What is the difference between the fact that grass is green and the green grass?
In a previous thread, I received a question posed by @Michael. It states the following:
Quoting Michael
I decided to post this question as it stood as the topic title.
Is the difference between the fact of grass being green and green grass embedded in our use of language? If one were to ask Wittgenstein, what would he say? Would his response differ from his Tractarian philosophy rather than the Investigations?
Quoting Michael
So one might say that the proposition that grass is green is made true by the fact that grass is green. But then what is the difference between the fact that grass is green and the green grass? Are they the same thing? If so, and if the latter is a thing, then facts are things. Are they different? If so, can we deduce the observer-independence of the fact from the observer-independence of the thing (assuming, for the sake of argument, that green grass is observer-independent)? To answer the latter we must first determine how the fact that grass is green differs from the green grass.
I decided to post this question as it stood as the topic title.
Is the difference between the fact of grass being green and green grass embedded in our use of language? If one were to ask Wittgenstein, what would he say? Would his response differ from his Tractarian philosophy rather than the Investigations?
Comments (52)
In other words, the fact that the grass is green alludes to a certain set of conditions that are universal in nature to determine that the grass is green, where the green grass is just a statement based on individual experience that is much like the beetle in Wittgenstein's box.
Someone here quoted Wittgenstein as saying that there are no facts, only things.
But surely facts are things, and so, by "things", he must have meant "things other than facts or other abstract objects". Or maybe "objectively, physically existent things".
(I realize that he wrote in German, and I don't know if our "thing" means exactly the same as the German world that is translated as "thing".)
Anyway, with that proviso, I think that quoted statement is true. I don't think there are any genuinely objectively-existent things. Just abstract logical facts, and inter-referring systems of them, including complex systems of them, such as our universe.
(And if there are objectively existent physical things, they’re superfluous, and the proposition of their existence is unfalsifiable and unverifiable, merely (as a brute-fact) duplicating the things that are part of our complex system of inter-referring logical facts that is our universe.)
Quoting Posty McPostface
No. The grass and a fact about it aren’t the same thing.
Surely we’d all agree that facts are things, but the green grass, and the fact that it’s green are two different things.
Yes.
The 2nd question is easier. Of course a fact about a thing is different from the thing.
The 1st question, about observer-independence is trickier. I think it’s natural, valid and right for us to define our world in terms of our experience, and so I speak of a person’s life-experience possibility-story as being more fundamental and primary, in a meaningful way, than the possibility-world that is that story’s setting.
You could say that we’re what makes our possibility-world meaningful and relevant. (…where “meaningful and relevant” means “meaningful and relevant to us"). That sounds a bit chauvinistic on our part, doesn’t it.
The abstract logical facts that make up our life-experience possibility-stories aren’t really different from all the other abstract logical facts.
So I don’t really believe in absolute observer-dependence, Anti-Realism.
I often tell the story of the Giraffe who said, “Alright then, let’s just say the one with the longest neck gets all the jellybeans.” The chauvinism of claiming absolute observer-dependence reminds me of that story. ...the notion that we make our world relevant because relevant is defined as "relevant to us".
So I don’t really believe in absolute Anti-Realism, though it’s true that the meanings of “real”, “exist” and “is” are flexible enough for us to validly call ourselves and our experience fundamental and primary. Our world is subjective, and that’s what there is, for us. and that subjective system of facts (our individual life-experience possibility-story) has its own independent reality and validity, regardless of there being other equally-valid logical facts and systems of them.
[quote PostyMcPostface]
I decided to post this question as it stood as the topic title.
Is the difference between the fact of grass being green and green grass embedded in our use of language?
[/quote]
Even if you agree that this world isn’t other than a complex system of inter-referring abstract logical facts about hypotheticals, the facts are still different from, and not made by, the words about them. The word are about the facts, but they aren’t responsible for the facts that they describe.
It just sounds to me like two completely different things, the grass and the fact. (…even if, as I suggest, our physical universe consists of a system of inter-referring abstract logical facts.)
