Hegel's Philosophy of Religion.

Hegel's concept of alienation has to do with human powers, and needs, which form reality for a man who finds himself in a certain context or history.

Man takes needs which he can't realize, which in fact disappoint him and he posits these needs to a fictional entity which has them in abundance, and he gives that entity power over what he ought to do, thereby alienating himself from his own power. As man develops his technology and rationally, it enables him to satisfy the needs the aspects which he initally posited to god. which are overcome enabling man to now get back the powers he posited in god. God then becomes more abstract, god is love, justice and so on.

It is part of Hegel analytical method...initial meanings, a state of alienation, and then overcoming of alienation asserting new meanings. Marx adopts this schema.

His treatment of god in his aesthetic theory is different. He says (SEP):

In religion—above all in Christianity—spirit gives expression to the same understanding of reason and of itself as philosophy. In religion, however, the process whereby the Idea becomes self-conscious spirit is represented—in images and metaphors—as the process whereby “God” becomes the “Holy Spirit” dwelling in humanity. Furthermore, this process is one in which we put our faith and trust: it is the object of feeling and belief, rather than conceptual understanding.

Reply to Wayfarer

If God is omniscient then he must first be, right? You can't be omniscient unless you can first be. You commit your own error of saying "he is this rather than that" by saying he is transcendent; that he is not the world or in the world. God is an infinite being; or, better, God is infinite being, but there is also a sense in which what we think of as finite beings are in-finite insofar as they are not precisely bounded or determinate.

Quoting Cavacava

Marx adopts this schema.

Only to turn it upside down.

Quoting Janus

If God is omniscient then he must first be, right?

The distinction being made here is between 'being' and 'existing'.

You might say of 'the first principle', that it IS, but not that it exists. The reason is given in that passage I quoted - 'to exist' is to be separate, to be this as distinct from that. The 'realm of existence' is the 'phenomenal realm' or, in traditional philosophical theology, 'the world' or even 'the fallen world'.

Furthermore, all finite things ('here below') are composed of parts and have a beginning and end in time - there is no particular thing to which this does not apply. So to all intents, that applies to everything that exists, every phenomenal thing ('all beings' or 'the ten thousand things' etc).

Whereas, if the first principle is not composed of parts, and doesn't begin and end in time, then how can you say of it that 'it exists'?

I think this type of understanding goes back to origins of Western metaphysics, the Parmenides: 'What is real, cannot not be, and what is not real, cannot come to be'. That began the 'dialectic of the nature of being and becoming' which was then elaborated over the subsequent centuries in theological philosophy.

Quoting Janus

there is also a sense in which what we think of as finite beings are in-finite insofar as they are not precisely bounded or determinate.

In this schema, particular beings - individuals - are created and therefore finite. In Christian doctrine, the soul might be immortal (although the details are somewhat mysterious) but the corporeal form is mortal.

This is a particular idea, with a particular history. You can find allusions to it in various philosophers and in philosophical theology. There's another OP I often link to, God Does Not Exist, by Bishop (!) Pierre Whalon. But it's hard to get the idea of apophatic theology, I do admit.

Quoting Wayfarer

You might say of 'the first principle', that it IS, but not that it exists.

Sure, but I didn't say God must exist, I said he must be. If God is, then God must be,which means that God is a being (albeit not a finite being). This is just a matter of the logic of the ideas; we must stick to that or we are simply talking nonsense. Of course God does cannot exist as an empirical being, that much is obvious.

Quoting Wayfarer

But it's hard to get the idea of apophatic theology, I do admit.

I am familiar enough with apophatic theology, so there's no need to be patronizing. Nothing at all can be said of God if you take the apophatic approach seriously; other than what God is not. This means we cannot say God is transcendent, immanent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, omnipotent or anything else at all. What use is such a notion of God? It constitutes a non-notion.

On the other hand its fine if you say that God cannot be known discursively, but only experientially, through affect. God then is a kind of human feeling. And Hegel does say something like this if I am not mistaken.

Quoting Wayfarer

As for 'God needing the world', I think any Christian would say, of course He does - why else did He wish to 'save' it?

I don't believe an orthodox Cristian would say that God needs the world. They might say God loves the world or cares about the world, but it is generally thought that, being omnipotent God could end the world in a heartbeat if He so willed. Of course there is an inherent contradiction involved in attributing any desire or emotion to an infinite, changeless, transcendent being.

Reply to Janus I wasn’t meaning to patronize, but not a lot of people get that there can be ‘non-empirical beings’.

Quoting Janus

God could end the world in a heartbeat if He so willed

I think the idea that the world is a gratuitous creation is liberating, somehow.

Quoting Janus

God then is a kind of human feeling.

God isn't so much a human feeling in this view (the experiential view), but rather the human feeling is pointing to the reality of God. By drawing the conclusion that "God is a kind of human feeling", you're beginning with the abstract concept of God and assigning it to "human feeling" instead of actually beginning with that feeling and experientially exploring whether it leads to "God". In other words, you (I think unintentionally) are setting up a straw man in which a God only accessible via experience can't actually exist in the first place.

Quoting Janus

I don't believe an orthodox Cristian would say that God needs the world.

You're correct, they wouldn't. The theology of sin, punishment, heaven and hell all prevent this concept from being acceptable.

Actually, it's fascinating to apply the concept of "need" to God. God is said to be Love itself, for instance; perfect, unconditional love. How do Love and Need interact?

Quoting Janus

being omnipotent God could end the world in a heartbeat if He so willed.

I've never understood the point of these hypotheticals about God. What's so compelling about this idea? If he did in fact end the world in a heartbeat, we wouldn't even be around to figure out what's so compelling... :-d

Quoting Wayfarer

I think the idea that the world is a gratuitous creation is liberating, somehow.

How so?

Reply to ?????????????

Can you explain "Being" for us, then?

Quoting ?????????????

This might be because it is never explained to them what's the difference between "existing" and "being".

Not an easy distinction to explain, I will admit.

Quoting ?????????????

I guess it is supposed to explain the contingency of the world's existence by identifying God's existence with his essence, whereas our existence and essence are distinct.

I would re-order those terms to say that: God is essence; existence emanates from God (essence). The physical world, and we humans, are existenants; emanations.

So I wouldn't assign existence and essence as separate concepts that apply to both God and us, but in apparently different ways. Rather, essence (God) -> existence (world).

Reply to ?????????????

Sure, the issue is actually that we're dealing with the most fundamental of fundamentals. But that's not begging the question; I'm not using a premise to support itself, for instance. What's actually happening is that language begins to fail here.

I'll offer a possible definition of essence: Ultimate Reality; the thing itself.

And a definition of existence: the creative emanation form essence. Our experience of existence, then, is largely an experience of the physical world, which is the creative emanation from essence.

Of course, then I would need to define "creative".

The key is ‘the way of negation’. That is something known in both Christian and Buddhist philosophy. It sounds very complicated when you try and articulate it verbally, but that’s because it arises from non-verbal understanding, which is of course central to the contemplative practice of monks from both traditions.

