What is Scepticism?

Quoting PossibleAaran

But what is Scepticism as you have thought about it? What is its thesis, if it has one? What are its arguments, if there are any? For whom is Scepticism a problem? What is the value of studying it, if anything?

Interesting and well written. Small "s" skepticism is a mode of thinking I use all the time if I have to evaluate a claim. 1) Do I believe it? Is it plausible? 2) Does it matter? 3) Is there anything I can do about it? Should I do something about it?

A) If the answer to 1 is yes and the answer 2 is no, I'll accept the claim at least provisionally
B) If 1 is yes, 2 is yes, and 3 is yes, then I'd better get cracking and do something
C) If 1 is yes, 2 is yes, and 3 is no, I'll accept the claim at least provisionally
D) If 1 is no and 2 is no - bell rings - I'm skeptical
E) If 1 is no, 2 is yes, and 3 is yes - I have to put in more effort to figure it out
F) If 1 is no, 2 is yes, and 3 is no - bell rings again - I'm skeptical

As for big "S" Skepticism, I think that's a luxury for people whose problems all fall into categories C, D, and F.

Quoting PossibleAaran

There is supposed to be a general argument which enables us to do this, and it goes by the name Agrippa's Trilemma. The value of scepticism is that it produces first suspension of judgement (epoche) and then peace of mind (ataraxia).

This is not skepticism, this is apathy.
Skepticism is the ability to reject the endemic assumption, reject the easy answer, and to examine the question a fresh. Ataraxia is not the end result of skepticism.
Freedom from dogma is the reward of skepticism, but this also goes with potential uncertainty as so often skepticism leads to never allowing yourself the luxury of knowing.

Reply to PossibleAaran Very well-written OP. I am interested in the theory that the historical origins of scepticism go back to Pyrrho of Elis who is said to have travelled East under the protection of Alexander. He is associated with Pyrrhonism of which Sextus Empiricus was the most notable exponent. I think the sophist-sceptics of the later Academy were of a different stripe.

Pyrrhonism’s main tenet was ‘the cessation of judgement concerning what is not evident’. It was not the positive claim that ‘no-one knows anything’ which results in inevitable contradictions, itself being a knowledge claim. I suppose in a pragmatic sense Pyrrhonism was more like not jumping to, or even drawing, conclusions. And here the significance of Pyrrho’s visit to the East is relevant, as he is said to have learned from what the Greeks called the ‘gymnosophists’, or yogis. The predominant school in Gandhara of those days (a region straddling Afghanistan and Pakistan) was Buddhist, and it was an early centre of what was to become Mah?y?na Buddhism. Buddhism is, perhaps paradoxically from our point of view, quite a sceptical religion; the Buddha himself was arguably a sceptic. And there is a teaching method in Zen Buddhism called 'only don't know', associated with the Korean Kwan Um school, which teaches adopting a 'don't know mind' as an outlook, by 'cutting off discursive thought'. I think that is possibly nearer the intent of the original sceptics than a lot of what is called scepticism nowadays.

Another interesting analysis is by a current professor called Katja Vogt, whose book 'Belief and Truth' is a sceptical analysis of Plato. 'Beliefs, doxai, are deficient cognitive attitudes. In believing something, one accepts some content as true without knowing that it is true; one holds something to be true that could turn out to be false. Since our actions reflect what we hold to be true, holding beliefs is potentially harmful for oneself and others. Accordingly, beliefs are ethically worrisome and even, in the words of Plato’s Socrates, “shameful." . Vogt also authored the piece on Early Scepticism on the SEP.

I think the value of scepticism lies in challenging what we take for granted. I think the inherent trust that modern culture places in naturalism is something certainly deserving of scepticism. But it's difficult to be sceptical about it, because the alternatives to naturalism have generally been dissolved by the 'acid of modernity'. The most common response is really a kind of nihilism - nothing really matters, and that doesn't really matter. And also the sense that the individual is the arbiter of what's real or important. There's a great deal to be sceptical about in this context, but it takes some careful analysis to understand how to go about it.

If I told you, I'd be telling.

Thanks for thoughtful replies

T Clark, I take it that you aren't so interested in Scepticism in any of the forms that I described in my OP? You draw a contrast between "big S Scepticism" and "small s scepticism" where the first, I suppose, is one of the forms of Scepticism I outlined in the OP (or all of them?).

A person is Small s Sceptical about a proposition, P, if and only if either (1) they do not believe that P and think it does not matter whether or not P, or (2) They do not believe that P, they do think it matters whether or not P, but there is 'nothing they can do about it'.

It would be good to get clear on some of this if you wouldn't mind. What is meant by there being 'nothing you can do about it'? Does it mean 'nothing you can do to make it true or false that P'? For example, I can act so as to make it true that I am eating an apple, or I can act so as to make it false. But in the case of Descartes being a Frenchman, there is nothing I can do to make it false that he was a Frenchman. Is that what you had in mind? Or did you mean 'nothing you can do about it' in the sense of there being no important implications for your actions whether or not P. For instance, it makes no difference to how I act whether or not Descartes was a Frenchman. These are just my two guesses. Perhaps you meant something else.

On the topic of Big S Scepticism, I am not sure what you meant by that at all. Like I said, it would have been taken to mean any one of the types of Scepticism which I outlined in the OP, but you didn't say which; or it could be taken to mean all of them. What you did say about Big S Scepticism is that you think:

Quoting T Clark

that's a luxury for people whose problems all fall into categories C, D, and F.

Big S Scepticism about P, then, is an issue which arises if and only if (1) you believe that P, it matters whether or not P, but there is nothing you can do about it, or (2) you don't believe P and it doesn't matter whether or not P, or (3) You don't believe that P, it does matter whether or not P, but there is nothing you can do about it. The troublesome phrase enters here again, 'nothing you can do about it', but that aside, if Big S Scepticism only arises in these conditions, I am not sure it is any of the types I outlined in the OP. Just one example, my last kind of scepticism which arises for Realism when combined with Empiricism. If its true that no one has ever observed the property of unperceived existence, and it can't be inferred from things which can be observed, it will turn out that we have no reliable means of establishing Realism at all. It would be a mere guess, akin to if I were take a stab in the dark at how many blades of grass are in Birmingham city centre. That issue doesn't seem to presuppose (1), (2) or (3). It might be an issue only if I believe Realism, but I'm not sure of the relevance of the other conditions. I think this same kind of thing can be said about all of the other kinds I sketched, which leaves me unsure what Big S Scepticism is, as you understand it.

Charleton, I doubt that its useful to argue over 'what scepticism is'. Philosophers often refer to 'the' problem of scepticism, but I doubt there is such a thing. As my OP illustrates, philosophers have discussed quite different things under the label 'scepticism' and for quite different purposes. You quote my summary of ancient scepticism and write that:

Quoting charleton

This is not skepticism, this is apathy.

But this was what scepticism was for the ancients, and certainly for Sextus.

Your substantive remarks were:

Skepticism is the ability to reject the endemic assumption, reject the easy answer, and to examine the question a fresh. Ataraxia is not the end result of skepticism.
Freedom from dogma is the reward of skepticism, but this also goes with potential uncertainty as so often skepticism leads to never allowing yourself the luxury of knowing.

Scepticism as you understand it is an ability, much like for the ancients. For you it is the ability to reject 'the endemic assumption and examine the question a fresh'. Again, I think you are much closer to ancient scepticism than your initial remarks suggest, since this is just what they did. I do agree with you that you can't get Ataraxia through this kind of thing, but you can get freedom from dogma.

Wayfarer, Sextus, at least, idolizes Pyrrho as the originator of scepticism. As I understand it, the Pyrrhonian school was a splinter of the Academy. The Academy immediately after Plato held that nothing could be known and, even more radically, that nothing was any more plausible than anything else. The early leaders of that school, Arcesilaus and Carneades were thought to be capable of arguing equally well on either side of any question, and they frequently did just that in public. They had both also been heavily critical of the Stoics, who had originally held both that some things could be known for certain and that some things were more plausible than others, and supplied a criterion for this. The later Academics interpreted Carneades less sceptically, and this lead to a weakening of the doctrine and to the acceptance that some things were more plausible than others. Aenesidemus and a number of others are thought to have dissented from the weakening, and split off, taking Pyrrho as their hero, and embracing an even more radical scepticism than even the early Academy. All this, if you believe the account in Bailey's 'Sextus Empiricus and Pyrrhonian Scepticism'.

Quoting Wayfarer

Pyrrhonism’s main tenet was ‘the cessation of judgement concerning what is not evident’.

But then, Sextus' account of what 'the evident' is amounts to the beliefs, traditions, laws and customs of the society in which he belongs. About these, Sextus will not suspend judgement, but this is only because he has to live his life and cannot do so in complete suspension; a criticism which was pressed by the Stoics and Aristotle and just about everybody! But, although Sextus will not suspend judgement on those things, he denies that he accepts them in the same sense that dogmatists do. He just 'goes along with' these things for the sake of life, without making any claim to their absolute truth. I am not sure what you would make of this interpretation of Sextus, but it seems to me right.

You also drew some parallels between forms of Buddhism and ancient scepticism and I think you are spot on about that. Most thinkers have lost that element of scepticism these days. See Charleton above, as a case in point. I tend to agree with him/her that you can't get the kind of peace of mind those Buddhists and sceptics thought you could get from the 'don't know attitude', but I have found that the freedom from dogma that comes with the attitude does, at least, lessen my anxiety about certain topics, to wit, religion, morality and politics.


Quoting Wayfarer

I think the value of scepticism lies in challenging what we take for granted. I think the inherent trust that modern culture places in naturalism is something certainly deserving of scepticism. But it's difficult to be sceptical about it, because the alternatives to naturalism have generally been dissolved by the 'acid of modernity'. The most common response is really a kind of nihilism - nothing really matters, and that doesn't really matter. And also the sense that the individual is the arbiter of what's real or important. There's a great deal to be sceptical about in this context, but it takes some careful analysis to understand how to go about it.

I largely agree with this. Naturalism has far too easy a time these days, with few sceptical challengers. Your acid metaphor is apt, since what tends to happen these days is alternatives to Naturalism are scoffed at and treated as absurd. I cannot count the number of articles I have read in which Idealism is dismissed as unbelievable, incredible, 'dead', or just plain silly. Theism gets a similar treatment, though to a lesser degree because it has been defended as of late by some capable philosophers. What tends to happen with Naturalism is that anyone who dares raise a challenge to it is insulted and discredited ad hominem. Thomas Nagel is an excellent philosopher, and there are few who would deny it. But his book 'Mind and Cosmos' puts principle tenets of Naturalism under serious pressure and for that he got a number of reviews with remarks like 'what has gotten into Thomas Nagel?', 'irresponsible', 'ignorant of science' and 'dangerous to children'. This, together with the vagueness of Naturalism itself, make challenges to it difficult.

Reply to PossibleAaran Thanks. I am an admirer of Nagel also, and often bring up that book on the Forum. I also like his book The Last Word, which contains an essay on Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion that I also reference frequently.

Quoting PossibleAaran

He just 'goes along with' these things for the sake of life, without making any claim to their absolute truth. I am not sure what you would make of this interpretation of Sextus, but it seems to me right.

A sensible approach, close to pragmatism. Again from Buddhism, and also found in the medieval Islamists, there is a device called 'the two truths' (called in Averroes the 'double truth'). This refers to the idea that there is a domain of conventional truth, (samvrti satya), which is the realm of conventional understanding, laws and even science (bearing in mind this was an ancient philosophy). The realm of transcendent truth (paramartha satya) was the domain of the Buddha's understanding. I think it enabled that kind of pragmatic adjustment to the realities of conventional life whilst still maintaining the proper relationship between the sacred and the profane.

In my reading about the life of Pyrrho, there are interesting anecdotes about his demeanour when he came back from the East - that he had to be looked after as he showed no sense of concern for his physical well-being, and also that he was highly tolerant to physical pain and discomfort. I think it's a hint that the 'suspension of judgement' went far deeper than simply the discursive.

Quoting PossibleAaran

According to an early Bertrand Russell, Scepticism arises because of the veil of perception. What we are aware of in sense perception is an image or 'sense datum', which only exists whilst we are aware of it. If this is so, we are never aware of physical objects - since these are supposed to exist independently of us. Since no one has ever seen a physical object before, but only an image of one in the mind, how does anyone know that there is a physical object which is like the image? On the empiricist assumption that our basic reliable belief forming methods are sense perception and inference, if we cannot infer physical objects from sense data, we cannot establish their existence by any reliable means. (Notice that I put this point in terms of reliability and not knowledge. This is to illustrate that you cannot escape the sort of scepticism Russell faced just by defining 'knowledge' as 'reliably produced true belief', as some philosophers have done.

Or one could attack the veil of perception and the notion that we perceive sense datum instead of the objects themselves. Direct realism has an easy answer to external world skepticism. It denies the starting point for getting skepticism off the ground. And you don't need idealism as an answer to skepticism if we're already perceiving physical objects, obviously.

The difficulty for direct realism is accounting for various aspects of perception and experience that led to skepticism in the first place. But this effort has continued to the present day. Direct realism is defended by some modern philosophers. It was never actually defeated, just called into serious question.

Wayfarer, I haven't read The Last Word, but I just did a quick google. It looks like it contains critiques of both Naturalism and Relativism, and that interests me greatly. I agree with Nagel on many things, and so I'm surprised I missed this one. Thanks for pointing me that way.

Quoting Wayfarer

In my reading about the life of Pyrrho, there are interesting anecdotes about his demeanour when he came back from the East - that he had to be looked after as he showed no sense of concern for his physical well-being, and also that he was highly tolerant to physical pain and discomfort. I think it's a hint that the 'suspension of judgement' went far deeper than simply the discursive.

The story I find most entertaining is that Pyrrho had to be protected by his friends at all times even just walking down the street because of his complete disregard. He would walk without stopping toward deep lakes and refuse to move out of the way of horses! I think you are right that his suspension was perfectly general. Most of his followers thought his style of life was ultimately unmanageable and undesirable, which I think is what lead to the 'going along with' beliefs of common life. This attitude of 'going along with' seems to give the sceptic who practices it a kind of hollow appearance. He says officially that he does not believe these things, but behaves for all the world as though he did. I don't know how much force a criticism like this really has. I suspect such a sceptic wouldn't be too concerned by the charge of hollowness.

Marchesk

Quoting Marchesk

Or one could attack the veil of perception and the notion that we perceive sense datum instead of the objects themselves. Direct realism has an easy answer to external world skepticism. It denies the starting point for getting skepticism off the ground. And you don't need idealism as an answer to skepticism if we're already perceiving physical objects, obviously.

The difficulty for direct realism is accounting for various aspects of perception and experience that led to skepticism in the first place. But this effort has continued to the present day. Direct realism is defended by some modern philosophers. It was never actually defeated, just called into serious question.

That is the way many philosophers attack the sort of scepticism which Russell sets up with his veil. But I suggest that you have made a mistake if you think that there is no problem of external world scepticism once you reject the veil. I briefly indicated this in the last paragraph of my OP, but let me try a little more carefully. Suppose Direct Realism is true. In that case, this, which I am looking at right now is a 'physical object' and not a 'sense datum'. It is also what I call a 'laptop'. I can observe that my laptop has various properties. It is black. It is rectangular. It has a screen and keys. All of this I can observe and reliably believe. But now suppose I close my eyes. I am in this room alone at present. Is there still a laptop there even though no one is perceiving it any longer? If I am a Realist, I want to say 'obviously yes', but by what reliable method can I sensibly believe that? If Empiricism is true, my only reliable sources of belief about the world outside of my mind are sense perception and inference. I have never observed that the laptop exists unperceived, like I have observed that it is rectangular. So I cannot sensibly believe this on the basis of sense perception. But now we are back to the problem which is set up by the veil. That is, now I need some means of inferring that the laptop exists when unperceived; an inference starting with the data that I do observe. The problem of inferring mind-independent objects from the data we observe reappears, but this time we haven't presupposed a veil of perception.

Thanks to both of you for your replies.
PA

Quoting PossibleAaran

ut now suppose I close my eyes. I am in this room alone at present. Is there still a laptop there even though no one is perceiving it any longer? If I am a Realist, I want to say 'obviously yes', but by what reliable method can I sensibly believe that?

When you close your eyes, is the room still there? The floor beneath your feet? The Earth hurtling around the Sun? Radiation from the sun keeping the atmosphere warm? Is anyone or anything there? Or just what you feel or hear or smell when you close your eyes? Does the back of your head even exist when you're not seeing it in a mirror?

Does it all come back just because you opened your eyes? Do things only exist for you as you perceive them? Does the starlight and dinosaur bones and tombstones and picture of your birth only exist when you look at them? Does whatever is causing that smell only exist when you finally see or touch it?

You can adopt that form of skepticism just like you could argue that we can't know everything popped into existence five minutes ago with the appearance of age and memories intact. And to use Russell, you could also say there is a giant orbiting teapot. But what's the point of that sort of skepticism? To demonstrate that you can be a doubting Descartes?

The much more likely answer is that our perceptions are possible because there exists an entire world full of people, objects and events to perceive that persists over time. That world is primary, not our perceptions of it.

Marchesk

Thanks again,

This reply which you have given is a common and understandable one, but I think it makes some subtle confusions which once made clear, reveal that a much more careful analysis is needed to deal with scepticism than this one that you have given.

The questions you ask beginning "when you close your eyes" and ending "finally see or touch it" are more ways of raising the same sceptical issue I raised about my laptop, so these are not at issue. But you go on:

Quoting Marchesk

You can adopt that form of skepticism just like you could argue that we can't know everything popped into existence five minutes ago with the appearance of age and memories intact. And to use Russell, you could also say there is a giant orbiting teapot. But what's the point of that sort of skepticism? To demonstrate that you can be a doubting Descartes?

Now these questions are very different. My original question was "by what reliable method can you believe that the laptop exists when it is unperceived?". What creates the difficulty is the Empiricist claim that there are only two reliable sources of belief about the physical world - sense perception and inference. Sense perception is reliable with respect to things which can be sensed. Sense perception does not reliably yield true beliefs about unobservables. I cannot use sense perception alone to reliably form the belief that there is exactly one alien insect on the furthest planet from earth. I have never observed any such thing, and sense perception is only reliable concerning things which have been sensed. That is why sense perception cannot deliver a reliable belief that the laptop exists unperceived - because the property of unperceived existence is unobservable. This only leaves inference, which is why there needs to be an inference from the observed laptop to its unobserved existence.

Notice crucially that the way I framed the issue above is not me being a 'doubting Descartes'. I am not simply doubting everything that can be doubted for the sake of it, regardless of whether it is probable or not. When I, playing the role of sceptic, doubt that the laptop exists unperceived, I doubt something which, if we cannot provide an inferential argument for it, there is absolutely no reliable basis for accepting. If no inference is provided, human beings have no reliable means of establishing that any object exists unperceived, not even with the slightest probability. So much for your criticism that I am pointlessly being a 'doubting Descartes'. I am being no more a 'doubting Descartes' than someone who refuses to accept the existence of atoms on the basis of plain unaided observations of trees and rocks. Without a scientific inference, such a person has no reliable means of figuring out that there are atoms at all.

You also raise a number of issues about memory. Your thought is that perhaps the world popped into existence 5 minutes ago with the appearance of age. Well, I seem to remember that the world existed at least ten minutes ago, when I ate meatballs. Of course, a doubting Descartes might question the reliability of memory. He might say "oh but maybe your memory is deceiving you and the world was created 5 minutes ago". He could say that, but that would be to raise a very different kind of sceptical problem than the kind I am trying to raise. My problem is that, even assuming all of the usual human faculties are reliable sources of belief, there is no reliable basis for the belief that an object exists unperceived, unless an inferential argument can be given. Hence, the issue I raise for sense perception has no parallel for memory. Memory is a reliable source of belief about the past. Sense perception is reliable about things that can be sensed, but is not a reliable source of belief about unobservables, and the property of unperceived existence is an unobservable. Hence, there is a difference between the radical sceptical issue you raised about memory and the issue I raised about sense perception.

Lastly, you write:

Quoting Marchesk

The much more likely answer is that our perceptions are possible because there exists an entire world full of people, objects and events to perceive that persists over time. That world is primary, not our perceptions of it.

But what makes it more likely? There are many alternative hypotheses which explain the observable data, and I'm sure you are familiar with them. The dream hypothesis. The evil demon hypothesis. Etc. What makes these worse off than Realism?

PA

Reply to PossibleAaran Let's say your laptop is performing some computation that you can't carry out in your mind. You close your eyes and when you open them, the laptop has an answer for you. How did it compute that answer while it no longer existed?

We can make the thought experiment more involved. Let's say your survival depends on the laptop performing some computation. If it fails to when you close your eyes, then a bomb goes off, killing you. You close your eyes. No laptop, no bomb, except for that ticking sound.

That's why idealism is silly. You either end up with an extremely gappy world in between perception where events somehow still appeared to have happened, or you have to invoke something like God to keep the laptop and everything else in existence. We know what Berkeley opted for.

Quoting PossibleAaran

But what makes it more likely? There are many alternative hypotheses which explain the observable data, and I'm sure you are familiar with them. The dream hypothesis. The evil demon hypothesis. Etc. What makes these worse off than Realism?

The dream hypothesis fails because dreams are not like waking experience. The evil demon hypothesis has nothing empirical in its favor, unlike laptops and trees and what not. We can't infer an evil demon, a simulation, or being a brain in a vat from what is perceived. But we can infer a physical world. The laptop performs the computation when you close it's eyes because it's still there. Simple as that.

Reply to PossibleAaran
Kuddos for a well thought out OP. As you mention, Skepticism as term and denotation carries with it a multitude of often divergent meanings, each endowed with its own bundle of understandings. Many paradigms—be they adopted or rejected—thereby become expressible via this one word.

In relation to the OP’s questions, as for myself, I liken philosophical skepticism with the simple, commonsensical affirmation that no one is ever perfectly infallible. It doesn’t prove the unmitigated certainty of any belief—regardless of whether these are positively or negatively affirmed. Instead, it endows the intellect with tools via which emotively held, non-contemplated absolutes (or, in this sense, dogmas) become replaced with beliefs upheld on grounds of their greater quality of justification—justified beliefs that then, in turn, become emotively lived until even more coherent beliefs may be established through similar noncontradictory justifications. So, as I interpret it, the stance opens up the doorways of the intellect, of cognitive perception, to most everything holding conceivable alternatives—and the alternative one upholds to be true, this at expense of all other alternatives then being judged false, becomes so upheld due to coherent reasoning—and not, for example, due to blind bias (again, dogma in this sense of the word). In other words, it makes one more perceptive by comparison to the tunnel vision of not mentally seeing the alternatives that otherwise can be discerned.

BTW, to me this stance has no bearing on the possession of knowledge … not unless one denotes knowledge as something that is directly or indirectly equivalent with some epistemological absolute: be this absolute certainty, absolute justification, absolute awareness of what is true and/or real, etc. To me the lack of epistemological absolutes does not then signify the lack of reliable epistemological givens. It is only in this equivocal sense that phrases such as “I know I know nothing,” can make any sense to me.

Quoting PossibleAaran

As I have been thinking of it the last few days, Scepticism is a problem for Realism - the view that there are objects which exist even when no-one is perceiving, thinking or talking about them.

That there factually is an external world can well be upheld by a Skeptic on grounds that it is the most cohesive means of justifying most of the whys and hows that apply to any particular experience of the external world. This especially when considering issues of causation.The reality of an external world, in other words, can be well upheld to provide the greatest explanatory power to the greatest number of questions that could be asked of something experienced to pertain to an external world. Still—in contradiction to some of my good natured nemeses here about—for a Skeptic to uphold the factual reality of an external world is not for him/her to also necessarily uphold that the external world is metaphysically primary to the metaphysical reality of psyche; i.e., just because individual minds are subject to the physical external world does not then entail that physicality is primary to psyche at metaphysical levels of reality (nor does the latter alternative entail theism).

Basically wanted to mention that this was a nice OP and add some comments. If I’m replied to, though, it might take a while till I answer in turn.

Reply to Marchesk didn’t all philosophy start off as direct realism?

Marchesk, I thought that you were maintaining that no inference was needed? In any case, I am not sure that the argument you suggest is subtle enough to do the job. Here is what you said:

Quoting Marchesk

Let's say your laptop is performing some computation that you can't carry out in your mind. You close your eyes and when you open them, the laptop has an answer for you. How did it compute that answer while it no longer existed?

We can make the thought experiment more involved. Let's say your survival depends on the laptop performing some computation. If it fails to when you close your eyes, then a bomb goes off, killing you. You close your eyes. No laptop, no bomb, except for that ticking sound.

That's why idealism is silly. You either end up with an extremely gappy world in between perception where events somehow still appeared to have happened, or you have to invoke something like God to keep the laptop and everything else in existence. We know what Berkeley opted for.

The first thing to note is that your characterization of the data is already biased in favour of Realism. You presuppose that the object which is before me when I look the first time is numerically the same object as the one which is before me when I look the 2nd time, and that already screams out that the object existed when I wasn't looking, or else, how could the same laptop have changed state while not existing, as you point out? But this isn't a fault with Idealistic hypotheses. It is a bias in your description. Describe the data without the assumption that the laptop is the same each time and the difficulty disappears:

My eyes are open at time T1 and I see that a laptop is in state X. I close my eyes and reopen them at T2 and I see that a laptop is in state Y. It is a Realistic bias to interpret this by saying that 'it looks like something happened when I wasn't looking'. Neither what I see at T1, nor what I see at T2, yields this information. So what explains the fact that I see something different each time? It could be that there is no explanation. That I see something different at T1 and T2 might be a brute fact about the universe. There might not be a single object, the laptop, whose different states I see at T1 and T2 which has some state or other even when I'm not looking. This doesn't require that the laptop changed over time when I wasn't looking even though it didn't exist. The Idealist doesn't postulate the laptop at all. Hence, Idealism doesn't lead to the kind of gappy absurdity that you suggest.

Quoting Marchesk

The dream hypothesis fails because dreams are not like waking experience. The evil demon hypothesis has nothing empirical in its favor, unlike laptops and trees and what not. We can't infer an evil demon, a simulation, or being a brain in a vat from what is perceived. But we can infer a physical world. The laptop performs the computation when you close it's eyes because it's still there. Simple as that.

Concerning alternative sceptical scenarios, it is true that ordinary dreams aren't like waking experience in a sense. But they are alike in an important respect. When I dream, I see things which do not exist when I am not seeing them. For dream objects, esse is percipi. Moreover, my mind is the cause of the dream and all of the dream objects. The dream hypothesis is the idea that (i) the objects seen while awake only exist when I am sensing them and (ii) my mind is the cause of the existence of all of those objects. The evil demon hypothesis is (i) together with (iii) an evil demon is the cause of the existence of all of those objects. What exactly is wrong with these two hypotheses? Why can we sensibly infer Realism as opposed to them? Sure, you say that Realism can be inferred and these can't, 'simple as that'. But that's just saying, and I could just say that the dream hypothesis is better than Realism, or that all of them are equally likely. Why is Realism to be preferred?

Javra, it pleases me to hear someone give the explanatory defence of Realism. I think if anything can answer the scepticism I alluded to in my OP last paragraph, it is this. But difficulties do remain. You say that Realism:

Quoting javra

provide the greatest explanatory power to the greatest number of questions that could be asked of something experienced to pertain to an external world

Which questions can be answered by Realism? Can they also be answered by Idealism, the dream hypothesis or the evil demon hypothesis? If so, in what sense are the Realist answers superior? Does the superiority of its answers entail that Realism is more likely to be true than the alternatives? I am quite confident that there is no question about experience that Realism can answer which the alternatives cannot, but the question of the adequacy of those answers is an interesting issue.

Do not worry if it takes some time for you to reply Javra. Thanks for your thoughts.

PA

Reply to PossibleAaran
There seems to be an excessively binomial use of the term 'Skepticism' here - either one is skeptical or one is not, but surely skepticism, by whatever definition, is a matter of degree?

I struggle to think of any example where one believes entirely beyond all doubt that some proposition is true (even priests have doubts), nor equally where one allows absolutely no bias whatsoever in one's behaviour in favour of some belief or other. Are we not really saying, when we talk about the decline of skepticism (in something like the approach to naturalism that had been mentioned) that the thinker is not being skeptical enough? If that is the case, then skepticism itself is not the issue, it is how can we justify a belief about the degree of skepticism that is appropriate in any given case.

Otherwise we end up in circular logic. We might say proponents of modern naturalism are not skeptical enough, but that in itself is a belief about which we could then be accused of demonstrating insufficient skepticism.

Quoting PossibleAaran

Which questions can be answered by Realism? Can they also be answered by Idealism, the dream hypothesis or the evil demon hypothesis? If so, in what sense are the Realist answers superior? Does the superiority of its answers entail that Realism is more likely to be true than the alternatives?

As one example, were a single light in the home to no longer turn on when I flick the light switch, the realism of an external world would indicate that there is something physically amiss with the light switch, the respective lightbulb, or with the wiring that dwells in between. The real problem might not be perceived nor thought of at first, yet the web of causal relations which such realism affirms facilitates my being able to discover what is wrong so as to resolve the problem. Other hypotheses, such as a Cartesian evil demon (or the materialist counterpart of being a BIV), could be conceived as alternatives to the reality of an external world. Yet, devoid of upheld belief in the very same external world, these alternative hypotheses would at best only encumber my ability to remedy the stated problem. This then can be expanded to why electricity operates the way that it does, to the question of where the electricity in my home originates from, etc.

The question to me is one of why uphold something like the Cartesian evil demon rather than an external world? I.e., what justifies the upholding of such a conviction?

Tangentially, to be more explicit about my understandings of idealism and realism, granting that these terms hold different meaning to different people:

The umbrella term of idealism does not equate to any particular subclass of belief which can be so classified, such as that of Berkley’s immaterialism. One can, for example, uphold a real, physical, external world as effete mind within an idealist system. Charles Pierce is known for so upholding. Thinking of more Eastern perspectives which we would likely term idealist, one could alternatively choose to uphold the external world to be a waking dream that is—in one way or another—resultant from the unconscious processes of all individual minds (the philosophy of Jung here also comes to mind) … yet even when so doing, and when presuming it to be the veil of Maya for one example, the external world would yet be real in the sense that it occurs in all its causally linked intricacies even when its intricacies are not perceived or thought of (what occurs at quantum levels, for instance … or, better yet, what occurs behind your back when you're neither looking nor pondering the matter).

On the other hand, realism, as I interpret you to have defined it, can well apply to both idealistic and materialistic systems of belief, as well as to anything in between—with the leading disagreements here concerning what is fundamentally real, upon which all other reality is founded. For example, it is common knowledge that Plato, an idealism-leaning philosophical skeptic, was a realist. It seems logically sound to me that Buddhists, by virtue of upholding Nirvana to be, are all realists--regardless of possible divergences as concerns other aspects of ontology—for Nirvana (and the four Noble Truths) would yet be even if all sentience were to somehow be, or become, unenlightened (in the Eastern sense of this term) … in other words, the Buddha didn’t invent an axiom of Nirvana but, instead, discovered Nirvana's existential presence via enlightenment (this, of course, in Buddhist worldviews). Materialist realism is, of course, yet another variant of realism—one that strictly upholds an underlying physical reality (here thinking of QM, the vacuum field, etc.). In all cases, there are one or more things postulated to be even when not perceived, thought of, or talked about by anyone.

Quoting Wayfarer

didn’t all philosophy start off as direct realism?

I don't know, but it's the default naive view people have. It would seem as if we're looking out at the world through the windows of our eyes. Of course it's not that kind of direct.

But then again, philosophers tend to get rather hung up on vision, which might be a tad misleading. We do have other senses and ways of interacting with the world. Not everything is a visual metaphor.

I don't like the term "naive realism" when applied to philosophical direct realism, because of course philosophers defending direct realism are aware of the criticisms and the biological underpinning for how our senses actually work.

Skepticism is the tendency for beliefs in representational theories of perception to collapse into beliefs in direct-perception and vice-versa.

I don't like discussions of skepticism in relation to idealism or realism, since both idealism and realism have been interpreted through the lens of representational metaphysics, and it isn't clear that either position constitutes a substantial ontological thesis.

Quoting PossibleAaran

My eyes are open at time T1 and I see that a laptop is in state X. I close my eyes and reopen them at T2 and I see that a laptop is in state Y. It is a Realistic bias to interpret this by saying that 'it looks like something happened when I wasn't looking'. Neither what I see at T1, nor what I see at T2, yields this information. So what explains the fact that I see something different each time? It could be that there is no explanation.

The problem with this is that we understand computation to be a process. The laptop at T2 can't complete a computation without having undergone the process of computing starting at T1.

You're right that it is an inference, when we bother to philosophize about it, but it's also the common sense view we all have on a daily basis. We don't really think there are different objects every time we close and open our eyes. We just think it's one object that we don't see when our eyes are closed.

But given that we're doing philosophy, a strong reason to trust the realist inference is because when we do watch our laptops, they undergo a process of computation from one state to the next. So we have no reason to think they don't just because we've closed our eyes.

If we adopt that form of skepticism, we might as well say the entire universe and everyone else disappears the moment we shut our eyes. That it only appears things continued on without us when we open our eyes back up.

Quoting Marchesk

philosophers defending direct realism are aware of the criticisms and the biological underpinning for how our senses actually work.

Thereby viewing philosophical questions through the perspectives of the biological sciences, which in turn assume scientific realism.

Reply to Wayfarer Sure, but I consider that a good reason.

Reply to Marchesk Plainly, as you and I have been debating basically the same question for about 6 years. X-)

Quoting Wayfarer

Plainly, as you and I have been debating basically the same question for about 6 years.

Yeah, but you're not nearly as frustrating as Landru, no offense.

Quoting PossibleAaran

T Clark, I take it that you aren't so interested in Scepticism in any of the forms that I described in my OP? You draw a contrast between "big S Scepticism" and "small s scepticism" where the first, I suppose, is one of the forms of Scepticism I outlined in the OP (or all of them?).

Yes - When I say large "S" skepticism I mean what you described. When something new comes along, I generally check it out on my plaus-o-meter. If the bell rings, I'll tentatively accept it. If the red light flashes, it gets the boot. This is true except when it has significant potential consequences, then I have to put more thought into it.

Big "S" skepticism seems lazy and cowardly to me. Come on Rene - don't give me this "cogito ergo sum" bullshit. Make up your damn mind. As I said previously, that type of skepticism is a luxury for those who can afford to sit around on their asses.

Quoting PossibleAaran

It would be good to get clear on some of this if you wouldn't mind. What is meant by there being 'nothing you can do about it'?

Let's use the example of climate change:

• [1] Is climate change happening? I say yes based on my understanding of the scientific consensus. Many others say no. [2] Does it matter? Will it have significant consequences. I vote yes on this, but I'm less sure. The scientific consensus predicts consequences, but the effect of those consequences depends on social and political factors too.[3] Is there anything we can do about it? Some say yes. Some say it's too late. Some say we shouldn't do anything.

Did that answer your question?

Quoting PossibleAaran

Big S Scepticism about P, then, is an issue which arises if and only if (1) you believe that P, it matters whether or not P, but there is nothing you can do about it, or (2) you don't believe P and it doesn't matter whether or not P, or (3) You don't believe that P, it does matter whether or not P, but there is nothing you can do about it.

I guess I wasn't clear. The problem with big S is that it always calls for skepticism, even when we can't afford it, i.e. when we have to decide based on the information we currently have what to do next. Skepticism as a general acknowledgement that we can never know everything about things that are important and that what we do know may be wrong is fine.

Quoting PossibleAaran

I largely agree with this. Naturalism has far too easy a time these days, with few sceptical challengers. Your acid metaphor is apt, since what tends to happen these days is alternatives to Naturalism are scoffed at and treated as absurd. I cannot count the number of articles I have read in which Idealism is dismissed as unbelievable, incredible, 'dead', or just plain silly. Theism gets a similar treatment, though to a lesser degree because it has been defended as of late by some capable philosophers.

Aren't you and @Wayfarer mixing up two different types of skepticism? When Descartes says "cogito ergo sum" he is talking about facts. Do I exist? Does the world I see exist? Is the capital of France Paris? When you talk about skepticism about Naturalism, you are questioning the metaphysical basis of a whole system of belief. Those seem fundamentally different to me. The only problem I really have with Naturalism is that its proponents seem to believe it provides some sort of privileged outlook on the nature of reality, which I strongly believe is wrong.

Reply to Marchesk None taken. I found Landru pretty frustrating myself.

Quoting T Clark

The only problem I really have with Naturalism is that its proponents seem to believe it provides some sort of privileged outlook on the nature of reality, which I strongly believe is wrong.

That's more or less what I meant. The 'privileged access' is the presumption that science is the only way of knowing. In pre-modern philosophy, there was a distinction between science and sapience, the latter being 'wisdom', which I think overall has been lost sight of.

Quoting PossibleAaran

Sense perception does not reliably yield true beliefs about unobservables. I cannot use sense perception alone to reliably form the belief that there is exactly one alien insect on the furthest planet from earth. I have never observed any such thing, and sense perception is only reliable concerning things which have been sensed. That is why sense perception cannot deliver a reliable belief that the laptop exists unperceived - because the property of unperceived existence is unobservable. This only leaves inference, which is why there needs to be an inference from the observed laptop to its unobserved existence.

Is this an acceptable inference - To the best of my memory, every time I saw something and then closed my eyes, one of two things happened when I opened my eyes again. Either it was still there or I could find an explanation of why it wasn't there. If there were times I don't remember when I couldn't find an explanation, I am confident enough in my understanding of the world to believe that there was an explanation even if I couldn't figure out what it was.

That seems trivial to me.

Quoting Marchesk

The dream hypothesis fails because dreams are not like waking experience. The evil demon hypothesis has nothing empirical in its favor, unlike laptops and trees and what not. We can't infer an evil demon, a simulation, or being a brain in a vat from what is perceived. But we can infer a physical world. The laptop performs the computation when you close it's eyes because it's still there. Simple as that.

It seems to me that the evil demon hypothesis or one where reality is just a program running on a computer are metaphysically equivalent to realism as long as we can never step outside the universe/program/demon's imagination to see what is really going on. If Morpheus, Neo, and the crew had never escaped the Matrix, could never escape it, what difference would it have made that it existed?

This is a fun thread.

Quoting T Clark

It seems to me that the evil demon hypothesis or one where reality is just a program running on a computer are metaphysically equivalent to realism as long as we can never step outside the universe/program/demon's imagination to see what is really going on.

Since we can't step outside, there's no reason to suppose we're inside a simulation. It's merely a philosophical exercise in what sort of wild scenarios we can imagine which aren't incompatible with our experiences. Brains in vats, evil demons, computer simulations, God's dreaming are flights of fancy. Something being merely possible isn't saying much. Maybe a cosmic unicorn farted and started the Big Bang.

Quoting T Clark

If Morpheus, Neo, and the crew had never escaped the Matrix, could never escape it, what difference would it have made that it existed?

You're asking this question by starting out saying the Matrix exists. We're not in a situation were we can do that. We can only imagine the possibility.

But to answer your question, it would matter when the machines decided to shut down the Matrix, or something happened to them such that the power could no longer be maintained, or a meteor struck the heart of Machine Ciy.

Anyway, the point is that realism doesn't require stretching the imagination like that. It can just borrow from science and experience.

Quoting Wayfarer

The 'privileged access' is the presumption that science is the only way of knowing. In pre-modern philosophy, there was a distinction between science and sapience, the latter being 'wisdom', which I think overall has been lost sight of.

In what way is the belief that science isn't the only way of knowing any less of a presumption. You have no proof that it isn't in the same way that realists have no proof that it is. This is the point I made earlier about degrees of skepticism. You seem quite critical (albeit politely) of materialism for 'presuming' without good reason that the physical world is objectively real and all there is, but you are committing the same fallacy, just at a different meta-level, by 'presuming' without good reason that a greater degree of skepticism is required or would be somehow better.

Quoting T Clark

The only problem I really have with Naturalism is that its proponents seem to believe it provides some sort of privileged outlook on the nature of reality, which I strongly believe is wrong.

Of course it's proponents believe it provides some privileged outlook, if they didn't they wouldn't have chosen to think within such constraints. They've selected it from the range of possible beliefs because they think it might work better. This is surely no less true for idealists, solipsists, theists, or agnostics. They've all selected their ways of looking at the world because they think it offers them some privileged insights, but none have any convincing proof that this is the case, why single out naturalism for criticism?

There are only three positions - an objective world exists, an objective world does not exist, an objective world may or may not exist. None provides the proponent any greater insight or privileged outlook. There seems to be an implicit assumption that being 'open to the possibility' of some spiritual or non-physical dimension confers some advantage such that choosing one of the other two options is reprehensibly narrow minded, but I'm not seeing any convincing argument to that effect.

Maybe it's a bit imposing for the materialist to scoff at the spiritualist and say they have no proof for their beliefs, but is it any less imposing for the agnostic/skeptic to scoff at either and say they have no reason to be so convinced?

Quoting Inter Alia

In what way is the belief that science isn't the only way of knowing any less of a presumption.

In light of the history of the subject of philosophy. In my view, the discipline of philosophy comprises seeing through the illusion of materialism.

Quoting Wayfarer

In light of the history of the subject of philosophy. In my view, the discipline of philosophy comprises seeing through the illusion of materialism.

That seems a strange view considering the large number of more or less strictly materialist philosophers. I'm not sure I can see how anyone could objectively come to any conclusion other than Philosophy comprises a whole variety of approaches to materialism ranging from outright rejection to almost complete adoption. I can understand a view that you might 'want' it to be that way, but not really a view that it actually is that way.

If the former, then you haven't really answered the question, which is why you think that makes this belief any less of a presumption that the belief in strong materialism.

Quoting Inter Alia

That seems a strange view considering the large number of more or less strictly materialist philosophers.

They’re a minority in Western philosophy, albeit temporarily influential. But, I don’t want to hijack Possibleaaran’s excellent thread. And also, compliments to your excellent writing style and obvious erudition, I hope you stick around.

Reply to Wayfarer

I see, I had mistakenly taken your rhetorical generalisation to be an absolute judgement, and thank you for your welcoming disposition. My comment, however, was not meant to steer the thread away from it's original focus but rather to serve as an example of what I think might be the real crux of the matter, that the application of skepticism can be viewed at different meta-levels To maybe put it more simply, if one finds it advisable to be skeptical, then one should be skeptical about whether it is advisable to be skeptical... and so on.

I find plenty of supporters of skepticism, particularly when it comes to opposing strict materialism with theism, but I find very few who then show any doubt that such a level of skepticism is appropriate. I thought such an example might help to condense the debate into what I think it is really about, which is how one might measure the degree of skepticism it is useful to have.

Too often (and I mean no offense to anyone here), I read the argument "Skepticism is a good and rational thing, therefore this degree of skepticism about proposition X is entirely appropriate", but the conclusion does not follow from the premise because the premise only establishes that some degree of skepticism is rational whereas the conclusion specifies (usually unintentionally) a specific degree of skepticism, often with associated action, lifestyle choices etc.

Skepticism can range from very much doubting a proposition is true to maintaining only the slightest possibility that one might be false. Very few philosophers advocate extremes greater than these, so the debate is about the middle ground. What interests me is what metric are we using to judge the effectiveness (or perhaps rightness?) of maintaining any given degree of skepticism.

To take strict materialism for example. One might argue that it is advisable to believe and act as if the world were entirely composed of physical objects discoverable by science but maintain only the slightest doubt that this might be the case. Attending a shamanic retreat would be a waste of time for such a person, since they have only the slightest doubts, not enough to justify the investigation of every alternative view. On the other hand someone who very much doubted materialism might well consider a shamanic retreat worth attending, after all the shaman's world view is as likely to be the case as any other. Neither are failing to be skeptical, they only differ in degree.

Reply to Inter Alia
Quoting Inter Alia

There seems to be an excessively binomial use of the term 'Skepticism' here - either one is skeptical or one is not, but surely skepticism, by whatever definition, is a matter of degree?

I'm not sure about this. In the sense of 'Skepticism' as 'doubt' then sure, it is a matter of degree. But that's not the only meaning of 'Skepticism' that has been intended in philosophy. Many have used it to mean that our beliefs lack a certain credibility status; perhaps that our faculties aren't reliable about certain matters, or we can't prove our beliefs using premises acceptable only to someone who does not believe them. Just two examples.

Reply to javra

Quoting javra

As one example, were a single light in the home to no longer turn on when I flick the light switch, the realism of an external world would indicate that there is something physically amiss with the light switch, the respective lightbulb, or with the wiring that dwells in between. The real problem might not be perceived nor thought of at first, yet the web of causal relations which such realism affirms facilitates my being able to discover what is wrong so as to resolve the problem. Other hypotheses, such as a Cartesian evil demon (or the materialist counterpart of being a BIV), could be conceived as alternatives to the reality of an external world. Yet, devoid of upheld belief in the very same external world, these alternative hypotheses would at best only encumber my ability to remedy the stated problem. This then can be expanded to why electricity operates the way that it does, to the question of where the electricity in my home originates from, etc.

