Nothing is intrinsically morally wrong
I really don't see any reason of why one should act in any way besides because they have a preference for acting in that way. For example, I often like to go out of my way and help others. This is because I value human connection. I value it because I have a preference for building good connections with others even if it's for a short time. It feels good.
Others may have different values because they have different preferences. This could be due to many factors (the way they've been raised, the way their brain is structured and/or defected, how their brain has been shaped by the reciprocal interplay of environment and biology over time). I might condemn someone else for stealing, but that's only because they didn't live up to my subjective standards. We can have a society and punish someone for murdering because the person acted in a way that went against our own subjective morality, but I don't see how that murder was intrinsically wrong. It just went against others' subjective morality, that's all.
It seems to me that our moralities are nothing but subjective preferences... nothing else. It is kind of uncomfortable, but I am trying to be intellectually honest and I don't see how there can be a case for an objective morality that lies outside our subjective values. I've tried to find arguments for objective morality, but they don't seem right to me. For example, Sam Harris argues that morality is about increasing well-being, but that's just his preference based on his own values. It doesn't solve Hume's is-ought problem. Why should anyone have a moral obligation for others' well-being? Well besides because they have a preference to value well-being so that we can co-exist peacefully.
When we condemn a murderer, essentially what we're saying is that we just don't like the murderer because he/she acted in a way that went against our preferred way of living.
EDIT: After some good discussion with some of the responses, my position has changed a little bit. I am no longer asserting that morality is subjective. I am now taking the position of not asserting that it is objective and not asserting that it is not objective. So if you assert that murder is objectively wrong, it is up to you to explain why that is so. I am also no longer using the word preferences because I think it was the wrong word to use for what I was trying to explain. To clear it up, I'll say that people create their moral codes for many reasons.
Others may have different values because they have different preferences. This could be due to many factors (the way they've been raised, the way their brain is structured and/or defected, how their brain has been shaped by the reciprocal interplay of environment and biology over time). I might condemn someone else for stealing, but that's only because they didn't live up to my subjective standards. We can have a society and punish someone for murdering because the person acted in a way that went against our own subjective morality, but I don't see how that murder was intrinsically wrong. It just went against others' subjective morality, that's all.
It seems to me that our moralities are nothing but subjective preferences... nothing else. It is kind of uncomfortable, but I am trying to be intellectually honest and I don't see how there can be a case for an objective morality that lies outside our subjective values. I've tried to find arguments for objective morality, but they don't seem right to me. For example, Sam Harris argues that morality is about increasing well-being, but that's just his preference based on his own values. It doesn't solve Hume's is-ought problem. Why should anyone have a moral obligation for others' well-being? Well besides because they have a preference to value well-being so that we can co-exist peacefully.
When we condemn a murderer, essentially what we're saying is that we just don't like the murderer because he/she acted in a way that went against our preferred way of living.
EDIT: After some good discussion with some of the responses, my position has changed a little bit. I am no longer asserting that morality is subjective. I am now taking the position of not asserting that it is objective and not asserting that it is not objective. So if you assert that murder is objectively wrong, it is up to you to explain why that is so. I am also no longer using the word preferences because I think it was the wrong word to use for what I was trying to explain. To clear it up, I'll say that people create their moral codes for many reasons.
Comments (310)
I honestly think that people who think the way you do are the reason why religion became so widespread. Apparently there are quite a few people who feel that, without an objective morality, we should just be free to do as we please with no thought as to how it will affect anyone else. Religion takes care of that issue by telling the people that there is objective morality.
I understand how surprising it can be when you finally figure out that objective morality doesn't exist (that we know of), but I don't see how you wouldn't think it through enough to immediately understand why we need morality anyway. If you want to go live in the wilderness in order to be free from morality, by all means. I'm sure it will be a real treat.
My point in this post was just to say that when we condemn a murderer, we are essentially saying that we don't like the person because they aren't acting the way we want everyone to act (for a stable society). In a way, it becomes a might makes right.
I agree with this in my case. You won't see me going around harming others. What about someone who enjoys going around conquering lands and becoming a harsh dictator. That person has a better quality of life, right? Who are you to tell that person he should care about others' well-being, while he's benefiting from being a dictator?
Your opening statement was "I really don't see any reason of why one should act in any way besides because they have a preference for acting in that way". You went on to elaborate that people should just do whatever makes them feel good. It follow from this that if murder makes a person feel good, they should be able to do it.
And then there's this...
Quoting SonJnana
...so I really don't see where you made it clear that you understood the necessity and purpose of morality. It seemed to be quite the opposite.
But moving on:
Quoting SonJnana
It's not about want, it's about need. These laws aren't just made up willy nilly, there is very clear purpose to the morals we have.
Quoting SonJnana
Quoting SonJnana
You still seem to be missing the point. If a person doesn't care about the well-being of others and is actively harming people, we don't allow them in our society.
Not murdering is a condition you must agree to in order to live in and receive the benefits of our society. If you want to try to form your own society where killing each other is legal, good luck.
I think it's more honest to say that the person is acting morally based on a subjective morality that values the extension of conscious life. Someone else may value something else and have a different subjective morality.
You just listed things that you claim are objectively moral without providing any argument or reasoning as to why.
Since when does preferences for acting exclude wanting to live in a stable society where we can co-exist? I think it's pretty obvious that if you want to live in a society that's stable (because it's useful) that it's a preference. I didn't think it was necessary to explain that. And if one has a stronger preference to live in a stable society than murder, then they shouldn't murder. Murder might make them feel good, but living in a stable society makes them feel better. What is it that you are not understanding?
Quoting JustSomeGuy
A subjective preference of living in a stable society where everyone benefits so you yourself benefit because it's useful.
Quoting JustSomeGuy
There is obviously a purpose - to live in a stable society. But it's saying the person isn't acting the way we NEED them to act for a stable society because we the majority WANT to live in a stable society.
Quoting JustSomeGuy
We don't allow them in our society. But what about a dictator killing people? What are you gonna tell them? "Stop what you're doing because me and many other people don't like it?" And why the hell will he care if you aren't a threat to his power?
Humans are biologically programmed to survive. In that context, human survival is good. It follows that any intentional act extending human survival, without negatively affecting other conscious life, is good.
You can't agree that human survival is good, in the context of human biological motivation? How about avoidance of unwanted suffering?
Parasitic organisms are biologically programmed to thrive off of harming others. In that context, harming others is good. How does that tell you anything about the morality of it though? Hume's is-ought problem.
Parasitic organisms don't know they are causing harm to another conscious entity. There is no morality involved when the organism isn't capable of assessing possible rightness or wrongness of an intentional act.
Those are both subjective, though...we're discussing objective morality.
Since we're discussing human morality, I think it makes sense to discuss it in terms of human biological instinct, no? You can't have morality without context, or without intentional acts and the ability to assess rightness or wrongness.
There are no known cases of it, but I think you're missing the point I was trying to get at. You say that helping others survive in the CONTEXT of biological survival is good. I agree with that. In this case the word "good" means beneficial to the cause of biological survival.
In the CONTEXT of harming others, stealing is good. In this case the word "good" means beneficial to the cause of harming others.
The point is that basing morality on the cause for biological survival is subjective. One might say morality should be based on the cause for fairness. So if someone murders one might say the murderer deserves to die. The causes for biological survival vs. cause for fairness, these are nothing but moralities based on subjective values. You prefer to see biological survival so you choose to base your morality on that, subjectively.
Quoting CasKev
I agree, but you originally claimed that there was objective morality, and what you're talking about is subjective morality. Objective would mean it exists independent of us or anything else.
This is a tough pill to swallow, because we do not approach morality as if we construct it but rather that it "calls" to us, it "commands" us as if it were objective. Judging an action as morally wrong is entirely different than judging an apple pie to be good. This is why, if we are to be moral anti-realists, I think error theory is superior to non-cognitivism (the subjectivism you have presented). Just by phenomenology alone we can know that morality is not just an expression of our subjective tastes or preferences, and that morality at least presents itself as being objective (even if it isn't).
From my perspective, the arrival of subjectivist/relativist interpretations of morality comes alongside a jadedness to humanity as a whole. People act irrationally, are mean, spiteful, hurtful and otherwise bad, always looking out for only themselves, not caring for anyone else, etc. Ironically and paradoxically, the move to a subjectivist/relativist moral view seems to often come from this disillusionment and disappointment with people living up to what we otherwise do see as objective moral laws. It's similar to the skeptical view of religion - there are so many religions and many religious people are actually quite terrible, thus there must not be anything objective about religion.
I'm also not arguing that this viewpoint I'm expressing is better for a certain cause. In fact, it might have some consequences that will destabilize society. I'm just trying to be intellectually honest here.
Quoting darthbarracuda
Judging an apple pie to be good is because you have preference for apple pie. Judging an action to be morally good is simply saying it is consistent with your morality code, which is based off of your subjective values, which expresses preferences (wants, needs, desires, comfortableness). Essentially, ones moral code is just their preferences.
Saying something is "subjective" doesn't mean anything; its to under describe the situation. Everything has a subjective element - values, desires, intentions, and beliefs. But that doesn't mean we don't have reasons to elect any of these, and the reasons are provided by external content that is universal in nature. You could say something like "ethical values aren't external in nature", but this is particularly to appeal and presuppose a type of materialism w.r.t to what can be external in nature.
I'm not seeing an actual argument for the idea that morality is just subjective preferences. Except maybe this:
Quoting SonJnana
Here you're essentially describing morality as the context in which the ends of a goal are met. In this context, the means only obtain within relation the ends, in other words. The problem is that this is not an argument for subjective morality; it's just a description of different moral contexts. This description doesn't actually say anything about whether morality is objective or subjective, in the way that you're using those terms.
You can't really tell a dictator he's morally wrong. You would only be saying that because you prefer to live in a society where everyone benefits, not just the dictator. But why should the dictator have a moral obligation to listen to your moral code which simply based off of your moral code which was created for your own wants, needs, desires.
If one truly cares about the well-being of others, the person prefers to see others happy. So they value well-being and create a moral code around it. That's all.
Even if everyone in the world agrees on what is moral, it is because they all agree to set a code that is consistent with all of their preferences. If one person agrees, it is simply one person has different values than the majority because they may have different preferences for how they want to see the world. But it isn't objective because there is no right or wrong outside the subjective moral code that people create because they prefer the world to be that way.
Ok; in that case I see no actual argument for morality being subjective preferences.
If someone kills someone, what do you do? One might say you shouldn't kill them back because that will destabilize society and hurt biological survival. Someone else might say you should kill the person because they deserve to die because that is fairness. How can you objectively say biological survival is a better code than fairness? It just comes down to one person wants to see a world that is more fair, whereas one person wants to see biological survival. These are conflicting moralities and there is no objective way, as far as I know, to say one is better than the other.
When I say morality being subjective preferences, I am saying that any person's moral code is to suit their preferences of how they want to see the world. They want to see a stable society so they say killing is wrong. That doesn't mean killing is wrong because it's intrinsically bad. It just means that its immoral to someone because not beneficial. And that is based off their preferences because in this case they prefer what is beneficial to them - a stable society in this case.
So you assert, but why should I believe this? Why should I believe that what seem to be truth-apt, cognitive statements like "murder is wrong" ultimately derive from non-cognitive, [s]meaningless[/s] non-truth-apt, particular preferences?
Perhaps man had no choice in the matter, if he wanted to survive nature and not have to constantly fear harm from some less civilized neighbors he was forced to become social and form communities and in doing so to create laws, and culture, institutions, a civilization. Wouldn't this entail that any actions, or laws that don't foster a safe, equitable, orderly society are intrinsically wrong, because they jeopardize man's survival, which is the purpose of living in a community.
I understand what you're getting at. But I think you go too far when you reduce morality to "subjective preferences". True, it is my personal preference that stealing is, for the most part, wrong, but I didn't decide this on my own. I was born into a society that is culturally structured around this norm (among many others) so I couldn't help but become normalised by it like everyone else.
Do you see what I mean? I'm saying that you have it in reverse. Our personal preferences don't ground morality, rather, morality becomes our personal preference.
Also I think it can be a bit misleading to talk about values like it is the same thing as morality. I despise the bourgeoisie, because I value a different ideology, but this has nothing to do with morality. And there are particular moral values that I have a greater or lesser personal preference for due to my personality, but this does not mean that I have a unique morality, nor does it mean that I won't still do the things that I have a weak preference for doing. I do them because I feel morally bound to do them, even though I don't want to do them and I would prefer not to do them. Why? Because morality is not our personal preference.
If you look at the history of morality and its temporal movement you'll see:
1. Similarities - love, peace, equality, happiness, freedom, harm not, etc.
2. Convergence over time - the moral landscape is, with time, becoming homoegenous i.e. the similarities in 1 above are universally appealing and are being adopted across cultures.
1 and 2 point to one thing - we have common values. If so it's interesting, to say the least, to inevestigate the reason why this is so.
Does the subjective-objective distinction matter for morality? Being objective is generally conisdered superior to the subjective. But what is the difference between the two? Being objective is unbiased/unprejudiced and therefore meets the standards of good reasoning. But reasoning must begin somewhere and the objectivity required for that starting point is quite different - our observations of reality need to be objective. How do we test our observations for objectivity? By repeating observations across observers, time and space. If you agree then aren't the following observations of the world objective facts?
1. We all want to be happy
2. We all want to avoid suffering
So, to some degree, morality, which is based on 1 and 2, is objective.
Again, none of this is an actual argument for your position. I'm not trying to be smart or trite; it really isn't.
You've yet to show why or how or to what extent morality is a subjective preference; all you've done is describe morality as a subjective preference.
I didn't say its not cognitive. I'm saying that you can't say that any moral code is objectively better than other. Or at least, there is no reason to believe that there is an objective morality where we can say killing is wrong because it's wrong. We can only say killing is wrong because we value a stable society, biological survival, or whatever you value. But the value is subjective.