The problem we have is that we mostly reside in the verbal/discursive layer or level of mind. That is perfectly OK as far as it goes but when it comes to dealing with ‘the fundamental principle’ it is not particularly useful. It takes meditation, but in the Eastern sense of ‘dhyana’ rather than verbally thinking something over.

Here’s an example from Buddhism. There was a series of scriptures called Prajñ?p?ramit? which were the initial Mah?y?na sutras. Some of them were extremely lengthy, for instance comprising 108,000 stanzas containing many abstruse philosophical distinctions. However, there is one particular form of the Prajñ?p?ramit? which is called ‘Prajñ?p?ramit? in One Letter’, that letter being the Sanskrit letter ‘A’ (?). This is the negative particle, approximately equal to the English particle ‘un-‘ (as in unknown, unmade, etc.) That is the ‘way of negation in a single syllable’. There’s an equivalent in Zen, the Chinese character Mu, ?, which carries the same meaning.

In Western spiritual traditions, there are parallels, although of course the liturgical and dogmatic backgrounds are very different. Although, as one Zen teacher once remarked, languages are different everywhere, but hearts and lungs all work the same. ;-)

Quoting ?????????????

I wonder then if that's the right place for you

'That' meaning...?

Reply to ????????????? Ordinary life can be the theatre of practice, but it takes work.

Quoting ?????????????

I used "begs the question", not with its logical fallacy meaning, but as an idiomatic phrase which means that a specific claim leads to a specific question. I'm not a native speaker, so if that's not really an acceptable phrase, my apologies.

No problem, I just assumed you meant the logical fallacy. But, what you're describing instead just sounds like a request for a definition of terms, which I tentatively offered.

Quoting ?????????????

This seems more like another name, not as a definition which explains the term by description.

Ah, but now you seem to be "begging the question" by your own definition of that phrase. :) How would you go about defining "essence"? And if you have no definition, why critique mine? I ask that in good faith. In other words, you seem to either have a definition in mind yourself, or you have a reason for why you're interested in the question itself, despite not having a definition in mind. I'd like to hear either one, whichever it is. It would probably bring some clarity.

Quoting ?????????????

Surely, it seems like the category of existence can't apply to it, since it is prior to existence, but "prior" seems to be commonsensically understood in relation to existence.

I don't use the word "prior" because it erroneously suggests that time is a component of the relationship between essence and existence. The problem here is that we have trouble imagining existence as an emanation from essence without conceptualizing "emanation" as an action; thus something that happens within time. But if we imagine that essence gives birth to the entire physical universe as we know it (3 dimensions, plus time as the so-called 4th dimension), then the problem doesn't exist; existence is, then, the given reality of the physical world.

Quoting ?????????????

So, it seems to me that, either this emanation you talk about is nonsensical (i.e. language fails)

No; I don't equate the failure of language with "nonsense". The failure of language points to the metaphysical reality that I'm describing above.

Quoting ?????????????

or emanation is not temporal or causal in any way, but rather essence is a logical category immanent to the empirical world

Yes, as I argued above, emanation isn't temporal or casual; however, because I don't understand your conflation of "language failing" and "nonsense", I'm not sure how "essence" as a "logical category immanent to the empirical world" follows, although it sounds interesting.

Reply to ?????????????

No; the gap between philosophy and religion/mysticism needs to be bridged; tell the kids to keep off your lawn, and nothing will ever change.

Reply to ????????????? Well, beg to differ. I've worked an eight-hour day all my life (although currently I'm between contracts). There are times when I don't seem connected to the teaching, but I've been practicing zazen (meditation) for most of my adult life, and it's had a big impact overall.

I quite admire Hegel but the German idealists, generally, were exceedingly verbose. Really after Hegel, the whole grand tradition of idealism tended to collapse under its own weight. But that article I linked to, about Hegel's philosophy of religion, resonated with me, because it is informed by a certain kind of mystical sensibility. Hence my segue into Buddhist philosophy - because that's the practice that I have found is means to realise such an understanding in day-to-day life. But also because the 'way of negation' really is a universal teaching, and I can see the connection between that, and Hegel's philosophy of religion.

And also because one of the formative books in my philosophical development was The Central Philosophy of Buddhism by T R V Murti. This was published in 1955, written by an Oxford-educated Indian scholar, who drew many parallels between Buddhism and Western idealism, particularly Hegel, Kant, and Bradley. I read it in the late 70's when I first encountered Buddhism. Indeed, his book has rather fallen out of favour as it's regarded as rather romantic and overly influenced by Kant by the current Buddhist studies academics. But I discovered Kant through it, and a connection between Kant and Madhyamika which has stayed with me ever since.

Quoting ?????????????

The only definition of "essense" that I have in the back of my mind is that of the aristotelian tradition, since that's where Wayfarer takes it from. In short, it's definition usually comes in the form of: "that by which something is what it is".

Right. For my own conception, I would take it further and say that essence is Being itself. See how language becomes inadequate here? Now we're moving unto Wittgenstein's slippery ice, which is the same as the Christian Mystic's "ungrund", etc...

Quoting ?????????????

But what you do here is substitute "emanates from" with "gives birth to", so the problem does exist, because we conceptualise birth as action too.

What? Nowhere in that quote did I substitute "emanates from" with "gives birth to".

Quoting ?????????????

For it to point there you have to already be aware of this metaphysical reality somehow.

Right; see my comments to John about an experiential apprehension of God. I've argued nothing else.

Quoting ?????????????

To be honest, I'm not sure if it's language that becomes inadequate or if it's just inadequate use of language.

Can you describe why you think that?

Quoting ?????????????

According to you, existence emanates from being itself. Can you describe what that means?

God (Being) creates (emanates) existence (the universe).

Quoting ?????????????

You wrote "The problem here is that we have trouble imagining existence as an emanation from essence without conceptualizing "emanation" as an action; thus something that happens within time. But if we imagine that essence gives birth to the entire physical universe as we know".

Right, that wasn't consisent; "gives birth to" is a metaphor though; it can still work. What I was illustrating is that language here always presupposes a physical apparatus when trying to describe existence emanating from being. All that's needed is to acknowledge the limitation and be conscious of it; that's why "gives birth to" is a valid metaphor, but only if we're both aware that its only a metaphor. The limits of language, again.

Quoting ?????????????

But it doesn't seem to work. You can only find out if "it leads to "God"", if you assume the abstract concept of God in the first place.

Why?

Quoting ?????????????

Then, there is another problem. Your last sentence, which refers to God's existence

An inconsistency of terms, yes.

You people have read more theology, and authors like Hegel and Tillich, than I have, but what's been said here, in the quotes and in the discussion, makes sense to me. It seems that nothing can be said about God, other than as the possessor of the universal benevolence, good intent, that is evident behind the world.

