The Sins of Leon Wieseltier
Over the years I have referred on many occasions to a 2006 review by Leon Wieseltier, then Literary Editor of the New Republic, of Daniel Dennett’s book Breaking the Spell, in the New York Times, under the headline The God Genome.
Agreed with every word of this savage review which triggered a fierce response from Dennett.
There was similar episode in 2012 in response to Steve Pinker’s essay, Science is not the Enemy of the Humanities, which triggered a debate on ‘scientism’ between Pinker and Daniel Dennett, and Leon Wieseltier, that also I’ve quoted from time to time. (Wieseltier’s response to Pinker here. Another perceptive critique here).
Subsequently the New Republic was bought by an internet maven, and Wieseltier resigned, declaring no confidence in the new management.
But, the interests of full disclosure, I am posting a current review of Wieseltier ’Climb and Fall’ by noted writer Joseph Epstein (who coined the title ‘Climb and fall’ deliberately, as becomes clear in the essay).
Epstein says of Wieseltier’s opinion pieces that:
But, what about ‘the fall’? Wieseltier, it seems, has been caught up in the slipstream of the Weinstein scandal, having been outed as a known workplace lech, which led to the collapse of an offer by Laurene Power Jobs (Steve Jobs’ widow) to fund an online magazine to be called ‘Ideas’.
It’s a shame, really - I would likely have been a customer for that publication. But for all his faults, I still think he did a good job nailing Dennett and Pinker’s scientism.
THE question of the place of science in human life is not a scientific question. It is a philosophical question. Scientism, the view that science can explain all human conditions and expressions, mental as well as physical, is a superstition, one of the dominant superstitions of our day; and it is not an insult to science to say so. For a sorry instance of present-day scientism, it would be hard to improve on Daniel C. Dennett's book. "Breaking the Spell" is a work of considerable historical interest, because it is a merry anthology of contemporary superstitions.
Agreed with every word of this savage review which triggered a fierce response from Dennett.
There was similar episode in 2012 in response to Steve Pinker’s essay, Science is not the Enemy of the Humanities, which triggered a debate on ‘scientism’ between Pinker and Daniel Dennett, and Leon Wieseltier, that also I’ve quoted from time to time. (Wieseltier’s response to Pinker here. Another perceptive critique here).
Subsequently the New Republic was bought by an internet maven, and Wieseltier resigned, declaring no confidence in the new management.
But, the interests of full disclosure, I am posting a current review of Wieseltier ’Climb and Fall’ by noted writer Joseph Epstein (who coined the title ‘Climb and fall’ deliberately, as becomes clear in the essay).
Epstein says of Wieseltier’s opinion pieces that:
These columns increasingly became moral diatribes. Whatever the subject, one thing they all had in common was that he, Leon Wieseltier, not only had a clearer vision of the world and what was important in it than anyone he was writing about, but also a deeper moral imagination. Along the way, he had developed a style which entailed short-sentences that suggested the aphorism. This style worked nicely to elevate himself while dismissing anyone who happened to disagree as a moral idiot, scum really, who if he understood how wretched he was would go instanter into the intellectual equivalent of a witness protection program.
But, what about ‘the fall’? Wieseltier, it seems, has been caught up in the slipstream of the Weinstein scandal, having been outed as a known workplace lech, which led to the collapse of an offer by Laurene Power Jobs (Steve Jobs’ widow) to fund an online magazine to be called ‘Ideas’.
It’s a shame, really - I would likely have been a customer for that publication. But for all his faults, I still think he did a good job nailing Dennett and Pinker’s scientism.
Comments (102)
I didn't find Dennett's book arrogant at all. To me it read like a collaborative exploration of possibilities. I was surprised to find later on that some of his other writing - particularly that on consciousness - is quite dogmatic. I felt that the accusations of scientism and reductionism could fairly be levelled at his writing on consciousness, but not at Breaking the Spell.
Perhaps I'm not remembering the book very well. Can you quote pieces you found particularly scientistic or reductionist? I couldn't see any in the review you linked. Indeed I though it was a sloppy, tendentious review, partly because most of the reviewer's opinions about what Dennett thinks were supported by paraphrases rather than actual quotes.
No, it's about 'the question of the place of science in human life'. It often occupies a de facto role of moral normativity to which it is not entitled.
Quoting andrewk
Dennett's life-work is scientistic and reductionist. By all accounts he's a very nice person, and also great company, good teacher, excellent jazz piano player, but in my view this is in spite of his philosophy, not because of it.
I don't think you could describe anybody's life work as 'scientistic and reductionist' - not even Richard Dawkins. After all, Dawkins did plenty of actual biology, which has nothing to do with Scientism or Reductionism, both of which are philosophies.
I probably dislike Christian apologists like William Craig as much as you dislike Dawkins but although I find Craig a terrible philosopher, I would not go so far as to dismiss his life work as 'apologetics' or in fact as anything. A person's life's work is a many-splendoured thing. Even Craig has done some things that I would find admirable - becoming fluent in German being one of them.
I repeat that I found 'Breaking the Spell' not at all scientistic or reductionist, in contrast to writings such as 'Consciousness Explained', which were. Unsubstantiated sweeping statements won't change that.
An ad hominem defense!
But anyway, according to Dennett, charity is really only one of the many devices by which the gene seeks to replicate itself. You may think that 'being charitable' is virtuous, but this is an illusion, created by the Darwinian processes of survival, the real intention of which is always the same thing:
Daniel Dennett, from Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life, quoted in Steve Talbott, Evolution and the Illusion of Randomness The New Atlantis
Charity is no exception, although if it makes you feel good then by all means you should engage in it, but know that there's nothing intrinsically good about it.
(By the way, I am not a defender of William Lane Craig. As far as current Christian philosophers go, I much prefer David Bentley Hart and Keith Ward.)
Quoting tim wood
No, it isn't categorical. There are any number of things about which it is essential to consult the science, that's not at issue.
How is that relevant?
Well, fair enough. When I read it, around the time of that review, how it struck me was of a piece with all of Dennett's other work, which is invariably 'scientistic' and reductionist. He is not known as an 'eliminative materialist' for no reason.
When Dennett is in reductionist mode he is trying to explain away things like consciousness in terms of subatomic particles. I started reading 'Breaking the Spell' expecting that sort of thing, and was surprised to find that there wasn't any. It was more like anthropology, wondering about why people feel religious and how the phenomenon of religion grows to have such a powerful hold on so many people. As I recall it was speculative, undogmatic, and not pretending to be science.
If there was a section that went into battle against arguments for the existence of god, or mounted arguments for her nonexistence, I either missed it or do not recall it. Ditto for sections that purport to explain consciousness or the origin of life.
My objection to Daniel Dennett's philosophical attitude, is that he is a well-known representative of scientific materialism, and also of eliminative materialism. This is the radical claim 'that our ordinary, common-sense understanding of the mind is deeply wrong and that some or all of the mental states posited by common-sense do not actually exist.' (S.E.P.)
In addition, Dennett is well known as one of the so-called 'Four Horsemen' of new atheism (the others being Sam Harris, Christopher Hitchens [now deceased] and Richard Dawkins.
The reason I refer to Wieseltier's review of Breaking the Spell, in particular, is not in regard to that specific book, but as a critique of those elements of Dennett's work, which is an epitome of what philosopher Thomas Nagel called 'neo-Darwinian materialism' in his 2012 book, Mind and Cosmos, about which I also started a thread recently. So that is what lead to this question:
Quoting tim wood
The Wikipedia definition of 'scientism' is:
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Quoting andrewk
But, a naturalistic account of religion can't help but be reductionistic, right? I agree, the book is written in a friendly tone, and seems non-dogmatic and helpful, but the central idea that 'religion' (which Dennett defines narrowly, i.e. as a belief in a supernatural being of a personal nature) can be explained in terms other than its own, must necessarily be reductionist.