You could say that any actions or laws that don't foster a safe, equitable, orderly society are wrong because they aren't consistent with your or the majority of society's values which may an expression for wanting to survive (preference). But you can't say they are intrinsically morally wrong - you have to demonstrate that. And there hasn't been any argument that has done that in my opinion.
That just means that your wants, needs, desires, etc. were socially conditioned which lead to the preference you have today for wanting to the world to be a certain way. If I live in a society where girls shave their legs, I might become conditioned to find girls with shaved legs attractive. Based on my needs, wants, desires that are conditioned, I prefer to be with girls that shave their legs. If you live in a society where certain things are normalized, you might then prefer that society. If you are either socially conditioned or genetically predisposed to like vanilla ice cream, that doesn't make you preference for vanilla ice cream any less of a preference.
Quoting bloodninja
The fact that you feel morally bound to them means that you have a preference for that moral code. If you get wronged, you might want to punch the person in the face. But if you decide not to because you think it is immoral, it's because you have a preference to live in a society where people shouldn't punch others in the face. So you create your moral code based off of your subjective value of wanting a stable society (because it benefits you), whether it was socially conditioned or not, and therefore don't punch them.
And also keep in mind even if you truly care about others' well-being and have a moral code that values it... when you choose to live by that moral code, you are still doing it for your benefit. By seeing others' happy you get what you want and it makes you feel good.
But I never said it wasn't a preference! All I said was that the preference was derivative rather than grounding!
Do you understand the word 'derivative'?
Quoting SonJnana
I don't really see how that is relevant to the discussion... But my response to that is: because we are normalised through the social norms (morality) we tend to feel good when those norms are reocognised and feel bad when somebody deviates from those norms. It has nothing to do with our own benefit. The point is that we are constituted by those norms and cannot get outside of those norms.
It is true that many people have common values, but just because even if everyone has similar values because they all prefer to live in a stable society where they are all happy, that doesn't make it any more objective. That would be like saying if everyone like vanilla ice cream best, that vanilla is the best ice cream. It's still subjective, but maybe consistent with everyone's wants, needs, desires.
Quoting TheMadFool
This is actually not true at all. Many people actually want power in the world but don't act on it because they don't want to go to jail. It is true humans have empathy for biological reasons throughout evolution. But my point is that everyone if every single human agreed on how they want the world to be, that would only mean that there is a human consensus of morality. But that doesn't make an action any more intrinsically right or wrong. It only means that everyone's wants, needs, desires are the same or similar so that everyone's preferences are consistent with each other.
Maybe I haven't been clear. What I am arguing is that individuals' and societies' moralities are based on subjective preferences. And that there is no rational way to say that any moral code is objectively better than another. When our laws and moral codes change over time, we can only say that they are changing. There is no objective standard to judge them off of to say that they are improving. We can say our society has changed it's rules so that now it is in a better position to survive, but that doesn't make any individual action any more or less intrinsically good.
I re-read your original post and I think I understand it better now. Could you explain a little further what you mean by saying it is a derivative?
Quoting bloodninja
This means that other peoples' moral code based on their subjective values based on their preferences becomes normalized into you. So your preferences become more like the preferences of society's. Maybe it's simply because it's what you get used to and it's too uncomfortable to live any other way so you prefer to live that way. That doesn't seem to be a problem to what I'm saying.
Quoting bloodninja
You say it is not your preference... however it is your preference. It's not black as white to say I either prefer to do something or not. There can be multiple reasons in conflict for wanting to do something or not. For example, maybe you donate a lot of money because you feel morally bound to do it even though you say you prefer not to. However, you chose to live by a moral code, which was based off of your values. Your values (wants, needs, desires) may have been socially conditioned or whatever, but the point is that you prefer to live by that code and you prefer to then donate because you feel satisfied in following through with your code and maybe also because it makes you feel good to donate.
Just because you have conflicting desires and you may prefer not to donate for some reasons, you still do it because in the end, you prefer to do it for other reasons that outweigh. I don't think it's fair to say that you do something because your morally bound even though you don't prefer to do it. When you make your decision, you choose to act on your moral code because you prefer that decision over the alternative of not acting on your moral code.
That's very clear; that's the assertion I've been critiquing.
Quoting SonJnana
A self-fulfilling prophecy, which presumably is your reasoning for your previous statement:
Quoting SonJnana
Quoting SonJnana
Meaningless, given the above.
Quoting SonJnana
So is survival the goal, in your view?
Again, I can't see any argument so far.
I think it might help you to distinguish between intrinsic and objective. There might be no intrinsic morality while at the same time morality might be an objective fact. This is basically my view. Morality just is objective conformism. Conformism is not intrinsic but is an objective fact nonetheless.
But again, you're just asserting this. Why is value merely subjective?
Quoting SonJnana
But you're implying that morality stems only from our "valuation" of things, and nothing more. Either you think morality is a sham (error theory), or you think it's an expression of some mental state (non-cognitivism), since those are basically the two major options for moral anti-realists.
To say "I value society" can be a true statement that represents a non-cognitive state, the state of my valuing society. From the non-cognitivist perspective, statements like "murder is wrong" is not really a proposition, it's more like "boo murder!" or "I dislike murder". The difficulty with this, of course, is that "right" and "wrong" seem to not obviously equate to "like" and "dislike". Whereas subjective preferences are one thing that we know frequently, rightness and goodness seem to be non-natural, indefinable things. Which is partially why I said I think the choice is between moral realism and error theory. Rightness and goodness just can't be reduced to subjective preferences. Either morality is a real thing or it's a "cobweb of the mind" (to use Kant's phrase).
I understand what you're saying. I re-evaluate my position. In the absence of any argument that rationally demonstrates that there is an objective morality, let alone how that morality would judge actions, it is not being intellectually honest to say that any action is objectively morally good or bad. I'm open to objective morality, but still haven't seen a good argument for it.
Quoting Noble Dust
Survival is the goal for many people's moral codes. But even if every individual agreed on a moral code, and they may think that it it is objectively wrong to murder, that doesn't mean that it is objectively wrong to murder. It only means that their is consensus.
The morality that people grow into seems to me to just be an expression of everyone's preferences. They may themselves think that murder is objectively morally right or wrong. And people that grow into it may adopt the same kind of thinking. It has to be demonstrated though that there is even a reason to believe there is an objective morality before we can even begin to judge any actions by it's standards.
Quoting bloodninja
If there was universal consensus, you can say that it is objectively true that everyone in the world thinks that murder is wrong. But that doesn't mean there is an objective standard we can use to judge whether it is right or wrong. If aliens come along and don't think that, what would you tell them? You can show them how it is useful to think that it's wrong to murder, but that doesn't mean that it is wrong to murder.
I have re-evaluated. In the absence of any argument that rationally demonstrates that there is an objective morality, let alone how that morality would judge actions, it is not being intellectually honest to say that any action is objectively good or bad. I'm open to objective morality, but still haven't seen a good argument for it.
Quoting darthbarracuda
I apologize that I'm not too familiar with technical terms in philosophy. I am still learning.
I agree right and wrong aren't the same think as like and dislike. My point is that we claim to say something is right or wrong based off of our preferences. If I like to live in a stable society, I may say murder is wrong. But when we say something is immoral, we're using the standard of our own personal moral code which is based off of our like and dislikes. Or maybe it's because it was socially conditioned and any other moral code is too uncomfortable. Or maybe it seems intuitive because of the person's genes. Or maybe the person themselves beleives something is objectively right or wrong.
It's often probably a case of many of those reasons. But it has to be demonstrated that there even is an objective morality. And then to judge murder as wrong objectively, we would have to then know how that objective morality would judge the act of murder.
This doesn't sound quite right, since it's question-begging. Why should morality, in the absence of any argument that demonstrates it to be objective, be seen as not-objective? Why shouldn't the opposite be the case? Why shouldn't you have to demonstrate the morality is not-objective? After all, morality certainly seems to appear to us as "objective", as a command-from-afar, an imperative, something we must do out of free will.
To put the "burden of proof" on the moral realist is question-begging because it only makes any sense at all if we already assume certain other metaphysical notions: notions that (if we are to discuss philosophy) need to be argued for (which would then just lead into an argument for moral anti-realism).
So you probably are assuming something along the lines of a "modern" naturalistic picture of the universe: the world operates (mechanically? statistically?) by certain "laws" that are discovered by science, and part of this includes the rejection of any sort of non-physical "stuff". Objective morals are seen as necessarily being non-physical, and thus we can assume they do not exist given the prevailing physicalist framework.
Okay. You may believe this is true. But you need to argue this to be true. For someone like myself is going to deny that physicalism is true, and a realist naturalist is going to deny that objective morals have to be non-physical. You can't just assume this naturalist framework is true, because not everyone agrees with it.
Quoting SonJnana
The ambiguity here is with your claim that morality is "based" on our preferences. I'm not sure what this exactly means. You say right and wrong are different than like and dislike, so as to regard them as separate things. But you say we claim something is right or wrong based off of our preferences. Since you deny preferences (like and dislike) are identical to right and wrong, and want to argue for anti-realism, you're effectively left with error theory: we have concepts of right and wrong, but they never are instantiated because there are no such things as objective right and wrong moral truths.
You claim that if I want to live in a stable society, I may say murder is wrong. Thus it seems as though you see morality as something people use for their own benefit. But this makes it ambiguous, still, as thus statements like "murder is wrong" seems to be basically saying "do not murder because I want to live in stable society". Yet I will press you on this - is this really what we mean? Do we really think something is moral or immoral based on our contingent preferences? Because it seems obvious to me that the two statements are not equivalent in any sense. One is a moral imperative and the other is non-moral supplication.
The difference between non-cognitivism and error theory is basically that of truth-aptness. Non-cognitivists think moral claims are expressions, say, of emotions or preferences, which themselves cannot have any truth value. Liking chocolate is not a truth claim. Whereas error theorists claim that moral propositions are truth-apt: saying "murder is wrong" is literally saying that murder is something: it is wrong. What separates the error theorist from the moral realist (they are both cognitivist positions) is that the error theorist denies there is anything real about right or wrong (or good and bad, etc).
You have said that the moral realist must provide the demonstration, but you yourself have offered mostly "maybes": maybe morality is socially conditioned, maybe it's "because of someone's genes", maybe they're fooling themselves, etc. You'll need to provide more to convince someone.
So in conclusion there are two things I think you need to explain and clarify:
1.) the general metaphysical framework you are coming from (including what you think objective morals are/must be), and
2.) what the claim "morality is based on preferences" ultimately amounts to, because although I think you wish to present something along the lines of error theory, you nevertheless seem to also vacillate into non-cognitivism.
Pretty much covered it in his response to your paragraph which was essentially the same as what you wrote to me here. But I wanted to point out one more thing. "Intellectual honesty" is an objective moral. And no, it's not a "subjective preference", because this suggests "intellectual dishonesty" would be an equally valid subjective preference. And to assert that such preferences are equally valid is to assert an objective morality: "these two preferences are equally valid". Honesty, by it's nature, is objective. Honesty is anti-dishonesty. It looks like one moral objective for you is intellectual honesty, which is an admirable one, but you don't seem aware of it.
You keep saying the same thing over and over again. But we (the collectivity of society and its various institutions) don't care what your preferences are. Further more, we teach people from childhood on up that we expect them to prefer what we (collectively) have defined as legal, right and good. Finally, whatever your preferences, you will be held to society's standards, whether that matches your preferences or not.
You think that might makes right? You're damn right. And we have the might, and you do not. Therefore, you will prefer what is right, or you will be severely punished.
As for your possibly felonious preferences, where do you think your preferences come from? Do you think you just make them up? Do you think your preferences are under your control? For the most part, no. You mostly prefer what you are allowed to prefer, and there isn't much you can do about it.
Consider chocolate cake and blueberry pie. Which do you prefer? Where did that preference come from? If you lived in France in 1500, you could not have a preference for either one of these, because they didn't exist in Europe at the time. Social realities have something to do with your preferences.
What you prefer depends on your genetics, the time and place in which you live, your pre-natal experiences, your early childhood, and later experiences. None of these things are under your control, and your preferences aren't freely chosen. Parents and society strongly discourage preferences that are not compatible with the prevailing morality. Society goes to considerable inconvenience to make sure that children prefer what we wish for them to prefer.
*applause*
I agree there is a big difference in those statements. One is an expression of what one likes and one is an expression of what one considers to be morally wrong. So now I ask you why is torturing children for fun wrong? What makes it objectively wrong?
No; what makes torturing children not objectively wrong?
If morality was merely one's subjective preference then there would be nothing normative in it. What makes morality significant is the fact that it has strong normative force, in other words, that it provides us with an 'ought' by which we feel compelled to act. It can only provide this because we take it as something bigger and more objective than our subjective preference. Moreover I think it is clear
that you have the burden of proof in this case, so it is you that has to justify your position, not us.
Quoting SonJnana
I would explain that murder was not our way, but there are no arguments to give for why it would also be an ought for their way of life if they have a completely different way of life and different way of organising their shared worlds. If they had any respect for beings other than themselves then they might respect our way of life and we could reach a compromise. If not then I guess there would be conflict. I think our shared way of life is as deep as it goes regarding morality however.
BTW I think what Bitter Crank said was pretty to the point...
The claim is that morality is objective. If I take the position of not believing that morality is either objective or non-objective, then the burden of proof lies on someone to demonstrate that it is objective. And in the absence of any argument for it that is convincing, I think it is unfair for me to say that any action is objectively wrong even if that feels uncomfortable to me.
I don't think I have to argue for my position because it is a lack of belief of objective morality. And one has to make an argument that something nonphysical exists, not the other way around. That would be like you telling me that there is an invisible unicorn in the room and telling me to prove that it isn't there.
