Does science require universals?
I've edited and renamed this several times in an attempt to differentiate it from similar topics, since I lack deletion powers.
Universals exist if the same properties or relations between particulars exist. Matter, energy, space, time, laws of nature, information, etc are all abstractions over particulars. But is that just a useful tool for us to make sense of particulars, or does that necessitate universal properties and relations?
So for example, we can ask what makes an electron an electron. In physics, all electrons have the same charge, mass and spin of 1/2. They share those properties. But this means there does exist the exact same properties for all electrons in the universe. Which makes them universal. The Standard Model depends on these universals being the case for particles and forces.
But if we deny that there are universal properties, then physics is wrong about electrons. They can't all be sharing the same charge, mass and spin. It's just a useful abstraction to make sense of messy particulars. In which case, the Standard Model can't be true, or accurate.
Universals exist if the same properties or relations between particulars exist. Matter, energy, space, time, laws of nature, information, etc are all abstractions over particulars. But is that just a useful tool for us to make sense of particulars, or does that necessitate universal properties and relations?
So for example, we can ask what makes an electron an electron. In physics, all electrons have the same charge, mass and spin of 1/2. They share those properties. But this means there does exist the exact same properties for all electrons in the universe. Which makes them universal. The Standard Model depends on these universals being the case for particles and forces.
But if we deny that there are universal properties, then physics is wrong about electrons. They can't all be sharing the same charge, mass and spin. It's just a useful abstraction to make sense of messy particulars. In which case, the Standard Model can't be true, or accurate.
Comments (13)
So properties are not like stickers that are applied to an object, properties are the way matter is acting. A yellow pencil does not have the property of yellow, rather, it is acting in such a way that it exemplifies yellow. Maybe universals represent all that is physically possible, that is, all the different forms that matter can be construed. In which case they would exist in the same way the laws of logic exist, out of abstraction. But I don't think there's some kind of mystical inventory that has all these universals floating around somewhere in abstracta, that reeks of pseudoscientific superstitious nonsense.
Also, I dislike the trend in metaphysics that distinguishes objects as entities in themselves. This makes absolutely no sense to me. I suppose this means I am a mereological nihilist.
EDIT:
My inclination would be to say that science does not require universals to exist. But, perhaps, if we believe that science is a good basis for ontology, then science strongly suggests that universals do exist. But if we do not believe that science is a good basis for ontology then there isn't as much at conflict between a denial of universals and the requirements of science to be, well, science.
It is a problematic notion, but the alternative is to explain all our universalizing in terms of particulars only. Because if the particulars can't do the job, then that means the abstracta is necessary, somehow.
Quoting darthbarracuda
That sounds promising.
Okay, I can agree with this. Can we then say that science requires the utilization of universal concepts to build its theories? Now If science isn't a good basis for ontology, the question becomes could scientific theories in principle be replaced by just talk of particulars? Or perhaps in that case, science is just a useful tool, and not an accurate model of reality.
But on a scientific realist account, electrons, spacetime and energy all exist, and that's strongly suggestive of universals existing.
I don't know if we can because I don't know what a universal concept is. I would agree that scientific theories aim at what is general rather than particular. But aiming at generalities doesn't necessitate universals -- such as a really existing red to which all red particulars correspond, or a universal number "1" to which all particular uses of "1" corresponds [or whatever relation we might posit], even if said universals are merely conceptual. I don't believe that one must be committed one way or the other with said beliefs in order for science to still "hold together" coherently and rationally.
It seems to me that if we are scientific realists then, yes, science strongly suggests universals exist. But if not, then not -- but I don't think that the answer to such a question could be decided via science -- science, itself, does not suggest one or the other. Rather, we believe one or the other, and it is in light of said beliefs about scientific realism/anti-realism which strongly suggests universals existing or not existing (or, perhaps, existing, but not due to science)
Though perhaps I don't quite grasp what is meant by "universal", here -- a bit of a curious word, yes? My understanding of "universal", with respect to the distinction between universal-particular, is that universals really exist and particulars are derivative or somehow participate or are related to this universal. But one might also say "universal" to mean "always applies", but then it seems to me that we're not talking about the problem of universals as much as we're talking about the "All" operator.
It is of course something of an oddity that scientific terms can shift in meaning quite a lot over time. 'Electron' is not what it was in Rutherford's day. 'Gene' is quite a different thing from when Dawkins wrote 'The selfish gene'. 'Species' is quite an uncertain beast. But perhaps that's my own hobby-horse and not this thread's :)
There is that. I recall reading where some physicists have speculated that the fundamental constants vary over time. But I don't know if there is any empirical evidence for this so far.
Are universals metaphors with particulars as their metonymic counterpart. Perhaps they can be thought that way linguistically.
The question is whether making universals out to be metaphors dispenses with the issue, and what sort of implications that has for scientific theories. Is GR with it's curved spacetime metaphorical? They seemed to think so.
Heh. Perhaps I am contradicting what I was saying before, but I wouldn't say that metaphors dispense with universals per se -- especially since what seems to be at issue is whether science implies universals. I would say that the question of scientific realism differs from the question of universals, unless one is a scientific realist.
But one could be a realist or an anti-realist of various stripes without this being at issue at all. Yes?