Not all books about religion by non-religious authors are reductionist. Consider Max Weber, for instance, whose 'Protestant Work Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism' is a justly famous work. I'm sure are many others by sociologists and anthropologists which provide insights and perspectives into religions. But Dennett can't help but be reductionist about the question, due to his uncompromising allegiance to what he elsewhere called 'Darwin's Dangerous Idea', which he compares to a 'universal acid' that 'eats everything it comes into contact with'. But, all that said:
Quoting andrewk
That is why I have created this thread, namely, 'The Sins of Leon Wieseltier'. In that critique of Wieseltier, Epstein does indeed accuse Wieseltier of exactly that kind of sermonising. So, definitely concede that is an element. But, I still think many of his criticisms are warranted.
Also a bit of a back-story - what got me interested in philosophy forums, was the publication of The God Delusion by Dawkins. He said that he hoped that a 'theist' would pick up that book, and put it down an atheist. I'm afraid it rather the opposite effect on me: I found the polemics of all the 'new atheists' so odious, that it mobilised me in the opposite direction. I do acknowledge I probably spend too much time on these issues, but that is the background.
I don't much care for the word 'salvation' myself - I prefer 'liberation' - but aside from that, this pretty well describes what I understand as the meaning of 'religion'. And notice that it doesn't necessarily rely on a belief in a personal God, as the same passage could be accepted by many Buddhists.
No, I don't agree to that at all. One can be the world's most spiritual person and yet regard all the world's organised religions as a load of bunk that gained currency through a combination of filling a psychological yearning and the exercise of temporal power.
Indeed I wonder whether somebody like Krishnamurti might fit that description reasonably well, and he certainly wasn't a reductionist.
Dennett is an atheist making speculations about why people are religious but it occurred to me as I read his speculations in that book that they could just as easily have been written by a SBNR person. Maybe they could even have been written by an adherent of a semi-organised but non-anthropomorphising religion such as Buddhism.
I think this is relevant because I think the accusation of scientism or reductionism is thrown around far too readily these days. Claiming without evidence that deeply mysterious things like consciousness must somehow be the product of interactions of particles is scientistic and reductionist. Suggesting that Christianity and Islam may have obtained their extraordinary spread and power because of psychological, sociological and geo-political factors rather than because they contain some deep metaphysical truth is not.
Beliefs get their validity because of personal prerogative - individuals deserve respect as they have a right to believe as they wish - but religion itself doesn’t. Similar point came up with our debate about Islam earlier this year.
Quoting andrewk
‘Social factors in addition to’ a metaphysical basis would not be reductionist, but denying a metaphysical basis is reductionist.
Really? For all religions, or just some?
What think you of the metaphysical basis for Scientology?
Is a Christian that denies the metaphysical basis of Islam reductionist?
Of course not. It's a valid study. In particular, physical science is a valid study and (best yet available) description of physical things and events in the physical universe.
Scientificism isn't science. It's pseudoscience.
Criticicizing Scientificism isn't criticizing science.
I call it "Scientificism" instead of "Scientism" because: What you call a believer in Scientism? A Scientist? No, that word already has a different meaning: A practitioner of science.
So I'd say that a Scientificist is a believer in Scientificism.
Probably a few, wouldn't you say? The fact that someone is highly qualified in science doesn't necessarily mean that you should listen to him about philosophy. ...but it doesn't mean that you shouldn't. Michael Faraday, in 1844, was evidently the first Westerner to get it right about metaphysics.
But there might be some scientists who are Scientificists. Look at the scientists interviewed by Kuhn, on Closer to Truth. Many (most or all?) of them seem to think that science has the metaphysical answers.
..
Scientificism? :D
Michael Ossipoff
My point is, to insist that religions can be explained naturalistically is obviously to deny their central claim of a reality ‘above nature’ (i.e. ‘supernatural’). A lot of people - hey, even Krishnamurti - say nowadays that ‘man invented God’, and I guess I can see some truth in it. But ultimately I think what is happening, is that religions are records of the human encounter with the sacred, which is not something explicable in naturalistic terms. If that makes me ‘a believer’, then so be it.
The basis for the fake ‘religion’ of scientology is not metaphysical but sociological, but if the naturalistic accounts were correct, then so that would be so of all the spiritual traditions.
In terms of a generalised account of the universal intuition of the sacred, Rudolf Otto’s book ‘The Idea of the Holy’, is a standard text.
Quoting tim wood
That is a fundamental point, and one that is mostly forgotten nowadays. In ancient philosophy, the basis of ontology was that the foundation or ground of reality was ‘the uncreated’. This intuition manifests in numerous forms, but the underlying idea is that ‘what is subject to change’ is of a lower order to what is not; which is the intuition of the ‘temporal’ as against ‘the eternal’. In many respects, ancient philosophy was the quest for the eternal, for the discovery of something beyond change and decay.
One of the solutions to that problem was atomism. The atom - uncuttable, eternal and uncreated - was at the same time, at the heart of the world of change. This is what gave atomism such explanatory power which animated materialism. However with Einstein’s discovery of matter-energy equivalence, and also with the discovery of fields, the atomistic model has been superseded (notwithstanding that most people still think in terms of the Universe being ‘made of atoms’.)
At any rate, the modern mind-body problem is mainly the consequence of Cartesian dualism, and reactions to it. But the archaic formulation of the relationship between ‘the unmade’ and ‘the manifest domain’ has generally been lost, except for in those remnants of traditionalist philosophy that still exist in the modern world, such as Thomism and some schools of Buddhism.
The claim that any naturalistic account of religion must also be reductionistic is the very claim I questioned you on in the other thread, by asking if you think this applies to so-called 'process theologies', since process theologies are not religion-as-belief-in-a-supernatural being at all. In any case you never answered the question or provided any argument for your sweeping claim.
Quoting Wayfarer
And here you seem to be contradicting yourself, at least if those accounts by the non-reductionistic "non-religious authors" are understood to be naturalistic accounts.
If they’re not, then how are they theologies at all?
Personally I think ‘supernatural’ gets a bad rap, it’s become a boo-word, something which no respectable person ought to believe or accept. We’ve drawn this tight boundary around ‘the natural’ as if ‘the natural’ is something self-contained, self-explanatory or thoroughly understood, when it’s clearly not.
The non-reductionist theories about religion may examine various sociological or anthropological dimensions of religious cultures, without claiming to have explained the origin of those religions in sociological or naturalistic terms.
Why not? Are you at all familiar with Whitehead's or Hartshorne's theologies? Even Spinoza's God is not a supernatural God, it is "deus sive natura": God or Nature. What do you think the concept of a supernatural God necessarily consists in: what are the essential characteristics of such a God?
Quoting Wayfarer
Then they are not really "books about religion" or " theories about religion", but descriptive accounts of religious social practices.
But one reason I am not committed to naturalism is that I accept the theistic argument that ‘nature doesn’t contain its ground or explanation’. I think this is demonstrably the case, even with regard to current science. So I am inclined to favour the arguments of natural theology over their opponents. But, that said, I know that I don’t know, and that the argument can’t be settled one way or the other.
Notice the definition in this post that I found on Maverick Philosopher’s blog. It gives what I consider a fair account; it’s what has always motivated my search, it even mentions my nickname! X-)
Does supernature "contain its ground or explanation"? If so, what might that be? At some point, we may well just bump up against brute facts, right? Is supernaturalism allowed brute facts, but naturalism is not? If so, what would be the justification for this claim?
No offense, but you have screamed bloody murder of the position of some scientists (e.g. Dawkins) who have claimed that the existence of God can be investigated on scientific grounds. And now you profess sympathy for natural theology...which purports to demonstrate God's existence on scientific grounds. So, is your position that such investigation is acceptable only if one believes in an affirmative answer to the question? I know you say that no definitive resolution can be reached, but this is nevertheless something of a double standard, wouldn't you say?
I recall many prior conversations with your good self about 'the ground of being', in terms of Paul Tillich, Pseudo-Dionysius, the Christian mystical tradition, and so on. Deep questions.
The point about the naturalist approach, however, is that 'naturalism assumes nature'. That sounds obviously a truism, but here's what I mean. Natural philosophy, which is what science used to be called, observes the behaviours and entities and forces that are found in nature. Actually, borrowing a term from Francis Bacon, it does more than 'observe' - it puts nature 'on the rack' by way of such devices as the LHC. But always, it's us here, the scientist, examining that there, the animal, or the atom, or whatever. There's the entire vast domain of scientific analysis.