Likewise the notion of God not being subject to the distinction of "existing" or "not existing".. I've been wording that by saying that God isn't an element of metaphysics.

I use the word "Reality" broadly, to include God. As for the word "is", I think it's right to say that it makes sense to distinguish it from "exists", and to only apply "exists" to elements of metaphysics.

I avoid the word "create" because it seems anthropormorphic.

Michael Ossipoff

Quoting Wayfarer

I wasn’t meaning to patronize, but not a lot of people get that there can be ‘non-empirical beings’.

OK, it seemed you were implying that I was one of them, but if not then I misread you.

Quoting Wayfarer

I think the idea that the world is a gratuitous creation is liberating, somehow.

It could seem liberating in an arbitrary kind of way I suppose. That view of God holds no appeal for me. I think when we think about God, transcendence, and the like, we can only follow our imaginations and the logic of what we can, however vaguely, imagine. Or we can use poetic language to evoke the numinous. Is there another alternative?

Quoting Noble Dust

God isn't so much a human feeling in this view (the experiential view), but rather the human feeling is pointing to the reality of God. By drawing the conclusion that "God is a kind of human feeling", you're beginning with the abstract concept of God and assigning it to "human feeling" instead of actually beginning with that feeling and experientially exploring whether it leads to "God". In other words, you (I think unintentionally) are setting up a straw man in which a God only accessible via experience can't actually exist in the first place.

You have misunderstood what I said very well here!

God is known to us only as a feeling, however faint or profound. and an imagining or intuition, however vague or vivid. We develop our ideas about God from our feelings, imagination and intuitions and they can only be assessed in terms of their logical consistency. So, I think that, for example, purported logical proofs of God's existence are hopeless.

So, I am not saying that God is thought to be a "kind of human feeling", but that he is, for us, a kind of feeling. That is, if we don't feel his presence then there is no God for us. We cannot conclude anything about God's purportedly actual existence or attributes , from feeling his presence, except that he is a much greater being that we are connected with, although that doesn't prevent people from trying to.

So, you have it quite the wrong way around here, I'm not beginning from an abstract concept at all. but from the feeling of the presence of God. A God accessible only via experience may or may not "exist" or better, be, but this is not something discursively decidable in any case; rather it is something we either feel or do not, and thus have faith in or do not.

Quoting Noble Dust

How do Love and Need interact?

Somehow, it doesn't seem odd to say that God loves us, but it does to say that he needs us. I think this is a bias due to our Christian heritage. From a quite different perspective Spinoza denied that God loves the world, because his God is eternal and changeless; and it would be a mistake to impute any emotion to such a being. On the other hand, Spinoza's God in a certain sense needs us (insofar as he must have us), because the world and everything in it just as it is, is as necessary as God is. I mean in one sense of course God is a necessary being and we are merely contingent beings; but that is the purely logical sense. Ontologically speaking, because God's nature is necessary every manifestation of it is equally necessary; everything is utterly determined by that necessity, and Spinoza sees God not as possessing free will in the "absolute fiat" sense any more than he sees us as possessing free will in that sense.

I'm not arguing for Spinoza's conception of God, though; I think it is too much based on logic and not enough on affect.

Quoting Noble Dust

I've never understood the point of these hypotheticals about God. What's so compelling about this idea? If he did in fact end the world in a heartbeat, we wouldn't even be around to figure out what's so compelling... :-d

I was just pointing out that it is a common Christian conception that follows from the idea that God is omnipotent, that he doesn't need the world at all, and that the world is a gift of divine fiat and grace. I don't think God is omnipotent at all; the idea leads to too many contradictions, and also it is not something we could ever feel in any case.

Reply to Wayfarer Reply to Janus

I was reading a nice article on Peirce/Schelling/Hegel/Emerson that you guys might appreciate. It says something deep about a "philosopher's" notion of the divine.

Returning to the Unformed: Emerson and Peirce on the “Law of Mind”, John Kaag
http://www.pucsp.br/pragmatismo/dowloads/lectures_papers/kaag-paper-04-10-12.pdf

The gist is that Hegel is like all those who make ontological arguments that presume the intelligibility of the world must reflect the already existing intelligibilty of a comprehending and reasoning mind.

But really, ontology has to start by facing the "monstrous ground" of the unformed. Pure indeterminancy or spontaneity.

Any creation story has to begin with uncomprending irrationality as its basis.

At the beginning of Peirce’s “Law of Mind,” he makes a statement that all of us know: “I have begun by showing that tychism must give birth to an evolutionary cosmology, in which all the regularities of nature and of mind are regarded as products of growth, and a Schelling-fashioned idealism which holds matter to be mere specialized and partially deadened mind." Perhaps we are less familiar with Emerson’s comment at the beginning of his “Laws of Mind” in 1870 when he states that, “I am of the oldest religion.
Leaving aside the question which was prior, egg or bird, I believe the mind is the creator of the world, and is ever creating; - that at last Matter is dead Mind.” Peirce suggests that this intellectual overlap between himself and Emerson – about matter being “deadened mind” – was a function of their shared indebtedness to German idealism, and I would argue, particularly to Schelling.

...For Schelling, they were meant to signal a break from the idealism of Hegel, which involved the working out of a well-articulated notion of reason. Schelling’s positive philosophy sought to systematically describe the relationship between the self and the objective world, like most idealist writings of his time, but it also required an account freedom that was not found in Hegel. For Schelling, as opposed to many other idealists of the time, the “alpha and the omega of philosophy was freedom.” Freedom depended on a type of existential contingency that could not be reduced to Hegelian self-mediation.

...For Schelling, as opposed to Hegel, one of these preconditions of freedom is difficult to articulate because it is the “unformed,” or what Schelling often calls the abyss or Abgrund. It is this abyss of the
unformed that serves as the curious ground, or more literally, the groundless ground, of freedom for Schelling.

