Semi-Kantian Argument to Personhood

ivans November 24, 2017 at 01:17 1825 views 3 comments

My own moral philosophy is a modified version of Kant's. First categorical imperative fails(relies on Kant's flawed epistemology) but Kant's second imperative(ends in themselves) is logically certain as it derives from the definition of personhood - whatever the essence of morality is, the person is the subject of moral duties. I propose this argument to personhood as an objective standard of morality.
1. A person is, by definition, and end in itself.
2. The self is a person because its rational will allows it to discover moral principles.
3. If the self is a person because of its rational will, all beings with rational will are persons.
4. Therefore, all beings with rational will are persons.
5. Therefore, all beings with rational will are ends in themselves.

Comments (3)

Deleted User November 24, 2017 at 02:36 #126663 0 likes

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ivans November 24, 2017 at 16:08 #126738 0 likes

Reply to tim wood The problem is that it fails to define exactly what makes something "able to stand as a universal law" without relying on either a subjective standard of morality or ungrounded standard of reason. I have heard the imperative being used when defined in a consequentialist way, in terms of the sustainability of a society, and in terms of the selfish value of an action, but in any case, it does not seem to make meaningful distinction.

If its application is an intuitive art, I can understand that. That's treading the line between Kantianism and moral intuitionism, though

Deleted User November 24, 2017 at 17:43 #126745 0 likes

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