Quoting darthbarracuda
They are different types of statements. When I was saying preferences I was meaning it to include what one's "conscience" tells them but I think me using the word preferences was misleading and caused confusion. I may have been misusing the word. The point is people create a moral code for many reasons. That's obviously true. The question is what makes the statement "murder is objectively morally wrong?"
I am just unconvinced that it is objective. I'm taking the position that if someone were to ask me "why is murder objectively morally wrong," I would say I don't know. I won't tell them that it is, but I also won't tell them that it isn't. So that is up to you argue for since I am not asserting that morality is objective or non-objective.
(My position from the original post has changed a little bit because I have found some holes in what I was originally, and I thank you all for that).
I don't understand. I thought objective morality was about what one ought to do. What makes intellectual honesty an objective moral?
What makes intellectual dishonesty a subjective moral?
Of course there is a difference. There is even a difference between "I don't like liver" and "I don't like Brussels sprouts." But, assuming emotivism for the sake of an argument, what is "crucial" about this difference, other than the strength of the emotion?
That is not a rhetorical question, but an invitation to elaborate the point. "Emotion" is one word, but that doesn't mean that all emotions are of the same sort. Is there a difference here that cannot be accommodated under some ordinary idea of emotion?
When I was using the word preferences, I never said that it isn't controlled by many factors. I have stated a few times now that they may have been socially conditioned, etc. But just because they aren't fully in control doesn't mean that at that point in time your preference is not your preference, regardless of what caused it to be your preference. I also think that by using the word preference I was not explaining my position very clearly so I'll avoid using it now.
People create their moral code for many reasons. Socially conditioned, beliefs about what is right or wrong, etc.. But if someone asserts that stealing is wrong, why is it objectively wrong? That is up to you to argue since I am taking the position of not asserting that it is objective or non-objective.
I didn't assert that. You asserted that it is objective moral so it's up argue that.
Also I'm not really sure I understand what moral means in this context so this may be just a big understanding lol.
I decided to no longer use the word preference because I think it was misleading for my point. The burden of proof is on you however because I am taking the position of being unconvinced that morality is objective or non-objective. I am not making assertions so if you claim that it is objective, that is up to you to support.
Quoting bloodninja
So if there is an isolated group of humans that have a completely different lifestyle and have never made contact with the rest of the world, would you tell them murder is objectively wrong?
Ok I will jump through your hoop. What would count for objectivity? My claim would be others in agreement. It all depends on this. A philosophical term for this is intersubjectivity.
Quoting SonJnana
I would say that In our society it is objectively wrong, even for the psychopaths. If they wanted to live in our society then it would be objectively wrong for them too, even if they are a psychopath.
You'd be right if I asserted that morality was non-objective but I'm not asserting that. I'm not asserting it to be objective or non-objective.
Quoting BlueBanana
If there is a dictator killing people and you tell him to stop because his murdering is immoral. He asks you why he should listen to you, What makes it so bad? What is your argument to the dictator?
Under these definitions if everyone was in agreement that the earth was flat, then wouldn't it be objectively true that the world was flat?
What you describe sounds like morality simpliciter. What is particularly "objective" about it? Or, to put it another way, what would a non-objective morality be like in your view?
Good point. Yes it would. BUT there would be relevant people (the people who determine the particular kind of objectivity) and irrelevant people (the people who have no influence on the particular kind of objectivity). So for example the shape of the earth is a question that can be fulfilled scientifically and not religiously. This is because it is a scientific question. If there is a general scientific agreement that the earth is flat then it would be true that the earth is flat. It turns out that there is no general scientific agreement that the earth is flat. Some religious groups think this, but they do not belong to an appropriate group to satisfy the objectivity claim in this case.
The objectivity in question won't always be scientific. It could be artistic, moral, law, philosophical, etc.
And if it's objective it's intrinsic, if it's not it can still be intrinsic. Therefor, the only way to come to the conclusion that nothing is intrinsically wrong is to take the premise that morals are subjective.
Quoting SonJnana
That it's my subjective opinion that killing people has an intrinsic negative moral value.
And if they later re-evaluated and agreed that the Earth is actually a sphere then what? You're telling me that they would say the earth used to be flat but now its a sphere because we changed our mind? How does that make any sense?
Like I said, I've already found some holes in what I was originally saying so I've re-evaluated and changed my position. I'm not asserting anymore. The burden of proof is on you.
Quoting BlueBanana
Please explain.
What is there to explain? I don't want him to kill people because it human life has subjective intrinsic value to me and that's my subjective view. He should, in my opinion, respect my opinion but objectively he doesn't have to.
Quoting SonJnana
Not unless you question the view and to do that you have to have the opposite view, and then the burden is on you as well.
I agree, moral attitudes seem to be prescriptive: they are aimed at compelling or constraining actions, which other attitudes such as pleasure, disgust, sadness, gratitude, fear, tenderness, etc. do not do in and of themselves. And they tend to have a more-or-less general character: not just do that in this particular instance, but whenever anyone finds themselves in similar circumstances, they ought to do something like that. So an argument can be made that moral attitudes can be grouped into a natural kind distinct from other attitudes (although the boundary is going to be somewhat fuzzy).
But that is a modest, commonsensical conclusion of conceptual analysis: it only assures us that the predicate "moral" is meaningful and expressive. It doesn't tell us much about the metaphysics of morality.
Quoting BlueBanana
I don't think this is accurate. The burden of proof lies on the person making a positive claim. You can counter a positive claim with a negative claim, which still leaves the burden of proof on the first person. An example would be:
"The Earth is round."
"No, it isn't."
There isn't a burden on the second person because they haven't made a positive claim to prove. If the person had said, "No, it's flat." Then that would hold a burden of proof.
Don't misconstrue this as the same thing as the equally-silly notion of an "agnostic atheist", where atheism is just assumed-to-be-true-unless-proven-wrong. That's precisely not how philosophy works. We don't just assume things are right or wrong. We don't assume anything, we start from the basics and work from there. And the basics are definitely not that physicalism is true, God does not exist, and morality isn't real.
The "invisible unicorn" schtick is frustrating because it shows you are not actually an agnostic here. You're a moral anti-realist. There's no "agnostic moral anti-realist" just as there is no "agnostic atheist". You can believe in the reality of x, deny it, or withdraw from commitment. You can't withdraw from commitment but still have your toe dipped in one camp. Well, I guess you can but it doesn't help the discussion at all, because we're concerned about the status of beliefs and not the status of how deeply you personally believe in something.
Notice how a lack of belief in something is not inherently asymmetrical. The agnostic lacks belief in both moral realism and anti-realism. You need to be uncommitted to both to be an agnostic. Whereas you are only lacking belief in realism, and have anti-realism as your fall-back position. Which is question-begging, as I said before.
So going back to the invisible unicorn: if you think the invisible unicorn does not exist, then you aren't agnostic about its existence. It's very, very simple and I get very frustrated when this sort of reasoning keeps cropping up. I blame it entirely on the new atheist charlatans. Sorry if this sounds like I'm attacking you personally, I just get really triggered by this.
Quoting SonJnana
Okay, I did not know you had changed your views. So now you are agnostic on this, at least you claim to be. If you are agnostic then you aren't sure if morality is real or not. But remember that a failure to provide a convincing argument for A does not entail ~A, logically. It just means there hasn't been a good argument for A; in the absence of all evidence for A, we may feel compelled to adopt ~A, but ~A still has not been demonstrated itself. Something about A has to be proven to be contradictory or incorrect for ~A to be proven.
You're right, that's my mistake. The example I gave didn't accurately portray my intended point. I was conflating claiming something isn't true with claiming something is false. An accurate example would be one person claiming that it is true that the Earth is round, and the other person claiming that it is not true.
If someone claims something is true, and you claim it is not, there is no burden of proof on you. That's what I originally meant. This is because, as darthbarracuda just said:
Quoting darthbarracuda
So, the claim that something isn't true is not the same as the claim that it is false.
No, it's more like, the absence of evidence for A is not evidence of the absence of A. Saying something isn't true is equivalent to saying it is false. Saying someone has not provided sufficient reason for believing in A does not mean A is false.
Questioning a view doesn't mean I have the opposite view. If you tell me that there is an even number of gumballs in a jar, I can question your view. I'll ask you okay show me how you know. But just because I haven't been convinced that the number is even, that doesn't mean I believe it's odd either.
Yes, there is. For something to be false is the same as it being not true, and the burden of proof being on someone means that their claim is not proven to be true. As long as it's not been proven the Earth is not round, it can't be considered to be not round and anyone claiming it's not true that the Earth is round has the burden of proof on them.
An agnostic atheist doesn't assume God is not real. It lacks the belief in a god.
If you ask me if there is an even number of gumballs in a jar, just because I lack the belief doesn't mean I assume that it is not even and therefore odd. How could I say that it is even with out a reason to think so. How could I say it's not even (and therefore odd) if I don't have any reason to believe that either? I am unconvinced both ways.
Similarly if you can't convince me why morality is objective, I have no reason to believe it. It doesn't mean I believe morality is not objective either.
But that's just agnosticism, not agnostic atheism towards their number being even.
Like I've said many times, I originally was asserting that morality is not objective, but since then I've changed my position because I realized I couldn't back up the assertion. People are still asserting that morality is objective, however, so that's up to them to back up.
Quoting BlueBanana
That's how lay people like to use the word but technically atheism is simply a lack of a belief. Atheism and agnostic are not mutually exclusive. Look I'm not gonna argue about semantics of the word atheism, that's a waste of time.
My position is this. There is a claim that morality is objective. I lack that belief similarly to me lacking a belief that there are an even number of gumballs. That does not mean that I believe that morality is not objective or that there is not an even number of gumballs. So if you assert that it is objective, back it up.
Agnostic atheism is an incoherent position that begs the question. Lacking belief in God does not mean you believe God does not exist just as lacking a belief in an even number of gumballs does not mean you believe there are an odd number of gumballs. Lacking a belief in objective morality does not mean you believe morality is subjective. I'm not seeing the issue here.
That's nonsense. The earth didn't change from flat to round in this case. It was always round, but we were wrong. Because it being round affecting our lives.
I have never heard your type of reasoning.
No, it's not. It's belief in the lack of something, which does obviously include the lack of belief in that something, but a lack of belief is agnosticism, not atheism.
Lacking a belief in god does not mean that I believe god does not exist - this is correct.
Lacking a belief in an even number of gumballs does not mean I believe there is an odd number of gumballs - correct.
Lacking a belief that there is an objective morality does not mean that I believe morality is subjective - correct.
Because like I've said many times now, originally I was asserting that it was subjective. But I don't know how clear I can make it, that I've changed my position since I made this topic. I've mentioned it so many times in my responses and even made an edit in the original post.
I am not asserting that morality is non-objective.
Okay, so you are agnostic on this and want people to convince you that objective morality is true?
This is clear, but the semantics of agnosticism/atheism and who has the burden nof proof are so interesting that we're sticking to those topics on a more general level even if you refuse to be an example.
I told you not to go there. But since you went there:
Definition of atheism
1 a : a lack of belief or a strong disbelief in the existence of a god or any gods
Quoting BlueBanana
Possibly. But then I would ask you why would a dictator care if you intrinsically value to not kill if he intrinsically values murder if it's only subjective.
Yes, because I lack the belief that morality is objective.
Hmm... when I imply that he wouldn't care or have any reason to, and you ask me why he would care, how should I answer the question?
Also, I don't think the dictator would intrinsically value killing. For him it'd only be means to achieve safety, success, well-being, or whatever.
If it's not used the way the dictionary defines it then fine, define it how you want. I'm not gonna argue about the semantics of a word. You understand that my position is the lack of a belief, we don't need any labels that carry baggage.
I ask this because I find it interesting that when someone says murder is wrong then, it's only because they subjectively intrinsically value something. But if anyone can intrinsically value any act then there doesn't seem to be good reason to tell someone that they shouldn't do something. You'd essentially be saying don't do it because I subjectively value it.
Quoting BlueBanana
Thank you
Quoting darthbarracuda
I lack the belief because I haven't been presented with an argument that convinces me morality is objective. So do you have one?
Argh, sniped.
Ah, you come from the utilitarianist point of view - if you can't convince them, why tell them what you think, right? But of course if you value something, you want the others to value the same thing, which is why you'd tell them to act the way you think is right.
A command from who?
Quoting darthbarracuda
It does require explanation because it's not intuitive and self-evident. If it was we wouldn't be having this conversation. You can't just say I'm right because it's obvious. You have to explain that.
I'm hesitant to answer this. I'm only describing what it's like. It's a command from the Other, whether that be God, a victim's face, or whatever.
Quoting SonJnana
Again I'm describing the experience of perceiving something as having moral content. Do you doubt that we do, in fact, see things as objectively right and wrong, good and bad, even if they aren't actually?
The point I'm making is that the perception that something is good or bad, right or wrong, is intuitive in the same way it is intuitive that a triangle has 180 degrees. It's synthetic a priori.
I don't like to label myself as having a point of view so I can't really speak for that.
Now of course this is all speaking hypothetically as if there were no objective view.
If a psychopath values murder and another person values to not kill. And then a thousand other people come along and decide say they also value to not kill. Then they make the rules. So that would mean that the people who have the power and similar values will then implement their rules and it'd be like a might makes right.
Why should I believe that there is a command coming from anything? I lack a belief in that.
Quoting darthbarracuda
I personally don't see things as objectively morally good or bad because I haven't been convinced so yet. Also, just because something feels intuitive doesn't make it true. I can intuitively think that what I see in a magic trick is true, but that doesn't mean it is true.
I am only saying that morality oftentimes takes the form of a command-from-afar. I'm providing a phenomenological description of our experience of morality.
