The metaphysical implications of disquotationalism
Let's start with something simple. "The chair exists" is true iff the chair exists. Are there any metaphysical implications of this? For example, does this imply realism? Some might say that it does; that anti realism or idealism require a different account of truth, e.g "The chair exists" is true iff a chair is seen. I disagree. I believe that the disquotational account simply states the relationship between a used statement, a mentioned statement, and truth-predication, hence it being a linguistic account of truth rather than a metaphysical account, and so that it neither implies realism nor is inconsistent with anti realism or idealism.
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Disquotationalism might still seem to fit naturally with a kind of deflationary realism. For deflationary realists, the task is a defensive one, to deny the unwarranted metaphysical excursions of idealism in favour of what is ordinarily evident, from life and science: I share with others a world that's often surprising—I often literally don't know what's around the next corner—and I've seen the bones of creatures that lumbered over the Earth a hundred million years ago, long before all human consciousness. The world transcends my self, my ideas, my thoughts, and at certain points the entire intersubjective world and the whole of history. It is as real as you can get.
This is naive, unphilosophical realism, and it's what the deflationary realist is defending. The idealist comes along and tries to reduce the world to a known substance or structure, that of the mental, or discourse, etc. This metaphysical move the realist cannot allow. But the deflationary realist is not offering a competing metaphysics on what the world is, but only affirming that it exceeds our bounds, as is merely evident. And this is why he wants to abandon correspondence. Correspondence is, usually, a classically realist theory, but it is too metaphysical, too positive for the deflationary realist. For him there can be no question of language vs the world, or anything that opens the door to talk of what reality is really like. Disquotationalism could be part of a suite of deflationary tactics designed to criticize idealist metaphysics.
I'd question what it means for a string of symbols to 'correspond' to something and for something to 'answer' to my meaning.
I don't see how "if the chair exists then it is something in the world which is empirically verifiable" follows from "'the chair exists' is true iff the chair exists".
The purpose of the disquotation is to explain what we mean by affirming the truth of a statement; we affirm the statement.
That doesn't mean anything.
Quoting Yahadreas
That's the reason for using disquotation. Notice the difference if you substitute unicorns. "Chairs exist" is true, but "Unicorns exist" is not. And why is that? Because unicorns aren't things in the world. This distinction would be impossible if disquotation was merely a linquistic device.
"Chairs exist" is true because chairs exist."Unicorns exist" is not true because unicorns do not exist. That's all disquotation shows us.
Being an empirically verifiable thing in the world is irrelevant to disquotationalism. That would be a different account of truth.
Of course it means something. "'Chairs exist' is true" means "chairs exist". Whereas neither "'Chairs exist' is false" nor "Chairs exist' is a sentence" mean "chairs exist".
The point of disquotation is to show that predicating the truth of a statement does nothing that using that statement doesn't also.
Now in a situation where English never arose as one of the many human languages, but chairs still existed, then chairs would exist but "chairs exist" would not be true.
So you don't need to worry about the implications of disquotationalism in the sense that it's false to begin with.
If chairs still existed then "chairs still existed" is true and if "chairs still existed" is true then chairs still existed. You seem to be saying that chairs still existed but "chairs still existed" is not true? That's a contradiction.
It is true that "chairs exist" is true, when evaluated relative to that situation via our current use of the sentence, as English is actually set up. But this is not what your disquotationalist premise wants to say; it wants to say that the two conditions, a sentence's being true on the one hand and chairs existing on the other, are equivalent, that is, that in any situation in which one holds, the other does as well.
This has the false consequence that any time a chair exists, English must exist as it does now as well.
I think it only says that the statements "the chair exists" and "'the chair exists' is true" mean the same thing.
As Arthur Prior says, every statement includes an implicit assertion of its own truth. That's really what the disquotational account explains (but in reverse).
This is false. For example, chairs can exist even if there is no English at all.
In order for "the chair exists" to be such that it can be true or false, there have to be elaborate linguistic conventions set up such that some truth value can be assigned to it. It's true that, with English as it now stands, this trivially coincides with cases in which chairs exist. But in a situation where English was different, or there was no English, this would not be so.
To see this, just reflect on the fact that your position results in the absurd conclusion that in any case in which someone makes a chair, this ipso facto means that English as it is now spoken suddenly must exist. But it's just not true that whether there are chairs or not controls whether language works in a certain way.
It doesn't matter if we're describing a hypothetical world in which the English language has never developed because we're still using the English language to describe this hypothetical world. We can either describe this world by saying that chairs exist or we can describe this world by saying that "chairs exist" is true. It's all the same.