Michael Ossipoff
When I used the term "things" I meant "material things" or "objects". Are facts the observer-independent objects[sup]1[/sup] that true statements describe, or are they something else?
As @Sapientia said in the original discussion, we can water green grass but we can't water the fact that grass is green, and so it would seem that the fact is not the object that the true statement describes. But if it's not the object (and if it's not the true statement) then what is it?
Regardless, it would seem that we have the statement, the object, and the fact.
[sup]1[/sup] Assuming, for the sake of argument, that objects are observer-independent.
If you meant "thing" as a material thing or material object, then of course a fact isn't that kind of a thing.
For the relation between "statement" and "fact", wouldn't you say that a statement is an utterance that tells about a fact?
But "thing" seems to mean anything that can be denoted by a noun. The words "anything" and "everything" seem to say that. Maybe a thing is anything other than action or a modifier (distinct from the words for them, and except when they too are being referred to as things). So, the meanings of "run" and "green" aren't things, but words are things, including those words.
But "object" can't just mean a material thing, because we speak of abstract objects.
No finite dictionary can non-circularly define all of its words. Maybe the meanings of "fact" and "thing" have to just be taken as understood.
Edit: Maybe, instead of saying "anything other than an action or modifier", I should say, "Whatever isn't an action or a modifier", in in order to avoid circularly using "thing" in "anything".
Michael Ossipoff
It can't just be individual experience per Wittgenstein's no private language argument. Statements of facts must be sociological. Other people agree that the grass is green such that we can construct propositions about it.
So you agree that there is the statement ("the grass is green"), the object (the green grass), and the fact (that grass is green)? Three distinct, albeit related, things?
I don't know. Do true statements refer to facts or objects?
True statements regarding empirical conditions have to refer to objective states of affairs other people can verify, however we wish to metaphysically classify those things. The ball is falling is true when it corresponds to an empirical situation with a falling ball.
And what are states of affairs? Facts or objects?
Doesn't a statement tell about and refer to both a fact and a thing?
Maybe a fact could be defined as a state of affairs that an utterance tells about, when an utterance tells about a state of affairs.
Quoting MichaelI'
I'd say a state of affairs is a fact.
But even a fact is a thing when it's spoken of as one.
In "abstract object", doesn't "object" mean the same as "thing"?
Michael Ossipoff
Objects or events. The facts are gleaned from the states of affairs.
So what's a fact, if not the object/state-of-affairs? Is it the true statement?
The fact is the state of affairs that the statement tells about.
It's neither the statement nor the object.
Michael Ossipoff
Michael Ossipoff
It's information about the states of affairs, which can be as simple as noting the color property of grass, or the direction the object is moving.
Then you're just changing the question to "what is the difference between a state of affairs and an object?"
Information? So facts are cognitive things? I guess that the answer to the original question, then, is that facts are observer-dependent (even if the object/event/state-of-affairs isn't)?
Yes, but not just.
A thing is whatever isn't a modifier or an action (distinct from the word for a modifier or an action, and except when the modifier or action is spoken of as a thing).
I think "object" is often used to mean "thing". Don't they have the same meaning, in such usages as "abstract object"?
A fact is a state of affairs.
I guess that's true even if no statement is made, to tell about it.
Even a fact is a thing.
Michael Ossipoff
None of this addresses the issue. We have the statement "the grass is green" and we have the green grass. But then we also have the fact as something else. So what sort of thing is a fact, if neither an utterance nor a material object? And if we put the original question in context, are facts observer-independent? We can accept that material objects are observer-independent, but given that facts aren't material objects, it doesn't then follow that facts are observer-independent.
We can certainly say that facts are dependent on material objects, but then they might also depend on something else (e.g. statements).
Not sure, but I'm not comfortable with saying facts are out there in the world. There is a close relationship with facts and states of affairs, but they're not the same thing in my view. Consider that the facts can be wrong. States of affairs can't be wrong. But what we take to be the facts can be.
