The Ontological Proof (TOP)
1. God is the greatest being imaginable [premise]
2. If God is the greatest being imaginable then I can't imagine a being greater than God [premise]
3. I can't imagine a being greater than God [Conclusion A from 1 and 2 modus ponens]
4. If God doesn't exist then I can imagine a being greater than God (a greatest being who exists) [premise]
Therefore
5. God exists [Conclusion B from 3 and 4 modus tollens]
Have I got it right?
Is this a good argument?
Premise 1 is reasonable. God = greatest being imaginable is how we define God and there's no point arguing on a definition that is true to the usual conception on what we mean by God.
Premise 2 is, more or less, self-evident. Greatest does preclude anything greater.
Conclusion A is straightforward.
So, by elimination, premise 4 is where the action is taking place. If God doesn't exist does it means I can imagine a being greater than God? Note here there's a certain point on which everything hinges, which is this being greater than God (let's call it X). But this X must be God who exists since X must incorporate everything that is greatest in imagination too.
In effect what premise 4 is stating is:
4a. If God doesn't exist then I can imagine a God that exists (X)
So the main argument becomes
3a. I can't imagine a God that exists (X)
4a. If God doesn't exist then I can imagine a God that exists (X)
Therefore
5a. God exists [from 3a and 4a modus tollens]
Clarifying the argument thus we can see that 3a is clearly false because we can imagine a God that exists which is X.
Is my criticism ok. Your views please. Thanks.
2. If God is the greatest being imaginable then I can't imagine a being greater than God [premise]
3. I can't imagine a being greater than God [Conclusion A from 1 and 2 modus ponens]
4. If God doesn't exist then I can imagine a being greater than God (a greatest being who exists) [premise]
Therefore
5. God exists [Conclusion B from 3 and 4 modus tollens]
Have I got it right?
Is this a good argument?
Premise 1 is reasonable. God = greatest being imaginable is how we define God and there's no point arguing on a definition that is true to the usual conception on what we mean by God.
Premise 2 is, more or less, self-evident. Greatest does preclude anything greater.
Conclusion A is straightforward.
So, by elimination, premise 4 is where the action is taking place. If God doesn't exist does it means I can imagine a being greater than God? Note here there's a certain point on which everything hinges, which is this being greater than God (let's call it X). But this X must be God who exists since X must incorporate everything that is greatest in imagination too.
In effect what premise 4 is stating is:
4a. If God doesn't exist then I can imagine a God that exists (X)
So the main argument becomes
3a. I can't imagine a God that exists (X)
4a. If God doesn't exist then I can imagine a God that exists (X)
Therefore
5a. God exists [from 3a and 4a modus tollens]
Clarifying the argument thus we can see that 3a is clearly false because we can imagine a God that exists which is X.
Is my criticism ok. Your views please. Thanks.
Comments (72)
I don't think you got the argument right. I don't think it was built around imagination like that. Try to restate it.
[quote=Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy]The first, and best-known, ontological argument was proposed by St. Anselm of Canterbury in the 11th. century C.E. In his Proslogion, St. Anselm claims to derive the existence of God from the concept of a being than which no greater can be conceived. St. Anselm reasoned that, if such a being fails to exist, then a greater being—namely, a being than which no greater can be conceived, and which exists—can be conceived. But this would be absurd: nothing can be greater than a being than which no greater can be conceived. So a being than which no greater can be conceived—i.e., God—exists[/quote]
I'm thinking conceive = imagine
Am I wrong still? What's the difference between ''conceive'' and ''imagine''?
Quoting Wayfarer
That's a good question. I've been thinking is existence greater than nonexistence? It seems to me that the answer won't be a unanimous ''yes'' or ''no''.
For the sake of my argument let's assume it is greater to exist. But how does this impression (existence is greater) cause something to exist? There simply is nothing reasonable that can take me from my preference of x to the existence of x.
