Realism and an Ideal Theory
An ideal theory is one which meets all observational data and satisfies every theoretical constraint. A realist is said to be committed to the possibility that an ideal theory about the world could be entirely* wrong. This is because the world is supposed to be mind-independent for the realist, while theories are constructed by minds. Therefore, an ideal theory could still be false.
This is seen as an important criticism from anti-realists. If the world could be totally* different from a theory supported by all observation and theory, then what reason would there to maintain that there is such a world? It would be something utterly beyond our ability to know about it, even with a perfect theory.
The out for realists here is to reject the notion that an ideal theory could be fundamentally* wrong. This is because there need not be an isomorphic relationship between reality and the mind. Even though realists maintain that the world is independent of our perceptions, conceptual schemes and linguistic practices, that does not necessitate that the mind is likewise independent of the world. Rather, it's most likely the case that the mind is fundamentally dependent on the world such that an ideal theory cannot be totally* wrong.
* It is still possible for an ideal theory to get some things wrong because those things don't appear to us nor show up in our models. We could have an ideal but incomplete picture of the world. The important point is that it could not be completely untrue, which would present problems for realism (how can one know about an unknowable reality?).
The crucial point is that mind is dependent on reality for realists, and as such, an ideal theory is constrained by reality.
This is seen as an important criticism from anti-realists. If the world could be totally* different from a theory supported by all observation and theory, then what reason would there to maintain that there is such a world? It would be something utterly beyond our ability to know about it, even with a perfect theory.
The out for realists here is to reject the notion that an ideal theory could be fundamentally* wrong. This is because there need not be an isomorphic relationship between reality and the mind. Even though realists maintain that the world is independent of our perceptions, conceptual schemes and linguistic practices, that does not necessitate that the mind is likewise independent of the world. Rather, it's most likely the case that the mind is fundamentally dependent on the world such that an ideal theory cannot be totally* wrong.
* It is still possible for an ideal theory to get some things wrong because those things don't appear to us nor show up in our models. We could have an ideal but incomplete picture of the world. The important point is that it could not be completely untrue, which would present problems for realism (how can one know about an unknowable reality?).
The crucial point is that mind is dependent on reality for realists, and as such, an ideal theory is constrained by reality.
Comments (68)
A Realist believes that it is possible, even if it is difficult, to obtain true depictions of reality.
The Anti-Realist argues that we are hidden behind a veil, which at the very least is held up by the apparent transcendentalism of reality, i.e. if it is impossible to access reality, then it is impossible to verify that what we have constructed is true.
[quote=Marchesk]The crucial point is that mind is dependent on reality for realists, and as such, an ideal theory is constrained by reality.[/quote]
The same is true for the anti-realist. Anti-realism is not un-realism. An "ideal theory" is still constrained by reality; it's just that reality doesn't transcend the empirical.
I think the fundamental position of a metaphysical realist is the existence of a mind-independent world, regardless of whether we can truly depict or not. That's what makes someone a realist. Given the OP, I would agree that it's necessarily possible to obtain a true depiction of reality, at least in part, since the mind is grounded by reality, but mind-independence of that world is what is key to the metaphysical position itself.
It would be the same if someone said that dreams were real and claimed the right to use dreamland as reality in a debate over realism.
No they're not. They're denying the realist's account of what it means to be real. Anti-realism is not un-realism. The argument is over the mind-independence/objectivity/verification-transcendence of reality, not over its existence. Mind-dependent/subjective/verification-immanent things are nonetheless real.
They're denying that there is a real world, only the world as it appears to us. This is a philosophical discussion, and as such, it's important to not misuse language.
They're saying that the world as it appears to us is the real world. They're denying that there's something else to the real world (e.g. mind-independence/objectivity/verification-transcendence).
Yeah, sure, dreams are real too, in that people do have dreams. But they're also not real, as in the things I dream about aren't part of the world. They didn't happen, except as a dream. Same with imagination. So we don't say that dreams or imagination are real. That's abusing language, even though it's true that people do imagine and dream.
But that's abusing language in context of a discussion over metaphysical realism. The realist thinks the distinction between appearances and reality is important, because there is a real world beyond appearances. The anti-realist denies this.
But the anti-realist doesn't say that dream trees or imagined trees are real trees. The anti-realist says that the trees we see when awake are real, but aren't mind-independent/objective/verification-transcendent.
If they're not mind-independent, then why call them real?
It is anti-realism, which means opposed to realism. So it's really strange to want to hold on to the word "reality" in such a discussion.
