Are 'facts' observer-dependent?

Facts are observer-dependent as long as we are a society of observers. Since facts for us are usually our human contextualization of physical realities and not just physical realities themselves, then the contextualizations of observers, and of those engaging the observers and their observations, are observer-dependent

Quoting Question

When we assume that facts exist, we are implicitly committing ourselves to a form of nominalism as opposed to viewing things as mutually dependent and holistic. When we assert the ontology of the universe as facts and not things, we seem to be saying that objects are nominalist, but, as opposed to what?

?

You should take another shot at that paragraph.

Reply to Srap Tasmaner

What part don't you understand?

Ontology of the universe as facts is a problem since facts are our views of the material reality of the universe, not the truths of the Universe itself.

Quoting Question

The early Wittgenstein postulated that the world is the totality of facts, not things.

History dulls the context.

The world does not consist of individuals - cats , mats, and so on; but of cats on mats.

Facts, unlike individuals, have predicate content.

Quoting Thanatos Sand

Facts are observer-dependent as long as we are a society of observers.

How a fact is presented is dependent on the social context; that does not mean that all facts are dependent on a social context.

Quoting Question

Are all of these facts observer dependant?

Some certainly are. The fact that I'm watching you, for example.

As for Wittgenstein, he says "facts cannot strictly speaking be defined, but we can explain what we mean by saying that facts are what make propositions true, or false".

So one might say that the proposition that grass is green is made true by the fact that grass is green. But then what is the difference between the fact that grass is green and the green grass? Are they the same thing? If so, and if the latter is a thing, then facts are things. Are they different? If so, can we deduce the observer-independence of the fact from the observer-independence of the thing (assuming, for the sake of argument, that green grass is observer-independent)? To answer the latter we must first determine how the fact that grass is green differs from the green grass.

Kind of. As Nietzsche pointed out, truth is interpretation, and there could theoretically be an infinite number of them for any given phenomenon, but that doesn't mean that all are equal good, useful, or relevant. Facts give the world form, and are ways of looking at it. Once formed they are for all intents and purposes, observer independent. Like bringing underlying regularities, or general principles to the surface.

Quoting Question

I have a hard time seeing these facts about the world as observer-independent, as one would naturally assume.

Each individual makes some observation.

When recalled from memory, the observer has a particular level of intensity of certainty about the observation, and will describe it using a range of words or other means as some sort of belief or fact. Something that is taught in school by a teacher may be recalled as a fact because of its association with a teacher or academia.

Something comes along (a new observation in memory) that questions the fact and the fact becomes degraded more or less, possibly to "I think this is what happened".

Facts are this beliefs with high level of intensity of certainty.

Certainty of beliefs may increase or decrease depending upon life experiences and observations (the credibility of a co-confirmer may come into question).

Facts are individual beliefs that may be shared with a higher level of certainty associated with it but no different than any other belief and equally fluid. It is a process.

Quoting Banno

The world does not consist of individuals - cats , mats, and so on; but of cats on mats.

Facts, unlike individuals, have predicate content.

Yes, but Wittgenstein specifically uses the term 'logical atomic facts' or 'simples'. These seem to point towards a nominalism of some sort. But, then how can one talk about individual facts without bearing their properties and characteristics in mind? Not sure if the crux of the matter is clear?

Quoting Michael

So one might say that the proposition that grass is green is made true by the fact that grass is green. But then what is the difference between the fact that grass is green and the green grass? Are they the same thing? If so, and if the latter is a thing, then facts are things. Are they different? If so, can we deduce the observer-independence of the fact from the observer-independence of the thing (assuming, for the sake of argument, that green grass is observer-independent)? To answer the latter we must first determine how the fact that grass is green differs from the green grass.

This seems to be a matter of where does one derive meaning from? Is it the fact or the subject-object relation that we're really talking about here, following that we have talked about our subjective vision of the world and the object itself. It's sounding awfully Kantian at this point.

Reply to Wosret

Yes, but the limits of my language are the limits of my world. Thus, solipsism?

Quoting Michael

So one might say that the proposition that grass is green is made true by the fact that grass is green. But then what is the difference between the fact that grass is green and the green grass? Are they the same thing? If so, and if the latter is a thing, then facts are things. Are they different? If so, can we deduce the observer-independence of the fact from the observer-independence of the thing (assuming, for the sake of argument, that green grass is observer-independent)? To answer the latter we must first determine how the fact that grass is green differs from the green grass.

Easy. The green grass is grass, but the fact that grass is green is not. I water the grass, not the fact. What reason would anyone have to confuse facts and grass in the first place?

Without a good reason to believe that facts are dependent on observers, why would I believe that to be so? The belief often seems to be erroneously founded in the way that Banno highlighted.

Quoting Sapientia

Easy. The green grass is grass, but the fact that grass is green is not. I water the grass, not the fact. What reason would anyone have to confuse facts and grass in the first place?

So the fact isn't the observer-independent physical thing?

Quoting Michael

So the fact isn't the observer-independent physical thing?

The fact is not the thing, like I said. The fact is about the thing. It's like a picture.

Quoting Sapientia

The fact is not the thing, like I said. The fact is about the thing. It's like a picture.

Then how do we show that the fact is observer-independent? We can perhaps show that the thing is observer-independent, but if we say that the fact isn't the thing then this doesn't help us.

So even if we grant that physical things are observer-independent, it doesn't then follow that facts are observer-independent.

Quoting Michael

Then how do we show that the fact is observer-independent?

One can show that a fact is observer-independent by drawing attention to the absence of evidence of this kind of dependence where you'd expect it to be.

I agree with you that some facts are observer-dependent, such as the fact that I'm watching you. I could even concede that the fact that grass is green is one such fact, because that wouldn't be sufficient grounds to conclude that facts are observer-dependent.

So my thought process goes like this:

"Are 'facts' observer-dependent?"

Me: "Ah, might be a fun thread. I have an opinion on that."

"What is the ontology of 'facts'"

Me: "Okay, that seems way broader than what the subject line promised . . . um, I wonder what this poster really wants to talk about . . . ":

"The early Wittgenstein postulated that the world is the totality of facts, not things."

Me: "Ugh. Why are we bringing Wittgenstein up? This isn't going to turn out to be a 'Let's discuss Wittgenstein' thread, is it?"

And then we move on to some other specific stuff that you brought up that's not necessarily the same thing as anything you brought up above:

Quoting Question

I have a hard time seeing these facts about the world as observer-independent, as one would naturally assume. After all, if nobody is around to hear a tree fall, it still falls regardless of our observation of it falling or not.

That seems to me like you didn't write what you wanted to write there. If you believe that if nobody is around to hear a tree fall, it still falls regardless of our observation, then it wouldn't be the case that you have a hard time seeing facts as observer-independent. So I'm not sure what you're saying there.

Quoting Question

When we assume that facts exist, we are implicitly committing ourselves to a form of nominalism as opposed to viewing things as mutually dependent and holistic.

This makes absolutely no logical sense to me. Why couldn't one believe that universal, mutually dependent and holistic facts exist? I have no idea what you're thinking there implicationally.

Quoting Question

When we assert the ontology of the universe as facts and not things, we seem to be saying that objects are nominalist,

Again, I have no idea why you're thinking this.

Quoting Question

Are all of these facts observer dependant? Because otherwise, everything would consist of thing's and not facts if it weren't.

First, I wouldn't worry about what Wittgenstein said. A lot of what Wittgenstein said is a lot of nonsense in my opinion.

But I don't understand your reasoning there either. You'd have to explain it in more detail.

In any event, my answer to what you asked in the subject line is simply this: "Some facts are observer-dependent. Some are not."

Quoting Sapientia

One can show that a fact is observer-independent by drawing attention to the absence of evidence of this kind of dependence where you'd expect it to be.

I don't know what to make of this. I certainly don't think we can talk about expected evidence until we have a clear understanding of what a fact is. I know what green grass is – by deferring to biology/chemistry/physics – and I'll grant that the fact that grass is green is something else – by deferring to your reasoning above – but without a more positive account of the ontology of facts, how can we claim that there's an absence of expected evidence?