"
Doesn't saying God is a "being" beg the question, since the word "being", implies existence.
Alternately, you could say the idea of God has existence, but I doubt that human thought could confer any existence, beyond its own thoughts.
My understanding is that non-existence at the quantum level is inherently more unstable than existence, and since the universe does exist, then how could "..;the non existence of a universe ought to be far more likely than the alternative" hold?
That's interesting but ''being'' here seems to a broader term than that which your objection depends on. In the argument ''being'' means both those which exist in reality and those which exist in imagination. So, there's no question begging as the argument flows from the being in imagination to the being in reality.
"There exists the greatest being (entity) imaginable and is called God.". In the first premise you assume that God exists, why bother proving its existence?
edit: This argument contains a lot of controversial topics from logic. Descriptions or using existence as a predicate are a few of them.
But then let's look at premise 4 again. You say that if there is no being who is omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, and existent then you can imagine a being greater than God? But from 1) that's to say that you can imagine a being who is greater than the being you imagine to be existent, omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent. So what are this greater being's properties? Presumably also existence, omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence? So this "greater" being is actually imagined to be identical to God, and so it doesn't make sense to claim it greater. Premise 4 is wrong.
Quoting Meta
No, existence in premise 1 is in imagination. So, no petitio principii fallacy.
I agree to some extent. However premise 1 is God (omniscient, omnipotent, omnibenevolent - OOO) and ''exists'' only in imagination.
In premise 4, the greatest being is the OOO God BUT this time, it exists for real.
None of this addresses the logic of my argument. You defined God as the greatest being imaginable, and implied that existence is a necessary property of the greatest being imaginable. So you've defined God as a thing that exists (and has other properties, such as omnipotence, say). But this is the same definition of your supposed greater-than-God being, which means it's not greater than God at all, but identical to God.
Of course, if you just want to define God as something that's only imagined to exist, and doesn't really exist, as you seem to have done here, then that God doesn't really exist is true by definition, and so your argument fails.
The argument is not formalized. When you try to formalize it you will see the problems I mentioned. By saying "God is the ..." you assume God exists (not in your imagination but in your logic).
I think you would like this ontological argument:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/G%C3%B6del%27s_ontological_proof
Have a listen to this TED talk, if you have 13 minutes.
Harry Cliff, by the way, is not a crank, he is employed at the LHC. This talk addresses the so-called 'naturalness problem'. The basic drift is, given what is known about physics, the Universe seems immensely unlikely.
Quoting TheMadFool
A note on 'being' - I think ontological arguments descend from The Parmenides. There is the intuition that 'being' in the broadest sense is a real good, and that non-being or non-existence is an imperfection or lack. The problem is however that 'being' is conceived of on a higher level than 'this or that being' - being is 'what is', the reality which includes everything (including the observer). 'What is', is actually the best way of expressing it.
The question 'does reality exist'? is a meaningless or even a stupid question. When we ask about 'the existence' of something, we generally consider things that exist, but might not, or things that don't exist, like unicorns. But whether any particular thing exists or not, presupposes that we are asking a question, and that presupposes that existence and non-existence are possible states; in other words, it presupposes reality. 'Reality' is presumed by every utterance or proposition. So it cannot not exist. (Nowadays, we take that reality to be 'the cosmos' described by science, which is the instinctive stance of naturalism, on the basis that we suppose that the 'testimony of sense' reveals reality; the ancients did not necessarily agree.)
In other words, it's a question-begging or tautological argument - which is quite true! Such arguments were not intended as deductive proofs or rhetorical devices, but as exercises in intellectual edification for the faithful; the medievals never would presume that God's being can be established by logic alone, in fact that would border on heresy in their eyes. The first requirement was faith, then afterwards the various 'proofs' were contemplated.
1. God is the greatest being imaginable [premise]
4. If God doesn't exist then I can imagine a being greater than God (a greatest being who exists)
Difference between the Gods:
God in 1 exists only in the imagination
God in 4 exists in both imagination and the real world
God in 4 is greater because it exists in the real world.