This suggests that facts are observer-dependent to an extent. And what sort of facts we're interested in will impact how we talk about a particular state of affairs. One could say that we generate facts (or information) from our interactions with states of affairs, based on what we're interested in.
...which spoils my definition of a thing.
Maybe "thing" can't be defined, though we all know what it means. Whatever can be referred to?
Michael Ossipoff
A fact is a state of affairs. A statement is an utterance that tells about a state of affairs.
A thing is whatever can be referred to.
"The grass is green" is a statement telling about a fact. it's also a fact.
Statements and facts are things too,
The fact and the statement aren't the same thing, though the statement is our only way of denoting the fact, and so "The grass is green" is both the statement and the fact.
A fact is a state of affairs.
Yes, The facts that make up our life-experience possibility-story aren't different from all the other abstract facts. But our life-experience possibility-stories, complex systems of inter-referring facts, have their own reality completely independent of the other abstract facts, In the context of our ilfe-experience possibility-stories, nothing is observer-independent.
But that's just in the context of our life-experience possibility-stories. In the global context, of course all the other facts are there too, independent of us and our life-story, just as our life-experience possibility-story is independent of them.
Not in the context of our life-experience stories.
Anyway, I don't think material objects have objective existence anyway. They're just part of a complex system of inter-referring abstract logical facts.
But aren't they anyway?
Surely the inter-referring logical facts of which someone's life-experience possibility-story is composed aren't really different from all the other abstract logical facts. Those other facts are independent of a person's life-experience story, just as it is independent of them.
Michael Ossipoff
Quoting Michael
I was addressing the issues that had been raised. But it isn't always obvious what someone else means, in topics such as these.
I was saying what I meant, and of course I'm always willing to clarify or re-word things, when specific phrases are referred to as unclear.
But, as I said above, sometimes we just can't tell what the other person means, no matter how well they say what they mean. Communication isn't perfect or reliable, and that's just a fact. Sorry if what I said wasn't clear, and I'm always willing to clarify or reword any particular statement or sentence referred to as unclear. But I realize that that doesn't always succeed, because communication on these topics isn't reliably successful.
We're talking about meanings of words whose meanings are rarely examined, and of course it can be far from obvious what someone else means in such a discussion.
Though I'm willing to clarify upon request, I also realize that you aren't obligated to pursue someone else's meaning.
Michael Ossipoff
Quoting Michael
I've been posting definitions of the terms whose definitions were being discussed. (Things, Statements,and Facts). ...and commenting on the relations between things, facts and statements.
See above.
But I'll repeat here that, though I'm always willing to clarify what I meant by any statement that someone specifically refers to as unclear, I also realize that you aren't obligated to care what I say.
Michael Ossipoff
I'll just add that of course, the only way that I could clarify the meaning of something that I said would be for someone to, first, specify a particular statement of mine whose meaning wasn't clear, and what wasn't clear about it.
You'd have to be specific.
Michael Ossipoff
Nothing. They are truth functionally equivalent.
A thing: a,b,c...
A predicate: F,G,H...
A fact: Fa, Ga, Hb
Facts are not things.
The error here is to think that fact has one meaning, one use, and our job is to fathom that. It ain't necessarily so.
So a fact can be what is the case, and also a statement of what is the case. p as opposed to "p", an ambiguous disquatation.
Quoting Michael
Trading on the ambiguity.
That's not the question here. The question is whether the content they convey is different from each other? Namely, is the statement that the fact the grass is green, observer-independent as opposed to the observer-dependent statement of green grass?
I don't know if that works. As Sap has said, we can water the green grass but we can't water the fact that grass is green.
Quoting Banno
I know that we often use the word "fact" to refer to a true statement/proposition, but that usage of the word "fact" isn't really that interesting. It's when we use the word "fact" to refer to what is the case that there's something to discuss.
Is there a difference between an object and what is the case? Between green grass and grass being green? Between a flying pig and that a pig is flying?