Now, we cannot say that "chairs exist" is true in that world -- in that world, there may even be no such sentence. This is different from saying that chairs exist in that hypothetical situation. Again, one is a claim about chairs, which do exist, and another claim is about a certain linguistic object, which in that situation, does not exist, and so cannot be true or false.
Put another way, the only way a sentence can be true is if certain linguistic conventions are set up. In the imagined situation, no such conventions are set up, and therefore the statement is not true.
The alternative would be to claim (1) that in any situation in which anything describable now by language occurs, language must also exist in that situation (language, even English is necessary, and it is impossible for it not to exist as it does now, with all of its conventions for assigning truth conditions -- an absurdity), or (2) that the truth of sentences is independent of any convention, either that no language need to exist for its sentences to be true (?!) or that language (all possible languages?) exist Platonically whether they are actually instantiated or not.
But disquotationalism doesn't say that if chairs exist in that world then "chairs exist" is true in that world; it says that if chairs exist in that world then "chairs exist in that world" is true.
It doesn't matter if the conventions aren't set up in this imagined situation. You have to consider the sentence "'chairs exist' is true" in the same situation in which you consider the sentence "chairs exist". Either there is no English language and one is silent or there is an English language and one can say either "chairs exist" or "'chairs exist' is true".
Under the current conventions of the existing English language-game the statements "chairs exist" and "'chairs exist' is true" mean the same thing. Both statements are used to assert the existence of chairs.
Indeed. Or rather an account of what exists rather than of "truth." Disquotationalism points out a logical relationship between statements and the world-i.e. if someone is talking about an existing chair, then a chair exists in the world.
Somehow you've got the the absurd conclusion disquotationalism is giving a description of the empirical world and that this is supposedly what the realist is arguing. It is not.
Disquotationalism is the identification of a logical point and it is on these logical grounds that realism is supported; whenever there is something to talk about, logically, is a state distinct from any language which talks about it. Things are not defined by experience of the thing. They are given in themselves.
Here the realist is not making an empirical point (e.g. a chair exists) but a logical one. Regardless of what empirical states there are, language which talks about a state of the world is distinct from the thing it talks about: no matter what exists, realism obtains.
Now, if I say, "Chairs exist iff 'Chairs exist' is true," and by this I mean that these two mean the same thing, then I am speaking a falsehood. Why? Because there are situations in which chairs exist, but "chairs exist" is not true, viz. situations in which the linguistic conventions are different or absent.
Put another way:
(1) Whether "chairs exist" is true depends on certain linguistic conventions are in place.
(2) It is possible that chairs exist, yet no such linguistic conventions are in place.
(3) Therefore, it is possible that chairs exist, yet it is not that case that "chairs exist" is true.
That's not (metaphysical) realism. Anti-realism is quite capable of distinguishing between speech and the things spoken about. "Frodo" is a name and Frodo is a hobbit. This is consistent with both realism and anti-realism. Realism is the position that argues that the things spoken about satisfy a particular ontology (and anti-realism another), and this ontology doesn't necessarily follow from the logical distinction.
My point is that disquotationalism doesn't entail the ontological commitments that some realists seem to think it does.
Realism is the position that things are not dependent on experience. States of the world (e.g. an existing chair) are defined independently of experience (i.e. someone talking, thinking, seeing, touching, etc.,etc. chair). The ontology of metaphysical realism is: things don't need need to be experienced to exist.
Anti-realism holds the opposite. It equivocates the existence of a thing with the presence of experience of the thing. It treats language as if it is the things the language talks about. Don't have the experience of a chair? Then it doesn't exist.
Realist ontology IS the distinction between experience (including language) and things experienced (including what language talks about).
Yes, so it does more than simply argue for a logical distinction between "Frodo" and Frodo.
No it doesn't. There are plenty of anti-realists (myself included) who do not equate chairs with the experience of chairs or language with the things language talks about. Anti-realism is quite capable of accepting the logical distinction between "Frodo" and Frodo. But accepting this logical distinction does not then entail accepting that Frodo is an ontologically independent person and that the truth of "Frodo is a hobbit" transcends verification (things that must be accepted to be a realist about Frodo).
The ontological distinction between language and the things we talk about, not (just) the logical distinction. The anti-realist can accept the latter and reject the former. This is why your defence of realism and criticism of anti-realism always fails. You only address the logical distinction, which is a non sequitur.
You think it does, but it doesn't. The logical distinction between language and what language talks about IS the distinction between "Frodo" (language) and Frodo (state of the world). Realist ontology is nothing more than this logical distinction. In holding position, one takes Frodo to be a ontologically independent person. Frodo is not experience of Frodo or language about Frodo. Frodo is different state of the world (i.e. ontologically independent of) to language which talks about Frodo.