Yes formalizing in predicate logic is problematic. However, sentential logic formalization is possible; as I've done.
Quoting Wayfarer
I agree every proposition presupposes reality but existence can't be presupposed. Existence/nonexistence need evidence.
If one accepts your argument then he has to accept that God rides a pink unicorn. Basically for a lot of predicates P(G) is greater than not P(G) therefore P(G) is true.
So either we don't accept the argument or we accept it, but then we can prove weird things.
When you imagine the greatest being, do you imagine that being to exist? If so then there is no conceptual difference between the God you imagine in 1 and the super-God you imagine in 4.
Remember that your argument rests on being able to imagine a greater being, and so the only thing that matters is the content of your imagination. In both the cases of the God in 1 and the super-God in 4, the content of your imagination is a thing that exists, is omnipotent, is omniscient, is omnibenevolent, and so on.
From a strictly logical standpoint, the argument seems to fall apart since it references an existing god, and the nonexisting one does not meet the criteria specified. In effect, the argument seems to say that if God doesn't exist, he wouldn't be God, and the conflict stated isn't conflicting at all.
From a modal logic point of view, a world in which there is this god would be consistent, and a world in which there is not this god is also consistent. The argument seems to be a simple tautology. St Anselm tried to argue that the later world is inconsistent there because the nonexistent god did not meet the existing-god requirement.
You're right. It can be used to prove weird things. But is weirdness, alone, a good enough refutation? I mean, aside from the weird conclusions we can derive from such reasoning, does the argument also prove God's existence? Is it a sound argument?
If I understand you correctly, there's no difference between
1. God that exists in imagination
And
2. God that exists in imagination AND the real world
Why do you say that?
I can imagine a horse. It may or may not exist in the real world. If it doesn't then it exists only in the imagination. If it exists in the real world, then it exists both in imagination AND the real world. Do the two horses not differ? According to you there's no difference. But there is - one is purely imaginary and the other is real, in the usual sense of the word.
Quoting noAxioms
Yes, I think that sums it up quite well. Is it true?
Quoting noAxioms
Can you please explain how?
I'm saying that the God you imagine in 1 is identical to the super-God you imagine in 4. In both cases you imagine a thing to really exist.
But you're saying that you can imagine a being greater than God. So the only thing we should be looking at is what you're imagining. And in both cases you're imagining a supremely powerful, existing thing. It's not like when asked to explain the God you imagine in 1 your response is "I'm imagining this powerful thing that exists only in my imagination".
This is why you need to not use the term "greatest being" and instead spell out the relevant properties. It makes things much clearer. What are the properties of the greatest being imaginable? Omnipotence, omniscience, existing in the real world and not just imagination, etc. So the thing you're imagining in 1 is imagined to be omnipotent, omniscient, and to exist in the real world and not just imagination. And the thing supposedly greater than God that you're imagining in 4 is imagined to be omnipotent, omniscient, and to exist in the real world and not just imagination. But you're just imagining the same thing as you were in 1.
You argument itself is valid in sentential logic. So you have proven the existence of God. But wait!
I can also prove the existence of God:
1. axiom: God exists. q.e.d
In practice the point of these types arguments is to persuade others to believe in God and accept the religion of the speaker. This is why religious people seldom use this onthological argument. (Because of the weird consequences I just mentioned which will contradict the Bible and stuff)
We have to go deeper and use predicate logic and a formal language to test the "deeper" validity of the argument.
This argument, however is just a fine little naive piece of logic. And even weirder: it is contradictiory imo. Let P(x) mean x is so great that you can't even imagine how great he is. Now P(x) is greater than not P(x) so P(G). But if you can't imagine the greatness of God then you have a contradiction because you stated at the beginning that you can imagine God. So the statements in (naive) predicate logic are inconsistent, you can prove that God exists and you can prove that God does not exist.
