The problem with the concept of pseudoscience

Perhaps "good science" should be rooted in its consistent ability to predict future events instead of its ability to be falsifiable

Quoting MonfortS26

Karl Popper proposed the solution to the problem of demarcation that is known as falsifiability. The problem with that is that the foundational axioms of science are unfalsifiable. Therefore, under this definition, all science is pseudoscience. I still think the idea of falsifiability is valuable to scientific understanding, but I have a proposition that builds upon that idea. If a claim is unfalsifiable, but the idea that the belief in its truth provides value is falsifiable, then it should still be regarded as science. I'm curious as to other peoples views on the concept of pseudoscience, certainty, as well as what I wrote above.

I think I like where this is heading, but I could use some clarification. How about an example of a claim which is unfalsifiable, but the idea that the belief in its truth provides value is falsifiable.

Reply to T Clark Part of my investigation into the philosophy of science started with my investigation into the philosophy of mind, specifically my attempts to define thought. I arrived at the hypothetical conclusion that if reductionism and determinism are true, thought could be defined as the action of carrying out instructions. Basically identical to the function of a CPU if I understand correctly. That drove me deep into the hard problem of consciousness, the concept of certainty, and the concept of "good science". If this is the case we could bypass the attempts to locate "consciousness" and focus directly on modifying behavior from a neuronal point of view. But the core of that idea is essentially panpsychism. The notion that thought is possible on an atomic level. I think it is possible that thought is a dimension (for lack of a better word) of matter. Attempting to test that though would be the same as trying to solve the hard problem of consciousness. Frankly though, all of that could be bullshit, all I know is I am officially confused.

But really one could argue that all science is reducible to its axioms and therefore any scientific evidence fits the description of what I was going for in the first post. It's just a way to include its axioms in the idea of falsifiability.

Quoting MonfortS26

Karl Popper proposed the solution to the problem of demarcation that is known as falsifiability. The problem with that is that the foundational axioms of science are unfalsifiable. Therefore, under this definition, all science is pseudoscience.

Popper's view was basically pragmatic - an empirical theory is one for which there can be empirical evidence either for or against. That covers an awfully large domain of possible knowledge. But metaphysical or epistemological theories may not be falsifiable in that way, and for this reason aren't considered scientific theories, regardless of any other merits they might have.

Perhaps it is right to say that 'falsifiability' is not itself an empirical principle but that doesn't undermine its validity. It's simply a definition or demarcation as to what ought to be considered empirical and what not. I don't see why the fact that it is not empirical is an argument against it.

There's a current case in point - actually a really very large and significant case. This is the debate over whether string theory and the idea of multiverses is science or pseudo-science, because they might never be testable. Those prosecuting the case against are George Ellis and Joe Silk, who led with a paper called Defend the Integrity of Physics in December 2014.

This year, debates in physics circles took a worrying turn. Faced with difficulties in applying fundamental theories to the observed Universe, some researchers called for a change in how theoretical physics is done. They began to argue — explicitly — that if a theory is sufficiently elegant and explanatory, it need not be tested experimentally, breaking with centuries of philosophical tradition of defining scientific knowledge as empirical. We disagree. As the philosopher of science Karl Popper argued: a theory must be falsifiable to be scientific.

Chief among the 'elegance will suffice' advocates are some string theorists. Because string theory is supposedly the 'only game in town' capable of unifying the four fundamental forces, they believe that it must contain a grain of truth even though it relies on extra dimensions that we can never observe. Some cosmologists, too, are seeking to abandon experimental verification of grand hypotheses that invoke imperceptible domains such as the kaleidoscopic multiverse (comprising myriad universes), the 'many worlds' version of quantum reality (in which observations spawn parallel branches of reality) and pre-Big Bang concepts.

These unprovable hypotheses are quite different from those that relate directly to the real world and that are testable through observations — such as the standard model of particle physics and the existence of dark matter and dark energy. As we see it, theoretical physics risks becoming a no-man's-land between mathematics, physics and philosophy that does not truly meet the requirements of any.

