Gettier's Case II Is Bewitchment
Let us suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following proposition:
(f) Jones owns a Ford. Smith's evidence might be that Jones has at all times in the past within Smith's
memory owned a car, and always a Ford, and that Jones has just offered Smith a
ride while driving a Ford.
Let us imagine, now, that Smith has another friend, Brown, of whose whereabouts he is totally ignorant. Smith selects three place names quite at random and constructs the following three propositions:
(g) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston.
(h) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona.
(i) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk.
Each of these propositions is entailed by (f). Imagine that Smith realizes the entailment of each of these propositions he has constructed by (0, and proceeds to accept (g), (h), and (i) on the basis of (f). Smith has correctly inferred (g), (h), and (i) from a proposition for which he has strong evidence. Smith is therefore completely justified in believing each of these three propositions. Smith, of course, has no idea where Brown is.
But imagine now that two further conditions hold. First, Jones does not own a Ford, but is at present driving a rented car. And secondly, by the sheerest coincidence, and entirely unknown to Smith, the place mentioned in proposition (h) happens really to be the place where Brown is. If these two conditions hold, then Smith does not KNOW that (h) is true, even though (i) (h) is true, (ii) Smith does believe that (h) is true, and (iii) Smith is justified in believing that (h) is true.
While it is true that (g), (h), and (i) are entailed by (f), and it is also true that Smith could accept/believe that all three are valid forms of disjunction. It is not true that Smith could believe anything at all about Brown's location. I mean, Gettier clearly states that Smith is totally ignorant about that. Thus, Smith - himself - would not form belief about Brown's location. One cannot know they are ignorant about Brown's location and simultaneously form and/or hold a belief about where Brown is located.
The mistake here is conflating knowledge of the rules of entailment/disjunction with belief. Believing that (g), (h), and (i) are entailed by (f) is not equivalent to believing the disjunctions.
Comments (1001)
The above works from an utterly inadequate, and all too common, (mis)conception of belief.
Belief statements are always believed by the speaker. Statements that are always believed by the speaker do not include statements that are not(believed by the speaker). Disjunctions can.
Disjunctions are not belief statements.
During sincere speech acts, when someone is talking about the world and/or themselves, s/he is talking in ways that represent their own belief. One cannot believe a statement that s/he does not think is true. Sincere speech acts do not include statements that are not believed. Disjunctions can.
Disjunctions are neither always sincere speech acts, nor belief statements.
When sensibly talking in terms of belief that 'X', X is always a belief statement. The history of philosophy has held that the value of 'X' can be satisfied by virtue of using a proposition. Propositions include disjunctions. Disjunctions are not belief statements. Propositions are not always belief statements. When sensibly talking in terms of belief that 'X', X cannot be a disjunction.
In order to know that 'X is true', one must believe 'X'. When sensibly talking in terms of knowing that 'X', X cannot be a disjunction.
((p) is true)
((p v q) follows from (p))
((p v q) is true if...(insert belief statement(s) regarding what makes this particular disjunction true))
((p v q) is true because...(insert belief statements corresponding to the above "if"))
The above clearly puts the necessary thought/belief process for believing a disjunction on display for all to see. It reports upon the necessary content within believing a disjunction. Since Gettier's case hinges upon what counts as believing a disjunction, it lands squarely within the applicable bounds/scope of the above solution.
This account is also quite amenable to the common sense groundwork at the top of this post. Gettier's report of Smith's belief is not.