Let me clarify even more why we need predicate logic here:
1. premise: I'm a human being
2. premise If I'm a human being then I have 8 eyes and 8 legs.
3. conclusion: I have 8 eyes and 8 legs
This is a perfectly valid argument however we need predicate logic and knowledge about human beings to know that is in fact invalid. Anselm's argument is the same.
One can say this IS the religious position.
Perhaps, but that doesn't necessarily entail fideism - the idea that everything is dependent on belief. I think faith can be quite considered, not necessarily a matter of literalism or clinging to belief. In fact the scholastics were quite fastidious in their logic. But to argue that the very notion of 'God' is a meaningless concept - a pink unicorn, or a human with eight eyes - it doesn't to justice to the argument so much as simply trivialise it. Which also amounts to a statement of belief; namely, that belief in God is absurd.
Certainly there ought to be no compulsion to believe anything whatever, but to consider the argument properly, at least it ought to reflect something of the intended meaning of the original argument.
If that's so, premise 4 becomes: If God exists AND God doesn't exist then I can imagine a being greater than God.
Add to that premise 3: I can't imagine a being greater than God
We get (by modus tollens): Either God exists or God does not exist.
Not the conclusion I was hoping for.
Thanks.
Quoting Meta
The problem with using predicate logic is
1''Existence'' isn't a predicate.
G = God is the greatest being imaginable, would require g = God, I = is the greatest being imaginable. So G = (Ex)Ix. That would be assuming what we want to prove.
2. There's no way of properly distinguishing, at least as required by the argument, between existence in imagination and existence in the real world.
U = Unicorns are imaginary creatures, would require C = is an imaginary creature. So U = (Ex)Cx and that is saying ''something exists that doesn't exist.
This seems to show that the greatest being can only be imagined.
BTW, what do you mean by "greatest"? "Greatest" is a subjective term. For some, God is egotistical, contradictory, and immoral.
Well, what do you think Anselm meant by ''greatest''? To keep things simple, let's say by ''greatest'' we mean embodying all that is good.
Just so you know @Michael has already found a nice big hole in the argument
Quoting Michael
I think I can produce a version of the ontological argument that avoids both of these objections, viz:
Premise 1: A being that is beneficent and exists is more beneficent than a being that does not exist.
Inference 1: If God does not exist, he is not the most beneficent being possible.
Premise 2: God is the most beneficent being possible.
Conclusion: God exists.
Notes:
Premise 1 is supposed to be obviously true, on the grounds that a being that does not exist would have zero beneficence (i.e. would do no good at all).
Inference 1 supposedly follows from premise 1.
Premise 2 is supposedly true by definition.
The conclusion follows from inference 1 plus premise 2.
I would be interested to hear other people's views on this. Personally I would claim that the argument fails because premise 1 is false. The reason I think it is false is that Premise 1 is equivalent to this:
A being that does not exist is less beneficent than a being that is beneficent and exists.
and this is false. It is false because a being that does not exist is the same thing as nothing, and 'less beneficent than a being that is beneficent and exists' is a property, and nothing cannot have properties.
If I am right about this, then I think it shows that there must be an error in any version of the ontological argument in which a comparison is made between a God who exists and a God who is effectively nothing. The God who is effectively nothing may be described in the argument as being imaginary, or existing only in the mind, or whatever, but these descriptions are merely alternative ways of saying that in place of an existent God, there is nothing. So all such versions of the argument effectively depend on attributing a property to nothing, and since nothing cannot have properties, they must all fail.
Comments, anyone?
Consider this argument:
Premise 1: A being that is rich and exists is richer than a being that does not exist
Inference 1: If X does not exist, he is not the richest being possible
Premise 2: X is the richest being possible.
Conclusion: X exists.