I agree, although I also know that my own understanding of the technicalities is very slight. But science nowadays is prepared to entertain some truly mind-boggling ideas that might never be 'falsifiable' in Popper's sense, so I think the question of whether they really are scientifically sound is a perfectly valid and important one.

Quoting Wayfarer

Those prosecuting the case against are George Ellis and Joe Silk, who led with a paper called Defend the Integrity of Physics in December 2014.

Maybe they were right. Maybe we've reached the limit of scientific knowledge and it's collapsing back onto its logical foundations. With that description, it seems like the work of these theoretical physicists is better described as abductive reasoning than science.

Quoting MonfortS26

The problem with that is that the foundational axioms of science are unfalsifiable

I don't think science has any foundational axioms.

The only scientific axioms I know of are those that are part of a theory - eg the postulates of quantum mechanics. Those postulates are open to falsification by doing experiments where the predictions of the postulates are not realised.

Quoting andrewk

I don't think science has any foundational axioms.

Off the top of my head. Not sure about all of these:

• There is an objective reality
• There is a relationship between a statement and objective reality called "truth."
• To know something the following statements must be true 1) I believe the subject of knowledge exists 2) The subject of knowledge is true and 3) I am justified in believing the subject of knowledge is true.
• Objective reality can be known by the procedures included in the scientific method.

Another big one is the belief that because natural laws have been true in the past, that they will continue to be true in the future

Quoting T Clark

There is an objective reality

In order for there to be an object, there must be a subject.

That is not science, in fact most scientists wouldn't think about it, but I'm sure it's true.

It comes out of Kant.

Quoting MonfortS26

Another big one is the belief that because natural laws have been true in the past, that they will continue to be true in the future

That is not far from Hume's 'problem of induction'.

Quoting Wayfarer

That is not science, in fact most scientists wouldn't think about it, but I'm sure it's true.

It comes out of Kant.

Of course it's not science, it's metaphysics. Of course it's not true, no matter how sure you are, it's metaphysics. Or were you saying you don't think it's true? If so, it's not not true, it's metaphysics.

And no, it's doesn't come out of Kant.

Quoting T Clark

Or were you saying you don't think it's true? If so, it's not not true, it's metaphysics.

I was questioning your first 'axiom', i.e. 'that there is an objective reality'. What I said was, that in order for there to be an object, there must also be a subject. So I am indirectly challenging the so-called 'mind-independence of reality'. But we can take that up in one of the threads to which it is probably more relevant.

Reply to T Clark I'd call those philosophical assumptions, not scientific assumptions.
I'm a Shut Up and Calculate person. When I want to connect scientific theories to ideas about reality or existence I take off my science hat and put on my philosophy hat.

Reply to MonfortS26 yes

Reply to andrewk It's philosophy of science though. Are the two really as separate as you're making them?

Reply to MonfortS26 Yes

Quoting MonfortS26

If a claim is unfalsifiable, but the idea that the belief in its truth provides value is falsifiable, then it should still be regarded as science.

Haven't you shot yourself in the foot? The value of scientific theories rests on them being falsifiable. If yes, how can an unfalsifiable claim/theory have any value? And why would anyone adopt a claim solely on value derived off it? By your reckoning religion is scientific because belief in God has value in terms of a moral society.

Pseudoscience is a bad concept because it's lazy. Anything someone disagrees with can be labeled as pseudoscience. If you think there is something wrong with it, don't just slap on a label and declare your dogmatism to be true. Spend the time to explain what is wrong with it and let people come to their own conclusions. There absolutely must be a separation of science and state, as there is religion and state, in order to avoid these totalizing and oppressive schemes where anything not-science is bad, wrong, misguided, corrupt, outdated, and worthless.

In fact I think we ought to scrap the whole label "science" and just refer to things as their individual disciplines. Fuck the idea of a unifying theory and fuck the idea of a unified methodology.

Quoting MonfortS26

Another big one is the belief that because natural laws have been true in the past, that they will continue to be true in the future

Admittedly it would be more difficult to make progress in science if that were not the case, but the scientific method, as expounded by Popper, makes no such assumption.