...Here we begin to get a sense of what Peirce meant by “being stricken” by the “monstrous mysticism of the East.” With these eastern traditions comes a monster: the unspeakable notion that appears in Schelling’s Essay on Human Freedom, namely the idea of the Abgrund. Commentators of Peirce, such as Niemoczynski brush up against the meaning of the Abgrund (which I think he accurately identifies, following Heidgegger, as the ontological difference between nature natured and nature naturing), but he then quickly turn to the closely related concept of Firstness, which he defines as the “potentiating ground” of existence.
A surprisingly large amount is then said about Firstness – how it is possibility, potentiality, “an infinitude that sustains, enables, and empowers all else” (124) By the time we return to the topic of the Abgrund, we find, according to Niemoczynski, that “like Firstness, it remains a pre-rational ground of feeling and possibility lying incomprehensibly at the basis of all thing.”
But then he goes one step further, and perhaps one step too far: the Abgrund is the place “where the life of God swells and surges forth from within ontological difference.” I believe that this theistic reading of the Abgrund, which is certainly consonant with Boehm and Schelling, is misleading if attributed to Peirce.
Certainly, Peirce writes the “Law of Mind” on the heels of his often-cited mystical experience, at a point where he even self-identifies as a religious man, perhaps for the first time. That being said, I am uncomfortable, deeply uncomfortable, with something about this reading, namely that it invites to us rest in rather comfortable philosophical conclusion, to develop a system of religious naturalism with clean hands.
Peirce was many things, but he was not restful, and he did not have clean hands. Indeed, a quick look at his papers at Houghton Library makes one thing perfectly clear: his hands were always dirty and always moving. Approaching, experiencing, recoiling from the Abgrund, the name of the unnamable. Repeatedly. Ceaselessly. If Peirce regarded the Abgrund as the locus of God’s life, this fact did not translate into his development of a well articulated religious naturalism (like Robert Corrington’s) or a systematic philosophy (like Robert Neville’s). No, the Abgrund remained, for Peirce at least, necessarily monstrous. It repels and repels repeatedly.
This explains why Peirce and Emerson remained unwilling to systematize existence. They believed that the “unformed” of existence called for a particular kind of response. Emerson writes that “To Be is the unsolved, unsolvable wonder. To Be, in its two connections of inward and outward, the mind and nature. The wonder subsists, and age, though of eternity, could not approach a solution.” Analysis is not sufficient to approach a solution. The best that one can do is dwell in the problem.

...Figuratively speaking, a monster can be any object of dread or awe, anything with a repulsive character. The Abgrund, however, is no object. In fact, it is no-thing at all. How can no-thing at all be
monstrous?
Perhaps a word from Emerson in 1870 might help us understand: “Silent…Nature offers every morning her wealth to Man. She is immensely rich; he is welcome to her entire goods. But she speaks no word, will not as much as beckon or cough only this – she is careful to leave all her doors ajar, - towers, hall, storeroom, and cellar. If he takes her hint, and uses her goods, she speaks no word. If he blunders and starves she says nothing” (bMS Am 1280 212 (1) Harvard Lectures. Introduction “In Praise of Knowledge”).
To one that listens with all ears (to a listener like Peirce) “saying nothing” and being-silent is truly monstrous.

...For Peirce, the groundless ground, the Abgrund, serves as a warning and reminder to those that would like to tell exhaustive and determinate stories about existence, human or otherwise. It poses an unshakable question to those in search of hard and fast answers.

Quoting ?????????????

why can't we just claim that there are multiple gods or that the universe is eternal, self-caused, necessary or some such?

Or, orbiting teapots, or the flying spaghetti monster, or....

Quoting Janus

I think when we think about God, transcendence, and the like, we can only follow our imaginations and the logic of what we can, however vaguely, imagine. Or we can use poetic language to evoke the numinous. Is there another alternative?

To discuss it under the heading 'philosophy of religion'?

Here we begin to get a sense of what Peirce meant by “being stricken” by the “monstrous mysticism of the East.” With these eastern traditions comes a monster: the unspeakable notion that appears in Schelling’s Essay on Human Freedom, namely the idea of the Abgrund.

Perhaps it's really 'the unconscious' - we become aware that we ourselves are very strange and unknown creatures. Although in Peirce's day, almost nothing was known of actual Eastern mystics -that wouldn't occur until the World Parliament of Religions, in (let's see) 1890 or so, associated with the Chicago World Fair. There, the three leading representative of the 'monstrous mysticism of the East', were Swami Vivekananda, a Vedantin, who spoke eloquently and subsequently toured the US by railroad, giving many addresses, and published a set of six books on 'the science of Yoga' which are still in circulation; Soyen Shaku Roshi, a Rinzai Zen monk who also went on to spend some time in America and arguably initiated Zen Buddhism in North America; and Dharmapala, a Sri Lankan Buddhist reformer. All unspeakable formless monsters, doubtlessly ;-)

Emerson:I believe the mind is the creator of the world, and is ever creating

In Plotinus, Nous is described as God, or more precisely an image of God, often referred to as the Demiurge. It thinks its own contents, which are thoughts, equated to the Platonic ideas or forms (eide). The thinking of this Intellect is the highest activity of life. The actualization (energeia) of this thinking is the being of the forms. This Intellect is the first principle or foundation of existence.

I'm pretty sure that is the source of the Emerson quote.

The first verse of the Dhammapada says 'what we are today comes from our thoughts of yesterday, and our present thoughts build our life of tomorrow: our life is the creation of our mind' (Mascaro translation).

There is a similarity, but also a difference. The dhammapada is not proposing an ontology - 'our life is the creation of our mind'. Whereas, in Western philosophy, to speak of 'creating the world' is about the origin of the actual cosmos.

But then, 'the world' is in some sense always 'the world as it's known by us'; we're not able to get outside of that (per Kant).

Quoting apokrisis

Hegel is like all those who make ontological arguments that presume the intelligibility of the world must reflect the already existing intelligibilty of a comprehending and reasoning mind.

But 'synthetic a priori judgements' are possible. In other words, certain predictions can be made infallibly, on the basis of premises that don't necessarily entail that conclusion by logic alone. The mind has the ability to penetrate, to some extent, the nature of things, purely on the basis of reason alone. The whole history of science is evidence of that.

But that whole debate between Schelling and Hegel, and what Emerson and Peirce make of it, bespeaks great confusion as far as I am concerned. I think on such matters I prefer Soyen Shaku, whose book of lectures given after the World Parliament of Religions is still in print, and a model of lucid philosophical and religious reasoning.


Soyen Shaku Roshi.

Quoting ?????????????

Because of the seemingly unnecessary identification of otherwise distinct concepts (essence-being), which could perform different functions in the argument.

Unnecessary identification with what? I don't understand this sentence. "Essence-being" is (are?) otherwise distinct concepts, except for how I'm using them? Are you saying my usage is blurring the distinction? I honestly can't tell.

Quoting ?????????????

And why can't we just claim that there are multiple gods or that the universe is eternal, self-caused, necessary or some such?

I don't know; why not?

Quoting ?????????????

What does your version of God (Being) explains that can't be explained by the other options?

It's robust, as ol' VagabondSpectre would say. A single, infinite, eternal, primordial, free, un-grounded Being which is the emanator of existence. It's actually a deceptively simple idea. Our Western obsession with categorization, definition, and splintering of abstract concepts gets in the way of experiencing how "omni" the concept is.

Quoting ?????????????

Or maybe what we have is use of language in a context where it's not meant to be used.

Right...the limits of language...

Quoting ?????????????

But even if we accept that it's a metaphor, what is it a metaphor for?

For how the known universe came into existence. Clearly...

Quoting ?????????????

If the metaphor is all we have, we don't seem to have much.

No; metaphor is the basis and structure of language itself. That means it's the structure of how we perceive the world through experience.

Quoting Noble Dust

which is the emanation of existence

emanator, I would have thought, i.e. 'existence' emanates from this, not vice versa.

Quoting Janus

God is known to us only as a feeling, however faint or profound.

