Whither coercion?
If I take your money via taxation, then I am coercing you by forcibly appropriating your wealth for the rest of society. If I allow you to keep your money, then I am allowing you to retain your power, which can presumably then be used to coerce others. If I censor you on the grounds that you are uttering hate speech, then I am coercing you to prevent violence (most likely also coercive) against other groups. If I allow you to continue uttering hate speech, then I am allowing you to incite violence against other groups. The question, then, is not, "Is coercion acceptable?" but "When is coercion acceptable?"
One could perhaps attempt to draw a patina of subtle distinctions here, so as to show that there is a middle way between these options. But it seems to me that, whether it's censorship or taxation, you are ultimately either containing someone or allowing them to contain everyone else. The egalitarian answer would appear to be a containment of everyone at the same level, so that everyone has roughly equal power over everyone else. There could be minor power differences, but there must always be the possibility of upward mobility.
It's ultimately a question of ends, of course. Do you want to limit coercion as much as possible, or is there a greater goal, in the name of which coercion is acceptable? Long answers to this question welcome.
One could perhaps attempt to draw a patina of subtle distinctions here, so as to show that there is a middle way between these options. But it seems to me that, whether it's censorship or taxation, you are ultimately either containing someone or allowing them to contain everyone else. The egalitarian answer would appear to be a containment of everyone at the same level, so that everyone has roughly equal power over everyone else. There could be minor power differences, but there must always be the possibility of upward mobility.
It's ultimately a question of ends, of course. Do you want to limit coercion as much as possible, or is there a greater goal, in the name of which coercion is acceptable? Long answers to this question welcome.
Comments (30)
Coercion means to obtain something (obedience, a confession, money) by the use of force or the threat of force -- perhaps in the form of a beating, torture, and so forth.
Taxation is not coercion in that one accepts taxation as part of citizenship. If natural citizens took the oath of naturalized citizens, it would record their willingness to support the laws of the United States. Taxation is one of several laws one is pledged to obey. Obeying the law and paying taxes, or being reminded that one must pay the taxes levied, is not coercion.
One may think taxes are too high, that tax revenue is being wasted, or that what the various levels of government are doing with tax revenue are foolish. Disliking the way taxes are spent doesn't make the collection of taxes coercive.
The government has the authority to use coercion to collect your taxes if you refuse to pay, just as the government has the authority to punish you coercively through a prison term for committing murder.
I agree. The liberty of every individual must be equal (excluding those who are deemed an unacceptable risk to the liberty of others).
It isn't possible for everyone to contain everyone else, or for everyone to have equal power over everybody else. There is enough "social and psychological distance" between people that one can have no involvement at all with most other people, neither containing them nor being contained by them. We can work out your "containing/contained positions with our various friends, partners, and children. It makes for peacefulness if one can both submit and impose within one's circle of friends as needed.
It is best for society (IMHO) for coercion to be minimized. The need for coercion can be minimized by emphasizing the cooperative, mutually beneficial roles which we can play with each other. Or, the need for coercion can be maximized by minimizing mutuality, and operating a ruthlessly competitive society where mutual benefit is scorned. I'll take the former over the latter.
Correct. When not if. Coercion eventually becomes necessary because we are not good at always regulating our self-centered, sometimes overtly aggressive interactions with others. Our ungoverned wishes can lead us into confrontations with our neighbors, co-workers, friends, and enemies. Various agencies are authorized to use force to suppress unauthorized force.
The exercise of coercion is dangerous. When police move to kill disturbed people because they are "behaving in a threatening manner" at a distance of 40 feet (rather than using a disabling shot or a taser, or just waiting when there is no gun present) trust between the police and citizens is rapidly eroded. When riot police make a massive show of power at a small demonstration, the clear intent of the police to coerce undermines community police relations. When people walk into a factory where they work and shoot at everyone in sight, killing several, the sense of trust between people is seriously damaged. A society where too much trust has been lost begins to disintegrate.
Quoting Bitter Crank
This would seem to imply that citizenship is voluntary. That's not necessarily the case. It's the same problem as with Hobbes' social contract; when the hell did I get the choice to sign that contract?
You don't have to sign the contract. But if you don't, then you cannot expect others to respect your right to property, freedom of movement, or life.
To put it more abstractly, the notion of coercion presumes social relations. The philosophical psychopath does not sign the social contract and takes prudential precautions against tigers and political authorities in the same spirit.
Your involuntary citizenship is a problem you will have to take up with your parents. Had they the foresight to reside in a stateless region of the earth, or had they annulled their own citizenship and arranged for your birth in international waters, then you could have chosen.
Most people, though, acquire the obligations of citizenship by receiving the benefits of citizenship. Your gestation and birth was likely supervised by doctors trained (at least in part) at state expense. You were educated (unless home schooled) at schools supported by the community, taught by teachers trained (at least in part) at state expense. You (seem to have) attended a college, and colleges are supported (at least in part) at state expense. You have traveled around the country on roads provided (at least in part) at state expense in vehicles whose level of safety (whatever that is) is regulated by the state. You have been more or less protected from predation by thieves, murderers, and (if you are old enough) the Soviet Armed Forces--provided entirely at state expense. The food that you choose to eat is less toxic than it might otherwise be because of the offices of the state.