Because they are real.
Yes. The anti-realist says that the real world is what appears, not something else. The disagreement is over the separation of the real world and the empirical world.
To be an anti-realist is to be opposed to metaphysical realism. It's not to be opposed to the existence of reality.
Consider, the moral anti-realist doesn't say that morality isn't real; they say that morality isn't mind-independent/objective/verification-transcendent. Unless they're also a moral nihilist, there's nonetheless a real mind-dependent/subjective/verification-immanent morality.
But they're not real, as in they're not mind-independent. Which is what real means in context of this discussion.
Quoting Michael
If the real world is what appears, and the anti-realist isn't a naive realist, then the anti-realist is talking about appearances.
Quoting Michael
I'm not sure about that, since direct realists and scientific realists might disagree. The disagreement then would be over whether the empirical world is mind-independent.
Quoting Michael
But it is, by definition. Reality entails mind-independence.
But it is, by definition. Reality entails mind-independence.[/quote]
"Real" doesn't mean "mind-independent". My dreams are real dreams but they're not mind-independent dreams.
If the real world is what appears and if the anti-realist accepts that things appear then the anti-realist accepts that there's a real world.
Sure. But regardless, the empirical world is the real world.
But in context of metaphysical realism, realists mean mind-independence when talking about reality. Anti-realists mean something different if/when they wish to use the word "reality". Of course realists don't deny that dreams happen, but dreams have no ontological status independent of minds, and that's what matters for being real, to a realist.
The anti-realist position is that what appears to us when we're awake has the same ontological status of dreams, in that it's mind-dependent. The realist disagrees. So using the word "reality" for both is to employ different meanings.
If the realist wants "real" to mean "mind-independent" then he can. But that doesn't require the anti-realist to adopt this terminology. The anti-realist can continue to use "real" as one ordinarily does; to describe the things we see every day when awake.
And the discussion can become a never ending argument over what is meant by "real".
Well, yes. That's the disagreement; over what it means for a tree to be real.
But let's go back to the first thing I quoted of you and replace the word "real" with "mind-independent", as that's what you claim to mean:
"The crucial point is that mind is dependent on a mind-independent world for realists, and as such, an ideal theory is constrained by a mind-independent world."
Yes, that seems like an accurate description of realism.
No, that's not the disagreement! The disagreement is over whether the tree can be mind-independent, and if so, if realists we warranted in maintaining such a position.
It's a metaphysical dispute, not a semantic one, although it seems to turn into a semantic one on these forums. And the reason is because someone wants to use the other side's terminology, but with different meaning, and then a big argument ensues over who has the right to use the terminology. Which completely derails the metaphysical dispute.
The realist doesn't have ownership over the word "real". "Reality" isn't realist terminology. It's English terminology.
But in context of metaphysical realism, the realist does get ownership over the word "real', because they are espousing realism.
Even if they don't, it's not the anti-realists job to tell the realist that they can't employ "real" the way they do to put forth their position, which is what you did in your initial response to the OP. I was putting forth a realist rebuttal to criticism of realism by virtue of an ideal argument being potentially false, and you criticized my use of the word "reality".
"Realism" and "real" mean different things. The realist is free to tell us what "realism" means but not what "real " means. You might as well say that Ayn Rand can tell us what "objective" means because she argues for Objectivism.
The realist is certainly free to use "reality" to mean mind-independence, or verification transcendence, or whatever to mean that the world is independent of our perceptions, conceptual schemes, and linguistic practices. The anti-realist might not wish to use the word "real" that way, but that's what the realist means, so it's bordering on absurd to argue over what the realist means when employing use of the word "reality".
As I said, you're free to use "reality" that way. But the anti-realist is free to use it another way because the realist doesn't have exclusive rights to how the words "real" and "reality" are used. Which is why, as I said in my first post, the anti-realist will also say that an ideal theory is constrained by reality.
I wasn't arguing over what the realist means when using the word "reality". What I said was that the anti-realist will also say that an ideal theory is constrained by reality.
The implication of what I said, then, is that your statement is ambiguous, and so you need to be more explicit with what you mean. I offered an explicit interpretation of your statement: "The crucial point is that mind is dependent on a mind-independent world for realists, and as such, an ideal theory is constrained by a mind-independent world."
Okay fine, but that doesn't mean the same thing. Anyway, I was responding to one critique of realism, which is that and ideal theory could still be false for realists. And that's problematic.