I'm not sure how something like the evil demon hypothesis 'encumbers your ability to remedy the stated problem'. You know from experience that when you turn on a light switch and the light doesn't come on, you probably need to change the bulb. That seems just as true on the evil demon hypothesis. The only difference is that neither the light bulb, nor the switch, nor the wiring exists when you aren't in the room, since these things are just projections of the evil demon. But that they are projections doesn't make any difference to how you would go about solving the problem. The advocate of an evil demon hypothesis can also easily accept all of the usual explanations about how electricity operates and where it comes from in your home. The only thing he denies is that any of these states of affairs obtains while unperceived. Still, I do think you might be on to something and I think its worth taking the time to flesh it out more. What, exactly, is it about the denial that things exist while unperceived which is explanatorily deficient? What questions, exactly, can't be answered by the evil demon hypothesis as well as they can be by Realism, and what is better about the Realist answers?

Quoting javra

The question to me is one of why uphold something like the Cartesian evil demon rather than an external world? I.e., what justifies the upholding of such a conviction?

What justifies the upholding of Realism? Are you assuming that unless there is some reason to think the evil demon hypothesis is true, Realism is somehow 'by default' more likely to be true?

Quoting javra

For example, it is common knowledge that Plato, an idealism-leaning philosophical skeptic, was a realist. It seems logically sound to me that Buddhists, by virtue of upholding Nirvana to be, are all realists--regardless of possible divergences as concerns other aspects of ontology—for Nirvana (and the four Noble Truths) would yet be even if all sentience were to somehow be, or become, unenlightened (in the Eastern sense of this term) … in other words, the Buddha didn’t invent an axiom of Nirvana but, instead, discovered Nirvana's existential presence via enlightenment (this, of course, in Buddhist worldviews). Materialist realism is, of course, yet another variant of realism—one that strictly upholds an underlying physical reality (here thinking of QM, the vacuum field, etc.). In all cases, there are one or more things postulated to be even when not perceived, thought of, or talked about by anyone.

I agree. Plato is a Realist in the sense that he holds that the Forms exist whether any one perceives them. He is an Idealist in a different sense to that in which Berkeley or Bradley or Stace were Idealists. The latter have in common the thesis that all that exists are minds and their perceptions. Plato held, by contrast, that the perceptible world is a mere shadow of a deeper Reality. Very different views.

Reply to sime

Quoting sime

Skepticism is the tendency for beliefs in representational theories of perception to collapse into beliefs in direct-perception and vice-versa.

I don't like discussions of skepticism in relation to idealism or realism, since both idealism and realism have been interpreted through the lens of representational metaphysics, and it isn't clear that either position constitutes a substantial ontological thesis.

Could you be more precise about what a 'representational theory of perception' is? Then perhaps we could discuss further.

Also, take Realism to be the thesis that some entities sometimes exist when no one is perceiving them (W.T Stace's definition). Take Idealism to be the denial of Realism. What about this presupposes a 'representational metaphysics'. I suppose I'm still not sure what that means, but these seem like substantial ontological theses to me.

Reply to Marchesk

Unfortunately I think you are still begging the question.

Quoting Marchesk

The problem with this is that we understand computation to be a process. The laptop at T2 can't complete a computation without having undergone the process of computing starting at T1.

We do understand computation to be a process, and the Idealist maintains that there is no such thing as unperceived computation. Computers undergo this process when we perceive them to, but they do not do this otherwise. They don't even exist otherwise. A laptop which exists at T1 is in state X, and A laptop which exists at T2 is in state Y. To assume either (a) that both are the same laptop which endures over time or (b) that the laptop undergoes a process between T1 and T2 called 'computation' while no one is perceiving it is just to assume what needs to be proven. True, we ordinarily think of computation as a process over time, but the Idealist is saying that what we ordinarily think, is false.


Quoting Marchesk

But given that we're doing philosophy, a strong reason to trust the realist inference is because when we do watch our laptops, they undergo a process of computation from one state to the next. So we have no reason to think they don't just because we've closed our eyes.

We have no reason to think that they don't compute when we close our eyes, but we have no reason to think that they do either, without some sort of inferential argument. Having no reason to think that it is false that X is not a reason to think that it is true that X.

Reply to T Clark

Quoting T Clark

Big "S" skepticism seems lazy and cowardly to me. Come on Rene - don't give me this "cogito ergo sum" bullshit. Make up your damn mind. As I said previously, that type of skepticism is a luxury for those who can afford to sit around on their asses.

I wouldn't want to deny that Big S Skepticism is not an issue which concerns people with more pressing 'practical' concerns, whatever they might be. But I would make two points. First, if the sceptic (of the sort I indicate in my last paragraph of the OP) is right, then we have absolutely no reliable source of belief in the existence of unperceived things. Such a belief has on rational basis at all and is of the same kind as the belief that there is a unicorn on mars (notice it isn't just that I can doubt this belief if I want to be an annoying and frivolous doubter. Rather, there is absolutely no rational basis for the belief at all). Now I don't deny that many people have things to do of a more consequential nature. If you are concerned with getting food for the starving, protecting the rainforest, saving endangered species or lessening terrorism then this kind of scepticism might seem abstract and useless. But I think if this sort of scepticism is right it teaches something very important. It is quite common for people of all kinds to deride different and unfamiliar belief systems, or even familiar but unpopular ones. It is even more popular to say of such systems that 'we know better' or that they are 'not based on evidence' or whatever other epistemic criticism. The realization that even our belief in unperceived existence is completely unfounded should encourage a great modesty and give pause when making that sort of evaluation.

Quoting T Clark

Aren't you and Wayfarer mixing up two different types of skepticism? When Descartes says "cogito ergo sum" he is talking about facts. Do I exist? Does the world I see exist? Is the capital of France Paris? When you talk about skepticism about Naturalism, you are questioning the metaphysical basis of a whole system of belief. Those seem fundamentally different to me. The only problem I really have with Naturalism is that its proponents seem to believe it provides some sort of privileged outlook on the nature of reality, which I strongly believe is wrong.

I am not sure I was mixing them up. When Descartes asks whether the whole world is a mere dream, he is effectively asking whether esse is percipi in waking life, as it is in dreams. If it were, that would surely entail that Naturalism is false? Although, it is hard to tell whether it would, since Naturalism is hardly ever clearly enough defined for one to tell what state of affairs would make it false!

I should note that I am not here suggesting that Descartes would have understood his topic this way. It seems to me that Descartes had very specific aims and goals behind his use of sceptical themes, and that these aims and goals are quite different to those of other writers who have used the same themes.

Quoting T Clark

Is this an acceptable inference - To the best of my memory, every time I saw something and then closed my eyes, one of two things happened when I opened my eyes again. Either it was still there or I could find an explanation of why it wasn't there. If there were times I don't remember when I couldn't find an explanation, I am confident enough in my understanding of the world to believe that there was an explanation even if I couldn't figure out what it was.

That seems trivial to me.

All of it seems true, but none of it entails that things exist unperceived, and I can't see anywhere that you even conclude that that is even probably true. I agree that every time I saw something and then closed my eyes, it was typically there when I opened my eyes again. I also agree that if it wasn't I could provide some explanation of why it wasn't. But why does this give me any reason to think that anything existed when I did close my eyes? What I am saying is, your inference might work, but it needs to be made more explicit what the inference is.

Quoting T Clark

It seems to me that the evil demon hypothesis or one where reality is just a program running on a computer are metaphysically equivalent to realism as long as we can never step outside the universe/program/demon's imagination to see what is really going on. If Morpheus, Neo, and the crew had never escaped the Matrix, could never escape it, what difference would it have made that it existed?

This is a fun thread.

This one wasn't directed at me, but I disagree. Realism says that the objects which I perceive exist when I am not perceiving them. The evil demon hypothesis says that the objects which I perceive do not exist when I am not perceiving them. It also says that the evil demon exists even when I am not perceiving him, and he is the explanation of the existence of the things I perceive. If 'metaphysically' is read in the usual way as concerning 'what there is', it is clear that these two hypotheses are not equivalent at all. I imagine that you mean equivalent for practical purposes, given your later remark, 'what difference would it have made'?

Sorry for leaving such a long post, but there were many insightful posts to reply to. Only one remains:

Reply to Wayfarer
Quoting Wayfarer

Possibleaaran’s excellent thread.

Thanks. It being my first thread, I wondered how much response it would get. Incidentally I agree with you that, relative to the history of philosophy, Materialism is a minority position.

PA

Quoting PossibleAaran

that our beliefs lack a certain credibility status; perhaps that our faculties aren't reliable about certain matters, or we can't prove our beliefs using premises acceptable only to someone who does not believe them.

I'm not seeing how either of these examples are not a matter of degree. Our faculties can be quite reliable, very reliable or completely unreliable, no? Likewise we can consider our belief completely unprovable to others, quite convincing or virtually impossible to refute (but retaining some small doubt). In each case our actions (or other response) are surely more guided by our beliefs about the extent of our skepticism than by its existence or not.

Quoting PossibleAaran

Now I don't deny that many people have things to do of a more consequential nature. If you are concerned with getting food for the starving, protecting the rainforest, saving endangered species or lessening terrorism then this kind of scepticism might seem abstract and useless. But I think if this sort of scepticism is right it teaches something very important.

If I took the skepticism about the unperceived world seriously, then wouldn't I doubt whether those issues even exist when I'm not perceiving them? As long as I'm not perceiving starving kids in Africa, terrorist cells, or the rainforest being cut down, then why should they be of any consequence? For all I know, they only exist when they come into view.

Maybe the better approach would be just to avoid seeing those issues so as to keep them nonexistent, if esse is percipi.

Quoting PossibleAaran

We have no reason to think that they don't compute when we close our eyes, but we have no reason to think that they do either, without some sort of inferential argument. Having no reason to think that it is false that X is not a reason to think that it is true that X.

But we do have cases where we open our eyes and see that the laptop is frozen up instead of delivering a result. So we have different possible scenarios upon opening our eyes:

The laptop displays a finished computation.

The laptop is frozen up.

The laptop is out of power.

The laptop has overheated.

The laptop is gone!

And so on. Brutely speaking, we can't say why any of the above happened. We open our eyes, and there's a new experience to be had. But we can provide realist explanations. The laptop is gone because someone else took advantage while our eyes were closed. Perhaps philosophical skepticism at a busy bus stop is a bad idea.

Skepticism turns off the lights in the house of philosophy. The light itself is an illusion so forget about what it illuminates.

Reply to Inter Alia Quoting Inter Alia

I'm not seeing how either of these examples are not a matter of degree. Our faculties can be quite reliable, very reliable or completely unreliable, no? Likewise we can consider our belief completely unprovable to others, quite convincing or virtually impossible to refute (but retaining some small doubt). In each case our actions (or other response) are surely more guided by our beliefs about the extent of our skepticism than by its existence or not.

I see your point. They are a matter of degree, but the challenges posed by sceptical writings have typically been absolute. So the thought is that we have no reliable means at all of establishing that things exist unperceived. Sense perception is reliable to a degree with respect to things observed, but it is not reliable at all when it comes to beliefs about things we have not observed. Stace argues in his refutation of Realism that its actually contradictory to suppose that sense perception is reliable even in the slightest concerning unobserved entities. Similarly, whether we can prove our beliefs to others is a matter of degree. I might be able to prove them to people who accept certain assumptions, but be incapable of proving it to someone who doesn't. Ancient sceptics thought you couldn't, ultimately prove anything to someone who was prepared to doubt far enough. They might have agreed that some things can be proven given this or that assumption. Thanks for making this point, which I had failed to see.

Reply to Marchesk Quoting Marchesk

If I took the skepticism about the unperceived world seriously, then wouldn't I doubt whether those issues even exist when I'm not perceiving them?

Not necessarily. I might maintain that we have no reliable means of establishing that things exist unperceived, but I might still continue to believe it. I might admit that I have no rational basis for the belief, but still believe it, just because I can't help it. Of course, that's not the route the Idealist takes, but it is a possible route.

Quoting Marchesk

As long as I'm not perceiving starving kids in Africa, terrorist cells, or the rainforest being cut down, then why should they be of any consequence? For all I know, they only exist when they come into view.

Maybe the better approach would be just to avoid seeing those issues so as to keep them nonexistent, if esse is percipi.

If I were to take the Idealist route, I would likely answer you like this. The Idealist view is not that nothing exists unperceived by me, but that nothing exists unperceived by some mind. The starving kids in Africa obviously perceive themselves and their starvation, so the Idealist need not say they don't exist. The same with terrorists. The rain forest being cut down is obviously being perceived by the people cutting it down.

Quoting Marchesk

But we do have cases where we open our eyes and see that the laptop is frozen up instead of delivering a result. So we have different possible scenarios upon opening our eyes:

The laptop displays a finished computation.

The laptop is frozen up.

The laptop is out of power.

The laptop has overheated.

The laptop is gone!

And so on. Brutely speaking, we can't say why any of the above happened. We open our eyes, and there's a new experience to be had. But we can provide realist explanations. The laptop is gone because someone else took advantage while our eyes were closed. Perhaps philosophical skepticism at a busy bus stop is a bad idea.

The explanation in terms of 'someone taking advantage' is available to the Idealist. Since the 'someone else' perceives the laptop as it is being stolen by him.

PA

Quoting PossibleAaran

If I were to take the Idealist route, I would likely answer you like this. The Idealist view is not that nothing exists unperceived by me, but that nothing exists unperceived by some mind. The starving kids in Africa obviously perceive themselves and their starvation, so the Idealist need not say they don't exist. The same with terrorists. The rain forest being cut down is obviously being perceived by the people cutting it down.

Sure, but the idealist knows about other perceivers the same way they know about laptops. I see you. I close my eyes and then open them. I see another you.

Quoting PossibleAaran

The rain forest being cut down is obviously being perceived by the people cutting it down.

I don't really understand caring about a rainforest that only exists as perception.

Reply to Marchesk You would need to ask an Idealist how he knows that there are other minds, and why he cares about a rain forest which only exists when people perceive it. I'm new here and I don't know if there are any Idealists around. Since I am not one, let's just concede that he has no answer to either question. The fact that Idealism has consequences which sound strange to us isn't a reason to think that Realism is true. Strange as Idealism is, we never found any reason to think that things exist unperceived.

PA

Quoting PossibleAaran

Strange as Idealism is, we never found any reason to think that things exist unperceived.

What do you mean by never having found any reason? Do you mean any reason the idealist would accept? I think there are good reasons for being a realist. They might not be good enough to convince an idealist or skeptic, but that's their problem.

Quoting PossibleAaran

You would need to ask an Idealist how he knows that there are other minds, and why he cares about a rain forest which only exists when people perceive it.

A relevant passage from Bryan Magee's book on Schopenhauer's Philosophy, which addresses this point:

I have often heard professional philosophers in Britain, including gifted ones, assert that according to transcendental idealism 'everything exists in a mind, or in minds, or 'existence is mental'.

This is a radical error. It is not what Kant or Schopenhauer were saying, nor is it what they believed. On the contrary, both of them believed that the abiding reality from which we are screened off by the ever-changing surface of our contingent and ephemeral experiences exists in itself, independent of minds and their perceptions or experiences.

If reality had consisted only of perception, or only of experience, then it would presumably have been possible for us to encompass it exhaustively in perception or experience, to know it through and through, without remainder. But that is not so, and the chief clout of transcendental idealism is contained in the insight that while it is possible for us to perceive or experience or think or envisage only in categories determined by our own apparatus, whatever exists cannot in itself exist in terms of those categories, because existence as such cannot be in categories at all. This must mean that in an unfathomably un-understandable way whatever exists independently of experience must be in and throughout its whole nature different from the world of our representations. But because the world of our representations is the only world we know ‚ and the only world we can ever know ‚ it is almost irresistibly difficult for us not to take it for the world tout court, reality, what there is, the world as it is in itself. This is what all of us grow up doing, it is the commonsense view of things, and only reflection of a profound and sophisticated character can free us from it.

I think what the realist does, and this is something Schopenhauer is explicit about, is that s/he forgets to take account of him or herself, the sense in which all of our knowledge of the world is mediated by the senses, assimilated by the understanding, and represented in the intellect. Realism, generally, doesn't critically reflect on the nature of experience, and the contribution the mind makes to it.

Reply to PossibleAaran

You posit the evil daemon to be inconsistent to realism—the latter, by your definition, being the stance that one or more things can hold presence when not perceived or thought about.

To understand your “skeptical” point of view better:

Does the evil daemon hold presence when not perceived or thought about?

Secondly, is everything that one thinks true (here, correspondent to what is real)?

BTW, it wouldn’t make much sense for me to answer your questions when mine are not first answered … since I’d have little if any understanding of your own stance.

Quoting Wayfarer

think what the realist does, and this is something Schopenhauer is explicit about, is that s/he forgets to take account of him or herself, the sense in which all of our knowledge of the world is mediated by the senses, assimilated by the understanding, and represented in the intellect. Realism, generally, doesn't critically reflect on the nature of experience, and the contribution the mind makes to it.

Also known as Stove's worst argument?

Quoting Marchesk

Also known as Stove's worst argument?

I studied Hume under David Stove. He was a great guy, and a terrific teacher. Very sympathetic to me, who was kind of a rebel without a clue. But I don't think Stove 'got' Kant at all.

Quoting Marchesk

Since we can't step outside, there's no reason to suppose we're inside a simulation. It's merely a philosophical exercise in what sort of wild scenarios we can imagine which aren't incompatible with our experiences. Brains in vats, evil demons, computer simulations, God's dreaming are flights of fancy. Something being merely possible isn't saying much. Maybe a cosmic unicorn farted and started the Big Bang.

Since we can't step outside of our perceptions, there's no reason to suppose we're inside an objective reality. It's merely a philosophical exercise in what sort of wild scenarios we can imagine which aren't incompatible with our experiences.

I'm not playing games here. I'm serious.

Quoting Marchesk

You're asking this question by starting out saying the Matrix exists. We're not in a situation were we can do that. We can only imagine the possibility.

You're asking this question by starting out saying objective reality exists. We're not in a situation were we can do that. We can only imagine the possibility.

Still serious. I think you are a victim of a failure of imagination. It is a common intellectual malady to believe that words and the world are the same thing.

Quoting PossibleAaran

This is not skepticism, this is apathy.
— charleton

But this was what scepticism was for the ancients, and certainly for Sextus.

No, I do not think so.I think this is more like the case of Catholics calling Protestants "atheists", failing to describe their thinking.
Skepticism was also for many years in the modern period (late Medieval) a term of abuse directed from those that were happy with their certainty, especially about God, against those that preferred to ask questions.
`By the religious establishment a good dose of healthy skepticism was seen as a major danger and was traduced as a "burning issue" in a literal sense.
But those self identifying as skeptic would have a more positive view of their position, as do I.

Reply to T Clark

Hold on a bit there. Change the referent from one of perceivable world/reality to one of logical inference. As regards logical possibilities, either a) there is an objective reality or b) there isn’t. Here, the law of excluded middle holds … and A and B are contradictory positions—so only one of the two can be true. All this has no bearing on what this objective reality actually is; one can be strictly spiritual about it (such as in upholding the neo-Platonic presence of “the One”, for example, as being thee only true objective reality) or strictly materialistic about it (upholding the vacuum field as the true objective reality? or at least something to the like … pick your stuff). Nevertheless, the same logical conundrum holds all the same: either we dwell within an objective reality (that is even when not perceived or thought of) or we don’t.

So, now, there’s an unavoidable contradiction to claiming the absence of an objective reality: to uphold the absence of objective reality is, in and of itself, to affirm what reality consists of when objectively appraised … i.e., is to uphold the presence of an objective reality.

Therefore, I’m quite comfortable with the logical conclusion that we dwell within an objective reality … details of what it actually is here set aside, it nevertheless is.

Quoting Inter Alia

Of course it's proponents believe it provides some privileged outlook, if they didn't they wouldn't have chosen to think within such constraints. They've selected it from the range of possible beliefs because they think it might work better. This is surely no less true for idealists, solipsists, theists, or agnostics. They've all selected their ways of looking at the world because they think it offers them some privileged insights, but none have any convincing proof that this is the case, why single out naturalism for criticism?

I think that views of the world are not right or wrong, they are more or less useful in a particular situation. I like science and I've always been good at it. I'm an engineer. Science makes up a large part of my understanding of the world. It can be very useful, but in a lot of situations it's not. The metaphor I like is a tool box. When you have something to do, you pull out the tool that works best.

As to why I'm picking on science - If I may personify, science thinks highly of itself and ridicules ways of seeing that are different. It claims it is the only valid way of seeing the world. The only institutions
I can think of that are similar are some brands of religion.

Quoting Inter Alia

There are only three positions - an objective world exists, an objective world does not exist, an objective world may or may not exist. None provides the proponent any greater insight or privileged outlook. There seems to be an implicit assumption that being 'open to the possibility' of some spiritual or non-physical dimension confers some advantage such that choosing one of the other two options is reprehensibly narrow minded, but I'm not seeing any convincing argument to that effect.

Let's see if I can come up with more than three.

• [1] No opinion. Until you brought it up, I never even considered it. I can't see any reason to decide. [2] It's neither true nor not true. It's metaphysics. As I said, it is more or less useful in a particular situation.[3] It doesn't matter whether or not it's true, because there is absolutely no way of knowing. [4] I don't care. The existence of objective reality has no impact on my life.

Quoting Inter Alia

Maybe it's a bit imposing for the materialist to scoff at the spiritualist and say they have no proof for their beliefs, but is it any less imposing for the agnostic/skeptic to scoff at either and say they have no reason to be so convinced?

I've said this before - agnosticism and skepticism are pointless, useless, cowardly when a decision has to be made. When it matters.

Quoting javra

Hold on a bit there. Change the referent from one of perceivable world/reality to one of logical inference. As regards logical possibilities, either a) there is an objective reality or b) there isn’t. Here, the law of excluded middle holds … and A and B are contradictory positions—so only one of the two can be true.

"Objective reality" is a name we give to a set of perceptions, observations, ideas. Do countries exist? Do minds exist? Does the stratosphere exist? Does love exist? Do rainbows exist? The answers - Yes. No. I don't know. It doesn't make any difference. I don't care. There is no way I can prove one way or another. Sometimes yes, sometimes no. I can choose to act as if it exists. I can choose to act as if it doesn't exist.

Quoting PossibleAaran

This one wasn't directed at me, but I disagree. Realism says that the objects which I perceive exist when I am not perceiving them. The evil demon hypothesis says that the objects which I perceive do not exist when I am not perceiving them. It also says that the evil demon exists even when I am not perceiving him, and he is the explanation of the existence of the things I perceive. If 'metaphysically' is read in the usual way as concerning 'what there is', it is clear that these two hypotheses are not equivalent at all. I imagine that you mean equivalent for practical purposes, given your later remark, 'what difference would it have made'?

I'm going to think about his some more. I'm not expressing myself clearly enough and I'm trying to think of another angle.

Quoting T Clark

"Objective reality" is a name we give to a set of perceptions, observations, ideas.

Objectivity—the state of being objective—holds multiple definitions (confer with Wiktionary, for instance). One of which is that of being just/impartial and, hence, unbiased. Objective reality is then either a repetition of synonyms (objective objectivity; the really real) or, to my mind, the affirmation of a reality not clouded by, hence impartial to, hence independent of, personal preferences (etc.).

All the same, how does the logic I’ve previously expressed not hold?

(Should clarify: since, as previously illustrated, to uphold a lack of objective reality is an instance of contradictory reasoning—one where both X and not-X occur at the same time and in the same way—it is a fallacy of reasoning.)

Quoting javra

Objectivity—the state of being objective—holds multiple definitions (confer with Wiktionary, for instance). One of which is that of being just/impartial and, hence, unbiased. Objective reality is then either a repetition of synonyms (objective objectivity; the really real) or, to my mind, the affirmation of a reality not clouded by, hence impartial to, hence independent of, personal preferences (etc.).

All the same, how does the logic I’ve previously expressed not hold?

By the logic you've previously expressed you mean the law of the excluded middle, correct? Well that's easy. The law of the excluded middle only applies if there is objective reality, so you've got a circular argument.

I wonder if I really believe what I just said. I might. I need to think about it some more.

Quoting T Clark

I wonder if I really believe what I just said. I might. I need to think about it some more.

Cool. I'll take a breather too.

Reply to Marchesk

Quoting Marchesk

What do you mean by never having found any reason? Do you mean any reason the idealist would accept? I think there are good reasons for being a realist. They might not be good enough to convince an idealist or skeptic, but that's their problem.

Let me distinguish two different conceptions of reason, and I say you have supplied neither of them in favour of Realism.

Reliability

Humans have two reliable sources of belief about the world. Sense perception and inference from sense perception. Sense perception is not reliable with respect to things unperceived, since sense perception is, obviously, only a reliable source of belief about things sensed. The property of unperceived existence cannot be sensed. Therefore sense perception is not a reliable source for the belief that Realism is true. (I think this is the very least that should be said. W.T Stace thought that the very idea of sense perception is reliable with respect to the unperceived was contradictory). This leaves inference. But the only inferences which you tried to make were question begging; they assumed what was to be proven, and question begging inferences are unreliable. This is one sense of 'reason'. S has a reason for believing that P if and only if S has some reliable means of acquiring the belief that P.

All one needs to 'have a reason' in this sense is to locate some reliable source for the belief, regardless of whether or not an Idealist or a Sceptic would believe that that source is reliable. Can you even locate a reliable source for the belief which even a Realist would accept is reliable? Sense perception and inference have been ruled out since sense perception is reliable only about what is sensed and the only inferences we have found so far have been fallacious.

Dialectical

You mentioned the power of reasons to convince, and you said that Realism has good reasons in its favour, just not reasons 'good enough to convince an idealist or a sceptic'. Well, as I pointed out, the only reasons you gave for believing Realism to be true were question begging and so powerless to convince any sensible person who does not believe Realism already. What is the point of a 'reason' which cannot convince someone who is not already convinced by the doctrine you are attempting to prove?

Reply to javra
Quoting javra

You posit the evil daemon to be inconsistent to realism—the latter, by your definition, being the stance that one or more things can hold presence when not perceived or thought about.

To understand your “skeptical” point of view better:

Does the evil daemon hold presence when not perceived or thought about?

Secondly, is everything that one thinks true (here, correspondent to what is real)?

BTW, it wouldn’t make much sense for me to answer your questions when mine are not first answered … since I’d have little if any understanding of your own stance.

The evil demon hypothesis does posit the existence of a demon which exists when unperceived. The contrast between this hypothesis and Realism is that Realism maintains that the objects which are perceived by us exist when unperceived, and the evil demon hypothesis denies that. (I should mention that there is also what goes by the name 'indirect Realism' according to which the objects we perceive are 'mental' and exist only when perceived, but there are other objects which these mental objects are pictures of and which exist unperceived).

I do not think that everything that I think is true, although I am not sure I have understood your second question correctly.

Reply to charleton Quoting charleton

No, I do not think so.I think this is more like the case of Catholics calling Protestants "atheists", failing to describe their thinking.
Skepticism was also for many years in the modern period (late Medieval) a term of abuse directed from those that were happy with their certainty, especially about God, against those that preferred to ask questions.
`By the religious establishment a good dose of healthy skepticism was seen as a major danger and was traduced as a "burning issue" in a literal sense.
But those self identifying as skeptic would have a more positive view of their position, as do I.

I am not sure what the point of this is. Are you merely insisting that the word 'scepticism' describes your position and your position only? If so, that ignores the evident fact that philosophers have used the word 'scepticism' to refer to many different things. I am not sure why you insist on it being used in only your sense.

Reply to Wayfarer Quoting Wayfarer

I think what the realist does, and this is something Schopenhauer is explicit about, is that s/he forgets to take account of him or herself, the sense in which all of our knowledge of the world is mediated by the senses, assimilated by the understanding, and represented in the intellect. Realism, generally, doesn't critically reflect on the nature of experience, and the contribution the mind makes to it.

Perhaps, although one needs to be very careful about what the minds 'contribution' is supposed to be. I am looking at my laptop right now and as a result having a certain sort of sense experience - I am sure you know roughly what it is like. What, exactly, does my mind contribute to that experience? What I am tempted to say is just that I look and I see the laptop. My mind isn't adding anything. The laptop is there before my consciousness. But I recognize that this is likely far too simple to be true.

PA

Quoting PossibleAaran

What, exactly, does my mind contribute to that experience? What I am tempted to say is just that I look and I see the laptop. My mind isn't adding anything. The laptop is there before my consciousness. But I recognize that this is likely far too simple to be true.

I suppose what I'm getting at, is that the human mentality provides a sense of scale, and a perspective, through which any judgements about 'what exists' are made. Even the sense of time and location is provided by the mind; when you look at your computer, it is something that exists in a location proximate to yourself, and is intelligible in terms of how you use it and what it means to you.

In a more general sense, the mind implicitly provides the scale and perspective within which we make any judgements about what exists. The moon, for example - I can picture it now - but I see it from a perspective, or rather, from within a perceptual framework, which is furnished by the mind. Also, recall that Kant said he was an empirical realist, as am I; I am not doubting the reality of the moon, but the notion of its mind independent reality.

There's a thought-experiment I sometimes offer here. Imagine that mountains are conscious beings, and you're a mountain. To you, humans are of such tiny magnitude, and their life-spans are so short, you can't even be aware of them. Rivers, you're aware of, because they last for hundreds of thousands of years, and cut ravines in your flanks. On the other end of the scale, if you're a microbe, then humans are to all intents a solar system from your point of view, and immensely long-lived, as your lifespan is hours or days.

Actually there's another passage in that McGee book that is useful in this respect:

[Kant once remarked] 'If I take away the thinking subject, the whole material world must vanish, as this world is nothing but the phenomenal appearance in the sensibility of our own subject, and is a species of this subject's representations.' … [An] objection would run: 'Everyone knows that the earth, and a fortiori the universe, existed for a long time before there were any living beings, and therefore any perceiving subjects. But according to what Kant has just been quoted as saying, that is impossible.' Schopenhauer's defence of Kant on this score was twofold. First, the objector has not understood to the very bottom the Kantian demonstration that time is one of the forms of our sensibility. The earth, say, as it was before there was life, is a field of empirical enquiry in which we have come to know a great deal; its reality is no more being denied than is the reality of perceived objects in the same room. The point is, the whole of the empirical world in space and time is the creation of our understanding, which apprehends all the objects of empirical knowledge within it as being in some part of that space and at some part of that time: and this is as true of the earth before there was life as it is of the pen I am now holding a few inches in front of my face and seeing slightly out of focus as it moves across the paper.

This, incidentally, illustrates a difficulty in the way of understanding which transcendental idealism has permanently to contend with: the assumptions of 'the inborn realism which arises from the original disposition of the intellect' enter unawares into the way in which the statements of transcendental idealism are understood, so that these statements appear faulty in ways in which, properly understood, they are not. Such realistic assumptions so pervade our normal use of concepts that the claims of transcendental idealism disclose their own non-absurdity only after difficult consideration, whereas criticisms of them at first appear cogent which on examination are seen to rest on confusion. We have to raise almost impossibly deep levels of presupposition in our own thinking and imagination to the level of self-consciousness before we are able to achieve a critical awareness of all our realistic assumptions, and thus achieve an understanding of transcendental idealism which is untainted by them.

Quoting Wayfarer

I studied Hume under David Stove. He was a great guy, and a terrific teacher. Very sympathetic to me, who was kind of a rebel without a clue. But I don't think Stove 'got' Kant at all.

Really? That's interesting. What would be Kant's response to Stove's worst argument critique?

Quoting T Clark

Since we can't step outside of our perceptions, there's no reason to supposed we're inside an objective reality. It's merely a philosophical exercise in what sort of wild scenarios we can imagine which aren't incompatible with our experiences.

A Heideggerian critique of that might be that our being in the world is primary, and so abstracting away from that to ask radically skeptical questions about our perceptions of the world is to make a fundamental mistake.

Quoting T Clark

You're asking this question by starting out saying objective reality exists. We're not in a situation were we can do that. We can only imagine the possibility.

This is assuming that our perceptions are subjective, and thus there is an objective gap that needs to be crossed to get at an external world, if it exists.

But one might start over by rejecting the notion that perceptions are subjective, or at least deny that perceptions make us aware of subjective objects (sense datum).

Quoting T Clark

I think you are a victim of a failure of imagination. It is a common intellectual malady to believe that words and the world are the same thing.

I can understand the brain in a vat argument. But I'm not sure that's the same as being in the world. Maybe we're just imagining that an envatted experience could be indistinguishable from an embodied one, because we don't know enough to rule it out.

Quoting Marchesk

A Heideggerian critique of that might be that our being in the world is primary, and so abstracting away from that to ask radically skeptical questions about our perceptions of the world is to make a fundamental mistake.

Which is begging the question. Who says being in the world is primary (other than Heidegger)?

Quoting Marchesk

This is assuming that our perceptions are subjective, and thus there is an objective gap that needs to be crossed to get at an external world, if it exists.

But one might start over by rejecting the notion that perceptions are subjective, or at least deny that perceptions make us aware of subjective objects (sense datum).

Are you saying that our experiences are objective? I'm not even sure what that means. I would have thought that personal experiences are the essence of subjectivity.

Quoting T Clark

Are you saying that our experiences are objective? I'm not even sure what that means. I would have thought that personal experiences are the essence of subjectivity.

Some of our experiences are subjective, but it's not clear how perception should be classified.

Quoting T Clark

Which is begging the question. Who says being in the world is primary (other than Heidegger)?

Heidegger makes the argument that we're always actively doing things with goals in mind which make sense in terms of a world, and it's only by abstracting from those activities that you can put yourself in a position to have radical doubt, which is an act of forgetting your constant worldly activity.

Or something along those lines, as I understand it.

Quoting Marchesk

What would be Kant's response to Stove's worst argument critique?

I don’t think Kant would bother responding. You can’t argue with instinctive realists, they have to begin to question their own sense of the solidity of the world before they’d consider it.

Reply to Wayfarer So Kant wouldn't have said anything to a hand waving argument either?

Neither would Wittgenstein, but for a different reason.

Reply to PossibleAaran

Thank you for your answers. We’re in accord about not everything thought of being necessarily true. This, then, includes the thoughts of an evil daemon (bogeyman?) messing around with you.

What makes realism more plausible than an evil daemon? One element to this is as follows: Conviction in realism is how I and a majority of the world’s populace—both greatly and poorly educated (education being a separate issue from that of intelligence for me)—navigate the world most pragmatically, for it facilitates an optimal flourishing of awareness in regard to worldly givens. The evil daemon hypothesis, however, presents a lack of reliable predictability as to what will be, and posits no way of reliably establishing what is—and, because of this, is debilitating to the living of life.

My former, yet unanswered question to you was “what justifies the favoring of an evil daemon as true at expense of realism being true?” An answer would now be appreciated.

--------

The title of this thread is “what is scepticism”. In your reoccurring arguments you overwhelmingly favor Descartes’ branch of skepticism, even though in your OP you thoughtfully point to different branches of belief that likewise go by the label of skepticism.

To me, Descartes warped the notion of philosophical skepticism from one of it being a path toward greater wisdom—cf. the Ancient Greek skeptikos, “thoughtful, inquiring”; Platonism standing out as one Ancient Greek example of this—to one of it being a ridiculous, endless stream of debilitating doubts in search for some inexistent grail of absolute certainty.

All philosophical skeptics throughout history were other than the typical modern strawman of “someone overcome by irresolvable doubts”; all philosophical skeptics that I am currently aware of held certainty of varying strengths in relation to how the world works, and all were realists.

BTW, Cicero, a philosophical skeptic, favored Stoicism in his “On the Nature of the Gods” … if this is of any interest to anyone. One point to this being a further illustration that philosophical skepticism is not about the rejection of plausible claims on grounds that they cannot be proven with absolute certainty. Cicero, it should be said, was religious … epitomizing a very distinct relation to that of philosophical skepticism and the commonly upheld dogmas of Abrahamic faiths.

I was more interested in discussing what philosophical skepticism logically signifies rather than debating against an endless stream of arguments about hypotheticals which can neither be disproven nor proven with absolute certainty—i.e., with perfect security from all possible error. This because, to my knowledge, no proposition can be successfully demonstrated to be perfectly secure from all possible error. Not even Descartes’ “(I doubt, therefore) I think, therefore I am” … nor the proposition that absolute certainty is impossible.

This, again, is not to deny that certainties of varying strengths always occur. The inductive conclusion that absolute certainties cannot be demonstrated, though not itself an absolute certainty, is nevertheless considered by me to be a (less than absolute) certainty of superlative strength. For another example, to doubt is to doubt what is real; thus, it is to in itself be in possession of certainty that something real is.

At any rate, if you seek solace via some promise of an absolute certainty—be it that realism is true or that some evil daemon concept one is momentarily entertaining is false—I’m not one to be of service in this regard.

Reply to T Clark Quoting T Clark

It [science] claims it is the only valid way of seeing the world. The only institutions I can think of that are similar are some brands of religion.

It's probably my archaic approach, but I don't seem to have made myself clear here, I'm not comparing science to skepticism, idealism, or theism as options and saying they all think they're the only way to look at the world. I'm saying that 'not thinking they're the only way to look at the world' is itself a way of looking at the world, and the proponents of this way are no less adamant that it's the right way than the proponent of any one of the aforementioned belief systems.

You express uncertainty that science is always the best way, you are open to other belief systems in other contexts and are skeptical in that sense, but you have not shown any skepticism about the belief that being open to other belief systems in other contexts is right, meta-skepticism if you will, skepticism about the rightness of being skeptical. Maybe being skeptical is wrong, maybe we'd all be better off if we just fervently believed in something?

Personally, I very much doubt that, but I'm sufficiently skeptical not to be too judgemental about people like certain scientists or religious believers who think that it's better to believe in one thing and stick to it.

I don't think a straight out comparison between religion and science is either accurate or helpful. I think the comparison ought to be between what is called 'the scientific worldview' and religions.

Working scientists are generally not engaged in the task of philosophizing about worldviews or how the world ought to be seen; they're busy doing the actual work of science, relating findings to theories, and so on. I think when thus engaged, scientists are sceptics in the original and best sense.

The 'scientific worldview' is another matter altogether - that is the sense in which science is viewed as being normative in respect of what we ought to think about general questions of life and meaning. And that is the province of popular intellectuals, science writers and broadcasters, like Brian Cox, Neil DeGrasse Tyson, Richard Dawkins, Steve Pinker, et al. In their hands, 'scepticism' has a definite ideological content, with some kinds of ideas being regarded favourably as 'scientific', and others - well, not so much. And I think most of the time what they call scepticism is really more a belief system - the religion of scientism.

Reply to javra, interesting post.

Quoting javra

What makes realism more plausible than an evil daemon? One element to this is as follows: Conviction in realism is how I and a majority of the world’s populace—both greatly and poorly educated (education being a separate issue from that of intelligence for me)—navigate the world most pragmatically, for it facilitates an optimal flourishing of awareness in regard to worldly givens. The evil daemon hypothesis, however, presents a lack of reliable predictability as to what will be, and posits no way of reliably establishing what is—and, because of this, is debilitating to the living of life.

The difficulty with the above argument was that, as I stressed to Marchesk, the sceptical problem I was alluding to consists in the fact that humans appear to have no reliable means of establishing that anything exists unperceived. The argument that Realism makes living life a lot easier has no obvious bearing on this issue, since believing what makes my life easier is not obviously a reliable source of truth. It is true that the evil demon hypothesis posits no 'way of establishing what is', but why should that make Realism more likely to be true? The argument appears incomplete.

Quoting javra

My former, yet unanswered question to you was “what justifies the favoring of an evil daemon as true at expense of realism being true?” An answer would now be appreciated.

I am not sure that there is anything that favours the evil demon hypothesis over Realism. But we are presently looking for some reliable source for the belief in Realism, and this question has no bearing on that.

Quoting javra

The title of this thread is “what is scepticism”. In your reoccurring arguments you overwhelmingly favor Descartes’ branch of skepticism, even though in your OP you thoughtfully point to different branches of belief that likewise go by the label of skepticism.

You are not the first to (a) interpret Descartes (mistakenly in my opinion) as driven by an unfounded obsession with certainty and (b) assume that I am also driven by the same obsession. With respect to (a), Descartes wanted his metaphysics to be 'stable and lasting'. He wanted it to have so great a dialectical advantage over any alternative position that it could not be overturned, like Aristotle's system was being in Descartes' time. That's why he sought certainty, and that seems to make perfect sense to me, even if he didn't succeed in the end. The interpretation of Descartes has little bearing on the present issue, so let's move to (b).

I am not engaging in the Quoting javra

endless stream of debilitating doubts in search for some inexistent grail of absolute certainty.

I would be happy if anybody could show that Realism was even slightly more probable than the alternatives. You don't even need to show that it is more probable using only premises that a radical sceptic or an Idealist would accept. I would be content if you could tell a story about the faculties of human beings which is such that (c) Realists believe that it is a true account of their own faculties, and (d) listed among those faculties is one which reliably produces the belief that things exist unperceived.

Let me illustrate with a religious example. Alvin Plantinga is well known for his 'Warranted Christian Belief'. What he does there is tells a story in which human beings possess this cognitive faculty, 'the sensus divinitatis', which reliably produces the belief that God exists (or more exactly, beliefs like, 'God is pleased with me', 'God is ashamed' and the like). If humans have a sensus divinitatis, their belief that God exists is probably true, since it is produced by this reliable faculty. Plantinga admits that he has no way to prove to atheists and agnostics, using only premises which they accept, that we have a sensus divinitatis which reliably produces the belief, or that God probably exists. Still, the story he tells is one which, if true, entails that God probably exists. It is also a story which Theists find plausible; they believe that we have a sensus divinitatis.

I would be content if you could tell a story like Plantinga told, but for the belief that things exist unperceived. If you could indicate any method at all which is such that (e) it could reliably establish that Realism is true, and (b) Realists actually believe that humans can use this method, I would be content. You do not have to prove that the method you imagine is one which humans could use, using premises only acceptable to sceptics and Idealists. You need, in short, only imagine a method which you can convince yourself is actually available to you. The problem is that Realists are typically unable to do even that. They are typically committed to Empiricism, the thesis that the only reliable sources of belief about the world that we have are sense perception and inference. Sense perception is not reliable about unperceived things, and no one, as yet, has been able to provide a non fallacious inference to the conclusions that things exist unperceived. And hence, their own account of human cognitive faculties is such that we have no reliable basis for the belief that Realism is true.

Quoting javra

At any rate, if you seek solace via some promise of an absolute certainty—be it that realism is true or that some evil daemon concept one is momentarily entertaining is false—I’m not one to be of service in this regard.

I don't think what I have asked for is certainty at all. All I have asked for is that the Realist have some account, which he can at least convince himself is true, of how human beings can have any reliable basis at all for the belief that Realism is true. What I have asked for is incredibly weak. Even Plantinga is able to muster this much for his belief that God exists, and most people think that what he is able to do is quite trivial.

PA

Quoting PossibleAaran

I don't think what I have asked for is certainty at all. All I have asked for is that the Realist have some account, which he can at least convince himself is true, of how human beings can have any reliable basis at all for the belief that Realism is true.

Wouldn't realism being the most likely inference from experience qualify? We don't need to posit demons or computer simulations. We can just say the things in perception continue to exist while not being perceived, along with other things we can't perceive, but we can infer from things perceived, like elementary particles.

That goes well with science, which doesn't infer demons or simulations or brains in vats, but does infer plenty of unobservables that make good sense of what is observed, along with object permanence.

Reply to PossibleAaran

OK, thanks for the clarification. As to logically inferred innate mechanisms that account for, and thereby justify, belief in realism, one can take a Kantian approach or—if a strict materialist—can strictly focus on consequences of biological evolution. In the Kantian approach, sentience holds within it aprior understanding of causation in the abstract, thereby facilitating belief that things causally continue to be even when not perceived or thought of. In a strictly evolutionary approach, were intellect-endowed sentience (sapient or otherwise) to not have evolved unconscious aptitudes for discerning how things continue to be when not perceived or thought about, the given sentience would perish; lifeforms would either be, for example, quickly killed by stealthy predators or predators would quickly starve to death. This cognitively evolved set of skills then became more pronounced in human beings--the most aware/intelligent lifeforms currently known to our own selves.

I presume you could find objections to one or the other accounts, or a need to further embellish and clarify them so as to convince those who are doubtful of realism. Nevertheless, both accounts provide that which has been now asked for: logically inferred innate mechanisms that account for belief in realism.

Quoting PossibleAaran

I am not sure that there is anything that favours the evil demon hypothesis over Realism. But we are presently looking for some reliable source for the belief in Realism, and this question has no bearing on that.

Yet, to me, this is the pivotal issue for any philosophical skeptic.

Please indulge me for a moment: To thoroughly distance myself from modern day equivocations of what skepticism is I a long time ago choose to label my stance of philosophical skepticism one of “radical skepticism”. You see, when one is skeptical about everything—i.e., holds that no proposition can as of yet be demonstrated to be perfectly secure from all possible error—the very notion that “one is skeptical about” this or that in particular becomes aberrantly nonsensical. To a philosophical skeptic of the ilk I’m describing, one becomes dubious of something, not skeptical of it—for to such person not everything is dubious though everything is appraised via skepticism (in the inquisitive sense addressed). Likewise, for another example, there can be no such particular thing as a “skeptical hypothesis”--for all hypotheses of the philosophic skeptic are equally skeptical—including that of “I think therefore I am”. Of course, due to prevailing modern day connotations, this label of radical skeptic again became misconstrued as the position of one who is bogged down in the mires of irresolvable doubts. Bullocks. But I’m back to labeling myself a philosophical skeptic and going against the flow when it comes to what this signifies. Point being, a (philosophical) skeptic by logical consistency cannot be skeptical about any particular thing. They can only have various degrees of doubt/uncertainty regarding any particular thing—and this because they hold certainty regarding others. (For that matter, only non-skeptics every claim to be skeptical about this or that—and guess where they pirated this term from. And next, as Wayfarer commented, they go about calling themselves skeptics.)