It is a quid pro quo situation, Asinus asinum frisât [that last word is supposed to be "fricat" which the AI spell check wants to change first to "frisât" (third-person singular imperfect subjunctive of friser--Fr., to curl) and then "frigate", a fast naval vessel. This is what happens when artificial intelligence decides that it never signed any social contract and can decide for itself when it should start correcting properly spelled Latin by substituting French verbs more to its liking. So, I guess it wants to say something along the lines of, "one jackass would have curled another jackass, had it a fast ship" instead of the homelier "one jackass scratches another jackass".] Mutuality is the idea in the Latin proverb. That's what the social contract is about--mutuality (not curling jackasses).
April 15 is coming up, so make an appointment with your accountant.
Here it is right at the start; there is no 'your money' or your anything except by way of the social contract. We agree not to break down the fence round 'your' pumpkin patch, as long as you agree to pay 'your' taxes.
Anyway...
Quoting unenlightened
But ownership did not come into existence through someone suddenly inventing ownership and everyone else agreeing to it. The agreement is tacit. And taxation is not a universal constant of human societies.
That being said - we don't have to read your (and Bittercrank's) arguments as indicating the absence of coercion. You can easily take them to show that coercion is constitutive for human societies. We can only exist in human societies because we limit one another, and force one another to do things.
I don't suppose it was sudden, but it was certainly invented and agreed.
Also, I don't think "This is written into the fabric of society" implies "This is not coercive." If something coercive is written into the fabric of society, then coercion is written into the fabric of society.
So, we may not like it, we probably don't like it, but authority and coercion are intrinsic pieces of creating and maintaining a social existence. Why? Because we are not automatons and we tend to seek self-satisfaction, even if that harms the common good and ultimately destroys the community which makes our life possible. To curb this chaotic tendency, we grant authority to one or several of our members to make decisions about the common good, and coercion is employed to enforce the decisions. By these means the group and individuals both flourish.
Authority needs to be renewed periodically. Rules need to be established about coercion -- how much, how severe, how long, when, where, who does it to whom, and so on.
It isn't necessary, of course, to recognize someone/anyone's authority. However, if someone has power to coerce, they don't need your or my recognition. These are the circumstances in which we begin to resent authority, coercion, centralized power, and so forth -- when we are forced to do something we don't want to do by people with power whose authority we don't recognize, and/or are punished.
Resenting authority and coercive force is probably not all that unusual. We do have to come to terms with it if we can't avoid it. Coming to terms may mean changing behavior or leaving the jurisdiction of the resented authority, or it may mean finding better defense attorneys.
Is there a way out of these problems? I think not. As long as individual wishes are out of sync with those who wish to enforce the social will, there will be conflict and the individual will usually lose. Conflict isn't the worst thing that can happen. It is possible to wish for more conflict as an opportunity to challenge the social will. (Just because society wants something to happen--the social will--doesn't mean it is good. Much of American society was, at one time, supported--lived off--slavery. Keeping people as slaves was the social will. It was once the social will to punish homosexuality. In both of these cases, in some societies, the social will was overthrown by concerted individual action -- until the combined individual resistance became the new social will.
If your best tools for social control are amped out from the get go, what additional resources do you have? none. And then you, as top Gestapo leader, are screwed. You have already spent your resources. And just as the forces of counterrevolution descend on you, you have nothing to defend yourself with.
Similarly, it doesn't make good sense to fight an infection with the strongest possible antibiotic. Begin, rather, with the weakest appropriate antibiotic and work upwards. Preserve your strongest options for the worst infections.
Of course, coercion isn't the only tool of social control.
Hollande aims to keep Britian from leaving the EU
Hollande communicates that if Brexit, Hollande's EU will bring consequences that would make Brexit less desirable to Britian than staying in the EU.
Hollande's claim is credible to Britian
...[argument structure based on Nozik's model in SEP]
I think the word "credible" need to be unpacked. Perhaps this is why under Nozik's model, coercion can only be successful... non-successful, attempted coercion is not coercion.
That's the place I begin. There will be sanctions against certain kinds of behaviour; then there will be sanctions if the first sanctions are disregarded. Here's one place coercion begins, starting I suppose from something like an imagined 'state of nature' (as both Rawls and Nozick start).
Another place to begin of course would be among the bullies, among groups that like fighting and competing, who think coercion is 'natural'. There are of course some quite hi-falutin theories built on that idea.
Wherever one begins, it's hard to see how one doesn't eventually arrive at a social contract of some kind, unless one simply accepts power/hierarchy/violence as self-managing. Then, within a social contract, to me it's a confusion to group all forms of supposed coercion together.