But the philosophical quest for the understanding of the ground of being, is of a different order to that. It is concerned with understanding reality as lived. For instance, from the SEP entry on Schopenhauer:
(Actually I'm reading a study by Dermot Moran, on the influence of the monastic scholastic Eriugena on the origin of German idealism - will report back later.)
Quoting Arkady
Not demonstrate - only suggest.
Nothing in that quote really answers my question, sorry. I don't even see what it has to do with supernaturalism, specifically.
Quoting Wayfarer
What does "suggest" mean? In my experience, a "suggestion" of something (as it is used in this context) is akin to a hint, or a weak form of evidence. Does empirical investigation provide evidence for or against the existence of God? Does it justify claims to the effect of "God [does/doesn't] exist"? If not, then what is the "suggestion" which you speak of here? If so, why do you have a bee in your bonnet about Dawkins and likeminded folks who also believe that empirical investigation can shed light on the existence of God (albeit coming at it from another angle)?
I suppose it's a case of abductive inference - arguing from effect to cause. I prefer the traditional belief that 'the heavens bespeak the divine word' to the opposite. But I can't make the leap from there to 'therefore the Bible is the Revealed Word of God', as I am by no means exclusively attached to the JC tradition.
But one thing I will say is that the belief that it is not God, or the requirement to exclude any such idea from consideration, has consequences. For example, there's the role attributed to chance - that living organisms are essentially the outcome of chance and physical necessity, that life is a cosmic accident. Scientists, generally, are concerned with disclosing causal relationships - yet curiously, when it comes to why evolution has produced intelligent self-aware beings capable of asking such questions, they are silent; we're simply the outcome of an algorithmic process rather like a chemical reaction, which in this case, has happened to result in h.sapiens. But in what other field of science would that be accepted as amounting to an hypothesis?
Nevertheless, the question is beyond the scope of empiricism, by definition. Maybe if we found a bunch of other life-bearing planets, and found they were inhabited by beings somewhat like us, and not like the denizens of a Star Wars bar, then perhaps we'd be obliged to re-consider. But I don't see it happening in my lifetime.
Quoting Arkady
I'm performing the modest public service of showing up the fallacies in Dawkins' anti-religious polemics.
I didn't say anything about the Bible or the Judeo-Christian tradition; I was asking about the existence of God. Is it that nature provides "suggestions" to the effect that God exists, or is it merely that you prefer that belief to its contrary? If the former, then I'd ask again what "suggestion" means in this context, because it seems a lot like "basis for rational belief," "justification," "evidence," and the usual accoutrements of abductive reasoning (the sort of reasoning employed by scientists, you will recall).
If the latter, then I'd ask what your preferences have to do with what is true or false?
Ok, we've been over this before. I don't say this to be condescending, but you honestly do sometimes seem incapable of imbibing information which goes against your set viewpoints. For the umpteenth time, evolutionary biologists do not regard life or the adaptive features thereof as an "accident." Dawkins goes positively apeshit when anyone characterizes his position thus; he does not believe that.
Furthermore (another thing we've covered, albeit fewer times, probably), evolutionary biology is not divested of causal relationships (how could it be, if there is to be any meaningful link between environment and phenotype?). It simply posits that life and the adaptive features thereof are a product of random variation and non-random selection. As I've said before, science does not eschew chance: on the contrary, it is the default position (i.e. null hypothesis) in the context of hypothesis testing! So, to answer the final question in your above paragraph: every other field of science!
Um, what would such a thing prove about the existence of God?
To what does one refer in relation to the nature of God, if not that? It is the background of this entire debate.
Quoting Arkady
I've read Dawkins' characterisation of chance in evolution, and I accept it. He says, iit is chance constrained by many other factors, so that in the context of evolutionary adaption, it's not simply random. I get that. But why living things exist in the first place, and why intelligent, self-aware beings evolve, is a different kind of question altogether. It's much more a question about telos, about whether there is a reason for living things, in a general sense, that is assumed by, for example, Aristotelian philosophy.
The book that spells out the viewpoint of evolutionary materialism is Jacques Monod's Chance and Necessity. He follows the implications of the non-intentional or non-purposive nature of life to its logical conclusion and in rigorous detail:
And, as far as that question of final causes is concerned, materialism must deny that there is anything of that kind, or any type of cause beyond the purely chemical or physical. So asking 'why' life exists in the first place, is a meaningless question, when looked at that way. And Dawkins definitely does believe that. The following is an excerpt from an exchange between a Bishop, George Pell, and Dawkins on a televised debate:
It's a clear indication that Dawkins' has no grasp of what is involved in the basic philosophical conundrum of 'why there is something rather than nothing'. He thinks it's a silly question.
Someone needn't be Jewish or Christian to believe in God. One could be a non-denominational theist, a deist, a pantheist, etc.
Ok. Is there any reason that you consistently mischaracterize Dawkins's position, then?
But, in smuggling a "why" question into such matters you are presupposing what you set out to prove. Why not ask "how"? I see no reason at all that abiogenesis or the evolution of intelligence are not scientific matters. The evolution of, say, feathers, is a matter for science, is it not? Why should intelligence not be? Because we exult sentience (H. sapiens's defining feature, conveniently enough) over all else? So, too, might a sparrow exult feathers over all else, and proclaim that no "scientistic" philosophy could ever begin to pierce the eternal mystery of "why" birds have feathers.
Now, this is not to say that a natural history of intelligence is understood in much detail, only that there's no reason for ruling it out of bounds for a scientific discussion.
I don’t believe I do.
Quoting Arkady
Well, back to the Wieseltier review that started this thread:
Bolds added.
You don't believe you consistently misrepresent his position, or that you don't misrepresent it simpliciter? If the former, then we can debate that, if the latter, then that belief should be negated by our discussion in this thread alone.
Quoting Wayfarer
Evolutionary arguments against naturalism are an interesting (IMO) and challenging area of inquiry to naturalistic theories of the evolution of intelligence. However, I'm not sure that appeals to supernaturalism, Aristolelian telos, or anything else really solves the problem, as ultimately we employ reason to analyze our reasoning faculties, whatever the origin or providence of said faculties is presumed to be. There may well be an inescapable circularity to such inquiries (albeit a very large circle, perhaps).
Well, listen to the scientists interviewed on Closer to Truth. They pretty much invariably give science as the answer to metaphysical questions.
And it's something that we regularly encounter elsewhere too. I'm not criticizing them--people in general have been taught that science has all the answers. With many or most people, Scientificism is now the official religion, and Materialism is the official metaphysics.
Every Materialist is a Scientificist, and vice-versa.
By the way, every Materialist is an Atheist, and every typical orthodox Atheist is a Materialist. (I'm not saying every Atheist here is a Materialist.)
Michael Ossipoff
Interesting. Even the great Searle has a harassment problem as you may know.
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Quoting Arkady
Dawkins is known for, not only being critical of religion, but also being deliberately insulting about it, by way of making the point that the reverence with which it is treated is unjustified. As Nagel says in his review of TGD, 'one of Dawkins’s aims is to overturn the convention of respect toward religion that belongs to the etiquette of modern civilization. He does this by persistently violating the convention, and being as offensive as possible.' He has now extended that behaviour to other targets, earning him approbation even from some earlier admirers.
So the fact that he is so routinely hostile about his targets, does provide a certain latitude to return serve in kind, I would have thought. But the really grave error that Dawkins makes is a much more serious matter. In that same panel discussion with Pell (incidentally, I thought Bishop Pell's performance on that occasion, as a representative of the Church, was lamentably poor), Dawkins is asked the question:
Of course I perfectly agree with that statement, and believe it's commendable of him to say so. But the point which Dawkins doesn't seem to grasp is that, whilst he might agree that 'Darwinism is an appalling basis for a social philosophy', he has devoted enormous effort to methodically undermining the philosophical and spiritual foundations of Western culture, which might provide an alternative. I mean, I have seen nothing from Dawkins about a real alternative philosophy, save for a kind of starry-eyed wonder at the 'marvels of science' (and also, I have to say, at a sense of his own cleverness for being so very good at it.) Dawkins is a textbook case of scientism.