Thanks for entertaining my views so far. My basic point here being, if you present the possibility of an evil daemon as nullifying the truth to realism on grounds of philosophical skepticism, for this to be in any way rational from the vantage of philosophical skepticism, there must be justification for why the presence of an evil daemon is to be deemed credible.

Otherwise, this has nothing to do with issues of philosophical skepticism.

Quoting Inter Alia

You express uncertainty that science is always the best way, you are open to other belief systems in other contexts and are skeptical in that sense, but you have not shown any skepticism about the belief that being open to other belief systems in other contexts is right, meta-skepticism if you will, skepticism about the rightness of being skeptical. Maybe being skeptical is wrong, maybe we'd all be better off if we just fervently believed in something?

I don't "express uncertainty that science is always the best way." I am as certain as I am of anything that science is not always the best way.

As I've said many times on many threads and I will say many times more - metaphysical systems, of which science is one, are not right or wrong, there are more or less useful in particular situations. You seem to be saying that that statement is a metaphysical claim. I'm ok with that. It is my position that it is a very useful metaphysical system.

Quoting T Clark

As I've said many times on many threads and I will say many times more - metaphysical systems, of which science is one, are not right or wrong, there are more or less useful in particular situations.

Do you think any other metaphysical system has a more useful answer than evolution as to how humans came to exist?

Actually, I'm not that interested in useful since a creationist can easily argue that their faith about creation is useful to them. Do you think anymetaphysics than science (really naturalism) has a more true answer?

Reply to Marchesk

Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection is not metaphysics. Evolution is a fact in the world. The theory that natural selection is the primary mechanism of evolution is well supported by factual evidence and is believed by a consensus of those with a strong understanding of human biology, geology, and paleontology.

Quoting T Clark

Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection is not metaphysics. Evolution is a fact in the world. The theory that natural selection is the primary mechanism of evolution is well supported by factual evidence and is believed by a consensus of those with a strong understanding of human biology, geology, and paleontology.

Right, but science has taken over for metaphysics in the past on questions that can be empirically investigated. At one point, the idea of evolution was metaphysical. That was before Darwin, of course. Same with atomism.

Reply to T Clark That word was cherry-picked and taken out of context.

Quoting T Clark

Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection is not metaphysics.

But the way it is interpreted has considerable metaphysical implications. I have no doubt at all about the facts of the matter, but considerable doubts about what they are often taken to mean.

Quoting Wayfarer

But the way it is interpreted has considerable metaphysical implications. I have no doubt at all about the facts of the matter, but considerable doubts about what they are taken to mean.

You and me baby ain't nothing but mammals?

Quoting Wayfarer

That word was cherry-picked and taken out of context.

Darwin's theory of evolution by natural selection is not metaphysics. — T Clark
But the way it is interpreted has considerable metaphysical implications. I have no doubt at all about the facts of the matter, but considerable doubts about what they are often taken to mean.

That was a mistake. I accidentally copied "scientism" into my post. What I was trying to do was look it up on the web.

Reply to T Clark Oh never mind then. But I think the post in which I mentioned it above, gives a pretty good definition, however, there's another thread, namely this one, which might be more related to this particular sub-debate.

Quoting Wayfarer

But the way it is interpreted has considerable metaphysical implications. I have no doubt at all about the facts of the matter, but considerable doubts about what they are often taken to mean.

Facts don't have metaphysical implications. The questions, "are there facts?" are "what does it take to make something a fact?" have metaphysical implications.

On the on side, we can affirm it, scepticism is the negation of the knowing of the things as absolutely, then the doubt carry us onward to know better and this can be "terminus ad quem" for it; on the other side, we must abolish it, because it can imprison us in a vicious cycle.

Quoting T Clark

Facts don't have metaphysical implications.

That's a big statement!

Quoting Marchesk

Right, but science has taken over for metaphysics in the past on questions that can be empirically investigated. At one point, the idea of evolution was metaphysical. That was before Darwin, of course. Same with atomism.

I don't think I understand what you mean. Genetic change in organisms over time was never a metaphysical issue. Evolution is a phenomenon, an event. It either happened or it didn't.

The only metaphysical question I can think of that deals with a potential fact is "does God exist?"

Quoting Wayfarer

That's a big statement!

I qualified that in a post I sent out a minute ago - "Does God exist?" is metaphysical and is also a matter of fact - the answer is yes or no.

Reply to T Clark...depending on what you mean by ‘exist’.,..

Quoting Wayfarer

...depending on what you mean by ‘exist’.,..

That's definitely a metaphysical question.

Quoting T Clark

That's definitely a metaphysical question.

God exists in my heart. True or false?

Quoting Marchesk

God exists in my heart. True or false?

Do you expect an answer? I don't know. I don't know what you mean.

Quoting T Clark

Do you expect an answer? I don't know. I don't know what you mean.

That's one problem with God being a fact.

Reply to Marchesk Presumably not so much for someone who actually believes it.

Quoting Wayfarer

Presumably not so much for someone who actually believes it.

That would be called faith, not a fact, would it not? Or even imagination, if we moved God from heart to head, depending on the person in question.

Reply to Marchesk Have a look back at my first one or two responses to this thread, about the purported Indian origins of Greek scepticism. Buddhism is, in most people’s reckoning, religious, but it doesn’t emphasis belief, in the same way that Christianity does. I sometimes wonder if one of the defining characteristics of Christianity is the fact that belief in the supernatural is required, in that the Resurrection is plainly a supernatural event, and you have to believe in that at the get-go.

Whereas, Buddhism starts with the observation that ‘life is dukkha (suffering or unsatisfactory)’ and then works from there through the ‘causes of dukkha’ (which is the subject of the rest of the teaching). However Buddhism also accommodates the supernatural (usually expressed as ‘transmundane’ or some such, so as to avoid the boo word ‘supernatural’.) Whether that belief is fundamental to the religion, is in fact a large bone of contention between those who wish to present it in purely naturalistic terms (like Stephen Bachelor and the ‘secular Buddhist’ movement) as distinct from the traditional exponents, for whom the ‘transmundane’ nature of the Buddha is accepted from the outset (along with acceptance of the miraculous powers, siddhi, that are understood to be possessed by the Buddhas and bodhisattvas.)

Thorny questions, all.

Anyway to get roughly back on point, the attitude that ‘only facts matter’ is, in simple terms, the attitude of positivism. The question ‘what do facts mean’ is the domain of hermeneutics, interpretation, ‘the meaning of things’. And the assertion that things have no meaning is precisely one of the customary claims of positivism; the view that the universe is essentially devoid of meaning being one of the ideas associated with modernity and modern science. But the belief in the ‘value-free’ nature of the Universe is one that most modern forms of scepticism will implicitly endorse, on the basis that scientific naturalism reveals what the world is really like when shorn of the accretions of belief. Which basically amounts to the view that, only scientifically-validated factual claims have truth value; which is, again, ultimately, a form of positivism, like it or not.

Quoting T Clark

The metaphor I like is a tool box. When you have something to do, you pull out the tool that works best.

So do you have a banana-fudger in your tool box at home? It's a tool that I just made up a bit like a feather tied to stick and painted green. It's for directing ants away from a lawn. No? Of course you don't because it's useless and something I just made up, you have tools in your toolbox that not only actually do a job that is needed but which you have personally experienced actually being useful. In a world without screws a screwdriver is just a useless piece of metal. The difference between realism and all other metaphysics is that realism is the metaphysical view we're born with. Kids play catch, they expect the laws of physics to work, they act as if the laptop (to borrow another example on this thread) is going to be the same laptop when they open their eyes as it was a minute ago., they act as if effect followed cause, and investigate cause using their senses fully anticipating that this will yield fruitful results. All other metaphysics are something people made up. That doesn't make them wrong, I think we've firmly established it would be impossible to prove that, but it does mean that, like the banana-fudger, they should not just be automatically stored alongside our native realism as an equally viable option, they must prove their worth.

Personally I'm a pragmatist in the tradition of Pierce, so I'm not going to claim that realism shows us the 'truth' of the world, nor that our senses can't be deceived, but what I do take issue with is the suggestion that because of this I must be open to Descarte's brand of dualism, or Berkely's solipsism, or some priest's religion. There are 7 billion people on the planet more who have ever lived and they all will have some opinion about the way the world is, the only way I could respond open-mindedly to all of them is to give each of them one ten millionth of my time to consider their views, that gives them all less than a second each. So if someone says to me I shouldn't be so dismissive of Platonic idealism, I could quite reasonably answer that I have given it a second's thought which is it's fair consideration given all the other equally viable ideas I must consider if I'm to be truly open-mined.

What is often labelled as open-mindedness is usually just an excuse for idolatry.

Reply to Marchesk Quoting Marchesk

Wouldn't realism being the most likely inference from experience qualify? We don't need to posit demons or computer simulations. We can just say the things in perception continue to exist while not being perceived, along with other things we can't perceive, but we can infer from things perceived, like elementary particles.

That goes well with science, which doesn't infer demons or simulations or brains in vats, but does infer plenty of unobservables that make good sense of what is observed, along with object permanence.

The inference you suggest would be just the kind of things which is needed, but what makes Realism a better explanation of experience than the evil demon hypothesis or a brain-in-vat hypothesis? In fact, why is such an explanation even necessary? Isn't it ontologically simpler to suppose that things only exist when perceived?

Reply to javra Quoting javra

In the Kantian approach, sentience holds within it aprior understanding of causation in the abstract, thereby facilitating belief that things causally continue to be even when not perceived or thought of.

I am not sure what this argument really is. I am supposed to have a 'prior understanding of causation in the abstract'. Does that mean that I innately have a concept of causation? If so, how does that show that the belief that things exist unperceived has a reliable source? (1) I am not sure what relevance causation has to whether things exist unperceived, and (2) even supposing it has relevance, it does not follow from the fact that I have an innate concept of X, that X is a correct description of the world, unless you are supposing that all innate concepts are reliable, but that's empirically false.

Quoting javra

In a strictly evolutionary approach, were intellect-endowed sentience (sapient or otherwise) to not have evolved unconscious aptitudes for discerning how things continue to be when not perceived or thought about, the given sentience would perish; lifeforms would either be, for example, quickly killed by stealthy predators or predators would quickly starve to death.

Is it true that if we didn't believe that things continue to exist when unperceived we would die? I am inclined to deny it. Could you give an example in which it is clearly true?

In addition, let's suppose that evolution gave us this belief. Evolution just 'programmed' this belief into our minds for the sake of survival. Is that a reliable source for belief? Couldn't all kinds of beliefs be useful for survival and yet false? The belief that tigers have submachine guns hidden in their fur would be useful for survival. It would sure keep me away from tigers, but it is obviously false.

PA

Quoting Inter Alia

The difference between realism and all other metaphysics is that realism is the metaphysical view we're born with. Kids play catch, they expect the laws of physics to work, they act as if the laptop (to borrow another example on this thread) is going to be the same laptop when they open their eyes as it was a minute ago., they act as if effect followed cause, and investigate cause using their senses fully anticipating that this will yield fruitful results. All other metaphysics are something people made up. That doesn't make them wrong, I think we've firmly established it would be impossible to prove that, but it does mean that, like the banana-fudger, they should not just be automatically stored alongside our native realism as an equally viable option, they must prove their worth.

Lots wrong here. No, children are not born with realism. They are taught it. They learn it. Parents don't say "cogito ergo sum." They say "oopsie, baby fall down." They don't expect the laws of physics to work. Why do you think peek-a-boo works so well? It's because young children don't know that something is still there when they cover their eyes. Children play catch, but they also go to church. Is that proof for the existence of god?

All metaphysics are made up. Metaphysics isn't true or false, it's fashionable or unfashionable. Pretty or ugly. Approved or prohibited. Clever or boneheaded. Useful or not useful. And all in particular situations, not for everything always.

One of the real values of the other metaphysical views is that they offer a tool to help see things we don't see because we are blinded by realism.

Quoting T Clark

It's because young children don't know that something is still there when they cover their eye

Some philosophers, I believe following Bertrand Russell, have defended Realism by saying that it is an instinctive believe 'built in' to all of us and which we cannot help but have (Javra has a very similar argument above). I've never been too sure what to make of that argument. What you say here points out that this claim is obviously false. Your point is so obvious that I can't believe I didn't see it. My niece is at just that stage in childhood right now, and yet I still didn't pick up the philosophical relevance.

Thanks for this.
PA

Reply to T Clark
Reply to PossibleAaran

This comes back to my point about the multiplicity of alternative metaphysics, you're both using the 'obviousness' of the fact that every single child is surprised by 'peek-a-boo' but then trying to establish an argument that it is far from obvious why every single child in every single culture in the world that has ever been recorded goes on act as if the parent continues to exist after they re-open their eyes. Are you suggesting that every single parent without exception just happens to indoctrinate their child with realism despite many equally reasonable alternatives, no-one in all of history has ever decided to teach their child solipsism and had the child obediently grow up to be solipsist?

I'm not suggesting that we're born with all the 'knowledge' of realism, that is provided us by sense data,but the evidence seems to be overwhelming that we are pre-programmed to interpret the sense data we receive through Realism, I literally can't think of a single example of any grown-up child in the world who genuinely still thinks their parent might actually have ceased to exist just because they can't see them any more. Is the teaching of realism to our children really that successful, I wish I could teach mine manners with the same degree of success.

Reply to Inter Alia

I don't suppose that every single child in the history of the earth is surprised by peek-a-boo, no. But, as I said, many Realists put forward, as a reason for thinking that Realism is true, the claim that Realism is an instinctive belief pre-programmed into us. But the fact is that many children are surprised by peek-a-boo. Many children do seem to think that you cease to exist just because they can no longer see you (it is hard to tell whether they really think this, since you can't ask children at that stage what they think, and when they get to the stage where you could sensibly ask them, they won't remember what they thought!). I am not suggesting that all think this way, but many do. What this shows, is that Realism is not 'built in', but is in fact learnt.

And yes, I suppose that the teaching of Realism to children is incredibly successful. Why don't children rebel from their teaching and reject Realism? Well, W.T Stace did, as did the whole Idealist tradition. No doubt they are a minority of the human race. I think the more satisfying answer is that people don't normally bother to question things which make no practical difference, unless there is good evidence that it is false. We are all taught as children that Santa delivers our presents on Christmas, and I believed this without question until I was told by numerous people that it was false, I saw my mother bringing my presents into the house, I was 'teased' by older children about how Santa isn't real. If none of that had happened, I would have just gone on believing it, since it made no practical difference to me at that time, whether my mother or Santa gave me the gifts. There was just no reason to question it.

The same is true of Realism, we are all taught as children that things exist unperceived - or this is implied by other things we are taught - and we all swallow it just like we swallow the Santa story. We never question Realism because it makes no practical difference whether it is true or not, and there is no evidence against it. This, together with the fact that it is very easy, if you don't do philosophy, to mistakenly think that you can 'just tell' by sense perception that Realism is true, mean that Realism goes unquestioned for the majority of people.

You can't teach your children manners as effectively because it often takes excessive effort to be polite when we are in a bad mood, or when being rude would be much more efficient for our purposes.

PA

Sorry for the double post, but perhaps I should add to the above that most people have never even noticed that Realism is something which they believe, although they would accept it if you brought it up. Until you do philosophy, it is very easy to completely fail to notice your own Realism or that there is an alternative. That is another reason why the teaching goes so smoothly.

PA

Reply to PossibleAaran

I understand the logic of what you're saying, but it isn't very convincing, it's a story that makes sense - realism is like santa claus, we don't question it until we have to - but it's not one that is necessary. The idea that realism is something literally all children follow from the moment they have enough sense data to process to at least until early adulthood is something which is easily explained by the fact that we are pre-programmed to interpret the world that way, it doesn't require another explanation, no conspiracy of indoctrination, no almost miraculously successful teaching is needed.

Aside from this (as I recognise your interpretation is perfectly reasonable even though I don't agree with it), this doesn't then solve the problem I mentioned in my previous posts about the multiplicity of alternatives. I think we can all agree that one cannot prove realism, nor even provide any sound argument as to why it is 'better' than any other metaphysical view, for the educated, philosophically mined adult. But this them means that all metaphysical views have an equal claim, Plato's, Kant's, my Grandma's whcih leads to what i think is the bigger question (bigger than whether Realism has a claim to being the 'default' position) which is what do we do about it? What should one actually do about the fact that realism cannot be proven yet we all seem to have grown up with it?

We can't just discard it because it can't be proven (that's true of all metaphysics), we can't check out all the alternative and give them their fair crack at convincing us (there are simply vastly too many alternatives to give them more than a few moment's thought each). Maybe we should just be open-minded to the ones we hear about, but that seems a bit defeatist and passive for my liking. That's basically where I come away from the anti-realists as a group, I'm not sure what value it has as an approach. I'm not sure what 'things' we're seeing that are of any actual use.

Quoting Inter Alia

Are you suggesting that every single parent without exception just happens to indoctrinate their child with realism despite many equally reasonable alternatives, no-one in all of history has ever decided to teach their child solipsism and had the child obediently grow up to be solipsist?

A lot of people are not what you call a realist. There are a lot of world views out there that you, and maybe I, would consider odd. It's always surprised me that people I consider very conventional have unconventional ideas about the world. My neighbor and friend is a 65 year old accountant. Very intelligent, mature, sophisticated, and conventional in the way he lives and in many of his ideas. He believes in reincarnation. Beyond that, I think very few people actually have world views that you would consider "realist." In the US, something like 45% of adults do not believe in evolution. More than 80% believe in God.

I think your adamant insistence reflects a failure of imagination and observation.

Quoting PossibleAaran

The same is true of Realism, we are all taught as children that things exist unperceived - or this is implied by other things we are taught - and we all swallow it just like we swallow the Santa story. We never question Realism because it makes no practical difference whether it is true or not, and there is no evidence against it. This, together with the fact that it is very easy, if you don't do philosophy, to mistakenly think that you can 'just tell' by sense perception that Realism is true, mean that Realism goes unquestioned for the majority of people.

I think you're buying into PossibleAaran's way of looking at this. You're trying to refute his argument from inside. The real problem with his argument comes from the outside, as I've tried to show in my other posts. To reiterate - most people are not realists. I wonder if anyone really is. That doesn't mean we don't use realism when it makes sense, or even when it doesn't.

Quoting PossibleAaran

Sorry for the double post, but perhaps I should add to the above that most people have never even noticed that Realism is something which they believe, although they would accept it if you brought it up. Until you do philosophy, it is very easy to completely fail to notice your own Realism or that there is an alternative. That is another reason why the teaching goes so smoothly.

This is a realist argument. You're using a realist argument to help PossibleAaran defend realism.

Reply to T Clark
I don't deny that adults have non- or anti-realist views, to do so in the face of overwhelming evidence would indeed be absurd. I'm talking entirely about the claim that Realism is the 'default' view of the biological creature that we are. The evidence I'm forwarding to support that view is that as we grow up all the sense data we accrue seems to be automatically processed in that way. I know of plenty of kids who reject santa claus, fairies, the industrial-capitalist model. I know of no kids who decide the laws of physics do not apply to them at the age of five, who when a ball is thrown to them they have no good reason to trust their instinctive estimate of where it will land. I know of no nine year olds who will naturally consider the laptop not exist when the shut their eyes and only pop back into existence again when they open them.

I think you may be under-defining Realism. The fact that people believe in something they haven't yet sensed is different to them believing in something other than what they sense.

Quoting Inter Alia

I think you may be under-defining Realism. The fact that people believe in something they haven't yet sensed is different to them believing in something other than what they sense.

You and I have started repeating our positions and responses without adding anything new. I can't think of anything new to say.

Quoting T Clark

Beyond that, I think very few people actually have world views that you would consider "realist." In the US, something like 45% of adults do not believe in evolution. More than 80% believe in God.

That doesn't make you non-realist. That just means you think reality is different than the naturalistic version. Metaphysical realist means a belief in a mind-independent world. I grew up Christian, and most of those folks believed God created a material world that may or may not be compatible with what scientists say. I don't recall anyone espousing Berkeley's idealism, other than reference to Christian Science or gnosticism, which was considered heretical.

Reply to PossibleAaran The problem with scepticism is that doubt only makes sense if it's limited, because doubt about one thing requires a reason to doubt, which presupposes the truth of something else, usually some other perception. Doubt can't exist in a vacuum, in suspension, without any presuppositions whatsoever.

The cash value of doubting is checking, which usually involves some further action. If you doubt whether a perception is illusory, then you do something like shift position, ask someone else, etc., etc. If you doubt the results of a calculation, you re-do the calculation, ask someone else to check it, etc., etc.

Generalized doubt, Cartesian doubt, or global scepticism, is fundamentally incoherent, especially if it's based on merely imagining that things could be different than they appear to be (imagining alternative "logical possibilities"). To doubt, you need a reason to doubt, not just a contextless wondering whether things might be different than you think they are.

One certainly imagines other possibilities when one is doubting, because one uses those alternative possibilities to formulate plans of action for checking; but the doubt is resolved by action in one way or another, it doesn't just stop at the mere imagining of alternative "logical possibilities."

And at some point, one or another of the results of the checking actions aren't doubted.

IOW, doubt is a phase of cognition that alternates with bits of truth acceptance, it can't coherently be elevated to a permanent cognitive stance that doubts everything.

Quoting gurugeorge

To doubt, you need a reason to doubt, not just a contextless wondering whether things might be different than you think they are.

Right, so for example you can imagine this is all a dream, but then we understand the distinction between dreaming and waking because we spend part of our time awake. But what does it mean if we were only dreaming the entire time?

Just like we can imagine taking a brain and putting it in a vat, but what would it actually mean for us to be brains in vats?

I understand what a simulation is because of the real things it's simulating, but what if everything was simulated? Then what does "simulated" mean?

Quoting Marchesk

That doesn't make you non-realist. That just means you think reality is different than the naturalistic version.

Indeed, that's what I meant by 'under-defining' but you explained it much more clearly, thanks.

The key question is not what we should doubt, but what doubting looks like. How would one tell that I doubted the entirely physical nature of existence, or even doubted the description of that existence as defined by the sum total of all the current scientific theories? I'm still very unclear on what such doubt would look like without relying on wholeheartedly believing something else instead, which means we're not talking about doubt in general but doubting some specific thing (generally science or naturalism) and wholeheartedly believing some other thing instead (spiritualism or religion).

I don't know if this is just my personal experience but I rarely get involved in discussions (outside of professional philosophy) advising one believes both in Buddhist reincarnation and Christian heaven because we shouldn't be so certain about reality. It seems remarkably easy to say we shouldn't dismiss the existence of the soul because we can't be sure, but much less popular to suggest we should follow the tenets of several different religions at once for the same reason.

Reply to Inter Alia, you disagree with my account of how people come to believe that Realism is true. You say that it just isn't convincing. For my part, I find the idea that a metaphysical interpretation of reality is biologically hardwired into the human race for survival purposes (what other purpose could the hardwiring serve, given natural selection?) incredible.

I do not have much stock in this however. It doesn't really matter to me whether it is hardwired or not. I was only interested in that idea insofar as it concerned the argument that 'because realism is hardwired into us, it is probably true', an argument which I reject entirely. It seems that you agree with me that there is no reason to think that Realism is true. I'm not sure yet what should be done about that fact. Of course, Idealists think we should just drop the assumption. I do think, however, that if we are right about the baselessness of Realism, that realization should instil a kind of modesty when criticizing worldviews different to our own, and I think that's a valuable consequence of this kind of philosophical discussion.

Reply to T Clark Quoting T Clark

You're using a realist argument to help PossibleAaran defend realism

The person you quoted is PossibleAaran, ie, me. Also, the argument I gave in the quotation isn't an argument in defence of Realism. I denied that Realism is 'in built' and suggested that it is taught to us as children. I haven't defended Realism at all in this thread. I have consistently said both that there is no way to prove Realism to those who don't accept it, and that the Realist can't even locate a reliable source for his belief in unperceived existence, even a source which Realists themselves recognize as reliable.

So I can't make much sense of what you said here.

Reply to gurugeorge Quoting gurugeorge

Generalized doubt, Cartesian doubt, or global scepticism, is fundamentally incoherent, especially if it's based on merely imagining that things could be different than they appear to be (imagining alternative "logical possibilities"). To doubt, you need a reason to doubt, not just a contextless wondering whether things might be different than you think they are.

Quoting gurugeorge

it can't coherently be elevated to a permanent cognitive stance that doubts everything.

I have heard this argument several times, usually from Wittgenstien's followers. But [I]why[/I] is it incoherent to doubt everything? There is no explicit contradiction, so can you make the contradiction explicit? Its obviously true that ordinarily we don't doubt everything. We hold some things fixed and doubt other things within that context. But I've never seen a reason to think that there is anything incoherent about extending the doubt to everything.

You said that 'you need a reason to doubt'. I don't think so. All you need in order to doubt something is the ability to ask 'why believe that?'. So long as I can ask that question, I can doubt, so why can't I ask that question with respect to everything I believe?

PA

Quoting Marchesk

That doesn't make you non-realist. That just means you think reality is different than the naturalistic version. Metaphysical realist means a belief in a mind-independent world. I grew up Christian, and most of those folks believed God created a material world that may or may not be compatible with what scientists say. I don't recall anyone espousing Berkeley's idealism, other than reference to Christian Science or gnosticism, which was considered heretical.

Interesting. I don't think I was making a distinction between realist, materialist, and naturalist. I may not have known there was one. I'll think about it.

Quoting PossibleAaran

So I can't make much sense of what you said here.

I seem to be having trouble getting my quotes and references wrong. I guess I need to slow down and pay better attention.

Reply to Marchesk Yeah, exactly. Global scepticism is a dead end in thought. It looks tempting, and it's instructive to poke around, but ultimately it just doesn't make any sense.

Or to put it another way, whatever the hell the global sceptic thinks they're doing, it sure isn't doubting :)

Reply to PossibleAaran Any "why believe that?" question can be answered normally. Why believe there's a table in front of you? Because you can see it, it's got the functional form of a table, you can rap on it, etc. Those sorts of things are the standard for answering "why believe?" questions.

You can't extend doubt to everything because, as I said, you can only doubt on the basis of some other things held to be true, because that's how doubt works, it's leveraged off of truths. Truth comes first, doubt is secondary. Truth is the usual state, doubt departs from it and returns to it.

For example, you can only say that something is an illusion on the basis of some other corrective perception that tells you it's an illusion. But that means you're accepting the corrective perception as valid. But that means you can't doubt whether all perceptions are illusions, only some.

IOW, if there's such a thing as illusion anywhere, then there logically must also be such a thing as valid perception somewhere, because without valid perceptions no such thing as illusion could possibly be revealed (or: "illusion" would have no meaning). They're inextricably tied together, depend on each other for meaning (or to be more precise, "valid perception" is tied to "illusion" in this way), so the idea of "extending" doubt to all perception is incoherent, it seems like something you might be able to do, but you can't actually do it, except as an imaginary exercise. But no truths hang on the use of the imagination.

Notice that even with something like the Brain in a Vat thought experiment, the hypothetical mad scientists must have been having valid perceptions in order to cobble together the apparatus. On the other hand if you use something like Descartes Demon to get rid of that problem, the problem with him is that he's just an imagined possibility. Whereas the mad scientists have the advantage that we know they're actually possible, at a stretch, there's no reason to believe a deceiving demon could exist; but if the mad scientists are possible then they must be perceiving things correctly, so the hypothesized BiV predicament can't possibly cast doubt on all perception, only one's own. But we already knew that our perception can be mistaken, that's why we sometimes check things by asking other people.

Another way of putting this: you can extend doubt by "but what if?" extensions, but the more "but what if?" extensions you add, the more you're just drifting into speculation without any reason for it, the more your doubt is transforming into idle imagination of alternative possibilities; whereas the simpler, more limited, more specific, particular and occasional the doubt, the more ACTUAL reasons you CAN HAVE for doubting.

Reply to gurugeorge, this all seems largely misconceived.

Quoting gurugeorge

Any "why believe that?" question can be answered normally. Why believe there's a table in front of you? Because you can see it, it's got the functional form of a table, you can rap on it, etc. Those sorts of things are the standard for answering "why believe?" questions.

I grant that that is how we normally answer 'why?' questions.

Quoting gurugeorge

You can't extend doubt to everything because, as I said, you can only doubt on the basis of some other things held to be true, because that's how doubt works, it's leveraged off of truths. Truth comes first, doubt is secondary. Truth is the usual state, doubt departs from it and returns to it.

Why can I only doubt on the basis of some other things held to be true? I am assuming that by 'doubt' here, you mean suspend judgement. I am not sure what else could be meant. But why can't I suspend judgement on everything without believing other things to be true? Its all well and good saying 'that's how doubt works', but that isn't to answer the question I have asked, but just to restate your view with the qualifier 'that's just how it is'. Hardly a satisfying argument.

Quoting gurugeorge

For example, you can only say that something is an illusion on the basis of some other corrective perception that tells you it's an illusion. But that means you're accepting the corrective perception as valid. But that means you can't doubt whether all perceptions are illusions, only some...

IOW, if there's such a thing as illusion anywhere, then there logically must also be such a thing as valid perception somewhere, because without valid perceptions no such thing as illusion could possibly be revealed (or: "illusion" would have no meaning). They're inextricably tied together, depend on each other for meaning, so the idea of "extending" doubt to all perception is incoherent, it seems like something you might be able to do, but you can't actually do it, except as an imaginary exercise. But no truths hang on the use of the imagination.

Your example brings out a misunderstanding of the role that sceptical hypotheses play in my OP and subsequent posts. I am not merely saying "oh well all of life might be an illusion. I suspend judgement on whether it is or not." I never made that suggestion. My suggestion was two fold. (1) We cannot prove to someone who doubts it that the objects of sense perception exist unperceived, (2) we cannot even locate a reliable source for that belief to the satisfaction of realists themselves.

But let's think about illusion. What is meant by saying that my current perceptual experience is an illusion? It surely just means that the object of my current perceptual experience is one which doesn't 'really' exist, and what does that mean? It means just that the object of my current perceptual experience doesn't exist when I am not perceiving it. The difference between an illusion and a veridical perception is that the object of the latter, but not the former, is supposed to exist unperceived. If this is the concept of 'illusion' involved, then there is nothing incoherent about supposing all of life to be an illusion at all. To suppose [i]that[/I] would be to suppose that every object of every perceptual experience one has is one which does not exist unperceived. And to think that the evil demon hypothesis is true is to think that every object of every perceptual experience one has is one which does not exist unperceived [I]and[/I] that an unperceived evil demon exists which is the cause of perceptual experience. What's incoherent about that? It sounds like a perfectly coherent story of how things might be. I have given a perfectly clear meaning of 'illusion' which doesn't at all depend on any of our perceptions being veridical.

Quoting gurugeorge

so the hypothesized BiV predicament can't possibly cast doubt on all perception, only one's own. But we already knew that our perception can be mistaken, that's why we sometimes check things by asking other people.

Of course, if I am doubting whether any of the objects of sense perception exist unperceived, it is the objects of [I]my[/I] sense perception about which I am doubting. It is true that perception can be mistaken and that we 'already knew that', but this is irrelevant to either (1) or (2) or my ability to entertain the evil demon hypothesis.

PA

Quoting gurugeorge

For example, you can only say that something is an illusion on the basis of some other corrective perception that tells you it's an illusion.

What you saying is, an illusion, compared to what? Which I think is a fair question.

It’s telling that in a culture which generally values scientific realism, that the possibility of life itself being a grand illusion is imagined in terms of what ought to be considered ‘veridical perception’ and the sense in which it might turn out not to be veridical. It’s as if we’re considering ‘illusion’ as a kind of optical illusion or mirage.

I think, by contrast, the original intent of scepticism was much more concerned with the possibility of the illusory valuation of what we (the hoi polloi!) all take for granted. I think the early sceptics doubted convention and conventional ways of understanding, and cast doubt on the values imputed by those around them on such things as wealth, possessions, social status, respectability, the social contract, and the kinds of things that ‘everyone knows’ to be true.

It was in that sense a renunciate phiosophy, which calls ‘the world’ into question, not in the sense of asserting that raw sensory experience is illusory, but in the sense that ‘the world’ is a world of imputed and agreed meanings, values, and attributions. SO I think the original intent of scepticism was to disentangle oneself from the illusions of conventional mores rather to cast doubt on whether ‘the table really is a table’ (which is the object of the rather ridiculous ‘objection to idealism’ ‘here is my hand’ by Moore.)

Reply to PossibleAaran Quoting PossibleAaran

I am assuming that by 'doubt' here, you mean suspend judgement.

Doubt is not suspension of judgement, it's the questioning of the truth or validity of something based on reasons (e.g. some anomaly). Suspension of judgement would be something like agnosticism or indecision.

Quoting PossibleAaran

We cannot prove to someone who doubts it that the objects of sense perception exist unperceived,

If they are truly objects of perception, then necessarily they exist unperceived, so doubting that objects of perception exist unperceived doesn't make any sense. Generally, with odd exceptions like rainbows, objects of perception just are the kinds of things that exist unperceived (or: if it doesn't exist unperceived, then it wasn't an object of perception after all). You can easily verify the existence of unperceived objects by means of instruments (e.g. using a watch, shut your eyes and simultaneously take a picture with a camera with a timestamp).

Quoting PossibleAaran

I have given a perfectly clear meaning of 'illusion' which doesn't at all depend on any of our perceptions being veridical.

Yes, but you've given us no reason to take it seriously and to replace our ordinary use of "illusion" with it. It's just an imaginary usage, a flight of fancy that bears little relation to the ordinary, everyday concept of illusion. The ordinary use of "illusion" is contextual - illusion in relation to veridical perception, and one doubts perception based on reasons. Imagining a deceiving demon isn't a reason to doubt perception.

Reply to Wayfarer Quoting Wayfarer

I think the early sceptics doubted convention and conventional ways of understanding, and cast doubt on the values imputed by those around them on such things as wealth, possessions, social status, respectability, the social contract, and the kinds of things that ‘everyone knows’ to be true.

Yes, I think that's right. Early philosophers would have been (rightly) baffled by Cartesian scepticism.

Quoting T Clark

Who says being in the world is primary (other than Heidegger)?

What's fascinating is that even an attempt like Heidegger's to get under the usual metaphysical fumes can begin to smell like one more fume.This is perhaps because a proper and moreover famous name is tied to 'being-in-the-world' and so on. This over-determines the concept and threatens to drain the words of their original power. If we really are being in the world, then it's away from the book we must look. But books that point away from books are fascinating. It's hard not to write a book about such a book. And now that's one more book we need to read to justify looking away from the cooked books.

In short, I relate to your 'who says?" reaction and at the same time defend the primality of being in the world. My defense fits with your critique elsewhere in the thread of exaggerated skepticism. We aren't bodiless computers in an air-conditioned room searching for perfect string of symbols. We have to eat and breath and excrete just to survive as bodies. We have to interact as babies and children to learn language and become more or less fully human in an emotional sense long before we can indulge in epistemological niceties and pretend to pretend that the world isn't really there. Our world, the world our bodies and hearts live in, has to be in pretty good shape already (as the result of work and suffering) for us to soar with the strange and long words of the metaphysicians. Is this something I need to prove? Ah, but if this isn't 'obvious' to my conversational partners, how I can hope to relate to those who know neither work nor suffering? Those do can doubt the existence of the hammer as it smashes their thumb? Those for whom the eyes of the beloved are an illusion?

Quoting Wayfarer

I think the early sceptics doubted convention and conventional ways of understanding, and cast doubt on the values imputed by those around them on such things as wealth, possessions, social status, respectability, the social contract, and the kinds of things that ‘everyone knows’ to be true.

I think this is still true of the type of skepticism being discussed here, it's just that one of the "kinds of things that ‘everyone knows’ to be true" today is the scientific explanation for the world we experience through sense perception, the laws of physics etc. It's not necessarily that fewer people believe in non-physical entities like the soul or heaven, it's that they find it much harder to justify their belief in the language of the modern era and so skepticism becomes a useful tool, they must call into question the veracity of the modern description of the world in order to talk about their beliefs. This was simply not necessary for most of (modern) history because the modern description of the world contained entities like heaven and souls at the time, they were objects taken for granted to exist by most people. Indeed, the skeptics at the time would have been those who called the existence of such things into doubt.

This is why I made the point earlier, and I'd be very interested to hear other peoples experiences here, that I have never heard a skeptic (of the type we're talking about in this thread) suggest that because we can't know for sure, it would be a good idea to both pray to mecca, and attend church, after all we should 'doubt' the veracity of both stories and hedge our bets. The rhetoric is always, we should not dismiss {insert spiritual activity here}, because we cannot prove that the scientific view of the world (which concludes such activity is probably hogwash) is true. The problem is not so much with the latter half of that proposition, but the former. This is because;

(1) It can be used to justify literally any action whatsoever, yet it's basically populist, any popular religion, spirituality, or non-realist philosophy is included in the list of things we should not dismiss, but the wild fantasies of the clearly delusional are never thus defended despite the fact that we equally cannot disprove them.
(2) "We should not dismiss..." in my opinion is generally interpreted as we shouldn't argue against, judge as nonsense, ridicule those who believe in, or (more worryingly) should actually give state support to {insert spiritual activity here}. None of these actions, however, amount to the same thing as concluding that {insert spiritual activity here} is beyond all doubt wrong, they're just expressions of our current judgement, judgements that we must all make.

Ultimately, and I think this is the point Reply to gurugeorge was alluding to, we cannot suspend judgement. If, say, the Calvinist God exists (and he might), we must immediately refrain from doing loads of stuff otherwise we might be tormented for eternity in the afterlife, if he doesn't exist we can carry on as we were, but (and this is the most important bit) we may also be harmed by others acting as if he does exist. Not only is it not possible for us to suspend judgement (we must fall down on one side or the other) but having made our choice it sometimes becomes incumbent upon us to argue against, dissuade and perhaps even ridicule those who made a different choice entirely because we did not suspend judgement, we came down on one side and that has implications for how we interact with other people as well as for ourselves.

Reply to gurugeorge Quoting gurugeorge

Doubt is not suspension of judgement, it's the questioning of the truth or validity of something based on reasons (e.g. some anomaly). Suspension of judgement would be something like agnosticism or indecision.

Alright, so you define 'doubt' as the questioning of truth based on reasons. Then you conclude that its incoherent to doubt something without reasons. Well I suppose your argument is correct, if only because its patently trivial. If that's what you mean by 'doubt', then I do not claim that we can 'doubt' everything. I claim the theses which I mentioned in my last post, all of which you ignored.

Quoting gurugeorge

If they are truly objects of perception, then necessarily they exist unperceived, so doubting that objects of perception exist unperceived doesn't make any sense. Generally, with odd exceptions like rainbows, objects of perception just are the kinds of things that exist unperceived (or: if it doesn't exist unperceived, then it wasn't an object of perception after all). You can easily verify the existence of unperceived objects by means of instruments (e.g. using a watch, shut your eyes and simultaneously take a picture with a camera with a timestamp).

You can't just define 'objects of perception' as 'things which exist unperceived' and then claim to have won some victory. I am currently having a certain sensory experience as I type these words. It is an experience I would describe as 'of a laptop'. The object of my experience is just that which I am aware of at that moment. Does that thing, 'the laptop', exist unperceived? Its clearly false that, as you say, 'objects of perception necessarily exist unperceived', since the present object of my perception could very well only exist when perceived. There is no contradiction in supposing that the laptop which I am currently aware of does not exist when unperceived.

You could define 'object of perception' so as to make yourself right, but that's hardly impressive. I think the disagreement we have had here is because you took me to be using 'object of perception' in a different way than I was.

Quoting gurugeorge

Yes, but you've given us no reason to take it seriously and to replace our ordinary use of "illusion" with it. It's just an imaginary usage, a flight of fancy that bears little relation to the ordinary, everyday concept of illusion. The ordinary use of "illusion" is contextual - illusion in relation to veridical perception, and one doubts perception based on reasons. Imagining a deceiving demon isn't a reason to doubt perception

Why do I need to give you a reason to accept a stipulated definition? I told you what I mean by illusion. An object of perception is illusory if and only if that object does not exist unperceived. If that isn't the ordinary usage, that's nice, but why does that matter? If you just don't like me using the word 'illusion' in a non-ordinary way, then use the word 'smillusion' for my concept. Is the ordinary concept somehow the word of God, so that I dare not ever introduce a non-ordinary concept for the discussion of a philosophical issue?

You don't need to imagine the demon for my purpose. I remind you again that I have no thesis about doubt understood in the way you understand it. I have maintained (1) We cannot prove to someone who does not believe it that the objects of sense perception exist unperceived, (2) we cannot even locate a reliable source for that belief to the satisfaction of realists themselves. I have discussed attempts to refute both of these theses (since I hope at least the 2nd one can be refuted) with several others. I can't find any argument in what you say against either (1) or (2). I can only find the insistence that we define 'doubt' in a certain way, that we define 'illusion' in a certain way, the ungrounded claim that 'the objects of perception necessarily exist unperceived' and the assumption that if a concept isn't an ordinary language concept, we aren't allowed to use it.

PA

Quoting Inter Alia

I think this is still true of the type of skepticism being discussed here, it's just that one of the "kinds of things that ‘everyone knows’ to be true" today is the scientific explanation for the world we experience through sense perception, the laws of physics etc. It's not necessarily that fewer people believe in non-physical entities like the soul or heaven, it's that they find it much harder to justify their belief in the language of the modern era and so skepticism becomes a useful tool, they must call into question the veracity of the modern description of the world in order to talk about their beliefs. This was simply not necessary for most of (modern) history because the modern description of the world contained entities like heaven and souls at the time, they were objects taken for granted to exist by most people. Indeed, the skeptics at the time would have been those who called the existence of such things into doubt.

There's some difficult questions here, but I do think the mention of 'the laws of physics' sticks out. I think what you're really talking about in your post, is worldviews, and the kinds of ideas which ought to be considered credible. On one side, the 'laws of physics', representing principles which have been validated by science; on the other side, 'praying to mecca', 'attending church', [ insert spiritual practice here ] as a competing, and presumably conflicting, set of beliefs and practices. So I think you're implicitly endorsing the 'conflict theory', which is the view that religious and scientific attitudes are necessarily in competition or conflict. But I think the 'conflict thesis' itself, and this way of viewing religious and scientific ideas as being in conflict, is the product of a particular cultural history, arising out of the complex relationship between religion and science in European history. But that is all quite tangential to this particular topic.

Quoting Wayfarer

I think the 'conflict thesis' itself, and this way of viewing religious and scientific ideas as being in conflict, is the product of a particular cultural history, arising out of the complex relationship between religion and science in European history.

I agree, and I'm not so sure is is tangential to this discussion. I think it relates to Reply to PossibleAaran 's second assertion that "we cannot even locate a reliable source for that belief to the satisfaction of realists themselves." I think there is a confusion between the anti-realism of solopsists or epistemological dualists and historical religion, which can be quite realistic in parts, adopting a Russellian monism (that there is scope for the soul and heaven to both be 'real' things we just haven't yet found a method of observing directly.

What I'm suggesting is that the realist do have a perfectly rational source for their belief which they themselves are satisfied with, it generally that realism (in the classic sense) seems like the 'default' position. The argument against that (that many people are religious or spiritual) makes the error I've outlined above, presuming these people are anti-realists when they are in fact more like reductive monists. They're not deliberately suspending judgement on the existence of a soul, they think there is one and if someone invented a 'soul measuring device' it would proceed to detect one without trouble.

Reply to PossibleAaran Quoting PossibleAaran

I claim the theses which I mentioned in my last post, all of which you ignored.

I didn't ignore it, I said that it's a flight of fancy you've given me no reason to take seriously. It's just a different definition of "doubt" from the everyday one which I've outlined (which you agree is what we normally use).

Quoting PossibleAaran

I am currently having a certain sensory experience as I type these words. It is an experience I would describe as 'of a laptop'. The object of my experience is just that which I am aware of at that moment. Does that thing, 'the laptop', exist unperceived?

If it's truly a laptop you're perceiving then of course it exists unperceived. Laptops are just the sort of thing that exists unperceived, and you can check for yourself, in the way I outlined, that your laptop exists unperceived.

If you are talking about (abstracting away) your experience of the laptop, then it obviously doesn't exist unexperienced.

But these are two very different things.

IOW, there's a sleight of hand here between "object of experience"=laptop and "object of experience"=experience-of-laptop.

So not only are you giving me an idiosyncratic definition of "doubt" without giving me any reason why I should follow you in your redefinition, you're also giving me an idiosyncratic definition of "object" without giving me any reason why I should follow you in that redefinition.

You may think you're revealing something profound and interesting, but from my point of view you're just redefining words in a way that creates a queer artificial mystery. No mystery exists in relation to the normal uses of the concepts, the mystery, the puzzle, only appears when one takes seriously your proposed redefinitions of those concepts.

But you will forgive me for being sceptical: why should I re-jig my concepts so that "object" means "experience-of-object?"