Anti-realism is not capable of accepting this logical distinction. It denies Frodo is ontologically independent (i.e. a different state of existence) to the language "Frodo."
(critically, this is not an empirical claim. In making this distinction, we are not making an argument that Frodo exists in the world. Just that Frodo ( or any given existing state) is necessarily distinct from "Frodo" (or any language which talks about a given existing state) ).
No it isn't. Realist ontology is a position regarding the ontological status of things, not a position regarding the logical distinction between sentence and subject.
That X and "X" are logically distinct is not that X is ontologically independent of "X". The anti-realist might very well deny that Frodo is ontologically independent of "Frodo" but he doesn't deny that Frodo is logically distinct from "Frodo".
The anti-realist is quite capable of saying that Frodo is a fictional hobbit and that "Frodo" is a 5-letter word used as a name. The anti-realist doesn't say that Frodo is a 5-letter word used as a name or that "Frodo" is a fictional hobbit.
To be a realist about Frodo is to say that Frodo exists in the world (in a manner independent of language and thoughts). That's why nobody is a realist about Frodo. Frodo is ontologically dependent on what we say and think about him, hence why everybody is an anti-realist about Frodo.
You continually misrepresent realism and anti-realism.
The ontological status of a thing (e.g. Frodo) and language (e.g. "Frodo" ) IS the logical distinction between subject and sentence. It is pointing out that there are two states of existence in a situation of statement which talks about a state of the world and state of the world. In this case, since we are talking about a situation in which a statement is being made about a state of the world, that X and "X" distinction is pointing out the ontological independence of the state of the world from the language which talks about it.
Quoting Michael
Nope. That is to understand Frodo to exist in the world. It is an empirical claim, not the position of realism. The existence of Frodo is most certainly not dependent on what we say or think about him. Since any existing Frodo is distinct from the language which talks about him (they are different states of existence), an existing Frodo will be - regardless of whether someone talks or thinks about him.
You are making the same mistake as Michael: thinking that "independence" means "outside language." It doesn't. Rather it specifies that, as language is a distinct state of existence from any state talked about, the presence of a thing does not require someone to speak or think about it.
Your assumption is mistaken. I'm well aware of the difference in meaning, and I'm aware that the former doesn't entail the latter.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
Whilst I agree with both of those claims on an individual basis, the latter doesn't logically follow from the former.
I stand by the claim that I made in my last post, and your reply (in which you reiterate your point, yet again) has failed to repudiate my criticism.
And yet you accuse me of mistakenly holding this "independence" from the distinction, as if "independence" meant something other than language and things talked about being their own states of existence.
How am I preaching to the choir when the choir is singing the exact opposite of my position?
We don't completely disagree. We're both realists. But I think that your parts of your argument are fallacious.
An anti-realist can claim, without contradiction, that X is distinct from "X", [i]and[/I] that X is dependent (or not independent) on (or of) "X".
Indeed, but the question here is not merely whether you make such a distinction, but whether the dependence claim of anti-realism is tenable.
To make the distinction between a thing and language which talks about it, on its own, does not identify a commitment to whether or not things exist independently of experience. One certainly draw that distinction without proclaiming themselves to be a realist. Such lack of comment can even be thought of as enough to make anti-realism consistent with the distinction. If one just says: "Well, I am an anti-realist" and then points to their act of distinguishing language form what language talks about, then it does appear the two positions are compatible. One can certainly think of themselves as an anti-relaist while still making the distinction in question.
But I'm not interested in whether one can believe this. I concerned about whether it makes sense. And it doesn't. In the drawing of the distinction between lounge and the things it talks about, each state is defined on its own terms, not whether it is thought or spoken about. Nothing is depedent on being thought of spoken about.
Anti-realism is incoherent given this position. Not because, somehow, it is impossible for someone to make the discintion between language and what it talks about, while also holding themselves to be an anti-realist. Rather it is because there is a contradiction between the claim of anti-realism (the existence of meaningful things defined by experience) and a world where language is distinct from what it talks about.
To make the distinction between a thing and language which talks about it, on its own, does not identify a commitment to whether or not things exist independently of experience.[/quote]
Yes, I know. That's what I've been trying to explain to you.
That a thing is defined "on its own terms" rather than in terms of "whether it is thought or spoken about" does not entail realist metaphysics. This is just semantics. To be a realist is to say that the truth of "X exists" is not dependent on experiences, concepts, or linguistic conventions.
That a thing is defined on its own terms, rather than whether it is spoken or thought about, IS realist metaphysics. It is not semantics at all. What is at stake is a logical point about how states are defined, not some meaning quibble over what to call something.