Quoting Banno
I think this exemplifies the problem, depending on how you translate it into a real example. Would you accept that grass is an example of a thing, that being green is an example of a predicate, and so that grass being green is an example of a fact? Would you also accept that green grass is a thing? Then if facts are not things then grass being green is not green grass.
But if grass being green isn't green grass (a material object), then what is it?
Let me state my definitions again, starting with "Thing", because some of the other definitions make use of that word:
Things are whatever can be referred to.
(I justify that broad definition by the all-inclusive meanings of "everything" and "anything".)
A fact is a state of affairs.
A state of affairs could also be defined as an aspect of the way things are.
A statement is an utterance that tells about a fact.
By those definitions, facts and statements are things too.
So yes, as you said, a fact is neither an utterance or a material object. So, what is it then? It's a state of affairs, or an aspect of how things are. That's what kind of thing a fact is.
So I've addressed and answered that question.
That's a whole separate issue, calling for a separate thread. I addressed that question too, in a longer post, just few postings back. It calls for longer and more involved discussion.
But, to make a long story short, yes facts in general are observer-independent, unless you're a strict Anti-Realist.
But, in the context of your life-experience possibility-story, that story is about your experience, and, in that context, you and your experience are primary, and the facts about the rest of your world (the part you aren't experiencing) are secondary, and only meaningful by implication. So you could say that, in the context of your life-experience possibility-story, it all depends on you and your experience.
But that's true only locally, in the context of your experience-story. Of course the facts in that story aren't different from all the other facts. All the many facts that aren't part of your experience story are independent of you and your experience-story, just as your experience-story is independent of facts that aren't about it.
But this issue, the Realism vs Anti-Realism issue, is a separate issue. There was a thread about it, last month. I recently wanted to post to it, but couldn't find it.
Maybes the Realism vs Anti-Realism thread should be re-started.
I don't think it's really an issue, because "real" isn't really metaphysically defined anyway. But, in the broad, general, objective context, yes facts are observer-independent.
I've justified that claim, above in this part of this post, and in a previous one.
But it seems to me that you're complicating this thread, when you combine two issues, adding-in the involved Realism vs Anti-Realism issue.
.
No, not to a strict Anti-Realist. And, in the context of your life-experience possibility-story, your experience is primary, and material objects that aren't in your experience, like a certain pebble on the ground in a field in Paris, France, which isn't in your experience, is relevant only if someone there picks it up and e-mails you about it, which brings it into your experience. But that observer-dependence is only in the experience-primary context of your life-experience possibility-story.
More generally, broadly and objectively, facts are observer-independent, for the reason I've spoken of.
True, the fact that facts aren't material object doesn't make them observer-independent. A strict Anti-Realist wouldn't say that they are.
But the complete unrelatedness of most facts to your life-experience story, and the fact that the facts of which your life-experience possibility-story is composed aren't really different from all the other facts, makes facts, in general, observer-independent.
To place experiencing beings at the center of all metaphysical existence would be chauvinistic. ...like that Giraffe that says it's entitled to all the jellybeans because it has the longest neck.
We certainly cannot say that.
"2 + 2 = 4" is true, if the additive associative axiom of the real numbers (and integers, and rational numbers) is true. ...by a natural and obvious definition of 1, 2, 3, and 4 in terms of the multiplicative identity of those number systems and addition.
So we have the following abstract if-then fact:
"if the additive associative axiom of the real numbers is true.then 2+2=4.(by a certain simple specified definition of 1, 2, 3 and 4 in terms of the multiplicative identity of the real numbers, and addiition."
That abstract if-then fact's truth doesn't depend on any material object. It's an inevitable abstract logical fact.
Material objects have nothing to do with what makes "2 + 2 = 4" true.
Abstract if-then logical facts don't depend on anything.
(...except their own internal logical validity.)
The if-then fact's "then" conclusionof course depends on its "if" premise being true. But the truth of the abstract if-then fact, itself, doesn't depend on anything.
