Demonstration of God's Existence III: an Augustinian Proof

I want to start a discussion on the third argument presented by Edward Feser, in his *Five Pro ofsof the Existence of God*. This argument, he tells us is historically known as the “Argument from Eternal Truths”; in Feser’s book it appears as an Argument from the Reality of Universals. The basic idea is that the existence of universals (or the reality of abstract objects) requires the existence of God.

The stages in this argument are four. Stage one, of course, is to clarify, identify, what is meant by “abstract objects”. He includes within this category, Universals, Propositions, Mathematical and Logical Truths, and Possible Worlds.

The second stage is to argue that such objects are real. Traditionally, theories about the ontological status of universals have been categorized into three opposing groups: Realism maintains that universals are real and mind-independent; Nominalism maintains that universals are not real, but merely convenient fictions; Conceptualism maintains that universals are real, but are mind-dependent.
Feser offers six direct arguments for Realism and four indirect arguments. The six direct arguments he labels (1) the “One over Many” Argument, (2) the Argument from Geometry, (3) The Argument from Mathematics, (4) The Argument from Science, and (6) The Argument from Possible Worlds. His indirect arguments consist of two against Nominalism ((7) the Vicious Regress Argument and (8) the “Words Are Universals Too” Argument) and two against Conceptualism ((9) the Argument from the Objectivity of Concepts and Knowledge and (10) the Argument from the Incoherence of Psychologism).

Stage Three pf his argument, he addresses the question “In what way are Universals real?” He claims that there are only three possible theories about how universals are real: Platonic Realism, Aristotelian Realism, and Scholastic Realism. He then proceeds to argue that neither Platonic Realism nor Aristotelian Realism are adequate, leaving only Scholastic Realism as a viable theory of universals. And according to this view of Realism “universals, propositions, mathematical and logical truths, and necessities and possibilities exist in an infinite, eternal, and divine intellect."

Stage Four of his argument purports to show why an eternal, divine intellect must have most, if not all, the properties of the traditional Theistic God.

Thus, from the reality of abstract objects, we prove the existence of God.

{There are so many arguments contained in this larger one, I thought to leave it to the commentators on this post as to which of these they wish to see expanded and discussed. The element I have the most doubts about is his claim that there are only three possible Realist views: Platonic, Aristotelian, and Scholastic, and that by a process of elimination, the Scholastic one wins.)