Right, but it's important because it means that our thoughts about the world can't be entirely different from the world, on a realist account. Which means that the world can't be entirely different, but not because it's mind-dependent, rather the opposite.
This doesn't follow. That an ideal theory is dependent on a mind-independent world is not necessarily that an ideal theory accurately describes it. If we're brains-in-a-vat then a theory "which meets all observational data and satisfies every theoretical constraint" might fail to say anything about the world outside the vat (which, according to realism, would be the real world).
Assuming we could be brains in a vat. I have my doubts.
Let's say that BIVs are possible. What could an ideal theory say about the world outside the vat? Well, it could say a lot, actually. Consider that the brain in a vat is like the brain in appearance fed to that brain. Which means that neuroscience, chemistry and physics are all similar. Otherwise, you don't have an envatted brain, since the notion depends on the kinds of brains the BIV has in experience, which all depend on physics, chemistry, etc being a certain way.
In which case I would just deny the thought experiment as being incoherent, since it can't even say what being envatted means. That coincides nicely with the OP. If mind is dependent on mind-independent reality, then you can't have an arrangement entirely outside our understanding giving rise to our understanding.
Which also means that I deny the possibility of Kant's noumena - the thing in itself of which we cannot say anything about.
That doesn't follow. That A depends on B is not that an understanding of A gives us an understanding of B. The appearance of Dr Manhattan I see on my TV depends on the pixels on the screen and the various mechanical processes behind it, but an understanding and description of the former is nothing like an understanding and description of the latter.
And that's the very thing I would use to argue against realism. You can't say what it means to be a tree or to exist without describing what such things look or sound or feel like. So for them to be something other than the appearance is incoherent.
Your proposed noumena is exactly like the not-really-a-brain in a not-really-a-vat.
It follows that we can't make an argument that A depends on B if we don't understand anything about B. It's like saying we could be BIVs, but the brain and the vat aren't anything like brains and vats that we experience.
So what are they then, and how could that scenario possibly hold? You see, the BIV gets it's meaning from what we experience.
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It follows that we can't make an argument that A depends on B if we don't understand anything about B.[/quote]
In which case you can't make an argument that phenomena depend on noumena.
You need to add "entirely unlike appearance" to make that work. If reality is entirely unlike anything we perceive or conceive or talk about, then we have no basis to say there is such a reality. But I'm not stating that. I'm stating that what we perceive, think and say is dependent on that reality such that we can't be totally in the dark.
You said that we can't know what noumena is and that we can't say that A depends on B if we don't know what B is. Therefore, from your own premises, we can't say that phenomena depends on noumena.
Then you've begged the question and presupposed that the world of appearance is something like the mind-independent world.
I'm providing an argument against one of the criticisms of realism, which is that an ideal theory could be completely untrue. It's a move available for realists to make. The criticism arises from one understanding of realism. But if the realist adds that the mind is dependent on the real such that an ideal theory can't be entirely wrong, then they have a rebuttal.
And the argument begs the question. If "A depends on B" can only be true if A is like B then "an ideal theory depends on a mind-independent world" can only be true if an ideal theory is like the mind-independent world. But what the realist needs to show is that an ideal theory really is like the (supposed) mind-independent world.
To put it another way, the realist does not need to maintain that our experiences and thoughts are entirely different from reality. What matters is that the world is not dependent on us.
But to do that he has to show than an ideal theory can't be false. So how does he do that?
Ideal theory only makes sense in a context where the observer is equivocated with the observed.
Does the ant-realist believe that the fact of the appearance of things is independent of what anyone believes and/or experiences? Does s/he believe that there could be any machinery responsible for the appearances, that does not itself appear?
Depends on the variety. The phenomenalist wouldn't but the internal realist would, for example.
Is the internal realist an anti-realist, then? Is so, it would seem somewhat contradictory...
If the internal realist claims there can be such a machinery, but admits that it might not be experienceable, then would that not be tantamount to admitting that there could be a reality that is not internal?
He says there isn't such machinery.
Yes.
Not really. It's a rejection of the metaphysical realist's claim that "the categories and structures of the external world are ... ontologically independent of the conceptualizations of the human mind."[sup]1[/sup] That's different from rejecting the claim that there is a causally independent machinery.
The part that causally explains phenomena, yes. But in contrast to the metaphysical realist, the internal realist rejects the claim that any of the more meaningful things we talk about – "the chair exists", "the cat is on the mat", "e = mc[sup]2[/sup]" etc. – say anything about these non-internal parts of the world.