Furthermore, whereas the likes of Camus, Sartre, and Nietzsche - convinced atheists all - grappled with the implications of 'the death of God', Dawkins seems to show no awareness of its implications. As David Bentley Hart said in one of his OP's on 'the new atheism':
Dennett, on the other hand, does at least acknowledge this. In a conference called Moving Naturalism Forward, the sense in which the 'acid of Darwin's dangerous idea' really is a threat to the social order was discussed:
(The author of that review says 'I was reminded of the debate among British censors over the publication of Lady Chatterley’s Lover half a century ago. “Fine for you or me,” one prosecutor is said to have remarked, “but is this the sort of thing you would leave lying about for your wife or servant to read?”)
So, these two really don't seem to understand that they are actually blowing up the ethical foundations of Western culture, even though Dawkins freely admits that Darwinian theory is 'an appalling basis for a social theory'. At least Sam Harris has recognised this, by venturing a warmed-over utilitarianism based on neuroscience. Personally I don’t think highly of it, but at least it's an effort.
I was referring to your characterization of Dawkins's position that life (or its adaptive features) is an "accident," which, again, you pretty much admitted above was not accurate. As I've said many times, he not only does not believe that, it is almost exactly contrary to his actual views on evolution by natural selection.
Doesn't that just mean that nature cannot show us any explanation for being? Does it follow from that that there must be an explanation for being? What if non-being is simply an impossibility, and nature is as necessary as God is? This is the process view that God and nature are not separate processes. Just as the cells that make up our bodies are not separate processes from the body as a whole, so nature is not a separate process from God, nor God from nature.
This is a view that entails that God is immanent in Nature, not separate from it. Of course God is transcendental to (not transcendent of) us, only in the sense that it is not an item of sensory experience. In another sense we are God and God is us, but this is obviously not to say that we are the whole of God or that we are all that God is.
The supernatural view of God is that He is remote, perfect, omnipotent and changeless; this is not the process view; where God is understood to evolve along with nature, and to suffer and enjoy along with His creatures. In this view God is a companion to be found within, not an unapproachable remote lawgiver.
If he had stuck to his biological knitting I would have had no reason to discuss his books on a philosophy forum. It's the inferences he draws from biology to philosophy that are at issue.
Quoting Janus
I don't know if that is really what it means; it's more like, how it appears when the original teachings are crystallised into a dogmatic form. That is like an image of God, but without agáp?, the revivifying love that animates the Universe, that became characteristic of Deism, where 'God' is reduced to an intellectual image - an idol, even.
And I think a Catholic is quite entitled to answer that God does 'suffer along with us', precisely by assuming birth as a human baby.
In any case, my remark about nature not being 'self-explanatory' is a concession to the argument from philosophical theology - that the organising principle of nature can't be found within nature. According to philosophical materialism, that organising principle was to be found in the 'motions of atoms' but that model has long since perished.
OK, I should have added "loving" or at least "benevolent" to that, but it nonetheless seems to be a conception of love "from afar", all except for the Incarnation. As to God's incarnation as Jesus constituting "suffering along with us" I agree, But that is a single historical instance and not like the process notion that God suffers along with all His creatures all the time. In any case by incarnating God does become part of nature and thus shows Himself to be not supernatural.
Another issue here in regard to the purported supernaturalness of God is about His ability to suspend or contravene the so-called Laws of nature; and that is certainly not the process view, according to which God cannot do any such thing. In any case my original point was merely that naturalistic theologies are possible; and I was not aiming to argue for any particular theology.
But if you look at the way the question has unfolded historically, you can see a kind of dialectic, between theism and idealism on one side ('God's handiwork' or 'higher intelligence') and materialism on the other (it's 'self-organising', 'matter in motion'.)
But at this point in history, it seems to me that the argument that it is self-organising, and that the principle of that organisation can be known by empirical means, is not sustainable - well, not without writing a large number of promissory notes. And the evidence for that are the crises and unanswered questions of physics (and physical cosmology generally) on the one hand, and the yawning gaps in evolutionary science, on the other. I don't think we're remotely close to understanding the foundation or fundamental principle, should there be one. So the appropriate response maybe is a kind of scepticism - in the original sense of 'epoche', the suspension of judgement.
There's a great essay, written by Tom Wolfe in 1997, called Sorry, but your Soul Just Died. It's about the entire debate over genetics, brain science, the Death of God, and so on, but written 10 years before the New Atheists' first books were published. It's a long read, but superbly written, and it being a Sunday, might be well worth the time. And it has a great punchline. ;-)
Why can't it be organized by an internal intelligence? That would be the central idea of the alternative naturalistic process theology. Your claim that I have arguing against was that there simply cannot be a naturalistic theology.
How does it work? Is it the consequence of molecular action, as Dennett says? If not, then how is it ‘internal?’ Cosider Bergson’s ‘Elan vital’ - that might be considered ‘internal’ but it’s an idea that’s generally been rejected by both philosophers and scientists.
What I’m owning up to, is that I don’t buy the kinds of arguments that Dawkins and Dennett both deploy: that scientific discovery has undermined the possibility of there being God. I have already described in this thread and many others, some of the issues that I think are involved. So Arkady asked me, if I think that science presents a kind of ‘proof’ of the opposite case. I don’t believe that, either. I have said, I find the arguments of natural theologians, such as Keith Ward and Alistair McGrath, quite persuasive - but neither of them are advocating any kind of intelligent design theory. My view is, if you believe that science can either prove or disprove God, then that tends towards either American-style fundamentalism (in the first case) or scientific materialism (in the second).
As for Whitehead and Hartsthorne, I have read a little of them, but they’re not part of my ongoing curriculum.
Perhaps "internal" has befuddled you. What I mean is that it is an intelligence immanently bound into the nature of things. I can't tell you "how it works", but everything we observe and experienceis its working. Why do you think it makes it easier to understand "how it works" if you postulate a transcendent, that is separate, intelligence? That just creates the further problem of interaction that bedevils Descartes' dualistic 'two substance' idea of a mechanical nature and a transcendent God that creates (and sustains?) it. So, you seem to be caught up in, and thinking from within, the very model ( nature as mechanism) that you want to refute. :s
Spirit, perhaps?
Yes, But spirit understood to be immanent in, not transcendent of, nature. So, it is not a supernatural conception of spirit. Nature just is spirit. It's not hard to understand the difference in conception here.
And you didn't attempt to answer my question, which is, I think, the salient point.
Quoting Janus
Because it is impossible to demonstrate that there is anything answering to the description of ‘spirit’ that is ‘imminently bound to the nature of things’. If you claim such a thing exists, Daniel Dennett is quite within his rights to ask ‘well, what is this “spirit”? What is the evidence that any such thing exists?’ And I’m pretty sure you won’t be able to show any evidence.
You are of course free to critique his philosophy, but when you misrepresent basic tenets of Dawkins's thinking, it does you no service, and it makes one think that perhaps you are engaging with a caricature of what you think Dawkins is, and how he's been represented in the sources you prefer, rather than engaging with the man and his works.
Adoption of one metaphysics or another is not driven by "evidence" if that is taken in the empirical sense. People choose the metaphysics that seems most logically coherent. consistent with their experience and feels right to them if they think about it, or they may adhere to the metaphysics that was drummed into them as a child.
So, I am referring to the choice between one conception of spirit (or theology) and another; which refers back to your statement that there cannot be a naturalistic theology (or by implication a naturalistic conception of spirit), and has nothing to do with Dennett.
If you read the OP that this thread starts off with, it does highlight that aspect of his character.
Quoting Janus
But the problem I then have is distinguishing this from naturalism at all. I have the same difficulty with Spinoza, for that matter. I don’t understand why it isn’t simply a natural philosophy, in which case, what it has to offer over and above science.
Quoting Arkady
That’s all I’ve ever done, as far as I am concerned. Dawkins makes many sweeping philosophical claims on the basis of the biological sciences, which is generally what I think deserves criticism. If I wanted to discuss Dawkin’s contributions to evolutionary biology, then I would read his books on that, and discuss it on a biology-related forum.