What evidence would you expect? It can't be empirical evidence, as empirical evidence is evidence of things.

And as a side question, are you promoting a Platonic approach to facts? Facts are abstract/intangible but observer-independent?

Quoting Michael

I don't know what to make of this. I certainly don't think we can talk about expected evidence until we have a clear understanding of what a fact is. I know what green grass is – by deferring to biology/chemistry/physics – and I'll grant that the fact that grass is green is something else – by deferring to your reasoning above – but without a more positive account of the ontology of facts, how can we claim that there's an absence of expected evidence?

What evidence would you expect? It can't be empirical evidence, as empirical evidence is evidence of things.

And as a side question, are you promoting a Platonic approach to facts? Facts are intangible but observer-independent entities?

What's wrong with what Wittgenstein said? Let's go with that. Facts are what make propositions true, or false. That the grass is green is what makes the corresponding proposition true. I don't think that that's Platonic. That the grass is green can be observed. Facts are like pictures, remember? Are you telling me you can't see the picture?

Quoting Michael

So one might say that the proposition that grass is green is made true by the fact that grass is green. But then what is the difference between the fact that grass is green and the green grass? Are they the same thing? If so, and if the latter is a thing, then facts are things. Are they different? If so, can we deduce the observer-independence of the fact from the observer-independence of the thing (assuming, for the sake of argument, that green grass is observer-independent)? To answer the latter we must first determine how the fact that grass is green differs from the green grass.

We could say that facts are (dynamic) things and relations. Of course, things are also dynamic relations--what we're calling grass is dynamic relations between chlorophyll and cellulose and so on, and on another level of examination, dynamic relations of carbon and oxygen and nitrogren, etc.

Part of the issue here is whether we have (and are using) a "technical definition" of "thing," and if so, what definition?

If we think of "thing" as being something like an abstracted item not necessarily in relation to other things, not necessary processual/dynamic, etc,, then I'd agree that facts are not simply things. Facts are things in dynamic relations with other things. (And again, things are really dynamic relations themselves, although maybe some microscopic level gets down to chunks of stuff that are not themselves dynamic relations).

Quoting Sapientia

What's wrong with what Wittgenstein said? Let's go with that. Facts are what make propositions true, or false.

The problem I have with stuff like that is that it's a "feature of facts," not an exhaustive definition of them, but philosophy has a tendency to treat stuff like that as if it's an exhaustive definition, and that leads to saying a bunch of nonsense.

Diagnosing philosophy's mental neuroses, I think that the tendency to do this arises from a "fear of saying too much," because the more you say, the more likely it's going to be challenged. So there turned out to be a drive to analyze everything from a sparse, abstract, linguistic perspective, as if that's all that things really are.

Quoting Sapientia

What's wrong with what Wittgenstein said? Let's go with that. Facts are what make propositions true, or false.

I might say that the green grass makes the proposition "the grass is green" true.

I don't think that that's Platonic

You're saying that the facts are not the physical things that they're about, but that they're observer-independent. So you're saying that there exists observer-independent non-physical things. That sounds like Platonism.

Facts are like pictures, remember? Are you telling me you can't see the picture?

This is a bad analogy, as pictures are physical things. You're saying that facts aren't physical things. Or are you saying that facts are physical things, but just not identical to the physical things that they're about? So I could, in principle, hold green grass is one hand and the fact that grass is green in the other?

Quoting Sapientia

That the grass is green can be observed.

And green grass can be observed. So what's the difference between observing green grass and observing the fact that the grass is green? If nothing then surely there isn't a difference between green grass and the fact that grass is green?

Quoting Michael

I might say that the green grass makes the proposition "the grass is green" true.

But that's just a lack of grammatical clarity. It isn't proper to say "green grass", therefore the grass is green. It's proper to say that the grass is green because there is green grass, i.e. that there is green grass is what makes the proposition true. And that's what I've been saying. That there is green grass is a fact.

Quoting Michael

You're saying that the facts are not the physical things that they're about, but that they're observer-independent. So you're saying that there exists observer-independent non-physical things. That sounds like Platonism.

Plato went beyond independence. Plato posited a separate realm that only special people can access. That's not what I'm doing. Facts are ordinary and accessible. They can often be observed, but they don't depend on it.

Quoting Michael

This is a bad analogy, as pictures are physical things. You're saying that facts aren't physical things. Or are you saying that facts are physical things, but just not identical to the physical things that they're about? So I could, in principle, hold green grass is one hand and the fact that grass is green in the other?

What do you mean by that? There are facts which have been discovered through physics, relate to physics, are about physics. Those are physical facts. I don't see the need to categorise facts as physical in any other way, nor as ideal. They are what they are. But no, you can't hold a fact in your hand.

Quoting Sapientia

But that's just a lack of grammatical clarity. It isn't proper to say "green grass", therefore the grass is green. It's proper to say that the grass is green because there is green grass, i.e. that the grass is green is what makes the proposition true. And that's what I've been saying. That the grass is green is a fact.

Why does grammar matter? If we're using the correspondence theory of truth, a proposition is true if it corresponds to a state-of-affairs, and if we're a materialist then states-of-affairs (in a lot of cases) are physical things. The green grass is a state-of-affairs, and it's the state-of-affairs that the proposition "the grass is green" corresponds to.

Plato went beyond independence. Plato posited a separate realm that only special people can access. That's not what I'm doing. Facts are ordinary and accessible. They can often be observed, but they don't depend on it.

How are they observed? I know how things are observed; they direct light towards my eyes. But how are facts observed? See my prior comment on the (non-)difference between observing the green grass and observing the fact that the grass is green.

What do you mean by that? There are facts which have been discovered through physics, relate to physics, are about physics. Those are physical facts. I don't see the need to categorise facts as physical in any other way, nor as ideal. They are what they are.

Physics discovers things. A particular arrangement of matter is detected and measured by a machine. Are you saying that, as well as detecting and measuring these physical things, they're also detecting and measuring facts? How do the facts that they detect and measure differ from the things that they detect and measure?

Quoting Michael

Why does grammar matter?

Grammar matters important demonstrated is sentence by.

Quoting Michael

How are they observed? I know how things are observed; they direct light towards my eyes. But how are facts observed?

Can you see that the grass is green? Yes or no? I can. Is this a mystery? I don't think so.

Quoting Michael

Physics discovers things. A particular arrangement of matter is detected and measured by a machine. Are you saying that, as well as detecting and measuring these physical things, they're also detecting and measuring facts? How do the facts that they detect and measure differ from the things that they detect and measure?

So the fact that that there is an upper limit to the efficiency of conversion of heat to work in a heat engine was not discovered through physics? Odd. I thought that it was discovered by the French scientist Sadi Carnot in 1824.

Quoting Sapientia

Grammar matters important demonstrated is sentence by.

You're deflecting.

Can you see that the grass is green? Yes or no?

Yes. But this is identical to seeing the green grass. Yes or no?

So the fact that that there is an upper limit to the efficiency of conversion of heat to work in a heat engine was not discovered through physics? Odd. I thought that it was discovered by the French scientist Sadi Carnot in 1824.

I didn't say that facts weren't discovered. I said that scientific measurements are measurements of observer-independent things. You're the one who's saying that facts are distinct from things (and also observer-independent). So I'm asking you to make sense of this. What's the difference between measuring a thing and measuring a fact? How do scientific instruments distinguish between the two?

Quoting Michael

. I said that scientific measurements are measurements of observer-independent things.

I don't think it is possible to have a measurement within a system without an observer. Everything is entangled. Any measurement (a process) will immediately entangle observe and observed. If there is something independent of the observer it is forever inaccessible and unknown in any manner.

Quoting Terrapin Station

That seems to me like you didn't write what you wanted to write there. If you believe that if nobody is around to hear a tree fall, it still falls regardless of our observation, then it wouldn't be the case that you have a hard time seeing facts as observer-independent. So I'm not sure what you're saying there.

Yeah, but we've already presupposed that the tree falls. Get the paradox?