Clearly there's a problem with inference 1, and so perhaps premise 1 (as you say). If we assume that life exists only on Earth then Bill Gates is the richest being that exists. But is he the richest being possible? Of course not. We could hypothesise a person with twice his wealth, even though that person doesn't exist.
It may be that I can't imagine anything tastier than a hotdog. This implies that a hotdog exists, but not that it is the tastiest thing out there - except in respect to my knowledge and perception of foods.
I like that you are trying to reason it out though.
(1) An entity X has property P.
(2) If X did not exist, then it would not have property P.
(3) X exists. (1,2, modus tollens)
P is typically 'greater than that which cannot be conceived' and X is god.
You can adjoin any set of properties to X, so long as P is among them X exists if the argument is valid. The argument is invalid anyway since (1) quantifies over the space of entities existentially. So (1) is equivalent to: there is a being Y such that Y = X and Y has property P, and a sub statement (there is a being Y such that Y=X) is exactly what the argument seeks to demonstrate, so it is circular.
edit: you don't even NEED 2 to conclude 3 from 1 with the quantifier.
Yes, this is exactly right. I've had this argument twice with another forum member. To predicate (truly or falsely) of an object does not show that the object is within your domain of discourse, but presupposes that it is.
There is a sort of epistemic variant that is worthwhile:
1. Something is perturbing the orbits of these asteroids.
2. If there were a planet of a certain mass there, it would do that.
3. ?
Well, you don't get to conclude anything. (2) gives you an abductive hypothesis to investigate, but you still need to investigate.
Quoting TheMadFool
Really. Why?
The definition in 1 is loaded by containing a hidden premise that there is an idea of a being that can be imagined that is greater than any other idea of a being that can be imagined. Why should that hidden premise be true?
The reason needs to be something that works in that case but not in the following case:
Premise: X is the greatest integer
What might such a reason be?
If God does not exist, then you CAN'T imagine a thing greater than god. For a comparison in real terms, both comparands must exist. So you can't imagine a thing greater than god, or lesser than god, or in any way related to god. Because it is a given (as per the condition) that god does not exist.
That makes sense in predicate logic. After all:
1. God is the greatest being imaginable
Statement 1 translates as (Ex)(Gx & Ix) where Gx = x is god and Ix = x is the greatest being imaginable. Existence is, it appears, presumed in statement 1.
Here's what I think...
Predicate logic fails to capture the full content of the Ontological argument. The Ontological argument moves from existence in imagination to existence in reality. So, the TOP depends on the distinction between existence in imagination and existence in reality. This crucial distinction can't be made in predicate logic. The existential quantifier, (Ex), is restricted to reality.
So, your critique fails to adequately refute the Ontological argument.
Please read above.
Quoting andrewk
It's reasonable to say ''God is the greatest being imaginable'' because God is defined as such and agrees with our conception of what a God must be.
Quoting szardosszemagad
If existence is ''better'' than nonexistence, then I can imagine a God that exists which would be greater than one that doesn't exist.
Honestly I think the ambiguity in the domain of quantification is the essential feature of the argument. You want there to be a single way in which something can be said to exist, collapsing the distinction between an imagined perfect entity and a real perfect entity - and if the argument is right, that's exactly what happens.
The distinction you draw absolutely is not in the argument's favour, since 'God exists in the imagination' is supposed to show through some property that 'God exists in reality', it may be that predication of 'is the greatest being imaginable' or like sentences is only a predicate of strictly imaginary entities... And really that's what's supposed to be so strong about the argument - you can go from supposedly minimal assumptions about imaginary entities and properties and deduce the existence of an entity. But if you would like to predicate God in a manner that makes God strictly imaginary that makes the existence of God a moot point.
1. God is the greatest being imaginable
2. If God doesn't exist then God isn't the greatest being imaginable
Therefore (modus tollens)
3. God exists
Your refutation applies to premise 2 and is a good one. I too think premise 2 is false because it's equivalent to: If God is the greatest being imaginable then God exists. This is illicit, according to you, and I agree. We can't imagine things into existence, can we????