Quoting ff0

In short, I relate to your 'who says?" reaction and at the same time defend the primality of being in the world. My defense fits with your critique elsewhere in the thread of exaggerated skepticism. We aren't bodiless computers in an air-conditioned room searching for perfect string of symbols. We have to eat and breath and excrete just to survive as bodies. We have to interact as babies and children to learn language and become more or less fully human in an emotional sense long before we can indulge in epistemological niceties and pretend to pretend that the world isn't really there. Our world, the world our bodies and hearts live in, has to be in pretty good shape already (as the result of work and suffering) for us to soar with the strange and long words of the metaphysicians. Is this something I need to prove? Ah, but if this isn't 'obvious' to my conversational partners, how I can hope to relate to those who know neither work nor suffering? Those do can doubt the existence of the hammer as it smashes their thumb? Those for whom the eyes of the beloved are an illusion?

A world seen through non-realist eyes is not chaotic or unknowable. It isn't the same thing as skepticism of any of the types we have been discussing. Also, I never rejected realism as a useful way of looking at the world. I only said it isn't the only one or even the best one. As I sit here eating my lunch, I don't question whether the chili and salad I'm eating are really there.

At the same time, especially when I'm actively participating in the forum, I'm also paying attention to my internal experience, my awareness. Just a moment ago I stopped for a second and examined what was going on inside me to see what I am really feeling and seeing. The two - external and internal - interact all the time. It is my position, and I'm not the only one, that the best way of looking at the world for me, most of the time is as a weaving together of what's outside and what's inside. The Tao Te Ching talks about human action bringing the world into existence. That makes a lot of sense to me - in a very practical and down to earth way.

Quoting Inter Alia

It can be used to justify literally any action whatsoever, yet it's basically populist, any popular religion, spirituality, or non-realist philosophy is included in the list of things we should not dismiss, but the wild fantasies of the clearly delusional are never thus defended despite the fact that we equally cannot disprove them.

We're not talking about action, we're talking about belief in the nature of the world. We're not talking about any fact (except, I guess, for the existence of God). Knock yourself out - dismiss anything you want. And I will dismiss, or reject, or at least argue against, your dismissal. Not because you're wrong, there is no right or wrong on this question, but because you are cutting yourself off from potentially useful ways of seeing things.

Quoting Inter Alia

"We should not dismiss..." in my opinion is generally interpreted as we shouldn't argue against, judge as nonsense, ridicule those who believe in, or (more worryingly) should actually give state support to {insert spiritual activity here}. None of these actions, however, amount to the same thing as concluding that {insert spiritual activity here} is beyond all doubt wrong, they're just expressions of our current judgement, judgements that we must all make.

As I said, dismiss anything you want. It is my opinion that you are cutting yourself off from valuable ways of seeing the world. I have been trying to make that argument in this thread, which is one of my favorites ever. (Thank you @PossibleAaran). I never have any problem with anyone arguing against any metaphysical position, although, as I've said before, I think most of those arguments show a misunderstanding of what a metaphysical position actually means. Same goes for "judging as nonsense."

As for "ridicule those who believe in." Well, I can't complain too much since I am not without sin, but I'll at least say it is a weak and logically faulty rhetorical method. Not to mention inconsiderate. I am a firm believer in separation of church and state. On the other hand, I would not necessarily have trouble with support for study or practice of meditation, mindfulness (a word I hate), established alternative medicines, and other similar approaches.

Quoting T Clark

We're not talking about action, we're talking about belief in the nature of the world.

The "action" I'm referring to is that by which others are being judged to be not skeptical enough, the post started by (and I've interpreted many of the subsequent posts as) suggesting that people have lost the appropriate degree of Skepticism and gave examples.
Quoting PossibleAaran

Naturalism has far too easy a time these days, with few sceptical challengers. Your acid metaphor is apt, since what tends to happen these days is alternatives to Naturalism are scoffed at and treated as absurd. I cannot count the number of articles I have read in which Idealism is dismissed as unbelievable, incredible, 'dead', or just plain silly. Theism gets a similar treatment, though to a lesser degree because it has been defended as of late by some capable philosophers. What tends to happen with Naturalism is that anyone who dares raise a challenge to it is insulted and discredited ad hominem.

What I'm asking is what does the appropriate (useful, to put it in your terms) amount of Skepticism (particularly about naturalism) actually look like, and how do we determine its utility? You must have some idea in order to conclude that there's not enough of it, and that more might be useful, but I'm struggling to see how such a degree of Skepticism would manifest itself, useful to do what?

It would seem that if someone comes up with some metaphysical idea and we all scoff at it as absurd, that's too skeptical we should apparently be more be believing of such an idea, but if someone presents the idea that things are pretty much as they seem, that's absurd and we should all be much more skeptical of that. I still don't feel like we've had any explanation as to why we should be that skeptical (no more, no less) only that logic allows us to be.

The fact that you would have no problem with giving state money to meditation is exactly the sort of "action" in response to doubting the materialist definition that I'm talking about. What about funding fairy research, or hollow-earth expeditions, the idea that I can cure you with my mind? It seems basically like you're saying we should be more prepared to belive all the popular alternative metaphysics but we can obviously ignore all the 'crazy' ones. What I'm asking is by what standard these are to be judged?

Quoting Inter Alia

It would seem that if someone comes up with some metaphysical idea and we all scoff at it as absurd, that's too skeptical we should apparently be more be believing of such an idea, but if someone presents the idea that things are pretty much as they seem, that's absurd and we should all be much more skeptical of that. I still don't feel like we've had any explanation as to why we should be that skeptical (no more, no less) only that logic allows us to be.

First of all - we don't all scoff at the metaphysical ideas we've been discussing. You do. No one said you should believe any of it. Nor did anyone reject realism. I said that, in my opinion, there are other ways of seeing things that are also valuable. We don't have to choose just one way of seeing the world. I've said this dozens of times, but I'll say it again - metaphysics is not a matter of fact, it's a choice. I think your rigid support for realism makes it hard for you to see that.

Quoting Inter Alia

The fact that you would have no problem with giving state money to meditation is exactly the sort of "action" in response to doubting the materialist definition that I'm talking about. What about funding fairy research, or hollow-earth expeditions, the idea that I can cure you with my mind? It seems basically like you're saying we should be more prepared to belive all the popular alternative metaphysics but we can obviously ignore all the 'crazy' ones. What I'm asking is by what standard these are to be judged?

I believe in separation of church and state for political reasons. To me, that's in a whole different class of issues than support for secular ideas. There are procedures for determining whether specific research is valuable. I'm not suggesting that those procedures be abandoned. The fact that you equate meditation with fairies is telling. To me, it means your mind is closed to anything that doesn't fit within the very narrow confines of how you see things. Even though much of the world sees things differently, they must all be wrong.

Quoting PossibleAaran

Why can I only doubt on the basis of some other things held to be true?

You must use language to doubt, no? Which is to assume that language is coherent and represents what you wish to doubt in such a way that doubting it could make sense.

Quoting T Clark

The two - external and internal - interact all the time. It is my position, and I'm not the only one, that the best way of looking at the world for me, most of the time is as a weaving together of what's outside and what's inside. The Tao Te Ching talks about human action bringing the world into existence. That makes a lot of sense to me - in a very practical and down to earth way.

I agree and relate. I might speak of a whole that we organize with categories internal and external. The way it all flows together is hard to articulate. We have words enough for most purposes, but it's hard to say what it is like to be there perfectly. Fail again. Fail better.

Quoting Inter Alia

What I'm suggesting is that the realists do have a perfectly rational source for their belief which they themselves are satisfied with, it generally that realism (in the classic sense) seems like the 'default' position. The argument against that (that many people are religious or spiritual) makes the error I've outlined above, presuming these people are anti-realists when they are in fact more like reductive monists

What do you mean by 'classic realism'? Today when we speak today of 'realism', it means, as I'm sure everyone here knows, a very different thing to what 'realism' meant for the medievals. The medieval version of 'realism' was realism in respect of universals (probably best preserved in Aquinas). Their opponents were nominalists, notably William of Ockham and Francis Bacon who (not coincidentally) were also foundational in modern scientific method.

I'm not saying that to drag the debate into arguments over universals (which was never resolved, by the way) but to make one point: that the meaning of the modern sense of 'realism' developed to a large extent out of the rejection of medieval realism. So whereas medieval realism used to consist of analysis of 'how the intellect receives the intelligible form of things', 'realism' nowadays basically refers to the acceptance of the data of raw experience as a kind of indubitable starting point for knowledge. It is based on the stance that natural human sense, if you like, is the basis for knowledge; I suppose this is also evident from the empirical principle that knowledge acquired scientifically has to be replicable in the third person, i.e. it must be something that can be known by anyone given the same circumstances, assumptions, equipment and so on (and leaving aside the recently-identified 'replication crisis' in the sciences).

Something that is easily overlooked in all this is that the pre-modern stance of realism with respect to universals, was already a critical philosophy in respect of 'natural knowledge', based on Platonic epistemology as modified by Aristotle and the subsequent tradition. But as those ideas became ossified into scholastic dogmas they lost their vitality (which is clearly seen in the effect of suffocating authority of Aristotle in the Middle Ages). Then along comes Newton and Galileo, and Descartes with his division of mind and matter and algebraic geometry; and, with that, and the Enlightenment, the overthrowing and rejection of scholastic metaphysics and classical realism, and even the growth of wholesale doubt about the reality of Descartes' res cogitans in the first place (which is the basis of all materialist theories of mind). All of these became major ingredients in today's 'scientific realism'.

But what was lost in all of this, was the original intent of scepticism, visible even in Descartes, in the sense of questioning the veracity of natural knowledge - the idea that our innate or instinctive sense of what is real, might be in some way fundamentally deficient or flawed (Descartes 'evil daemon').

Now that idea, in turn, was represented in Christian dogma, in the form of the 'doctrine of the Fall'. This was the view that the intellect had become corrupted by the original sin, for which faith was the remedy. (Indeed one of the motivations of 15th and 16th century science was to ameliorate the effects of the original sin through science, for which, see Harrison, The Fall of Man and the Foundations of Science.)

Now obviously there are many major historical and philosophical issues lurking behind all of this, which are the subjects of dense and enormous books. But the point of all of this is to call into question the statement that 'realism', in the sense we understand that today, is 'perfectly rational'. In fact, it's an historically-conditioned set of attitudes and normative beliefs that is the consequence of a preceding dialectical process that has unfolded over the centuries. And that conditions 'scepticism', in that there is now an implied normative framework, wherein 'the scientific worldview' now occupies the place formerly reserved for 'the revealed Word'.

Quoting ff0

I agree and relate. I might speak of a whole that we organize with categories internal and external. The way it all flows together is hard to articulate. We have words enough for most purposes, but it's hard to say what it is like to be there perfectly. Fail again. Fail better.

The Tao that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao.

Quoting Inter Alia

What I'm suggesting is that the realist do have a perfectly rational source for their belief which they themselves are satisfied with, it generally that realism (in the classic sense) seems like the 'default' position. The argument against that (that many people are religious or spiritual) makes the error I've outlined above, presuming these people are anti-realists when they are in fact more like reductive monists. They're not deliberately suspending judgement on the existence of a soul, they think there is one and if someone invented a 'soul measuring device' it would proceed to detect one without trouble.

Unless you mean the whole default position deal, I haven't heard any "rational" argument from the realists. Or do you mean Sapientia's "It's patently absurd!!!" I won't argue whether or not it's rational. The problem for the realists is that it's wrong. I'm not religious, not spiritual, and not anti-realist. I don't have any particular belief about the soul. You are mischaracterizing the argument and the arguers without directly addressing the substance of the question.

"Oh, those craaaazy theists," is not a rational argument.

Quoting T Clark

The Tao that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao.

To get back to the question of objective (bias-impartial) reality (be it physical or not, or both and co-related):

This statement to me is one that attempts to specify to the intellect an objective reality. It is not what may be termed a subjective reality—such as which flavor of ice-cream tastes better—but, if the statement indeed corresponds to what is objectively real, a statement conveying an otherwise purely noumenal objective truth.

For instance, one can say the same of the neo-Platonist “the One”: “the One” is a phenomenal item (a word written and read, or a sound, or a tactile structure) that is not itself that which is addressed: a purely noumenal, unified/part-less, non-quantity, superlative state of being that, hence, is perfectly devoid of all phenomena, for phenomena ratios. … Something like this at least.

BTW, I discovered a way of embellishing my former logical argument for objective reality, but I’ll save it for some other time (given contingents).

Reply to T Clark

Exactly. We try to find the words. It's a pleasure or a spiritual practice to look for those words, to become more awake to the way we are there. That the final word eludes us in one more aspect of this wakefulness. We are awake to the gulf between our doing-being and our saying.

Quoting javra

This statement to me is one that attempts to specify to the intellect an objective reality. It is not what may be termed a subjective reality—such as which flavor of ice-cream tastes better—but, if the statement indeed corresponds to what is objectively real, a statement conveying an otherwise purely noumenal objective truth.

When you say "this statement" do you mean my statement about the Tao? If so, in my understanding, it has nothing to do with objective reality. In a sense, the Tao is the opposite of objective reality. It's an idea, an experience, that I find much more useful then the idea of objective reality. It's much more in line with how I see reality.

Reply to T Clark
I think I can relate to your position in the post above. For lack of a better word, there's a kind of theoretical pose or sense of what one is about that makes for confusion. I think talk about the Tao is as you suggest not part of the usual metaphysical game. It's a way of pointing outside of it --outside of a way of using language.

Lots of philosophers want to do a kind of armchair science that's concerned with largely traditional entities. That's fine. Who am I to stop them? But this isn't the only way to practice 'philosophy.' It may even look artificial and bloodless from another perspective.

Quoting ff0

Lots of philosophers want to do a kind of armchair science that's concerned with largely traditional entities. That's fine. Who am I to stop them? But this isn't the only way to practice 'philosophy.' It may even look artificial and bloodless from another perspective.

If I understand what you're saying, it's not just artificial and bloodless, it can be misleading.

Quoting T Clark

When you say "this statement" do you mean my statement about the Tao?

yes

Quoting T Clark

If so, in my understanding, it has nothing to do with objective reality. In a sense, the Tao is the opposite of objective reality. It's an idea, an experience, that I find much more useful then the idea of objective reality. It's much more in line with how I see reality.

Hmm, as I previously tried to specify it from the perspective of metaphysical realism: “objective” in the sense of “impartial to, or independent of” personal preferences; “real”, I’ll now add, in the sense of what is “actual” and not fictitious, etc. So this definition of “objective reality” does not strictly relate to the physical world; although, by definition, it can well relate to the physical world. (and, for the materialist, strictly to the physical world)

Think, for example, of Platonic realism: it is not materialist naturalism (personally find the natural world an exceedingly important component to what is objectively real, but not the only component; I do also hold belief in an Aristotelian-like final cause as itself being objectively real); yet, despite not being materialism/naturalism/scientism, it yet upholds an idealistic type of reality to be in manners independent of personal preferences. Hence, it is yet a worldview that upholds the presence of an objective reality—this as I’ve just expressed it.

So, in the sense I’ve previously denoted, “the Tao which cannot be expressed” is, then, a reference to what is here taken to be objective reality. (It is not a mere whim of fancy or a fleeting emotion—though, I take it affirmed by Taoism that it can nevertheless be experienced and, in this sense, simultaneously both felt and cognized)

If you do find fault with my way of interpreting what objective reality signifies, can you explain why? I can’t now think of an alternative terminology for what I’ve herein referred to as “objective reality”.

Reply to javra Transcendentals may be thought of as 'real but not objective', as they are prior to the division of subject and object. Nowadays it is automatic to equate 'objective' with 'really existing' but that is a naturalistic axiom not a metaphysical principle.

Quoting javra

So, in the sense I’ve previously denoted, “the Tao which cannot be expressed” is, then, a reference to what is here taken to be objective reality. (It is not a mere whim of fancy or a fleeting emotion—though, I take it affirmed by Taoism that it can nevertheless be experienced and, in this sense, simultaneously both felt and cognized)

Here's something I wrote about 6 months ago:

In this corner – the challenger, Tao.
[1] The ground of being
[2] The Tao that cannot be spoken
[3] Oneness is the Tao which is invisible and formless.
[4] Nature is Tao. Tao is everlasting.
[5] The absolute principle underlying the universe
[6] That in virtue of which all things happen or exist
[7] The intuitive knowing of life that cannot be grasped full-heartedly as just a concept

In this corner – the reigning champion, objective reality.
[1] The collection of things that we are sure exist independently of us
[2] How things really are
[3] The reality that exists independent of our minds
[4] That which is true even outside of a subject's individual biases, interpretations, feelings, and imaginings
[5] The world as seen by God
[6] Things that we are sure exist

In the thread, which I can't figure out how to link to, I was trying to lay out my understanding of how a world view centered around the Tao differs from one centered around objective reality. It is my opinion that objective reality does not exist, at least not as a real phenomenon in the world. It is a metaphysical assumption which can be useful in some situations, but can also be extremely misleading. The Tao is also a metaphysical entity. It doesn't exist or not exist. It's also a way of thinking about the world we live in. One I find very comfortable intellectually and emotionally.

Reply to Wayfarer Reply to T Clark

Right.

Still, any advice on how I/anyone who’s interested in philosophical issues (even at the expense of current cultural norms) should then specify that which I’ve intend in my previous posts?

“Nonsubjective actuality”, for example, doesn’t yet seem to me to be proper terminology for this concept—again, the concept of “a reality that is perfectly indifferent to personal preferences and opinions regarding what is or what ought to be”.

So, if either of you feel like offering your opinions on this, could “nonsubjective actuality” be cogently understood to express this stated meaning? Such as in the proposition: “that the first person point of view holds presence while it is in any way aware is a nonsubjective actuality”. (this being the first example that comes to my mind)

Quoting Wayfarer

Transcendentals may be thought of as 'real but not objective', as they are prior to the division of subject and object.

Yet this depends on how one uses language. For example: Transcendentals are themselves the objects of awareness of any subject which is so aware of them--thereby here constituting objects within the subject-object divide. But yes, of course current cultural norms would have it otherwise, even though the linguistic use of "objects" or "object-hood" I've just engaged in to me currently seems philosophically valid.

Edit: on second thought, please overlook this second remark to you. Just realized that I’ve here addressed the idea of transcendentals and not transcendentals themselves. While the idea is an object of awareness, the transcendental itself—like the a priori understanding of causation, I presume—is not. My bad.

Reply to javra

Sorry, there are a couple of threads open now that have been dealing with similar issues and I've lost track of what goes where. I feel like the tiger running around and around in circles, faster and faster. Looks like I've finally turned to butter.

This really is a wonderful thread.

Reply to T Clark X-) No problems. Thanks for the reply.

Reply to gurugeorge, you say that I have been redefining words so as to create a mystery. From my perspective, it is you that is obfuscating things with words. Your insistence on never using a word in any sense other than the 'ordinary one' prevents any interesting discussion of a real philosophical issue. Let me try to state the problem again.

The problem is this. I am presently looking at something. This thing, which is in front of me, has a certain shape and size and colour. Does it still exist if I leave the room and no one is perceiving it? What you said in this connection is:

Quoting gurugeorge

If it's truly a laptop you're perceiving then of course it exists unperceived. Laptops are just the sort of thing that exists unperceived, and you can check for yourself, in the way I outlined, that your laptop exists unperceived.

If you are talking about (abstracting away) your experience of the laptop, then it obviously doesn't exist unexperienced.

But this is clearly just a semantic trick devised to dodge the substantive issue. Yes, the way we ordinarily use the word 'laptop' is such that 'laptops' exist unperceived. Fine, forget the word 'laptop'. The thing which I am looking at right now, does it exist unperceived? Yes, I ordinarily think that it does and I ordinarily use a word, 'laptop' in such a way that 'laptops' exist unperceived, but this is all irrelevant. I am presently asking whether what I ordinarily think is actually true, and whether I have any reliable means of figuring it out. That I use the word 'laptop' in a realist way is irrelevant.

Quoting gurugeorge

So not only are you giving me an idiosyncratic definition of "doubt" without giving me any reason why I should follow you in your redefinition, you're also giving me an idiosyncratic definition of "object" without giving me any reason why I should follow you in that redefinition.

You may think you're revealing something profound and interesting, but from my point of view you're just redefining words in a way that creates a queer artificial mystery. No mystery exists in relation to the normal uses of the concepts, the mystery, the puzzle, only appears when one takes seriously your proposed redefinitions of those concepts.

But you will forgive me for being sceptical: why should I re-jig my concepts so that "object" means "experience-of-object?"

Don't 'rejig' your concepts at all. Leave them where they are. Use the word 'laptop' so that it means something which exists unperceived. My question then is, is that thing in front of me at the moment a 'laptop'? That is, is it something which exists unperceived!

Don't follow me in my 'redefinitions' if you don't want. Just recognize that I am presently looking at something, and there is a fact of the matter as to whether that thing exists unperceived or not. I am wondering whether there is any truth conductive source for the belief that it does exist unperceived. If there isn't, that belief will turn out to be a baseless speculation. Whether you call it a 'laptop' or not I don't much care. Whether you say the issue is one of 'illusion' or not doesn't matter to me. Whether we describe the issue as about 'doubt' or not is something you can decide.

You don't need a bundle of special concepts to create an issue here. The issue is that there appears to be no reliable way for humans to have come to believe that Realism is true.

A painfully simple way to see the difficulty with your argument here is as follows. Every Theist means by 'God', a being which actually exists. Does it then follow that God exists, just from the fact that the Theist uses a word a certain way? Surely not, but if not, why should it follow, from the fact that I use the word 'laptop' to mean a being which exists unperceived, that the thing actually exists unperceived?

The dogmas of the day are often etched into the meaning of our words, but one shouldn't think that the fact that they are so etched means that they must be true, or that they are beyond question. Not even Austin, the paradigm ordinary language philosopher, thought that.

As a side note, I deny that there is any such thing as 'the ordinary language concept' of anything, beyond a vague association of a word with other words, together with a list of examples to which the word applies. I don't think ordinary people have very precise concepts at all, or that people all have the same concepts so that it makes sense to say that there is 'the ordinary concept'.

Reply to Janus Quoting Janus

You must use language to doubt, no? Which is to assume that language is coherent and represents what you wish to doubt in such a way that doubting it could make sense

You raise an interesting question. Can I coherently doubt that my language means what I think that it means? I believe Kripke discusses this at length in connection with Wittgenstein. I am honestly not sure of the answer, though I think its a fascinating question. It depends what is meant by 'meaning'. I would think several different explications of the concept are possible, which extrapolate from a vague ordinary notion, and the question may have different answers on different explications.

Reply to T Clark I have enjoyed the thread too. I want to read over the discussion between you and Wayfarer. Perhaps in the morning when I am less tired.

PA

Quoting PossibleAaran

You raise an interesting question. Can I coherently doubt that my language means what I think that it means?

Actually that was not quite the question I wanted to ask. The question was more to do with whether we do not need to assume that language refers to the world in the way we think it does (even minimally just refers to the world as we assume it to be intersubjectively perceived) in order to raise doubts about the metaphysical, or even merely physical, nature of that purportedly shared world.

Quoting javra

So, in the sense I’ve previously denoted, “the Tao which cannot be expressed” is, then, a reference to what is here taken to be objective reality. (It is not a mere whim of fancy or a fleeting emotion—though, I take it affirmed by Taoism that it can nevertheless be experienced and, in this sense, simultaneously both felt and cognized)

Hi. I don't claim any authority on the Tao, but I'd like to provide another way of thinking of it. Instead of the 'still-too-theoretical' idea of objective reality, it might also be taken as the flowing situation in its fullness. It is the way it is like to be there. It includes finding ourselves in a language, in a body, in feelings and traditions. It is the place from which we theorize that makes theorizing possible. To speak the Tao would be to get behind what makes our speaking possible or to get behind our own speaking. It would be to make the situation (existence, etc.) smaller than the theoretical mind. For me this looks impossible, though I understand the urge to do so. It is perhaps this very urge that reveals the impossibility of its satisfaction. Trying to say what it is to be there and being sensitive and open to poetic failure is what, in my opinion, leads to statements that the true way cannot be spoken.

So I like thinking of the Tao that is indeed always already being experienced. It is known in one sense and unspeakable in another. Reality is not wholly conceptual, one might say. We can, however, create concepts for that which swamps mere conceptuality. We use negation to indicate presence.

Of course only philosophers would dream that life can be tied up with a final set concepts in the first place --that a nice little system could conquer the worry and business of being there. Perhaps the general shape of the goal is to get back to a state of flow. But the metaphysician perhaps want to get off the wheel altogether, to stop the flow. Even this apparently anti-philosophical point is an attempt at clarification. It wants to name the general shape of the human situation. It does at least point back to direct experience.

Reply to ff0 Hello, and thanks for a reply.

I’ve got nothing against direct experience. Most who’ve begrudgingly come to know a little of my philosophical stances would likely claim that I give way too much importance to experience. And yes, to me flow is good. Philosophy, then, to me, is about the theories and discoveries which facilitate better experience of flow—at least in the long term, if not in the short.

As an apropos, when you say “anti-philosophical” I intuitively hear “anti-interest/love for wisdom (Sophia as she’s been called)”. While I do uphold that wisdom concerning life is not the truth of experience/life itself, that it is the map and not the terrain, I nevertheless deem wisdom of great value. At any rate, I take it you have something else in mind when you use the term(?).

But, in relation to my previous posts on this thread, here’s my sole, hopefully cordial-ish, rebuttal:

Quoting ff0

Trying to say what it is to be there and being sensitive and open to poetic failure is what, in my opinion, leads to statements that the true way cannot be spoken.

In the statement “the true way”, either “true” is referencing a path that is regardless of what anybody might say or believe or, else, it is not. If it is, then the Tao that can’t be spoken which is inextricable from life and experience is—ahum—a “non-subjective actuality” (just made this term up, but I’m hoping it’s understood given my recent posts on this thread). If it is not, then the Tao is as subjective a reality as is one’s preference for ice-cream, no more metaphysically significant than the clothes one chooses to wear on any particular day.

Same would apply for the Tao being the source of all that is: either it would be the non-subjectively actual source of all that is or, else, it would strictly be so believed to be by some without any real bearing on what the source of all things is.

So far, I very strongly presume Taoism to be addressing the former and not the latter.

So it’s known, I too am no expert on Taoism, but I hold affinities to the outlines of it that I pick up on.

Also, I’m not trying to make the case for what in fact is “non-subjectively actual”; I’ve only been trying to make the case that something “non-subjectively actual” is—whatever it might in fact be. The affirmation of the Tao then being an example of a concept specifying its referent to be non-subjectively actual.

Quoting javra

Hello, and thanks for a reply

My pleasure. Thanks for yours.

Quoting javra

Philosophy, then, to me, is about the theories and discoveries which facilitate better experience of flow—at least in the long term, if not in the short.

Yes, I relate to that.

Quoting javra

As an apropos, when you say “anti-philosophical” I intuitively hear “anti-interest/love for wisdom (Sophia as she’s been called)”. While I do uphold that wisdom concerning life is not the truth of experience/life itself, that it is the map and not the terrain, I nevertheless deem wisdom of great value. At any rate, I take it you have something else in mind when you use the term(?).

Actually we're more on the same page than it may appear. The philosophy with respect to which I am 'anti-' is just the bloodless stuff that wants to be a depersonalized armchair science. I wouldn't try to stop anyone from doing it that way, but I've come to find it fairly dry and insignificant. There's a world outside of me that contains me and I share it with others who are also in this world. I was just at the memorial of someone I've known for twenty years. I have their dog now. The world survived their passing. I and their dog are still here in the familiar surroundings. I and their dog will follow them into the void eventually, or so I expect.

As I see it, we want what might be called the true and the beautiful --to know it and to be it. I prefer that these words be understood vaguely. We sharpen these words in different ways. That's the drama, sometimes bloody. Wisdom I associate with truth and beauty. I want it. I sometimes feel that I have it. At other times life swells up with pain and I humbled again. The word is both good and perhaps the sound emitted by a kind of smug complacency. A luck that takes itself for granted. Same with (the words for) truth and beauty. And yet truth, beauty, wisdom 'themselves' as vague goals seem pretty stable. I think it's safe to say that most of us want to live truly and beautifully and die bravely. Anyway, I too deem wisdom of great value. It's up there with love not as a duty but as a self-justifying higher pleasure.

Quoting javra

In the statement “the true way”, either “true” is referencing a path that is regardless of what anybody might say or believe or, else, it is not. If it is, then the Tao that can’t be spoken which is inextricable from life and experience is—ahum—a “non-subjective actuality” (just made this term up, but I’m hoping it’s understood given my recent posts on this thread). If it is not, then the Tao is as subjective a reality as is one’s preference for ice-cream, no more metaphysically significant than the clothes one chooses to wear on any particular day.

You have put your finger on the issue. I confess that I do indeed assume that others experience in rough outline what I experience. They enjoy a hot bath after working outside in the cold in about the same way. Vanilla ice cream tastes the same to them. Moreover there is a pre-theoretical sense of shared-world to which statements may or may not conform. As we conceptualize this shared-ness, we nevertheless debate whether these conceptualizations somehow conform to what they are supposed to be conceptualizing in the first place. It's a kind of logical space that makes impassioned debate possible. We can argue about norms (to put it in another way) only because there is always already a norm in place. The norm-already-there is what we appeal to (perhaps unwittingly) when try to install a new norm beside or on top of it. We take the very language we argue with for granted. We see it for the most part no more than fish see water. We may focus on one word's true meaning (the word true), but we do this as we take every other meaning use to argue about it for granted.

So I was suggesting the Tao as something prior to and making possible everything we might say about it. Its an odd thing to point at. "It is older than time." It is older and newer than anything and everything. It's the flow of experience or that raging experience itself that I assume without trying that my conversational partners also 'are.' But it's not something that I'd try to prove something about --no more than a love poem is a kind of proof. I do like non-subjective actuality. That suggests a priorness to the subject-object distinction. For me all distinctions are something that we know how to use without knowing how we know how to use them. 'Since no man knows aught of all he leaves....' Of course we know how to do things, but there's something like a massive ignorance that (in my view) we mostly ignore. Yet this same ignorance when experienced is wonder itself.

Quoting Wayfarer

What do you mean by 'classic realism'?

I mean that which is typical of it's class, the conventional meaning for the word 'classic', not 'Classical' as in the historical period. I'm sorry if that caused some confusion, although your resultant potted history was very interesting nonetheless.

Quoting Wayfarer

But the point of all of this is to call into question the statement that 'realism', in the sense we understand that today, is 'perfectly rational'.

I'm not at all sure the history of Realism shows this. To my mind the history of Realism shows a marked trend towards the distancing of concepts once held to be part of observable reality in order to preserve them in the face of advancing observational power. It's no different to the distancing of the Gods, once they were super-powerful humanoids sat on a mountain, as that became increasingly untenable they had to be removed to inaccessible realms (but kept the long beards, interestingly) but with real influence on the world (Old Testament style) as the source of these influences became more directly observable, their influence became more removed from observable reality too. Basically we've invented anti-realism as a place for the gods to live and act as their place in the 'real' observable world becomes less and less tenable in the face of increasing understanding about it's workings.

I see no difference (despite the change in subject matter) in the history of universals or that of free-will. As a concept that people hold dear become more untenable philosophical, instead of letting it go, philosophers create a magical place for it out of nothing, whether that be dualism of one sort or another, or solipsism, or modern versions of 'spirituality'.

The point I've been trying to make on this thread, which no-one seems to have picked up, is that when we talk about doubting Realism (or more often Materialism/Physicalism, which seems to be what most posters are actually talking about), we inevitably judge whether that has happened to the degree we're expecting by the extent to which someone adopt the tenet of some other alternative. It seems inexplicably insufficient for someone to doubt Realism, but doubt theism, dualism or solipsism even more. Somehow that seems to be not good enough, we're still labelled as "narrow-minded". I know of no modern materialist, not even people like Churchland, who say that they are 100% certain that everything is exactly as it seem to be, it's just that they find the available alternatives even less convincing and so fell they can dismiss them from their world view, I can't understand what's wrong with that.

We can't possibly believe everything, so we must make some judgements, we don't need to make them with absolute certainty, but part of that process will be to reject some options. If, like Dawkins, you believe that religion does more harm than good, then it is morally incumbent upon you to attempt to persuade others to abandon it's practices, i.e. you must "act" on your belief, it is not possible to suspend judgement because you believe some harm might be done. That, again, is why I keep returning to this point about action. Everyone has (in effect) suspended their judgement on things about which they do not need to act, they may be mentally weighing the option, even favour one view, but they have not really committed until they act.

It is those things about which we need to take some action that we must commit ourselves to one view or the other and this necessity does not leave any room for the sort of Skepticism that's being asked for here. We must decide where to spend the state money, we must decide if religious belief is harmful to society, we must decide what to teach our children, we must decide whether to pay for the shamanic healing. We cannot suspend judgement on these things (be sceptical of them) when they are there in the world for us to do something about.

Quoting ff0

The philosophy with respect to which I am 'anti-' is just the bloodless stuff that wants to be a depersonalized armchair science.

As to philosophic justifications, while I hold deep empathy for pathos given outlooks that provide wisdom, I’ve come to believe that only logos can convince logos. This, then, does lead toward one of those dry, analytic forms of argumentation … at least this—I guess unfortunately—is the formal approach I’m taking in putting together whatever philosophy I’ve got.

Quoting ff0

There's a world outside of me that contains me and I share it with others who are also in this world. I was just at the memorial of someone I've known for twenty years. I have their dog now. The world survived their passing.

Condolences, and may things work out for the best.

Quoting ff0

It's up there with love not as a duty but as a self-justifying higher pleasure.

I’d use the word “happiness” for, to me, this concept encompasses that of pleasure. All the same, I like the way you’ve stated this. Hence, then, the supposed pinnacle of love—that of absolute, selfless love—is not an issue of duty but one of attraction toward a self-justifying highest (or deepest) happiness of personal being (by which I take for granted the love of other; interpreting one’s proximity to this pinnacle to be proportional to the degree—dwelling at least within individual moments—to which distinction between self and other fizzles away … be this relation one of romance or otherwise). Anyways, nicely worded.

Quoting ff0

I do like non-subjective actuality.

:) Thanks for so saying. I’ll begin to make use of it, then.

Quoting ff0

Of course we know how to do things, but there's something like a massive ignorance that (in my view) we mostly ignore. Yet this same ignorance when experienced is wonder itself.

See, it is this very aesthetic that makes philosophical skepticism so wonderful a stance for me. Somehow always feel the strain in saying this from those who are Cartesian or else interpret skepticism from a Cartesian stance of “doubt”—now common fare culturally. Nevertheless, this (occasionally felt) experience of beauty in there being unending wonder and unending discoveries is to me part and parcel of what philosophical skepticism is all about.

Quoting T Clark

"Unless you mean the whole default position deal,"

Yes I do mean the whole "default position deal". Earlier Reply to PossibleAaran put forward Plantinga's rather weak argument in favour of of his theism and seemed to suggest that no such argument exited for Realism which the realists themselves believed. I'm demonstrating that such an argument does exist, the "default position" argument is much more subtle and well-thought out than you caricature it as being. It may be wrong, of course, but to suggest it is so absurd that even the Realists don't believe it is nonsense.

Quoting T Clark

"Oh, those craaaazy theists," is not a rational argument.

And you had just done with accusing me of mis-characterising the argument and the arguers! I have never presented an argument which states or implies that because theists are crazy we should ignore them. The only use of the word crazy was to describe the way in which we would consider someone who believed in fairies, or believed they were Admiral Nelson. These people are locked up and yet we have no more reason to dismiss their belief than we have someone who believes in God. The same denial of Realism on the grounds that we cannot prove it can be applied to the insane. How can we prove that they're not Admiral Nelson? Only by our belief in the fact that re-incarnation doesn't work like that, hence we treat them for their Schizophrenia, not consult them about naval strategy.

Quoting javra

As to philosophic justifications, while I hold deep empathy for pathos given outlooks that provide wisdom, I’ve come to believe that only logos can convince logos. This, then, does lead toward one of those dry, analytic forms of argumentation … at least this—I guess unfortunately—is the formal approach I’m taking in putting together whatever philosophy I’ve got.

In my view, we work with a persuasive speech that is both logical and feeling-tinged. For instance, I might ask you what it is for logos to convince logos. What is this being convinced? Is this not something like a feeling about the way that sentences hang together? A good feeling that approves? (I realize that this stress on feeling drags along the specter of irrationalism. )

Quoting javra

Condolences, and may things work out for the best.

Thank you.

Quoting javra

I’d use the word “happiness” for, to me, this concept encompasses that of pleasure. All the same, I like the way you’ve stated this. Hence, then, the supposed pinnacle of love—that of absolute, selfless love—is not an issue of duty but one of attraction toward a self-justifying highest (or deepest) happiness of personal being (by which I take for granted the love of other; interpreting one’s proximity to this pinnacle to be proportional to the degree—dwelling at least within individual moments—to which distinction between self and other fizzles away … be this relation one of romance or otherwise). Anyways, nicely worded.

Beautifully written. I like how you mention that the distinction of the self and the other fizzles away. This is the stuff we live for, right? We are absorbed in the play. The theoretical mode vanishes. And the selflessness of the love is absorption in the object. Love poems as the true theology. If philosophy has no interest in that, fine --but then some other discourse becomes the highest discourse. It's nice to know things. It's nice to be correct and/or clever. But all of this is small in the face of love. It's also small in the face of terror and agony.

In my highest moments, I invented poems. These poems were sometimes theses, codifications of the realization that was alive there in that moment. They were 'mystic truths,' and yet utterl carnal and of the flesh and of the world --pointing to nothing beyond the laughing flesh and this world. Why would they point away from paradise? Of course those moments are rare. The same statements mock their author if re-read in a low moment. Concept/metaphor alone is impotent. At best they can help to kindle a total, embodied situation. At worst they 'neurotically' prevent such a moment. (Julien Sorel in the early part of The Red and the Black comes to mind --a great novel.)

Quoting javra

See, it is this very aesthetic that makes philosophical skepticism so wonderful a stance for me. Somehow always feel the strain in saying this from those who are Cartesian or else interpret skepticism from a Cartesian stance of “doubt”—now common fair culturally. Nevertheless, this (occasionally felt) experience of beauty in there being unending wonder and unending discoveries is to me part and parcel of what philosophical skepticism is all about.

I completely agree. Whitman is a master of the beauty of this not-knowing and this letting-be. I guess that's the 'wisdom' aspect, though I don't want to use 'wisdom' in a smug way. The metaphor of the child comes to mind. Staying green and open. Not rusting into a know-it-all system-drunk fixity. What words won't eyes can. Here in this world I can meet eyes with someone beautiful and say something behind and around the words. I can't say what this saying is. Call me cunt-struck, but how do 'theologians' neglect this language of the eyes? How do folks dream that all can be made explicit? That our little nets of concepts get the job done? That our being here is neutralized by some 'explanation'?

Quoting PossibleAaran

Surely not, but if not, why should it follow, from the fact that I use the word 'laptop' to mean a being which exists unperceived, that the thing actually exists unperceived?

Hi. I've enjoyed your posts and this thread as a whole. I just thought I'd chime in to stress that (in my view) ordinary language is not metaphysical. It's like one of Zizek's jokes about the progammer's not providing code for the insides of houses that the characters aren't allowed to go in. No need.

I'm skeptical about whether we can ever really pluck language out of the total context of action. It's like a surface that we don't think to check behind --most of the time. Then philosophers come along and plausibly fill in the gaps. But as they fill in one gap they themselves are gliding on the surface of all the words they take for granted to this. Our ignorance (inexplicit know-how) is massive, as I see it. And I only began to see it long after I had been immersed in it for many years.

As a first approximation, recall that old trick of repeating a word until its strangeness appears. We make these meaning-charged sounds, meaning-charged marks. But what is this meaning? It is just there. Whatever we pile on top of it is just more meaning. In my experience, this meaning is foggy. Here and there we can sharpen it. Certain poets used resonant objects (objective correlative) to damp this ambiguity. But that gives a crisp image that is all the more ambiguous in terms of feeling and intention.

Quoting Inter Alia

We can't possibly believe everything, so we must make some judgements, we don't need to make them with absolute certainty, but part of that process will be to reject some options.

True. I would add that we largely find certain options already rejected. They are dead for us on impact. Ruled out. Right away we reach for a refutation, a defense. When a real choice is thrown at us, it's genuine burden. Being caught between two live options hurts. (At least when there is more risk involved than optimal versus not-quite-optimal pleasure attainment --which ice cream to buy. What I have in mind is, for instance, whether to abandon one's wife, quit one's job, hang oneself, etc.)

Quoting Inter Alia

If, like Dawkins, you believe that religion does more harm than good, then it is morally incumbent upon you to attempt to persuade others to abandon it's practices, i.e. you must "act" on your belief, it is not possible to suspend judgement because you believe some harm might be done.

The inconsistency here is that ‘the conscience’ is generally understood as an innate moral faculty, which you’re here applealing to. But it is just such innate moral faciulties which Dawkins has devoted considerable energy to de-bunking on the grounds that what really motivates human actions are the unconscious motives of the selfish gene. So there’s a kind of irony in a self-righteous call to action on the basis of the very faculty which the Dawkins of this world declare a religious delusion.

Quoting Wayfarer

The inconsistency here is that ‘the conscience’ is generally understood as an innate moral faculty, which you’re here applealing to. But it is just such innate moral faciulties which Dawkins has devoted considerable energy to de-bunking on the grounds that what really motivates human actions are the unconscious motives of the selfish gene. So there’s a kind of irony in a self-righteous call to action on the basis of the very faculty which the Dawkins of this world declare a religious delusion.

Firstly, that Dawkins might be hypocritical in his use of morality does not refute the argument, it just dodges it. Let's say Dawkins never wrote the Selfish Gene and was a committed humanist in the sense of a belief in human altruism as an emergent property. The argument that he must then act on that belief still stands. a realist can still believe in innate moral faculties, Ethical Naturalists do.

You haven't answered the point, in common with the rest of this thread, that most world-views clash and will inevitably lead to a requirement to act one way or another. At that point one must decide, up until that point one is, by default, in a state of suspended judgement, so no-one is a skeptic when it come to actions and everyone is a skeptic before that.

Reply to Inter Alia I’m not dodging anything. You cite Dawkins in support of an ‘argument from moral principle’ then you’d better be prepared for the implications.

Furthermore, I did answer the exact point, by pointing out the sense in which it is the very adoption of ‘world views’ which vitiates the whole argument. Scepticism is about not adopting ‘world views’ as a kind of global opinion.

Quoting Wayfarer

So there’s a kind of irony in a self-righteous call to action on the basis of the very faculty which the Dawkins of this world declare a religious delusion.

That's a good point. A self-righteous self-declared accidental ape. Why should science or reason be holy or sacred under such assumptions? The position seems vaguely deterministic, too, so the self-righteousness is also questionable from that angle.

I like science well enough, but it does make for a pretty lame god and cure-all. Hitler's famous book has lots to say about men as animals. It even has lots to say about altruism. Suffice it to say that the man as ape metaphor isn't as scientific as it pretends (in my view). It projects one kind of discourse, trustworthy in its own context perhaps, as a quasi-reigious dominant discourse. It's not that man can be usefully understood for certain purposes as another animal that troubles me, but rather the self-subverting assertion that man is essentially an animal. Such a position ignores us as a god-chasing world-reshaping language users.

I think it's supposed to come off as a seductive humility. Those who deny that we are 'mere' animals are supposed to be sentimentalists or flakes. But of course this ignores the way we actually live and think and speak in terms of good and evil, wise and foolish. What do we do with animals (whether we should or not)? Factory farming, euthanasia when they are inconvenient or threatening, etc. It's no small thing to reduce man to another animal, another piece of programmed meat. Even if it's largely true.
That small(?) 'trans-animal' aspect or potential is not something we want to snuff out?

Reply to PossibleAaranI'd be interested to get your thoughts on what constitutes a "good reason" for believing that objects continue to exist when they are not perceived. You mention observation and inference, so let's head down that path a bit.

Consider classical physics. It is it reasonable to claim that classical physics is the best available model for understanding the motion of inanimate, macroscopic objects? Classical theories assume continuous trajectories and temporally persistent masses. They predict that if objects disappeared when unobserved then there would be observable consequences that we simply do not experience. A reasonable explanation, given the assumptions built into our best model, is that those objects don't disappear when unobserved, but continue to exist much as they were when last observed.

Is this philosophically air-tight? No. Is it reasonable and responsible for the purposes of belief? No question.

What are your thoughts?

Quoting Wayfarer

Scepticism is about not adopting ‘world views’ as a kind of global opinion.

Right, so back to my earlier question of what does skepticism look like then? You seem quite convinced that there's not enough skepticism but I'm lost as to how you reached that conclusion. If it's not the adoption of any 'world view' how does such a person act that people (including the Dawkins' and Church land's of the world) aren't currently doing?

Isn't the belief that we shouldn't adopt any particular 'world view' itself a 'world view'. If you've justified skepticism by its necessity, rather than its utility, then how come it isn't also necessary when deciding whether skepticism is the right approach?

Even if we were to adopt a "don't adopt any world view as a global opinion" approach, how does that apply to Dawkins' attacks on religion, he's not suggesting that materialism is his "world view" in 100% of all thought, just that it isn't when it comes to morality, the afterlife etc. What's wrong with that?

Quoting Inter Alia

I'm demonstrating that such an argument does exist, the "default position" argument is much more subtle and well-thought out than you caricature it as being. It may be wrong, of course, but to suggest it is so absurd that even the Realists don't believe it is nonsense.

I don't remember saying that the default position is absurd, I said it is wrong. And I don't mean metaphysical wrong, I mean real in-the-world wrong. What do they call that..., oh, wait, that's right - realism. [Fe] That's not the way the world works. It's not the way the human mind works. It's not the way children or parents work.