Ok, I hate to play this card, but, in good faith, can you define "feeling" here? It would be helpful.

Quoting Janus

We develop our ideas about God from our feelings, imagination and intuitions and they can only be assessed in terms of their logical consistency. So, I think that, for example, purported logical proofs of God's existence are hopeless.

First, I don't quite agree, because I don't rule out the possibility of actual, real, connection with and/or direct experience of God. I'm reading Evelyn Underhill's "Mysticism" currently (thanks to Reply to Wayfarer 's rec), and am feeling quite at home. But of course, it's hard to make a philosophical argument for the reality of direct experience of God...

But, that's exactly the reason why I agree with your second statement; logical proofs don't do much for me either, but for the reasons stated above.

Quoting Janus

So, I am not saying that God is thought to be a "kind of human feeling", but that he is, for us, a kind of feeling.

That's the same thing still. Look at those two phrases: "a kind of human feeling" and "he is, for us, a kind of feeling".

Quoting Janus

So, you have it quite the wrong way around here, I'm not beginning from an abstract concept at all.

Ok, I see that now, yes.

Quoting Janus

A God accessible only via experience may or may not "exist" or better, be, but this is not something discursively decidable in any case; rather it is something we either feel or do not, and thus have faith in or do not.

I agree, except that I always place priority on experience. Because, as I've attempted to argue many times, experience is reality. Nothing escapes the realm of experience, not even logical proofs for or against God's existence; not even discursive reasoning to bolster an argument for or against. The strongest logical proofs from the most brilliant minds are still mere moments in the constant stream of experience.

Quoting Janus

Somehow, it doesn't seem odd to say that God loves us, but it does to say that he needs us. I think this is a bias due to our Christian heritage.

It is. It took me quite awhile to accept my nagging intuition that God has need for man.

Quoting Janus

I'm not arguing for Spinoza's conception of God, though; I think it is too much based on logic and not enough on affect.

I agree. It's murky territory, though. Viewing God as Being which emanates existence (of which we are a part), it's easier to imagine not that God needs us and us him/her (logically), but rather that we are literally a generative aspect of the divine, thus inseparable. So the concept of "need" sort of falls flat, and it's rather an inexorable teleological movement towards irresistible future Union. Love isn't so much the mechanism of that movement, then, but rather a description of that irresistible movement.

Reply to Wayfarer

You're right, thank you. Edited.

Quoting Wayfarer

I think when we think about God, transcendence, and the like, we can only follow our imaginations and the logic of what we can, however vaguely, imagine. Or we can use poetic language to evoke the numinous. Is there another alternative? — Janus


To discuss it under the heading 'philosophy of religion'?

It seems to be irrelevant what heading we discuss it under. How would we discuss it "under the heading of philosophy of religion" other than by thinking "about God, transcendence and the like" by following "our imaginations and the logic of whatever we can, however vaguely, imagine."? Is there another methodology separate from imagination and logic when it comes to metaphysics or philosophy of religion or whatever you want to call it, and if so what do you think it is?

Quoting ?????????????

You wrote "God is essence". Then you gave it other names too, Being, Being Itself, Thing In itself, Ultimate reality etc. So, I took it that you identified them. For example, a thomist would not do that, he would identify essence as that by which something is what it is, so that he could argue, among lots of other things, that the world's essence is distinct from its existence, that is to say its existence is contingent, while God's essence is identical with Its existence, that is to say, God is His act of existence, Being itself, ipsum esse subsistens. To do that, he needed not just the concept of existence but that of essence as well. An option which is not open to you if you're going to use "essence" as just another name for Being.

I'm not a Thomist, so...I don't know. My concept still stands against what you're saying here, as far as I can see.

Quoting ?????????????

Why not what?

You asked "why not" originally here, so you tell me.

Quoting ?????????????

but the difficult thing to do is to explain in understandable language (since you express these properties in language as well) what they mean and show why they apply to A and not to B.

Right, it's difficult because it's impossible, because logic isn't the correct tool to use to apprehend the concept.

Quoting ?????????????

Or its bad usage.

No, don't misquote. You said:

Quoting ?????????????

Or maybe what we have is use of language in a context where it's not meant to be used.

To which I said:

Quoting Noble Dust

Right...the limits of language...

Quoting ?????????????

Clearly that is a generality and as such is not informative in the least. A doctor can tell you the exact process of human birth. That is to say, when he uses the name "birth" there's something specific this name refers to. So, if he uses a metaphor for "birth", I know where this metaphor ultimately refers to because I know where "birth" refers to. It's not referring just to another name (i.e how babies exit the womb), it refers to a specific process.

What??? A metaphor describes a concept in non-literal terms, via equating two otherwise disparate concepts or objects. You're literally describing to me right now how a doctor can literally describe birth as a literal process. That has nothing to do with metaphor.

Quoting ?????????????

No, it's not. Unless you were using "metaphor" metaphorically.

Existence, being, and metaphor all disagree with you, and that just based on a shallow Google search.

Quoting Noble Dust

Ok, I hate to play this card, but, in good faith, can you define "feeling" here? It would be helpful.

Don't we all know what feeling is? An emotion that moves us? For example do you know love if you have not felt it? Why should it be different with God?

Quoting Noble Dust

First, I don't quite agree, because I don't rule out the possibility of actual, real, connection with and/or direct experience of God.

How do you think we would experience that other than as a feeling? It cannot be merely an idea, no?

Quoting Noble Dust

But of course, it's hard to make a philosophical argument for the reality of direct experience of God...

The reality of the experience is in the reality of the feeling, isn't it? Where else? Of course you can have faith that the reality of the feeling shows you that God is a reality, but we don't even know what God's independent reality could mean, any more than we know what the independent reality of anything we experience could mean.

Quoting Noble Dust

That's the same thing still. Look at those two phrases: "a kind of human feeling" and "he is, for us, a kind of feeling".

There is a logical distinction between how we experience God (as a feeling) and how we think of God (as something beyond, and yet co-originary of, our feeling, for one possible example)

Quoting Noble Dust

I agree, except that I always place priority on experience. Because, as I've attempted to argue many times, experience is reality. Nothing escapes the realm of experience, not even logical proofs for or against God's existence; not even discursive reasoning to bolster an argument for or against. The strongest logical proofs from the most brilliant minds are still mere moments in the constant stream of experience.

So, for you God cannot be both in and beyond our experience? If God cannot "escape the realm of experience" then he cannot be an independent entity at all, but would remain confined to the human feeling of his presence.

Quoting Noble Dust

it's easier to imagine not that God needs us and us him/her (logically), but rather that we are literally a generative aspect of the divine, thus inseparable.

If we think of God as the origin of our experience, of our very selves, then logically in that sense we need him more than he needs us. He is a necessary being whose essence it is to exist, and we are contingent beings, whose essence does not entail existence, as per Spinoza.

.

Reply to apokrisis

Looks interesting, thanks apo.