I think it's appropriate to imagine things into existence so long as there's not a unique sense of what it means to exist. EG, Gods are myths, chairs are actual, the abstract concept of golf is something else...
In the same sense that it's reasonable to say that 'X is the greatest integer', or perhaps 'Fred is the fattest ten-foot tall man', or 'Nemo is the smallest talking fish' because they are defined as such.
It isn't reasonable to say "X is the greatest integer" because there is none. Also, it's unreasonable to say "Fred is the fattest ten-foot tall man" because we know human's can't achieve 10 feet heights.
There's nothing wrong, as you say, in defining God as the ultimate being - the possessor of superlative qualities. Where is the inconsistency in this definition?
Because saying 'Define God to be the greatest imaginable being' is equivalent to the following sequence of statements:
1. There exists an idea X of a being such that:
a. X can be imagined by at least one human, and
b. for any Y that is an idea of a being, if Y can be imagined by at least one human, then either Y=X or X is greater than Y
2. If statement 1 is true then we label the idea X whose existence is asserted by 1, as 'God'.
Statement 1 is an assertion.
Statement 2 is a definition that only operates if statement 1 is true.
So unless statement 1 is true, we do not even have a definition of 'God'.
And no argument has been supplied to indicate why we should accept statement 1 as true. Indeed, my intuition says very strongly that it is not true - that for any imaginable great being, one can imagine a greater one.
[I]I[/i] can, presumably others too, imagine a greatest possible being - omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent - one greater than which can't be imagined. So, (a) and (b) are true, making assertion 1 true.
Is that not sufficient to make 1 true?
That's precisely what I intended. All of those words denote things which, at face value, exist in different ways.
taken out of context, any proposition can be falsified.
My point is meaningless without the context I put it in. You don't have the right to take it out of context and manipulate it to your whimsy. You are committing a Strawman fallacy.
You can't argue like that in a proper philosophy forum.
I therefore reject your argument, Mad Fool.
That's A.
B. is that you made a new proposal, in the new context which you placed the question in. That proposal is pending on a condition, which is Quoting TheMadFool
This is a condition which is not proven or supported by argument pro or con. So your argument is meaningless at best.
No, because I can imagine a being greater than yours.
Sequences of divine entities are like the rationals, incomplete and thus irreal. *badumtisch*
I agree. That existence is better than nonexistence is questionable. How about if we look at this from the perspective of life as a whole. It's surely better that an omnibenevolent being exists than not exists. Do you agree? If yes, then existence of such a being is positively better than nonexistence.
Quoting andrewk
You can imagine a being greater than God, who's omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient? Can you describe such a being?
Quoting tim wood
Can you clarify where the argument goes wrong?
Of course not! If it were describable in mere human words, that would hardly be very impressive, would it?
Omnipotent, omnibenevolent, omniscient, and sexy. That, of course, proves that God must be a woman.
As I said before, this term "greater" is so unclear as to be vacuous. Spell out the actual properties and you'll see that your argument doesn't work.
1. God is defined as the greatest being imaginable
2. The greatest being imaginable is imagined to have the properties of omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence.
3. If nothing exists that has the properties of omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence then ...?
Your argument wants to end the 3rd premise with "I can imagine a being greater than God (a being who exists)". The problem is that this contradicts both premises 1 and 2. It contradicts premise 1 because you're saying that you can imagine a being greater than the greatest being imaginable, and it contradicts premise 2 because you're saying that the greatest being imaginable is imagined to exist, which wasn't included in the initial description of the greatest being imaginable.
Now, let's reconsider the argument with this new description of the greatest being imaginable (which includes the notion of existence):
1. God is defined as the greatest being imaginable
2. The greatest being imaginable is imagined to have the properties of omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence and to exist.