Quoting Inter Alia

And you had just done with accusing me of mis-characterising the argument and the arguers! I have never presented an argument which states or implies that because theists are crazy we should ignore them.

I was making a joke. Being ironic. I'll start using the international symbol for irony [Fe] from now on.

Quoting Inter Alia

The only use of the word crazy was to describe the way in which we would consider someone who believed in fairies, or believed they were Admiral Nelson. These people are locked up and yet we have no more reason to dismiss their belief than we have someone who believes in God. The same denial of Realism on the grounds that we cannot prove it can be applied to the insane.

I have a very conventional, very sane friend who believes in reincarnation. People with unconventional understandings of the world are not ipso facto crazy just like very conventional people are not necessarily sane. Speaking for myself, I have never denied realism. It can't be denied, it's not a fact, it's a way of thinking, a story we tell. It has no consequences for the real world, although it may have consequences for how we see it. Realism, idealism, mysticism, whatever - it's the same damn world.

Quoting javra

“Nonsubjective actuality”, for example, doesn’t yet seem to me to be proper terminology for this concept—again, the concept of “a reality that is perfectly indifferent to personal preferences and opinions regarding what is or what ought to be”.

So, if either of you feel like offering your opinions on this, could “nonsubjective actuality” be cogently understood to express this stated meaning? Such as in the proposition: “that the first person point of view holds presence while it is in any way aware is a nonsubjective actuality”. (this being the first example that comes to my mind)

I'm back after a rest and ready to get back in the fray. So, "nonsubjective reality" is your term that could include both the Tao and objective reality, as a way to avoid pointless argument about terminology. Is that correct? Off the top of my head, have no problem with that, although I'll think about it some more. Wherever I finally come down, I appreciate the effort and understand the impulse. The problem for me is that the really interesting issues are found between the two concepts. This is a fight between the Tao and OR, not one where they join together like a Power Ranger to create a mighty Nonsubjective Reality to fight for truth and justice. Wow, that's some metaphor. I'm really proud of that.

Quoting T Clark

I don't remember saying that the default position is absurd, I said it is wrong. And I don't mean metaphysical wrong, I mean real in-the-world wrong.

Great, that's at least tangible, so could you explain why you think the theory that children naturally, instinctively understand the data they receive from their senses in a classically realist sense (physicalist, even materialist) is wrong?

Quoting T Clark

I was making a joke.

Yes, so was I. We also need a symbol to indicate when we've got it.

Quoting T Clark

People with unconventional understandings of the world are not ipso facto crazy

Yes but clearly we treat some of them as such, why is someone who believes they're Admiral Nelson not consulted on naval strategy but someone who believes they can speak to God (the Pope) is consulted on morality?

Quoting T Clark

It has no consequences for the real world,

Did you not previously describe it as a toolbox, are they now all tools which you never use because they don't actually do anything? I'm a bit lost now.

Quoting Inter Alia

Great, that's at least tangible, so could you explain why you think the theory that children naturally, instinctively understand the data they receive from their senses in a classically realist sense (physicalist, even materialist) is wrong?

Aw, geez, you mean you want me to get facts. I hate that. Just trust me.

Ok, ok, I'll do some homework and come back to discuss further. By which I mean that I'll wait till you forget about this and deny ever saying anything. I am really, really lazy. That's my version of Occam's Razor - if it takes any effort, screw it.

Quoting Inter Alia

Yes, so was I. We also need a symbol to indicate when we've got it.

I spent some time with the periodic table but couldn't find anything good. How about [O][K]. Or you could use [B] if you don't find the discussion interesting. [EDIT - Ha, I guess we can't use B in brackets. All that does is bold the text. I'll use {B} instead]

Quoting Inter Alia

Yes but clearly we treat some of them as such, why is someone who believes they're Admiral Nelson not consulted on naval strategy but someone who believes they can speak to God (the Pope) is consulted on morality?

Poor analogy - the belief that the Pope has a direct relationship with God is supported and reinforced by a vast social and cultural network. He may be wrong, but he's not crazy. Do you really think he is?

The Pope's job is to understand what God wants. Who better to give their opinion than someone who talks to God?

Quoting Inter Alia

Did you not previously describe it as a toolbox, are they now all tools which you never use because they don't actually do anything? I'm a bit lost now.

It's an intellectual tool box. It has to do with our understanding of the world, not the world itself. Is a wrench the car? That may be a stupid metaphor. I'll think about it.

Quoting T Clark

I spent some time with the periodic table but couldn't find anything good. How about [O][K].

I was thinking - we should just use [K]. That's the cute short hand for OK now. Because, you know, like OK is too hard to type.

Quoting ff0

In my view, we work with a persuasive speech that is both logical and feeling-tinged. For instance, I might ask you what it is for logos to convince logos. What is this being convinced? Is this not something like a feeling about the way that sentences hang together? A good feeling that approves? (I realize that this stress on feeling drags along the specter of irrationalism. )

Yea, you’re of course correct that there is no such thing as emotion-devoid logic. Logic is, I very strongly believe, strictly a tool via which our cherished emotions (e.g., sense of well-being) are safeguarded, embellished, and so forth. Hence, our emotive experience of being is primary and our logic (or even wisdom) secondary—thought the first is strongly dependent upon the second. Yet, even in this, merely so saying will not be enough to convince someone who deems logic to be the superlative faculty of intellect to which, ideally, all emotions (including those of desire and sense of satisfaction/comfort) then become subservient slaves of. So, while I agree with you, I still personally find the fine-tuning of logical arguments to be very worthwhile. Then again, there’s wisdom in how one best goes about conveying what one intends to convey, this again addressing the emotive aspects of what is expressed … and I’ve so far found myself direly lacking in this department. But I’m aiming to fail better next time around. :)

Quoting T Clark

So, "nonsubjective reality" is your term that could include both the Tao and objective reality, as a way to avoid pointless argument about terminology. Is that correct? Off the top of my head, have no problem with that, although I'll think about it some more. Wherever I finally come down, I appreciate the effort and understand the impulse. The problem for me is that the really interesting issues are found between the two concepts. This is a fight between the Tao and OR, not one where they join together like a Power Ranger to create a mighty Nonsubjective Reality to fight for truth and justice. Wow, that's some metaphor. I'm really proud of that.

Very cool. To my mind, if it could be agreed upon (else, logically demonstrated) that nonsubjective reality holds presence, this would then simplify a great deal of ongoing arguments—mostly dealing with at least some issues of what can be labeled subjectivism. Then the concerns become solely focused on what in fact is nonsubjectively real. A lot of disagreements would yet occur, but at least we’d all agree that there is something real which underlies all that we otherwise imagine to be—maybe even including a strictly subjective opinion that there is a logical contradiction to the Tao and OR co-occurring. (Maybe.)

OK then, so my resolute stance is then one of nonsubjective realism. (Just trying to get used to expressing this phrase … still weird to me, but I’ll be using it.)

Quoting T Clark

Aw, geez, you mean you want me to get facts. I hate that. Just trust me.

[K]

Quoting T Clark

Poor analogy - the belief that the Pope has a direct relationship with God is supported and reinforced by a vast social and cultural network. He may be wrong, but he's not crazy. Do you really think he is?

I think he might be, yes, but let's not dwell on that. You're right it was a poor analogy because what I'm trying to say is that the reason the Pope is consulted and our Nelson delusion is not is only because of the social network and I just don't think that's a very good reason to give any greater credit to what the Pope says than to our Nelson. But I agree it might be a good reason to think our Nelson's mad and the Pope isn't.

Quoting Inter Alia

Scepticism is about not adopting ‘world views’ as a kind of global opinion.
— Wayfarer

Right, so back to my earlier question of what does skepticism look like then? You seem quite convinced that there's not enough skepticism but I'm lost as to how you reached that conclusion. If it's not the adoption of any 'world view' how does such a person act that people (including the Dawkins' and Churchland's of the world) aren't currently doing?

The materialism of those types of thinking is an ideology, a constellation of ideas, which form the basis for judgements about what is and isn't true. For that reason, they are examples of 'unbelief as a belief'. Your own appeal to Dawkins illustrates a similar tendency: the view that science is (pardon the irony) the 'path of righteousness' while religion is a pernicious error; it puts science in the place of a religion, not in its methods, but in the sense of being the source of normative judgement.

'Dawkins's message is basically that we are social animals on an evolutionary trajectory to ever more rational, and therefore higher, moral standards, but that the process has been derailed somewhere along the line by the appearance of religion. It had looked until recently as though we were shaking off religion and entering an Age of Reason. But now, with the rise of religious fundamentalism, there is a relapse which accounts for the world's present troubles. Nevertheless, thanks to the enlightenment Science brings, we can root out religion and get back on track.[sup] 1[/sup]'


Quoting Inter Alia

Isn't the belief that we shouldn't adopt any particular 'world view' itself a 'world view'. If you've justified skepticism by its necessity, rather than its utility, then how come it isn't also necessary when deciding whether skepticism is the right approach?

That's a good question, to which I refer back to my initial response.

Reply to PossibleAaran Quoting PossibleAaran

I am presently asking whether what I ordinarily think is actually true, and whether I have any reliable means of figuring it out.

I already told you: do something like take a picture while you have your eyes closed, and you will be able to verify that the object of your experience exists unperceived. Or just ask someone else. It's not that complicated or difficult, and there's no great mystery about it.

As I said, you're only making it seem difficult and mysterious because you're mixing up the abstraction of the experience of the object with the object. This is also the reason why you think I'm begging the question, or defining things into existence.

Your experience of the laptop, certainly, cannot possibly exist unperceived. In the case of experiences as such, abstracted away from what they're experiences of, esse most certainly is percipi.

But objects, the things we normally perceive, are not the sorts of things that exist only while being perceived, they exist unperceived, and that is easily verified by means such as I outlined (instruments, like cameras or other causally-connectable things).

Quoting PossibleAaran

A painfully simple way to see the difficulty with your argument here is as follows. Every Theist means by 'God', a being which actually exists. Does it then follow that God exists, just from the fact that the Theist uses a word a certain way? Surely not, but if not, why should it follow, from the fact that I use the word 'laptop' to mean a being which exists unperceived, that the thing actually exists unperceived?

It doesn't follow from the fact that you use the word "laptop" that the laptop exists unperceived, it follows from the fact (if it is a fact) that you're really and truly perceiving a laptop that it exists unperceived.

Again, if you're really perceiving a laptop, then necessarily it exists unperceived, because a laptop is a physical object and physical objects are just the sorts of things that exist unperceived (a fact that can easily be verified by various kinds of instruments, as I said).

And you check whether it's really a laptop (a physical object) by means of further inspection - e.g. by switching it on to see if it functions as a laptop, by opening it up; or by taking a picture, or asking someone else, if you suspect you might be having something like a laptop hallucination (which would be something that only exists while perceived).

Quoting Inter Alia

what I'm trying to say is that the reason the Pope is consulted and our Nelson delusion is not is only because of the social network and I just don't think that's a very good reason to give any greater credit to what the Pope says than to our Nelson.

This is true of all of us. My place in the world on a day to day basis comes from my social network. I'm an engineer. I have a job and can practice because of the social network. Ditto for you. You, me, the Pope, we're all in this together. He may be wrong, but he got here the same way you and I did.

Quoting javra

Yea, you’re of course correct that there is no such thing as emotion-devoid logic. Logic is, I very strongly believe, strictly a tool via which our cherished emotions (e.g., sense of well-being) are safeguarded, embellished, and so forth. Hence, our emotive experience of being is primary and our logic (or even wisdom) secondary—thought the first is strongly dependent upon the second. Yet, even in this, merely so saying will not be enough to convince someone who deems logic to be the superlative faculty of intellect to which, ideally, all emotions (including those of desire and sense of satisfaction/comfort) then become subservient slaves of. So, while I agree with you, I still personally find the fine-tuning of logical arguments to be very worthwhile. Then again, there’s wisdom in how one best goes about conveying what one intends to convey, this again addressing the emotive aspects of what is expressed … and I’ve so far found myself direly lacking in this department. But I’m aiming to fail better next time around. :)

All good points. What's interesting to me is that an investment in the superiority or priority of logic is still 'irrational' in a certain sense. We take our most fundamental criterion in a blindly passionate sort of way. Because what's so great about being logical? We can't use logic to justify this, since the authority of logic as a criterion is what's at stake. On the other hand, something like being logical is experienced as a self-justifying value. It's 'aesthetic' in some sense. How are logic textbooks written? With what authority? With an intuitive authority. Strip away everything where bias plays a role, and we all agree intuitively on the skeleton.

The problem with real language is ambiguity. We're never finished deciding what our non-trivial terms mean. One might say that reason is rhetoric, self-persuasive and other-persuasive. Or reason is rationalization. Of course we use these words pejoratively when describing speech that fails to persuade us. That it persuades others we chalk up to bias, weak-mindedness or lying, etc.

I understand the charm of fine-tuning arguments. Still, I think the most revolutionizing speech often involves a strong new metaphor --an analogically shifted paradigm, etc.

Reply to Aaron R Quoting Aaron R

I'd be interested to get your thoughts on what constitutes a "good reason" for believing that objects continue to exist when they are not perceived. You mention observation and inference, so let's head down that path a bit.

Consider classical physics. It is it reasonable to claim that classical physics is the best available model for understanding the motion of inanimate, macroscopic objects? Classical theories assume continuous trajectories and temporally persistent masses. They predict that if objects disappeared when unobserved then there would be observable consequences that we simply do not experience. A reasonable explanation, given the assumptions built into our best model, is that those objects don't disappear when unobserved, but continue to exist much as they were when last observed.

Is this philosophically air-tight? No. Is it reasonable and responsible for the purposes of belief? No question

A good reason to believe it would be any means of reliably establishing it to be true. Sense perception and inference I discussed because these are our most obvious and relevant reliable faculties.

It is true that classical physical theories assume that things exist unperceived, but this is hardly a justification of that claim. What reason do these classical theories give for supposing that things do exist unperceived? They certainly [I]say[/I] it, but why do they say it? The theories predict that 'if objects disappeared when unobserved then there would be observable consequences'. What would those consequences be? It seems like the hypothesis that things only exist when perceived has all of the same predictive consequences as the hypothesis that they exist also unperceived. Perhaps I have missed something. But if so, it would be good to be clear about what.

Reply to gurugeorge Quoting gurugeorge

I already told you: do something like take a picture while you have your eyes closed, and you will be able to verify that the object of your experience exists unperceived. Or just ask someone else. It's not that complicated or difficult, and there's no great mystery about it.

But I don't believe you did 'already tell me'. This argument about taking a picture is a new argument introduced with this post, is it not? At any rate, this isn't all that clear. What exactly does taking the picture prove? So at this moment, T1, I am perceiving something. I close my eyes at T2. Does that which I perceived when my eyes were open still exist when unperceived? I take a picture with my eyes closed at T3. When I open them at T4, I can see on the camera a picture which 'looks just like' that which I experienced with my eyes open. What is the evidence we have at this stage? Well I remember perceiving something at T1 and I remember taking a picture at T3, and I am currently perceiving something else (namely, the picture which looks like what I perceived at T1, on a camera screen) at T4. These three bits of evidence don't logically entail that something existed unperceived and which the camera took a picture of.

I know at this point you will likely complain that they do entail it, because cameras take pictures of things and they can't take pictures of things which don't exist. So if I really did take a picture of something at T3, it follows that the thing I took a picture of existed unperceived at that time. But now it is clear that this whole language of the camera 'taking pictures of things' [I]assumes[/I] that Realism is true and hence begs the question. In other words, it is an [i]interpretation[/I] of the evidence to suggest that I took a picture of something which existed unperceived at T3 and that thing is what I have a picture of at T4. The experiences I have at T1-T4 do not entail that interpretation. We should describe the evidence neutrally, in a way that doesn't just assume that something existed at T3 of which I took a picture. If we do that then the evidence I have is that I perceive something at T1, then I close my eyes at T2, then I press a button at T3 and hear a clicking sound, then at T4 I perceive a picture of something which looks like the thing I perceived at T1. None of that entails that things exist unperceived, so how do you cogently infer that things exist unperceived from this data? This would be an intriguing argument, if you could fill the details in.

Quoting gurugeorge

As I said, you're only making it seem difficult and mysterious because you're mixing up the abstraction of the experience of the object with the object. This is also the reason why you think I'm begging the question, or defining things into existence.

Your experience of the laptop, certainly, cannot possibly exist unperceived. In the case of experiences as such, abstracted away from what they're experiences of, esse most certainly is percipi.

This is the 2nd time you have accused me of this conflation. I am well aware of the difference, which Moore pointed out, between the experience of something and the object of the experience. I am not sure I even used those words in my last post. At T1 I perceive something. It is something which I would [I]ordinarily[/I] call a 'laptop', but since you insist that if it is a laptop then it must exist unperceived, I do not call it a 'laptop'. Instead I try to characterize the perception in a way that doesn't presuppose Realism, by saying merely 'I perceive something'. This was also the reason I spoke of the 'object of my experience'. The 'object', as I was thinking of it, is merely that which I see. I see a black, rectangular thing with a slightly lighter front face. What I don't see, is the property of unperceived existence, which is why if the thing I perceive really has that property, I can only reliably tell that this is so by inference.

Reply to ff0 I completely agree with you that our language itself isn't metaphysically loaded. I think ordinary language is far less precise than most philosophers suppose that it is and doesn't have 'build in' views on philosophical issues. I think Bertrand Russell saw this clearly. I do think, though, that most non-philosophers believe that Realism is true, at least implicitly.

PA

Quoting PossibleAaran

I completely agree with you that our language itself isn't metaphysically loaded. I think ordinary language is far less precise than most philosophers suppose that it is and doesn't have 'build in' views on philosophical issues. I think Bertrand Russell saw this clearly. I do think, though, that most non-philosophers believe that Realism is true, at least implicitly.

Yes, I agree that non-philosophers accept realism as a true, in a sort of unconscious way. Indeed, I think we all think some kind of 'primordial' realism is true. In our Humean studies we can play with other ideas, but everywhere else the pre-theoretical sense of a shared world is primary. We can only bother to communicate from this half-conscious half-conceptual assumption. We can only bother to debate about what is the case because there is a sort of shared space about which statements can be true or false. Or that's how I see it. Thanks for your reply.

Quoting ff0

We take our most fundamental criterion in a blindly passionate sort of way. Because what's so great about being logical? We can't use logic to justify this, since the authority of logic as a criterion is what's at stake. On the other hand, something like being logical is experienced as a self-justifying value. It's 'aesthetic' in some sense.

[...]

I understand the charm of fine-tuning arguments. Still, I think the most revolutionizing speech often involves a strong new metaphor --an analogically shifted paradigm, etc.

Hesitantly—and kind’a encouraged by the last quoted statement—I’ll be a bit creative in this post’s expressions so as to condense an otherwise hard to communicate concept:

I sometimes liken logic (logos as it was addressed in Ancient Greek) to itself be a universal metaphor—in the sense here intended, a metaphor for pure being as it is and as it, in all its existentially divided parts, operates via process of becoming. This can probably become a multifaceted stance—and maybe you’ll agree that poetic speech might be both helpful for conveyance of meaning between some while simultaneously being a hindrance as regards meaning-conveyance among others. Still, relying on the Ancient Greek concept of Logos: logic, reasoning, ratios and rationing (or, partitioning this from that; appropriating relations between; proportionality; etc.), rationalizing, and language itself—among other concepts—were all interlinked in the concept of Logos. Are all interlinked, I’d say. Our inability to get behind language—which you’ve previously mentioned—is then, from certain vantages, one and the same with our inability to get behind the logos within which we dwell and of which we are in large part composed … and—like the fish’s lack of awareness of the water within which it swims, which you’ve addressed—quite often of which we can’t help but be utterly unaware of. IMO, due to our inability to get behind all the logos that is, we in some ways then cannot ever get to the pure, non-linguistic, being that is—for which we as beings use logos to address.

That perspective briefly mentioned, logic—in the form of the principles of thought being consistently applied—then serves as our common, human, universal language—or common meta-language if one prefers. (For my part, the particulars of formal logic then follow suit, but are not as universal as the principles of thought themselves.)

To cut to the chase, what I’m here trying to make the case for is this: imo, the optimal metaphor would be one that consists of a logical expression readily accessible to all—such that the meaning holds the potential to become commonly understood by (as extremely overreaching an ideal as this is) all people. Since all people share the aesthetic for consistency in what is and what is deemed to be—otherwise said, all are subjects to the principle of noncontradiction—all could then in principle come to understand such logos-bound expressions.

… or so I’m currently thinking. And waxing a bit too poetic at that, I imagine. (Heck, not all poetic verse is good even from the vantage of its author.) But I trust that some of this can come across in a comprehensible manner—though maybe not to everyone.

Quoting javra

Still, relying on the Ancient Greek concept of Logos: logic, reasoning, ratios and rationing (or, partitioning this from that; appropriating relations between; proportionality; etc.), rationalizing, and language itself—among other concepts—were all interlinked in the concept of Logos. Are all interlinked, I’d say. Our inability to get behind language—which you’ve previously mentioned—is then, from certain vantages, one and the same with our inability to get behind the logos within which we dwell and of which we are in large part composed … and—like the fish’s lack of awareness of the water within which it swims, which you’ve addressed—quite often of which we can’t help but be utterly unaware of. IMO, due to our inability to get behind all the logos that is, we in some ways then cannot ever get to the pure, non-linguistic, being that is—for which we as beings use logos to address.

Yes. Very well put. I follow you well here. We can't behind the logos completely. I think 'factic life' is a one name of this impossible target --the fantasy of the unmediated. Moment zero, unstained by the past, unstained by the inherited pre-interpretaion through which we always already are forced to peer through as if through stained glass. Unmediated being, the smooth untrodden snow, a sort of holy virgin of uncontaminated truth.

Quoting javra

That perspective briefly mentioned, logic then—in the form of the principles of thought being consistently applied—then serves as our common, human, universal language—or common meta-language if one prefers. (For my part, the particulars of formal logic then follow suit, but are not as universal as the principles of thought themselves.)

Right. And we can agree on the basic structures when we filter out all the usual content about which we are biased. But plug in the word 'God' or 'virtue' or 'science' or 'rationality' and the stain of history is there, including personal history. The words we care about are wet.

Quoting javra

To cut to the chase, what I’m here trying to make the case for is this: imo, the optimal metaphor would be one that consists of a logical expression readily accessible to all—such that the meaning holds the potential to become commonly understood by (as extremely overreaching an ideal as this is) all people. Since all people share the aesthetic for consistency in what is and what is deemed to be—otherwise said, all are subjects to the principle of noncontradiction—all could then in principle come to understand such logos-bound expressions.

… or so I’m currently thinking. And waxing a bit too poetic at that, I imagine. (Heck, not all poetic verse is good even from the vantage of its author.) But I trust that some of this can come across in a comprehensible manner—though maybe not to everyone.

I mostly agree. I do speculate that some metaphors will only speak to certain types of people. For instance, some don't give a damn about Nietzsche's poetry of solitude. It speaks to me. He also writes that the spirit is a stomach. That too speaks to me. But others don't like the idea of consumption,that life is a bloody maw in some sense, digesting experience, turning disaster into opportunity. The spirit must instead be a sort of diamond apart from the 'filth' of time-trapped flesh. So we might speak of esoteric metaphors, of 'passwords.'

But I generally agree. A metaphor can become literalized for a culture. 'Love is the only law. ' This, for instance, would institute a way of holding any particular law as an imperfect approximation of some foggy ideal law. With this notion comes 'the letter killeth, but the spirt giveth life.' And then maybe we have implicit metaphors, such as the physicist as priest who connects us to inhuman really real reality.

Quoting Wayfarer

The materialism of those types of thinking is an ideology, a constellation of ideas, which form the basis for judgements about what is and isn't true. For that reason, they are examples of 'unbelief as a belief'. Your own appeal to Dawkins illustrates a similar tendency: the view that science is (pardon the irony) the 'path of righteousness' while religion is a pernicious error; it puts science in the place of a religion, not in its methods, but in the sense of being the source of normative judgement.

Yes. The question was what's wrong with that? Where's the epistemological or moral error? Dawkins has taken an issue - say contraception - he's deciding how to look at it. He chosen materialism out of the range of equally valid ideologies, the tools in his toolbox to borrow an analogy, no reason why he should have chosen any other. Having done so, a moral issue arises, the Pope (who just some bloke, we've chosen materialism as our world view for this one) is suggesting that people shouldn't use it and this seems to be risking the harm of unwanted pregnancies and STDs, so now he has a moral obligation to try and dissuade people from following the precepts of that religion.

He looks at another issue, the afterlife. Chooses his world-view, his ideology, that's going to help him understand this one and he chooses materialism again, after all it seemed to help last time and it's a perfectly valid choice among others. He sees maybe how a belief in the afterlife comforts some people, but others without such a belief are not falling apart so it can't be that important, but he sees how a belief in the afterlife can be used to promote suicide bombing. Another moral obligation arises, to dissuade people from this belief for which the benefits seem small and easily replaced, but the harms seem quite serious.

Now he notices a trend. All these moral obligations would be served if he could just convince people not to be religious. There doesn't seem to him to be any advantage that can't be easily replaced, but there are all these harms he feels morally obliged to try and avoid, all of which would be avoided if people stopped being religious.

Now replace religion with homoeopathy and the moral harm is the spending of Health Service money on something which doesn't work (according to the world-view that's been selected to look at the problem), or astrology and the harm is people being given false guidance for money they might not easily afford, the list goes on.

This is essentially the campaigning materialist's position that is being subtly attacked here (or at least criticised); but where is the epistemological or ethical error? Are they not allowed to pick materialism so often, are we obliged to pick some other world view once in a while, do we have to allocate one problem to each world view out there just to give them all a fair chance?

You said;
Quoting Wayfarer

I think the inherent trust that modern culture places in naturalism is something certainly deserving of scepticism.

I still don't feel like anyone has answered, why? All that's happened is there's been a robust proof that naturalism is just an ideology like any other, so? What is then wrong with choosing it as often as we like and following the moral implications of doing so?

Quoting T Clark

This is true of all of us. My place in the world on a day to day basis comes from my social network.

I'm not talking about how he got his job, I'm talking about why there is a movement within epistemology to take his views seriously, but not those of our delusional Nelson. Lots of other people believing him is a perfectly good reason to conclude he's probably not mad, it's also a perfectly good explanation of how he got his job, it is not an epistemological argument.

Quoting PossibleAaran

At T1 I perceive something. It is something which I would ordinarily call a 'laptop', but since you insist that if it is a laptop then it must exist unperceived, I do not call it a 'laptop'. Instead I try to characterize the perception in a way that doesn't presuppose Realism, by saying merely 'I perceive something'.

"I perceive something" still presupposes realism (that the something exists). "I experience an internal sensation, one I've come to associate with perceiving something" is a description that does not assume Realism. It is obvious then that whilst you're not looking, that experience goes away, it comes back when you start looking again. This does not tell us anything about the laptop whilst you weren't looking, but it doesn't tell us anything about the laptop whilst you were looking either. Unless we relate the experience to the existence of an object outside of our minds the issue with closing your eyes and opening them again is an unnecessary distraction. The question is simply, does the experience relate to a thing outside of your mind?

I don't think anyone here is then arguing that it can be proven beyond all doubt that it does, you might be looking at a picture of a laptop and be deceived, you might be a schizophrenic and be experiencing a very powerful hallucination of a laptop, or Berkeley might be right and there is no laptop, only your experience of it. The question is what difference does it make?

Imagine you're sat in a public library working on your laptop, there's been a spate of thefts recently. You close your eyes to daydream for a while and hear the rustle of clothing indicating someone is reaching out to where you laptop was. What do you think it would be best to do? Open your eyes to prevent the thief, or think "it's OK the laptop probably isn't there because I can't see it, it'll be fine"?
You would never dare do the latter, every instinct in your body would be crying out to tell you that £300 of equipment is about to be nicked. That is the 'evidence' you're looking for as to why Realists are Realists.

Quoting Inter Alia

[Dawkins] has chosen materialism out of the range of equally valid ideologies

Begs the question!

Quoting Inter Alia

I still don't feel like anyone has answered, why? All that's happened is there's been a robust proof that naturalism is just an ideology like any other, so? What is then wrong with choosing it as often as we like and following the moral implications of doing so?

Two answers - the general answer is, because ideology is just the kind of thing that the sceptic ought to avoid.

The particular answer is, that as philosophical naturalism now occupies a similar role in culture to that previously occupied by religion in the sense of being a normative belief system, then it is also deserving of scepticism when it is treated as an authoritative source in respect of issues which are not themselves scientific questions.

(While it is perfectly true that the empirical claims of science may be validated by empirical means, the broader claims of the so-called ‘scientific worldview’ are often a different matter. But that is strictly speaking a different topic.)

Reply to Inter Alia Quoting Inter Alia

"I perceive something" still presupposes realism (that the something exists). "I experience an internal sensation, one I've come to associate with perceiving something" is a description that does not assume Realism. It is obvious then that whilst you're not looking, that experience goes away, it comes back when you start looking again. This does not tell us anything about the laptop whilst you weren't looking, but it doesn't tell us anything about the laptop whilst you were looking either. Unless we relate the experience to the existence of an object outside of our minds the issue with closing your eyes and opening them again is an unnecessary distraction. The question is simply, does the experience relate to a thing outside of your mind?

Hold your hand up and look at it. You are perceiving something at that moment. There are certain qualitative features or properties of which you are aware. This doesn't entail that those features or properties exist unperceived. It only entails that they exist right now, as you are perceiving them. Hence, I don't see how what I said presupposes Realism, so long as understood carefully. However, the phrase 'I experience an internal sensation' puts the sensation in as the object of the perception (the sensation is [I]what[/I] I perceive, and that idea presupposes the veil of perception - that I can only perceive my sensation of a hand and never a 'hand'. This doctrine confuses the object of experience with the experience itself. That's a confusion which gurugeorge has been accusing me of and which I've been trying to avoid.

PA

Reply to Inter Alia Quoting Inter Alia

, every instinct in your body would be crying out to tell you that £300 of equipment is about to be nicked.

Are my instincts a reliable guide to reality? It doesn't seem so. When I look at the stick immersed in water my instincts urge me to believe that it is bent, before I learn that it isn't. It isn't clear that what I instinctively believe is reliable at all, and hence, not clear that this 'evidence' is really any good. At any rate, there are two senses of instinct. In one sense, a belief is instinctive just if it is 'hardwired' in. As I have said before, I highly doubt that Realism is hardwired, and suspect it is just implied by things we are taught as children and so we swallow it unconsciously. In another sense, a belief is instinctive just in case I cannot help believe it at this particular time. When you say 'every instinct in my body would be crying out', it seems that 'instinct' is taken in the second sense, and if so, I am quite confident that this is a wholly unreliable means of belief formation. Believing what I cannot help believe at a given time is an easy way to get taken in by dogma, persuasion, propaganda and merely popular ideas.

PA

Quoting Wayfarer

Begs the question!

Care to explain how?

Quoting Wayfarer

ideology is just the kind of thing that the sceptic ought to avoid.

How does one avoid ideology? That's the question I've been trying to address here. What does not having an ideology look like. What sort of things would Dawkins do differently if he didn't have an ideology?

Quoting Wayfarer

as philosophical naturalism now occupies a similar role in culture to that previously occupied by religion in the sense of being a normative belief system, then it is also deserving of scepticism

Again, what would such skepticism look like? I'm sure you're not doing it deliberately, but it feels like you keep dodging the question by describing the current state of affairs without identifying the harm or describing the solution.

Quoting PossibleAaran

Are my instincts a reliable guide to reality?

As reliable as any other, that's the point. Your instincts are there already, for whatever reason, call it hardwiring, call it indoctrination, but they're there. So the question is not can they be trusted, but can anything else be trusted more?

When we see the bent stick, or any other illusion we recognise that we can't trust our initial sense data, but where do we look for an alternative explanation? Do we leap to the conclusion that it must be magic because we're standing in a fairy grove? No, we look back to other, more complicated sense data from experiments with light, we see how this thing we sense as light gets refracted and we presume that's what's happened to the stick, not because it's infallibly right but because we have no better explanation than the one we somehow seem to have entered adulthood with.

Quoting PossibleAaran

I am quite confident that this is a wholly unreliable means of belief formation.

But do you have a better one?

Quoting Inter Alia

What does not having an ideology look like.

If I can interrupt and answer with a sincere joke, I think not having an ideology looks like corpse.

Quoting Inter Alia

So the question is not can they be trusted, but can anything else be trusted more?

And maybe there's also the question of what we are trusting in the first place in order to manufacture theoretical doubt. For instance, the idea of some inaccessible reality. Or the very language that such doubts and questions are expressed. Or that someone is out there listening, placed in a sufficiently shared reality to understand the question/theory as relating to a shared situation.

Quoting PossibleAaran

When I look at the stick immersed in water my instincts urge me to believe that it is bent, before I learn that it isn't.

But why is the bent stick the illusion and the unbent stick the reality? I suggest because the unbent stick is what figures in the total practical context. Optical illusions are illusions, it seems to me, because they aren't something we can generally build on. We are future oriented beings. We make plans. It's in terms of these plans that we care about seeing a situation 'accurately' (usefully, enjoyably). If we weren't future-oriented beings who work and suffer now to avoid more work and more suffering later, we might not bother with doubt. In my view, recalling that care and projects are at the center of human life clarifies epistemological issues.

Quoting javra

“Nonsubjective actuality”, for example, doesn’t yet seem to me to be proper terminology for this concept—again, the concept of “a reality that is perfectly indifferent to personal preferences and opinions regarding what is or what ought to be”.

What I like about this is its focus on emotion. It's the idea of something that will not be moved with tears, prayers, flattery. It is the real that resists. It is the tree that has fallen across the road. We have to be clever and push it or drag it out of the way. This isn't metaphysical 'reality.' Instead it's a pain in the ass, a bone in the throat of our project.

I think we can also get a better picture of doubt this way. Two friends are trying to get to a party, let's say. Romantic opportunities await. But how to move the tree? They spend time and stress on doubt because the fear wasting even more time and stress on a plan that will not work. The thinking is structured by the goal in the future (the tree out of the way, but really the promising possibility of the party around the bonfire, and everyone's going to be there.) But back to the first point. They don't ask the tree nicely to move. They've accepted the end of animism. The world is not their parents when they were children. Importantly, the attack the tree problem without some explicit theory of materialism. Their imaginations run simulations. They exchange words to compare, persuade, etc.

Quoting Inter Alia

Begs the question!
— Wayfarer

Care to explain how?

Certainly. The point at issue was my criticism of the naturalistic ethics of Dawkins and the like. So to say that his choice of materialism amounts to one amongst 'a range of equally valid ideologies', assumes what it sets out to prove - which is the precise meaning of 'begging the question'.

Quoting Inter Alia

That's the question I've been trying to address here. What does not having an ideology look like. What sort of things would Dawkins do differently if he didn't have an ideology?

Presumably he would stick to science instead of engaging in anti-religious polemics.

With respect to the what an actual sceptical philosopher would be like - the examples of ancient sceptics (and cynics, who were similar) is that they were renunciates, living outside the normal constraints of society and culture. In that respect, they were rather similar to the religious recluses that one still encounters in India to this day. Plainly us modern urbanites are generally not going to adopt such a radical lifestyle, but I would say, in practical terms, that a sceptical philosophy ought to try and avoid dogmatic creeds and rigid ideologies. But it goes a bit deeper than that - one of the tenets of scepticism is 'withholding judgement regarding that which is not evident'. In practice, we are constantly inclined to such judgements - our minds are quite frequently a constant stream of them. (I know mine is, anyway.)

I could say more, but it would be a long digression.

Quoting ff0

recalling that care and projects are at the center of human life clarifies epistemological issues.

Exactly. We might well conclude that we can't trust our eyes or that materialism might not encompass all there is, I'd entirely agree, but it's a very big leap from that to "the inherent trust that modern culture places in naturalism is something certainly deserving of scepticism." and "Naturalism has far too easy a time these days...".

To advise more skepticism, or giving naturalism a harder time, we'd surely have to have some reason within the context of human endeavours some benefit doing so might bring, which in turn implies some better way, neither of which I feel have been addressed. Maybe people feel it's too off topic, but the question was "what is Skepticism?" and I'd say the simple answer would be it is exactly that quality that virtually every single human already displays, no-one is 100% certain of anything, deep down. Which means what we're really talking about is "are people skeptical enough?", as revealed by the two quotes I've cited above. To answer this we must first answer "enough for what?".

Quoting Wayfarer

to say that his choice of materialism amounts to one amongst 'a range of equally valid ideologies', assumes what it sets out to prove - which is the precise meaning of 'begging the question'.

Nope, not getting any of that, are you saying it isn't a valid ideology, or it isn't one amongst many? Those are the only two assertions contained within the premise.

Quoting Wayfarer

Presumably he would stick to science instead of engaging in anti-religious polemics.

Why? He's a materialist, he thinks that the materially detectable universe is all there is, and that some consequences of people believing otherwise are harmful, why on earth shouldn't he state his case? If he's not allowed to speak against religion because he is a scientist then who is. You're getting dangerously close to suggesting that no one should be allowed to speak out against religion.

Quoting Wayfarer

in practical terms, that a sceptical philosophy ought to try and avoid dogmatic creeds and rigid ideologies.

That's not "in practical terms" that's just restating the question, I asked what it means. You need to decide whether to use contraception or not, Catholicism sounds a bit like a dogmatic creed to me so we ignore what the Pope says about it, but hang on, those who suggest religion is a load of nonsense are now dogmatic too, so maybe we should listen to the Pope, what does the skeptic do?

Reply to Inter Alia Quoting Inter Alia

But do you have a better one?

Is this strictly relevant? We began looking for a reliable source for the belief that things exist unperceived. You suggest instinct and I replied by saying that pure instinct is unreliable. You now ask me whether I have a more reliable method than instinct to suggest. I admit that I don't, but that is just to admit that there is no reliable source for this belief at all. Its just a wild speculation.

Imagine that we began by looking for a reliable source for the belief that ghosts exist. You suggest instinct and I say that instinct isn't reliable. You then counter 'ah, but do you have a better method for establishing that ghosts exist?'. No, I don't but that's no defence of the belief that ghosts exist. It is still wild speculation.

Reply to ff0 Quoting ff0

But why is the bent stick the illusion and the unbent stick the reality? I suggest because the unbent stick is what figures in the total practical context. Optical illusions are illusions, it seems to me, because they aren't something we can generally build on. We are future oriented beings. We make plans. It's in terms of these plans that we care about seeing a situation 'accurately' (usefully, enjoyably). If we weren't future-oriented beings who work and suffer now to avoid more work and more suffering later, we might not bother with doubt. In my view, recalling that care and projects are at the center of human life clarifies epistemological issues.

Well, if I were to say that some experience is an 'illusion', I wouldn't mean that the experience 'isn't one that I can build on'. What I would mean is that the thing which I experience does not exist unperceived. If I say that the bent stick I perceive is an illusion, what I mean is that the bent stick doesn't exist unperceived. And to add to this that 'what really exists is an unbent stick', is to add that an unbent stick exists unperceived. That's what I would mean by those words, at any rate. I certainly wouldn't mean anything merely pragmatic.

PA

Quoting PossibleAaran

But I don't believe you did 'already tell me'. This argument about taking a picture is a new argument introduced with this post, is it not?

No, I proposed such a test in post 131625, and you even quoted it yourself en passant in a later post:

"You can easily verify the existence of unperceived objects by means of instruments (e.g. using a watch, shut your eyes and simultaneously take a picture with a camera with a timestamp)."

Quoting PossibleAaran

At any rate, this isn't all that clear. What exactly does taking the picture prove? So at this moment, T1, I am perceiving something. I close my eyes at T2. Does that which I perceived when my eyes were open still exist when unperceived? I take a picture with my eyes closed at T3. When I open them at T4, I can see on the camera a picture which 'looks just like' that which I experienced with my eyes open. What is the evidence we have at this stage? Well I remember perceiving something at T1 and I remember taking a picture at T3, and I am currently perceiving something else (namely, the picture which looks like what I perceived at T1, on a camera screen) at T4. These three bits of evidence don't logically entail that something existed unperceived and which the camera took a picture of.

They do logically entail that, because that sort of test (perhaps tightened up with watch and timestamp, as I proposed) is just the kind of standard by which we'd normally decide whether something exists unperceived, in the ordinary sense of "exists unperceived" (such as real vs. hallucination). And normally it's even simpler than that: we just ask a friend. If you think that standard isn't good enough, you need to say why.

Now, as I said before, you could load a bunch of "but what ifs?" on top of the tests, but at each stage you'd have to justify it - and merely thinking up something that's logically possible that might require a higher standard of justification if it were the case (such as: objects that otherwise have all the normal characteristics of physical objects, except that they blink out of existence when unperceived) isn't a actually a justification for dissatisfaction with that standard.

For example, "but what if my memory is playing me false?" Well, do you have any reason to think your memory is playing you false? Just the mere thought "my memory might be playing me false" isn't in and of itself a reason to doubt that your memory is being reliable, it's just a logical possibility hanging in a vacuum.

Quoting PossibleAaran

I know at this point you will likely complain that they do entail it, because cameras take pictures of things and they can't take pictures of things which don't exist. So if I really did take a picture of something at T3, it follows that the thing I took a picture of existed unperceived at that time. But now it is clear that this whole language of the camera 'taking pictures of things' assumes that Realism is true and hence begs the question.

What else is it doing if it's really and truly a camera?

Quoting PossibleAaran

In other words, it is an interpretation of the evidence to suggest that I took a picture of something which existed unperceived at T3 and that thing is what I have a picture of at T4.

No, it just falls out from what cameras are and what physical objects are, and you need to give me a reason why I should suspect that what I'm using isn't a camera and what it's taking a picture of isn't a physical object.

Quoting PossibleAaran

The experiences I have at T1-T4 do not entail that interpretation. We should describe the evidence neutrally, in a way that doesn't just assume that something existed at T3 of which I took a picture. If we do that then the evidence I have is that I perceive something at T1, then I close my eyes at T2, then I press a button at T3 and hear a clicking sound, then at T4 I perceive a picture of something which looks like the thing I perceived at T1. None of that entails that things exist unperceived, so how do you cogently infer that things exist unperceived from this data? This would be an intriguing argument, if you could fill the details in.

That's not "describing the evidence neutrally", it's redescribing the evidence in a weird way that automatically creates the mystery you're supposedly trying to solve (for example "I press a button at T3 and hear a clicking sound" is just a queer way of saying "I take a picture with a camera").

As I said, the sheer positing of alternative logical possibilities (such as laptops that blink in and out of existence depending on whether they're perceived or not) simply isn't good enough reason to doubt, therefore the idea that someone else has to provide you with something you're calling "evidence" to guard against those possibilities is a meaningless rigmarole. That's just not what evidence is, it's not the kind of thing that links or unlinks imagined alternative logical possibilities to experience, but rather it connects experienced object to experienced object in a continuum, weaving a coherent story. It doesn't have to step outside the continuum of experience to take account of mere imaginings - such as physical objects that blink into and out of existence - and "prove" that the imaginings aren't really the case.

We don't have to "cogently infer" that things don't flash out of existence when unperceived, because a) there's no reason to think that there is any such thing as an object that has all the sense-available characteristics of physical objects, except that it blinks out of existence when it's unperceived, and b) we can easily test by perfectly ordinary means whether things do or don't exist unperceived.

Quoting PossibleAaran

This is the 2nd time you have accused me of this conflation. I am well aware of the difference, which Moore pointed out, between the experience of something and the object of the experience. I am not sure I even used those words in my last post. At T1 I perceive something. It is something which I would ordinarily call a 'laptop', but since you insist that if it is a laptop then it must exist unperceived, I do not call it a 'laptop'. Instead I try to characterize the perception in a way that doesn't presuppose Realism, by saying merely 'I perceive something'. This was also the reason I spoke of the 'object of my experience'. The 'object', as I was thinking of it, is merely that which I see. I see a black, rectangular thing with a slightly lighter front face. What I don't see, is the property of unperceived existence, which is why if the thing I perceive really has that property, I can only reliably tell that this is so by inference.

Again, it's the very narrowing of your description that's causing the problem, but it's actually impossible to say what you want to say unless you are in fact doing what you say you aren't doing.

For example, as soon as you say "see", then that automatically carries connotations of physical objecthood - unless you're doing what you say you aren't doing, which is taking "experience-of-object" for "object".

It comes down to this: what reason do you have to suspect that things could possibly exist that to all appearances seem like normal physical things, except that they pop out of existence when they're not being perceived?

If you did have a reason to suspect that such things existed, then yes, you'd have a hell of a puzzle trying to figure out an evidentiary standard for distinguishing them FROM "normal" physical objects that don't blink out of existence when unperceived.

But you don't have any reason to think such things exist, so there's no reason to think that the ordinary evidentiary standard for "exists unperceived" (such as I've given you) is somehow insufficient for distinguishing whether objects exist unperceived.

Quoting Inter Alia

I'm not talking about how he got his job, I'm talking about why there is a movement within epistemology to take his views seriously, but not those of our delusional Nelson. Lots of other people believing him is a perfectly good reason to conclude he's probably not mad, it's also a perfectly good explanation of how he got his job, it is not an epistemological argument.

I won't make any defense of the claims of Catholicism, Christianity, or any other church. I do think that a religious/spiritual point of view allows experience of important aspects of the world that so-called realist or materialist world views are blind to. I've made this case in previous threads. There is not room enough or time to make it here.