Quoting Wayfarer

Hegel is like all those who make ontological arguments that presume the intelligibility of the world must reflect the already existing intelligibilty of a comprehending and reasoning mind. — apokrisis


But 'synthetic a priori judgements' are possible. In other words, certain predictions can be made infallibly, on the basis of premises that don't necessarily entail that conclusion by logic alone. The mind has the ability to penetrate, to some extent, the nature of things, purely on the basis of reason alone. The whole history of science is evidence of that.

And yet this possibility of 'synthetic a priori judgements' tells us nothing, ontologically speaking. You say the mind "has the ability to penetrate to some extent"; how can you possibly judge the extent of the mind's penetration and what are the absolute conditions that enable it?

But that whole debate between Schelling and Hegel, and what Emerson and Peirce make of it, bespeaks great confusion as far as I am concerned. I think on such matters I prefer Soyen Shaku,

Are you familiar with the "whole debate" in all its intricacies?

Quoting Janus

Don't we all know what feeling is?

I just wanted to know what you meant. So you meant emotion, right? That's how I'm reading each instance of the world "feeling" in your subsequent post, now, given your response. The definition of "feeling" is never at all clear to me, in these discussions.

Quoting Janus

How do you think we would experience that other than as a feeling? It cannot be merely an idea, no?

Is an experience of blinding, unexpected sunlight a "feeling", or is it an "idea"? Or, is it something else entirely?

Quoting Janus

The reality of the experience is in the reality of the feeling, isn't it?

The reality of the (emotion)? No.

Quoting Janus

but we don't even know what God's independent reality could mean, any more than we know what the independent reality of anything we experience could mean.

Oh? If "feeling" just meanings "emotion", and if that's our only experiential pipeline to God, then sure...

Quoting Janus

So, for you God cannot be both in and beyond our experience?

No, that's not true per my view. What made you think so?

Quoting Janus

If God cannot "escape the realm of experience" then he cannot be an independent entity at all, but would remain confined to the human feeling of his presence.

And I didn't say that; what made you assume I meant this?

I described how experience is unescapable. Pure and simple. I made no assumptions about how this relates to God, in that specific paragraph. I'd be happy to clear up the distinction and then move on to bringing in the problem of God into that reality.

Quoting Janus

If we think of God as the origin of our experience, of our very selves, then logically in that sense we need him more than he needs us.

No; why would that follow? Why assume that "created needs creator", and yet "creator needs not created"? I see no logical series there.

Quoting ?????????????

If your previous answer was just a declaration of inability, then I'm content with that. It's enough to show that you just assume a whole lot of stuff.

You're right; I routinely declare my inability, and do my best to show that I assume a whole lot of stuff. It's my duty as a philosophy forum member; nay, it's my duty as a student of the neurotic insanity of Western Thought.

Quoting ?????????????

Right, so next time a thread like this comes up, we'd better post poems, songs and paintings instead of using phrases like "A single, infinite, eternal, primordial, free, un-grounded Being which is the emanator of existence" pretending they say something that makes sense.

Are you making fun of me because you sincerely think I'm an idiot, or because your logical mind can't extricate itself from it's series of logical proofs in order to entertain the possibility of a reality that exists beyond logical thought? And thus ad homs are the only defense against the gaping black hole of the possibility of your entire philosophical structure having weak foundations? I'm asking in good faith.

Quoting ?????????????

I don't misquote, that's what I mean by bad usage.

Thank God!

Quoting ?????????????

The doctor's metaphor for birth does not merely refer to a name (birth).

What doctor is using a metaphor for birth, and where? A doctor literally gives birth to babies; that is, a doctor who's job it is to do so.

Quoting ?????????????

Your metaphor instead refers to nothing specific, it just refers to a name which you use for something you can't even describe.

I mean this sincerely; you seem to not understand what a metaphor is. I gave a provisional definition earlier, if you're interested.

Quoting ?????????????

Apropos of nothing.

The etymology of words and their metaphorical changes are apropos of nothing, yes, absolutely.

Quoting Noble Dust

I just wanted to know what you meant. So you meant emotion, right? That's how I'm reading each instance of the world "feeling" in your subsequent post, now, given your response. The definition of "feeling" is never at all clear to me, in these discussions.

A feeling is an affect; it is being-affected, moved. Not all feeling are emotions in the ordinary sense of the emotions we categorize: fear. anxiety, love, hate, jealousy, lust, greed and so on.

Quoting Noble Dust

No, that's not true per my view. What made you think so?

This:
Quoting Noble Dust

Because, as I've attempted to argue many times, experience is reality. Nothing escapes the realm of experience,

Although I suppose if God is nothing then he can escape the realm of experience.

Quoting Noble Dust

Is an experience of blinding, unexpected sunlight a "feeling", or is it an "idea"? Or, is it something else entirely?

That is experience of the empirical

kind, about which we can have not only feelings but definite ideas that are determinably correct or incorrect.: we are not discussing that.

Quoting Noble Dust

The reality of the (emotion)? No.

I hope it is obvious I am speaking about experiences that are not of empirical objects.

Quoting Noble Dust

No; why would that follow? Why assume that "created needs creator", and yet "creator needs not created"? I see no logical series there.

Because logically if we are created by a creator then we are dependent on that creator in an obvious way that the creator is not, purely logically speaking, dependent on us, and certainly not on any one of us; and not even ontologically dependent on us unless all events are absolutely necessary unfolding of God's nature, that is, determined.

Quoting ?????????????

That's a virtue, you're lucky to have it.

Well, I wrote that response sarcastically, but then re-read it after I posted it, and noticed that it had a sincere meaning as well. Take it as an Artist's Statement. Dare I say a metaphorical statement? Ah, the beauty of metaphor: it's interpretation depends on the interpreter.

Quoting ?????????????

You're asking in good faith, assuming my bad faith.

Yes, because the majority of your response two replies ago to me was an insult.

Quoting ?????????????

I think I do. If you think I don't point to my misunderstanding.

Quoting ?????????????

Right. It has to do with what the metaphor refers to. The doctor's metaphor for birth does not merely refer to a name (birth). It ultimately refers to that that the name refers to. Your metaphor instead refers to nothing specific, it just refers to a name which you use for something you can't even describe.

In this paragraph, you mysteriously refer to "the doctor's metaphor"; I have no idea what that is. Then your sentences which I quoted follow. I honestly don't understand what you mean. It looks as if you don't understand what I mean by metaphor, but maybe that's not the case.

Quoting ?????????????

If you imply that "the etymology of words and their metaphorical changes" is related to "That means it's the structure of how we perceive the world through experience.", then feel free to clarify on it.

What I'm trying to point out (and maybe haven't so far) is that much of language consists of "dead metaphors". I brought this up specifically because you seemed to be dismissing metaphor as having any philosophical weight.

Quoting Janus

it is being-affected, moved.

Sorry again, but given the use of "being" in this thread, I'm not sure what this means.