Quoting SonJnana
But why haven't you been convinced yet? What's the argument against what I've said? I want to know what the metaphysical framework you're coming from is.
Quoting SonJnana
You misunderstand me. Essentially I am saying that if you deny objective morality than you ought to deny that mathematics is also objective. Consider how both operate through intuitive principles that can be applied through logical reasoning. Both can be rationally argued for - at least, we do believe that someone can be right or wrong about mathematics, so why cannot someone be right or wrong about morality?
You originally said "Morality is given to us in the form of a command-from-afar, as something we ought to do." So tell me, why should I believe that there is this command coming? Explain to me where it is how you know there is a command, where is it coming from, and why should I believe that it is objective? I don't hear this command.
Quoting darthbarracuda
I don't need any framework. I am unconvinced that there are an even number of gumballs in the jar. So now it is up to you to explain why there is and I will be convinced if I don't see any holes in your reasoning. So you provide your moral framework since you're the one asserting that morality is objective.
Quoting darthbarracuda
Someone who says one gumball plus two gumballs = three gumballs can be proven right because if you actually have one and add two, you end up with three. It's reliable and consistent for practical knowledge. Someone who says "murder is morally objectively wrong" why should I believe that that's right? So far all you've said to support this is that there is some command, but haven't explained how you know there is this command.
No it isn't. Something false is necessarily not true, but something not true is not necessarily false. Something can be neither true nor false. This is true both in the sense that we're talking about (whether something has been proven) as well as in an objective sense.
So, if I claim something is true that is not proven true, and another person claims it is not true, they have no burden of proof because, as I said, the thing is not proven true.
Example: a person claims it is true that God exists, and I claim it is not true. I am not claiming that God doesn't exist, only that it is not proven true that God exists, which is correct.
Quoting BlueBanana
This is a common misconception. Agnosticism relates to knowledge, not belief. This is why you can be an agnostic theist or an agnostic atheist. Agnosticism is just the position that we do not or cannot possess knowledge of something. You can be agnostic about matters other than theism.
You don't "hear" the calling of the face of a victim? You don't "hear" the inner voice of your conscience telling you to do something? You don't see morality as a system of imperatives, something we must do based on something that is higher than our own empirical desires?
Again, this is just phenomenology. I'm not necessarily saying here that there actually is someone who calls or grounds these imperatives. It's just how morality manifests in our consciousness.
Quoting SonJnana
You do need a framework if you're going to explain what it is about my explanation that you find wanting. Otherwise it's just you denying anything I say as "unconvincing" without any dialectic argument. I need to know what you think is wrong with my argument.
Quoting SonJnana
And we know this a priori. What I was pointing out was that one and two and three could just be "mental" stuff that doesn't apply to the "real" world, if we're to be nominalists, and the same could be said about moral things as well. So if we deny morality is real on the grounds that it's just "mental" and not "real", what prevents us from doing this with mathematical claims as well? Why are numbers real but morals not?
Quoting SonJnana
I already said we know of moral things like rightness and goodness through an a priori intuition in the same way we know mathematical things. Rightness and goodness are sui generis concepts and are importantly simple, not being able to be reduced to parts. By the same way we know 2+3=5 and that triangles have 180 degrees, we can know that gratuitous suffering is bad and inflicting needless harm onto others wrong.
That's not what not being true means. True things are true, even when not proven to be.
No, agnosticism in philosophy is the lack of any belief on the matter. This is why agnostic atheism and agnostic theism are logically incoherent. Don't let the etymology trip you up here. Agnosticism is used not as a knowledge claim but as a middle-ground between positive beliefs.
From the SEP: "Nowadays, the term “agnostic” is often used (when the issue is God’s existence) to refer to those who follow the recommendation expressed in the conclusion of Huxley’s argument: an agnostic is a person who has entertained the proposition that there is a God but believes neither that it is true nor that it is false." Note that this is not denying the cognitive content of God talk but is denying any positive alignment with a view.
Just because your "conscience" tells you something is right or wrong doesn't mean that it is objectively morally right or wrong. If that were the case then if my friend conscience tells them to donate 50% of their money then that implies that it is objectively morally good to do that. But other peoples' conscience tells them to donate 25% maybe. You can't get to objectivity from conscience. That's nonsense. It could just be a psychological mechanism that our brains developed because those without empathy didn't pass on their genes and cooperation was promoted by evolution. You can't get an objective morality from that. If your brain were to activate hormones that make you feel bad when you murder because that kind of process was useful for your ancestors to survive, that doesn't make it objectively true that it is morally wrong to murder. Also, there may be people such as psychopaths who may not even have this conscience you speak of.
Quoting darthbarracuda
You are laying out your argument for why there is objective morality and I'm clearly quoting you and explaining in each instance what I find wanting in your explanations.
Quoting darthbarracuda
We can know 2+3=5 because we can take 2, add 3, and see that there are 5. We can create a triangle and measure the 180 degrees. These are objective facts. We can develop proofs for mathematics that are sound. But we cant say that it is objectively true harming others needlessly is objectively morally wrong. Show me the proof for that. I've already explained why conscience doesn't work for that.
That's another philosophical topic entirely. But to be brief, when we say something is true, what we mean is that it has been proven to be true based on the information we currently have. Things are always subject to change, and we often discover new information that forces us to change our "truths". It is impossible for us to say anything is objectively true because it is impossible for us to possess all of the information in the universe.
So, yes, true things are true whether we know they are true or not, but that isn't the kind of truth we're referring to when we typically discuss truth. We're referring to things that are "true" based on the information we currently have, which is incomplete and always will be.
From SEP:
The terms “agnostic” and “agnosticism” were famously coined in the late nineteenth century by the English biologist, T.H. Huxley. He said that he originally "invented the word “Agnostic” to denote people who, like [himself], confess themselves to be hopelessly ignorant concerning a variety of matters, about which metaphysicians and theologians, both orthodox and heterodox, dogmatise with the utmost confidence." (1884)
I know today it is often used to refer to a middle ground between atheism and theism, but that isn't the true meaning of the term. If you want to argue that a word's meaning should change based on its use, that's fine, I would just disagree. That essentially renders languages meaningless; you can say any word and claim it means anything you want.
Exactly what, outside of social agreement, is the "true meaning" of the term agnosticism? Does something being really old make it truer?
Also relevant.
Just because people can be mistaken in moral beliefs or moral perceptions doesn't mean morality isn't objective. People disagree about things all the time. Doesn't change anything.
What is it about a priori intuition of moral truths that you find problematic? All I'm saying is the concepts "good" and "right" are similar in kind to the concepts "number" and the specific numbers themselves.
Quoting SonJnana
How do we "see" they are equal to 5, if not through an intuitive, a priori understanding of certain mathematical concepts? I don't just "see" 2+3=5 when I look at some scribbles on a page or see some things put into the same bunch as other things.
Quoting SonJnana
Well, as I've said, if we are honest and clear-headed I think it should be clear what some of these moral principles are, which we can manipulate logically. And the fact is that we can create valid logical inferences with moral propositions. Honestly I don't see your resistance to this as any more than a prejudice, a prejudice I've been trying to get you to acknowledge.
So because a fact complicates things, we should ignore it?
Quoting darthbarracuda
First of all, who is "we"?
Second, the fact that you apparently think it not only acceptable, but more reasonable to ignore certain details and intricacies of an issue in favour of simplifying it is surprising, being that we're on a philosophy forum and that attitude is very un-philosophical.
And third, I'm not opposed to have a term to describe someone who is neither atheist nor theist, but agnostic already means something else entirely, so instead of stealing the words of others, how about creating a new word to serve this new purpose?
I posted the true meaning of the term in the same comment you just quoted. Did you miss it somehow?
It's not a fact, it's just a useless and sneaky way for a lot of people to escape having to justify their beliefs by pretending to be the "null position" and begging the question. That's bullshit.
Quoting JustSomeGuy
Presumably anyone interested in knowing whether God exists or not.
Quoting JustSomeGuy
Why? I just showed how it was useless and dumb to put agnostic and (a)theism together. It's incoherent and unhelpful.
Quoting JustSomeGuy
Well like you said, words go through changes in definition. As of now agnostic is used primarily as a middle position between atheism and theism.
I now see trying to use reason with you is futile. You apparently have no interest in it.
Carry on without me.
The principle of mathematics can be logically proven by what we see in reality. You can't group objective morality in the same group. The only thing you've mentioned as grounded in reality about objective morality is that there is a command from a-far, which you haven't demonstrated, and the conscience argument.
Quoting darthbarracuda
As I've stated before "If your brain were to activate hormones that make you feel bad when you murder because that kind of process was useful for your ancestors to survive, that doesn't make it objectively true that it is morally wrong to murder." Conscience is not proof that it is objectively wrong to murder.
You keep asserting this but I've denied this every time. I just see moral principles as on basically the same level as mathematical principles. Forget the whole "calling" thing, because it's not even that relevant (it's just a phenomenological description with no connection to whether it's actually objective).
Quoting SonJnana
But is conscience just the feeling of good or bad, or does it have cognitive content (as I've said many time already)?
Mathematical principle can be proven in reality. You still have to prove the objective morality.
Quoting darthbarracuda
Let me rephrase a little bit. If the human brain were to evolve to encompass a type of thinking where it believes that it is objectively morally wrong and/or activate hormones that make a person feel bad when they murder because that kind of thought process was useful for ancestors to survive, that doesn't make it objectively true that it is morally wrong to murder. Conscience is not proof that it is objectively wrong to murder.
How do we do this? I'm stressing that mathematics is synthetic a priori, not synthetic a posteriori. We don't do mathematical experiments, at least not in the sense of using experiments to show 2+3=5.
Quoting SonJnana
I'm not associated conscience with a good or bad feeling, like a hit of dopamine. I'm associating it with the feeling that what one did was right or wrong (with the good and bad feelings, of course).
The point I'm making is that I don't see morality as too much different to mathematics, and I think you don't recognize that mathematics is a priori in this sense. Empirical senses provide content for mathematical forms, and empirical senses also provide content for the application of moral principles.
If moral principles seem to you weird or not reliable (because they came from evolution, say), we need only remember that the same thing can be said about mathematical principles. Our mathematical sense is just as much a product of evolution as our moral sense would be. Yet most of us think mathematical principles are in fact objective and not a cobweb of the mind.
Isn't this an objective observation you've made?
I don't see what you have a problem with? I never said the earth changed shape. I was making a claim about the conditions for objectivity.
Quoting darthbarracuda
Take two objects. Take three objects. See that there are five objects. That's a posteriori knowledge.
How do I know what two, three, and five objects are, though? I must already have numbers as an a priori concept before.
How do we perceive amounts? Pretty sure we're given sense data and our mental faculties organize it. Do you think we perceive space and time?
There a clear distinction between mathematics and morality. When we make a math statement like 5+5=11, we can check that. If we have 5 apples and add 5, we get 10. We realize that the original statement 5+5=11 is wrong because statements like those are grounded in reality. That is a math law that is true regardless of what people think.
To say that morality is the same, you would have to prove that there is a natural law of ought. Conscience does not get us there because it relies on what people think is true. You have to prove that there is that objective morality outside of what people think. People can be socially conditioned to think many things, but just because they think that there is an objective morality and make statements about it, doesn't mean that there actually is one.
If everyone's favorite ice cream was vanilla, it would objectively be true that everyone's opinion of ice cream being the best flavor was consistent. But that wouldn't mean the opinion itself was an objective fact. It would just mean that the subjective opinions are consistent. Consensus on an opinion or belief doesn't mean that the opinion or belief itself is objectively true.
But we check statements like 5+5=11 by thinking. You're just assuming mathematics is objective, but it is the person themselves that has to think about mathematical principles to derive conclusions. "Checking" mathematical proofs is not empirically verifiable or anything like that, because mathematics is synthetic a priori.
So why not think of morality like this? Why not say, I can check to see if this law is morally acceptable, or if my actions are in line with moral principles? At its base, mathematics relies on certain axioms that must be taken to be true. Why can't morality be the same?
Quoting SonJnana
People can be socially conditioned to believe in an objective reality apart from consciousness, or God, or in the objectivity of mathematics, or the realism of scientific theories, or whatever. This is a possibility of error, yes. But it's still what you keep saying - a maybe, a perhaps. That's not very convincing.
I should've said this earlier, but yeah our definitions for objective differ if you define objective as just consensus of what people think or believe so we're just beating a dead horse lol.
I am not making any claims (see the edit in the original post). I am saying I haven't seen proof that there is an objective morality for why murder is immoral, other than what people think.
Math statements however are grounded in reality. It doesn't matter if hypothetically everyone thinks that 5+5=11. Regardless of what people think, when you have 5 objects and add 5 more, you objectively have 10 not 11. The people that think it is 11 are wrong.
Quoting darthbarracuda
Where are you going to check these moral principles? Where are you getting this objective morality from?
Quoting darthbarracuda
Unless you are solipsistic (in which case I'd end the discussion right here and now), you'd probably agree that the universe is. And mathematics can be derived from is. To argue for an objective ought, you'd have to assume that there is objective purpose behind the universe, and these balls of atoms that we label as humans have objective obligations. Do you believe in God?
(https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/2297/if-objective-morality-exists-then-its-knowledge-must-be-innate/p2). I have several posts in this thread, so it's not just one post. So for what it's worth here is my argument.
How do you know this? Again, you're just asserting the objectivity of mathematics.
Quoting SonJnana
In the same way you would check mathematical proofs. By thinking about them, a priori and synthetically.
Quoting SonJnana
But what I've been saying all this time is that we don't derive mathematics from the sense datum we take in, at least not in a wholly passive way.
Quoting SonJnana
See, now you're offering snippets of the metaphysical picture of reality you think is true. That objective morality requires teleology to the universe, perhaps a God, is part of your conception of what objective morality is. You need to actually explain this though because I'm not sure I follow.