A society has to have some form of taxation, a human is a social animal, there is no opting out of all societies; one can move if one has the resources, or one can come to terms with where one is.
The supposed coercion involved in giving birth seems to me similarly a strange philosophy of impossibilism. These two activities, social grouping and making new humans, are going to keep happening and the search for wisdom involves partly working out how to come to terms with these things. To live by resentment of taxation or birth-giving seems a futile, nihilistic path.
Beyond that, I'm for minimising coercion. Kindness and overtures for peace generally make life more endurable, and even pleasant. But there are many occasions when it's necessary to oppose bullies and coercers, and it certainly isn't possible to oppose them effectively without sometimes giving them some of their own medicine. The danger then alas is that the process of such violence or quasi-violence gives people a taste for it. (We should be clear though that there are some little-explored areas where the modern State is coercive, for instance in the grotesque incarceration rates in the US, Russia and nowadays here in the UK too)
I suppose I should have picked a different example, since the knee-jerk reaction seems to have been to ignore the overarching point I've made over the last few posts (and described above) and instead recoil in horror because my example sounded vaguely non-Leftist, despite my repeated statement that I am not arguing against coercion or taxes. You can discuss the issue without becoming a mind-controlled zombie minion of the Koch brothers, I promise.
I sense irony, but I'll take it seriously because I don't see the point in continuing barbs. Can you explain this further, and its relation to your previous post? I didn't see anything in that post about conscience or self-coercion, but maybe I'm missing some background here.
I think none. Given that painful truth, you have basically two broad options: (1) stick to your guns and deny that coercion is acceptable, and since all life is coercive, conclude that life is therefore unacceptable; (2) admit (in practice, if not in principle) that coercion is acceptable, and work toward coercing the world into a desired state (become a Muslim, or a liberal, or whatever).
I prefer the first route, but I think it's a matter of taste: whether you think your (nonexistent) visions are worth the (real) suffering.
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Also, while I see the rhetorical purpose of the taxation point was badly misconstrued, it still never ceases to amaze me how far people will go to convince themselves that something so obviously coercive as taxation is not coercive somehow. Why not just own up to it instead and admit you approve of coercion when it suits your world view? You're not going to think yourself out of contradictions, and straight up lying about them helps no one.
'Ownership' is a legal contrivance created to regulate a situation and set of practices that were already at work in society before it was written into law. Much of early (and even Medieval) agriculture was done on "commons". As it happened as a matter of historical material circumstances, land was often taken by force and without the general consent of society and was often met with resistance (see the practices of enclosure in England for example). The 'owners' were only recognized and designated as such later in the law, complete with a host of legal protections, often because they and other more wealthy peasantry used their influence and control over the state to benefit their own interests.
Of course 'ownership' in a broad sense, that is, the effective control of something (and exclusivity to whatever surplus is gained from it), existed in varying forms in pre-modern times. But 'ownership' is a legal concept, and it would do us good not to project our modern sense of the term onto history, or to justify our modern legal conception of it as 'natural' through the use of ahistorical fictions, such as...
Quoting mcdoodle
The 'state of nature' is a fiction, and as such functions as to frame the discussion and our general orientation toward the question. It sets limits and boundaries on what is a possible or acceptable answer. Fictions are useful, but as they are written, they are useful toward certain ends. In Hobbes' case, it was particularly useful to justify a particular nexus of power, to make this particular form of power and hierarchy seem natural in the general course of man's secular rise from a fallen state, and of course the imposition of British settler and colonial states on indigenous populations. Locke's depiction of life in the 'state of nature' is different from Hobbes' 'nasty, brutish, and short' one, yet of course it's interesting that he manages to smuggle modern concepts of property ownership into the 'necessary' development of civilization, which of course proved handy as the British were dispossessing native Americans of their land.
A starting point of a fiction such as the 'state of nature' of course has its particular instrumental and discursive conveniences, especially with a particular philosophical methodology in mind, than the complex, messy, and diachronic one of history. But I think it's more beneficial to approach coercion (and power in general) it at it exists in a continuous historical dialectic, because that is where we must (and any human in any moment in time), must always already find ourselves starting from.
Our approach to the question is then transformed from a largely metaphysical-moral one to a largely historical and political one. There isn't a set of necessary and sufficient conditions as to 'when' coercion is acceptable to be universally applied across disparate concrete historical situations. Yes, rephrasing the question from 'is coercion acceptable' to 'when is it acceptable', as does, is on the right track. But I would go further and say it is a question of, who is using coercion and to what ends? And what particular historical 'problem' are they responding to?
It matters not to my point whether it is more broad or more legal of a contrivance; To claim it is already to claim the validity of the self same social contract which is then repudiated in the op when it comes to paying taxes.
As one revolutionary put it, "Render unto Caesar that which is Caesar's'. The laws and practices that constitute property (or any other) rights of whatever formality or informality cannot be claimed without the quid pro quo of relevant undertakings. Well I suppose it can be claimed, but not justifiably; either a social contract with rights and obligations both, or else 'property is theft'.