Quoting Terrapin Station

This makes absolutely no logical sense to me. Why couldn't one believe that universal, mutually dependent and holistic facts exist? I have no idea what you're thinking there implicationally.

The rationale is that there are elementary facts of which nothing can be said about in isolation. This is a hard form of nominalism. Now, here's the issue. We are presupposing that elementary facts exist in isolation, which can only be talked about in relation to other things.The elementary fact or logical atomic fact or object exists as a sort of noumena if you see where I'm getting at.

Quoting Michael

You're deflecting.

No, that was a demonstration of the importance of grammar, which is what you were questioning.

Quoting Michael

Yes. But this is identical to seeing the green grass. Yes or no?

No. I see that the grass is green as a result of seeing the green grass.

Quoting Michael

I didn't say that facts weren't discovered.

When you said that physics discovers things, I took you to be suggesting that physics discovers things rather than facts.

Quoting Michael

I said that scientific measurements are measurements of observer-independent things. You're the one who's saying that facts are distinct from things (and also observer-independent). So I'm asking you to make sense of this. What's the difference between measuring a thing and measuring a fact? How do scientific instruments distinguish between the two?

So you want [i]me[/I] to get you out of the confusion that [i]you've[/I] got yourself in to? Why can't you untangle yourself? I haven't said anything about measuring a fact or instruments which can distinguish between the two. That's come from you.

I've already provided a distinction. One is enough. I don't have to keep going on [I]ad infinitum[/I]. Time to revise your argument. It was over before it even took off.

Quoting Question

Yeah, but we've already presupposed that the tree falls. Get the paradox?

Yes, this in itself is immediately an observer (mind) dependent observation/thought.

Quoting Sapientia

No, that was a demonstration of the importance of grammar, which is what you were questioning.

I was questioning what grammar has to do with truth makers, not with descriptions. The important part was what I said next: If we're using the correspondence theory of truth, a proposition is true if it corresponds to a state-of-affairs, and if we're a materialist then states-of-affairs (in a lot of cases) are physical things. The green grass is a state-of-affairs, and it's the state-of-affairs that the proposition "the grass is green" corresponds to.

No. I see that the grass is green as a result of seeing the green grass.

I can't make sense of this. It seems to be using two different senses of "see". I assume the latter is referring to the occurrence of visual phenomena. What's the former?

When you said that physics discovers things, I took you to be suggesting that physics discovers things rather than facts.

I'm saying that our measuring machines can only detect things. That's just how they work; they're physical things that are causally influenced by other physical things. Therefore either facts are physical things or our measuring machines can't detect facts.

Whereas you seem to be saying that facts aren't physical things but can still somehow be detected by our measuring machines. What kind of causal mechanism is involved in that?

So you want me to get you out of the confusion that you've got yourself in to? Why can't you untangle yourself? I haven't said anything about measuring a fact or instruments which can distinguish between the two. That's come from you.

You're the one who's saying that facts are not things and that facts can be discovered. So you need to distinguish between discovering a thing and discovering a fact.

Quoting Question

Yeah, but we've already presupposed that the tree falls. Get the paradox?

Not really, because you said "I have a hard time seeing . . ." Do you have a hard time seeing how facts would be mind-independent or not?

Quoting Question

The rationale is that there are elementary facts of which nothing can be said about in isolation.

That still makes no sense. Why couldn't the elementary facts of which nothing can be said (about) in isolation be either universal facts or particular facts. (And/or why couldn't it imply that there are either universal or only particular facts?)

Quoting Question

The elementary fact or logical atomic fact or object exists as a sort of noumena if you see where I'm getting at

Okay, but you could think that's either a universal or a particular.

Quoting Michael

You're the one who's saying that facts are not things and that facts can be discovered. So you need to distinguish between discovering a thing and discovering a fact.

I've already distinguished the two, and one distinction is enough. Your suggestion that they're identical has been refuted already.

That facts can be discovered is evident from the example I gave, which you accepted. That was not a thing, it was a fact.

One problem with facts is how to tell when one fact is the same as another. There's no fat man in my doorway. There's no thin man in my doorway, either. Two facts or one or none? Perhaps there's just One Big Fact to which all true statements refer - which gets around the problem of fact-identity. But if that is so then we can no longer talk meaningfully about facts in the plural. But if there are any facts then there are surely lots of facts - or we are not quite making sense.

There are certainly daisies and we have fairly reliable ways of telling them apart. We can count daisies and someone can point out that we have missed some or counted some twice. On the other hand, there are certainly clouds, but our ways of telling them apart can be a lot less reliable.

Which all establishes that facts are not daisies but they might be clouds. A modest conclusion, perhaps, but surely worth considering.

Quoting Cuthbert

One problem with facts is how to tell when one fact is the same as another. There's no fat man in my doorway. There's no thin man in my doorway, either.

One fact in my view.

"Fact" doesn't refer to a statement (with the exception of it being a fact that someone made whatever statement they did etc.)

Reply to Question I think a good place to look for understanding what Wittgenstein meant is Frege, especially Frege's context principle (which Wittgenstein adopted in the Tractatus: "never ask about the meaning of a word in isolation from its occurrence in sentences"). Here's a very useful quote form Frege:

What is distinctive about my conception of logic is that I begin by giving pride of place to the content of the word ‘true’, and then immediately go on to introduce a thought as that to which the question ‘Is it true?’ is in principle applicable. So I do not begin with concepts and put them together to form a thought or judgment; I come by the parts of a thought by analyzing the thought”

(the emphasis is mine)

And I think this quote is useful because it captures pretty well what Wittgenstein was doing in the Tractatus as well. Wittgenstein was interested in the logical analysis of propositions, and what characterizes propositions is that (like Frege's thoughts) they can be either true or false. So when we analyze a proposition (that is, break it down into its constituent parts) what we should be asking in the course of our analysis is what the proposition should be like in order to function as a sign that is essentially capable of representing a situation either truly or falsely. And Wittgenstein's key insight was that a proposition is able to do this because it is a picture of a possible state of affairs, or a fact. And now we can further analyze facts into things, but whatever those things are, they must owe they identity to the facts in which they can logically occur (just like words owe their meaning to the meaning of the sentences which they compose, as the context principle says). And thus Wittgenstein writes:

2.011 It is essential to a thing that it can be a constituent part of an atomic fact.

2.012 In logic nothing is accidental: if a thing can occur in an atomic fact the possibility of that atomic fact must already be prejudged in the thing.

2.0123 If I know an object, then I also know all the possibilities of its occurrence in atomic facts. (Every such possibility must lie in the nature of the object.) A new possibility cannot subsequently be found.

So what Wittgenstein did is start from language (propositions) and ask what the world must be like for language to function the way it does (that is, represent things truly or falsely). In other words, Wittgenstein took logic as a guide to our ontology. Whatever things are there in the world, they must be such that we can think them (or represent them in language); and what we can think is facts or states of affairs, not objects or things. So this is why he says in the opening sections of the Tractatus that the world is made up of facts not things, in order to emphasize, like Frege, that he gives the concept of truth the central place in his analysis.

It is also useful to contrast Wittgenstein's approach to Russell's theory of judgment (which Wittgenstein also criticized in the Traactatus). For Russell, judging that such and such is a matter of a relation between a subject and a list of things (such as objects, properties and relations). So Russell's approach is the opposite to Wittgenstein's: you start with ontology and give the list of things that exist in the world, and then you try to explain judgment or meaning by relating the subject with the things which exist according to your ontology. And what was wrong in Russell's analysis from Wittgenstein's point of view is that he neglected the concept of truth; nothing in Russell explains why standing in a relation to some things allows one to form meaningful and true judgements, while it is not the case when a subject related to some other things. Wittgenstein answer was that unless we think about the things from which the world is made as something the can essentially occur within facts, we will have no way of explaining how it is possible to judge anything about the world, or represent it in language.

Quoting Fafner

"never ask about the meaning of a word in isolation from its occurrence in sentences").

The first big problem, then, is that that idea is ridiculous.

The second big problem is illegitimately analogizing that to the relation of "things" to facts.

"I begin by giving pride of place to the content of the word ‘true’," . . . whatever that amounts to.