Spinoza's idea of God as the substance of nature is metaphysical and rationalistic. It has nothing to with science (the empirical).
That's all well and good, but don't you think said criticism should be based upon an accurate understanding and presentation of his position? Because you've said things here about Dawkins, evolutionary biology, and science generally which are grossly inaccurate. Ergo, I don't see how your critiques can have much merit. I daresay that you appear to be as unacquainted with the subject of your critique as you purport Dawkins to be with regard to religion.
I stand by all of them. Again, my criticism of Dawkins, Dennett, and their ilk is purely on the grounds of their scientific materialism for which they are known public advocates.
It seems to be more of a condemnation than a criticism, and it seems you condemn them simply because they hold different worldviews than you do.
How is that an "ad hom"? Criticisms deal with arguments on their own terms not on yours. That's why what you say about Dennett looks more like a condemnation.To point this out is not adhominous at all because it is about your argument not about you.
Speak about ad hominem! This is one example of your failure to address Dennett's work on its own terms.
Can you show us an example of where you have produced any critique which does address his actual work?
The general criticism I have of Dawkins/Dennett is in this post.
Ok. Once again: you said that Dawkins et al claim that life is an "accident," when in fact he has said exactly the opposite. You have said the evolutionary biology is unique among the sciences in allowing for "chance" to enter into explanations, which is grossly false. You have admittedly never even read The God Delusion, and yet carp about it endlessly. So, again I submit that you are as ignorant about the target your criticisms as you purport Dawkins to be about religion.
I would again offer you to submit some arguments against materialism, which you never seem to get around to doing: you offer only complaints, and then quote additional complaints by like minded individuals. You have accused me of not doing philosophy, but you never seem to do any yourself.
No, he doesn't say the opposite at all. In The God Delusion, he presents an elaborate argument along the lines that 'life only had to start once' and that there are billions of planets on which this might have occurred. He admits that science really has no account of how DNA came into existence, but also claims that this is not really important.
What Dawkins objects to, is the assertion that evolution progresses 'by chance alone', i.e. random and unguided chance gives rise to new species. He says that there are many factors involved, meaning that 'chance' is only one facet of the whole process.
I accept that, but I still consider the above criticism to stand.
Quoting Arkady
What I have said, is that the belief that 'life began for no reason', as argued by, for example, Jacques Monod, in his book, Chance and Necessity, does not amount to an hypothesis. Ask the proverbial man-in-the-street why they came to exist, and they will generally say that life's a cosmic crap-shoot, it's a fluke. Overall, 'popular Darwinism' has had a degenerative effect on modern culture IMO.
Quoting Arkady
If my posts about it bother you, you have the option of ignoring them.
The reason I started this thread, if you read the OP, was to acknowledge a negative review of one of the authors I have frequently referred to about this matter.
But - you're right. This is the very last post, ever, I will write about Dawkins and Dennett.
Yes, there is a gap in scientific knowledge concerning the origin of DNA (you may be aware that some models - referred to as the "RNA world" - posit RNA as the first molecule of heredity, rather than DNA).
But why wedge God or Purpose or Design or anything into that gap? A creationist offering a "God of the gaps" strategy has set himself upon an ever-shrinking landscape, with fewer and fewer places to provide refuge every year against the advance of science (yes - materialistic science). I know you've previously derided such thinking as the "promissory notes of materialism" (channeling Popper, was it?), but given the history of the last 400 years or so, where would the safe money be? On supernatural or teleological explanations, or on mechanistic, physicalistic science? I think that any objective reading of the historical record can give succor only to the latter.
I suppose it would depend on what street. The majority of Americans, for instance, profess belief in God (or a "spirit" of some sort...), so it's questionable as to whether they would indeed say that "life's a cosmic crap-shoot." Indeed, popular discourse is rife with narcissistic statements (masquerading as pious humility) along the lines that "God sent me here to [X]..."
Speaking for myself, I would indeed say that life is most likely a purely chemical and physical phenomenon, with no purpose, design, or teleology in either its origin or functional workings.
Perhaps you'd like a return to the European Middle Ages: the "Age of Faith"? Ah, those were the days.
Sure...but that has nothing to do with his views on The New Atheists, his criticism of whom you've repeatedly said you still agree with. That's what at issue in the little sidebar you and I have going here.
Somehow I doubt that. >:O
But it’s just not true., The nature or existence of purpose, design, intention - none of these are scientific questions at al. Certainly naturalism puts those matters aside for its purposes, but then declaring that ‘science has shown’ that the Universe/world is devoid of purpose is a metaphysical; conclusion based on a naturalist assumption.
Second - the gaps are getting bigger, not smaller. We are told that science can detect only 4% of the totality of the cosmos. Galaxies are held together by some unknown force - let’s call that ‘dark matter’ as matter is all we’ll consider. The Universe is expanded by some unknown energy - let’s call that ‘dark energy’ as energy is all we’ll consider. And so on. Then there’s ‘the multiverse’ - respected scientists are on the record saying they favour the idea, because it presents a solution to the annoying problem of why the universe seems fine-tuned for life. And other respected scientists question whether the multiverse and ‘string theory’ are even scientific theories at all.
There’s progress in some ways - better technology, medicine, food production techniques, enerfy sources. All indispsnable and highly important. But there are also many respects ini which modern scientific cultures fail to provide a sustaining philosophy, precisely because of Western cultural attitudes towards purpose, intentionalit,y life and death. Actually, it’s not the job of science to provide such a philosophy, which is the point.
So I am going to stop posting about Dawkins and Dennett, but it’s not for one minute that I think theiir anti-religious polemics have the slightest merit. IN fact the world has moved on, ‘new atheism’ is no longer new, and there are more interesting things to consider. Over and out.
This would seem an argument by assertion. As we've gone over many times at this point, some disciplines (e.g. natural theology - for which you yourself have expressed some sympathy - and intelligent design creationism) have purported to detect the workings of God, gods, or a "Designer" based on an examination of nature. To simply state that these questions are out of bounds of science doesn't cut it: the onus is on you to demonstrate or argue for this point.
As I've pointed out to you long ago, to say that design, purpose, and intentionality in nature is not a matter for science is to posit that a designed universe is empirically indistinguishable from an undesigned one. To say the least, this proposition is counter-intuitive, so you need to flesh out your position somewhat instead of just stamping your feet and declaring what must be the case.
I largely agree with this. Writer Matt Ridley once had a nice line about scientific progress sometimes clearing a space in the forest of questions which gives scientists a clearer view of multitude of trees still before them.
However, my point is that since the advent of modern science, every question posed about organisms and their workings has yielded to a physicalistic, naturalistic, and mechanistic analysis. Living things have been dissected down to their component atoms, and it has become increasingly clear that there is no mysterious "life force", "elan vital," or any other supernatural or teleological process. Some frontiers remain: consciousness, for instance, is still very poorly understood.
But given the successful track record of modern science to date, there is no reason whatsoever for thinking that the answer to such questions will not be solved in the same manner. The same applies to cosmological mysteries such as dark matter and dark energy. Yes, they are as-yet poorly understood: but there is no inkling that it is anything other than yet another scientific problem.
First of all, the question of the place of science in human life is a scientific question because you use evidence, observations and falsification in order to determine the answer to that question.
If the view that science can explain all human conditions and expressions is a superstition, then ANY view of some method of determining all truths will also be a superstition. If you can't falsify any claim about the world and our place in it, then what good is the claim? What makes it better than any other claim that can't be falsified?
All the things you've 'pointed out to me' over the years, amount to your explaining your point of view. We agree on some things, and disagree on many more, as I have always been opposed to scientific materialism, and so it would be mistaken to assume that I have been persuaded by your arguments. As for 'stamping my feet', I have been on these forums for a good while, at various times I have entered elaborate arguments in favour of the views I hold which I'm not going to repeat in detail on every occasion. What I provided is my general attitude towards the matter, and I stand by it.
I don't think even the nature of 'purpose, intention or design', or arguments about what these amount to, are in scope for the physical sciences (although they may be for natural philosophy proper). Certainly in the modern scientific method until now, such questions have generally been put aside, in line with the approach of 'methodological naturalism'. But to say that science thereby shows or proves that there are no such factors in play, goes beyond the remit of methodological naturalism and into the territory of philosophical positivism. And positivism is precisely the error of making metaphysical statements on the grounds of naturalistic judgements.