Do you think that beliefs change objective reality? Do you think that just because people believed that 5+5=11 (and not just redefined 11 to mean 10, but they actually believed 11), having 5 objects and then adding 5 would become 11?
Quoting darthbarracuda
I actually take back what I said. But I do want to know since your asserting objective morality. Just so I can understand your position even more clear... does your claim of objective morality rely on the assumption that there is teleology, perhaps a god?
No, I don't think beliefs change reality. But I don't think you quite understand that it's not obvious to me, based on what you've said, that mathematics is objectively part of the world. And it certainly is not obvious to me that we somehow "see" mathematics in the sense datum.
Quoting SonJnana
No, I don't think so - at least not in the sense of there being a transcendent and all powerful being. Again, my position is that if we agree mathematics is indeed objective, then we also have reason to believe morality is objective, since both are synthetic a priori.
If you agree that people changing their beliefs to 5+5=11 in the example I gave doesn't change the fact that it is objectively true that right now if I have 5 objects and I add 5 I would get 10, then you agree that there is some objective math law that doesn't depend whether a person thinks that math law is true or not.
If you agree that a person who believes 5+5=11 saw 5 objects added to 5 more and ended up with 10 should re-evaluate their reasoning based off of that empirical evidence, you agree that the math knowledge we talk about is based off of an actual objective math law. And we know math laws are objective because we see them in reality.
The distinction with that and morality is that it has to first be demonstrated that our concepts of morality are actually based off of an actual objective morality. Or else we can't distinguish whether we are just constructing this idea of an objective morality, or if there actually is an objective morality (independent of one what thinks) and we can prove that.
Quoting darthbarracuda
Thanks for clearing that up. I think I fully understand your position now.
No, once again, mathematics is synthetic a priori. We don't "see" numbers. We don't "see" math. Nowhere in the sense data are you going to find that. Just like nowhere in the sense data are you going to find good and bad, right and wrong. All of this is synthetic a priori. I've emphasized this many times now: mathematics as well as morality are in the realm of reason. Just by reflection can we come to know mathematical truths, and just by reflection can we come to know moral truths.
That's not to say we are always great at doing morality. For a few simple principles or concepts might be easy enough to acknowledge but the right course of action in a specific particular situation is hardly ever self-evident. Probably in many cases we do the wrong thing by sheer ignorance.
Proof for the objectivity of morality comes from where? Conscience isn't good enough. 5 objects + 5 objects = 10 objects even before humans were around. That's because the math law is objective. However I can't distinguish whether it is objectively morally wrong to murder independently of human thought, or if humans evolved to believe that it is wrong to murder because it's useful. You have to demonstrate that.
You only said that it is an essential property, not why it is. With that reasoning I could say that the conventional view of justice is an essential property, and therefore if someone kills your wife you should kill his wife. They both seem subjective. You have to explain why harm is the essential property.
Are you not familiar with moral proofs? Moral principles are cognitive and can be manipulated in logic. We can make proofs. The question is whether or not our principles are true, principles like how suffering is bad, and needless harming wrong. But the same is true of mathematics. Again, mathematics could be nominalistic in the same way morality could be subjective. But I'll say that if we see mathematics as real, objectively, then we should also see morality as real, objectively. For it's in the same category of thought. It is now up to the anti-realist to show why, despite the fact that both morality and mathematics are synthetic a priori, mathematics is objective while morality is not.
Why do you not doubt that numbers are real but doubt that suffering is bad? Is it not intuitive that suffering is bad in the same way it is intuitive that 2+3=5?
Morality is not that same. You have to demonstrate that it is knowledge of an actual objective morality.
Quoting darthbarracuda
No it is not intuitive to me. I don't like suffering and I would like to see less suffering in both me and others because I don't like the way it makes me feel, but it's not intuitive that it's objectively morally wrong. Just because it is uncomfortable to me doesn't make it objectively morally wrong.
Even if it was intuitive, you still have to explain that there is an objective morality that exists outside of human thinking and that it's not a case of there being no objective morality but rather that humans evolved to be predisposed to want to believe that there is an objective morality and made it a human construct because the ones that didn't committed crimes and were killed by society.
The same could be said about mathematics. You keep going in circles, assuming mathematics is objective and empirical.
Just because you disagree with a moral evaluation, or don't see its pull, doesn't mean morality isn't objective. To say morality has to necessarily be recognized by a mind to be objective begs the question. You need to explain why morality cannot be objective, not just state you don't "see" it intuitively. Because clearly you do see some things that are good and bad, right and wrong, or you wouldn't even know what morality is (apart from some empty commands with no content - is this how you really take morality to be?)
The same can't be said about mathematics because the mathematical knowledge we have is about the actual objective math law which can be demonstrated, while the objective morality hasn't been demonstrated to me.
Quoting darthbarracuda
I do believe I understand what people mean when they say that something is objectively right or wrong, but that doesn't mean I myself believe that acts are objectively morally right or wrong.
Quoting darthbarracuda
I don't have to explain why it can't be objective because I'm not even asserting that it's non-objective. I thought we cleared my position up a long time ago. You are the one asserting why it is objective and if you can't demonstrate that, then you haven't backed up your claim.
"a case of there being no objective morality but rather that humans evolved to be predisposed to want to believe that there is an objective morality and made it a human construct because the ones that didn't committed crimes and were killed by society. "
^When I said this, I never said that I believe this is true. I'm not the one making claims. But if you assert that there is objective morality, it is up to you to demonstrate that it's not this case.
"My own view is that there is an essential property to a moral act, and that property is the conventional view of justice. All moral acts are those that act for justice. If there is no justice, there is no morality. When I say this I'm not saying that every justice act is an morally good one, only that all good or moral acts are for justice.
The second component is that morality is objective, that is, it's not subjective, or a matter of opinion, or a matter of consensus. For example, if I kill someone's wife because he killed mine, there are several factors that make this a moral act, and moreover, make it an objective moral act. First, it's objectively true that the arm has been cut off, we can see it on the ground. Second, we can objectively observe the fact that my wife was dead originally and now I have killed his. These two reactions show the objective nature of the justice done. No opinion or consensus will or can change the objective nature of these observations."
See the problem?
Look, I've already demonstrated to you that morality can come in the form of valid logical syllogisms, and that the premises are what are being doubted here. But I've also shown that mathematics also relies on certain premises. Both mathematics and morality are synthetic a priori. And I've argued that if we see mathematics as objective then, barring any good reasons to the opposite, we should also see morality as objective. It is a point in favor, I think, of morality being real that it has this affinity to logical reasoning. It is rational, and we can form cognitive beliefs about it. More importantly, we can disagree about things as well.
If you do not recognize the concepts right or wrong, good or bad, then there's nothing I can do to convince you. Just as you could never convince someone of the objectivity of mathematics if they failed to grasp mathematical principles. Morality is, as I see it, synthetic a priori and is intuitively grasped in the same way mathematics is. Surely you would not think that a child who does not understand mathematics shows that mathematics is entirely subjective?
So I have provided what I see to be a plausible theory of what morality is. As a response you have merely asserted that morality could be something else entirely. I cannot cover all my bases, I cannot knock down every alternative you present. You need to go on the offensive and explain to me what about my theory is false, or the discussion will end as I will have nothing else to say to convince you.
"When we say we have mathematical knowledge, what is it knowledge of? It is knowledge of the objective math law. Whether it's because you discovered it by noticing that when you had 5 objects and you added 5 you ended up with 10, or whether it's because the human brain evolved because it was useful understand the objective math law, or even maybe because you were socially conditioned to think that way. The point is that it is knowledge about an actual objective law that can be demonstrated."
Like I've said, it doesn't matter how you can get to the knowledge. The point is that mathematical knowledge is knowledge about a math law that actually objectively exists and can be demonstrated. But no, you haven't demonstrated that there is an objective morality rather than human construct.
"Even if it was intuitive, you still have to explain that there is an objective morality that exists outside of human thinking and that it's not a case of there being no objective morality but rather that humans evolved to be predisposed to want to believe that there is an objective morality and made it a human construct because the ones that didn't committed crimes and were killed by society. "
Furthermore, belief in God is intuitively true for many people as they say themselves. Does that make it true? If I see a magician, my brain is programmed to intuitively think that what they do is really happening, but I can use reasoning to realize that it doesn't make much sense.
Quoting darthbarracuda
I do recognize them. I just lack the belief that there is an objective moral standard of right or wrong.
Quoting darthbarracuda
No I wouldn't because I could demonstrate it with objects and it'd be true independent of whether they think it is an objective law or not. But I can't demonstrate that killing is objectively morally bad independent of whether people think it is true. That's the distinction.
Quoting darthbarracuda
Yes, I've stated that I can't distinguish whether there is an objective morality or a case of there being no objective morality but rather that humans evolved to be predisposed to want to believe that there is an objective morality and made it a human construct because the ones that didn't committed crimes and were killed by society.
All I'm saying is that I can't distinguish which one therefore I lack the belief that there is an objectively morality similarly to how I lack the belief that there is an even number of gumballs in the jar. But like I've said many times, that doesn't mean that I believe that there is an odd number of gumballs in the jar.
How even could I go on the offensive and back up my claims when I'm not making any? It's you making the claim and me seeing if it makes sense or not.
Now you're begging the question, though. In what way is demonstrating a mathematical proof different than demonstrating a moral proof?
Quoting SonJnana
Yes, I am making claims and trying to convince you of them. If you disagree you will need to give reasons why you disagree, which is just simply going on the offensive. It's just you saying that there is something wrong with my argument which is preventing you from agreeing with it.
The fact that I think morality is intuitive makes it difficult to show that it is objective to anyone who does not recognize or is not willing to recognize these intuitions. I've tried to make it easier by drawing the similarity between morality and mathematics in that both are synthetic a priori and both are grasped through reason and not empirical observation.
It may be the case that we will never be able to show that morality is objective or subjective. But this is how it is with many metaphysical debates. Oftentimes all we can hope to show is the plausibility, or at least coherence, of a view. In my case, it is particularly difficult for me to argue against moral anti-realism if the other person is reluctant to agree that morality is synthetic a priori and grasped intuitively. The best I can hope to do is to draw an analogy and say that as a child failing to understand mathematics does not disprove mathematics as objective, a person who is unconvinced of the truth of a certain moral claim (such as that murder is wrong) does not show that this claim is false or could not possibly be true.
Ultimately, probably the best I can do is to show that there are no good reasons against moral realism. But then again, that's the case for many things anyway. I don't think I could deductively prove that moral realism is true. I think I can only show it to be coherent and plausible, and that the modern scientific view is not incompatible with it.
I may be wrong but how does one test for objectivity of observations?
For me being objective has two parts:
1. We must be logical in our thinking
2. Our observations of the world must be accurate
1 is taught to us and we learn to avoid logical missteps.
2 can only be achieved through consistency over space, time and observers. For instance a lump of sugar tastes good in China and America, in January and in June, to me and you and Mr. X. So objectivity is achieved through consensus in my opinion. I think I'm wrong on this. Can you point out my error. Thanks.
Anyone can make a logical proof about anything. The question is whether it is sound. The reason for objective law of mathematics being sound is the fact that we can demonstrate it. If you say 5+5=11, I can prove to you that you are wrong by showing you that your knowledge of math is not consistent with the objective math law that is independent of whether or not people think it is true. I know that math law is objective because it can be demonstrated.
Quoting darthbarracuda
Saying what is wrong with your argument which is preventing me from agreeing with it is the same thing as giving reasons why I am disagreeing though. I'm not trying to be an asshole here. I just really want to see if anyone can give an argument for objective morality that makes sense. And if it doesn't make sense I will be honest about why I think that it doesn't.
Quoting darthbarracuda
But just because something is intuitive or not doesn't make it true. If a kid doesn't intuitively understand math, that doesn't mean that there is no objective math law. If I intuitively think what I see in a magical illusion is real, that doesn't mean that what I intuitively may think the magician is doing is actually happening.
Quoting darthbarracuda
I am not saying it is false or could not be possibly true just like I am not saying that it is false or could not be possibly true that the jar has an even number of gumballs. It may very well be true. It's a lack of belief. If I am ignorant, I won't say that there is an even number of pieces of grass in the world. I really just don't know. I lack the belief that it is even but I'm not saying that it is impossible. I'm saying I don't know. If someone claims to know then I'll ask them how they know. And I'll see if their reasoning makes sense.
Quoting darthbarracuda
It is a very hard think to do. I do not believe that you've shown it to be coherent or plausible to be honest, but I do respect that attempt that you've made thus far. It's made us both think more and that's the best part about this thread.
Yet Descartes specifically argued that an evil demon could be tricking us into believing 2+2=4.
Quoting SonJnana
Do you understand what I mean when I say "intuitive"? I'm not meaning it like some warm fuzzy feeling or whatever, I'm meaning in the same way we "intuit" mathematical truths. When you're in math class and learning math, you are doing so through the operation of reason. Math isn't science.
Quoting SonJnana
Yes, indeed. As I said, it is difficult to show that moral realism is true, given how morality must be if it is real. It is not as if I would be able to show something to be incoherent in moral anti-realism and thus affirm realism. The universe would seem to be indifferent whether there are objective morals or not.
What I am aiming to show is that there aren't any good reasons to deny objective morality. Now that doesn't show objective morality exists but it does show that it is not incoherent and is at least something we can plausibly believe in. And, I think perhaps both of us will agree, there being objective morality is superior than there being none. We ought to hope there is objective morality and be disappointed if there isn't.
I think it depends on how you make the statement. For example, if I say that ice cream tastes good, that's an opinion. I could say that it's objectively true that ice cream taste good to me which would be another way of saying that it's objectively true that I like ice cream. Usually that's implied when I say ice cream tastes good. But the statement itself "ice cream taste good", using the word good here is implying that one subjectively likes it.