We should probably make this thread not about Wittgenstein. Why discuss someone who had things so wrong?

Quoting Terrapin Station

The first big problem, then, is that that idea is ridiculous.

Why? Because you've said so?

Quoting Cuthbert

One problem with facts is how to tell when one fact is the same as another. There's no fat man in my doorway. There's no thin man in my doorway, either. Two facts or one or none? Perhaps there's just One Big Fact to which all true statements refer - which gets around the problem of fact-identity.

According to the slingshot argument there indeed only is one single fact that all true sentences correspond to. The arguments, though, has also been viewed as a refutation of the correspondence theory of truth.

Quoting Fafner

Why? Because you've said so?

Because we obviously deal with the meanings of words in isolation. It's clearly not the case that there's any problem with this just because Frege or Wittgenstein said so.

Reply to Terrapin Station What do you mean by "deal" and "meaning of words"? It seems to me that you have something different in mind than what Frege and Wittgenstein had.

Reply to Pierre-Normand

Re the slingshot argument, this step seems particularly peculiar:

"Every sentence is equivalent to a sentence of the form F(a). In other words, every sentence has the same designation as some sentence that attributes a property to something. (For example, 'All men are mortal' is equivalent to 'The number 1 has the property of being such that all men are mortal'.)"

How in the world are those two sentences equivalent? I'd say they have nothing to do with each other, and that the second sentence is nonsensical.

Reply to Fafner

The definition of "deal (with)" there is "utilize" or "make use of" or "involve ourselves (with)"

Are you going to ask for definitions of some of those words next?

Quoting Terrapin Station

Are you going to ask for definitions of some of those words next?

At least give some sort example to illustrate what you meant (that is an example of "dealing with the meanings of words in isolation").

Quoting Fafner

At least give some sort example to illustrate what you meant

Give some sort of example? You can't parse definitions?

Quoting Terrapin Station

You can't parse definitions?

Whatever that means...

Reply to Terrapin Station

Ok. And are they both the same fact as this: Julius Caesar was not born in 2015. If not, why not? If so, we are surely tending towards all facts being one - the one big fact that is all that is the case. And that has problems of its own.

Quoting Fafner

Whatever that means...

You should start with Jack and Jill if what I'm saying is beyond you. I can't guarantee you're not a moron or something. And in that case, you're not going to understand anything.

Quoting Cuthbert

Ok. And are they both the same fact as this: Julius Caesar was not born in 2015.

No, I'd say not. Because Julius Caesar has nothing to do with whether there's someone in the doorway.

Reply to Terrapin Station If I'm a moron, why don't you fuck off and leave me alone?

Reply to Fafner

You're underestimating my deviance. You could try not playing games and bullshitting though, and maybe that would be more productive for you.

Quoting Question

What is the ontology of 'facts'.

The early Wittgenstein postulated that the world is the totality of facts, not things.

Then he was right.

And we have similar statements from physicists Michael Faraday, Frank Tippler, and Max Tegmark.

...from Faraday as early as 1844. So far as I'm aware, Faraday was the first Westerner to suggest that logical/mathematical facts, and their inter-relation, are enough to explain observations, without believing in fundamentally-existent, primary, "stuff".

"Stuff" is the Physicalist's (Naturalist's) phlogiston.

But maybe there were a few millennia of philosophers in India who already knew that and said it.

And the "things" that the facts are about can be regarded as part of the facts.

What does he mean by asserting the existence of facts in logical space?

Does that really need any asserting? As I've mentioned elsewhere here, an inter-referring system of hypothetical facts have meaning in terms of and in reference to eachother. What other existence do they need?

I have a hard time seeing these facts about the world as observer-independent

They needn't have anything to do with an observer, because, as I said above, their relevance and meaning are in reference to eachother.

But you're also right to emphasize the observer--but for a different reason:

Those facts without an observer, including infinitely-many possibility-worlds with no inhabitants, aren't part of anyone's life, and don't mean anything to anyone. We're understandably self-centered, and if it doesn't relate to, or mean something, to us (or at least to someone), then it feels as if it has less reality-status..

You, as Protagonist, are the center of your hypothetical life-experience possibility-story. You're that story's essential component.

So the facts of your own life-experience story are the ones that seem most real to you.

I always agree that what's in the context of a person's life is what's particularly "real" to that person. ...like your desk and chair.

But I have to agree with Lightwave's statement that even abstract facts exist, because I speak of them as "are 'there' ", or in similar terms.(...even though I said that word isn't metaphysically-defined).

(A typing-error that I just made suggests asking if non-vegetarian metaphysics would be meataphysics

Lightwave says that contradictory or inconsistent propositions don't exist, and I'd agree that they differ from consistent ones, by not being valid. ...and that that's a big difference that might disqualify them from the broad category of "existent". I don't know. That hadn't occurred to me before.

So, I guess "exist" has a very broad unavoidable default meaning, even if there are more exclusive definitions of it.

Maybe "real" is more subject to individual people's limiting definitions. I ran across, on the Internet, a suggested hierarchy of real-ness, intended to roughly describe actual usage, and it seems to me that "actual" was at the top of that hierarchy, as the strongest real-ness. So maybe "actual" is a good word for things that are "physically" real in the context of someone's life..

When we assume that facts exist, we are implicitly committing ourselves to a form of nominalism as opposed to viewing things as mutually dependent and holistic.

...but your world, your possibility-world, and your life-experience possibility-story that takes place in it, are indeed dependent on you, as that story's Protagonist. It's a life-experience story only because it has a Protagonist--you, in this instance.

Are all of these facts observer dependant?

Your life-experience story is dependent on you, the observer/protagonist, being part of it. In general, though, facts aren't dependent on an observer, as I spoke of above, near the top of this post.

Michael Ossipoff

Quoting Michael Ossipoff

..from Faraday as early as 1844. So far as I'm aware, Faraday was the first Westerner to suggest that logical/mathematical facts, and their inter-relation, are enough to explain observations, without believing in fundamentally-existent, primary, "stuff".

"Stuff" is the Physicalist's (Naturalist's) phlogiston.

The error there isn't with positing "stuff," it's with being uncomfortable just in case we can't prove that there's stuff.

Quoting Thanatos Sand

Ontology of the universe as facts is a problem since facts are our views of the material reality of the universe, not the truths of the Universe itself.

That's an unsupported belief.

Your statement is a statement of the Physicalist belief that reality is material. ...that the material world is primary, is what's fundamentally real and existent.

Your primary, fundamentally real and existent material world is a big, blatant brute-fact.

There's no need for brute-facts. A metaphysics based on inter-referring hypothetical facts needs no brute-facts or assumptions. ...as I describe in my topic "A Uniquely Parsimonious and Skeptical Metaphysics."

In my other reply to this topic, I told some reasons for that.

Michael Ossipoff

Quoting Terrapin Station

" "Stuff" is the Physicalist's (Naturalist's) phlogiston+ — Michael Ossipoff


The error there isn't with positing "stuff," it's with being uncomfortable just in case we can't prove that there's stuff.

Fine, if you're comfortable with an unsupported brute-fact.

Michael Ossipoff

Reply to Banno Except all facts are presented in language, which is always a social context. Some facts, particularly those presented in the language of Math, are more successful in representing indisputability and resisting slippage into ambiguity. However, they're all presented in language.

Quoting Thanatos Sand

Except all facts are presented in language, which is always a social context. Some facts, particularly those presented in the language of Math, are more successful in representing indisputability and resisting slippage into ambiguity. However, they're all presented in language.

Yes, all statements of what is believed to be a fact is done so in some symbolic language which is inevitably ambiguous for a variety of reasons.

Mathematical symbols, when stated as a definition, are more resistant too change because they are accepted definitions (for now). However, mathematics when used as representational suffers from the v same problems as any symbolic language.

Reply to Michael Ossipoff

[Ontology of the universe as facts is a problem since facts are our views of the material reality of the universe, not the truths of the Universe itself.
— Thanatos Sand

That's an unsupported belief.

