Kant and lying to the murderer problem
Kant formulated the Categorical Imperative (CI). The CI basically states that only those actions are morally good that can be universal law. Have I got that right?
So, lies are a definite no-no because if lying became a universal law, nothing would make sense.
To this specific don't (do not lie), the philosopher Benjamin Constant invented the Problem of Lying to a Murderer(PLM).
Benjamin said that the CI makes one duty-bound to disclose the location of a potential victim to a murderer and that is, obviously, wrong. Kant replied that the person must tell the truth, in spite of the horrible consequences. His reasoning is based on not using people.
What I think is Kant's CI can't be isolated in this fashion, as required by the PLM. It's like formulating a law and comparing it to an exception to the law, that particular exception being a case of suspension of the law and not a special case where the law is not applicable.
Imagine a law that applies to all women in America. What is reasonable is to find an American woman, a special case, to which the law is inapplicable. What isn't reasonable is to find a woman in Algeria and produce her as an exception to the law. The PLM does exactly this.
What I mean is if the CI is enforced universally, there would be no murderer and so the issue the PLM raises becomes nonexistent. No murderer, no need to lie to a murderer.
Therefore, this particular criticism doesn't damage Kantian morality, at least not to the extent advertised.
It appears that Kant's moral theory is quite sound if universally applied. It's the morality of a perfect world. A world without murderers, thieves, deceivers, etc.
Other moral theories, consequentialism for instance, don't seem to possess this quality - that of being applicable in practical terms.
What do you think?
So, lies are a definite no-no because if lying became a universal law, nothing would make sense.
To this specific don't (do not lie), the philosopher Benjamin Constant invented the Problem of Lying to a Murderer(PLM).
Benjamin said that the CI makes one duty-bound to disclose the location of a potential victim to a murderer and that is, obviously, wrong. Kant replied that the person must tell the truth, in spite of the horrible consequences. His reasoning is based on not using people.
What I think is Kant's CI can't be isolated in this fashion, as required by the PLM. It's like formulating a law and comparing it to an exception to the law, that particular exception being a case of suspension of the law and not a special case where the law is not applicable.
Imagine a law that applies to all women in America. What is reasonable is to find an American woman, a special case, to which the law is inapplicable. What isn't reasonable is to find a woman in Algeria and produce her as an exception to the law. The PLM does exactly this.
What I mean is if the CI is enforced universally, there would be no murderer and so the issue the PLM raises becomes nonexistent. No murderer, no need to lie to a murderer.
Therefore, this particular criticism doesn't damage Kantian morality, at least not to the extent advertised.
It appears that Kant's moral theory is quite sound if universally applied. It's the morality of a perfect world. A world without murderers, thieves, deceivers, etc.
Other moral theories, consequentialism for instance, don't seem to possess this quality - that of being applicable in practical terms.
What do you think?
Comments (32)
With that, I'd say that yes, I think Kant's view is for another type of world, that of moral agents, of which one takes part of as one acts morally. Since the real world however provides all sorts of situations, the obligations would seem to necessarily get mixed up with one another. I don't see how it's a problem for the theory that it's wrong to lie to a murderer insofar as she is a moral agent. Blindly following a dogma is certainly not a commendable reason for acting morally, and I'm sure Kant was not of that opinion, so we can't just list up the universal laws and start acting only on them all. Were chained to the natural world after all, and never completely free agents (and so as citizens of the moral world), because the natural world demands us other things, and sometimes we need to pick one of many bad options and admit that we can't be perfectly free and perfectly good.
So to me the criticism seems to miss the point, which is about a constant structure beneath the actions, not about the acting-out of them. Which seems close to the point made in the opening post.
Nowhere does Kant claim that the categorial imperative only applies in a perfect world.
The thing is that Kant was not trying to produce a theory of applied ethics, I recall reading this in his introduction to the Groundwork, or 2nd Critique. So to judge him on the basis of lying to a murderer is not charitable.