3. If nothing exists that has the properties of omnipotence, omniscience, and omnibenevolence then ...?
How do we end the third premise? With "I can imagine a being greater than God (a being who exists)"? Leaving aside the continued fact that this contradicts premise 1, there is no difference between the God you imagine and this greater-than-God being you imagine; in both cases you imagine a being to be omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, and to exist.
The ontological proof works well for the God of philosophy or of the Quran. There is no other beside Him, the almighty, all merciful, all wise kind of God. Which happens to be kinda of God I think is most plausible. The proof may not with absolute certainty establish that God must exist, but it's definitely informative as to His nature.
But Anselm who wrote this proof was Christian. Plato in his Republic, before Jesus was born of course, makes a powerful argument I think. God is perfectly good and cannot be higher. To change at all would only make Him less and being good He would not do that. He also has no need of deception and deceiving one about God is the greatest evil. Therefore, Gods do not incarnate. Because incarnation would be a change of state. I always find it funny that Paul says (in a quote evangelicals love) that God never changes yet the whole Torah and New Testament split is all about a change from an old convenant to a new convenant in which Gos's method of revelation and relationship with man is fundamentally changed. If God is perfect in the Torah then he can't change and he can't incarnate. If he isn't perfect in the Torah, then He's not God.
There is a way out that Jesus, the Logos, existed in the Torah and since the beginning. John 1. But then isn't Jesus then go from non-incarnate to incarnate to effectively non-incarnate again. (A body in heaven is not here on earrh, we can't visit him so it's not a real incarnation).
I think you can have a incarnate God made man but then you can't have an ontologicaly perfect God. The incarnation destroyed the idea of perfect, that's the point. God becomes man and becomes sin.
I believe you are correct. I don't understand Anselm's psychology behind his statements.
Just because you can imagine a flavor of ice cream that's better than all others doesn't mean that there isn't a better one out there. What's to say someone hasn't conceived of something better that suits their needs?
'Better' is a subjective term anyways.
:D You have a point. Let's go with your ''greatest being'' then. Surely you agree that this particular being, that which can't even be described, is the greatest being imaginable. So, assertion 1 is true.
What's the problem with ''greater''? Take power, knowledge and benevolence and maximize them into omnipotence, omnscience and omnibenevolence. It doesn't look that problematic to me.
You're saying the argument is circular. Anyway, here's another version that, hopefully, brings out the main point of the argument:
1. God is the greatest being [imaginable]
2. If God is the greatest being [imaginable] then God must exist
Therefore,
3. God must exist
The above is as clear as I can get. The argument is circular too, as you said. There is no assumption of existence in premise 1; God is in the imagination. The problem I see is in premise 2. How does something in the imagination become real?
(Y)
Quoting MountainDwarf
Well, we can come to a consensus. In fact that's what's happened with omniscience, omnibenevolence and omnipotence.
The second premise is false when we include the term "imaginable".
Am I stronger than Superman because I exist, or is he stronger than me because he's imagined to have the strength to move planets? Am I richer than Scrooge McDuck because I exist, or is he richer than me because he's imagined to be worth billions of dollars?
The strongest person imaginable doesn't exist and the richest person imaginable doesn't exist. So there's no contradiction in claiming that the most powerful person imaginable doesn't exist, that the most knowledgeable person imaginable doesn't exist, and that the kindest person imaginable doesn't exist.
That an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenolvent thing can be imagined is not that an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent thing exists.
You can't define into existence a thing with superlative properties.
Definitely. Have you seen the Youtube video with the Professor from MIT on the problem of evil?
No, because this morning I imagined a being that is 10% greater than the one I imagined yesterday.
This is one flaw you've pointed out and one that I can understand. Are there any other problems with the argument?
It's a non sequitur basically.
Quoting MountainDwarf
The problem of evil isn't really a problem because we can always say God's intentions are beyond our understanding.