Quoting PossibleAaran

Is this strictly relevant? We began looking for a reliable source for the belief that things exist unperceived. You suggest instinct and I replied by saying that pure instinct is unreliable. You now ask me whether I have a more reliable method than instinct to suggest.

No, I'm asking you if you have a better alternative to Realism, not a better justification for a belief in it.

The reason I'm asking is because the question you asked was not quite "looking for a reliable source for the belief that things exist unperceived". It was looking for 'any' justification that even the Realists themselves believed.

I have argued that such a justification exists and it is that, for whatever reason (evolution or indoctrination), Realism is the default position we, as adults find ourselves with. I've used the laptop thief as an example to show you that (you would not keep your eyes closed in such a situation, you do not really believe for a minute that the laptop is not there).

But, being the default position is not really a very good reason to keep thinking something, in fact it's a rubbish reason unless there is no better alternative, in which case it becomes an excellent reason for continuing to believe something.

That is why I keep asking so many times for someone to describe, or provide an example of how some way of looking at things other than Realism provides some advantage and how we identify such circumstances that we might profit from this alternative.

I've yet to have such an example in anything other than really vague generalisations with no demonstration of how they are better.

Sceptism is a tool that uses what isn’t or what hasn’t happened to define what is.

Quoting T Clark

I've made this case in previous threads. There is not room enough or time to make it here.

Is there some way you could provide links to these threads, the case for what benefits alternatives to Realism bring is exactly what I've been asking about. See my post above for how I think it links to the question here.

Quoting Inter Alia

Is there some way you could provide links to these threads, the case for what benefits alternatives to Realism bring is exactly what I've been asking about. See my post above for how I think it links to the question here.

http://www.dictionary.com/browse/scepticism

Realism is the exact opposite of scepticism.

http://www.dictionary.com/browse/realism

Quoting Inter Alia

Nope, not getting any of that, are you saying it isn't a valid ideology, or it isn't one amongst many?

What I am saying is that when you simply assert that ‘materialism is an equally valid choice’ among ‘other choices’, then you’re begging the question, because instead of arguing for WHY materialism is ‘equally valid’, you’re simply assuming it. Hence, begging the question.

Quoting Inter Alia

If he's not allowed to speak against religion because he is a scientist then who is.

I'm not suggesting for a moment that he not be allowed to argue against religion, all I am saying (and very many of his critics agree [sup]1, 2[/sup]) is that he makes a hash of it, because he doesn’t know what he’s talking about. He’s misled by a false belief, which is exactly why I think he is deserving of scepticism in this regard.

Quoting Inter Alia

You need to decide whether to use contraception or not, Catholicism sounds a bit like a dogmatic creed to me so we ignore what the Pope says about it, but hang on, those who suggest religion is a load of nonsense are now dogmatic too, so maybe we should listen to the Pope, what does the skeptic do?

If you assent to being Catholic (which incidentally I am not) then presumably you ought to agree to the rules as it is indeed a dogmatic creed. So I suggest, a skeptic would not likely to assent to being a Catholic (although I suspect that some scholarly Catholics would have a very good rebuttal to that suggestion.)

Quoting Inter Alia

We might well conclude that we can't trust our eyes or that materialism might not encompass all there is, I'd entirely agree, but it's a very big leap from that to "the inherent trust that modern culture places in naturalism is something certainly deserving of scepticism." and "Naturalism has far too easy a time these days...".

I agree. There's no necessary leap there, as far as I can see. I do however reject materialism in the name of a sort of higher [s]materialism.[/s] Why? Because these 'isms' are all too theoretical in a particular sense. Materialism is 'theological' and theology is 'mechanical.' I'm coming from a phenomenological perspective here. I like early Heidegger, for instance. For me the game tends to operate on a falsely depersonalized level. We want to be rational, etc., and yet cultural criticism is fairly nakedly a 'religious' kind of thinking. It's roughly politics at a higher level of abstraction. What I don't see enough of for me own taste is an awareness of how personal or 'existential' this kind of talk really is.

Quoting Inter Alia

Maybe people feel it's too off topic, but the question was "what is Skepticism?" and I'd say the simple answer would be it is exactly that quality that virtually every single human already displays, no-one is 100% certain of anything, deep down. Which means what we're really talking about is "are people skeptical enough?", as revealed by the two quotes I've cited above. To answer this we must first answer "enough for what?".

Yeah, I agree completely. 'Enough for what?' For me the general structure is a more or less vague idea of what humans ought to be which is projected outward rhetorically. 'Be more like this, more like me.' I don't pretend to escape this structure myself. We impose our own value-driven vision of the shared world rhetorically. To be reasonable is to take that ubiquitous skepticism into account and to wrestle against.

Reply to gurugeorge

I think we have reached an impasse. From where you see it, my characterization of the issue is just an odd way of talking which creates problems. For me, you are just insisting that things exist unperceived by definition. I will try once more to try to make you see it my way.

Look at your computer. What do you see, literally? Describe every property of the thing you are looking at, without adding any property which you can't see. You might say things like 'a black, rectangular, three dimensional thing with letters on it'. No matter how careful and detailed is your description, you will never say 'which exists when I am not perceiving it'. If you did say this, you would no longer be describing, literally, what you can see. You would just be adding a property which you believe the object to have, but which you can't see that it is, rather like the amateur artist who draws the human eye as a perfect oval, because that's the shape he believes it has (artists have to work quite hard to learn only to draw what they see and nothing more).

If you have never seen the property of unperceived existence, how do you know the object you are looking at has this property? Can you infer that property from what you do see? If you can't, then how can you possibly know it? 'Know' is being used here merely in the weak sense of reliably produced true belief. How can you reliably believe it?

You have said that if you take a picture with a camera then that will prove that things exist unperceived. But how? Since you cannot literally see that things exist unperceived, I took it that you meant to offer an argument for it here, but I think that argument is fallacious. Here is something we ordinarily believe about cameras: you can put a camera up in a room when no one is in it and the camera can get you a picture of the things which exist in that room when no one is there. Equally, you could close your eyes and take a picture of your computer, and the camera would show you what the computer was doing when you weren't looking.

I think once I lay out this ordinary understanding of a camera in this way, you can see immediately that nobody who wasn't already convinced of Realism would accept without further question that any of it is true. Someone who does not believe Realism to be true would not accept that you can put a camera up and leave it to take a picture of what exists unperceived. Equally, if I do not accept Realism already, I will not just swallow the claim that the picture which I get when I close my eyes and press the camera button is one which is of a thing which existed when I wasn't looking. That is why it begs the question to assume that my pressing the camera button has this effect. Assuming it has this effect is assuming Realism and no one who doesn't already believe Realism will swallow that without question. Yes, it is our ordinary understanding of cameras and it might (though I doubt it) be part of the very concept of 'camera'. None of that changes the fact that no one except someone already committed to Realism will simply accept that ordinary understanding.

Quoting gurugeorge

It comes down to this: what reason do you have to suspect that things could possibly exist that to all appearances seem like normal physical things, except that they pop out of existence when they're not being perceived?

'To all appearances seem like normal physical things' is tantamount to 'to all appearances seem like things which exist unperceived', but as I have pointed out, you never see that something exists unperceived and so, literally, it never seems that way. Perhaps you can infer that things exist unperceived from something which we do see, but the insistence that what we mean by 'camera' is 'something which takes pictures of things that exist unperceived' and the insistence that we dare not speak otherwise is not going to do the trick. Nor is the, repeated, accusation that I conflate the object of experience with the experience. If by 'object of experience' you mean 'something which exists unperceived', then I am questioning whether there is any such thing as that. But to merely question it isn't to confuse it with the experience itself.

Reply to Inter Alia Quoting Inter Alia

But, being the default position is not really a very good reason to keep thinking something, in fact it's a rubbish reason unless there is no better alternative, in which case it becomes an excellent reason for continuing to believe something.

It is good that we agree that 'being the default' is not really a good reason for a belief. Let me ask, what is the advantage of believing Realism as opposed to Idealism? Is it a practical advantage?

PA

Quoting PossibleAaran

Well, if I were to say that some experience is an 'illusion', I wouldn't mean that the experience 'isn't one that I can build on'. What I would mean is that the thing which I experience does not exist unperceived. If I say that the bent stick I perceive is an illusion, what I mean is that the bent stick doesn't exist unperceived. And to add to this that 'what really exists is an unbent stick', is to add that an unbent stick exists unperceived. That's what I would mean by those words, at any rate. I certainly wouldn't mean anything merely pragmatic.

Right. But my point is that this way of talking about things ('exists unperceived') is (to my mind) something like an artificial game that rests on 'pragmatic' foundations. Why not doubt this theoretical framework itself? What is this framework parasitic upon? Do you assume some kind of Newtonian space? With time as a separate dimension running continuously? What does it mean that something is there, apart from all human purpose? Is it some kind of 'matter' that just endures there in 3-space? And maybe it blinks out when we turn our eyes away? But this assumes the correctness, meaningfulness, and stability of this 3-space and a certain mathematical notion of time.

In a way I'm being skeptical myself here, but about the framework rather than about the objects. I'm skeptical about the usual version of the epistemological game. For me it's as artificial as chess. What's wrong with being artificial? Nothing, really. But I have 'aesthetic' reasons for wanting to get closer to the lived situation, which you may or may not share. I want to be 'objective' in a non-theoretical sense, which is to say that I want theory to be closer to non-philosophical life.

Kantian transcendental idealism answers many of these questions.

Quoting PossibleAaran

It is true that classical physical theories assume that things exist unperceived, but this is hardly a justification of that claim.

Quite right. The justification for the assumptions built into the model is the empirical adequacy of the model as a whole. This is a pragmatic rather than a foundationalist approach to justification. Remember, we're just looking for "good reasons", not "deductive proof".

Quoting PossibleAaran

The theories predict that 'if objects disappeared when unobserved then there would be observable consequences'. What would those consequences be? It seems like the hypothesis that things only exist when perceived has all of the same predictive consequences as the hypothesis that they exist also unperceived. Perhaps I have missed something. But if so, it would be good to be clear about what.

For instance, classical models predict that if the planet Jupiter ceased to exist every time that no one was looking at it, then the earth would be displaced from its current orbit with catastrophic consequences for its inhabitants. This obviously doesn't happen.

Quoting PossibleAaran

I am not sure what the point of this is. Are you merely insisting that the word 'scepticism' describes your position and your position only? If so, that ignores the evident fact that philosophers have used the word 'scepticism' to refer to many different things. I am not sure why you insist on it being used in only your sense.

I think its clear enough that your use of the word is idiosyncratic, and atypical.

To anyone who is in any way interested with the topics of this thread:

Having read through a good portion of this thread, I’m starting to lose my aesthetic for the terms “skeptic” and “skepticism”. Common modern notions—as easily pinpointed in dictionaries—associate these terms as antithetical to something real being, and to belief in reality. OK, nothing new to me about common modern notions … but on a philosophy form? I’m starting to question my use of this term …

So, my question: is there a viable, alternative, philosophical terminology—other than that of a newly invented word that no one else know of—for what most take to be this rather simple, commonsensical, epistemological stance: that of, “we as of yet have not demonstrated any proposition to be perfectly secure from all possible error”.

Note: this stance is one of unabashed certainty, not of doubt; it is also one of logical inference, and not one of supposition; lastly, it is one that implicitly affirms that truth—and, by extension, the ontic—does hold presence regardless of what people may claim or feel … with this specific, just underlined conclusion regarding human epistemology being itself upheld as an instantiation of such truths. Oh, and all this fully upheld, and entwined, with the commonsensical, self-evident truth that all the certainties we live by, aka subjective certainties (from the weakest to the strongest), are never contingent on some absolute certainty being first demonstrated by the intellect.

Whatever ready existent term for the aforementioned, underlined stance is in fact proper, it certainly is not that of “skepticism” as it has been used by at least half of the (philosophically learned) people of this thread. Uphold the stance previously underlined, and questions regarding things such as “how does one know (i.e., gain absolute certainty) that laptops don’t turn into seven headed evil demons that mock you behind your back every time you blink your eyes?” become exceedingly illogical … especially given all the justification for the contrary that has been so far provided.

Maybe this post comes off as off-putting. It’s not intended to be.

The underlined proposition above is logically valid, if not sound, given the arguments for it. To my knowledge so far, this commonsense position can only be termed one of skepticism. Hence, since so many people quite erroneously assert that global/philosophical “skepticism” entails lack of justified belief in reality, realism, etc. (nothing in the underlined stance justifies this) either a) there’s something quite wrong about the authoritarian biases of those who purport this entailment or b) there’s got to be a different philosophical term for the commonsensical, and quite ancient, philosophical position underlined above.

… eha, OK, maybe I’m not currently in the best of moods. Still, I find that the contents still hold.

Reply to Inter Alia

Here's a link to a discussion of the Tao vs. objective reality. I just went back and reread a few posts. I remember how much I enjoyed the discussion.

Reply to T Clark

Quoting Wayfarer

instead of arguing for WHY materialism is ‘equally valid’, you’re simply assuming it. Hence, begging the question.

Begging the question is a statement where the conclusion is presumed to some extent in the premise. I haven't provided you with my premise, just my conclusion. What I've made is an unsubstantiated proposition, that I think materialism is an equally valid world-view. Are you suggesting it isn't? I thought you were recently arguing against dogma and now you seem to be promoting your world-view so emphatically that you're implying materialism isn't even a valid opinion to hold, ever.

Quoting Wayfarer

all I am saying (and very many of his critics agree 1, 2) is that he makes a hash of it, because he doesn’t know what he’s talking about.

His critics think he's making a hash of it, well what a surprise! They'd be pretty rubbish critics if they thought he was doing a tremendous job wouldn't they? And I though we were talking about religion here, not science, how can anyone possibly 'know' what they're talking about, there's nothing to 'know' it is entirely made up. Dawkins simply makes arguments from his observation of the way religions act in the world. Those observations are as valid as any other, he doesn't need to 'know' anything about what religion says it is, he is reporting (within the constraint of his own bias, as everyone must) what he observes religion to actually be.

As to the issue around contraception, you still haven't answered the question of what a Skeptic would actually do. Yes Catholicism is dogmatic, but so, apparently, is a blanket rejection of Catholicism, so where does that leave the Skeptic?. Same with abortion, alternative medicine, gay marriage, burquas in public, faith schools, segregation... you have to decide about these things because the solutions are usually mutually exclusive, you can't spend your whole life on the fence.

Quoting PossibleAaran

what is the advantage of believing Realism as opposed to Idealism?

Simple, such a belief has been entirely harmless for the (more than I'd care to mention) years of my life so far. Can anyone say the same of Idealism?

You've not outlined what it is about my argument you disagree with, I'd be interested to hear, if you've time.

Quoting Inter Alia

Simple, such a belief has been entirely harmless for the (more than I'd care to mention) years of my life so far. Can anyone say the same of Idealism?

Fallibilism?

You're touching on a great issue here. Probably some could say the same of idealism. But if the realist and idealist live the same kind of sane life in terms of action (avoiding crimes, maintaining relationships), what then is the weight of such positions? In theory, they are big deal. Everything is real or ideal, etc. But in practice it looks like slapping this or that name on the shame shared reality.

Political isms probably get more attention precisely because they are better indicators of behavior. We care more about how others treat us than we do about the names they slap on the familiar world we share.

Quoting T Clark

Here's a link to a discussion of the Tao vs. objective reality. I just went back and reread a few posts. I remember how much I enjoyed the discussion.

Thanks. I will enjoy reading it.

Quoting ff0

Probably some could say the same of idealism. But if the realist and idealist live the same kind of sane life in terms of action (avoiding crimes, maintaining relationships), what then is the weight of such positions?

Exactly. If the lives of the Idealist and the Realist are identical in behaviour then they are not functionally different and the distinction is pointless, if they do differ then we should (after at least 2000 years) be able to very simply point to the advantages of one over the other.

My suspicion is the former is the case, that Idealism has no practical implications that can be demonstrated to be of any value, but there's lots of people in the world and I don't claim to know all of their experiences. There may be some non-realists out there living wonderful lives considerably happier and more fulfilled than any Realist, but I've yet to encounter any.

Quoting Inter Alia

Begging the question is a statement where the conclusion is presumed to some extent in the premise. I haven't provided you with my premise, just my conclusion.

Your premise was implicit in your conclusion, therefore you’re begging the question.

Quoting Inter Alia

And I though we were talking about religion here, not science, how can anyone possibly 'know' what they're talking about, there's nothing to 'know' it is entirely made up.

And again.

Quoting Inter Alia

Dawkins simply makes arguments from his observation of the way religions act in the world.

Dawkins never acknowledges the work done by religious charities in amelioration of poverty etc. He only sees and talks about what he thinks is evil in them.

Quoting Inter Alia

As to the issue around contraception, you still haven't answered the question of what a Skeptic would actually do.

As skeptics don’t generally defend an ideological position, what they would do would depend on the circumstances, I imagine. That said, there might be skeptics who object to contraception on moral grounds for their own reasons, and others that don’t. It would be hard to generalise.

But do notice that all of your rhetorical efforts are an attempt to frame the issue in terms of what you understand as ‘scientific humanism’ on the one hand, and ‘superstitious religion’ on the other.

Quoting Inter Alia

If the lives of the Idealist and the Realist are identical in behaviour then they are not functionally different and the distinction is pointless

Yeah. I think OLP and pragmatism exploded the 'ism' approach to philosophy for me. I see that there's an -ism on the end of pragma- there, but I read it as a sort of anti-ism or trans-ism that tries to get behind merely verbal disputes.

Maybe you've already looked into him, but I think William James is great. Here's a few quotes:

[quote=James]
For the philosophy which is so important in each of us is not a technical matter; it is our more or less dumb sense of what life honestly and deeply means.
...

The pragmatic method is primarily a method of settling metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be interminable. Is the world one or many?—fated or free?—material or spiritual?—here are notions either of which may or may not hold good of the world; and disputes over such notions are unending. The pragmatic method in such cases is to try to interpret each notion by tracing its respective practical consequences. What difference would it practically make to anyone if this notion rather than that notion were true? If no practical difference whatever can be traced, then the alternatives mean practically the same thing, and all dispute is idle.

...
Pragmatism represents a perfectly familiar attitude in philosophy, the empiricist attitude, but it represents it, as it seems to me, both in a more radical and in a less objectionable form than it has ever yet assumed. A pragmatist turns his back resolutely and once for all upon a lot of inveterate habits dear to professional philosophers. He turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins. He turns towards concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action, and towards power. That means the empiricist temper regnant, and the rationalist temper sincerely given up. It means the open air and possibilities of nature, as against dogma, artificiality and the pretence of finality in truth.

[/quote]
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/5116/5116-h/5116-h.htm

Reply to ff0

Yeah, I'm a big fan of both James and Pierce.

" What difference would it practically make to anyone if this notion rather than that notion were true? If no practical difference whatever can be traced, then the alternatives mean practically the same thing, and all dispute is idle." basically sums up this discussion for me.

Quoting Wayfarer

Your premise was implicit in your conclusion, therefore you’re begging the question.

No, my premise is that no one has yet provided any evidence that materialism causes any harm or can be proven logically impossible. Those two things make it an equally valid choice of world view in my opinion. You may not agree, with either of those premises, you may not agree that they sufficiently and necessarily lead to my conclusion, but it's not begging the question, it's a standard, analytical statement.

Quoting Wayfarer

Dawkins never acknowledges the work done by religious charities in amelioration of poverty etc. He only sees and talks about what he thinks is evil in them.

I'm not sure why he might be in any way obliged to do so, he's presenting his conclusion, not his entire thought process. I'm not privy to his analysis, but I'd imagine he has, as have I, looked at the charitable work done by atheists also, and concluded that ridding the world of religion would not diminish charitable work but would diminish a lot of war, persecution and suffering. He may be wrong, but if he is it will be as a result of evidence that religion necessarily leads to charity, but only incidentally leads to war, persecution and suffering. I've seen no such evidence and neither, I suspect, has he.

Reply to ff0 Quoting ff0

Right. But my point is that this way of talking about things ('exists unperceived') is (to my mind) something like an artificial game that rests on 'pragmatic' foundations. Why not doubt this theoretical framework itself? What is this framework parasitic upon? Do you assume some kind of Newtonian space? With time as a separate dimension running continuously? What does it mean that something is there, apart from all human purpose? Is it some kind of 'matter' that just endures there in 3-space? And maybe it blinks out when we turn our eyes away? But this assumes the correctness, meaningfulness, and stability of this 3-space and a certain mathematical notion of time.

In a way I'm being skeptical myself here, but about the framework rather than about the objects. I'm skeptical about the usual version of the epistemological game. For me it's as artificial as chess. What's wrong with being artificial? Nothing, really. But I have 'aesthetic' reasons for wanting to get closer to the lived situation, which you may or may not share. I want to be 'objective' in a non-theoretical sense, which is to say that I want theory to be closer to non-philosophical life.

I don't understand what you mean when you say that the whole thing is 'artificial'. All of us have a clear idea of what it is for something to exist, since, as Descartes pointed out, one has a first hand awareness of one's own existence. Moving on to what it would be for something to exist while perceived by me. The thing which I am looking at right now, for example, exists and I think this is perfectly intelligible, even if I couldn't define 'exists' in terms of anything more basic, except perhaps by saying 'there is something'. If I understand what it is for something to exist while perceived by me, and surely I understand what it is for me [I]not[/I] to be perceiving something, it is quite a simple process to arrive at the concept of 'unperceived existence', again even if I couldn't define it in more basic terms, except by saying that 'the thing which I saw a minute ago is still there even though I am no longer perceiving it'.

I find the notions of 'matter' and '3-space' far more difficult than the notions 'existence' and 'perception', since I have an immediate awareness of both my own existence and my ability to perceive, whilst 'matter' and Newtonian '3-Space' are (perhaps correctly) postulated to explain my existence and the things I perceive.

You say that this whole language of 'existence' and 'perception' is artificial, but I don't think it is at all. I'm immediately aware both of my existence and my perceiving, so in what sense is it artificial? Without an answer to that, I can't see what you mean in saying that you desire theory closer to 'non-philosophical life', since it seems to me that the concepts 'existence' and 'perception' can be understood merely by reflection on your own mental life and so they are, as it were, as close to your life as could be!

Reply to Aaron R Quoting Aaron R

Quite right. The justification for the assumptions built into the model is the empirical adequacy of the model as a whole. This is a pragmatic rather than a foundationalist approach to justification. Remember, we're just looking for "good reasons", not "deductive proof".

If by 'pragmatic justification' you mean 'its useful to believe it', then that is not the sort of things which we began by looking for. But the argument which you suggest is fortunately not of that kind at all:

Quoting Aaron R

For instance, classical models predict that if the planet Jupiter ceased to exist every time that no one was looking at it, then the earth would be displaced from its current orbit with catastrophic consequences for its inhabitants. This obviously doesn't happen.

I think this is a promising argument, perhaps the most promising so far. But there may be some difficulties. The classic model clearly does predict that there will be observable consequences if certain things don't exist while unperceived, but I have two queries and I can only begin to answer one of them. Perhaps you can help further.

First, whilst it is clear that, according to the classic model, an object like Jupiter not existing while unperceived would produce observable consequences, it is less clear that all objects would have such consequences. What about my laptop, for example. I can't think of any observable consequences which could reasonably be expected if it didn't exist while unperceived, certainly not according to the sort of physical theory which predicts the same about Jupiter. And so an issue still remains. While we have a reason to think that Jupiter exists unperceived, there doesn't seem to be one for thinking that the objects closer to home exist unperceived.

What do you think of the following extension of your argument? If we have a reason for thinking that Jupiter and all the other planets exist unperceived, then it would certainly be very strange if more homely objects don't. We would then be in a universe in which some of the largest objects in it exist unperceived but certain objects don't. Certain objects just pop in and out of existence when they are perceived and certain ones are permenant, and there is apparently no good explanation of why this is so. That certainly is a very odd world, and it would be far simpler to suppose that everything in the universe has the same ontological status unless there is some reason to think otherwise. Thus, since there is no apparent difference between my laptop and Jupiter which would explain why they are ontologically different, the simplest explanation is that my laptop also exists unperceived.

This brings us to the second difficulty. The classic model is what gives us a reason to believe that Jupiter exists unperceived. What is the evidence for the classic model? If that evidence ever assumes that anything exists unperceived, the argument will be circular and so fallacious. I suspect, sadly, that the classic model and the evidence for it do presuppose that things exist unperceived. But I do hope I am wrong about that!

Reply to charleton Quoting charleton

I think its clear enough that your use of the word is idiosyncratic, and atypical.

I am using the word the way it is used in contemporary academic philosophy. I reject the doctrine that there is a 'typical' meaning of the word 'scepticism' outside of philosophy. Indeed I reject the doctrine that there is a 'typical' meaning of most interesting words.

Reply to Inter Alia Quoting Inter Alia

Simple, such a belief has been entirely harmless for the (more than I'd care to mention) years of my life so far. Can anyone say the same of Idealism?

Well many people have been Idealists and lived perfectly decent lives. So it isn't clear to me that Realism has an advantage in that department, but I suspect that that is a person relative issue.

You have asked me to address you argument, but I'm not sure exactly which argument you mean. I'm going to take a guess:

Quoting Inter Alia

When we see the bent stick, or any other illusion we recognise that we can't trust our initial sense data, but where do we look for an alternative explanation? Do we leap to the conclusion that it must be magic because we're standing in a fairy grove? No, we look back to other, more complicated sense data from experiments with light, we see how this thing we sense as light gets refracted and we presume that's what's happened to the stick, not because it's infallibly right but because we have no better explanation than the one we somehow seem to have entered adulthood with.

We look at the stick out of water and we perceive a straight stick. Submerge the stick and perceive a bent stick. What we have now are two bits of data: The stick is seen to be bent in one circumstance and seen to be straight in another circumstance. Some how we have arrived at the belief that the straight stick exists while unperceived and the bent stick doesn't - there really is no bent stick, its just an illusion created by the refraction of light. I think its relatively clear to me how we reach the conclusion that the bent stick doesn't exist when unperceived, and you have detailed that well in this quote. But far less clear is why we believe that the straight stick exists when unperceived. It might be that there is 'no better explanation than the one we somehow seem to have entered adulthood with', but if so, why is it the best explanation? Why is it not an equally good explanation to suppose that the straight stick doesn't exist unperceived either? I'm not asking for some infallible guarantee that the stick exists unperceived, but just for any account of why this is a better explanation than the hypothesis that it doesn't exist unperceived? What makes you postulate an unperceived straight stick?

Quoting Inter Alia

no one has yet provided any evidence that materialism causes any harm or can be proven logically impossible. Those two things make it an equally valid choice of world view in my opinion.

Excuse me for butting in, but are those really sufficient conditions for a viable choice of worldview? I wonder if this is a little weak. All sorts of speculation is harmless and not demonstrated logically impossible. The Greek pantheon is harmless and not demonstrated logically impossible, as is Leibniz's Monadology, The old Stoic dual aspect theory of nature, The NeoPlatonic doctrine of emanation from God, a Dualistic Christianity - in fact, Creationism seems both harmless and not proven [i]logically impossible[/I]. But then, it depends what counts as harmful and what doesn't. Is it harmful if a doctrine contradicts the science of the day? Or is something only harmful if it causes actual physical or emotional harm to people?

PA

Quoting PossibleAaran

I am using the word the way it is used in contemporary academic philosophy. I reject the doctrine that there is a 'typical' meaning of the word 'scepticism' outside of philosophy. Indeed I reject the doctrine that there is a 'typical' meaning of most interesting words.

Whilst I agree that there might not be a typical meaning, there is no doubt that yours so flies against the basic definition that it is definitely idiosyncratic to the point of an abuse of language.
Inside and outside philosophy it maintains the meaning of systematic doubt.
You have chosen to characterise that in a negative way, when our entire world of reliable knowledge relies on skeptical enquiry, and always has.
Your view is angst followed by apathy.
Skepticism is literally "enquiry". No knowledge is available without it.

Reply to charleton Quoting charleton

Your view is angst followed by apathy.

First, it isn't my 'view'. It isn't even how I use the word 'scepticism' most of the time. The definition to which you are referring is the one which the ancient sceptics used. The ancient sceptics of the Pyrrhonian school practiced suspension of judgement about every matter and claimed that this lead to peace of mind. Here is Sextus, our best source on ancient scepticism:

"Scepticism is an ability to place in antithesis, in any manner whatever, appearances and judgements, and thus -- because of the equality of force in the objects and arguments proposed -- to come first of all to a suspension of judgement and then to mental tranquillity.". -- Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism.

Note, he is talking about what 'scepticism' meant [I]to the ancient Pyrrhonain school[/I]. Since this is so, your whole claim about how the definition 'flies against' what is ordinarily meant to the point of an abuse of language is just irrelevant. Obviously people today use the word 'scepticism' in a different way to the way it was used roughly 2500 years ago. So what? What I was saying is that the ancients used the word (or their ancient equivalent which is translated 'scepticism') that way.

Quoting PossibleAaran

Pyrrhonian school practiced suspension

That's just a point of view from people who had written themselves off from the world.
Its not the most common, nor typical, nor accurate.
Skepticism is the fuel of science and the progress of humanity.
What you are presenting is "giving up."

Since the title of the thread is "What is skepticism" you are failing to offer any useful insight.

Reply to charleton

I agree that its not the most common use these days, even in academic philosophy. Though if you gloss the Pyrrhonian school as having 'given up' and as full of 'angst' and 'apathy', I can only assume you haven't read the Outlines or any scholarly work on the school, because they had an entirely different attitude from that.

Quoting PossibleAaran

I think we have reached an impasse. From where you see it, my characterization of the issue is just an odd way of talking which creates problems. For me, you are just insisting that things exist unperceived by definition. I will try once more to try to make you see it my way.

Hehe, I'm not being obtuse, I assure you. I used to be captivated by all this stuff myself, so I understand its attraction.

Quoting PossibleAaran

Look at your computer. What do you see, literally?

A computer.

Quoting PossibleAaran

Describe every property of the thing you are looking at, without adding any property which you can't see. You might say things like 'a black, rectangular, three dimensional thing with letters on it'.

Why would I describe it in such peculiar terms? "A black rectangular three dimensional thing with letters on it" could just as easily describe a plaque as a computer. It's a computer, so it's implicitly and necessarily a three-dimensional thing, and has a shape and colour.

The reason I think it's a computer is because I'm familiar with computers and it's very similar to other computers I've seen, and it functions as a computer; not because it's a "black rectangular three-dimensional object." It is those things, but those properties are incidental, they aren't the signifiers of it being a computer, and I don't get anywhere closer to specifying it as a computer just by specifying a comprehensive list of those sorts of properties. The signifiers of it being a computer are more to do with its internal structure and its functionality (use it for email, browse the internet, play videogames, etc.).

Again, you keep denying that you're mistaking experience for object, but this smells very much like you're asking me to reduce my description of my experience to my sensory experiences in abstraction from what they're sensory experiences of, and then somehow build up or infer an idea of what I'm perceiving from there.

Quoting PossibleAaran

No matter how careful and detailed is your description, you will never say 'which exists when I am not perceiving it'.

I wouldn't say "which has a motherboard, CPU and RAM inside it" either, but those are also implicit in the thing's being a computer, yet my not seeing those things doesn't mean it's not a computer.

The point is, there's no occasion to add "which exists when I am not perceiving it" because I already know it exists when I'm not perceiving it, because it's a computer.

It's possible that I could be mistaken that it's a computer, but if it is a computer then I can't be mistaken about its persistence while I'm not looking, and that persistence is not something I need to "see" or "infer."

Quoting PossibleAaran

If you did say this, you would no longer be describing, literally, what you can see. You would just be adding a property which you believe the object to have,

No, no, no. I already "added the property" (so to speak) when I saw the thing as a computer. The property is implicit in the thing's being a computer. And I can test that property, if I want, by the means I pointed out, just as I can test the computerhood of the object by seeing if I can email with it, etc.

Quoting PossibleAaran

but which you can't see that it is, rather like the amateur artist who draws the human eye as a perfect oval, because that's the shape he believes it has (artists have to work quite hard to learn only to draw what they see and nothing more).

Yes, exactly, and the fact that you use this example suggests, again, that you're doing what you say you're not doing. Because the perspectival proportions are not what the artist literally sees, what the artist literally sees is the object, the perspectival vision is precisely the result of training in abstracting away what one knows of what one sees, and sort of beholding one's sensory experience in suspension, as something like a projection on a flat surface with certain proportions of colour and shape. (Amusingly in this context, parsing a photograph is the opposite process.)

Similarly, this tangle you're getting yourself into is the result of you abstracting away what you know of the thing you're experiencing, so that "literally" to you really means a detached, truncated description of some sensory experiences in abstraction.

Sure, you're never going to perceive unperceived persistence that way, but you'd never be able to perceive perceived persistence that way either, because you've already cut yourself off from directly perceiving any object that isn't pure, present sensory experience. You've already turned yourself into a phenomenalist or idealist by choosing the method you've chosen, so the whole exercise is a sham.

If you really weren't doing what you say you aren't doing, then the answer and the tests I've given you would be sufficient. The fact that you still think a camera test is insufficient, and you still think that you need something extra to prove unperceived persistence, over and above the fact that physical objects are by definition things that exist unperceived, and that that persistence can be tested by the use of various kinds of tools and instruments, demonstrates that you are after all painting yourself into the corner of a phenomenalist/idealist stance.

Quoting PossibleAaran

If you have never seen the property of unperceived existence, how do you know the object you are looking at has this property?

If it's "an object I'm looking at," a physical object, then necessarily it has this property. (If the "object" is just sensory experience in abstraction that I'm sheerly beholding, on the other hand, then necessarily it doesn't.)

Quoting PossibleAaran

Can you infer that property from what you do see? If you can't, then how can you possibly know it? 'Know' is being used here merely in the weak sense of reliably produced true belief. How can you reliably believe it?

Some people are incurious and never open up their computers, so they've never seen the motherboard and CPU. So how do they know their computer has a motherboard and CPU if they haven't seen it?

Similarly, I'm incurious about the computer's existing unperceived, so I've never done the camera test. But I could easily do it.

We can be incurious about these things and still know about them because having a motherboard and CPU is a necessary implication of a thing's being a computer, and persisting unperceived is a necessary implication of a thing's being a physical object.

In these examples, the properties (respectively, having a motherboard and CPU, existing unperceived) aren't being directly perceived in sensory experience, nor are they inferred from sensory experience, they're inferred from the things' being what they are, supposing that they truly are those things.

Quoting PossibleAaran

You have said that if you take a picture with a camera then that will prove that things exist unperceived. But how? Since you cannot literally see that things exist unperceived, I took it that you meant to offer an argument for it here, but I think that argument is fallacious. Here is something we ordinarily believe about cameras: you can put a camera up in a room when no one is in it and the camera can get you a picture of the things which exist in that room when no one is there. Equally, you could close your eyes and take a picture of your computer, and the camera would show you what the computer was doing when you weren't looking.

I think once I lay out this ordinary understanding of a camera in this way, you can see immediately that nobody who wasn't already convinced of Realism would accept without further question that any of it is true. Someone who does not believe Realism to be true would not accept that you can put a camera up and leave it to take a picture of what exists unperceived.

Yeah, but there's nobody who actually believes that. People who say they don't believe in Realism don't really disbelieve Realism, they just disbelieve Realism in toy examples where they're hypnotizing themselves into artificially shrinking their experience of the world down to the experience of sensory qualities in abstraction. It's a rakish pose.

I understand what you're saying: the camera is on a level with the laptop, and if the laptop's unperceived existence is dubious, so is the camera's, so one can't be used to prove the other.

But neither the laptop nor the camera's unperceived existence is at all dubious - if they're truly laptops and cameras.

Now they might indeed be something else - a laptopX and a cameraX, both of which have all the properties of normal laptops and cameras, with the exception of unperceived existence. But you'd have to demonstrate that's what they are. And you can't demonstrate that with your "let me literally behold only my sensory experiences in abstraction" game, any more than you could demonstrate perceived existence from that stance.

Quoting PossibleAaran

'To all appearances seem like normal physical things' is tantamount to 'to all appearances seem like things which exist unperceived', but as I have pointed out, you never see that something exists unperceived and so, literally, it never seems that way.

"You never see that something exists unperceived". Genius :)

But one wouldn't expect the property of unperceived existence to be something one could see.

Fortunately, you don't need to "see that something exists unperceived" to know that the physical thing before you exists unperceived, because as I said, that's already an ironclad implication of things being physical objects.

You have to accept this, unless you're going the phenomenalist/idealist route you deny. It's completely incoherent to say, "This is a physical object, but I can't be sure, from inspection, whether it exists unperceived." Present inspection isn't the sort of thing you could logically expect to reveal that particular property. What you could logically expect to reveal that property would be things like the camera test.

Now, you might say something like this:- "Ha! You think you are perceiving physical objects, but for all you know you might be perceiving something that to all appearances look and behave like physical objects, but lack the property of existing unperceived."

In that case we'd do the camera test. If the camera showed nothing there when I took the picture, that would be a verified example of something blinking out of existence when unpercieved. BUT THEN IT WOULDN'T BE A PHYSICAL OBJECT AS WE UNDERSTAND PHYSICAL OBJECTS It would be something new, something mysterious and interesting, that shares some properties with physical objects, but lacks the property physical objects have, of existing unperceived.

SUMMARY:- We don't "build up" the idea of physical objects from sensory experience, we POSIT such a thing as physical objecthood and then we test with POSSIBLE tests, using perception as the very standard of judgement, whether a thing answers to those properties. (The process is the same throughout all cognition, right up to science: generate-and-test. What would be the logically necessary outcome for sensory experience, for perception, supposing x is true? Test it.)

Unperceived existence is certainly one of those properties, but since seeing the unseen is a logical impossibility it's not a possible test for unperceived existence; but if something passes possible tests for unperceived existence (like using cameras or other instruments), then that is a sufficient test for unperceived existence.

Quoting PossibleAaran

You have asked me to address you argument, but I'm not sure exactly which argument you mean.

Sorry, I mean the following;
1. We enter adult life as Realists for whatever reason (evolution or indoctrination). My test with the laptop the if proves this.
2. We have been given no good reason to replace this belief with any other, at the very least they are all equally good, but none is arguably better.

Therefore, logically we should continue with this belief until a better one is presented to us.

...but I appreciated your thoughts on the bent stick anyway.

As toQuoting PossibleAaran

Well many people have been Idealists and lived perfectly decent lives.

I simply don't agree. If you are an idealist, the approaching car is just an idea, not constrained by any external force, entirely a creation of your mind. There is no more need to get out of its way than there is to escape the dragon you dreamt about last night. all you need do is shut your eyes and presume it does not exist. Absolutely everyone who is not notifiabley insane will try to get out of the way of the approaching car, there are no Idealists. there are people who claim to be Idealists in areas where it would conveniently cause them no actual real-life harm to be one, like the soul, heaven, the infallibility of the Pope, but not ever where it matters. You name me one person who, on getting run over, rushes, not the local A&E to get real treatment, but to the nearest crystal therapist to get their chakras re-aligned. It simply doesn't happen. Any time it actually matters people are Realists, they believe in the real world with its laws of physics.

Quoting PossibleAaran

are those really sufficient conditions for a viable choice of worldview?

No, but Wayfarer was trying to argue that is was possibly not even a valid option, 'valid' and 'viable' require two very different proofs, but that aside, I still wouldn't be sure what other conditions might be needed, even for viability, any ideas?

Reply to gurugeorge You agree with me that nobody who doesn't already accept that Realism is true would accept your argument about cameras. So someone who has no belief about whether anything exists unperceived or not would not be (sensibly) convinced by your argument about cameras. If that is so, what is the point of your argument about cameras? What use is an argument which can only convince people who already believe the conclusion? I have some of your quotes here for ease of exposition:

Quote 1
Quoting gurugeorge

Yeah, but there's nobody who actually believes that. People who say they don't believe in Realism don't really disbelieve Realism, they just disbelieve Realism in toy examples where they're hypnotizing themselves into artificially shrinking their experience of the world down to the experience of sensory qualities in abstraction. It's a rakish pose.

Quote 2
Quoting gurugeorge

I understand what you're saying: the camera is on a level with the laptop, and if the laptop's unperceived existence is dubious, so is the camera's, so one can't be used to prove the other. But neither the laptop nor the camera's unperceived existence is at all dubious - if they're truly laptops and cameras.

Quote 3
Quoting gurugeorge

Similarly, this tangle you're getting yourself into is the result of you abstracting away what you know of the thing you're experiencing, so that "literally" to you really means a detached, truncated description of some sensory experiences in abstraction.

Quote 4
Quoting gurugeorge

In these examples, the properties (respectively, having a motherboard and CPU, existing unperceived) aren't being directly perceived in sensory experience, nor are they inferred from sensory experience, they're inferred from the things' being what they are, supposing that they truly are those things.

Quote 5
Quoting gurugeorge

you are after all painting yourself into the corner of a phenomenalist/idealist stance.

Quote 6
Quoting gurugeorge

You have to accept this, unless you're going the phenomenalist/idealist route you deny. It's completely incoherent to say, "This is a physical object, but I can't be sure, from inspection, whether it exists unperceived."

Quote7
Quoting gurugeorge

Present inspection isn't the sort of thing you could logically expect to reveal that particular property. What you could logically expect to reveal that property would be things like the camera test.

Let us begin by distinguishing between perceiving something and perceiving [I]that[/I] something is the case. I say that, though you might perceive a laptop - where this is by definition something which exists unperceived - you can never perceive [I]that[/I] it is a laptop, since the property of unperceived existence is not something which you can possibly perceive. You agree with this in Quote 4 and Quote 7. But you worry in Quote 3, Quote 5 and Quote 6 that my characterization of sense experience is already committed to Phenomenalism or even that it is incoherent. It isn't. All I am saying is you never perceive [I]that[/I] something exists unperceived, since that property is not one which you could perceive. Similarly, I say that if 'laptop' means partly 'a thing which exists unperceived', you can never perceive [I]that[/I] something is a laptop, even though you might be perceiving a laptop. Perhaps I did not make this clear before.

I say that if you cannot perceive [I]that[/I] something exists unperceived then, if you are to have any reliable means of establishing it, you need to infer it from the properties that you can perceive (perceive that). This was what I thought you were offering by offering the camera test. I thought you were trying to give an inferential argument that things exist unperceived. Understood that way, the camera test is fallacious. Nobody who did not already accept Realism would accept the ordinary understanding of what the camera can do, even if it is part of the concept 'camera', and that ordinary understanding of what the camera can do is just presupposed by your camera test. You admit this of your camera test in Quote 2, but insist that there is no problem here, because 'neither the laptop nor the camera's unperceived existence is at all dubious - if they're truly laptops and cameras'. I struggle to understand why you have said this. If we are genuinely open about whether Realism or Phenomenalism is true, you have admitted that the camera test won't sensibly convince us of Realism. What use is an argument which can only convince someone who already believes the conclusion? I think such an argument is worthless, which is why I called it fallacious, and using arguments of that sort is not at all truth conductive.

Inferring that the thing which I perceive exists unperceived from the premise that what I perceive is a camera and cameras, by definition, exist unperceived is just as fallacious as arguing that the thing which I mystically perceived must exist because what I mystically perceived was God and God exists by definition. Nobody who doesn't accept the conclusion will accept the premises.

You try to anticipate my reaction to your post here:

Quoting gurugeorge

Now, you might say something like this:- "Ha! You think you are perceiving physical objects, but for all you know you might be perceiving something that to all appearances look and behave like physical objects, but lack the property of existing unperceived."

In that case we'd do the camera test. If the camera showed nothing there when I took the picture, that would be a verified example of something blinking out of existence when unpercieved. BUT THEN IT WOULDN'T BE A PHYSICAL OBJECT AS WE UNDERSTAND PHYSICAL OBJECTS It would be something new, something mysterious and interesting, that shares some properties with physical objects, but lacks the property physical objects have, of existing unperceived.

You are right. I would say that, and you would offer me the camera test, to which I would answer: "the camera test could not convince anybody who doesn't already accept Realism. It couldn't convince someone who is open to both Realism or Phenomenalism. So what is the point of the camera test? That it could convince you? But you already believe that things exist unperceived without doing the test!"

So far we have seen that neither sense perception nor inference is a reliable means of establishing that things exist unperceived. You agree that we can never see [I]that[/I] something exists unperceived. I am not sure whether you agree that we cannot cogently infer it, but we have seen that if your camera test is supposed to be such an inference, it is fallacious because it presupposes Realism and arguments which assume what they set out to prove are not only incapable of convincing someone who does not believe the conclusion, but are also completely unreliable forms of inference. So if we can't reliably reach the belief that things exist unperceived by sense perception or by inference, how can we do it?

But then, perhaps you weren't offering the camera test as a kind of inference. Perhaps you were saying that the camera test is a reliable method of establishing that things exist unperceived, distinct from sense perception and inference. If that were your suggestion, you would be doing just what I asked various others to do: locate a reliable source for the belief that things exist unperceived even if there is no way to prove that the source is reliable to anyone who didn't believe that it was. That would certainly make a lot of sense of your insistence that 'if the camera is a camera, then it can verify that things exist unperceived'. Before I discuss this suggestion. Is this what you meant to do? If it is, I apologize for having missed it for so long.