Quoting Janus

Not all feeling are emotions in the ordinary sense of the emotions we categorize: fear. anxiety, love, hate, jealousy, lust, greed and so on.

I think I get the sense; would nostalgia, or the stronger feeling underneath nostalgia (almost Plato's remembering, if you know what I mean), count as a feeling, then?

Quoting Janus

No, that's not true per my view. What made you think so?
— Noble Dust

This:
Because, as I've attempted to argue many times, experience is reality. Nothing escapes the realm of experience,
— Noble Dust

Ah, right. I do tend to muddle my terms, in part because I'm a hobbyist, and in part because I'm rusty, not having posted here much recently. Let me try again.

When I say "experience is reality", I mean that nothing within our personal windshield view of life exists outside of experience. This actually seems stupid and nonsensical because of how obvious it is, but the reason I feel the need to bring this up is that, in philosophy, abstract logical arguments are bandied about with such rapier-like dexterity, that, amongst all the expert jabs and defenses, the simple reality of experience (the jousting rink itself) gets forgotten. But not only that; emotions and mental states (states of self-imposed "reality") do the same thing; they create a world. But all of these worlds, imposed and helped by various mental and spiritual faculties, all exist within experience.

So, now, in regards to God: God represents, in this metaphor, the jousting rink itself. And yes, that was not clear previously in my posts. Does that make more sense?

Quoting Janus

That is experience of the empirical

kind, about which we can have not only feelings but definite ideas that are determinably correct or incorrect.: we are not discussing that.

I meant that as a metaphor.

Quoting Janus

Because logically if we are created by a creator then we are dependent on that creator in an obvious way that the creator is not, purely logically speaking, dependent on us, and certainly not on any one of us; and not even ontologically dependent on us unless all events are absolutely necessary unfolding of God's nature, that is, determined.

I disagree. What is a creator without a creation? Certainly not a creator.

Quoting Noble Dust

I disagree. What is a creator without a creation? Certainly not a creator.

If you are a creator your being does not depend on that. You might create paintings for example, but you will still exist if you do not. On the other the created; the paintings, will not exist if you do not create them.

The rest later.

Reply to Janus

No, you're missing what I'm saying. A creator is not a creator unless something is created. A painter is not a painter until a painting is painted.

Reply to Noble Dust

God is not necessarily merely a creator, though. So his necessary existence does not logically depend on him creating anything, whereas the existence of what he creates does so depend..

Quoting Janus

God is known to us only as a feeling, however faint or profound. and an imagining or intuition, however vague or vivid.

That does leave something out, namely, the idea of there being a revealed truth.

Quoting Janus

How would we discuss it "under the heading of philosophy of religion" other than by thinking "about God, transcendence and the like" by following "our imaginations and the logic of whatever we can, however vaguely, imagine."? Is there another methodology separate from imagination and logic when it comes to metaphysics or philosophy of religion or whatever you want to call it, and if so what do you think it is?

I mean, aside from what is felt about it, there is a domain of discourse. The meaning of the ideas that have been debated in the history of the subject, aren’t simply a matter of feeling, even though ‘feeling’ is indeed central to it. I do acknowledge my own grasp of the formal or traditional debates on such matters is rudimentary but I would still like to consider these ideas through those perspectives rather than consigning the whole matter to feeling.

Quoting Janus

yet this possibility of 'synthetic a priori judgements' tells us nothing, ontologically speaking. You say the mind "has the ability to penetrate to some extent"; how can you possibly judge the extent of the mind's penetration and what are the absolute conditions that enable it?

The computer you’re writing that on, could never have been developed without the facility I’m referring to. What it means is that we can have certain knowledge of some things, beyond the scope of perception - we know some things must be the case, even though we can’t see the evidence for those things at the time we make that prediction. A case in point are the many correct predictions of the theory of relativity which, at the time they were made, were not able to be empirically validated. But as the apparatus improved, the results come in, which, as far as I know, have always amounted to: ‘Einstein proved right, again’. (@Apokrisis - am I wrong here?)

Quoting Janus

God is not necessarily merely a creator, though.

What else would God be?

Quoting Janus

So his necessary existence does not logically depend on him creating anything, whereas the existence of what he creates does so depend..

That necessary existence in which nothing was created, then, would be something completely incomprehensible to created beings like us (or non-created if you like, atheistically). Which essentially renders that idea incomprehensible.

Again, consider the aphorism: A painter is only a painter once a painting is painted.

In other words, the existence from which you are currently discursively arguing, is the painting itself. You can't actually ask whether the painter could be a painter without the painting, because the painting is the perspective from which you're trying to apprehend the painter; the method through which you came to exist (as an member of the painting).

Quoting Wayfarer

That does leave something out, namely, the idea of there being a revealed truth.

But the idea of there being a revealed truth is either a feeling or a thought that is part of the experience of revelation, or it is a feeling or thought about the experience that comes after.
So, I have a vision accompanied by a profound felling of ecstasy: what I see is just an image; its real significance lies in what I feel about it.

Quoting Wayfarer

I mean, aside form what is felt about it, there is a domain of discourse.

But that domain of discourse consists in what others have felt and imagined, and thought about what they had felt and imagined.

Quoting Wayfarer

The computer you’re writing that on, could never have been developed without the facility I’m referring to.

But that still says nothing at all about the ontological status of the computer.

Quoting Noble Dust

What else would God be?

An infinite being absorbed in absolute ecstasy, for example. ;)

In the Christian vision God creates the world from nothing at a particular time, in the sense that the world has not always existed. God, on the other hand, has always existed, so logically, creating, on that view, cannot be all there is to God.

Quoting Noble Dust

In other words, the existence from which you are currently discursively arguing, is the painting itself.

I can't see the relevance here. We finite temporal beings try to think from the 'point of view' of an eternal infinite being. If we simply cannot do that at all, then saying that God is either dependent upon or independent of us would be equally empty and nonsensical; as would any discourse about God at all.

Quoting Janus

An infinite being absorbed in absolute ecstasy, for example.

But that's nonsensical; it doesn't apply to experience, theology, or...anything else, as far as I can see. It's purely abstract, which is to say, nonsensical. So, my question of what God could possibly be, other than a creator, still stands.

Quoting Janus

In the Christian vision God creates the world from nothing at a particular time, in the sense that the world has not always existed.

God doesn't create the world at a particular time if time itself is an aspect of the world that he created. So, in this view, God creating the world would be an emanation from eternity. I know that sounds vague, but what I mean is that God, eternally existant, would actionally express himself in such a way so as to create a reality in which time is also created as a function of said reality.

Quoting Janus

God, on the other hand, has always existed, so creating on that view cannot be all there is to God.

I think this stunts the concept of creation. Take Tielhard's view, for example. God is an ever-evolving entity; creation, in his view, is an ever-evolving process that is part and parcel to God. Creation isn't an act within time that didn't exist, and then did exist. Creation is an aspect of God; an ever-evolving process. As humans, our participation in that creative act manifests itself as precious little dips into the river. Dips into the river which are often refreshing, profound, and life-giving.