Haven't really thought about this much, but I guess that's what I can come up with right now.
Yeah that's true, but there's a difference between absolute knowledge and practical knowledge. I can't claim that I absolutely know there's an apple in my hand so why should I believe it? Because it's practical. If I don't eat anything I might actually die. That can go down a messy road towards solipcism, but this is all assuming practical knowledge. At that point I'd prefer a solipcist to make their own thread because I'm not gonna argue about that here lol.
Quoting darthbarracuda
Yeah I understand and I believe the example I gave with the magician and illusion was sufficient for that. I don't think the person's head has been cut off because of a fuzzy emotion, I actually see it with my own eyes. But I can reason that it doesn't make sense. Although when I was younger, I actually did believe magicians were actually doing what I saw.
Quoting darthbarracuda
Yeah. That's why when originally I was asserting that morality is non-objective, I realized I can't prove that when people responded. And so I changed my position to be one of not claiming that it is objective or non-objective.
Quoting darthbarracuda
I still don't think it's rational to believe in it just like it wouldn't be rational to believe that there are an even number of gumballs in the jar. But of course it could be true.
And yeah I do hope that there is an objective morality. Who knows how the masses of the world would act if they didn't believe in that there was. Good thing most people believe in God right now at least.
I've realized something. Something is objective if and only if there's observer consistency (across space, time and different observers).
So, an object is said to be objectively 10 kg in mass if and only if many instruments show the reading 10 kg.
If you agree then what follows are the following objective observations:
1. Everyone wants happiness
2. No one wants to suffer
1 and 2 are objective because they meet the definition of objectivity (consistency across observers). What say you?
I don't agree with those definitions. Objective reality is independent of whether or not there is observer consistency. If there is consistency, you have reason to think that it probably is true. But of course sometimes we can be tricked and wrong. The question then would be how can we claim to know something in terms of practical knowledge of what is likely or not.
Quoting TheMadFool
Even if this were true, all you could say is that it is objectively true that everyone wants happiness and no one wants to suffer. You can't get an objective morality from this just like you can't say it is objectively true everyone should eat ice cream even it is objectively true that everyone wants ice cream.
This is all assuming practical knowledge.
Mathematics knowledge is about a math law. We can demonstrate that the math law objectively exists. But I haven't seen objective morality demonstrated to be true.
What is your definition of objectivity? How can one know that he/she is being objective?
Quoting SonJnana
Why not?
1. It is moral to make people happy
2. It is immoral to make people suffer
How do we demonstrate mathematical law, and how is this different to moral law?
Objective reality is what is real independent of what one thinks. An example would be a crime scene. If there is no evidence, it might be irrational to believe this person committed the crime. If there is a lot of evidence, it might be more rational to believe this person did it, yet they could also have been framed. If there is overwhelming evidence and it seems unlikely, practically impossible that the person was framed, and on top of that the person also admits to it, then you could probably say that you now, in terms of practical knowledge. But this can go on and on.
The point is that objective reality is independent of what people think. And how can one know that he/she is being objective? One can't absolutely know, but in terms of practical knowledge, one can say they know if something is overwhelmingly rational.
If you aren't using practical knowledge and only value absolute knowledge then you'd be a solipsist and that'd be an argument for another thread. This is all assuming practical knowledge. Everyone is always assuming that, besides solipcists. And that can have it's own thread.
Just because everyone want to be, even if that were true, that wouldn't make it objectively morally right to make people happy. Using that same reasoning we could say that it is moral to make people slaves if everyone hypothetically wanted societies with slaves.
We can demonstrate math law by showing that 5 objects + 5 objects = 10 objects. It is rational to believe this is knowledge about an objective math law, in terms of practical knowledge, because math law is applied in our daily lives constantly empirically. The same can not be said about morality.
If you don't think it's rational to believe that 5 objects + 5 objects will equal ten this time, it's probably because your a solipcist and care only about absolute knowledge.
Of course we do. Well, technically we see amounts, and derive the concept of numbers from those.
I am not a solipsist by any means. How is 5+5=10 different from saying murder is wrong?
So you mean our sense data in itself is just photons, and doesn't contain the amount? Well it doesn't contain the concept of apples either, but you wouldn't call the concept of apple a priori. Although encrypted, the visual data you get does contain the information of the amount of objects you see.
Take 5 apples in a bowl, take 5 more, count the apples. You have 10 apples. You make the conclusion that 5+5=10.
Kill the person: a person is dead. Check if they're dead. The only conclusion you can make is that killing makes things dead.
LOL no, I'd make the conclusion that killing this person was wrong.
Emotional commitment?
It seems to me that sincere mathematical propositions have no emotional component whereas moral propositions , if they're sincere, clearly demonstrate an emotional commitment (would you accept as sincere a claim that child torture was wrong made by someone who failed to to show any personal repugnance to child torture?).
From the a priori intuition that killing people needlessly is wrong.
That may be true, but how does this alter morality's truth value? And after all, many scientists and mathematicians are deeply amazed by the beauty of certain structures. This is an emotional reaction as well, even if it's not as often.
Scientific testing involves the use of mathematics that have already been discovered by synthetic a priori analysis.
All scientific testing involves the use of information discovered by other scientific research.
Quoting darthbarracuda
It's theoretically possible to figure out numbers and mathematics a priori. It's possible for one's imagination to create any concept a priori. That doesn't make it a priori knowledge. Mathematics and numbers are discovered by perceiving amounts in the physical world. They're a posteriori.
Yeah but also mathematics, which isn't scientific strictly.
Quoting BlueBanana
No. We never "perceive amounts", since we need to already have the concept of amounts before.
I'm not so sure that justice is an essential property of [all] moral acts. Moreover, I would disagree that justice is a matter of convention (conventionality connotes subjectivity for me), that is, there seems to be an objective component to what's just. That said, I would agree that justice is an important part of being moral, but it doesn't seem to be an essential component. I haven't read all of your posts, but it's important here to define, at least generally, what you mean by being just. Justice seems to me to be something that's meted out in terms of compensation. Let's say that I help an elderly women cross the street, most people would consider this a moral action, the right thing to do. Furthermore, I may just act in accord with what I consider my duty as another human being, so my action doesn't proceed from the idea of justice, but it's based on a duty, a rule, or a principle. Justice may never enter the picture for most, most would just act from the motivation of kindness.
Quoting SonJnana
Maybe you mistyped, I'm not sure, but this act is not an example, of a "justice done," but is an immoral act based on the harm done. What makes all immoral acts evil, is the harm done to oneself or to others or to both. If a justice is done in terms of the act as you presented, then the person cutting the arm off would have to suffer the consequences of their actions based on relevant criteria. Justice would be something meted out after the fact, after the harm has been done. I suppose you could say an injustice has been done, but this begs-the-question, because what makes it unjust other than the harm itself? Harm is foundational for all immoral actions, as far as I can tell - no harm, no immorality.
You've asked this same question so many times and I've responded the same thing so many times. You should just go back and re-read our discussion about this first.
Objective means that it doesn't depend what people think. If everyone thinks the earth is flat, that doesn't mean that the earth is flat. If you or even everyone agrees that it is objectively wrong to harm, that doesn't make it objectively wrong to harm.
Why? One could very well perceive two apples and three apples, notice a difference between them and acquire the understanding of the concept of amount a posteriori.
Humans may have evolved to be predisposed to understanding math. Yet I can distinguish that there actually is an objective math law it can be demonstrated. 5 + 5 = 10 objects independent of human thought. Therefore I know that my knowledge of math is of an objective math law that exists.
Humans may have evolved to be predisposed to believing that there is an objective morality. Yet I can't distinguish that there actually is an objective morality independent of human thought or if humans evolved to be predisposed to believe that there is an objective morality because it was useful. Since I can't demonstrate objective morality, I can't say that this "knowledge" is knowledge of an actual objective morality. Objective morality has to be demonstrated before making that claim.
Intuition doesn't make something objectively true. If humans didn't have an intuition of math, that wouldn't make it any less objectively true that 5+5=10 apples falling from a tree. And if I intuitively believe that a magician is cutting someone's head off, that doesn't mean that he's really cutting the person's head off.
I am asserting math is objective and you'd probably have to be a solipcist to disagree. I am not asserting that morality is not objective, I just lack the belief that it is objective. We've gone over this a hundred times that there is a difference. So you at this point you are being dishonest when you keep saying that I am asserting that morality is not objective.
^I've said all of this to you at least 10 times and I won't do it anymore. Unless you can come up with a new argument, it's pointless to repeat the same thing over and over again.
I don't think you understand my position. I don't claim that any acts are objectively immoral. I lack the belief that there is an objective morality. So you asking me to give an example of an immoral act that doesn't cause harm... Well I can't because I can't even give an example of an act that is objectively immoral in the first place, if I lack the belief that there is an objective morality.
Therefore if you claim there is objective morality it's up to you to demonstrate why there is, and why harm is an essential property. And I will tell you if I think it makes sense.
Quoting Sam26
I don't know that there is anything that makes anything objectively moral. I lack the belief in objectively morality, that's the whole point. When I said justice I was just giving a generic example of what someone might say. I don't believe justice makes something moral. But I think you misunderstood the whole point I was making so forget that example.
You asked how the two propositions were different and I suggested one possibility.
If what I said were true, then it would seem that moral propositions have a necessarily emotive component not shared by some non-moral propositions. This could be construed as evidence that moral claims have a necessarily subjective component.
I don't define objectivity by what just anyone thinks, but by what the relevant people think. For example scientific objectivity depends on a consensus among scientists (i.e., experts) about what counts as scientific knowledge and correct practices for testing hypotheses, etc. Moral objectivity similarly depends on a consensus among suitable moral agents. This does not mean it depends on just what anyone thinks, and it absolutely does not depend on what philosophers think. A moral philosopher's job is merely to articulate this background objective morality.
How would you define objectivity?
You make a good point but I think you're making a small mistake, not something I would've seen without your help.
You seem to be looking for objective morality in a different sense. For you objective morality is, as I see it, outside of humanity or even life itself; much like a scientist searching for particle. This is a mistake because morality only relates to life or, in a narrow sense, human existence. So, objectivity in morality consists of looking at what's life-preserving and what's life-destroying.
It would be objectively true that the earth was not flat even if there was consensus that it was flat because the fact that it's not flat affected their life in ways that they have not known. That how I thought the conventional way to apply objective was and have never heard it used in the way you used it.
Sounds like you just redefined it to mean relevant consensus.
When humans say it is objectively wrong to kill is it because
1. they discovered/have knowledge about an objective morality where it is objectively wrong to kill
or a possible alternative
2. They constructed this idea that it is morally wrong to kill because they realized it was useful even though it’s actually not objectively wrong to kill. Similar to believing the Earth is flat even though it's not objectively true that the earth is flat. Then humans evolved to be predisposed to believe it is objectively wrong to kill and/or people growing up in society are socially conditioned from a young age to believe that it is objectively morally wrong to kill.
Can you demonstrate why it would be the first case and not an alternative in which it is not objectively wrong to kill?
I think it does matter though. Of course there still are consequences of going against what the majority want. But it feels liberating to not look at morality as some moral obligation outside of other people's subjective values. And it's especially important when you go to another culture and realize that they have different subjective values, but don't think that yours are any closer to some "truth". Though some might be more useful than others for stability.
I mean it's a philosophy forum, what do you expect lol
According to you it's something that isn't about personal likes and dislikes. Put in different words it's not something that should differ across culture or time. However, and I agree, we do find such differences. Child marriage in India is rape in America. Homosexuality is not a problem in Australia but is a death sentence in Iran.
However, how does the timeline of morality look like? To me, the various moral systems seem to be converging i.e. we're beginning to find a common position on moral issues. Now, murder is bad everywhere not because its a fashion that has appealed to the tastes of the world's people but because it's objectively wrong to deprive someone of a fulfilling and productive life.
I think it's not the matter of morality being objective or subjective. It's the matter of "logic". We, as human beings, are brought up together with the power of logic which has resulted in our development, science, etc. In between, most people have gone astray and made up concepts and regarded them values which are nonsense. Morality in most cases is the same.
We still need pure logic for our decisions. We need philosophy and we have to teach children to ask themselves "why". It depends what we are considering as moral.
And about environment, it is the place we are living. Logic says do no harm to your home if you are looking for a good future. That's simple.
Or it could just be that as societies have become more sophisticated they started to value cooperation more, and so murder made less sense to them. Values also can converge with the world becoming so connected with more globalization of culture and especially the internet.
If I am pretty sure I can steal from someone, there a few things preventing me from doing it. One is the obvious if I get caught somehow I deal with the consequences. But even if I knew for a 100% I wouldn't get caught I still wouldn't do it.
I don't like to harm others because I just don't like to. I acknowledge that is a product of the interaction between my genetics and upbringing/conditioning. In some sense, I value not harming others for the sake of harming. On top of that, I also wouldn't want to go down a slippery slope where I do it, enjoy it, and start developing impulses for harming others in worse ways. That could cause problems in being able to genuinely connect with others, which is also something I value, and could get me in jail.
I have very little faith in collective intelligence of the masses but I think they're right on morality.
You still have to demonstrate why the morality people believe in is objective. Just because a lot of people believe it is objectively wrong to murder doesn't mean that it is objectively wrong to murder. Similarly to how just because a lot of people a lot of people believe that there is a personal god helping them in their life doesn't mean that there actually is.
So you claim.
When humans say it is objectively wrong to kill is it because
1. they discovered/have knowledge about an objective morality where it is objectively wrong to kill
or a possible alternative
2. They constructed this idea that it is morally wrong to kill because they realized it was useful even though it’s actually not objectively wrong to kill. Similar to believing the Earth is flat even though it's not objectively true that the earth is flat. Then humans evolved to be predisposed to believe it is objectively wrong to kill and/or people growing up in society are socially conditioned from a young age to believe that it is objectively morally wrong to kill.