To be a realist is to say that the existence of state X is defined on its own terms, rather than if it is thought or spoken about. The "truth of X" being defined "independent of experiences, concepts, and linguistic conventions" only extends to the fact that, for any state, the world which is needed for a true statement isn't required for the state to exist.
A chair can exist (what is required for someone to be able to make a true statement about a chair) whether or not anyone thinks or speaks about it. What we talk about when we make statements of truth (e.g. "X is true" ) doesn't need to be though or spoken about to exist. This is what "independence" means here. There isn't something extra, something outside the reach of language, required to define what's true. That's only the meaning (which may stated in language) of the state in question.
Of course it's semantics. You're talking about how things are defined.
Yes, that's what I said. To be a realist about chairs is to argue that the truth of "the chair exists" is independent of experience and conception and language. But that's not the same as arguing that chairs and "chairs" are logically distinct. The anti-realist can accept the latter whilst rejecting the former, and it's in rejecting the former that marks one as an anti-realist (and it's in accepting the former that marks one as a realist).
If it is about definitions, then there is more than language going on. If definitions are involve, then there is a question of logic. Someone doesn't understand a meaning or a relevant distinction.
You are still confusing realism (things are defined in themselves) with empirical claims ( a "squiloople exists" ). They are different claims. No-one is "a realist about X." Realism is a metaphysical position (i.e. logic) not a position on empirical states.
To "be realist about X" doesn't make because, for any state of the world, it is the same regardless of one metaphysical stance. The tree in front of you is the same regardless of whether you hold a realist position or an anti-realist position. There is no discintion make in an empirical state to define someone as "a realist about X" or an "anti-realist about X."
This is the fundamental issue with your position. Metaphysics and logic are different things. Logic is concerned with the proper relationship between sentences and valid reasoning. Metaphysics is concerned with the fundamental nature of being and the world. And semantics is concerned with meaning and definitions (in fact, when you talking about "logical distinction" it seems you're really talking about "semantic distinction").
But that makes no sense because, if we are talking about an existing tree, there is no "anti-realist" or "realist" option. An existing tree is the same, a state of the world, regardless of whether we think it is dependent of experience or not. To be realist or anti-realist about an existing tree is incoherent.
No doubt people use the "realist" and "anti-realist" distinction, in some cases, as a shorthand for the distinction between "existing state (e.g. a tree)" and "logic and fictions (e.g. morality)," but this distinction no longer makes sense if we are talking about an existing tree. How could an existing tree possibly be anything other than a state of the world? It can't be. It is incoherent to apply the question: "Is it an existing state (realism) or a point of logic (anti-realism)?" in that situation.
To be a realist about an existing tree is to argue that the truth of "the tree exists" is independent of experience, conception, and language. To be an anti-realist about an existing tree is to argue that the truth of "the tree exists" is dependent on experience, conception, and language.
One can accept that a tree is defined as a member of the category that excludes experience, conception, and language whilst also accepting that the statement "the tree exists" is dependent on experience, conception, and language (e.g. if one adopts the coherence theory of truth). That's why one can be an anti-realist whilst maintaining a logical (or, rather, semantic) distinction between trees and "trees".
Similarly, the "anti-realist" position is incoherent because the true of "the tree exists" is both defined only with language (as language is required for a statement to be made) and without it (as the tree may exist regardless of whether it is spoken about).
Quoting Michael
Here you've switched subjects. You are no longer discussing whether or not states of existence are dependent on language and the relationship of this to true statements. Nor do you make any comment on the distinction between states of the world and language which talks about them.
Now you are talking about merely the existence of the statement "the tree exists," as opposed to the truth "the tree exists." The realist completely agrees the statement "the tree exists" is of experience, conception, and language. One cannot have statement without language.
No I'm not. I'm discussing the truth of "the tree exists". The anti-realist argues that the statement is only true if certain experiential, conceptual, or linguistic criteria are met, and the realist argues that the statement is only true if certain non-experiential, non-conceptual, and non-linguistic criteria are met.
I've made the distinction plenty of times. It's a matter of definition. The anti-realist is quite capable of accepting a semantic distinction between objects and the words which name them. As an example, the anti-realist will say that trees are plants and that "trees" is a word. He doesn't say that trees are words or that "trees" is a plant.
What I mean to say is, when I read your screen name 'Michael' I, by default, associate it with two ideas; namely a person I know and the Arch angel. What if someone knows an actual, real life Frodo? You might then confuse two entirely different entities when refering to them 'by name'.
Now, when we refer to an object; let's say the 'chair', we - similarly - could conjure up many different types of chairs, however, we haven't ascribed psychological set values or given it that level of emotional context.