What do you mean? I've expressed the argument as clearly as possible in sentential logic.
Quoting andrewk
How about if I imagine God to be the infinite?
And the next day I will imagine the powerset of that, which will be still greater.
And so on......
Well, you can say that but if God's intentions are beyond our understanding why does he even attempt to reveal himself through things like Scripture or tradition?
Put another way, if God's intentions are beyond our understanding how can he communicate his intentions to us?
How do you know when God is on your side and when he isn't?
But is big = great?
I mean, does something have to be quantitatively big for it to be great? A brave man is great but there isn't a number that specifies his greatness. Math has no relevance to bravery. Similarly, I think God's properties of omnipotence, omnibenevolence and omniscience are qualities, not quantities.
God takes sides?! If he does take sides there are only two possibilities. Either he takes the side of the virtuous which means actually practicing virtue and has nothing to do with having right or wrong beliefs, only actions and intentions matter. Or, He takes everyone's side. I think in war, for example, God is on the side of every victim and for every act of selfless bravery, but does not care at for nationalism or ideology or even just war theory. I fought in the Iraq war in the US Army, God was on my side because I was a foolish kid thrust into a warzone trying to do the right thing but he was also on side of the families who houses we bombed.
This is even more contraversial but I'm beginning to suspect that having God on your side or praying to Him doesn't do any good in a worldly sense. God didn't stop some of my friends getting hurt and He didn't stop the family from loosing their home. God is on our side in the sense He calls us to greater virtue and draws us closer to Him. He only cares about eternity and He knows that He alone is what we seek. Maybe God did keep me safe (I have no way of knowing what could have happened without His providence) but He definitely does not have personal wish granting as His focus. If He grants wishes, then childhood cancer and genocide prove He does a poor job at that.
What about all the times in the Old Testament when he said to such and such a nation that he would end them? Can God be on your side in the midst of destroying you? I don't know. If he loves the very people he destroys why destroy them? Why not send a prophet like Jonah to those nations?
Yeah, are the Jews the chosen people? Did the Absolute choose to reveal Himself to Abraham and the rest of the world was kept guessing?
God orders lots of murders in the Torah for sure. The plot thickens. I have no idea. I don't know if God commanded those things or people just said He did. I don't take the flood literally but I believe the slaughter of enemy tribes probably happened.
What about this example:
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Muath_Al-Kasasbeh
Here is a Muslim family man who was burned alive in a cage by Isis who claimed to do so in the name of God. If a group of crazy people where kidnapping and killing people saying you told them to do it and that you approved of it, wouldn't you try to stop it or at least denounce it? Why did God not save this person or reveal to us Isis is wrong? Perhaps He already has revealed that you can't do this with murdering in the name of God in the Torah, Gospels. Quran and about any holy book you read. But it doesn't seem enough. Obviously Isis skips over those passages. Why is the world so full of this suffering? Why is the Truth not clearer? I don't know, I have no answers.
So if God is the greatest being conceivable he should be powerful enough to not give us a chance to do evil. After all, it is greater to keep someone from doing evil rather than idly sitting. If he is great and omnibenevolent why is there evil?
These are good questions. Perhaps an analogy will help.
A mother loves her child. She wants her child to be the best - a good person, excel in all fields, a productive member of society, etc. This is a mother's prime objective. The way this is achieved is by encouragement, inspiration, love AND discipline. Discipline is one area where some sternness and force may be required. The child, being immature, lacks the capacity to understand the logic and method of his mother but the end result, if all goes well, is a healthy vibrant member of society. Later, perhaps in adulthood, the person will appreciate both the tender love and the painful punishments/admonishments of his mother.
Likewise the evil we see may be just God's method of teaching us the value of goodness. No?
The rest of my post. The part(s) you didn't respond to.
You pointed out two flaws:
1. Question begging
2. Imagining x can make x exist
Possibly. But that would still make God evil. Right? Would that or would it not justify abuse?