In fact, it is central to the scientific method that no such assumptions are made.

Reply to MonfortS26 I think your oversimplification of Popper is basically a straw man.

Quoting MonfortS26

Perhaps "good science" should be rooted in its consistent ability to predict future events instead of its ability to be falsifiable

Like astrology? They consistently predict future events because of the broad likelihood that millions of Capricorns might feel stressed in a few days time but that they will find a day to relax and things will get better. It does show something; is 'science' here being defined rationally or sociologically as Kuhn pointed out? These predictions merely accommodate pre-existing facts or possibilities because pseudoscience is static. "Astrologers were greatly impressed, and misled, by what they believed to be confirming evidence - so much so that they were quite unimpressed by any unfavourable evidence. Moreover, by making their interpretations and prophesies sufficiently vague they were able to explain away anything that might have been a refutation of the theory had the theory and the prophesies been more precise. In order to escape falsification they destroyed the testability of their theory. It is a typical soothsayers trick to predict things so vaguely that the predictions can hardly fail: they they become irrefutable."

Consciousness does not contain physical properties and as such cannot be defined in physical terms, because consciousness is a feature of the brain and thus property dualism can be compatible to science.

Quoting T Clark

Off the top of my head. Not sure about all of these:

There is an objective reality
There is a relationship between a statement and objective reality called "truth."
To know something the following statements must be true 1) I believe the subject of knowledge exists 2) The subject of knowledge is true and 3) I am justified in believing the subject of knowledge is true.
Objective reality can be known by the procedures included in the scientific method.

It would seem that every single statement there is questionable if not downright false:

A great deal of progress was made in the early 20C by scientists who denied the objective reality of what they were studying. Famously Einstein disagreed with them, but they were making the progress, not him!

Science does not claim truth for any of its theories or statements, or that true statements or theories are possible.

Justified true belief???? Nay, Nay, and thrice Nay!

Reply to andrewk "Nonsense on Stilts" by Pigliucci is a fun read. (Y)

Quoting TimeLine

Consciousness does not contain physical properties and as such cannot be defined in physical terms, because consciousness is a feature of the brain and thus property dualism can be compatible to science.

It occurs to me that the 1st and 2nd Laws of Thermodynamics are also evidence that science can cope with property dualism.

Reply to tom How both physical and phenomenal properties interact without violating the law of thermodynamics is pretty complex because of the autonomy of phenomenal experiences; do mental states have energy? Gosh, what a juicy topic!

Quoting T Clark

I think I like where this is heading, but I could use some clarification. How about an example of a claim which is unfalsifiable, but the idea that the belief in its truth provides value is falsifiable.

Ironically, I think the theory of Evolution might just provide an example of this. I don't mention it often, because the fits of emotional apoplexy it reaps, but I think the theory of Evolution is in large part a metaphysical theory which is unfalsifiable.

Evolution is also the only "scientific" theory that I have ever heard scientist claim is actually true, which is another hint at its metaphysical status.

So, I think we have an unfalsifiable theory, that people actually believe is true, and that this belief adds value. You can test this by comparing societies that believe or deny Evolution on an objective scale of progress in medicine etc.

Quoting TimeLine

How both physical and phenomenal properties interact without violating the law of thermodynamics is pretty complex because of the autonomy of phenomenal experiences; do mental states have energy? Gosh, what a juicy topic!

Energy and entropy - remember the 1st and 2nd Laws!

Reply to tom (Y)

"How about an example of a claim which is unfalsifiable, but the idea that the belief in its truth provides value is falsifiable."

Here is the unfalsifiable claim: An unbiassed coin thrown randomly is equally likely to fall heads or tails.

And here is the falsifiable hypothesis arising from that claim: If I flip this evenly weighted coin nice and high a thousand times I'll get about the same number tails as heads.

Suppose I only get three heads and 997 tails. Then the hypothesis is falsified. But the original claim is not. I would assume the coin was not thrown randomly, or I've got a possible but unlikely run of tails, or some other strange factor was at play.

