The riddle of determinism and thought
I am exercised by the Calvinist statement that God 'did ... freely and unchangeably ordain ... whatever comes to pass.'
The words 'whatever comes to pass' are all-inclusive, allowing no exception for our thought processes. However, if we suppose that our thoughts have been ordained for us, along with all else, we cannot place any faith in them. They are not in fact OUR thoughts at all. We may have the sensation of thoughts but cannot assess their validity since we do not have the independent existence necessary for the wielding of judgment.
Is there any answer to this objection?
The words 'whatever comes to pass' are all-inclusive, allowing no exception for our thought processes. However, if we suppose that our thoughts have been ordained for us, along with all else, we cannot place any faith in them. They are not in fact OUR thoughts at all. We may have the sensation of thoughts but cannot assess their validity since we do not have the independent existence necessary for the wielding of judgment.
Is there any answer to this objection?
Comments (25)
Similarly, a determinist might use the Laws of Nature and that which is governing us and inserting all of these concepts into us. Why would the Laws of Nature bother inserting ideas like thought and judgment into us? Beats me, but one does not question the reasons of the Lord (Laws of Nature).
Are you asking whether Calvinists believe in free will, or are you asking if there is room for free will if God willed whatever comes to pass? If the former, I don't know the answer, and I too would like to know what Calvinists believe.
If the latter, then free will is logically compatible with God willing everything. In short, God willed humans to have free will. At which point, we have full control (and responsibility) over our intentions.
This would be a God without omnipotence which might be a problem for some.
God's omnipotence is not defined as the ability to do anything whatsoever, but the ability to do anything that is logically possible. If God wills for us to have free will, then he cannot logically will to remove our free will at the same time.
https://blogs.thegospelcoalition.org/kevindeyoung/2009/10/27/can-god-know-everything-and-still-give-us-free-will/
Truth does not contradict truth, and so if a claim is illogical, then it cannot be true. That goes for all types of truths, including religious claims. That is not to say that there cannot also be faith. One may have faith that a claim is true, but only insofar that the claim is not illogical.
I will read the blog and get back to you on it.
When force is applied perpendicular to an arch structure, it should provide great resistance if it's a true arch.
Likewise, when we have thoughts which amount to an understanding of something, we can apply pressure to that understanding by testing it from all appropriate angles. If the understanding holds up under our best criticisms, then like a successfully constructed arch, the ideas themselves stand up on their own merits, whether or not we were determined to have them to begin with...
It seems to me that everyone who thinks they're voluntarily and meaningfully posting comments must actually disagree with the Calvinist view. (This would even be true - paradoxically - of someone who was defending it.)
This does not follow. You may believe that this is the case, but if so, this is in consequence to your understanding of ownership, personhood, freedom - all tricky metaphysical (or perhaps just psychosocial) notions that do not straightforwardly follow from that assumption.
If you accept that God is outside of time, that he knows everything that ever was or will ever be, then "whatever comes to pass" is memory for him, and as such he cannot change his own memories, therefore what ever we do is freely done.
This is it pretty much in a nutshell. Problems arise for those of either faith when they try to create a combination of free will and determinism (fatalism) in order to achieve some goal. Any time a subject area creates an external governing omniscient, omnipresent, omnipotent force, there is a problem with concepts such as judgement or why event such a feeling of judgement exists.
Hello again. I have finally read the blog. As I understand it, its argument against free will is as follows:
p1: If God is omniscient, then he can foresee my future acts with certainty.
p2: If my future acts are known, then they will occur necessarily (not that knowing is what causes the act, but rather the act is the necessary cause to knowing).
p3: If my future acts are necessary, then I have no free will.
I reject premise 1. God might exist outside of time. If so, then all instants, past, present and future to us, are always "live" or "now" to God. There is no foreseeing if there is no future from God's point of view; there is only seeing. If you eat an apple right now in front of me, I know with certainty that you are eating an apple because I see it. It does not follow that you don't have free will in the act, as it is not foreseeing.
Whether one is discussion God or Laws of nature, one must always keep in mind, if they are embracing these concepts, they govern not vice-versa. It's a rather awkward way if thinking of oneself (we actually all have choice, but some would prefer to pretend they don't), but if I've chooses to do so, then one has to accept it for what it is.
I agree with you that to claim to know everything about God is also to claim to transcend God; and this is not only pretentious, it is also false, because since God is above all things by definition, we can never fully know him.
Having said that, we can know some things about God: If God exists and is the creator of all things, then he is the creator of human reason. Therefore we can trust our reason to help us find truth, including some truths about God, if these can be found through reason. Not all, but some.
I don't see what the problem is with that. If God ordains us with the ability to understand him, say through human reason, then we can understand his ways through it.
A typical example is goodness and logic. If God created us in his image, then our idea of goodness and logic must be the same as God's.
One cannot know the intentions of the Lord.
This statement is not a logical necessity. For one thing, we could know God's intentions if he told them to us. This Lord you speak of fits more into deism rather than theism.
One last thought before we part ways. If we have zero ability to judge a religion and to differentiate a probably true one from a probably false one, then any religion whatsoever, like the Flying Spaghetti Monster, ancient greek religions, or any cults, would need to be taken as seriously as established religions like Christianity, Islam, or Buddhism.
To answer that question, I may ask you, why didn't you chose the cherry pie or the vanilla ice cream? Free will means one can freely choose any alternative without any predetermined emotional or psychological cost or benefit. Cost or benefit means it is not free. If you had a preference for chocolate, but not for the cherry pie, your choice was predetermined, since the other choice would have a cost. The chocolate cake turns a profit, so it too is not free. This is not free will.
One can pretend this is free will, but somewhere in your past a choice was inherent, was made or was induced that eliminates your ability to this make this a free choice. Any strong preference or dislike in choices is a symptom of determinism.
Why do the people in this forum like to analyze things and express their ideas in writing? This is less about free choice and more about what makes us feel good. Free choice would require no strong feelings about anything, so our path for choice is wide open, and not predetermined by our feelings or bias. Free will is skill that has to be learned. Free will is not predetermined at birth or predetermined by simply being human.
Denying the world is an exercise for developing free will. One holds back all impulses; instinctive, personal, habitual and collective so one can differentiate the predetermined. Since so few people will make this effort, very few people ever develop free will.
You're arguing that the development of free will is a choice, thus creating a circularity problem. If you can choose to transcend all worldly impulses, that presumes you already had free will, making it predetermined at birth, which you denied.
If denying one's impulses is necessary for the exercise of free will, how does one deny one's impulses prior to acquiring free will so that they'll then have it?