Your statement is a statement of the Physicalist belief that reality is material. ...that the material world is primary, is what's fundamentally real and existent.

Your primary, fundamentally real and existent material world is a big, blatant brute-fact.

There's no need for brute-facts. A metaphysics based on inter-referring hypothetical facts needs no brute-facts or assumptions. ...as I describe in my topic "A Uniquely Parsimonious and Skeptical Metaphysics."

In my other reply to this topic, I told some reasons for that.

Michael Ossipoff

Nothing you say in your "counter" to my quote above it counters or even effectively addresses what I said at all. I never made a physicalist belief; I just correctly said our facts are our reflections of the material reality of the universe; I never said they weren't part of our reality as well.

And the only big, blatant brute-fact is your statement calling my statement one, as my statements can and have been explained, and you don't explain or support yours at all. And your referring to your outside in-supported topic with the interesting name does not suffice or stand as explanation or support.

Thanatos Sand

Reply to Rich

Except all facts are presented in language, which is always a social context. Some facts, particularly those presented in the language of Math, are more successful in representing indisputability and resisting slippage into ambiguity. However, they're all presented in language.
— Thanatos Sand

Yes, all statements of what is believed to be a fact is done so in some symbolic language which is inevitably ambiguous for a variety of reasons.

Mathematical symbols, when stated as a definition, are more resistant too change because they are accepted definitions (for now). However, mathematics when used as representational suffers from the v same problems as any symbolic language.

Absolutely, as Godel showed long ago, which is why I said Math was more successful in representing indisputability, but still is vulnerable to the dynamics of language.

Quoting Thanatos Sand

Absolutely, as Godel showed long ago, which is why I said Math was more successful in representing indisputability, but still is vulnerable to the dynamics of language.

Yes, the vulnerability comes in several forms. I believe the fundamental problem is (and I know I am in a distinct minority) is that math, by necessity and practicality, must apply discreteness to a non-discrete (continuous) universe. This only becomes a problem when a particular mathematical construct (which is developed for practical application) is given ontological status. It happens quite often and creates all kinds of paradoxical problems.

I agree with that.

Reply to Thanatos Sand

You’d said:
.

[Ontology of the universe as facts is a problem since facts are our views of the material reality of the universe, not the truths of the Universe itself.
— Thanatos Sand

.

That's an unsupported belief.

Your statement is a statement of the Physicalist belief that reality is material. ...that the material world is primary, is what's fundamentally real and existent.

Your primary, fundamentally real and existent material world is a big, blatant brute-fact.

There's no need for brute-facts. A metaphysics based on inter-referring hypothetical facts needs no brute-facts or assumptions. ...as I describe in my topic "A Uniquely Parsimonious and Skeptical Metaphysics."

In my other reply to this topic, I told some reasons for that.

Michael Ossipoff

.
You reply:
.

Nothing you say in your "counter" to my quote above it counters or even effectively addresses what I said at all. I never made a physicalist belief; I just correctly said our facts are our reflections of the material reality of the universe; I never said they weren't part of our reality as well.

.
Well, let’s look at what you said:
.

Ontology of the universe as facts is a problem since facts are our views of the material reality of the universe, not the truths of the Universe itself.
— Thanatos Sand

.
You clearly said that facts are our views of the material reality. So the material is the Reality, and the facts are just “views” of that Reality. …and that facts aren’t the “truths of the universe”. Then what is the “truth of the universe”? Why, the material Reality, of course, of which the facts are merely a “view” and not the truths of the universe.
.
Yes, you said that. And, in the post that I’m replying to, you re-affirm that what you said is “correct”.
.

And the only big, blatant brute-fact is your statement calling my statement one

.
Well, the material reality that is primary, the fundamental-existent, the “reality” as opposed to just a “view” that isn’t a “truth of the universe” is a blatant brute-fact.
.
Why is there that material reality? There just is, right? That’s a brute-fact.
.

, as my statements can and have been explained

.
You repeated them, but that doesn’t change them.
.
“Explain” them? Alright, explain why there’s the material reality that you refer to that is the primary fundamental existent, instead of facts, which you say are merely “views” of your material reality, rather than “truths of the universe”.
.
If the facts are merely views of the material reality, and aren’t the “truths of the universe”, then explain what is the truth of the universe.
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And, if material reality is the “truth of the universe”, explain why there’s that “truth of the universe”.
.
But I’ve already asked you to explain why there is that material reality that you referred to.
.

, and you don't explain or support yours at all.

.
I’ve explained that a system of mutually inter-related and inter-referring hypothetical facts, including “physical laws” which are facts about relations between hypothetical quantities; and including such abstract facts as mathematical theorems and abstract logical facts
.
As I said before, the “things” that facts are about can be regarded as and spoken of as part of those facts.
.
Why do such systems “exist”?
.
How could they not? Such a system’s components have meaning in reference to eachother. They “exist” in reference to eachother. That’s their only “existence”. What more existence do they need?
.
Your life-experience possibility-story is such a system. Part of it consists of the hypothetical possibility-world in which your life-experience possibility-story is set.
.
I’ve explained this at various topics, at various forums at this website.
.
But you said that I haven’t explained or supported it, and so I’ve supplied the above brief summary.
.
Ever since Michael Faraday, in 1844, some physicists have been pointing out that there’s nothing about physics’s observations to imply that our physical world is other than a system such as I described above, consisting of mathematical and logical relation. …and no fundamentally-existent, primary “stuff”.
.

And your referring to your outside in-supported topic

.
I’m going to guess that you meant to say “unsupported topic”.
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I’ve supported my “A Uniquely Parsimonious and Skeptical Metaphysics” topic (…including its title). I’ve repeated, here in this post, a summary of that justification of it.
.

…with the interesting name does not suffice or stand as explanation or support.

.
I didn’t explain or support it by merely referring to it. But I explained and supported my initial post to “A Uniquely Parsimonious and Skeptical Metaphysics”, when I posted it, and many times since. …and I’ve provided a brief summary of that support and justification, above, in this post.
.
If you want to say that I haven’t explained and justified my claims, or the metaphysics that I propose, and offer justification of, then you’d need to specify particular not-valid statements in that justification, or ways in which my metaphysical proposal, its explanation or its justification is lacking.
.
But be specific.

.
Michael Ossipoff

That was a bunch of blather that again misrepresented my views and didn't address them at all. And your referring to a "topic" you wrote doesn't constitute presenting the erroneous arguments within that topic, so you still fail to support your argument in any way.

I suggest you tighten up your thoughts and address my arguments in concise paragraph form instead of writing a ramble of semi-coherent sentences, your final doozy being a prime example of that semi-coherence.

You continue to repeat your claim that I haven't supported my metaphysical proposal or its explanaion and justification.

But you missed one line of my previous post:

I said, "Be specific".

Apparently you're unable to.

I've been patient with you. When I asked you to be specific, I was giving you one more chance to show that you actually have a specific substantial objection. You've shown that you don't.

It wouldn't be productive for me to waste any more time replying to you.

As always, at this point, I emphasize that when I don't reply to Thanatos Sand, it doesn't mean that he's said something irrefutable. It's just that I've finally given up on asking for him to be more specific and less vague in his objections.

Michael Ossipoff


Quoting Thanatos Sand

That was a bunch of blather that again misrepresented my views and didn't address them at all. And your referring to a "topic" you wrote doesn't constitute presenting the erroneous arguments within that topic, so you still fail to support your argument in any way.

I suggest you tighten up your thoughts and address my arguments in concise paragraph form instead of writing a ramble of semi-coherent sentences, your final doozy being a prime example of that semi-coherence.

Again you post blather when you ask me to be specific when you've given no specificity, and when you ask me to be specific in unnecessarily proving a negative against your false unproven positive. So I don't need to provid a specific to back my correct criticism of your erroneous statement. Your thinking I do is cute.

Quoting Michael Ossipoff

Fine, if you're comfortable with an unsupported brute-fact.

That there's no "stuff" isn't any better-supported, haha

Who said there's no stuff? And he certainly didn't show I had a brute fact.

Quoting Question

The early Wittgenstein postulated that the world is the totality of facts, not things.