Quoting Janus

I can't see the relevance here. We finite temporal beings try to think from the 'point of view' of an eternal infinite being.

But I wasn't saying that within that specific metaphor of the painting; in that metaphor, the painting is reality (the thing which God created). I was trying to point out that we all, ultimately, think from the perspective of experience: "the painting itself".

Quoting Janus

If we simply cannot do that at all, then saying that God is either dependent upon or independent of us would be equally empty and nonsensical; as would any discourse about God at all.

Well, there I'm open more to interpretation, because it's not clear to me at all whether we are dependent on God, or whether God is dependent on us, or some other state. And all for the reasons and arguments I've laid out here. But my intuition, for what it's worth, is that God has a greater need for us than we know.

Quoting Janus

So, I have a vision accompanied by a profound felling of ecstasy:

I actually meant, by revealed truth, documents including The Bible. The ‘domain of discourse’ is about more than ‘feelings’, as it also describes alleged historical instances and events and then reflection on and discussion of those events. It’s not simply subjective.

Quoting Janus

that still says nothing at all about the ontological status of the computer.

Are you sure you know the significance of the ‘synthetic a priori’?

Quoting Noble Dust

But that's nonsensical; it doesn't apply to experience, theology, or...anything else, as far as I can see.

It's basically the Hindu conception of Brahman: Satchitananda. I have said all along that theology is worked out from imagination and experience via logic. This is obviously one of the possibilities of God's infinite eternal existence that is capable of being imagined, so calling it "nonsense" won't do unless you are a logical positivist or something like that.

Quoting Noble Dust

God doesn't create the world at a particular time if time itself is an aspect of the world that he created. So, in this view, God creating the world would be an emanation from eternity. I know that sounds vague, but what I mean is that God, eternally existant, would actionally express himself in such a way so as to create a reality in which time is also created as a function of said reality.

None of that changes the fact that God is usually conceived to have always existed whereas the world is not. Everything said about God "sounds vague" because it is vague. If God 'actionally expresses himself in such a way to create a reality" then He must be prior to that act, logically speaking, no?

Quoting Noble Dust

I think this stunts the concept of creation. Take Tielhard's view, for example. God is an ever-evolving entity; creation, in his view, is an ever-evolving process that is part and parcel to God.

Yes, but I haven't argued that other views such that God is dependent on his creation, is not omnipotent, is an evolving being, and so on; are not possible; I was merely trying to elaborate the logic of the Christian understanding of God as transcendent being.

Quoting Noble Dust

I was trying to point out that we all, ultimately, think from the perspective of experience: "the painting itself".

Well, that is just what I have been trying to point out all along. Experience consists in being affected, in feeling.

Quoting Noble Dust

But my intuition, for what it's worth, is that God has a greater need for us than we know.

I tend think that way too rather than the Christian way of imagining God as an utterly self-dependent transcendent being

Quoting Wayfarer

as it also describes alleged historical instances and events

Sure, but historical events are not revelations; they are either the reports of actual or purported eyewitnesses or written reports of what had been previously handed down verbal reports of actual or purported eyewitnesses.

Quoting Wayfarer

Are you sure you know the significance of the ‘synthetic a priori’?

I am well acquainted with the idea of the synthetic a priori, a fact which you should be well aware of from previous discussions; but from that it certainly does not follow that I believe it has the same significance, or even the same kind of significance, that you do.

Reply to Janus

Lol; we always end up agreeing more than we realize, you and I. Probably mostly because I'm not as well-read and not as experienced. So I tend to phrase things in my own way, which becomes problematic.

Quoting Janus

It's basically the Hindu conception of Brahman: Satchitananda. I have said all along that theology is worked out from imagination and experience via logic. This is obviously one of the possibilities of God's infinite eternal existence that is capable of being imagined, so calling it "nonsense" won't do unless you are a logical positivist or something like that.

Understood. I've read the Upanishads and a little of the Gita, but obviously not enough to recognize the concept; or rather, I'm still too stuck in the Western ethos to quickly notice.

Quoting Janus

None of that changes the fact that God is usually conceived to have always existed whereas the world is not. Everything said about God "sounds vague" because it is vague. If God 'actionally expresses himself in such a way to create a reality" then He must be prior to that act, logically speaking, no?

Yeah, I get your points here. But I'm honestly bored with all of the logical specifics; I really am, and I don't mean that as a cop out. Feel free to pry me more on those if you're unsure.

My aphorism is still the thing that makes the most sense, within my view: the painter is only a painter once a painting has been painted. You can take that as a white flag or a rallying charge; I don't mean it as either. I'm open to whatever response you might have.

Quoting Janus

I was merely trying to elaborate the logic of the Christian understanding of God as transcendent being.

Ok. I wasn't trying to do that; again, we've probably been talking past each other a bit; or at least, I've been talking past you to some extent.

Quoting Janus

Well, that is just what I have been trying to point out all along. Experience consists in being affected, in feeling.

Quoting Janus

I tend think that way too rather than the Christian way of imaging God as an utterly self-dependent transcendent being

See my initial comment. >:O

Quoting Noble Dust

Lol; we always end up agreeing more than we realize, you and I.

It mostly does seem like that. Language is a tricky one.

Quoting Noble Dust

Understood. I've read the Upanishads and a little of the Gita, but obviously not enough to recognize the concept; or rather, I'm still too stuck in the Western ethos to quickly notice.

I've long loved the idea. And yet I have often heard people claim that a state of permanent supreme ecstasy would become boring.Could that be true if there were no sense at all of time involved? I'd be willing to do the experiment. :)

Quoting Noble Dust

the painter is only a painter once a painting has been painted.

I'll take that as a rallying charge, and my response is that I agree and that likewise God is only a creator once a creation has been created. What was the painter before she painted?

Oddly enough (or not?) this thread has not been much about Hegel!

Quoting Janus

I've long loved the idea. And yet I have often heard people claim that a state of permanent supreme ecstasy would become boring.Could that be true if there were no sense at all of time involved? I'd be willing to do the experiment

The only possibility I've come up with is that it would be a totally different state of reality, existence, and experience; a state in which the question "wouldn't perfection get boring?" Is rendered meaningless. I've had glimpses of this possibility in dreams and feelings, and in art and creativity.

Quoting Janus

Oddly enough (or not?) this thread has not been much about Hegel!

Whoops!

Quoting Noble Dust

The only possibility I've come up with is that it would be a totally different state of reality, existence, and experience; a state in which the question "wouldn't perfection get boring?" Is rendered meaningless. I've had glimpses of this possibility in dreams and feelings, and in art and creativity.

Likewise. :)

I've long loved the idea. And yet I have often heard people claim that a state of permanent supreme ecstasy would become boring.Could that be true if there were no sense at all of time involved?

No. Without time, there can't be boredom.

Michael Ossipoff