Can you demonstrate why it would be the first case and not an alternative in which it is not objectively wrong to kill?
It has mostly been held to be morally acceptable to kill another human. And in the majority of cultures throughout the world, even today, that is still true.
There are instances where it is thought bad, but it all depends. And the dependant factors are culturally subjective and take into account, race, nation, gender, age, health and a range of circumstances related to the killer and the killed.
Quoting SonJnana
Obviously this alternative is rubbish. How would you even make that 'discovery'?
Also , obviously the case of the flatness of the earth is a matter of fact and not a matter of opinion. Whilst all moral statements are matters of value.
I don't know. That is up to the one claiming that there is an objective morality to demonstrate.
Just because many/majority people have agreed that it is morally wrong to kill, the only objective statement about that is that it is objectively true that many/majority of people believe that it is objectively wrong to kill. That isn't a demonstration that it actually is objectively morally wrong to kill.
Now you have to demonstrate that even if every single organism believed that it is acceptable to kill including humans, that it would still be objectively true that it is morally wrong to kill. If the claim that it is wrong to kill is dependent on what any organism believes, thinks, or feels, then it is not objectively true.
1. A world where it is objectively morally wrong to kill so organisms don't kill
2. A world where it is not objectively morally wrong to kill, however organisms want to survive, so they've evolved to become predisposed to have an emotional component to not kill needlessly because its useful (unless it's for food or threat of danger).
How do we distinguish that it is 1 and not 2?
Just because life did not have the ability to needlessly kill doesn't not mean that it was due to some objective moral principle. It may have been due to the fact that the laws of physics were only able to create life that was too unsophisticated at it's inception to have the ability to needlessly kill.
It may have been so, but it's very unlikely and to me doesn't make much sense. If you believe that killing is not natural on an objective level, things easily come together and phenomenons that we can observe around us fit in. If you from the other side believe that killing is just as natural as non-killing, all kinds of facts become difficult to explain, like for example why there is relatively little bloodshed in nature compared with peaceful life today, why there was no predation in early stages of life (the argument you try to make does not stand, since viruses for example are extremely simple organisms yet they are destroying cells more complex than them).
I already addressed this point
Quoting SonJnana
Quoting Dalibor
1. Viruses are not considered organisms. They are non-living
2. Even if hypothetically they were living organisms, they kill cells because it's necessary. That's not the same thing as needlessly killing.
I've stated the obvious haven't I? Do worms have anything to do with morality? What are your views?
I don't agree. Just because something is doesn't give it any objective ought morality value. You can get to an objective morality in this case only after you've laid out presupposition values. You can say that you value (meaning it is important to you) life, therefore it is objectively true that in that context of those values it is morally wrong to kill. But those values are subjective. Someone else may value differently. Even if every single living organism values life, that doesn't make it objectively morally wrong to kill. It means that based off of what all living things value (which is subjective), in that context there are some things that actions that are better to express a value than others. To say that it is objectively true however, you have to demonstrate that there is some objective moral value that exists outside of what anyone values.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JRguTJhTlYQ If you start this video at 5 minutes I think it does a good job of describing my position in case it's still unclear.
You simply hold those two to be disjunctive. But I don't see the world that way. I believe there is a strong connection between subjective and objective. Now, in order to explain the details of this belief of mine, I would have to write a whole essay, which I can't do in this moment. I would just invite you to think for yourself: can you divide the world on subjective and objective as if those two are unrelated?
Objective either means true regardless of opinion;
True whether or not any one even knows it is true;
Or just some stuff that the establishment tells you is true.
What's it gonna be?
True in the same sense that it would be objectively true that the earth is not flat even if every person thought it was. Similarly, just because everyone thinks it is objectively morally wrong to kill doesn't mean it actually is.
No actions could be demonstrated to be objectively morally right or wrong, yes. So essentially when someone does kill, we'd be saying they are morally wrong in the context of our presupposition values. And if majority of people agree on those values in a society, then they will condemn and punish a murderer.
Quoting Dalibor
Even if hypothetically every single life form refrained from needlessly killing, that wouldn't give the act of needlessly killing any more or less objective moral value. That would just mean if someone decides to kill, they are going against what all other life forms value. But not against some objective moral standard.
The title of this thread is a little misleading now, but I don't expect you to read all the replies. My position now is that objective morality hasn't been demonstrated. So as you say murder is socially reprehensible, that is because many humans generally value life and safety. Since those presupposition values are subjective, that doesn't demonstrate that it is objectively morally wrong to kill.
Quoting SonJnana
So your position went from:
Nothing is intrinsically morally wrong
to
Objective morality hasn't been demonstrated.
Is intrinsic morality the same as objective morality?
It's not objectively morally wrong because the person you're killing values life and safety. It's objectively morally wrong because murder annihilates the person's ability to valuate at all.
I don't think so because something can be intrinsically valuable to a person.
Quoting matt
It would be wrong with presupposed values that are consistent with allowing others to have the ability to valuate. However how can you demonstrate that that those presupposed values aren't just what you or majority of people feel or think is right vs. some objective moral standard that describes what actually is right or wrong.
It is objectively morally wrong to kill if we ascribe objectivity to an outer, non-human judge. However, we have no proof of that, no proof of a "God" prescribing to humans objective moral values. Otherwise, it is a collective notion for the suffering of an innocent person to be objectively morally wrong.
Therefore, SonJnana's assertion that morality is self-decided is correct. Killing and stealing are actions that are self-justified, therefore the issue over whether an objective, universal morality exists has been overridden.
My argument only matters if you grant intrinsic=objective. I'm thinking something along the lines, that the fact the life exists and seems to have forced itself into existence (something like Schopenhauer's Will). I believe transgression and violation against this will of life itself is intrinsically, objectively morally wrong. Life and nature's morality stands on its own. Life's persistence isn't a presupposed value nor is it a matter of majority opinion. And it's got nothing to do with "outer, non-human judge".
You are confusing two completely different things; Matters of fact, and matter of opinion.
It can never be factual that killing is right or wrong. Morals do not render facts.
"Nothing is intrinsically morally wrong." - Morality is only relevant in the context of a community. Separate the individual from community and morality no longer exists. Therefore, morality is a human construct. Let's face it. SonJnana's statement stirs within the majority of those reading it feelings of discomfort. Just because it doesn't stir me does not make me a person without morals. Morals are self-decided, like I said before. We determine what we consider right and wrong according to our own unique needs.
How could it have forced itself into existence before it existed?
Quoting matt
You have to demonstrate that there is some sort of will and not just a case of the because of the physical laws and conditions of the universe, life just happened to come about.
So then are you saying that when a person murders, it is because he is going against the opinions of the majority of people?
I'm not sure I understand what you mean by softer, but what I'm asking is for you to demonstrate that it is wrong to kill because it actually is, not because it goes against what is important to organisms.
There may be some truth to this lol
What does 'wrong' mean in this context? You seem to be asking the impossible. Something can be objectively 'true' outside of human opinion (for a physicalist) but something can't be objectively wrong without defining 'wrong'.
Even in maths 2+2=5 is objectively wrong only because we've defined 'wrong' as being an answer that does not allow further functions within that framework.
If the point you're trying to make is that the meaning of the word 'wrong' is created by humans, then I'm not sure you'd have anyone disagree with you. If not, then you need to specify what meaning, in this context, you're trying to claim is unprovable for moral statements.
My point is that if you say the earth is flat, you're not wrong because people think you're wrong, you're wrong because the earth really is not flat and that is demonstrable. And so if someone for some reason thought that that it was flat, it could be demonstrated that the earth is not flat.
But if you say murder is wrong, that hasn't been demonstrated. So if there is no objective morality, you can only say it's wrong because a bunch of other people believe it to be wrong. In the absence of objective morality, people are essentially saying murder is only "wrong" because it goes against what majority may think or feel is wrong. Basically like just going against the crowd.
Quoting Pseudonym
Not saying it's unprovable, just saying I haven't seen it proved.
You're still missing the point of how we're using the words. "The earth is flat" is 'wrong' because the earth (the thing we live on) can be shown to be not flat (a plane extending either infinitely, or to edges) by looking at a photo of it showing its plane to have no edges. This is only possible because we have defined 'the earth' and we have (at least broadly) defined the group 'things which are flat' sufficiently to say that 'the earth' does not belong in that group.
Now take the statement "murder is wrong". Superficially it doesn't conform to the previous one. 'Murder' is just a single word, not a proposition, so to ask if it can be wrong is meaningless. Taking a more generous interpretation we could say the proposition is that "murder is bad". Now we have a statement where it is grammatically possible for it to be wrong. It might be that 'murder' does not fit into the group 'bad things'. But in order to check this, we'll have to define the group 'bad things'. If we refuse to define such a group, then the question is not proven, it simply becomes meaningless (like asking whether the proposition "all cats are slithy" is wrong when we don't know what 'slithy' means). If we disagree about the definition of the group 'bad things' then that is the discussion we need to be having. If we agree on the definition of the group 'bad things' then we can confidently make objective claims as to whether murder is in it or not, in exactly the same way as we did with the proposition "the earth is flat".
For physical laws, that is the dead world, we can state scientific facts about it because we can put distance between it and us. But when we come to life experiences, that is life, it's impossible to us to make this distance. Therefore we can't talk about objectivity of morality on the same way as we can for scientific facts. But we can on an indirect way, which you constantly refuse.
Quoting SonJnana
Here lies the problem. Morality has no other reason to exist except to serve organisms. If you refuse to make this leap and accept that we can't talk about morality as we do about physical laws, but only in the context of life that we are living - this is what I meant under 'softer' - than you are not only asking the impossible, but also opening a more general discussion about objectivity in general, foremost the existence of objective world unrelated to our subjective experiences.
No I am saying exactly what I meant to be saying. You are confusing matters of fact with matter of opinion. Own it; deal with it.
It is worth noting that even if nothing is intrinsically morally wrong, it does not follow that nothing is morally wrong.
Are you using the word bad here as that which one doesn't hope or desire for? Like for example saying ice cream is good. If so then we're basically saying the same thing. If not, can you explain what context you are using the word bad?
We could just be using the word objective in different ways which would make this argument going nowhere so let's clear it up. If a psychopath says he wants to murder because he enjoys murdering and doesn't care if other people don't like it, what reasoning do you have for telling him he shouldn't do it.
Is it because it goes against what you or majority of people desire? In this case the act of murdering is simply an act that goes against what other people want.
Is it because it is wrong in the context of presupposed value of life? In this case if "life" isn't important to the psychopath, then he's just doing something that goes against what others find important and in some sense just acting against others' desires.
Or is it because murder is just wrong for some other reason?
Own what?
I'm not the one asserting that murder can be demonstrated as a fact. That's why I made this thread, to see if anyone can demonstrate it because a lot of people talk as if it is a fact. What are you even talking about???
Sure, but we can't say that any presupposed values that dictate one's morality are any better than those of some else without a demonstration that there is some objective morality that is better than others.
If you come across a culture where if one person cuts someone's hand off, it is okay for the person now with one hand to go find that guy and retaliate by cutting his hand off, what would you think?
Assuming that in your sense of morality it's not okay for the guy to retaliate by cutting his hand off...
What makes your sense of morality better than that culture's sense of morality? Sure you could say that in the context of a stable society, this is not good. Or maybe in the context of valuing life it's bad. But if the culture values their own sense of fairness over a stable society and life, how can you say that your morality is any better than there's?
Ah. So evaluating actions in terms of their morality requires standards, does it?
So what sort of thing is a standard? Is it a measure? Is it something we are agreed on?
Then if we have a shared standard, is it not objective?
And if a psychopath murders and society judges that as immoral while the psychopath doesn't value what society values, isn't it just a case might makes right?
Let me give you a more complete example.
A nation has sufficient funds to keep for a very, very large army, yet despite not being under imminent direct threat, it refuses to use some of this money to provide an equitable health care system.
Is that an acceptable use of the country's resources?
Now, rather than telling me what your answer is, tell me what each of the possible answers tells us about those who accept it.
Again, tell me what you think - is the psychopath right?
And what does your answer tell us about you?
I can say the psychopath is not right because I value society and safety. Those things are important to me. I have no problem acknowledging me saying that is just an expression of what I desire and find important in life.
The question is not whether or not I find it uncomfortable, I care about what is really happening. When the psychopath murders, he is doing something that goes against what the majority value. Yet when the majority lock him up, they are acting against what the psychopath values.
This moral system you are referring to sounds like might makes right. One person doesn't have power over a society. So if society's values go against those of the murderer, then the society will win and do what they want which is to lock him up.
But what do you think?
Try this example. Suppose that there were a moral system that set out for you, in any and every case, what you ought do.
Ought you do what such a system says?
You have to clarify first. Where is this moral system coming from? Is this my moral system based off of what I value? Or is it society's moral system about what people as a majority have agreed on what to do based off of their common values?
My values would be closer to what society values than the psychopath. So what? What makes my moral system any better than the psychopath's? It sounds more like a conflict of interest. We value different things.
Suppose for the sake of discussion that you have agreed previously to the moral system; perhaps you believe it to be the undeniable word of god, or it has the form of a computer programmed to follow a specific algorithm that you have examined and found convincing.
Here's the point: suppose further that the system tells you that you ought do something that you find morally reprehensible; kill your firstborn or explode a bomb in a school.
What do you do?
But equally, what makes your value system any less than the psychopaths?
SO, what moral system will you follow, yours or the psychopaths or the crowds?
I would not. Not because I think that my morality is any better in some objective sense, but because it goes against my moral values, which are an expression of what is important to me and what I desire. So in some sense it would be like saying I won't do it because I don't want to.