Design, purpose or intention doesn't incidentally mean an endorsement of 'intelligent design', which I am generally averse to, on account of my dislike of American evangelical protestantism. But I do think some of the arguments that have been thrown up by these controversies cast serious doubt on the materialist elements of so-called 'neo-darwinism', regardless of the merits of their proponents. That's why I think Thomas Nagel's book Mind and Cosmos is important, as it demonstrates the inherent absurdity of philosophical materialism on purely rational grounds. Nothing could go past Andrew Ferguson's review of the controversy generated by that title, The Heretic, for explaining in brief what I see as the absurdities of the materialist view, and not least because Nagel is not defending a theistic philosophy. It is instructive, however, that as far as his critics are concerned, if he criticizes materialism, then he must be religious, as this demonstrates the sense in which their own views amount to a religious commitment.
Quoting Arkady
However, the nature of life and mind remain elusive. Certainly there is no 'vital spirit' as an objective substance, but the allegory I prefer to think in terms of, is the relationship between letters and meaning, or between microelectronics and drama - you won't find TV shows or the characters that play them, inside a television set, you won't find the meaning of a text inside the ink and paper in which it is reproduced.
Quoting Arkady
More of the 'promissory notes of materialism'.
You generally seem to suggest that Dennett is somehow dishonest for holding to the ( from your point of view, it seems, somehow monstrous) philosophy that he does. And yet I doubt you have read his actual works,and you never seem to produce any cogent critique of anything he has actually written. Mostly hand-waving it seems to me. I'm not trying to be unkind, just calling it as I see it, because I think rigor is important if you aspire to engage in genuine philosophical critique.
I couldn't find any critique of Dennett in your own writing, and mostly only sarcasm in the quoted passage. If you take the following excerpt, and do not interpret the "not at all" as a sarcastic jibe, and substitute "says Dennett" with 'says Buddhism', the passage seems apt enough to me. Or think of Plato's "Noble Lie".
Can you cite any statement from any of Nagels' critics where it is explicitly claimed, or even implied, that Nagel "must be religious"?
Thomas Nagel is Praised by Creationists
Where Thomas Nagel Went Wrong
(I do wonder if it's the only recorded accusation of being 'a teleologist'.)
From his blog
Notre Dame Review
Thomas Nagel: An Atheist Loved by Creationists, yet Hated by his Kin
The Most Despised Science Book of 2012 is worth reading
A Darwinist Mob Goes After a Serious Philosopher.
I am of the view that Dennett's work is so preposterously mistaken that it ought not to warrant serious consideration. But that's also why I've said, above, that I am finished with commenting on Dennett, and I certainly am - this is the last thing I will ever say on a public forum about Dennett.
In that case I won't ask you what precise ideas of his you find "preposterous", and just why you find them so. ;)
Most of those quotes and links seem somewhat sensationailzed, and in any case, I did not find any statement to the effect that Nagel "must be religious". The main criticism would seem to be that his argument might lend support to creationism. I do agree that some evolutionary theorists are philosophically militant against any suggestion of teleology operating in nature. That seems misplaced. On the other hand, in the context of scientific practice the idea, because it cannot be demonstrated one way or the other, is pretty much useless.
The preposterousness of Dennett’s philosophical project is not hard to identify. His whole philosophy is based on arguing that the mind is an illusion. Of course, if you say it bluntly like that, then it’s clearly preposterous, because illusions can only occur in minds. But he goes to great lengths to argue this case, in book after book, and despite his critics pointing out that he ignores the problem of consciousness, rather that explaining it. Indeed, his book ‘Consciousness Explained’ was called, satirically, Consciousness Ignored - and not just by rubes on philosophy forums, but by John Searle and Thomas Nagel. It’s exactly what he’s up to, and it’s preposterous.
David Bentley Hart:
Thomas Nagel:
Other examples could be given ad nauseum. But that’s definitely all from me on this topic.
Quoting Janus
They’re from reputable sources, including Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. If it’s sensational, it’s because a respected member of the academy has come out against the mainstream consensus. It would be like a medieval Bishop preaching the Death of God.
I take Dennett to be saying that the mind is just the brain and that illusions can occur in brains; so there doesn't seem to be a contradiction inherent in what he is claiming.
I mean it is certainly possible that we are just physical beings and that the ideas we have of minds and qualia are just illusions caused by our inability to perceive our brain activity.
If that were the case do you believe it would necessarily (I mean apart from some individual's emotional reactions to the very idea) detract any value from human life?
What do you mean by "I mean"? Do you really "mean" something, or is that just a kind of neurological reflex, that is causing you to say that?
Another point - all kinds of conditions can occur in brains, but illusions can only occur in cognitive systems. Illusions are mistaken judgements. I can see how a brain injury could cause you to make mistakes in judgement, but I can’t see how a brain injury would BE a mistake in judgement.
I don't know what you mean to be indicating here. I favor a phenomenological approach, so I don't personally hold to a physicalist view, as you should be aware.
But I see no contradiction in saying that meaning something and neurological activity are the very same activity seen from two different perspectives. I favour the phenomenological approach because no one feels meaning something as neurological activity; and for me experience is primacy. But this is a really matter of approach, and I can understand that others favor other approaches.
Do you understand that, or do believe there can only be one approach?
You acknowledge that neuronal activity may be the origin of cognitive errors?
I’m sure the point a materialist would make is that perspectives are also part of the illusion that the brain generates; ‘a perspective’ as such can’t have any real meaning. Materialism is strictly monistic
Quoting Janus
It’s not about what I believe.
Quoting Janus
Obviously. But that doesn’t undermine the fact that illusions amount to errors of judgement.
If that were true, the materialist perspective would fare no better than any other. The point is that even if all perspectives are, ultimately, illusory as Buddhism also proclaims, it doesn't follow that we experience them as illusory. An illusion cannot be experienced as an illusion otherwise it could not be an illusion.
Quoting Wayfarer
But it is about what you believe. That's what it's all about; what each of us believes. What else?
Quoting Wayfarer
Sure, and that definitional fact is as compatible with materialism as it is with idealism or just about any metaphysical standpoint you can imagine. It actually seems to be most compatible with realism, because there must be a reality (independent of perception) about which we may be mistaken for there to be the possibility of cognitive error in the first place.
You came into this thread, saying, ‘what’s the matter with Dennett’s realism? He might after all be correct.’ But then when I challenged that, you say, well it’s not how I see things, I prefer ‘a phenomenological’ approach, whatever that is. It’s a pointless argument.
That's a truly pointless objection Wayfarer; Dennett's position represents one of the metaphysical scenarios that may be imagined, and it might even be correct, for all we know. I don't personally think it is correct, and you obviously don't. But you have provided no compelling argument as to why it is preposterous; which is to say, why it could not be correct.
And what we all believe is what it is about; I mean look at your own posts which are mostly concerned with asserting what you believe, based on the assumptions that are amenable to you personally. There's nothing wrong with that; that's what we all do; but some humble recognition that what you happen to believe (about Dennett or anything else) is not thereby self-evidently true would be a good thing and a step forward, I would say.
It's not. If, as you suggest:
Quoting Janus
Then what is the point of discussion? That's what makes it pointless, because, if true, there is no way to persuade by reasoned argument. This is what I mean about the preposterousness of Dennett's materialism: if it's true, then philosophical debate is pointless. It undermines reason itself. Now, that has been elaborated in journal articles which I could link to [i.e. here] but what would be the point? You could still say 'it could be that we are just physical beings....'
No Dennet's position just leads to the conclusion that reasoned argument along with all our experience is ultimately illusory. But it is still important to human life, so we must engage in it. Reason just like the rest of human experience, is not undermined unless you want to claim that it must have some absolute foundation. Interestingly Buddhism says exactly the same thing; that ultimately human experience and reason are illusory; and you are a Buddhist. You don't mind when it is said by Buddhism but you don't like it when Dennett says it. :s
From a point beyond it, not from the point of view of being an evolved simian.