And likewise for a complex system of inter-referring abstract logical if-then facts. ...an infinity of them.. ...including one whose events and relations matches those of our physical universe.
There's no reason to believe that our physical universe is other than that.
If this universe has objective existence (not just consisting of abstract facts),and if the "stuff",the "matter" of this universe is objectively and fundamentally existent, then it's also superfluous. It superfluously duplicates what is already there. A proposition about its objective existence is an unfalsifiable, unverifiable proposition.
Michael Ossipoff
What does that prove? The fact that a fact can be about a thing doesn't mean that a fact, itself, isn't a thing too.
(That sentence, directly above states a fact about a fact.)
Or here's another:
"The fact that you got a job is the reason why I didn't evict you."
Michael Ossipoff
Incorrect. A statement isn't a fact. A statement is an utterance telling about a fact (or claiming one, whether truly or falsly).
Michael Ossipoff
I don't think there is the ambiguity that Banno spoke of. A statement just plain isn't a fact. It's an utterance that tells about or claims a fact.
A statement is a thing, however.
But there's ambiguity about what's real, existent, or what is. ...because those words aren't metaphysically defined.
Yes, I don't think mathematics uses undefined terms, as ordinary speech.does. A finite dictionary can't define all of its words non-circularly.
I guess mathematics relies a bit on dictionary definitions, but the important terms evidently don't have an ambiguity problem. I guess it could be said that mathematics avoids ambiguous terms.
Michael Ossipoff
But you know that they are. Not everyone calls them "real" or "existent". (Those two words aren't metaphysically defined, and so people can have different opinions about what's real.)
I myself don't claim that abstract logical facts are objectively real, or that a universe consisting only of them is objectively real.
No, then they aren't facts. A statement (utterance claiming a fact) can be wrong, false, but there aren't wrong facts. When we say that someone's facts are wrong, we really mean "facts", not facts.
...when what we take to be facts aren't really facts.
I'm not saying that Anti-Realism is wrong. The undefinedness of "real" and "exist" means that Realism vs Anti-Realism isn't really an issue.
From our own point of view, in the context of our life-experience story, our experience is primary, but, in previous posts here, I told why there's good reason to say that facts in general aren't dependent on our experience of them. Facts not about our experience are independent of our life-experience story, just as it's independent of them.
.[/quote]
You could replace "thing" with "variable" and the question still stands.
However, you could resolve it by simply saying that "thing" is purely an objectual demonstrative.
Everything is a thing!
Content. What's that?
Referentialy, extensionaly, they are identical. If you think there is a sense in whcih they are different it is up to you to present it.
I am using the italicised words in their philosophical sense.
Quoting Michael
Tha's what I was pointing out.
That's inconsistent.
If there's no difference between the fact that grass is green and green grass, and if green grass is a thing, then facts are things.
But again, we can water green grass but we can't water the fact that grass is green. And so it seems that the fact that grass is green is different to the green grass.
Going back to this...
I don't think they are referentially or extensionally equivalent. I think, talking about a fact is different from a statement based on observation. So, green grass is a statement based on observation, where talking about the grass being green is an observer-independent fact derived from reasoning about the world.
Different things, no?
Obviously, we can't claim the fact that grass is green, is true, if the grass isn't green.
So, it would seem that this is an issue with inductive reasoning. We can't deduce a fact without prior observation, can we? At least not in an informal language.
Facts, i've been convinced, are neither true nor false - that is, truth an falsity does not apply to them. So, if you like, the difference between "the grass is green" and the green grass is that one can be true, the other just is.
Yeah, that may be true, pun-intended. But, the ontology of a fact has to be grounded in a statement either being true or false.
Does that make 'facts' metaphysical or in other words what performative role does the inclusion of a 'fact' have on a state of affairs?
It does? What's that mean?
As per Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, the totality of facts of either what is or is not the case, constitute the world of objects, not things.
What did he say about that in Philosophical Investigations?
Sorry, I have no idea what passage you are referring to. I have the book in front of me trying to find what passage you might have in mind.