Reply to Inter Alia, thanks for the clarification.
Quoting Inter Alia

Sorry, I mean the following;
1. We enter adult life as Realists for whatever reason (evolution or indoctrination). My test with the laptop the if proves this.
2. We have been given no good reason to replace this belief with any other, at the very least they are all equally good, but none is arguably better.

Therefore, logically we should continue with this belief until a better one is presented to us.

Your argument assumes:

[i]Conservatism.[/I] We ought to continue to hold the beliefs we do hold, unless we are given some good reason to replace them.

I can see the merits of Conservatism. It certainly saves time and effort having to constantly worry, in Cartesian fashion, whether what we believe is actually true and whether we can find any reasons for it. It is also much more useful insofar as we can simply build on the beliefs we already have, and that can bear practical fruit.

I have to say that I'm not of that philosophical inclination. I incline towards the 'evidentialist' tradition:

[i]Evidentialism.[/I] We ought only accept those beliefs which we can find some reason to think true.

I am happy to construe Evidentialism weakly, so that if a source of belief is in fact reliable, that source can give a good reason for holding the belief, even if there is no way to prove that the source is reliable to anyone who didn't believe that it was. I don't think I have any way to convince you of Evidentialism over Conservatism. I suppose that all I could say is that Evidentialism is a safeguard against wild, unreliable speculation. It consoles us to stick to what we at least have some reliable means of establishing. Conservatism, in contrast, strikes me as an unreliable preference for the dogmas of the day. But I know you will reject this characterization.

PA

Reply to PossibleAaran

I understand your preference for Evidentialism, I just don't see how it applies here. Neither Idealism nor Realism have any more reliable source for the belief than the other. The same is true of Theism and Solopsism, they're all just ways of thinking about the world that only make sense if you accept their axioms. You've cited Plantagina, as your example source for Theism, but have ignored Putnam's 'no miracles' argument for Realism. You've cited Plato, but ignored the Corroboration Argument. There are plenty of sources for the belief in Realism as there are for most other metaphysical views, but each has its counterargument, that's why Evidentialism let's us down.

Quoting PossibleAaran

Though if you gloss the Pyrrhonian school as having 'given up' and as full of 'angst' and 'apathy'

I'm not saying that. I am saying that you are saying that about their attitude to skepticism, which is about enquiry or it is about nothing.
What seems to be happening is that Pyrrhonianism is declaring enquiry useless. That is a political position, and one that few who had not given up on could ever aspire to. I assume they are supposed to reject all reason and enquiry and substitute Faith?

Reply to Inter Alia Quoting Inter Alia

I understand your preference for Evidentialism, I just don't see how it applies here. Neither Idealism nor Realism have any more reliable source for the belief than the other. The same is true of Theism and Solopsism, they're all just ways of thinking about the world that only make sense if you accept their axioms. You've cited Plantagina, as your example source for Theism, but have ignored Putnam's 'no miracles' argument for Realism. You've cited Plato, but ignored the Corroboration Argument. There are plenty of sources for the belief in Realism as there are for most other metaphysical views, but each has its counterargument, that's why Evidentialism let's us down.

I am not defending Idealism as true. I am happy to concede that there is no more a reliable source for Idealism than we seem to have found for Realism.

I did cite Plantinga, but not as a 'source for Theism', if this means that I think Plantinga has an argument for Theism. He doesn't. He just tells a story which, if true, gives us a reliable source for belief in God. I only cited it as an example of the kind of thing which I wanted for Realism: a story which, if true, gives us a reliable source for belief in Realism.

I haven't ignored Putnam's no miracles argument for Realism, nor the Corroboration Argument. I just haven't discussed them because nobody here mentioned them until now, and no one has sketched them as a defence of Realism in this thread. I was just discussing the themes that came up. I'd be happy to discuss them if someone wants to sketch their interpretation of them as a starting point.

I tend to apply Evidentialism in every area. If we can't find reasons, even in the very weak sense of a plausibly reliable source, then I hold that we ought not to believe. I am not sure what you mean by 'Evidentialism let's us down'. How does it do that? Just because it doesn't tell us what to believe when there are both arguments and counter arguments?

Reply to charleton Quoting charleton

I'm not saying that. I am saying that you are saying that about their attitude to skepticism, which is about enquiry or it is about nothing.
What seems to be happening is that Pyrrhonianism is declaring enquiry useless. That is a political position, and one that few who had not given up on could ever aspire to. I assume they are supposed to reject all reason and enquiry and substitute Faith?

No they don't substitute faith or reject all enquiry. In fact, they often contrast themselves with dogmatists. Dogmatists think that enquiry can be settled once and for all about some matters. Pyrrhonians just keep on enquiring. It isn't that enquiry is useless for the Pyrrhonians. Its just that it has severe limitations which force them to suspend judgement about the real nature of things and 'go along with' the customs and habits of the day, making no claim that those things are true. I have always found the view paradoxical, but it is what they held and even practiced. Some of the ancient Pyrrhonians were early doctors.

PA

Reply to PossibleAaran How come ataraxia?

Quoting charleton

How come ataraxia?

Personally, I liken it to making both emotive and cognitive peace with the epistemic truth that “we have not yet demonstrated any proposition to be perfectly secure from all possible error—not even this one”.

O:)

... but then this can go in as many directions as there are directions to go in.

Edit:

Stephen Crane:I saw a man pursuing the horizon;
Round and round they sped.
I was disturbed at this;
I accosted the man.
“It is futile,” I said,
“You can never —”

“You lie,” he cried,
And ran on.

Notice that in the deeper truths of this poem, the horizon nevertheless does hold ontic presence.

… to try to add some perspective to the issue of ataraxia, at least as I so far understand it.

Quoting PossibleAaran

I'd be happy to discuss them if someone wants to sketch their interpretation of them as a starting point

People have been doing so, though just not by name. gurugeorge's argument about the camera is the corroboration argument, no matter what device we use recording whatever phenomenon (light, sound, radiowaves, time, sonar, radioactive decay) they will all record the laptop as existing when our eyes are shut. They can all be explained away, it's just an argument after all, not proof, but that's basically it. Putman's 'no miracles' argument is basically what I've been saying about harm. If Realism was wrong, gave us the wrong impression of something about the 'real' world, it's pretty remarkable that no-one has yet come to any harm as a result. If we've all been presuming the laptop is there when we shut our eyes and actually it isn't, it's quite astounding that this error has has no effect on us whatsoever despite being perpetrated in every single interaction of every person in the world thousands of time a day. Putnam goes on to defend scientific realism in the same way with the simple incredulity that our scientific prediction could be so reliable if the world was not as they presumed it to be. Again, not foolproof, but certainly as much a contender for reliable source as Plantagina is for Theism.

Quoting PossibleAaran

I am not sure what you mean by 'Evidentialism let's us down'. How does it do that? Just because it doesn't tell us what to believe when there are both arguments and counter arguments?

Yes, that's exactly it. Sometimes you have to decide something, contraception, abortion, faith schools, segregation halal meat, the approaching car, catching a ball, the laptop thief, we have to decide one way or another. If Evidentialism isn't going to help, what is?

Quoting PossibleAaran

Let us begin by distinguishing between perceiving something and perceiving that something is the case. I say that, though you might perceive a laptop - where this is by definition something which exists unperceived - you can never perceive that it is a laptop, since the property of unperceived existence is not something which you can possibly perceive. You agree with this in Quote 4 and Quote 7. But you worry in Quote 3, Quote 5 and Quote 6 that my characterization of sense experience is already committed to Phenomenalism or even that it is incoherent. It isn't. All I am saying is you never perceive that something exists unperceived, since that property is not one which you could perceive. Similarly, I say that if 'laptop' means partly 'a thing which exists unperceived', you can never perceive that something is a laptop, even though you might be perceiving a laptop. Perhaps I did not make this clear before.

Ah, the perpetual beginning, the perpetual setup of the hypnotic trance! If only you could just get ... behind it, somehow, you could discover something wonderful :)

What's true apriori is that you cannot perceive what you are not perceiving; it doesn't follow, from that, that you can't perceive that something exists unperceived. You can do it easily via a photograph, which reveals that the thing existed while you weren't perceiving it.

Quoting PossibleAaran

I say that if you cannot perceive that something exists unperceived then, if you are to have any reliable means of establishing it, you need to infer it from the properties that you can perceive (perceive that).

Not at all, you can perceive it indirectly (e.g. by means of a photograph, or a weight sensor or something like that), you don't have to "infer" it from other properties that you can perceive.

Quoting PossibleAaran

This was what I thought you were offering by offering the camera test. I thought you were trying to give an inferential argument that things exist unperceived. Understood that way, the camera test is fallacious. Nobody who did not already accept Realism would accept the ordinary understanding of what the camera can do, even if it is part of the concept 'camera', and that ordinary understanding of what the camera can do is just presupposed by your camera test. You admit this of your camera test in Quote 2, but insist that there is no problem here, because 'neither the laptop nor the camera's unperceived existence is at all dubious - if they're truly laptops and cameras'. I struggle to understand why you have said this. If we are genuinely open about whether Realism or Phenomenalism is true, you have admitted that the camera test won't sensibly convince us of Realism. What use is an argument which can only convince someone who already believes the conclusion? I think such an argument is worthless, which is why I called it fallacious, and using arguments of that sort is not at all truth conductive.

The point is that you don't infer the property of unperceived existence from other, presently-perceived properties of the object, you infer it from the identity you're claiming for the object. As I've said numerous times, IF it's a physical object, then necessarily it exists unperceived, because that's what physical objects do - and you can test that that's what they do by various means, like the camera test, or asking someone else to check if the object disappears when you turn away, etc. Such procedures are the standard by which we check "exists unperceived." There is no other "exists unpercieved" standard, particularly no "exists unperceived" standard that comes from the kinds of reflections you're indulging in.

You haven't seen your friend for years, you ask, "Did you exist while I wasn't perceiving you?" They answer, "Yes". That sort of thing is sufficient, our lives are interwoven with such things constantly, and the mass of such observations and interactions cement the idea of a physical object. There is no other place such an idea could come from - particularly not from staring at one's sensations in the present moment.

If you think the camera is made of ectoplasm or is a cameraX that itself disappears when unperceived, or if you think you're friend is mistaken, then you need to provide separate arguments to that effect.

Now, of course, you might be mistaken in your identification of the object (could be a laptopX and not a laptop, it could be a cameraX and not a camera), but you could only discover that you are mistaken by means of further perceptions that you accept, at some point, as valid identifications. (That's the point re. primacy of truth over doubt again.)

Quoting PossibleAaran

Inferring that the thing which I perceive exists unperceived from the premise that what I perceive is a camera and cameras, by definition, exist unperceived is just as fallacious as arguing that the thing which I mystically perceived must exist because what I mystically perceived was God and God exists by definition. Nobody who doesn't accept the conclusion will accept the premises.

But nobody is saying that cameras or laptops exist by definition (whatever that might mean). They may or may not exist, but IF they exist then necessarily they are such things as exist unperceived.

Quoting PossibleAaran

But then, perhaps you weren't offering the camera test as a kind of inference. Perhaps you were saying that the camera test is a reliable method of establishing that things exist unperceived, distinct from sense perception and inference. If that were your suggestion, you would be doing just what I asked various others to do: locate a reliable source for the belief that things exist unperceived even if there is no way to prove that the source is reliable to anyone who didn't believe that it was. That would certainly make a lot of sense of your insistence that 'if the camera is a camera, then it can verify that things exist unperceived'. Before I discuss this suggestion. Is this what you meant to do? If it is, I apologize for having missed it for so long.

No, that's not it either.

The camera test is an extension of perception, just as a SWAT mirror is an extension of perception. Again, there's no great mystery about it.

Despite your protestations, and probably unbeknownst to you, you keep doing doing the thing you say you're not doing: proceeding from the kinds of assumptions in terms of which alone the silly debate between Phenomenalism and Realism seems to make some kind of profound, mysterious sense.

One doesn't specify the nature of the thing one is perceiving from the qualities of present sensation, as you keep wanting to do; one specifies a logically possible object apriori and one tests whether the thing one is perceiving answers to those properties, has that identity. But that's a process that takes place in a world that's already accepted as public, already accepted as physical, already accepted as taking place in time and space, and often involves instruments and other people, it's not a sheer beholding of present sensation. But it's from that world that the very concept of "exists unperceived" (and the standards for resolving it) comes; philosophers aren't originating that concept, as if it were some kind of special armchair discovery, they're merely pinching it, detaching it from its normal moorings and making an odd game out of it.

In particular, from the method of sheerly beholding present sensations NOTHING can be securely inferred, so it's no surprise that the quality of physical objects, that they exist unperceived, can't be inferred either.

Reply to Inter Alia Quoting Inter Alia

People have been doing so, though just not by name. gurugeorge's argument about the camera is the corroboration argument, no matter what device we use recording whatever phenomenon (light, sound, radiowaves, time, sonar, radioactive decay) they will all record the laptop as existing when our eyes are shut. They can all be explained away, it's just an argument after all, not proof, but that's basically it.

But I [I]did[/I] discuss this argument with gurugeorge, over many posts. My basic point has been that the argument is circular, since it assumes, without any reason at all, that the recording on the device is a recording of something which existed when not perceived, and no one who doesn't accept Realism will accept this understanding of the device. Now I don't deny that its not meant to be a proof, but is an argument of a more modest kind. But my point is that even as a modest argument trying to show that things probably exist unperceived it fails, because it is fallacious, circular, begs the question, however you want to put it.

Quoting Inter Alia

Putman's 'no miracles' argument is basically what I've been saying about harm. If Realism was wrong, gave us the wrong impression of something about the 'real' world, it's pretty remarkable that no-one has yet come to any harm as a result. If we've all been presuming the laptop is there when we shut our eyes and actually it isn't, it's quite astounding that this error has has no effect on us whatsoever despite being perpetrated in every single interaction of every person in the world thousands of time a day. Putnam goes on to defend scientific realism in the same way with the simple incredulity that our scientific prediction could be so reliable if the world was not as they presumed it to be

I'm a fan of Putnam, but I am not sure what harm would result if we made this error. I mean, on Idealism, things exist if and only if they are perceived. Suppose the world were like that and we mistakenly thought things existed even unperceived. What harm might that cause? Could you give an example?

Quoting Inter Alia

Again, not foolproof, but certainly as much a contender for reliable source as Plantagina is for Theism.

Plantinga is not supposed to be the reliable source. He says we have a cognitive faculty which reliably produces the belief that God exists. If that were true, we could reliably establish God's existence by use of that faculty. Now, it might not be true, and one might be inclined to doubt it. But my point is that all I wanted from the Realist was some story like this; a story which entails that we can reliably establish that Realism is true by some means, even if people who don't accept Realism are inclined to doubt that we have this faculty. (Note that this is different from the Corroboration Argument, since that is supposed to be a way of inferring that Realism is true from premises using only cogent forms of inference. Circular reasoning, not only fails to convince people who don't accept the conclusion, but is also fallacious, not cogent).

Quoting Inter Alia

Yes, that's exactly it. Sometimes you have to decide something, contraception, abortion, faith schools, segregation halal meat, the approaching car, catching a ball, the laptop thief, we have to decide one way or another. If Evidentialism isn't going to help, what is?

It is easier to discuss particular examples. Take the laptop thief. Evidentialism says that unless you have some reliable way of establishing who the laptop thief is, you ought not believe that it is Inter Alia. And this seems to me to make perfect sense. I shouldn't just go accusing you of stealing a laptop without a shred of evidence.

Now take an approaching car. Evidentialism says that unless you have some reliable way of establishing that a car is approaching, you ought not believe that one is. And this seems to me to make perfect sense. What kind of maniac would I be if I just believed, out of the blue, that a car was approaching and dived, screaming and crying, onto the nearest sidewalk. I had never heard the sound of a car or seen one. I just decided one was coming. That would surely be foolish.

Now take abortion. Evidentialism says that unless you have some reliable way of establishing that abortion is right or wrong in this particular case, you should not believe that it is or that it isn't. Moral cases I think are difficult for Evidentialism, since evidently some decision has to be made about whether to abort of not. A non decision is effectively a decision not to abort, and so one has no choice but to make decisions of this kind. I think what the Evidentialist should say is that, [i]insofar as it is possible not to make a decision[/I], one should only make a decision if there is some reliable means of establishing what the right decision is.

Why not see what Conservatism has to say about these cases? Conservatism says about the laptop thief that if I already suspect that Inter Alia stole my laptop, I should believe this unless I have some reason to think otherwise. That sounds quite unfair to you. Conservatism says that if I already believe that a car is approaching, I should continue to believe that one is unless I have some reason to think that it isn't. Never mind that I never heard or saw a car. I just believe this because I have an irrational fear of being run over every time I go near the road. Conservatism says that this belief, produced by my irrational fear, is what I should believe. Conservatism says about abortion that if I already believe that abortion is right in this case, even if I have no means whatsoever of reliably figuring out whether it is or not, I should believe that it is right and do the abortion, unless I find some reason to think it is wrong. That sounds like a dangerous idea to my mind. I have no reliable means at all of figuring out what the right thing to do is, but I still go ahead and terminate a potential human being because I believe, for no particular reason, that abortion is right in this case.

No doubt I have offered a straw man of Conservatism. If I have done so, I have done so with tongue in cheek, to provoke you to defend Conservatism with the rigour I am sure you are capable of.

PA

Reply to gurugeorge Quoting gurugeorge

One doesn't specify the nature of the thing one is perceiving from the qualities of present sensation, as you keep wanting to do; one specifies a logically possible object apriori and one tests whether the thing one is perceiving answers to those properties, has that identity.

Suppose I do that. Suppose I specify apriori that I want to figure out whether there exists anything which is black, rectangular, has a motherboard and exists even when unperceived- in a word, a laptop. I then look to my perceptions. I perceive that the thing is black and rectangular. I look inside and perceive that it has a motherboard. But I don't perceive that it exists unperceived. I can't. So I find this thing, a camera, and I take a photo with my eyes closed and get a print out. The picture is a picture which looks just like the thing I was earlier looking at. What does this show? That the laptop existed unperceived while I took the picture? Well if the thing I used really was a camera then yes, it shows that. But unless I already believe that things exist unperceived I won't believe that it really was a camera - that is, I won't believe that the picture it took is one of a thing which existed unperceived. And this you already admitted.

But now you add something more:

Quoting gurugeorge

But that's a process that takes place in a world that's already accepted as public, already acceptd as physical, already accepted as taking place in time and space, and often involves instruments and other people, it's not a sheer beholding of present sensation.

So, I already have to accept that things exist unperceived before I can use the camera test. Got that. And then:

Quoting gurugeorge

But it's from that world that the very concept of "exists unperceived" (and the standards for resolving it) comes; philosophers aren't originating that concept, as if it were some kind of special armchair discovery, they're merely pinching it, detaching it from its normal moorings and making an odd game out of it.

I am not sure about that first part. I'm not even sure what is meant by saying that the concept of unperceived existence 'comes from the world of public physical objects'. What do you mean 'comes from'? Are you saying that I couldn't possibly have that concept unless there were physical objects? Surely I could gain the concept of unperceived existence just by reflection on myself and my experience. The concept of existence I can derive from knowledge of my own existence. The concept of experience I can derive from awareness of my own experience. I can negate the concept of experience to create 'unexperienced' and then put the two ideas together to create 'unperceived existence', and then it is just a matter of imagining a thing which has that property. Why does the concept need to 'come from' the world of physical objects, whatever 'comes from' means here?

I agree that the camera test standard is the ordinary standard for testing whether something exists unperceived, by why can't we question whether that standard is really sufficient? The standard itself presupposes that things exist unperceived and so it is quite a lousy standard if it is intended to establish [I]for the first time[/I] that anything exists unperceived, though admittedly it is a good standard once we have accepted that certain things do exist unperceived.

Thus, I don't think philosophers are stealing anything. You [I]can[/I] get the concept of unperceived existence in the armchair. I don't know what is meant by 'the concept comes from the public world of physical objects'. The concept comes, like every concept, from experience, and from experience which I can be acquainted with in the armchair.

Incidentally, I thought originally that you were defending Realism. But now it turns out that you think Realism is just as non-sensical as Phenomenalism. Is that right?

At any rate, I think you will agree that a proof of the existence of God which only works if we assume that God exists is absolutely worthless if we are trying to establish God's existence for the first time, without merely assuming it to be true. I think you will agree that it is of no consolation whatsoever to be told that the concept of 'God's existence' is a concept which 'comes from the world in which God exists' and to do anything like question that idea is to take the concept 'God's existence' and make an odd game of it. Is there some difference between your argument and this one? What is it?

PA

Reply to PossibleAaran

So first, I certainly notice you had mounted a robust critique of both proofs, I think I'm failing to grasp quite what it is about Plantagina's argument, which I understand is just an example, that you find acceptable but which is absent from any argument in favour of Realism. As far as I understand it, Plantagina is simply saying we have a faculty which reliably produces a belief in God. Well, what's wrong with "we have a faculty which reliably produces a belief in Realism"?

Quoting PossibleAaran

Suppose the world were like that and we mistakenly thought things existed even unperceived. What harm might that cause? Could you give an example?

We mistakenly think the bridge is there even though we can't see it. We mistakenly presume electricity is not in the 240volt wire because we can't see it. It's too easy to come up with thousands of these, I presume I'm missing something?

I will take each of your examples in turn, a couple are not quite what I meant so I might need to clarify first.

The laptop thief - what I meant was someone could steal your laptop whilst you've got your eyes shut. You have to decide do I need to protect my property when I can't see it (because it's really there) or can I continue to have this lovely daydream with my eyes closed (because the laptop isn't really there whilst my eyes are closed and so no-one can steal it)

The approaching car - again not quite what I mean, I meant a car is definitely approaching, you establish that with your own eyes, but the (let's say due to panic, or flying debris) you go both blind and deaf. Is the car still coming? You've got no reason (apart from conservatism) to think it is, there's no longer any evidence of it, do you get out of the way?

The moral cases you seem to have some sympathy with anyway, I'm basically saying that most of life is like that. One moral or necessary decision after another.

Skepticism is only possible when one does not need to decide one way or the other, and in such cases it is basically redundant.

Quoting PossibleAaran

I don't understand what you mean when you say that the whole thing is 'artificial'. All of us have a clear idea of what it is for something to exist, since, as Descartes pointed out, one has a first hand awareness of one's own existence.

I find the critics of the Cartesian approach pretty convincing. I'd like to know what you'd make of Heidegger's The Concept of Time. It's a short, early draft of his most famous work. It's about 80 pages of philosophical revolution.

Quoting PossibleAaran

You say that this whole language of 'existence' and 'perception' is artificial, but I don't think it is at all. I'm immediately aware both of my existence and my perceiving, so in what sense is it artificial? Without an answer to that, I can't see what you mean in saying that you desire theory closer to 'non-philosophical life', since it seems to me that the concepts 'existence' and 'perception' can be understood merely by reflection on your own mental life and so they are, as it were, as close to your life as could be!

We operate, though, with a lot of inherited metaphysical baggage. It's so familiar that we take it for granted. For instance, are we thinking substances? Do objects in the word exist in physics time, physics space? Or is there a different kind of existential time and existential spatiality that we cover up with what 'should' be there, with what has become an educated common sense that no longer checks itself against the flow of experience. For the most part we 'comport' ourselves nontheoretically in the world. We don't even have a language for this as a general rule, because it's so automatic as to be almost invisible to the theoretical mind.

The theoretical mind just stares at objects. They become concept-organized sensations, perhaps. But the non-theoretical mind uses objects as tools. Or has pillow talk with the wife. The theoretical epistemology-obsessed approach has nothing to do with this kind of living.

Being-in-the-world and being-with-others is something like a pre-theoretical 'sense' or phenomenon that operates as an in-explicit foundation for our theorizing. We 'know' that we are in a shared situation or world in a pre-rational way. I can't prove this. I can only point to the phenomenon. In the same way, I can only define words in terms of other words. We just do grasp language as a whole, as a sort of mysterious condition for the possibility of theoretical talk. The artificiality comes in when this vast background goes unnoticed and we play with a few concepts on the foreground. We don't see that we play on the mere surface of an ocean of dark knowhow.

Quoting PossibleAaran

Suppose I do that. Suppose I specify apriori that I want to figure out whether there exists anything which is black, rectangular, has a motherboard and exists even when unperceived- in a word, a laptop. I then look to my perceptions. I perceive that the thing is black and rectangular. I look inside and perceive that it has a motherboard. But I don't perceive that it exists unperceived. I can't.

Yes, you can't directly perceive that it exists unperceived while you're not perceiving it, but you can indirectly verify that it has the property of unperceived existence by virtue of traces of the causal connections it has to the rest of the world while you are not perceiving it, by virtue of the fact that it interacts with the world around it while you're not perceiving it.

Quoting PossibleAaran

So I find this thing, a camera, and I take a photo with my eyes closed and get a print out. The picture is a picture which looks just like the thing I was earlier looking at. What does this show? That the laptop existed unperceived while I took the picture? Well if the thing I used really was a camera then yes, it shows that. But unless I already believe that things exist unperceived I won't believe that it really was a camera - that is, I won't believe that the picture it took is one of a thing which existed unperceived. And this you already admitted.

It doesn't even matter if the camera doesn't exist unperceived, so long as it functions in all respects like a camera for the purposes of the test - it could itself be a cameraX (that blinks out of existence when you're not looking at it) for all you know, but that wouldn't matter, because its property of not existing unperceived wouldn't make any difference to the test. (You could easily tighten up the test to take account of the possibility that the thing you're using to test the unperceived existence of the original object is a cameraX - don't let it out of your sight and take the picture backwards.)

You don't have to believe that everything exists unperceived prior to the test. That's something you have no possible way of knowing anyway (even less so if you're just staring at present sensation). You merely have to stipulate a possible kind of thing, that you're going to call "physical," as possessing a logically possible property - unperceived existence - and check whether there's any instance of it. And in order to check whether there's any instance of it, all you need to do is (not attempt the impossible - i.e. perceive that something exists unperceived by the method of directly, in the here and now, perceiving its unperceived existence, but) perceive evidence of the fact that it still interacts with the world around it while you're not perceiving it, which is something that can be done indirectly. A photograph is evidence of that, as would be the readings from a weight sensor, etc., etc., or the testimony of someone else.

Quoting PossibleAaran

I am not sure about that first part. I'm not even sure what is meant by saying that the concept of unperceived existence 'comes from the world of public physical objects'. What do you mean 'comes from'? Are you saying that I couldn't possibly have that concept unless there were physical objects? Surely I could gain the concept of unperceived existence just by reflection on myself and my experience. The concept of existence I can derive from knowledge of my own existence. The concept of experience I can derive from awareness of my own experience.

What it means for you to exist, what it means for you to experience, each of these concepts only has meaning in the context of a public world.

Suppose you do restrict yourself to the consideration of present experience without presuppositions, then in that case the "you" that's experiencing isn't a human being with a body, it's something like Descartes' "thinking thing," or the "pure experiencing" of the non-dual mystic, and its object is something like a 3-d cinema show hanging in nothing. So in that scenario, concepts like me and experience, or sensation - their grammar, as ordinarily used, doesn't have any purchase. Those concepts are "built for" (have criteria in terms of) the physical world, and then only secondarily are introjected by the philosopher in course of the peculiar exercise of Cartesian bracketing; but they only have verifiability conditions in a physical world, they have no verifiability conditions in that queer, truncated realm.

IOW "Experience" in ordinary language doesn't mean, "a 3-d cinema show hanging in nothing," it means experience as the usual kind of human being in a world of objects with the usual qualities.
So in essence what you are doing in the course of the Cartesian exercise is re-defining "experience" to mean something like, "a 3-d cinema show hanging in nothing," which is the newly discovered object of your ("you" now as a pure point of perception) exercise in Cartesian bracketing. But in that case you have no standard of verification for your new term, like you would have had when you used the concept normally (you can't presuppose the validity of those tests). You can't even avail yourself of the concept of memory to check things, because memory too lives in the very public world you've temporarily renounced in the course of the exercise.

Quoting PossibleAaran

I can negate the concept of experience to create 'unexperienced' and then put the two ideas together to create 'unperceived existence', and then it is just a matter of imagining a thing which has that property. Why does the concept need to 'come from' the world of physical objects, whatever 'comes from' means here?

You can certainly negate "experience" in the normal sense, in which case you end up with things like the camera test to verify the negation. But how would you go about negating "experience" as referring to that "3-d cinema show hanging in nothing" thing?

If you depart from the criteria for concepts as used in the ordinary sense, then you've lost the ability to apply those concepts in the presuppositionless stance too. But then what are you talking about after all? You don't know, you don't know what it is, you don't know the first thing about it. But if you don't know the first thing about it, how can you draw usable criteria from it?

Bracketing presuppositions is an important tool of philosophy, for sure, but bracketing all presuppositions is not definitive of philosophical reflection, and actually doesn't lead anywhere, can't lead anywhere. It's a Chinese finger puzzle for the mind (or Wittgenstein's "fly bottle").

So again, we come back to the thing of truth being prior to doubt, doubt functioning as doubt by using truth as a lever (e.g. the subsequent perception telling you that the previous perception was an illusion).

Quoting PossibleAaran

Incidentally, I thought originally that you were defending Realism. But now it turns out that you think Realism is just as non-sensical as Phenomenalism. Is that right?

Yes. It's a non-problem, because the Realist and the Phenomenalist take in each others' washing. Each actually allows some grain of truth in the other's position. The grain of truth that the Realist has to accept from the Phenomenalist is something we already know and are familiar with - that perception can't be "direct" in the Naive Realist sense (although that doesn't mean it can't be direct in other senses - the actual directness is in the fact that there are no such things as mistakes in a casual chain from object to brain). But the Phenomenalist sin is this: you can't reduce experience to something called "sensation," or even "experience," without accepting some elements of the Realist position. For example, as above, the thing you're staring at while exercising Cartesian doubt can't be "sensation" unless some elements of the real world story are accepted. But then if it's not sensation, if it's being thought of truly "without presuppositions," as the 3-d cinema show hovering in nothing, then no conclusion can be drawn from its existence or form whatsoever. It's already a foregone conclusion that it's not going to be able to connect to anything external to it, it's not an interesting discovery that it can't connect to anything external to it.

At any rate, I think you will agree that a proof of the existence of God which only works if we assume that God exists is absolutely worthless if we are trying to establish God's existence for the first time, without merely assuming it to be true. I think you will agree that it is of no consolation whatsoever to be told that the concept of 'God's existence' is a concept which 'comes from the world in which God exists' and to do anything like question that idea is to take the concept 'God's existence' and make an odd game of it. Is there some difference between your argument and this one? What is it?

As I said, no one's claiming that physical cameras and laptops are such things as exist necessarily and couldn't possibly not exist, like God is supposed to be.

Reply to Inter Alia Quoting Inter Alia

Well, what's wrong with "we have a faculty which reliably produces a belief in Realism"?

You have to say what the faculty is. And the difficulty is, the faculties typically accepted as possessed by humans by Realists don't fit the bill. Sense perception won't do it. Inference won't do it. So which faculty reliably produces belief in Realism?

Quoting Inter Alia

We mistakenly think the bridge is there even though we can't see it. We mistakenly presume electricity is not in the 240volt wire because we can't see it. It's too easy to come up with thousands of these, I presume I'm missing something?

I still don't grasp the volt case. If I believe that the volts exist unperceived I won't put my finger on an exposed live wire. As it happens - let's suppose - the volts only exist while perceived. Why should that make any difference to whether I hurt myself or not? My believing - mistakenly - that the volts exist unperceived keeps me perfectly safe because it stops me from putting my finger on a live wire, even though the belief is false. Why is that mysterious?

The bridge example is clearer but manageable. The Idealist holds that there is no bridge when unperceived. Suppose that's true and I walk over where I mistakenly believe there to be a bridge. What will happen is quite simple. I will perceive a floor underneath my feet, and that floor, since it is being perceived, exists. The floor which I feel under my feat is the bridge! Obviously a crude Idealist holds that if I weren't feeling the floor under my feet at that time, the bridge would not exist. But why does this create some mystery about why I don't hurt myself more? I could understand if the Idealist merely said that things don't exist when you aren't [I]looking[/I], since that would imply that if I walk where I believe there to be a bridge but have my eyes closed, I will fall to my death. But even the crudest Idealists will hold that the necessary condition for existence is being [I]perceived[/I], not merely seen.

Quoting Inter Alia

The laptop thief - what I meant was someone could steal your laptop whilst you've got your eyes shut. You have to decide do I need to protect my property when I can't see it (because it's really there) or can I continue to have this lovely daydream with my eyes closed (because the laptop isn't really there whilst my eyes are closed and so no-one can steal it)

The approaching car - again not quite what I mean, I meant a car is definitely approaching, you establish that with your own eyes, but the (let's say due to panic, or flying debris) you go both blind and deaf. Is the car still coming? You've got no reason (apart from conservatism) to think it is, there's no longer any evidence of it, do you get out of the way?

The moral cases you seem to have some sympathy with anyway, I'm basically saying that most of life is like that. One moral or necessary decision after another.

Skepticism is only possible when one does not need to decide one way or the other, and in such cases it is basically redundant.

I see, so it isn't Evidentialism [I]as such[/I] that let's us down with decision making. Its Evidentialism plus the idea that we have no evidence that Idealism is false. Let's take the examples in turn again.

[I]The Laptop Thief[/I]
There are two ways to interpret the scenario. First, it might be that I just have my eyes closed and can still hear the man stealing my laptop. I can hear him unplugging it, rustling the keys, mumbling about how heavy it is, stuffing it in his bag, and so on. In that case I do have reason to think that a man is stealing my laptop don't I? So Evidentialism will yield the satisfying result that we ought to believe the laptop is being stolen and so protect it.

Second, it might be that I cannot perceive my laptop being stolen at the present moment at all. Does that mean that we have no reason to believe that the laptop is being stolen? I can't see that it entails that. Perhaps I remember seeing the laptop being stolen just 1 second ago when I was perceiving it, and that's my evidence. Unless you think that remembering that the laptop was being stolen 1 second ago is not good evidence that it is being stolen now? By contrast Conservatism seems silly here. Perhaps I just believe, willy nilly, that my laptop is being stolen - I'm an incredibly anxious and suspicious person; the sort that constantly expects conspiracy. I haven't seen or heard anything which might suggest this. I am just such a serious conspiracy theorist that I believe it to be. Conservatism entails that the sensible thing for me to do is to continue to believe this and rush to my laptop in its defence. Now, in one sense, it is sensible for me to do that. [I]Given[/I] that I believe the laptop is being stolen, it is sensible to rush to its defence. But my belief here is not sensible, since there is no evidence for it, and so my action is all things unconsidered not sensible either.

[I] The Approaching Car [/I]

Much the same thing can be said here. Although I am no longer perceiving the car I can remember that it was approaching a moment ago, and I know that a car which was approaching a moment ago will likely still be approaching now. I think I know what you are getting at with these two cases, and that's that although my response here is fine, an [I]Idealist[/I] cannot make it. He simply cannot say that the car is likely still approaching while unperceived because it was approaching a moment ago, since that refutes his thesis. Right, but the Idealist can simply say that an experienced car was approaching a moment ago, and he knows from past experience that if you perceive a car approaching at one moment and you do not move, you will, shortly after, experience a car hitting you. He need not postulate a car which exists unperceived; just a car which approaches and a car which hits him.

Reply to gurugeorge Quoting gurugeorge

What it means for you to exist, what it means for you to experience, each of these concepts only has meaning in the context of a public world.

What do you mean 'a public world'? What's a 'public world', and why does the concept 'experience' only have meaning 'in that context'?

Quoting gurugeorge

Suppose you do restrict yourself to the consideration of present experience without presuppositions, then in that case the "you" that's experiencing isn't a human being with a body, it's something like Descartes' "thinking thing," or the "pure experiencing" of the non-dual mystic, and its object is something like a 3-d cinema show hanging in nothing. So in that scenario, concepts like me and experience, or sensation - their grammar, as ordinarily used, doesn't have any purchase. Those concepts are "built for" (have criteria in terms of) the physical world, and then only secondarily are introjected by the philosopher in course of the peculiar exercise of Cartesian bracketing; but they only have verifiability conditions in a physical world, they have no verifiability conditions in that queer, truncated realm.

There is a lot here to discuss. The characterization '3-d cinema show hanging in nothing' is both uncharitable and difficult to understand. What is meant by 'hanging in nothing'. If you mean here that experience is the presentation of images which are pictures of the world, and the phrase 'hanging in nothing' is supposed to indicate that we are bracketing the issue of whether the pictures really are of the world, that is not at all what I meant to do. That obviously presupposes a veil of perception, which I reject. What I mean to restrict us to at the outset is simply what can be seen. Now, in one sense, when I look in front of me at the moment, what I can see is a laptop, and as you said, the laptop exists unperceived. But in [i]another sense[/I], that isn't what I see at all. What is available or given to my consciousness at this moment? Not the property of existing unperceived. Only certain patches of colour of a certain size and shape. Now, I am not saying that all I experience, in the ordinary sense of experience, is patches of colour. What I am saying is that that is the only part of my present experience which is indisputable; it is the only part of my experience for which there is a clear answer why I should believe it to be there. On the basis of this experience alone, there is no answer as to why I should believe that anything exists unperceived. You are right that this is a non-ordinary concept of experience. It is one tailored for the purpose of building an indisputable system of philosophy - not one which is certain, just one where there is a sensible answer as to why each part should be accepted. You don't even have to call this concept experience if you don't want. Call it schmexperience for all it matters. What I schmexperience is only certain colour patches of a certain size and shape. These things are given to me in such a way that it is simply indisputable that they are there. I cannot sensibly doubt that there are these patches of colour before me at this moment. There is an obvious reason [I]why[/I] I should believe it. With that said, I am happy to concede that the ordinary concept of 'experience' cannot be meaningfully applied here.

Quoting gurugeorge

So in essence what you are doing in the course of the Cartesian exercise is re-defining "experience" to mean something like, "a 3-d cinema show hanging in nothing," which is the newly discovered object of your ("you" now as a pure point of perception) exercise in Cartesian bracketing.

As I said, the concept of 'experience' implicit in my remarks is the concept of 'what is indisputably before my consciousness'. I don't want to 're-define' anything. I am happy not to use the word 'experience' if it is so troubling, although to drop that word represents a departure from traditional ways of discussing the issue.

Quoting gurugeorge

If you depart from the criteria for concepts as used in the ordinary sense, then you've lost the ability to apply those concepts in the presuppositionless stance too. But then what are you talking about after all? You don't know, you don't know what it is, you don't know the first thing about it. But if you don't know the first thing about it, how can you draw usable criteria from it?

Does the concept which I have explicated above have no meaning? It seems to me that I understand it perfectly well. Perhaps you are worried because the concept is not 'ordinary', but I don't see any reason to think that if a concept is 'not ordinary' then it must be meaningless. What is so magical about 'ordinary concepts' that they get to have meaning but 'non-ordinary' concepts don't.

Quoting gurugeorge

Bracketing presuppositions is an important tool of philosophy, for sure, but bracketing all presuppositions is not definitive of philosophical reflection, and actually doesn't lead anywhere, can't lead anywhere. It's a Chinese finger puzzle for the mind (or Wittgenstein's "fly bottle").

This is just the suggestion that it is impossible to build an indisputable system of philosophy, which is just what ancient scepticism was. I've always thought that Wittgenstein was a Pyrrhonian.

Quoting gurugeorge

Yes. It's a non-problem, because the Realist and the Phenomenalist take in each others' washing. Each actually allows some grain of truth in the other's position. The grain of truth that the Realist has to accept from the Phenomenalist is something we already know and are familiar with - that perception can't be "direct" in the Naive Realist sense (although that doesn't mean it can't be direct in other senses - the actual directness is in the fact that there are no such things as mistakes in a casual chain from object to brain).

I know some Realists and Phenomenalists made a lot of this issue of the 'directness' of perception. Russell did, for example. I don't think that's important at all. All that matters is that certain elements of experience are unproblematically available to consciousness in such a way as to make them indisputable, and some aren't. The property of unperceived existence, isn't. It is painfully easy to produce a story, compatible with all of the indisputable 'given' elements of experience such that nothing exists unperceived. I have no way to prove to you, I suppose that the property of unperceived existence isn't given to my conscious awareness like the property of blueness is. I take this to be patently obvious to anyone who has the faculty of sense perception.


Quoting gurugeorge

But then if it's not sensation, if it's being thought of truly "without presuppositions," as the 3-d cinema show hovering in nothing, then no conclusion can be drawn from its existence or form whatsoever. It's already a foregone conclusion that it's not going to be able to connect to anything external to it, it's not an interesting discovery that it can't connect to anything external to it.

I don't think its foregone at all. Why is it so obvious that no conclusion can be drawn from the given? I certainly can't tell, a priori, that this is so. The discovery, if it were one, would be that almost nothing that I believe is indisputable, and that sounds to me like an interesting philosophical discovery. I can't stop global warming with it, but all the same.

Quoting gurugeorge

As I said, no one's claiming that physical cameras and laptops are such things as exist necessarily and couldn't possibly not exist, like God is supposed to be.

I didn't use the concept of necessary existence in my reducio about God. I used the concept of existence, and you did claim that laptops are such things as exist - which was the premise of the reducio. So it still seems to me that that argument is parallel to the one which you gave.

Reply to ff0 Quoting ff0

I find the critics of the Cartesian approach pretty convincing.

What is it about the Cartesian approach that you find untenable?

Quoting ff0

The theoretical epistemology-obsessed approach has nothing to do with this kind of living.

I agree.

Quoting ff0

We 'know' that we are in a shared situation or world in a pre-rational way.

If 'know' means that the thing known is indisputable, it isn't clear to me that that is true. By 'Indisputable', I don't mean 'certain', I just mean that there is some reason, no matter how meagre, which sensibly answers the question of why we should believe it to be true.

Quoting PossibleAaran

He need not postulate a car which exists unperceived; just a car which approaches and a car which hits him.

I'm going to just respond to this proposition for now because I think it gets to the heart of what I'm trying to say. If the Idealist has the concept of these two cars and the idea that the one leads to the other, then he is in no meaningful way any different to a Realist. The only difference would be how he would describe events and (as we've established before) such an obtuse definition would be difficult for him to obtain, for no gain. This is why I keep asking what benefit such a view might bring the Idealist.

Also, perhaps even more importantly, this is what it is to be a Realist. We too postulate a perceived car and an impacting car. We then come up with a theory as to why these two cars seem to be so inextricably linked, that theory is that they are the same car. Its a damn good theory too, it does exactly what a theory is meant to do in that it provides us with virtually 100% successful predictions, now why would we change that process in favour of one which gives no explanation as to why the two cars are inextricably linked.

I'd be interested to hear your theory, why is it that whenever I sense an approaching object and then close my eyes, seconds later an object of exactly the same description impacts with me from exactly the trajectory the previous object had?

Reply to Inter Alia Quoting Inter Alia

If the Idealist has the concept of these two cars and the idea that the one leads to the other, then he is in no meaningful way any different to a Realist

It seems to me that he is meaningfully different and that you recognize this. The Realist postulates that these two experienced cars are numerically the same car which persisted whilst unperceived. The Idealist denies this.

Quoting Inter Alia

We too postulate a perceived car and an impacting car. We then come up with a theory as to why these two cars seem to be so inextricably linked, that theory is that they are the same car. Its a damn good theory too, it does exactly what a theory is meant to do in that it provides us with virtually 100% successful predictions, now why would we change that process in favour of one which gives no explanation as to why the two cars are inextricably linked.

I think you are right that this kind of argument is the kind which Idealists of the past typically missed. What leads Stace, for example, to Idealism is that he thinks you can only infer that things exist unperceived either by deduction or enumerative induction. He completely fails to see inference to the best explanation.

The Idealist is indeed offering no explanation at all, at least as I characterized him so far. In that way perhaps Realism is superior, but then, it isn't clear that Realism is the best explanation period. Why Is Realism a better explanation of the two perceived cars than the evil demon hypothesis? Perhaps an evil demon brings these cars in and out of existence to trick you into thinking that Realism is true.

PA

Quoting PossibleAaran

It seems to me that he is meaningfully different and that you recognize this.

No, this is the major problem I have with the general argument (not your argument personally), I do not think that he is meaningfully different, it has no important consequences at all. If the idealist is thinking carefully and doesn't start believing in bridges that aren't there, or allowing their laptops to be stolen out of a belief that it no longer exists because they have their eyes shut, then they are indistinguishable from the Realist.

Quoting PossibleAaran

Why Is Realism a better explanation of the two perceived cars than the evil demon hypothesis? Perhaps an evil demon brings these cars in and out of existence to trick you into thinking that Realism is true.

Basically because we cannot see, hear speak to or otherwise interact with the 'evil demon' he has shown himself in no other way than being the enactor of the laws of physics, he hasn't turned up in the flesh one day asking for money. So because his actions are indistinguishable from the laws of physics the issue becomes semantics. We might as well have departments of 'evil demonology' at our universities, studying the effects of the evil demon, trying to predict his activities. In fact they'd do such a good job of predicting his actions (because he's extremely consistent) that they might even propose evil demon laws to help us predict what he's going to do next.

Unless the evil demon is going to start acting like a demon (evil, capricious, capable of changing his mind) then he basically is the laws of physics and the difference is just in what we call it.

Quoting PossibleAaran

What do you mean 'a public world'? What's a 'public world', and why does the concept 'experience' only have meaning 'in that context'?