How can anything at all be said from a "point beyond human experience and understanding" that makes absolutely no sense. And from Dennett's view of the 'ultimate' nature of reality as being something like physical forces and particles, the notion of being an "evolved simian" would also be ultimately illusory, en epiphenomeon of conscious awareness. And that statement would also be ultimately based on illusion as well, as, ultimately, would the view of physical particles and forces itself. I see no inconsistency there. It minds me of Wittgenstein's ladder or Buddhas raft.
That's what 'transcendental' refers to - the Buddha has gone beyond, that is part of what it means to be Buddha. That is symbolised in Tibetan depicts of the Wheel of Life and Death, by the fact that the Buddha is outside the 'six realms'.
That's not what 'transcendental' refers to in Western philosophy, which is what we are dealing with here. In those terms the story about Buddha's purported transcendental nature is groundless and thus unsupportable. IT is based on myth and allegory not rigorous thought. It is not the stuff of philosophy (understood as rigorous argumetation) at all, although it could be argued that it sits more comfortably with philosophy as "love of wisdom" (where 'wisdom' is not coterminous with 'discursive knowledge'). The point is that that is not what most of the people who participate in these forums are primarily concerned with; and thus not what the forums themselves are primarily concerned with; it's a different set of "language games".
Whereas Buddhists say the Buddha’s insight transcends reason:
Source
Hence - entirely different perspectives.
It's nonsense to say that Dennett thinks reason is "undermined". If he thought that why would take the trouble to write books that consist in reasoned argument.
I's not a corollary of his positon any more than than is of Buddhism that reason is "undermined". Reason is underpinned only by its own principles of coherence and consistency, not by anything beyond itself. Dennett could consistently say, just as Buddhism does, that the real transcends reason (in the sense that the map is not the territory).
The grounds are like this - as has been discussed at length in the thread on whether information is physical, the conception of ‘reason’ in the history of philosophy, has generally been that the nature of reason is incorporeal or immaterial. This is because of the understanding that an intelligible truth, such as a logical or arithmetical proof, is self-evidently true to the faculty of reason itself, without any need to refer to an external (or corporeal) fact. So when we employ the various terms that are common in reasoned inference - if this, then that, if x is the case, then y must follow - we’re not relying on a physical fact to make the case, but on the relationships of ideas, which has the force of logical necessity. So the basic argument from this is that logic and reason themselves, can’t be reduced to, or understood in terms of, natural or physical relations or conjunctions; they rely on the fact that abstractions have real force or potency in their own right. That is what Wieseltier refers to as the ‘independence of reason’ (which is also referred to as ‘sovereignty of reason’.)
This line of argument has been developed at length by Alvin Plantinga, in the ‘evolutionary argument against naturalism’. I myself am not persuaded by some aspects of Plantinga’s argument, but the fact of its existence at least it ought to demonstrate that the accusation that ‘materialism undermines reason’, is a serious argument and not simply a statement of feeling or a throwaway line.
There’s another ground as well, which is the one Wieseltier refers to when he says that Dennett ‘animalises’ reason. This is the argument that, as the quotation says, if ‘reason’ is to be understood in biological terms, as an adaption or a means to survival, then why would one have any faith in reason? ‘Reason’ might be the name for an elaborate ruse on the part of the hominid brain, the aim of which is always ultimately the same thing, namely to survive and procreate. (That seems awfully close to the argument of that Californian professor we discussed recently, namely Donald Hoffman.)
And then there’s also the sense in which biological materialism undermines the sense of there being a cosmic reason for existence itself. Given that the theistic religions understand mankind as central to the cosmic drama, the appeal to evolutionary naturalism as a counter-argument often involves the claim, explicit or implicit, that life occurs ‘for no reason’, that it’s a kind of ‘chemical reaction’ that got started by a lightning strike or in an undersea vent, and then basically developed via an algorithm according to Darwinian principles, resulting, in Stephen Hawkings’ charming phrase, in the ‘chemical scum’ of human life.
What I "pointed out" is a logical consequence of your own view. If you are unpersuaded by what I am saying, then that is simply a failure of rationality on your part, not a failure to be swayed by my general worldview.
However competing philosophical theories are adjudicated, it is not by reference to empirical observations about nature. If they were, then we'd no longer be doing metaphysics, but rather would be doing physics. Debates over, say, platonism vs. nominalism are not fought with competing sets of data: they're fought with a priori argumentation.
Science (under which I here broadly lump other empirical, evidence-based disciplines such as history) relies on observation and the collecting of evidence to bolster its theories, i.e. an empiricist methodology. Disputes which can be adjudicated empirically fall (at least in principle) within the ambit of the sciences. Ergo, to claim that a particular dispute - "design" vs. "no design" in this case - is not a matter for the sciences is to claim that it cannot be adjudicated empirically, i.e. that a designed universe is observationally indistinguishable from an undesigned one. That seems, at least prima facie to be an absurd claim (for one thing, in the case of the "design" hypothesis, it makes one wonder just what the designer has designed). Therefore, it is incorrect to claim that such disputes are not a scientific matter. If you see a flaw in my reasoning, please point it out, and please be specific.
Could you do me the favor of providing a link to a discussion (with me, or with anyone else) in which you in fact did offer arguments in favor of your views? Not to be uncharitable, but the closest thing to an argument I've yet seen you muster is a sort of appeal to adverse consequences (i.e. "it would be terrible for society if materialism is true, ergo materialism must be false"), which is most definitely fallacious reasoning. The rest comes from name-dropping your circle of preferred authors and linking to things other people have written, rather than putting their points into your own words, and distilling them into cogent arguments which can be analyzed on a premise-by-premise basis, or anything of the sort.
AFAIK, "natural philosophy" is simply an antiquated term for "science;" thus, there is little relevant distinction between the two in modern times.
This would seem a genetic fallacy. I myself am likewise no fan of intelligent design creationism or of evangelical Protestantism, but to regard ID as false "on account of" one's dislike for its main proponents is fallacious. Good arguments can be propounded by bad people.
I grant that the nature of mind (at least in terms of the mind-body problem, the hard problem of consciousness, etc) is poorly understood: however, it is as poorly-understood by philosophy as it is by science! And science (unlike philosophy) can have important and relevant things to say about the neurophysiological correlates of consciousness, the workings of the brain, its ontogeny and phylogeny, and a host of other problems which a priori philosophy is mostly impotent to tackle.
However, I deny that the nature of life itself remains elusive. What, exactly, is elusive about it? Again, we have dissected life to its component atoms, and have acquired exquisitely detailed understanding of its workings, down to the level of molecules in many cases. Certainly, much remains to be discovered, but there is nothing fundamentally mysterious about life anymore: science has demystified it.
Sure. And as I said above, the good money is on a physicalistic/naturalistic science to solve these problems, given its extraordinarily successful track record, and given the extraordinary paucity of successes of its alternatives. So, you'd do well to extend those promissory notes to materialism than to its alternatives: it has much better credit.
The old forum has died. In any case in this thread I have provided detailed responses to your questions here, here, and especially here, and here. There must be about - what - 2,500 words written in response to your criticisms (although some of them you didn't respond to and anything that strays too far from your customary positivist scientific realism seems to go by you.)
Quoting Arkady
How is it an empirical question? Could a 'non-designed universe' ever be compared to 'a designed universe'?
In a Scientific American cover story on the Multiverse, we read the following:
DOES THE MULTIVERSE REALLY EXIST? (cover story). By: Ellis, George F. R. Scientific American. Aug 2011, Vol. 305 Issue 2, p38-43. 6p.
So, notice the reasoning here: Weinberg and Susskind find the actual 'fine-tuning argument' is embarrassing, because, by golly, it really does seem to show that we're not simply accidental tourists, that the universe, in Freeman Dyson's words, 'really did seem to know we were coming'. But not to worry! Why not just posit gazillions of other universes! And then we save the 'accidental tourist' theory! It's so easy! And nobody can ever resolve it! That sure kicks the ball into the long grass, doesn't it.