Quoting Banno
This only supports my point. I cant say my value system is any better or worse than the psychopaths.
Quoting Banno
I follow my moral system which is an expression of my values. What is important to me. Although I won't do anything that goes against society's moral system if I have to deal with potential consequences. I am lucky, unlike the psychopath, that my values are similar to the values that society has used to make laws.
So whether those values are objective or subjective is irrelevant to your decision.
And that is where this discussion has been headed. Thanks for playing along.
For me specifically yes. You could have just said this from the start I don't disagree with this lol.
However some people will argue that their values are in some way superior to other peoples' values by some objective moral standard. Your example is a hypothetical and that too seems subjective. I don't even see how objective morality could be possible which is why I made this thread in the first place.
There are people out that might actually say because god told them to do something like that, it must be objectively true and that the moral values of that are somehow superior, Or that some moral system is objectively superior just because of some biological argument or "common sense." That is why I made this thread.
Sure; and if objective morality is impossible, so is subjective morality.
The argument that morality is not objective, therefore it is subjective, is as valid as the argument that fish are not poetry, therefore fish are prose.
Yeah, but I'm not asserting that objective morality is impossible or that morality is subjective. If you read the OP completely, you would see that. I am just saying it hasn't been demonstrated to me that morality is objective. I don't know how it could be demonstrated that it is which is why I made this thread.
And in the absence of any objective morality standard demonstrated, statements like "No, my morality and values are better than yours" don't make much sense. If you are gonna make a statement like that, you have to demonstrate why it is based off of an objective moral standard. If you can't, I have no reason to think anyone's morality and values are better than anyone else's.
Quoting SonJnana
Statements like that don't make much sense even with an objective morality, as the example above shows. One's acts are always chosen; even accepting someone else's moral system is itself your moral choice.
The point is, it doesn't matter how I am using the word bad. It's no different to asking how I'm using the word 'flat' when saying the earth is flat. I can be wrong about the earth being flat only because we all broadly agree on the meaning of the word 'flat', but the most important thing about it is this doesn't stop being the case if one person in the world decided that 'flat' means "curved like a ball". The fact that most of the world agree on the the properties of things that belong in the group "things which are flat", is what allows me to say that someone claiming the earth is flat, is wrong. I compare the earth to the widely agreed upon criteria for membership of the group "things which are flat" and decide that it does not meet these criteria, therefore the person is wrong. It doesn't matter if a small group of people dispute the criteria for membership of the group "things which are flat".
Morality is no different. We have a widely agreed upon group "things which are bad". The edges of that group are very blurred, but this is true of many groups. You think you know what a car is, or a table, but it's not difficult to think of ambiguous object which would be difficult to classify (an amphibious car, a piece of furniture designed to be both sat on and eaten from). This does not in some way invalidate the group "things which are a car/table", we get along quite well with blurred edges to our definitions.
So morality is not some special case, it's exactly the same, we have some things which clearly fall into the group "things which are immoral/bad", like murder of innocents (remember, the fact that one or two people might disagree about the definition of a group does not invalidate the description any more than if I now declared that only green things are 'cars', that doesn't suddenly make the use of the term 'car' ambiguous). We also have blurred edges, like adultery, where there is discussion about whether they fall into the group, but this is resolvable by the second point about definitions,
Group membership criteria are not defined first. No-one ever said "all small modes of personal self-propelled transport with four wheels shall henceforth be called cars", the first thing to be called a car was simple called that, and all subsequent things were compared to it for similarity. If they were similar enough they were called cars, if not they were given another name.
Deciding if a thing belongs in the group "moral behaviour" or not can be approached the same way, is it similar enough to other things in the group to justify inclusion. If it is not, then we can justifiable say someone claiming it to be "moral" is wrong. Murder of innocents clearly does not share the characteristics of other things in the group "moral types of behaviour", it is about as unlike to all those things as anything could get, so someone claiming that the murder of innocents was moral behaviour would clearly be wrong.
If there are only 2 cultures that live separately in the world. One culture says it is wrong to needlessly kill and the other culture says it is morally acceptable to needlessly kill. How do we decide which culture is right? Is it only dependent on the presupposed values that each culture uses to establish a definition of the word "morality"?
If there are two groups of people in the world and one group say that cars are modes of transport with four wheels and the other say they are small swimming things that live in rivers, how do we decide whether the thing I'm driving to work is car or not? It's the same question, morality isn't special in this regard. The reality is we don't have two such cultures so the issue does not arise.
The difference here is the word morality still means the same thing in both cultures. It means what is right or wrong. So now we have to define those two words. What is a "right" act and what is a "wrong" act. The words themselves mean the same thing in both cultures, however it has gotten blurry what each culture should consider to be right or wrong. So is what one culture considers to be right whatever they want to be right? Is that what you're saying? I'm just trying to understand your position better.
No, the words 'right' and 'wrong' are defined by the things that are in them. Think of them like groups to which certain things belong. The word didn't come first, the group did. So to say "The words themselves mean the same thing in both cultures" is meaningless unless they define a group of behaviours which are all similar in some way. To be wrong about a definition does not require any pre-existing knowledge of the criteria. If I presented you with a collection of objects all of which were green balls made of plastic and told you they were all "bandersnatches", you would have no trouble providing me with a justified true belief about whether the red jelly-like substance I present you with is a "bandersnatch". The more you are presented with things which are called "bandersnatches" the more justified you will be in deciding if a new thing is similar enough to fall into that group. At no point in time have I had to tell you what a "bandersnatch" actually is.
So, to answer your direct question, it depends on what the behaviour is. If it is something which can arguably be shown to be similar to all the other behaviours already in the group "moral behaviour", then it is a reasonable argument. Others might disagree, but we can have such a discussion based on arguments about similarity. If, however, the culture tries to claim that something belongs in the group which is entirely dissimilar from everything else in the group, and provides no argument as to what it is about this behaviour which they consider similar, then they are objectively wrong, just as wrong as they would be if they decided to just randomly call thing 'car' based on no similarities at all.
Quoting Pseudonym
When you say that it is a group that is similar, similar in what way? (Non harm causing, helping, stablizing society, etc.)
There are two issues here that are completely separate.
1. What people claim they think is morally acceptable because it confers membership of a social group to which they wish to belong, and what people actually think is morally acceptable are not always the same thing. Not all claims that a behaviour is moral can be trusted to be honest. A staunch Conservative might claim they believe low taxes to be an economic stimulant, but in reality, they don't care if it stimulates the economy or not, they're just being greedy. I suspect a good number of people stoning homosexuals probably knew full well it was wrong but did it because everyone else was doing it.
2. Notwithstanding the above, there are obviously still cases that are as you describe. In such cases we have indeed redefined morality slightly in that it includes something it previously did not, but the important thing is that we have not done so randomly. An argument has been made that stoning homosexuals is much more similar to all the things we call 'immoral' than it is to the things we call 'moral'. You cannot reasonably make such an argument about just anything.
We have discussions like this one. I used to sit on a board of ethics and we have discussions like this all the time. The point is we don't just throw our hands up and say "anything goes", we are defining, ever more carefully, where the boundaries of the definition are. Sometimes it became necessary to refer to 'popular opinion', but also arguments can be made by virtue of similarity alone.
Quoting SonJnana
By 'they' I assume you mean definitions of morality in common usage? Haidt and Graham for example identify five common threads; Care, Fairness, Loyalty, Authority, and Sanctity, but others such a Bernard Gert list them as avoiding being the cause of death, pain, disability, loss of freedom, loss of pleasure, in that order (i.e, you might unavoidably be the cause of the later ones on the the list in order to avoid being the cause of the earlier ones).
The point is, whatever list you chose, you will not find murdering innocents on any of them, absolutely no-one thinks it is moral and they are right to think that because it is absolutely unlike everything else we have ever called 'moral', in just about every aspect. It doesn't matter if one quibbles over the exact nature of the similarities, that's what ethical discussions are about, but it would be quite a stretch to suggest there are no similarities.
Let's recap on what you were saying.
You were comparing two things.
1) The roundness or flatness of the earth.
2) The rightness or wrongness of killing.
1) This is a matter of fact. It does not matter what you feel, what you believe, what your culture is.. The earth is flat or round.
2) If killing is wrong, or if killing is right is a matter of opinion. It does matter what you feel, what you believe, what your culture is. It matters if you were brought up by the Yanomami tribe which believes that if you have not made your first kill then you are not a man. Alternatively you might be brought up a Jain. They believe that treading on an ant or a worm is bad.
Psychopathy is an illness, so this is an unfortunate demonstration.
Murder is principally wrong because it goes against the nature of life itself. This can't be demonstrated as if it was a scientific fact, but can be demonstrated on other ways. Doesn't the fact that societies around the globe progressively traveled from allowing killing in many situations towards universal ban on killing tell you something?
The reason I was comparing those two things is because people have been arguing that the killing is wrong as if it is objectively true yet that's what I have been refuting. I'm not the one saying 2 can be true like 1. I'm saying that has to be demonstrated, and that's what many people in this thread have been trying to do.
What is the reason for labeling this group of acts as morally right? Is the term morally right a label used for this group because it is a useful way to express the values of the majority of society (like care, fairness, etc.)? Meaning what is important and/or desirable to the majority of people in that society?
All this tells me is that as societies have become more sophisticated, they have as a whole come to value not killing. This could be because attitudes have changed, because it is useful for cooperation purposes, safety, etc. Probably a combination of many reasons.
My main point is that when someone does something that others consider morally wrong, essentially what happened is that the person did something that goes against the values (what they find is important and/or desirable) of the majority in the absence of an objective morality. Until you can demonstrate some objective morality that goes beyond an expression of what the majority values, I have no reason to think that a murderer is doing anything other than being morally wrong in the sense that he is going against what the majority of people value, who have defined the term morality based off of that.
None. There's no more reason to the label than there is to the label "flat". You might as well ask "why do we group all things which are not curved or very bumpy together and call them all 'flat'?
What I've been trying to say right from the start is that there is a very important distinction between the identification of a set of similar behaviours (which is objectively verifiable) and the actions that one 'should' take as a result of such identification which are two separate things, in philosophy we call them Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics respectively.
Yes, the reason why we've chosen those particular features to call 'good' and the opposite set to call 'bad' is to some extent an opinion, but it is no less an opinion than whether the earth is flat. 'Good' things all have similar traits, they seem to result in a particular type of human well-being (a long-term, stable sort of happiness). So to call the murder of innocents 'good' would be objectively wrong, it does not seem to result in any sort of long-term stable happiness like the other things in the group.
If I were to assert that grass was blue, you would have no trouble proving I was wrong, not because there is some universal dictionary written in the stars at the beginning of time to which we can refer. You would prove me wrong by lining up a whole load of things which are blue and noting that grass sticks out like a sore thumb.
It's no different with 'Good' and 'Bad'. You can line up all things already in the category 'Good' and see if your contested behaviour/thing fits with them or sticks out.
It's not your assertion that "murder of innocents is wrong" derives from the values of a particular society that I object to, It's your assertion that this is in some way categorically different from "the earth is flat", which, in exactly the same way, derives from a particular society's opinion about what 'flat' means. Neither come from some outside source, but neither are entirely subjective either, anyone trying to argue that a ball was flat could be countered by showing that a ball is unlike all the other things which we agree are flat; someone trying to argue that murder was good could be countered by showing how murder is unlike all the other things we call good.
The reason I was comparing flat and morally right is because flat is a word that describes a concept and unless you change the word, it will be true. As you've pointed out, that is what happens with morality as well and I don't disagree. Saying that something is morally right is dependent upon presupposed value and it's ambiguous. People have different values so people disagree on what is morally right. As as you acknowledged in a previous comment, what society as a whole considers morally right can change as values change. So what is morally right is subject to change depending on what people find important and/or desire, and practically there are a lot of differences between cultures and periods of time. I was just using that distinction to point out that people define what is morally right differently depending on their values and I don't see how there are "better" values, people just find different things important and therefore define morality differently. Though I think you made some good points and I don't disagree with what you've said.
Quoting Pseudonym
When a person murders, what makes it wrong is that he committed an act in a group of acts that society has defined as morally wrong based off of society's values. I have no reason to think there is something "wrong" about it that goes beyond that. That's the main point of this thread and it seems as though you don't disagree, so I think we are on the same page unless I've misrepresented you.
The only point of disagreement that I'm sensing might still be there between our two positions is that the collection of acts must be coherent in themselves in order to justify a collective term 'moral acts'. It would be objectively wrong for such a collection of acts to be unconnected, even if that's what society wanted.
For example, let's say a particular culture decided it was immoral to wear a hat, walk upstairs two at a time, and eat fish. I would argue that such a society was objectively wrong for classifying those things as immoral even if every single member agreed on such a collection.
It defies meaning to say that an unconnected collection of objects/concepts all belong in the same group just because we say they do. That's just not how meaningful communication works.
So whilst it is society's values which define the requisite properties for items in the group, society owes its members a degree of consistency and coherence in their definition and I think it is objectively justified for anyone to call out inconsistency in this regard.
"Life itself". Are you kidding?
Life and its evolution has always depended on killing as the ultimate act of competition which has given us the evolution of the most remarkable higher animals such as lions, tigers, killer whales and humans.
"Murder" is distinct from mere killing and is a legal, and therefore culturally specific, definition of a type of killing. Different cultures have different understandings of what killing is okay and what counts as murder, which is definitively "unlawful killing". Since law is not natural but a cultural artefact it cannot be said to be related to the "nature" of life in any sense.
If all claims are equally valid, then all claims are also equally invalid, including yours. At that point, its just whoever desires something more strongly and capably, which is more about power than the concept of morality.
If you think this is an unsatisfactory account, the challenge is to transcend it without falling back on a realist view of morality.