Honestly, I don't think Popper can be taken seriously after Feyerabend. Not that you have to go "all the way" with Feyerabend, but his work can be read as a thorough critique and revealing of the weaknesses in Popper's thoughts on science. In "Against Method" he basically uses Popper's thoughts on falsifiability to prove that if they were true, then Galileo would not have made the inferences he did.

On the whole this is the problem with Popper's project -- it is prescriptive, and when one looks at the work actual scientists do they simply do not follow the prescriptions. So it leaves one wondering what good are these prescriptions if the actual practices of scientists, which do, in fact, continue, aren't even close to what they prescribe.

Popper is best read with the problem of induction and the positivists in mind. His criterion of demarcation is the kind of thing journalists of science like to grab onto because it seems simple to explain, and gives them some kind of philosophical authority for rejecting this or that. But science is messier than what the venerable Popper wanted it to be in order to solve his philosophical problems.

TimeLine:...consciousness is a feature of the brain...

Do you always write pure rubbish, or can you cite scientific research which establishes this fact? How were you made aware that the hard problem had been solved?

Quoting tom

It would seem that every single statement there is questionable if not downright false:

A great deal of progress was made in the early 20C by scientists who denied the objective reality of what they were studying. Famously Einstein disagreed with them, but they were making the progress, not him!

Science does not claim truth for any of its theories or statements, or that true statements or theories are possible.

Justified true belief???? Nay, Nay, and thrice Nay!

I didn't say I thought they were correct, only that they are underlying assumptions. Many, most scientists believe in an objective reality. Even particle physicists. Why else a multiverse interpretation. Same is true for the truth of scientific statements and theories. Also - why only 3 "nays" for JTB? It deserves more.

Quoting tom

Ironically, I think the theory of Evolution might just provide an example of this. I don't mention it often, because the fits of emotional apoplexy it reaps, but I think the theory of Evolution is in large part a metaphysical theory which is unfalsifiable.

Strongly disagree. First of all, let's be precise. There is evolution - which is a phenomenon. A proposed phenomenon if you must. Then there is the theory of evolution by natural selection - which is a proposed explanation for that phenomenon.

I use the phrase "proposed phenomenon" to avoid using the word "fact," but it is a fact. Now... thank you for the opportunity to bring out one of my favorite quotes from Stephen J. Gould.

In science, "fact" can only mean "confirmed to such a degree that it would be perverse to withhold provisional assent." - from "Evolution as Fact and Theory,” in “Hen’s Teeth and Horse’s Toes.”

Science is more methodological than axiomatic/foundationalist.

Something like self-critical, bias-minimizing model ? evidence convergence, where tentative hypotheses can be derived from the models. Evidence, observation, experimental results, all that accumulate, and models converge thereupon.

The success of science (the most successful epistemic endeavor in all of human history) is then evidence of science being onto something, so I guess you might say self-justifying in that sense.

That said, there are some things that's fallen out of quantum mechanics for example, that seem unfalsifiable. And, of course, science utilizes mathematics and such, which itself is more axiomatic.

(I was just discussing this with some other folks)

model ? evidence convergence

Scientific progress:

The Flagellants (superstitious fools) probably made the Black Plague worse. Later medical research and antibiotics largely eradicated the Plague.

Aristotelian physics was long since abandoned. But it was a start.

Newtonian gravity from some 330 years ago is taught to this day, and used routinely by NASA and engineers around the globe. Technically, relativity supersedes Newtonian gravity, due to domain-specificity. Somewhat similarly, we already know that relativity and quantum mechanics cannot both be quite “right”, though both are exceedingly successful in their respective domains — that is, they’re established, justified descriptions. (Much effort has gone into, and is going into, unification.)

It’s worth noting that models like relativity and quantum mechanics are descriptive, not prescriptive. It’s a fallacy to abstract the described away, only to go ahead and reify the descriptions instead.