Now, as it happens, in the years since this article was written, a controversy has erupted in which that author, George Ellis, is a player. This controversy is about whether string theory, and the related mutiverse cosmology, are scientific theories at all (for which, see Scientific method: Defend the integrity of physics, Nature.) Ellis and Silk recommend circumspection with respect to some of the wilder theories in circulation. In the other corner, we have Max Tegmark, Sean Carroll, and others, for whom no speculative metaphysics is too far-out provided the mathematics makes some kind of sense.
So when you work out a way, in this climate, to resolve the question of the 'grand design', then do let us know.
That's not grounds, it is merely what some philosophers thought about the nature of reason in the past. Many modern philosophers think that this way of thinking about reason is based on the fact that we cannot intuit the source of our thoughts in brain activity.
I'm not arguing for that standpoint, I'm arguing that it is one plausible explanation for the idea that reason is "immaterial". Remember, to say reason is immaterial is to postulate the existence of immaterial substance or process.. This is to posit dualism. The problems with this view were definitively brought to light in the Cartesian picture; which is a vision of totally brute mechanical matter, and substantively separate minds perceiving its activities and (somehow?) interacting with it.
What does it mean to say that thought is not physical or material?
We don't know what the correlation between rational thought and neuronal activity is, but there seems to be very good reason to believe that there is such a correlation. Personally, I don't believe the question can ever be definitively answered due to the fact that we cannot directly perceive the neuronal generation of thought; but any fruitful approach to an answer cannot be based on positing two entirely separate substances, a material and an immaterial; that much seems clear.
Quoting Wayfarer
Reason provides its own justification for having faith in it; because it works. We don't know what the source of reason is, but if we have reason to believe that its origin is in "animality" (an idea which is supported by the great deal of evidence for evolution) why should that diminish our faith in it? We know it works, so no theory about its origin could ever undermine our faith in it.
There seems to be an indwelling material, vegetative, animal intelligence in nature itself I would say, yet it seem impossible to see how that will ever be directly observable. I would be tempted to call that material intelligence God, and think that reason, as well as instinct, imagination, intuition, emotion and volition have their sources in that material intelligence.
Quoting Wayfarer
But the cosmos is existence itself. How could there be a reason for that existence "outside of" itself. As Far as I know the Buddhists posit no positive reason for existence, but only the negative reason of attachment. I prefer to think that the reason for existence lies in God's (nature's) desire to produce greater and greater creations; nature as an artist. I also like the idea that everything in nature, in fact nature/God itself has not only a temporal, but an eternal existence. As Plato said: "Time is the moving image of eternity". Materialism in its broadest conceptions does not conflict with this at all, so far as I can see.
All philosophy is what 'some philosophers thought'.
Quoting Janus
That is one version of dualism, which depicts mind as 'a substance', with many well-known and copiously documented problems,
Quoting Janus
I will refer to the same argument that I referred to in the information as physical thread. What does 'originate' mean?
Ask yourself this: what about something like a logical principle, such as the law of the excluded middle, or the law of identity. Do you think that is something that could be said to have 'its origin in neural activity'? I would say not: it is a principle that a sufficiently intelligent being is able to discern. And the same principle can be applied to many articles of 'the furniture of reason', such as number. Whatever kind of brain you have, you will be obliged to recognise that 2 does in fact equal 2. That is not something which 'originates in the brain'.
Another point is that neuroscience has shown that the mind can actually cause material changes to neural configuration. That happens in cases where there has been damage to one area of the brain, and where the mind re-organises the activities of the brain to compensate. It also happens because learned skills influence neural configuration. Those are some of many examples of 'top-down causation', where volitional or cognitive activity acts 'downward' on neural matter. If the mind were the product of the brain, you wouldn't expect to see that - changes ought only to go 'upward' from the material layer. The same can be said of many psychosomatic effects, even the placebo effect.
Quoting Janus
We only know that it works because we are able to reason. Reason is the criterion for making that judgement. Where I'm dubious, and suspicious, about Dennett's reasoning, is that he purports to explain reason in terms of adaptive necessity. He animalises reason, exactly as Wieseltier says.
Quoting Janus
We already discussed that.
Quoting Janus
Carl Sagan: 'Cosmos is all there is, and ever will be', a canonical statement of naturalism. I didn't think you maintained that naturalism was all-inclusive, although you don't seem to be able to make up your mind. In any case, a traditional epithet of the Buddha is that he is 'lokuttara' which means 'world-transcending'; which is central to this debate.
Yes, obviously, so what is it above that? Why is it a ground for thinking that thought is immaterial?
Quoting Wayfarer
Right, so please give an account of the other version.
Quoting Wayfarer
Check the dictionary. You know what "originate" means. Do you think thoughts originate in the brain or not. If not, then where?
Quoting Wayfarer
Not to my satisfaction. Here is the discussion you referenced:
Quoting Wayfarer
It is equally impossible to demonstrate that there is a mind or spirit that is transcendent so this answer is nothing more than a red herring. The question was 'which conception of spirit makes it easier to understand how it could act in nature?'. It seems obvious to me that this would be the immanent notion of spirit, or God, or mind or whatever you want to call it.
Quoting Wayfarer
Where else would a logical principle originate but in a brain/mind as a generalization of the nature of its experience? Isn't the "sufficiently intelligent being that is able to discern it" just a being with the requisite complexity of neural activity? Do you think you would be able to recognize logical principles if you were given a frontal lobotomy?
Quoting Wayfarer
Yes, the brain, just like the body, can, within limits,reorganize itself to compensate for damage. I don't see why a physical organ would not be able to cause physical changes. Note, though, that unlike you I don't separate the physical from the mental and the spiritual; so the brain is a spiritual organ in virtue of its physicality, not in spite of it.
Quoting Wayfarer
Do you really want to claim that human reason has not evolved and adapted over the estimated million or so years that human beings have existed as a species? It is the human animal that has evolved. The animal is not contrary or separate to the spirit; it is the spirit; which means that animals are spiritual beings too, just as we are.
Quoting Wayfarer
I do think in naturalistic terms. I don't even know what it could mean to think in supernaturalistic terms; I wouldn't know where to begin. Buddha's epithets are irrelevant, I think, rather than "central" to this debate. That is mythology not philosophy. I don't believe you know what Buddha's purported "world transcendence" could really mean; it is a vague notion. (if you did know about it it would be in such a way that you could not speak about your knowledge, but only show it in your manner of being).
By the way I am not denying that there might be an afterlife, but I do deny that we could know it if there were, or that it is a matter of reason as opposed to a matter of faith. I have no argument with people trying to imagine, intuit or have faith in such ideas; if it useful to them and helps them live better then that's great. But such ideas, insofar as they are outside the ambit of inter-subjective corroboration and agreement cannot be the subject of either science or philosophical argumentation (and the latter seems to be what we are attempting to do here). As an aside, I believe such otherworldly ideas should not be matters that influence law, public policy, morals, ethics and so on. Religion and politics should be kept well separate).
I can see that. Metaphysics is difficult.
This is a typical example of your apparent inability to deal with objections except by becoming condescending.
The fact is that you can't produce a coherent account of what it means to think in supernaturalistic terms, and you are attempting to hide that fact by resorting to your usual cheap tricks.
For every argument supporting any metaphysical position there is a potentially more sophisticated argumemt supporting its opposite; that is the nature of dialectic.
None of these contain arguments. Do you not understand the difference? All you have done is quoted other sources, stated your view, and so forth. But, you have provided no reasons for supposing that materialism (or physicalism, naturalism, and allied positions) is false. It has nothing to do with my "positivist scientific realism;" it has to do with you never defending your views, only stating what those views are and complaining about those views you don't like.
Quoting Wayfarer
I think it couldn't be any other way. Again, if an undesigned universe is empirically indistinguishable from a designed one (that is, each hypothesis makes the exact same predictions, and both are equally well-supported by the same set of observations), then just what is the designer supposed to have designed?
I admit I have not read this in detail, as you have provided yet another quotation in lieu of actually discussing something yourself. I will only say that I have never defended the veracity of the multiverse, many-worlds hypothesis, string theory, or anything of the sort (and I agree that, to the extent that they don't make testable predictions, then they're not science). It is simply a subject outside of my knowledge (or even interest, really).