As you know I'm a Wittgenstein fan but this Tractatus business is just a way of putting it. Are all the facts about the Harry Potter universe part of this totality of facts, for instance?

Later Witt (if TS will allow us to carry on quoting him) suits me better: there are different language-games in which 'fact' works very usefully. But the descriptions even of the same purported fact are likely to be different: does that make the fact different? The Battle of the Boyne happened in 1690, for instance. Either heroic Orangemen expunged dastardly Catholics from the country, or heroic Catholics were cruelly outlawed by despicable Orangemen. I appreciate we feel less strongly about experiments on particles, but there's often a point of view embedded in our descriptions. In Academe, and indeed among friends or families or a society, there's a normative practice which agrees some basis for 'facts', from which chair is Grandad's to who was heroic in 1690.

Quoting Terrapin Station

"Fine, if you're comfortable with an unsupported brute-fact". — Michael Ossipoff

That there's no "stuff" isn't any better-supported, haha

You're confusing two different kinds/levels/orders of assumptions:

Have I proven that my metaphysics is correct, and that yours (whatever it may be) isn't?

For example, specificallyl, have I proven that there's no "stuff"?

Of course not, I've repeatedly suggested that no metaphysics is provable.

So, when we're checking for unsupported assumptions that a metaphysics needs, it doesn't make any sense to say,. "Your metaphysics depends on the unsupported assumption that it's correct and mine isn't."

I don't advocate an assumption that Skepticism is correct. So much for that "assumption."

Sorry, no. That isn't the kind of unsupported assumptions by which we're comparing metaphysics's parsimony.

A primary, fundamentally-existent material reality is a brute-fact. Physicalism and "Naturalism" need to posit that brute-fact. That's what makes it unparsimonious...not the fact that someone assumes that Physicalism is correct.

In other words, Physicalism's unsupported assumption is an assumption within Physicalism, rather than an external assumption about Physicalism, like an assumption that Physicalism is correct.

Skepticism doesn't share that un-parsimony,,,doesn't make an internal unsupported assumption..

Skepticism make no assumptions and posits no brute-facts.

It explains our physical world in terms of a system of inter-referring hypothetical facts.

"If this and this and this, then that."

I've told why that doesn't need an external explanation, because the components of that system refer only to eachother, and undeniably "exist" in terms of and in reference to eachother.

This isn't just my claim. We've named several physicists and a Western philosopher who have likewise said that a system of inter-referring hypothetical facts can explain the observations of physics, and our physical world.

Michael Ossipoff.

Reply to Michael Ossipoff

A primary, fundamentally-existent material reality is a brute-fact. Physicalism and "Naturalism" need to posit that brute-fact. That's what makes it unparsimonious...not the fact that someone assumes that Physicalism is correct.

A primary, fundamentally existent material reality Is not a "brute-fact," as a brute-fact is something that cannot be explained and a primary, fundamentally existent material reality can be explained. Michael doesnt' know what "brute-fact" means.

Quoting Michael Ossipoff

In other words, Physicalism's unsupported assumption is an assumption within Physicalism, rather than an external assumption about Physicalism, like an assumption that Physicalism is correct.

Skepticism doesn't share that un-parsimony,,,doesn't make an internal unsupported assumption..

What in the world do "internal" and "external" refer to there exactly?

Depends?

If I observe "I'm in a great mood", then that fact is observer-dependent.
If I observe "The Moon is round", then that fact is independent of me observing it.

An observation may be observer-dependent, the observed may not be.

Actually, the moon Is round is observer dependent since it will only seem round to those seeing it from a particular part of the earth, and "round" is a human concept placing an idealized shape on the Moon it doesnt' actually have.

Here "round" doesn't mean

[math]
(x - x_0)^2 + (y - y_0)^2 + (z - z_0)^2 = r^2
[/math]

The shape of the Moon is largely a result of gravity and composition and whatever, a spheroid within some margin of variation, round.
It had that shape long before homo sapiens walked the Earth.

Reply to jorndoe

Here "round" doesn't mean

(x?
x
0
)
2
+(y?
y
0
)
2
+(z?
z
0
)
2
=
r
2
(x?x0)2+(y?y0)2+(z?z0)2=r2


The shape of the Moon is largely a result of gravity and composition and whatever, a spheroid within some margin of variation, round.
It had that shape long before homo sapiens walked the Earth.

No, round is a human concept to which the moon didn't apply before we existed and doesn't even fit many human concepts of round as it isn't a smooth-circled orb.

Quoting jorndoe

It had that shape long before homo sapiens walked the Earth

And this is known how?

Roundness is an observation of a mind. Without the mind, the moon is just entangled quanta which is entangled with everything around it.

I'm not referring to our concepts or words, but the shape of the Moon.
Feel free to chat about the former; meanwhile I'll chat about the Moon. :)

And the shape of the moon wasn't "round" until humans called it that. And since the moon isn't a smooth-edged orb, it's not actually "round." So, you're not chatting about the moon, just your personal concept of it.

Quoting jorndoe

I'm not referring to our concepts or words, but the shape of the Moon.
Feel free to chat about the former; meanwhile I'll chat about the Moon. :)

All we know is that the moon is quanta which is essentially nothing. Anything you observe in your life is necessarily the result of the interaction between you, the observer, and the observed quanta. This is absolutely fundamental without any wiggle room.

Quoting Thanatos Sand

And since the moon isn't a smooth-edged orb, it's not actually "round."

Quoting jorndoe

The shape of the Moon is largely a result of gravity and composition and whatever, a spheroid within some margin of variation, round.

Emphasis added.
In this context, the term round is how we already characterize the Moon, along with whatever other things.
It's not a definition of the Moon's shape (we don't define things into existence), it's observation.
In case I'd written "the Earth is flat", I'd be wrong. Not so with "the Moon is round".

Quoting Rich

All we know is that the moon is quanta which is essentially nothing.

???

Reply to Terrapin Station

A NASA scientist's perspective:

"Let us ask a simple question: When you look up at night and "see" a star, what is "really" going on? A Newtonian philosopher might answer that you are "really seeing" the star, since, in Newtonian physics, the speed of light is reckoned as being infinite. An Einsteinian philosopher, on the other hand, would answer that you are seeing the star as it was in a past epoch, since light travels with finite velocity and therefore takes time to cross the gulf of space between the star and your eye. To see the star "as it is right now" has no meaning since there exists no means for making such an observation.

A quantum philosopher would answer that you are not seeing the star at all. The star sets up a condition that extends throughout space and time-an electromagnetic field. What you "see" as a star, is actually the result of a quantum interaction between the local field and the retina of your eye. Energy is being absorbed from the field by your eye, and the local field is being modified as a result. You can interpret your observation as pertaining to a distant object if you wish, or concentrate strictly on local field effects."

https://www.grc.nasa.gov/www/k-12/Numbers/Math/Mathematical_Thinking/observer.htm

Reply to jorndoe

And since the moon isn't a smooth-edged orb, it's not actually "round."
— Thanatos Sand

The shape of the Moon is largely a result of gravity and composition and whatever, a spheroid within some margin of variation, round.
— jorndoe

Emphasis added.
In this context, the term round is how we already characterize the Moon, along with whatever other things.
It's not a definition of the Moon's shape (we don't define things into existence), it's observation.
In case I'd written "the Earth is flat", I'd be wrong. Not so with "the Moon is round".

It's not observation. It's imposition of a human concept onto an object that never had that concept as an essential attribute. And, as I mentioned before, the moon isn't even actually round, as it's not a smooth-edged orb. Your ignoring that fact doesn't change it.

Reply to Thanatos Sand, you introduced "smooth-edged orb"; "a spheroid within some margin of variation" is a bit better.
Not that it matters much, though.
Would you prefer using other words when we chat about the Moon?

LOL. You accuse me of introducing a definition then you, yourself, introduce a definition with no more basis in physical reality or the English language than mine.

Thanks for further showing that "round" is just a linguistic concept dependent on other equally non-materially based linguistic concepts as itself. So, use whatever words you want when you chat about the moon. All you'll be doing is using words, not accurately describing the moon itself.