We learn from when we’re wrong as well. When we discover that theories or propositions are incorrect or inaccurate, then that by itself is knowledge acquisition. Sometimes ancients had the audacity to postulate something :o and then later we found out that the postulates could do with some revisions, or perhaps be replaced. But they tried, started something. (y)

[quote=Tennyson]
‘Tis better to have loved and lost
Than never to have loved at all.
[/quote]

Computers, communicating worldwide over the Internet, GPS (which depends on relativity), medical science (don’t forget taking your kids to the doctor on occasion), the International Space Station, etc, clearly demonstrates that we can increase our knowledge about it all.

Quoting Moliere

On the whole this is the problem with Popper's project -- it is prescriptive, and when one looks at the work actual scientists do they simply do not follow the prescriptions. So it leaves one wondering what good are these prescriptions if the actual practices of scientists, which do, in fact, continue, aren't even close to what they prescribe.

There are many eminent scientists who attribute their success to applying Popper's method when they really needed to think deeply to solve a problem.

Sir Peter Medawar - Nobel Prize winner for medicine said in 1972, "I think Popper is incomparably the greatest philosopher of science there has ever been."

Nobel Prize winner Jaques Monod publicly acknowledged his influence.

Nobel Prize winner Sir John Eccles wrote "...my scientific life owes so much to my conversion in 1945, if I may call it so, to Popper's teachings on the conduct of scientific investigations...I have endeavoured to follow Popper in the formulation and the investigation of the fundamental problems of neurobiology."

Sir Herman Bondi opined "there is no more to science than its method, and no more to its method than what Popper has said."

And of course the preeminent Popperian right now attributes the discovery of the quantum computer to following Popper.

One thing is for certain however, if you think Popper is prescriptive, you have never read "Logic of Scientific Discovery".

Quoting T Clark

Strongly disagree. First of all, let's be precise. There is evolution - which is a phenomenon. A proposed phenomenon if you must. Then there is the theory of evolution by natural selection - which is a proposed explanation for that phenomenon.

I've encountered ID fanatics who have said the same. The difference is that they adhere to known physics, and do not need to invoke "randomness" as a source of variation. You might call their theory metaphysical if you were in a good mood, but you certainly wouldn't call it scientific.

Evolutionary theory (I mean Darwinian not ID) is a branch of epistemology, and as such is metaphysics.

Quoting Galuchat

Do you always write pure rubbish, or can you cite scientific research which establishes this fact? How were you made aware that the hard problem had been solved?

If you can explicate why this is "pure rubbish" then you may just answer the OP' concern. While I never stated that the hard problem of consciousness is solved, do I really need to explain what property dualism is?

Reply to TimeLine Apparently so.

Quoting tom

I've encountered ID fanatics who have said the same. The difference is that they adhere to known physics, and do not need to invoke "randomness" as a source of variation. You might call their theory metaphysical if you were in a good mood, but you certainly wouldn't call it scientific.

Evolutionary theory (I mean Darwinian not ID) is a branch of epistemology, and as such is metaphysics.

I don't get this argument at all. What do we have against randomness? All phenomena in the universe are based on randomness. Is the problem you've identified just a problem for evolutionary biology or does it cause trouble for other observational sciences, e.g. geology, paleontology, archeology?

Reply to Galuchat To try and keep this in line with the OP, I guess I am not surprised considering you think the brain is like an 'analog system' which leads me to think about naturalistic dualism and the ERR model vis-a-vis the 'software' and the 'hardware' of the brain. The interesting thing about the model is that it does not contain computationally efficient algorithms so does information become a property of the physical world? If you think about the double-slit and that the wave function collapses because of the observer, that would mean wave-functions never collapsed prior to humans unless consciousness is external to us and thus comparable to panpsychist notions that mental properties are injected somehow and therefore a property of the universe, which is understandable but (in my opinion) garbage.

Physicalism denies that consciousness contains physical properties as - like your analog system - records information or phenomenal experiences and the brain simply plays this back. In relation to the OP and why I mentioned it, that is a static concept like substance dualism because we do not fully understand the complexity of the brain, making the suggestion 'pseudoscience' because there appears to be no further effort for progress. Information still appears to be within the physical domain because since your analog brain is recording immaterial information, it becomes a property of the material world, thus 'property dualism'.

