It goes without saying that you’re free to and welcome to have a different opinion (in favor of absolute Anti-Realism). I’ve merely told why I don’t agree with that position.
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As I’ve said my reasons for that are these:
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1. To say that only facts that are experienced by an animal (like us) are valid, because “valid” means (at least in part) “experienced by someone”, is an instance of saying that something true because of the choice of a definition that says that it’s true.
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2. The abstract facts that constitute your life-experience possibility-story aren’t really different from all of the other abstract facts.
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3. Inevitable abstract if-then facts (of which I’ve given a few examples) are true, when evaluated for truth or falsity, by anyone anywhere anytime. Ancient Greece, or now, or on another planet, in another galaxy, in a different sub-universe of a physically-inter-related multiverse of which our Big-Bang Universe is a part…or even in an entirely different possibility-world.
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Given that, there’s obviously something to those facts that is independent of the experiencer.
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But, as I said, you’re of course welcome to disagree, and that wouldn’t contradict my metaphysical proposal, which is an Anti-Realism, about individual experience. If you believe that abstract facts are valid only with respect to experiencers, that doesn’t contradict my Anti-Realist metaphysical proposal.
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I just don’t take Anti-Realism to the extreme that you seem to be saying that you do.
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I’d said:
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— Michael Ossipoff
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Incorrect. But let’s just agree to disagree on that, and let others judge for themselves which claim is correct.
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Continuing to state our claims about that isn’t serving any purpose.
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Nevertheless, mathematicians and logicians are saying that their if-then facts are true any time, any place where they’re evaluated for truth/falsity. …timeless universal in that sense.
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The matter of whether abstract if-then facts are valid or true only with respect to an experiencer is a different issue, a position held by some, but not all, in metaphysics. …but not an issue of mathematics or logic.
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I agree that we disagree on that metaphysical matter, and I re-emphasize that that issue isn’t relevant to my metaphysical proposal, because my proposal is from the point of view of individual experience.
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I’d said:
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You reply:
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Thank you for your opinion on that.
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As I said, that’s a matter for others to judge.
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I’d said:
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You reply
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They aren’t true for a groundhog, because s/he isn’t into that sort of thing at all. But neither are they false for a groundhog.
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They’re true when examined/evaluated by humans. Can some humans be mistaken? Of course. If someone in authority says that even if all Slitheytoves are brillig, and all Jaberwockeys are Slitheytoves, nevertheless some Jaberwockeys aren’t brillig, I guarantee that his supporters will enthusiastically and emphatically agree.
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Humans are subject to error, and sometimes outright delusion.
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But the fact remains that, anywhere, anywhen, even in any self-consistent possibility-world, there would be a consensus for my Slitheytoves & Jaberwockeys if-then fact, among those who take interest in such discussion.
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Said more accurately:
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There will be a measurable statistical positive correlation between the people who agree with that statement, and the people who are evaluated to be right, in general, on objective practical matters of fact. …and there will be a measureable statistical positive correlation between people who disagree with that Slitheytoves/Jaberwockeys statement and people who are in general evaluated to be wrong about objective practical matters of fact.
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How do you explain that, unless there’s something about that fact that transcends and is independent of any particular world or individual experience?
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How do you answer my other numbered reasons (above in this post) for saying that abstract if-then facts are independent of experiencers?
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It would mean that there’s something about those facts that transcends and is independent of a particular experiencer or a particular world.
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And I emphasize that at least many or most abstract if-then facts can be expressed in words, in ordinary human spoken language.
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Michael Ossipoff
That would be a good place at which for us to agree to disagree.
Michael Ossipoff
Yes, well at least disagreement was reached. :)
Quoting Janus
There's certainly a sense in which a tautology isn't useful in a practical way, But they're certainly useful for illustrating other things,.making other points. ...as in this discussion.Tautologies are of course never surprising or very informative.
Even if there were Slitheytoves and Jaberwockeys, my if-then fact about them wouldn't surprise anyone.
But it was only intended as an easily shown example of an inevitable abstract if-then fact.
Surely "If the associative axiom is true for the integers under the operation of addition, then 2+2=4 (with the definitions that I've stated)" is a fact (...as are the if-then facts about physical quantities and physical laws.) and you wouldn't deny that.
The "then" provably follows directly from the "if".
It differs from the Slithytoves & Jaberwockeys if-then fact only in degree of obviousness, and amount of wording needed to demonstrate that it's a fact.
Yes, so it's artificial to draw a line among them, regarding which ones you agree are facts.
It just means that some inevitable timeless abstract if-then facts (the ones that are tautologies) are simpler and more obvious than others..
Michael Ossipoff
Another way to say this is, I've been emphasizing that the person hirself (himself/herself) is part of hir life-experience possibility-story. ...but is obviously its essential, central component, as its protagonist, whose experience it's about.
So my metaphysics doesn't require that facts exist independent of experiencers. The system of facts, and the experiencer who is part of that system can be regarded as timelessly being there together, as a complementary unit, a system of inter-referring if-thens.
And, all along, I've been emphasizing that the complex system of inter-referring inevitable abstract if-then facts that is someone's life-experience possibility-story doesn't need to have global or objective existence. It needn't be considered other than in its own local inter-referring system.
Neither does it need some sort of global permission to be, or some larger context or medium in which to be.
For the purpose of my metaphysics, doesn't that avoid any problem about the existence of the facts? They're relevant only to eachother.
Of course, without an experiencer, you could ask for whom it's all real, and what it means to say it's real. But that doesn't matter, because this life-experience possibility-story is about an experiencer, its central, essential, primary component.
I don't know if I've made the point strongly enough, about the complete local independence of that experience possibility-story, that system of inter-referring if-thens, and that I'm not saying that it meaningfully "is", outside of its own context, or for anyone other than the experiencer who is part of that system of inter-referring facts.
No one can deny that that system of inter-referring if-thens is there for itself and eachother, can they? I mean, the facts are only about eachother.
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That metaphysics that i propose is Anti-Realism, compared to MUH.
But, quite aside from all that, I do claim a sort of Realism, as argued in the numbered list of reasons that i stated in my other post.
It seems to me, then, that the "Realism"/"Anti-Realism" distinction might not be really useful.or always applicable.
Michael Ossipoff.