Perhaps he ''failed'' to see the full power of the categorical imperative. Applied universally, it precludes any conflict of duty.
I mean, as per the categorical imperative, murder is wrong. So, if applied, this would free the world of murderers. The categorical imperative makes lying wrong and so, there would be no liars. The point is there's no reason to lie in a world without murderers. In other words, there will never arise a conflict of duties, as presented in the ''lying to a murderer'' thought experiment.
And in which world will there be no murderers or thieves or deceivers or liars? Such a world is what I refer to as perfect.
The categorical imperative is "act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law", not "act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law, but only if others do the same".
Not quite. Only those actions whose maxim conforms in form to the demands of duty can be moral and that form must pass the test of non-contradiction in order to be legislated as a universal law.
How about if we look at it from another angle. The categorical imperative is a moral imperative i.e. it's supposed to be applied universally - morality is about existence in relation to another, about society, the collective.
Morality isn't about individual, solitary existence. What is the point of not lying or not killing when you're the only person in existence. In other words, morality reduces to nonsense at the individual level. This is implied by the categorical imperative: if lying is universal, nothing will make sense; chaos will ensue and this is exactly what's happening with lying to the murderer thought experiment - it is one instance where the categorical imperative is being applied to one person when, actually, it should apply to all.
Quoting Cavacava
Everything must pass the test of non-contradiction.
Quoting MikeL
Yes, but if you're compelled to give an answer the problem remains.
See the comment directly above your last post.
Your ensuing reasoning is solid, and acceptable. It reminds one of the prisoners' dilemma, but is more general, and with a more wide-spread applicability.
From the rest of your post, it seems that Kant was aware of the gist of my solution.
One more thing...
Interpreted this way, Kant's moral theory, if applied universally, is more practical than competing theories. I guess the ''applied universally'' part is impractical.
Consequentialism seems impractical because the full scope of an action's consequences are impossible to determine. For instance, the effects of an action can, theoretically, continue to the end of time itself.
As I understand Kant, the maxim of one's action is striped of all empirical content, it becomes a formal principal, and only as such can it be willed as a universal law.
Kant's moral system is built on freedom of action. If so then to lie to an ax murder is neither moral nor immoral because in this circumstance one is not free, so there is no moral choice, in my opinion.
Kant disagrees:
Maybe so, but as I already stated, this is extraneous to his earlier work (1785) the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morales , which is the basis of his moral system.
It was entailed by his earlier work, which is why Constant brought it up. This later article didn't change his system; it reaffirmed it in light of the objection.
The following from his Groundwork, Part III
The threat of the murderer effectively relinquishes "a will of one's own"
One is free insofar as one follows the unconditional duty to tell the truth, even if to the detriment of oneself and others. The man who lies to the murderer isn't free, whereas the man who tells the truth is free.
Given that Kant disagreed, I'm confident in claiming that you're wrong.
And that work entailed the duty to not lie to the murderer, as Constant recognised, hence his objection. Your suggested "out" seems to be a misunderstanding.
No, I don't think so. Freedom can't be compromised and still be freedom, such a person cannot be a free agent, and any resultant action can't be construed as moral or immoral. I think this follows from Kant's system.
You argument from authority fails.
Again, Kant disagreed. From the The Critique of Practical Reason:
You're interpreting Kant's words according to your own views on morality and freedom. That isn't the right way to go about it. You have to interpret his words according to his views.
Analogies are attempted emotional manipulation. I tell you a story, and make you feel that it is silly, or dumb, and then say that it is the same thing as the point in contention.
I don't believe that Kant addressed at all the absolutely devastation power of art on the soul. We "suspend disbelief" and allow ourselves to be taken for a ride, as it were, but always included in art are both representations of the world, and cause and effect, neither of which need to be accurate at all, and the effects on the soul may override experience, tempt people into pretension, and generate widespread mass delusion, and enslavement.
Once I entirely crack the anti-life equation, I'ma write a book, and then all your souls will me mine, and I'll have escaped death.