Can I sleep now?

Quoting T Clark

I don't get this argument at all. What do we have against randomness? All phenomena in the universe are based on randomness. Is the problem you've identified just a problem for evolutionary biology or does it cause trouble for other observational sciences, e.g. geology, paleontology, archeology?

Quantum mechanics is a globally deterministic theory - it is completely unitary. General relativity is also deterministic. Combining the two has produced theories that are not only deterministic, but static.

So, how do you get metaphysical randomness from a globally deterministic theory? You have to impose it!

Any finite sequence will fail some test of randomness, and since finite sequences are all we ever have, is this randomness actually testable?

If all phenomena in the universe are based on randomness as you claim, how is accurate replication possible?

Quoting Galuchat

Do you always write pure rubbish, or can you cite scientific research which establishes this fact? How were you made aware that the hard problem had been solved?

There is a vast body of scientific research that establishes the fact that consciousness is a feature of the functioning brain. It is even possible to instantiate, through injury or surgery, more than one consciousness on a single brain, with different personalities, preferences and goals.

As for the hard problem, it has been solved in principle for about 30 years. Consciousness is a software feature.

Reply to tom What's your opinion of the Ellis and Silk paper, Defend the Integrity of Physics?

Quoting tom

Consciousness is a software feature.

All known software is the product of human intelligence. Who is the architect in this case?

Quoting tom

If all phenomena in the universe are based on randomness as you claim, how is accurate replication possible?

It is my understanding that just about every phenomenon in the universe represents the actions of many entities interacting in accordance with the principles of statistical mechanics - either classical or quantum. Statistical mechanics describes the mass actions of large numbers of individual particles or other entities acting in an indeterminate manner.

Quoting jorndoe

The success of science (the most successful epistemic endeavor in all of human history) is then evidence of science being onto something....

Interesting statement. I want to argue about it just because I think it would be fun to argue about, but first I have to decide whether or not I agree with it. I may argue against it even if I think it's true just for entertainment.

Quoting Wayfarer

What's your opinion of the Ellis and Silk paper, Defend the Integrity of Physics?

I started a thread where I pointed out that everyone seems to accept the Cosmological Multiverse despite the total absence of evidence for it, whereas people are violently opposed to the Quantum Multiverse despite the overwhelming evidence. This is a very strange psychological phenomenon that I would like to understand.

Nevertheless, it took quite a bit of work to deduce testable predictions of our current best theories. In particular it took 100yrs before gravitational waves could be detected, and 50yrs for the Higgs, entanglement. If String theory and Inflation are scientific theories, they will make testable prediction eventually. They are certainly well worth trying.

In the end, the criticism that String theory and Inflationary cosmology are pathologically flexible may prevail. We just don't know, and we can't know without more effort.

It is interesting to note that the quantum computer was a result of trying to find a test to distinguish Many Worlds from Copenhagen.

Quoting Wayfarer

All known software is the product of human intelligence. Who is the architect in this case?

The code in DNA is software.

Quoting tom

people are violently opposed to the Quantum Multiverse despite the overwhelming evidence

The fact that there can be disagreement suggests that the evidence must be ambiguous.

Quoting tom

All known software is the product of human intelligence. Who is the architect in this case?
— Wayfarer

The code in DNA is software.

But that doesn't answer the question. Actual software is made by an agency - the fact that 'DNA is software' is actually one of the main arguments of ID advocates, on the that very basis.

Science is a social endeavor. There are universities and research centers that produce research. There are scientific journals and book publishers that publish research. There are conferences that organize meetings and presentations. There are governmental and non-governmental agencies that distribute funds and commission and stimulate research programmes. There are educational institutions that teach science fundamentals, and government institutions that issue educational guidelines and select textbooks. There are entrepreneurs and corporate R&D departments that turn research into practical applications.

All of these institutions, each in their own capacity, are engaged in evaluating science, one way or another. At the most basic level, that comes down to the question: Is it even science? So it is no use to stamp your feet and rail against those who ask and answer that question, @darthbarracuda. They have to. And no, science, or "science," is not going away, and thank god for that.