Quoting Thanatos Sand

It's not observation. It's imposition of a human concept onto an object that never had that concept as an essential attribute. And, as I mentioned before, the moon isn't even actually round, as it's not a smooth-edged orb. Your ignoring that fact doesn't change it.

The moon is actually just a quantum field which has no attributes. Everything we see and think about the moon is the result of observation. With quantum theory, it is no longer possible to discuss any object without introducing an observer. Object/observer actually morphs into a process.

Quoting Rich

All we know is that the moon is quanta which is essentially nothing. Anything you observe in your life is necessarily the result of the interaction between you, the observer, and the observed quanta. This is absolutely fundamental without any wiggle room.

Allow me to misquote you:

All jorndoe knows is that Rich is quanta which is essentially nothing. Anything jorndoe observes in jorndoe's life is necessarily the result of the interaction between jorndoe, and the observed quanta. This is absolutely fundamental without any wiggle room.

Solipsism.

"There is no Moon"? :)

Reply to jorndoe

More properly phrased, you know nothing about Rich until you observe Rich, and what observe about me may or may not be in concordance with what I observe about myself. In all probability we will disagree about almost everything. Such is the nature of observation.

I don't think it is possible to imagine a quantum field without observation.

Quoting Thanatos Sand

Thanks for further showing that "round" is just a linguistic concept dependent on other equally non-materially based linguistic concepts as itself. So, use whatever words you want when you chat about the moon. All you'll be doing is using words, not accurately describing the moon itself.

Well I'm not trying to be exhaustively accurate with error-free certainty, just chatting about the Moon.
If you'd written "the Moon is a regular tetrahedron", then you might need new glasses or a new encyclopedia or something. :)
As mentioned, I'm not chatting about English, but about the Moon.
Not about the word "Moon" either, but about the Moon.

As an aside, I just noticed the Wikipedia page has a list of characteristics, mean/equatorial/polar radius, flattening, circumference, surface area, volume, ...
I guess you could register and fix the page?

Quoting jorndoe

Well I'm not trying to be exhaustively accurate with error-free certainty, just chatting about the Moon.
If you'd written "the Moon is a regular tetrahedron", then you might need new glasses or a new encyclopedia or something. :)
As mentioned, I'm not chatting about English, but about the Moon.
Not about the word "Moon" either, but about the Moon.

As an aside, I just noticed the Wikipedia page has a list of characteristics, mean/equatorial/polar radius, flattening, circumference, surface area, volume, ...
I guess you could register and fix the page?

All you have done is describe the moon after observation.

Now, describe it before observation.

Quoting Rich

All you have done is describe the moon after observation.

Now, describe it before observation.

Huh?
Maybe I should ask you to describe my colleague.
If you're conflating ontology and epistemology, then you'll conclude there's no such colleague.
And maybe there isn't for all you know.

Quoting jorndoe

Maybe I should ask you to describe my colleague.
If you're conflating ontology and epistemology, then you'll conclude there's no such colleague.
And maybe there isn't for all you know.

Ask me, since it will illustrate the issue.

What you are doing is showing that everything that is known is by observation and observations will disagree for a number of reasons.

Now, if you you can illustrate what the moon would look like without observation, i.e. the attributes of a quantum field without observation, then it would certainly help to support your point of view, remembering of course that any observation affects the moon's quantum field.

Quoting Thanatos Sand

Thanks for further showing that "round" is just a linguistic concept dependent on other equally non-materially based linguistic concepts as itself. So, use whatever words you want when you chat about the moon. All you'll be doing is using words, not accurately describing the moon itself.

Are you claiming that language is only ever about language? Or about concepts? :o
That doesn't seem right.

Reply to Question "Atomic facts" as such were specifically rejected in Wittgenstein II.

Reply to jorndoe

Thanks for further showing that "round" is just a linguistic concept dependent on other equally non-materially based linguistic concepts as itself. So, use whatever words you want when you chat about the moon. All you'll be doing is using words, not accurately describing the moon itself.
— Thanatos Sand

Well I'm not trying to be exhaustively accurate with error-free certainty, just chatting about the Moon.
If you'd written "the Moon is a regular tetrahedron", then you might need new glasses or a new encyclopedia or something. :)
As mentioned, I'm not chatting about English, but about the Moon.
Not about the word "Moon" either, but about the Moon.

As an aside, I just noticed the Wikipedia page has a list of characteristics, mean/equatorial/polar radius, flattening, circumference, surface area, volume, ...
I guess you could register and fix the page?

Thanks for confirming everything I said in the post to which you responded.

Reply to Thanatos Sand Seems you are agreeing with me.

Reply to Thanatos Sand
See if we agree on this. There are some facts that cannot be represented away.

If the keys are locked in the car, they will be locked in the car regardless of how you present or represent them.

Seems you are agreeing with me.

Reply to Banno Possibly. Since you've done many posts I haven't seen, and you didn't list which one with which I agreed.

Reply to Thanatos Sand The post to which I replied was the one linked in the reply.

Reply to Banno I sure don't see it. Feel free to repost which post of yours with which I supposedly agreed.

Reply to Thanatos Sand Click on your name.

Reply to Thanatos Sand <===Click here.

It's how threads work.

Reply to Banno

See if we agree on this. There are some facts that cannot be represented away.

If the keys are locked in the car, they will be locked in the car regardless of how you present or represent them.

No, they will only be "locked in the car" within the structures and confines of the English language; that will not be their actual physical state. And they won't even be actually "locked in the car" within those structures and confines, as that phrase will not accurately represent the time they are locked in the car, nor will it represent how much they are actually locked in the car.

Reply to Banno Quoting Banno

It's how threads work.

They don't all work that way, and I'm new to this forum. But I checked back and, no, I don't agree with you.

Quoting Banno

If the keys are locked in the car, they will be locked in the car regardless of how you present or represent them.

You've already presented (or represented) the situation as "the keys are locked in the car" when you said "if the keys are locked in the car". So the question would be how could you present (or represent) this situation in another way. And, I'm sure it could be done with another language. So we should conclude that "the keys are locked in the car" is not the fact, but your presentation (representation) of the fact, even if the keys are locked in the car. The keys are locked in the car is not fact, even if the keys are locked in the car.

Quoting Thanatos Sand

No, [quote="Thanatos Sand;86025"]they will only be "locked in the car" within the structures and confines of the English language; that will not be their actual physical state.

I'd like to try to understand what you are claiming here.

Quoting Thanatos Sand

they will only be "locked in the car" within the structures and confines of the English language; that will not be their actual physical state.

Do you mean that there may be a language, other than English, in which the keys are not locked in the car?

Reply to Banno

I'd like to try to understand what you are claiming here.

they will only be "locked in the car" within the structures and confines of the English language; that will not be their actual physical state.
— Thanatos Sand

Do you mean that there may be a language, other than English, in which the keys are not locked in the car?

This was my whole, and very clear quote. If you took that from it, you didn't read it very well:

No, they will only be "locked in the car" within the structures and confines of the English language; that will not be their actual physical state. And they won't even be actually "locked in the car" within those structures and confines, as that phrase will not accurately represent the time they are locked in the car, nor will it represent how much they are actually locked in the car.

All I did was look at one side of the conjunction. Here's the other side:

And they won't even be actually "locked in the car" within those structures and confines, as that phrase will not accurately represent the time they are locked in the car, nor will it represent how much they are actually locked in the car.

It would be simple to add a time - "the keys are locked in the car now". I'm not at all sure what it would mean to add degrees of locked-ness....

Quoting Thanatos Sand

This was my whole, and very clear quote. If you took that from it, you didn't read it very well:

No, they will only be "locked in the car" within the structures and confines of the English language; that will not be their actual physical state. And they won't even be actually "locked in the car" within those structures and confines, as that phrase will not accurately represent the time they are locked in the car, nor will it represent how much they are actually locked in the car.

Agreed. It it's not a fact, it is a personal judgement which of course could be incorrect.

To analyze the problem one must not be too quick to jump to a conclusion before uttering the statement, but instead has to analyze all possibilities that could make the statement a judgement call rather than a fact.