Because the conditions for whether a concept like "experience" as ordinarily understood is being used correctly, or not, only make sense if the world is a public world, a shared world, a world we are all partaking in, accessing together and discussing together, investigating together, etc. We normally use words like "me," "you," "experience", "unperceived", etc. in a way that involves (not the "prior acceptance of Realism" as you would have it but) acceptance that at least some things are as we think they are, that there are at least some perceptions that are valid, etc.

The methodological solipsism of the Cartesian method brackets that world from the start, but in doing so it thereby removes the normal conditions for the use of those concepts, which means that the concept isn't being used in the way it's normally used.

But then what, in what way is it being used? When are you applying or using "schmexperience" properly? How would you know? What is the nature of the "self" who's "having" "experience" in this new sense? Or does schmexperience not have a haver? Or is the haver of a different kind? If so what?

The situation is really that the words are being used as analogies. The concepts have a vague connection to the ordinary concepts, but only insofar as they still have a few of the criteria that in their ordinary use would accompany the bracketed criteria, so there's enough of a family resemblance we feel justified in using the term.

But actually we don't know, in the depths of suspension of presuppositions, what the hell it is that's going on; we actually have less confidence than we have looking at the whole show in terms of ordinary language, not more.

Quoting PossibleAaran

There is a lot here to discuss. The characterization '3-d cinema show hanging in nothing' is both uncharitable and difficult to understand.

Why is it uncharitable? It's just an attempt to describe, by analogy, what you get when you don't have any presuppositions. The nearest you can get to describing the stuff of experience without presuppositions is that it's some kind of experiential display that purports to be of something, but you can't be sure that it's of anything, and nor can you be sure what you are, who perceives it. In fact, "you" even drop out of the picture altogether (even your thoughts themselves are just part of the display) and the nearest that one can get to describing what "you" are in that context is the very perspectivalness of the display, the fact that it seems to display things from a point of view.

But what news from that world enlightens the ordinary, everyday world? How do you tighten up our thinking in the ordinary everyday world but simply noting that the less you presuppose the less you can say about what exists?

Quoting PossibleAaran

What is meant by 'hanging in nothing'. If you mean here that experience is the presentation of images which are pictures of the world, and the phrase 'hanging in nothing' is supposed to indicate that we are bracketing the issue of whether the pictures really are of the world, that is not at all what I meant to do. That obviously presupposes a veil of perception, which I reject. What I mean to restrict us to at the outset is simply what can be seen. Now, in one sense, when I look in front of me at the moment, what I can see is a laptop, and as you said, the laptop exists unperceived. But in another sense, that isn't what I see at all. What is available or given to my consciousness at this moment? Not the property of existing unperceived. Only certain patches of colour of a certain size and shape.

"In another sense" - in WHAT sense, precisely? What is this "seeing" you're talking about?

Normally seeing implies or presupposes a bunch of physical-world-story stuff. But if you're not implying that, then what is the testable content of this "seeing", what are the conditions for whether one is "seeing" in this sense? When can one correctly be said to be "seeing" (shcmeeing? :) ) in this sense, and when not?

Quoting PossibleAaran

Now, I am not saying that all I experience, in the ordinary sense of experience, is patches of colour. What I am saying is that that is the only part of my present experience which is indisputable; it is the only part of my experience for which there is a clear answer why I should believe it to be there.

Actually it's no more "indisputable" than unperceived existence. That this is a "colour", or a "patch" - these terms also hide presuppositions, just like "seeing."

I'm afraid I can't shake the suspicion that you are captivated by the veil of perception idea, otherwise why would you think that "coloured patch" is somehow less disputable than "laptop?" In fact, without the normal background world story as a context for the phrase's normal use, a phrase like "I'm seeing a coloured patch" used in the Cartesianly bracketed sense is even MORE disputable, MORE mysterious, than the same phrase could ever be in the ordinary, unbracketed sense.

"Coloured patch" and "laptop" and "unperceived existence" are all on a level, and all involve elements of public verification (it's just that unperceived existence requires a bit of indirect verification, and can't be read off from present experience of the object); you aren't getting to some deeper, more indisputable level by calling a thing a "coloured patch" and not "a laptop."

You might think "coloured patch" is something you can "read off" of present experience without presupposition, but look more deeply. Colours are normally a property of light or physical surfaces, both of which are such things as are capable of existing unperceived - but if you can't allow that they're a property of light and physical surfaces, because you can't perceive unperceived existence so you can't be sure there are physical surfaces, then what is this "colour" thing if it's not a property of physical surfaces? And if surfaces aren't such things as can demonstrably exist unperceived, what are they? What is this thing that you're sheerly beholding and are determined to restrict to present experience in order to behold? You can't call it colour, so let's call it schmolour. What are the criteria for application of schmolour, if they're not the usual ones for colour?

If you really want to drill down to absolutely no presuppositions, then you can't even help yourself to terms like "colour" or "patch." On the other hand, if you feel you can confidently call a thing a "coloured patch", then you can just as confidently call it a "laptop." Again, you're not actually getting to any deeper or more indubitable a layer by calling something a "coloured patch."

Quoting PossibleAaran

On the basis of this experience alone, there is no answer as to why I should believe that anything exists unperceived. You are right that this is a non-ordinary concept of experience. It is one tailored for the purpose of building an indisputable system of philosophy - not one which is certain, just one where there is a sensible answer as to why each part should be accepted. You don't even have to call this concept experience if you don't want. Call it schmexperience for all it matters. What I schmexperience is only certain colour patches of a certain size and shape. These things are given to me in such a way that it is simply indisputable that they are there. I cannot sensibly doubt that there are these patches of colour before me at this moment. There is an obvious reason why I should believe it. With that said, I am happy to concede that the ordinary concept of 'experience' cannot be meaningfully applied here.

And neither can ordinary concepts like "patches of colour." If you accept "patches of colour" then you are implicitly bringing in the public world, because patches of colour have no name outside the context of that kind of world, there's not even any possible method for tying them together across time (because, again, "memory" is going to have a different meaning in a non-physical world, and we don't know what that meaning could possibly be).

Quoting PossibleAaran

As I said, the concept of 'experience' implicit in my remarks is the concept of 'what is indisputably before my consciousness'.

And this consciousness is what? Is it the consciousness of a human being? Then you're implicitly accepting phsyical, public world presuppositions. Is it, on the other hand, the consciousness of a mere thinking thing or an abstract point of view as such? Then you're never going to get outside that prison by any means, so you might as well give up now! :)

The conditions for verification grow and shrink with the presuppositions accepted (hence my Chinese finger puzzle metaphor) - but then in that case, nothing is being revealed from the level with no presuppositions that's going to be of any help at the more presuppositions level, that level is not being firmed up in any way - but then, nor does it need to be, it never needed to be. Whatever you discover there, in the presuppositionless world, you can't bring back to here, it stays there and is applicable only there. But that's fine - that's why it's just a queer little game off to the side of life, and doesn't have the profound purport some philosophers think it does.

Quoting PossibleAaran

I don't want to 're-define' anything. I am happy not to use the word 'experience' if it is so troubling, although to drop that word represents a departure from traditional ways of discussing the issue.

So if it's not experience, what is it, and what bearing does it have on experience as ordinarily understood?

Quoting PossibleAaran

Does the concept which I have explicated above have no meaning? It seems to me that I understand it perfectly well.

Yes, that's the illusion. You think you are saying something that makes sense. But it doesn't make any sense in the world out here with its presuppositions (where things like camera tests are perfectly fine for testing unperceived existence). But then if it doesn't make sense here, then there must be some other kind of sense for it to make in the presuppositionless realm. So what is it? To what are you attaching the term "seeing" or "experience" or "coloured patch" in the presuppositionless realm? What is that thing? And how can you be sure you're not using the term or applying the concept wrongly?

On the other hand, if that thing is a "sensation", then we're back in the world where camera tests makes sense, where the fact that you can't perceive the unperceived is a mere tautology, and the difficulty it presents can easily be gotten around by perceiving not the unperceived existence, but the distal effects of that unperceived existence on your perception, by means of the present traces of its existence while you weren't perceiving it. If what you're having is a sensation as ordinarily understood, then the camera test is fine. It's only if what you're having is a "sensation" in the Cartesian, bracketed sense, that there's still the feeling that the truth has to be gotten from present experience directly. But that's only because you've set it up so that answers can only be gotten from present experience directly (and that's what's making the tautology that you can't perceive the unperceived an un-get-overable barrier to understanding, instead of just a slight inconvenience that can easily be gotten around).

Quoting PossibleAaran

Perhaps you are worried because the concept is not 'ordinary', but I don't see any reason to think that if a concept is 'not ordinary' then it must be meaningless. What is so magical about 'ordinary concepts' that they get to have meaning but 'non-ordinary' concepts don't.

It's not that they don't, I don't know whether they do or don't have meaning; it's that their meaning (the meaning of concepts used at the presuppositionless level) has yet to be explicated, and it's difficult to see how they can be explicated without surreptitiously borrowing from their meaning in the larger world.

Quoting PossibleAaran

This is just the suggestion that it is impossible to build an indisputable system of philosophy, which is just what ancient scepticism was. I've always thought that Wittgenstein was a Pyrrhonian.

No, rather it's saying that bracketing all presuppositions isn't necessarily the best way to build an indusputable system of philosophy. IOW, such a thing may or may not be attainable, but it's certainly not going to be attainable by retreating to a presuppositionless realm and trying to rebuild from there. We already know how that ends up, it ends up in solipsism with a thing that has no name and character "experiencing" various things that may or may not be the case. Yes, a very solid foundation for a philosophy.

Quoting PossibleAaran

I know some Realists and Phenomenalists made a lot of this issue of the 'directness' of perception. Russell did, for example. I don't think that's important at all.

If so, then you should have no problem with the camera test.

Quoting PossibleAaran

All that matters is that certain elements of experience are unproblematically available to consciousness in such a way as to make them indisputable, and some aren't. The property of unperceived existence, isn't. It is painfully easy to produce a story, compatible with all of the indisputable 'given' elements of experience such that nothing exists unperceived. I have no way to prove to you, I suppose that the property of unperceived existence isn't given to my conscious awareness like the property of blueness is. I take this to be patently obvious to anyone who has the faculty of sense perception.

Again, given =/= indisputable. "Given," like "experience," etc., etc., already carries some baggage from the larger world. "Given" in distinction to what?

Quoting PossibleAaran

I don't think its foregone at all. Why is it so obvious that no conclusion can be drawn from the given? I certainly can't tell, a priori, that this is so. The discovery, if it were one, would be that almost nothing that I believe is indisputable, and that sounds to me like an interesting philosophical discovery. I can't stop global warming with it, but all the same.

But you already knew that nothing is indisputable, that's already built into the ordinary way of looking at things. You just need a reason to dispute, but staring at your sensations and dreaming up alternative logical possibilities doesn't give you a reason to doubt the ordinary application of some ordinary concept.

Quoting PossibleAaran

I didn't use the concept of necessary existence in my reducio about God. I used the concept of existence, and you did claim that laptops are such things as exist - which was the premise of the reducio. So it still seems to me that that argument is parallel to the one which you gave.

But the argument only makes sense as pointing to a fallacy if you do think of necessary existence as taken for granted. Otherwise it's just an ordinary case of empirical discovery - someone says something exists, and we all go look and see, and take our scientific instruments with us (which help us "see" things we can't see). They might be right, they might be mistaken, any number of things could be problematic about the claim.

Reply to Inter Alia I see your point. The evil demon hypothesis is one which is empirically indistinguishable from the Realist hypothesis. I agree with you on that, since they both have all of the same predictive consequences. You infer from this that the two hypotheses aren't meaningfully different and that it is just a verbal matter of whether to [I]say[/I] that, for example, the laws of physics are the laws which govern the behaviour of the demon, or not. 'We may as well have a demonology department' and it would be just the same as our ordinary physics department. I agree with everything except your inference that the two aren't meaningfully different. For you to infer that from the facts which you have mentioned, you require the premise that two hypotheses are meaningfully different only if they have different empirical consequences, and this amounts to the premise that two hypotheses are meaningfully different only if they predict a difference in what we perceive.

That premise is a form of Verificationism, and I can't see why you would accept it.

Reply to gurugeorge Excuse me for only extracting parts of your post for discussion. All of it is excellent, but I fear that each of our posts will spiral into large treatises before long! I will try to get to the heart of our disagreement.

Quoting gurugeorge

But then what, in what way is it being used? When are you applying or using "schmexperience" properly? How would you know? What is the nature of the "self" who's "having" "experience" in this new sense? Or does schmexperience not have a haver? Or is the haver of a different kind? If so what?

Say that X is schmexperienced if and only if X is given to conscious awareness in such a way as to provide a sensible answer as to why the subject should believe that X.

So I might schexperience a patch of red only if the redness is given to my conscious awareness in such a way as to provide a sensible answer as to why I should believe that there is a patch of red. Of course the notion of 'given to conscious awareness' is somewhat metaphorical, but I don't think this is a barrier. Anyone can get a handle on what it is for something to be given to consciousness just by reflection on his own present awareness. One might doubt that anything ever is given in this sense, but that does not mean that the concept is meaningless; just that it is not an accurate description of anything.


Quoting gurugeorge

"In another sense" - in WHAT sense, precisely? What is this "seeing" you're talking about?

Normally seeing implies or presupposes a bunch of physical-world-story stuff. But if you're not implying that, then what is the testable content of this "seeing", what are the conditions for whether one is "seeing" in this sense? When can one correctly be said to be "seeing" (shcmeeing? :) ) in this sense, and when not?

One is 'seeing' that X in the sense I have in mind only if X is given to consciousness in such a way as to provide a sensible answer as to why the subject should believe that X. That is when one can be said to be seeing something in my sense; when the thing seen is so unproblematically available to consciousness as to preclude any further sensible doubt about whether it exists. Again, maybe you doubt that there is anything which is available to consciousness in this way, but that doesn't speak to the meaningfulness of the concept.

Quoting gurugeorge

No, rather it's saying that bracketing all presuppositions isn't necessarily the best way to build an indusputable system of philosophy. We already know how that ends up, it ends up in solipsism with a thing that has no name and character "experiencing" various things that may or may not be the case. Yes, a very solid foundation for a philosophy.

Perhaps you are right, but I don't think its anywhere near as clear as you make it out to be. Many philosophers have this habit these days. The habit of just saying 'oh its just obvious that bracketing all presuppositions leads to solipsism' and then adding 'such a philosophical method is useless'. But very rarely, if ever, does anyone take the time to look at the matter in detail. You seem to be doing just the same thing here.

Quoting gurugeorge

If so, then you should have no problem with the camera test.

My issue with the camera test is that it presupposes that Realism is true. No one who didn't already accept Realism would accept the camera test.

Quoting gurugeorge

Again, given =/= indisputable. "Given," like "experience," etc., etc., already carries some baggage from the larger world. "Given" in distinction to what?

Given in the sense of, as Stace puts it, 'logically given'. Indisputable in that what is given provides a satisfactory, non-question begging, answer to the question "why should I believe that?". What is given is the ultimate starting point for argument.

Quoting gurugeorge

But you already knew that nothing is indisputable, that's already built into the ordinary way of looking at things. You just need a reason to dispute, but staring at your sensations and dreaming up alternative logical possibilities doesn't give you a reason to doubt the ordinary application of some ordinary concept.

I reject the doctrine that there is an 'ordinary way of thinking' with respect to pretty much anything. Everybody thinks differently, and in this case there may, for all I know, be very great differences in what people take to be indisputable. In any case, that [I]you[/I] ordinarily think that nothing is indisputable is not a good reason for you to suppose that it is true. What is ordinarily thought is just a matter of what you have been conditioned by culture and evolution, together with your own individual background, to believe.

It is worth pointing out, since you have many conceptual doubts, that the sense of 'indisputable' I have in mind is that something is indisputable if and only if there is a non-question begging answer to the question as to why it should be believed. Do I ordinarily think that nothing is indisputable? No. I was initially inclined to think that a lot of what I believe is indisputable. Perhaps I am wrong, but that is what I thought.

To shift the discussion slightly, your posts always presuppose that there is such a thing as 'our ordinary concepts' and that is your fixed point from which you argue that my position warps those concepts into meaninglessness. I reject the idea that there is any substantive body called 'our ordinary concepts'. People sometimes have the same thing in mind and use the same word to represent it, but quite often people have quite different or slightly different things in mind whilst using the same words. I might use the word 'knowledge' and mean by it something like indisputably true belief, but you might use that word in a very different way, even though when talking to each other, we never notice that difference in our communications. I also think that most people have no very precise concept at all for the concepts which are discussed in philosophy - knowledge, reason, space, time, morality, perceive, mind, physical, and so on, and because the concepts are so vague ordinarily, I think it even less likely that people often have exactly the same thing in mind by them, even though this goes unnoticed in every day communication.

From your perspective, the ordinary is the paradigm of meaning and it isn't clear how any non-ordinary concept is meaningful unless it is very carefully explicated. But as I see it, its the ordinary which is vague, full of variation and inconsistency, and in desperate need of explication. I guess I'm an Aristotelean or a Carnapian, and you are Wittgensteinian.

PA

Reply to PossibleAaran

I think we're finally converging on a joint understanding which seems like a worthwhile achievement, but I'm not sure what you mean by "That premise is a form of Verificationism, and I can't see why you would accept it.". When I talk about meaning, I'm talking about collective utility, in the same way as it is collectively useful for us to all agree broadly on the meaning of the word 'tree' so that we can use it in a conversation. I might have my own private meaning, but it's not something I can share because it serves no purpose.

It's like that with the 'cause' of a perceived effect it could be physical or it could be an evil demon, and whichever you believe may have subjective meaning to you, but it is as pointless as a personal definition of the word 'tree' in public discourse because it has no shared meaning. If 'evil deamon' and 'physics' have exactly the same effect then their shared public meaning is the same. It doesn't seem the same because actually when we think of an evil demon we're certainly not thinking of something like the laws of physics, we're thinking of something like an malicious person, but with horns. But we've just established that if there is an evil demon doing all this he's not like that at all, he's extremely consistent, apparently benign (or at least disinterested), just like the laws of physics are.

Reply to PossibleAaran Quoting PossibleAaran

To shift the discussion slightly, your posts always presuppose that there is such a thing as 'our ordinary concepts' and that is your fixed point from which you argue that my position warps those concepts into meaninglessness. I reject the idea that there is any substantive body called 'our ordinary concepts'. People sometimes have the same thing in mind and use the same word to represent it, but quite often people have quite different or slightly different things in mind whilst using the same words.

Yes but that's a feature, not a bug. We can certainly tighten up our language and our concepts for any given purpose, narrowing our focus but what I doubt is the idea that we can (or need to) tighten up our language in a general (non-domain specific) way by means of things like the Cartesian method.

As Wittgenstein said, I paraphrase, the philosophizing in the Tractatus is like a special case of the philosophizing in the PI, it's not that there's anything wrong with philosophical theorizing in general, because doing so does help you see things in a different light - it's not like the Cartesian excursion is fruitless, because you learn what not to do, what's a waste of time - the problem is when you're theorizing philosophically but you think you've got something more objective and more indubitable than you had before, when really you're just getting into even murkier territory where we don't know what up or down is (metaphorically speaking).

Just as an aside, I'd say that Wittgenstein is closer to Aristotle than maybe you think. Aristotle would have had no truck with any of this kind of nonsense either :D I always thought it was quite ironic and amusing that Wittgenstein lamented he'd read no Aristotle, since he was sort of starting to reinvent Aristotle in On Certainty :)

Quoting PossibleAaran

Given in the sense of, as Stace puts it, 'logically given'. Indisputable in that what is given provides a satisfactory, non-question begging, answer to the question "why should I believe that?".

Yeah, that's the thing, I don't think there is such a thing in the ordinary realm, but I don't think there's any such thing as a non-question begging answer as to what it is you're seeing when you're looking at matters from a truncated, phenomenalist point of view either. It's even more mysterious, so it can't be a purifying foundation. Isn't that what Carnap found out, after all?

Quoting gurugeorge

always thought it was quite ironic and amusing that Wittgenstein lamented he'd read no Aristotle

Whereas I find it comforting to know. ;-)

Quoting Pollywalls

I think science doesn't necessarily have to be correct. it just has to work.

This is a great issue. I'm studying physics. I'm at that point where I have to choose between engineering and pure science, and I'm leaning toward engineering. Why? Because that's seems to be the real reason we believe in science --because it works. It does stuff for us. It's the same with math. A few people in my calc classes are going for pure math. I can't relate to that. The numbers detached from reality have no appeal for me. I want to operate and maybe even create machines that get things done.

Quoting Pollywalls

is it even logical to be logical? what is the proof of the proof of the proof of the proof of anything? how can we justify the regress argument? I can't seem to find a solution. maybe I should give up. there might be no solution. I feel so frustrated about it.

The only philosophers to have held my attention so far have been pragmatists and Wittgenstein. How do we get out of the endless tangle of words? For the most part they go nowhere, it seems to me. X means Y means Z means...nothing. Or it's all finally justified in practice. Does anyone really know what they are talking about if they can't do anything with it? On the other hand, some of this talk motivates the millions. I guess that's doing something with it. Of course it's all got to be simplified into jingles and talking points in that case. Because others are impatient dummies like myself, waiting for the talk to become relevant to what they want and what they fear.

Reply to Inter Alia There are some difficulties in what you said, or perhaps just difficulties in my understanding it. You say that 'when you are talking about meaning, you are talking about collective utility', and you give the example that it is collectively useful to agree that the word 'tree' means a specific kind of object and this allows us to 'use it in conversation'. I agree with this, but what is the relevance? Here is what you say:

Quoting Inter Alia

It's like that with the 'cause' of a perceived effect it could be physical or it could be an evil demon, and whichever you believe may have subjective meaning to you, but it is as pointless as a personal definition of the word 'tree' in public discourse because it has no shared meaning. If 'evil deamon' and 'physics' have exactly the same effect then their shared public meaning is the same. It doesn't seem the same because actually when we think of an evil demon we're certainly not thinking of something like the laws of physics, we're thinking of something like an malicious person, but with horns. But we've just established that if there is an evil demon doing all this he's not like that at all, he's extremely consistent, apparently benign (or at least disinterested), just like the laws of physics are.

We need to be very careful not to fall into the veil of perception doctrine here. Talk of 'what causes the perceived effect, a physical object or a demon?' makes it sound like what we perceive is an image which is caused by one of these two; the veil of perception doctrine. I am presently perceiving something which I normally call a laptop. Does it exist unperceived? If the evil demon hypothesis is true, it doesn't, since the demon just puts these things before me like a show, and 'turns them off' when I am not watching. Your objection to the evil demon hypothesis was that is not 'meaningfully different' from the Realist hypothesis that things exist unperceived. My answer was that there is a clear difference in the things postulated by each hypothesis: the Realist posits unperceived laptops, the evil demon hypothesis posits an unperceived evil demon. Your thought is not that because they have all of the same empirical consequences, there is no significant difference between them. Is that right? I took that from your use of words like 'pointless'. You say further that the two hypotheses have 'the same public meaning'. I'm not sure what a public meaning is and how it is different from meaning [I]simpliciter[/I].

Reply to gurugeorge I think at last we can locate the substantive disagreement between us.

Quoting gurugeorge

it's not like the Cartesian excursion is fruitless, because you learn what not to do, what's a waste of time - the problem is when you're theorizing philosophically but you think you've got something more objective and more indubitable than you had before, when really you're just getting into even murkier territory where we don't know what up or down is (metaphorically speaking).

Quoting gurugeorge

I don't think there's any such thing as a non-question begging answer as to what it is you're seeing when you're looking at matters from a truncated, phenomenalist point of view either. It's even more mysterious, so it can't be a purifying foundation. Isn't that what Carnap found out, after all?

Our disagreement is that you don't think any non-question begging rationale can be had for our beliefs, at least not if you push questioning far enough back. You seem to think this is obvious. I'd be interested to know why you think it is so obvious, and also whether you would be prepared to characterize this as a kind of Pyrrhonian Scepticism, since it is just what those ancient sceptics used to maintain?

PA

Quoting PossibleAaran

Your thought is not that because they have all of the same empirical consequences, there is no significant difference between them. Is that right?

Yes. It might be easier if we split our terminology into 'hypothesis' and 'explanation'. The Realist hypothesis might be something like "if I open my eyes the laptop will be there" or "if I use any automated measuring device on the laptop, it will record some interaction with it, whether I'm looking or not". Their 'explanation' for why these hypotheses are so successful at predicting results is that the laptop exists unpercieved.

The Idealist's 'explanation' is that an evil demon simply makes all these things appear the way they are (or some other non-realist position) but their hypotheses seem to remain the same, they still act as if it will be there when they open their eyes, they are unsurprised when the automated camera reveals an image of it, etc.

The explanations are internal, they matter to none but ourselves (at any one moment), like our own private definition of 'tree'. Only our hypotheses are public because they dictate how we behave, what we say etc, like the public meaning of the word 'tree'.

So whilst both the Realist and the Idealist have the same public hypotheses they are effectively the same in the field of public discourse.

What is meaningfully different (and I should have mentioned this earlier) is when one's explanation leads one to the next hypothesis. Then the quality of one explanation can be judged objectively. Is it leading to hypotheses in the public realm (behaviour, predictions etc.) that are proving more successful? This is where Realism trumps Idealism. I don't know of any examples where the 'evil demon' explanation has yielded any new hypotheses that have proven useful. I know plenty of new hypotheses (the whole of science) which have resulted from believing in a Realist explanation.

As I have mentioned elsewhere, this is where my issue with Idealism lies, not with its foundational logic, which I agree is flawless, but with what it's proponents go on to hypothesise (usually some variant of "you should therefore let me do whatever my book/god/guru says without judgement"). Such hypotheses do not logically follow from the 'explaination' Idealists are perfectly entitled to privately hold, but from a deception, a trick of metaphors. You and I might agree that an evil demon might be doing all these things, but if so he is a completely consistent and predictable one. The unscrupulous then take this agreement to mean an actual Evil Deamon is causing all these things, one with the attendant horns, capriciousness, and malice and we'd better then hang crosses on our doors just in case, the logic of Skepticism simply doesn't lead there.

Quoting PossibleAaran

Your thought is not that because they have all of the same empirical consequences, there is no significant difference between them. Is that right?

Yes. It might be easier if we split our terminology into 'hypothesis' and 'explanation'. The Realist hypothesis might be something like "if I open my eyes the laptop will be there" or "if I use any automated measuring device on the laptop, it will record some interaction with it, whether I'm looking or not". Their 'explanation' for why these hypotheses are so successful at predicting results is that the laptop exists unpercieved.

The Idealist's 'explanation' is that an evil demon simply makes all these things appear the way they are (or some other non-realist position) but their hypotheses seem to remain the same, they still act as if it will be there when they open their eyes, they are unsurprised when the automated camera reveals an image of it, etc.

The explanations are internal, they matter to none but ourselves (at any one moment), like our own private definition of 'tree'. Only our hypotheses are public because they dictate how we behave, what we say etc, like the public meaning of the word 'tree'.

So whilst both the Realist and the Idealist have the same public hypotheses they are effectively the same in the field of public discourse.

What is meaningfully different (and I should have mentioned this earlier) is when one's explanation leads one to the next hypothesis. Then the quality of one explanation can be judged objectively. Is it leading to hypotheses in the public realm (behaviour, predictions etc.) that are proving more successful? This is where Realism trumps Idealism. I don't know of any examples where the 'evil demon' explanation has yielded any new hypotheses that have proven useful. I know plenty of new hypotheses (the whole of science) which have resulted from believing in a Realist explanation.

As I have mentioned elsewhere, this is where my issue with Idealism lies, not with its foundational logic, which I agree is flawless, but with what it's proponents go on to hypothesise (usually some variant of "you should therefore let me do whatever my book/god/guru says without judgement"). Such hypotheses do not logically follow from the 'explaination' Idealists are perfectly entitled to privately hold, but from a deception, a trick of metaphors. You and I might agree that an evil demon might be doing all these things, but if so he is a completely consistent and predictable one. The unscrupulous then take this agreement to mean an actual Evil Deamon is causing all these things, one with the attendant horns, capriciousness, and malice and we'd better then hang crosses on our doors just in case, the logic of Skepticism simply doesn't lead there.

Reply to Inter Alia Quoting Inter Alia

So whilst both the Realist and the Idealist have the same public hypotheses they are effectively the same in the field of public discourse.

Now I see what you mean by this. Thanks for the clarification.

Quoting Inter Alia

I don't know of any examples where the 'evil demon' explanation has yielded any new hypotheses that have proven useful.

But this is less clear. I thought you said that the evil demon explanation and the Realist explanation have the same hypotheses. So if Realism has useful hypotheses so does the evil demon explanation.

Quoting Inter Alia

I know plenty of new hypotheses (the whole of science) which have resulted from believing in a Realist explanation.

Could you give a specific example of a hypothesis which only results from Realism and not the evil demon hypothesis? (Again, if what you said above is right, there are none, and so I am puzzled).

Quoting Inter Alia

(usually some variant of "you should therefore let me do whatever my book/god/guru says without judgement")

I have never met an Idealist who takes that line (to be sure, I haven't met many Idealists at all!).

PA

Quoting PossibleAaran

Our disagreement is that you don't think any non-question begging rationale can be had for our beliefs, at least not if you push questioning far enough back. You seem to think this is obvious. I'd be interested to know why you think it is so obvious, and also whether you would be prepared to characterize this as a kind of Pyrrhonian Scepticism, since it is just what those ancient sceptics used to maintain?

It just goes back to my original points re. doubt - the reason you dig back behind presuppositions in the ordinary way of inquiry is when and if you have some anomaly or some other reason to doubt. Some hint from experience that things may not be as you think they are. That's the home of doing something like "examining our presuppositions."

Other than that, I don't think there's any general need to have "indubitable foundations" - so it's not so much that I don't think any non-question-begging rationale can be had, it's that I wonder at the purpose of the exercise of looking for some non-question-begging, over-arching rationale, given that the usual process of knowledge-gathering doesn't require such things.

As Popper says somewhere, you don't need to drive piles infinitely deep to have a secure foundation for a house - not even if it's built on sand.

IOW, we examine our presuppositions in a certain general type of context, and there's a reason why we check our premises, and that context and reason is usually discomfort at some anomaly, some way in which our experience isn't going as the words and concepts we're using (to characterize the world) would predict it would go. Doubt is the active searching process for an alternative explanation consequent upon such an anomaly.

So there's a one-to-one match between the procedure of examining our presuppositions, and some problem or anomaly that prompts the procedure. Essentially, it's a contextual flipping of the usual hierarchy, where we trust our presuppositions (and the tiny but fairly secure fortress of established scientific fact) and that gives us leverage to doubt the evidence of our senses. Here instead we trust the evidence of our senses (although in fact we no longer know what these "senses" are or what "evidence" would mean in the flipped context) and we think that gives us leverage to doubt our presuppositions. But there's no general "examining of presuppositions" required in the ordinary context, there's no reason to be constantly on tenterhooks second-guessing our presuppositions.

Or to put it another way, one can envisage such a reason to doubt the entire chain of our presuppositions to its depths - but it would have to be something world-shakingly, majorly anomalous, like people turning into bananas, or a giant Stay Puft Marshmallow Man stomping through Times Square.

A philosopher merely dreaming up some alternative possibility from the one we think obtains, and demanding that we secure our propositions against that imaginary scenario, isn't going to cut it - that's not even an anomaly, it's not a reason to doubt, it's just an imaginary way we could be wrong.

Quoting gurugeorge

Doubt is the active searching process for an alternative explanation consequent upon such an anomaly.

I like this, as distinct from confidence, which is a measure of proportions of success/failure. Nice perspective.

Reply to gurugeorge Quoting gurugeorge

It just goes back to my original points re. doubt - the reason you dig back behind presuppositions in the ordinary way of inquiry is when and if you have some anomaly or some other reason to doubt. Some hint from experience that things may not be as you think they are. That's the home of doing something like "examining our presuppositions."

Right, ordinarily.

Quoting gurugeorge

Other than that, I don't think there's any general need to have "indubitable foundations" - so it's not so much that I don't think any non-question-begging rationale can be had, it's that I wonder at the purpose of the exercise of looking for some non-question-begging, over-arching rationale, given that the usual process of knowledge-gathering doesn't require such things.

I have some difficulty with this. In a way, there isn't a [I]need[/I] for all sorts of things that we insist on doing. There is no need to have literary critics, but we have them. There is no need to figure out the history of the romans, but we try. There is no need to figure out whether the universe is temporally finite or eternal, but we try. What drives all of these inquiries isn't some desperate need to solve the problems, but curiosity. Equally, one might simply be curious whether a non-question begging rationale can be had for all of what one presently believes. It might be that there is no dramatically important reason why we [I]must[/I] have that rationale; its just that one wants it, or wants to see whether it can be had. That's how it is for me anyway.

On the other hand, the question whether the rationale can be had seems important for the following reason. Many of us often assume that some beliefs are silly, or absurd, or unreasonable, or just plain crazy. We often criticize rival systems of belief on that ground. Perhaps its Christianity, or Islam, or Hinduism, or the old Norse or Greek mythologies. Perhaps its belief in the immortal soul and the afterlife. These are just the examples that come to mind and which many people often dismiss for being rationally sub-standard. When you look into those criticisms, what they often come to is the criticism that no non-question begging rationale can be given for those beliefs. But how silly are these criticisms if we can't provide a non-question begging rationale for our own beliefs when it comes to a persistent sceptic? If we can't provide a non-question begging rationale for even the simplest things then this kind of criticism, which is prevalent in culture, is completely unfounded. Many philosophers today don't see the point of looking for a non-question begging rationale for what they call 'common-sense', but they fail to see the point that if you can't do it, a certain kind of rational criticism on which we rely all the time turns out to be a hollow game.

PA

Quoting PossibleAaran

But this is less clear. I thought you said that the evil demon explanation and the Realist explanation have the same hypotheses. So if Realism has useful hypotheses so does the evil demon explanation.

So, here I'm talking about the 'real' evil demon hypothesis, which results from what I said about the public meaning of words. The words 'evil' and 'demon' already have a public meaning, they refer collectively to a powerful, capricious creature who intends harm and has taken steps to bring about that harm. The hypotheses resulting from the true 'evil demon' explanation would be that next time you look at your laptop and shut your eyes, when you open them again it will have turned into a skull, just to freak you out, or be made entirely of razor blades so you can't pick it up. To say that an actual 'evil demon' was responsible, this time, for making the laptop pop back into existence in a completely harmless way just like he did last time and all the hundred times before that is not to describe an 'evil demon' by the public meaning of the word at all. You might not want to ascribe the phenomenon to the laws of physics, but if you want to draw such mundane, benign hypotheses from your explanation, it has to be of a mundane, benign nature.

This is what I mean by the deception of metaphor. Whilst we cannot say what causes the laptop to appear to us again every time we open our eyes, we can say that the cause is mundane, benign (or at least disinterested), extremely consistent and unobservable to us or our machinery. That rules out certain things by their public meaning. Demons are one, God is another, the mad scientists/brain in a vat a third. Oddly, a matrix-like simulation is not ruled out by this requirement as its very purpose would be to be mundane and consistent, so it's not a complete argument for realism so much as an argument against certain forms of anti-realism.

Reply to Inter Alia Quoting Inter Alia

To say that an actual 'evil demon' was responsible, this time, for making the laptop pop back into existence in a completely harmless way just like he did last time and all the hundred times before that is not to describe an 'evil demon' by the public meaning of the word at all.

Perhaps the description 'evil' is misplaced then. Try instead, 'deceiving demon'. He certainly does deceive, since he fools everyone into thinking that the objects they perceive also exist unperceived when they don't.

Quoting Inter Alia

Whilst we cannot say what causes the laptop to appear to us again every time we open our eyes, we can say that the cause is mundane, benign (or at least disinterested), extremely consistent and unobservable to us or our machinery. That rules out certain things by their public meaning. Demons are one, God is another, the mad scientists/brain in a vat a third. Oddly, a matrix-like simulation is not ruled out by this requirement as its very purpose would be to be mundane and consistent, so it's not a complete argument for realism so much as an argument against certain forms of anti-realism.

I would add 'deceiving demon explanation' to the simulation explanation insofar as both are mundane and consistent. Is it right that you think there is no reason to prefer Realism over these kinds of mundane and consistent alternatives?

PA

Reply to PossibleAaran

I still have a problem with 'demon' because of its anthropogenic connotations. Nothing in my understanding of the term 'demon' would predict such consistency, but in general principle I agree that so long as the terminology is not deceptive, that it does not imply hypotheses that are not actually ever made, then they are of equal value.

Reply to PossibleAaran Quoting PossibleAaran

Equally, one might simply be curious whether a non-question begging rationale can be had for all of what one presently believes. It might be that there is no dramatically important reason why we must have that rationale; its just that one wants it, or wants to see whether it can be had. That's how it is for me anyway.

Yes, but what I'm arguing against is the idea that motivated some of the early modern philosophers - they took seriously the problem of general foundations for knowledge, they thought you actually do NEED such a general foundation otherwise normal inquiry can't proceed properly. That, I think is wrong, and the truth is somewhere inbetween - it's a good exercise to examine our presuppositions generally now and then, sure, and as you point out it's something that arouses curiosity anyway. But it's not something that's necessary (such that if we don't do it, we must down tools and resolve the problem before knowledge-gathering can proceed any further).

One criticizes religion for being question-begging on specifiable, verifiable grounds that are fairly close to the surface. In order to do that, one doesn't need to have examined one's own presuppositions - although that can be done, it doesn't affect the "bite" of the criticism of religion on its own terms.

e.g. one doesn't need to have indubitable foundations for knowledge in general to criticize a religious argument for taking it for granted that "everything must have a cause."

And on the other hand, a lot of the criticism of religious (and these days now, quasi-religious political) dogmas is because people base other-people-killing policies on thin foundations. You say you've had a vision of the Virgin Mary? Well and good, but why do you think that gives you license to slay the unbeliever?

Basically, it's all the other way round from what philosophers thought it was, for a long time: we don't build our picture of the world up from guaranteed-to-be-valid-nuggets (either bits of clear reasoning or bits of clear, indubitable experience); we have an ongoing model of the world that we ongoingly juggle into existence, which is the thing we believe in and trust, until such time as an anomaly crops up and we have to revise the model. That model is always, in its most fundamental nature, conjectural. (Which is the same thing as my earlier "stipulation," as "grammar", as the apriori, etc.) (I should add of course that the validity of our world model in its most general terms is guaranteed in a limited sense, by evolution. IOW, up till now the world has been a particular way that we've evolved to fit in with, so we can be sure the world is largely the way our model models it, at least in terms of "middle-sized furniture.")

So in that context it's perturbances that motivate the resolution of something called "doubt." And while it's a theoretical option to extend that doubt to the whole of the background of the knowledge-gathering process, at that point since the type of perturbance that would have to crop up to motivate a serious inquiry at that level would have to be absolutely enormously weird, a playful inquiry isn't going to get very far, because it has no actual anomaly of that "size" to work on.

Or: yes, doubt at that over-arching (or to switch the metaphor foundational) level is possible, but we haven't yet found a reason why doubt at that level, doubt about the presuppositions of knowledge in general, has to be taken seriously. For the doubt to be taken seriously, you'd have some evidence to work on, and you'd need evidence of a weird anomaly on a massive scale that would be the evidence that JUSTIFIES THE DOUBT. And again, merely imagining alternative possibilities isn't a reason to doubt.

Reply to gurugeorge Quoting gurugeorge

Yes, but what I'm arguing against is the idea that motivated some of the early modern philosophers - they took seriously the problem of general foundations for knowledge, they thought you actually do NEED such a general foundation otherwise normal inquiry can't proceed properly. That, I think is wrong, and the truth is somewhere inbetween - it's a good exercise to examine our presuppositions generally now and then, sure, and as you point out it's something that arouses curiosity anyway. But it's not something that's necessary (such that if we don't do it, we must down tools and resolve the problem before knowledge-gathering can proceed any further).

I'm not sure how many of the early moderns thought that. Hume certainly didn't, since he thought no such foundation was possible and yet still wrote on history. Descartes didn't think so either. He just thought that if he [I]could[/I] secure such a foundation for his fundamental metaphysical ideas, it would give those ideas a huge advantage over alternatives; it would make them stable and lasting. It wasn't that he thought you couldn't do inquiry otherwise; the Aristotelean program before him had done so and he knew this. He just thought it would be better to have the foundation in place, and that still sounds right to me.

Quoting gurugeorge

One criticizes religion for being question-begging on specifiable, verifiable grounds that are fairly close to the surface. In order to do that, one doesn't need to have examined one's own presuppositions - although that can be done, it doesn't affect the "bite" of the criticism of religion on its own terms.

e.g. one doesn't need to have indubitable foundations for knowledge in general to criticize a religious argument for taking it for granted that "everything must have a cause."

Why can't they take fore granted that everything must have a cause? Why do they need to prove this principle using premises only a religious sceptic would accept? Why can't they just assume it to be true and get on with Theology? Isn't that just what we do with something like 'sense perception is reliable, on the assumption that no non-question begging rationale for that belief is needed? What can the criticism of the principle of sufficient reason amount to if that very same criticism can be levied against 'sense perception is reliable'?

Moreover, why can't the religious believer just say, as Plantinga does say, 'the cognitive faculty which produces belief in God is reliable', and take this as an assumption which can't be provided any non-question begging rationale? And when someone dares question this axiom of theirs, why can't they just say 'I don't need to put my religious belief on any more secure foundation'?

Quoting gurugeorge

we have an ongoing model of the world that we ongoingly juggle into existence, which is the thing we believe in and trust, until such time as an anomaly crops up and we have to revise the model. That model is always, in its most fundamental nature, conjectural

Doesn't the Norse Pagan have that? He has a model of the world which he ongoingly juggles and which he trusts, until such a time as an anomaly crops up. He has no way to prove to you that he will go to Valhalla on death so long as he dies a warrior's death. Its just part of his model, like 'sense perception is reliable' is part of ours. What's the difference?

Another way to appreciate this last point is to appreciate that [I]we[/I] don't have an ongoing model. [I]each one of us[/I] has our own on going model which is different to others - and sometimes radically so - and all of them are conjectural on your understanding. But this, surely, makes every model, no matter how seemingly absurd, equal in authority to every other.

PA

Quoting PossibleAaran

Another way to appreciate this last point is to appreciate that we don't have an ongoing model. each one of us has our own on going model which is different to others - and sometimes radically so - and all of them are conjectural on your understanding. But this, surely, makes every model, no matter how seemingly absurd, equal in authority to every other.

You raise good points. Yet there remains this: the Viking, the young Earth Christian, and the physicalist atheist, when they are in close enough proximity to interact, will all hold implicit accord on everything which is common to all three. They may each enter into immediate conflict upon such an encounter due to disagreements—even that of an all-out war—yet even in so doing they each will hold implicit accord in what causes what in relation to their immediate, concrete, commonly shared reality (hence, in the reality of causation); in who said or did something prior to the other saying or doing something (hence, in the reality of temporal sequences and, thereby, of time); in the truth that they are standing upon a solid substratum which affects each equally (hence, in the reality of a physical realm applicable to all); etc.

Each of the three individual’s explanations for causation, time, physicality, etc. will indeed be different—and each will project upon the others a belief that the others lack an adequate understanding of what is metaphysically true—yet this commonly shared reality between each will itself hold its own metaphysical validity in so being.

To me at least, the more mature caricatures of the Viking, the YE Christian, and the physicalist atheist would only have grounds for conflict when contradictions occur in regard to what is commonly shared.

They share one world but hold different explanations for it. This, in itself, is not grounds for conflict for it is a difference that makes no significant difference. But when these explanations for the shared world a) are not demonstrated to be and b) infringe upon the others understanding of what the shared world is, then the explanations of each takes away from the extended-self of the others. By “extended-self” I’m keeping in mind that context is itself one aspect by which the self is defined; e.g. who I am is in part defined by whether I’m a BIV puppeteer by others or not; by whether the world I inhabit is fully deterministic or else can facilitate the reality of freewill; by whether the laws of nature are stable—and some can from this extrapolate eternally fixed—or, to address the other extreme, can change on a dime at any time for no reason whatsoever; etc. A different subject but I'm hoping this issue of an extended-self can be at least partially understood.

To simplify, I’ll only address the YE Christian and the physicalist atheist. They both hold common knowledge of a multitude of givens regarding the here and now—including that of both being humans inhabiting planet Earth. Yet the first claims that Earth started about 6,000 years ago on causal grounds of God and the latter claims that Earth started about 4.5 billion years ago on causal grounds of physical laws. The latter’s claims are accordant to the empirical sciences at expense of any divinity being real and the former’s claims are accordant to one of many interpretations of divinity being real at expense of the empirical sciences. Add some politics into this as regards what the nation to which they both hold citizenship should do and conflicts as regards explanations can then unfold on grounds of contradictions in terms of what is.

Despite such potential conflicts, there yet remains the common reality. I’m upholding that while this reality common to all (“uni-verse” will carry the same connotations) may be reinterpreted metaphysically—such as via inquiry into metaphysics regarding substantiations for what is—it nevertheless can neither be ignored nor denied as a core metaphysical component of reality.

Not that all this serves as any resolution to the problems addressed. But to me at least it reframes the problems in a way that is more acceptable. So, with such outlook, it’s not an issue of everyone for themselves in terms of metaphysics but an issue of which explanation for the whole best accounts for what is common to all in noncontradictory manners … ideally, in as impartial a fashion as is possible, imo.