As for the demarcation criteria, in the real life they can be vague and messy, and vary depending on who is asking the question. But I think that what is known as "falsifiability" does get at some important, though fairly obvious, idea. It is inherent in the very notion of empirical knowledge. In order to qualify as such, empirical knowledge has to be sensitive to observations. And the more sensitive it is, the more engaged it is with empirical observations - the more relevant it is.

Popper was not the first to realize this, nor the last. He was just one of the philosophers of science and epistemologists who were trying to formalize this empiricist intuition and incorporate it into his own theory. In the end, it seems, his theory didn't prove to be all that influential (most of those who name-drop Popper know very little of it), but he did succeed in popularizing some terms and basic notions.

tom:There is a vast body of scientific research that establishes the fact that consciousness is a feature of the functioning brain.

I'm still waiting for a citation.

It's relevant to the OP to determine whether this particular claim is based on empirical evidence or not (i.e., whether or not it is based on pseudoscience). So, I would be keen to review the research you think establishes this claim as fact.

Quoting Wayfarer

But that doesn't answer the question. Actual software is made by an agency - the fact that 'DNA is software' is actually one of the main arguments of ID advocates, on the that very basis.

Actual software is not made by an actual agency according to actual Darwinism.

Reply to tom There are eminent persons the world over who cite philosophers as the basis for their action, but I wouldn't say that this then entails that the eminent persons actually followed said philosopher. Stephen J Gould, for one, credited Feyerabend with some of his scientific thinking, but Gould was far from a scientific anarchist.

And I'm not sure how you read Popper, but given that his theory is all about choices between competing theories given such and such basic statements that is so clearly prescriptive that I'm not sure how else to read him. He believes that we should choose theories which are [i]easier[i] to refute, and hold them tentatively.

Quoting Galuchat

I'm still waiting for a citation.

It's relevant to the OP to determine whether this particular claim is based on empirical evidence or not (i.e., whether or not it is based on pseudoscience). So, I would be keen to review the research you think establishes this claim as fact.

There are literally libraries worth of evidence, research, clinical findings. Go to one!

tom:There are literally libraries worth of evidence, research, clinical findings. Go to one!

You made the claim; the burden of proof is on you.

Quoting Galuchat

You made the claim; the burden of proof is on you.

Have you ever visited a university library? You would need many tonnes of haulage to carry the evidence.

Quoting tom

Actual software is not made by an actual agency according to actual Darwinism.

But, you see, DNA is not actually 'software', but is a metaphorical description. So not being able to distinguish the metaphorical from the actual is rather a basic error, don't you think?

And one relevant text on the metaphor of 'mind as computer' is Hacker and Bennett's The Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience.

“The Mereological Fallacy in Neuroscience” - Bennett and Hacker set out a critical framework that is the pivot of the book. They argue that for some neuroscientists, the brain does all manner of things: it believes (Crick); interprets (Edelman); knows (Blakemore); poses questions to itself (Young); makes decisions (Damasio); contains symbols (Gregory) and represents information (Marr). Implicit in these assertions is a philosophical mistake, insofar as it unreasonably inflates the conception of the 'brain' by assigning to it powers and activities that are normally reserved for sentient beings. It is the degree to which these assertions depart from the norms of linguistic practice that sends up a red flag. The reason for objection is this: it is one thing to suggest on empirical grounds correlations between a subjective, complex whole (say, the activity of deciding and some particular physical part of that capacity, say, neural firings) but there is considerable objection to concluding that the part just is the whole. These claims are not false; rather, they are devoid of sense.

Quoting Wayfarer

But, you see, DNA is not actually 'software', but is a metaphorical description. So not being able to distinguish the metaphorical from the actual is rather a basic error, don't you think?

My Haskell metaphorical description seems to run though.

Quoting Wayfarer

And one relevant text on the metaphor of 'mind as computer' is Hacker and Bennett's The Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience.

It's not metaphor. Computationally universal machines can emulate each other.