So it allows for an ideal theory that doesn't correspond to mind-independent things, and is comparable to model-dependent realism in science.
[sup]1[/sup]https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hilary_Putnam#Metaphilosophy_and_ontology
What motivates the internal realist to be an internal realist as opposed to a phenomenalist? Why think there is some sort of mind-independent machinery that we can't talk about? I suppose it's the same reason Kant thought there was noumena, but it suffers from the same problems.
I would agree with you about the first two examples, which ostensibly speak only to an experience which can be thought to be 'internal' to, in the sense of being circumscribed by, language; but "e=mc2" speaks to nothing internal to our experience, but rather says that the fundamental constitution of matter is such that it holds an unfathomable potential for an enormous release of energy. This latter actually is a metaphysical claim since we can never see (experience) this potential or the energy, but merely what are inferred to be the effects.
So you're a scientific realist. But that's not the only approach to science. There's instrumentalism and the aforementioned and related model-dependent realism. The internal realist would adopt one of the last two interpretations.
Note, when I write "non-empirical' what I have in mind is that ordinary language expressions of the formula consist in speculative statements about posited powers or forces. I don't see any other way they can be understood.
e = mc[sup]2[/sup] is a formula which describes and predicts observed phenomena. I don't see how that's anything other than an 'empirical statement'.
My mistake. I thought you were suggesting that the equation ought to be understood according to realism rather than instrumentalism (or model-dependent realism).
I echo Marchesk's response. 'e=mc2' cannot be understood as an empirical statement. It says in ordinary language something like 'energy equals mass multiplied by the speed of light squared'. None of these bar the speed of light is empirically observable, and even whether that is is arguable.
My point is just that if the statement is not intelligible as an empirical statement, that is in terms of observable phenomena, then how is it intelligible; that is, what entities are being posited in order to render it intelligible?
It is not even strictly a statement that predicts observable phenomena as those predictions are not explicit in the statement but are inferences to what might be expected if the hypothetical entities or properties 'energy' and 'mass' ( as well as other hypothetical entities such as uranium atoms, electrons, protons and neutrons and so on) actually are and behave as the formula says they should be and behave. I believe most physicists would interpret the extraordinary success of the predictions to count as empirical evidence ( the only kind of evidence in this kind of connection we could ever have) that the 'extra-empirical' (causal) 'realm' is ( more or less) as we have modeled it.
Although there can never be 'proof' that such an interpretation is correct, I can see no serious reason to doubt that it is.
The fact is that you cannot give any ordinary English interpretation of this formula that does not involve a position of the existence of these hypothetical (meta-empirical) entities and properties. Unless you can come up with an alternative account then I think intellectual honesty demands that you owe allegiance to belief in their existence.
Right, so as I said before you're adopting scientific realism. But the internal realist wouldn't adopt scientific realism. They'd adopt something like instrumentalism or model-dependent realism.
Well, I said "most physicists" not "I", but it is true that I don't see any serious alternative. The fact that I don't see any serious alternative does not, though, mean that I have to "adopt scientific realism". In other words 'accepting' is not the same as 'adopting'.
You still haven't explained how any other position would render 'e=mc2' as an intelligible sentence in ordinary language.
You haven't explained, that is. how a (philosophical) adoption of instrumentalism or model-dependence could be really, as opposed to merely superficially appearing to be, coherent.
You haven't explained, that is. how a (philosophical) adoption of instrumentalism or model-dependence could be really, as opposed to merely superficially appearing to be, coherent.[/quote]
I'm not here to defend instrumentalism or model-dependent realism. I'm just explaining internal realism to you as you asked about it.
Right, but it employs math and theoretical entities, as John mentioned.
Quoting Michael
In the context of scientific laws and theories, it's more a matter of rationalism vs empiricism, where empiricism alone can't get you to something like e=mc2. And it also goes back to Plato and the universalism debate. The shadows on the cave wall don't give you the forms. In scientific terms, the empirical data doesn't provide the theory. That's something humans add to make sense of the data. The realist question is whether that addition exists independent of us, or is made up by us, or is due to our constitution as cognitive agents (Kantian categories).
The question is a mistake in the first instance. Relationships like e=mc2 are an expression of the functioning empirical world. To ask whether, for example, e=mc2 exists doesn't make sense. It's not a state of the world. As a logical expression of states of the world, it is not an existing object itself. We can't look out in the world and find and e=mc2 anymore than we can find the meaning of "red" sitting on the road.
Maybe. It is curious though how well something like e=mc2 works. As if there is something more than just the observables.