Reply to Banno

Glad that you brought up modalities. Not that it explains what a fact is, but rather enhances its ontological footprint.

All I did was look at one side of the conjunction. Here's the other side:
And they won't even be actually "locked in the car" within those structures and confines, as that phrase will not accurately represent the time they are locked in the car, nor will it represent how much they are actually locked in the car.

It would be simple to add a time - "the keys are locked in the car now". I'm not at all sure what it would mean to add degrees of locked-ness....

Reply to Banno

And you failed to address or represent what that side of the conjunction said. And thanks for supporting and confirming what I said about the inadequacy of your posited phrase, since the word "now" would not sufficiently represent the time they are locked either. As you well know, or should know, "now" can denote that very second or any length of time the speaker saw as "now" when he uttered or wrote the phrase.

Reply to Thanatos Sand What we have here is a failure to engage.

If you lock your keys in the car, don't ask for my help.

Reply to Rich But suppose you examine the situation and make the personal judgement that the keys are indeed locked in the car?

Yes, and the failure to engage is yours. I won't even bother to help your critical "thinking" and language "skills."

And as with the other thread, I won't bother to read or respond to any more of your posts.

Reply to Banno

That's fine. I've made judgements such as this. It's a belief I might have and it may even be practical to say is locked, but as with all such observations, the situation is fluid and any number of different events may change my mind about the situation.

Reply to Rich Sounds eminently sensible. So would you continue by working from the supposition that the keys are locked in the car, perhaps seeking another way to unlock the car? Of course.

That is, you would act as if, that the keys are locked in the car were indeed a fact.

Reply to Banno Any number of enumerable events may transpire that may further confirm my judgement or convince me otherwise. As with all beliefs, the situation always remains fluid. One can operate under these conditions, and that is what people do. They form judgements and then take actions or events transpire that confirm it deny.

Reply to Question While we ought keep modality in mind, it is a small thing at this stage of the discussion. There's indexicals and quantification to deal with, too.

Reply to Rich Agreed. Beliefs are best kept in a state of flux. Well, most of them, anyway.

Do we conclude that there are no such things as facts?

Reply to Rich That might sound as if I am being tricksy.

What I am wondering is, if you believe that the keys are in car, then don;t you also believe that it is true that the keys are in the car; and hence, that it is a fact that the keys are in the car?

That is, we haven't entirely thrown facts away, at least not yet.

Quoting Banno

How a fact is presented is dependent on the social context; that does not mean that all facts are dependent on a social context.

That the keys are in the car can be represented in English, French, Arabic... or sign language, if you like.

But that the keys are in the car will be true regardless of how it is represented.

Reply to Banno Personally, I don't think in terms of facts. What is happening is that I observe the keys, I check the doors, I wonder how the keys can be in the car and the doors unable to open and then then start figuring out what to do next based upon my judgement of what is transpiring. It is a very
fluid situation as I work on the problem. Beliefs well change as more observations and judgements are made by me or someone else.

I might also add, there is a also a semantic issue here. For example, I may think that the doors are locked, but exactly at what point? Suppose I try the door, it is stuck, I believe it is locked, I try again and it opens. Defining situations via symbolic language is very tricky.

If the keys are locked in the car, they will be locked in the car regardless of how you present or represent them.

Is a deduction not a fact.

Reply to Rich Sure. Talking in terms of facts is something that philosophers do, not mechanics. But are we going to say that there are no facts?

What I am suggesting is that if you believe something, then you believe that that something is true.

And if you believe that it is true, then you believe that it is a fact.

If you like, I'm trying to wheedle out the connections between belief, truth and facts.

Isn't it sometimes the case, as I think you are suggesting, that we change our beliefs because we find them incompatible with the facts?

Reply to Cavacava You think?

Seems to me that if someone were to come along and claim that the keys were not locked in the car, when they clearly are, that they have either misunderstood, or they are wrong.


Edit: I may be misunderstanding you. Are you saying that, that the keys are locked in the car is a deduction, not a fact?

Or are you saying that "If the keys are locked in the car, they will be locked in the car regardless of how you present or represent them" is a deduction, not a fact?

Reply to Banno I personally don't believe there are facts for one fundamental reason, that is a fact represents some immobility in a universe which I believe is in a constant state of flux. In other words duration annihilates facts. I could imagine this as a piece of clay that when molded changes everywhere at once.

When testing this belief, it seems to hold. When presented with a problem, it appears that I cannot find the immobile fact. Everything is too fleeting and too fluid. Of course, this all may change because every idea I ever have is always changing as I learn more.

I might add that I find no downside to not believing in facts other than accepting the fluidity of life. New beliefs will modify old beliefs in radical or subtle ways.

The trite reply would be to point out that it seems you think it a fact that there are no facts.

But it might be better to say that there is a remarkable degree of coherence and consistency in the world. Enough, at the least, for this conversation to be taking place.

I think that you and I agree about more than we disagree. We agree that this conversation is in English, with all that is entailed therein; that we are on a philosophy forum, that what you are typing is pretty much what I get to read, and so on.

When I give consideration to the issue, it seems incontrovertible that coherence vastly outweighs chaos.

Reply to Rich

No one ever meant that seeing a star amounted to your eye actually touching the star, so he's setting up a ridiculous straw man.

Quoting Thanatos Sand

A primary, fundamentally existent material reality Is not a "brute-fact," as a brute-fact is something that cannot be explained and a primary, fundamentally existent material reality can be explained. Michael doesnt' know what "brute-fact" means.

Then explain why there is the metaphysically-primary, fundamentally existent material reality that you (or at least some people) believe in.
.
Michael Ossipoff

You just supported its existence by writing on it and successfully communicating on it to me. Thanks.

Quoting Rich

I personally don't believe there are facts for one fundamental reason, that is a fact represents some immobility in a universe which I believe is in a constant state of flux. In other words duration annihilates facts. I could imagine this as a piece of clay that when molded changes everywhere at once.

It's well established that the physical world has facts. The physical constants are either constant, or very nearly so. The laws of physics don't seem to be changing either (...and no, the ongoing discovery in physics doesn't mean that the laws are changeng, as physicists find out more about them).

Though changes of various kinds are happening in the universe, there are some constant facts.

In any case, the facts that I was referring to, systems of inter-referring hypothetical facts can't not be.

Some particular, familiar, and quite undeniable physical facts are mathematical theorems and abstract logical facts, such as some of our obvious syllogisms, and truth-tables, etc.

Those are facts, and they're well established to be facts. And the Pythagorean theorem hasn't changed much lately, unless I just haven't heard about it. :)

Those are examples, but possibility-worlds additionally consist of other facts about hypotheticals. ...and facts that, themselves, are hypothetical. ."If there were these physical laws (hypothetical relational facts between hypothetical physical quantities, and if certain quantities had these values, then..."

As I said, the "things" that the facts refer to can be regarded as part of the facts, instead of being separated as separate "things".

As I've been saying, all these mutually inter-referring hypothetical facts referring to hypothetical things don't, and needn't exist in any context other than there reference to eachother.

When you claim they don't exist, you're making an implausible claim that needs explanation and justification.

Anyway, mathematical theorems, and the abstract logical facts that I mentioned are enough to establish that there are abstract facts.

Michael Ossipoff

Reply to Banno The second interpretation.

"If the keys are locked in the car, they will be locked in the car regardless of how you present or represent them"

has an If-then, inferential form. The fact is "...the keys are locked in the car..." the rest is deduced

Quoting Michael Ossipoff

It's well established that the physical world has facts.

I guess this is what is being discussed. Notice the OP with "facts" in quotes.

So, in my opinion, and in cohort with the pragmatists, it seems that facts are the physical laws and mathematical truths that govern the world at play.

Again, if a tree falls in a forest and nobody is there to witness it, it still falls.

Again, if a tree falls in a forest and nobody is there to witness it, it still falls.

Reply to Question The tree physically moves in that way "it falls" aims to represent, but the action itself is not fully represented by the phrase "it falls;" "it falls" only fully represents the symbols of the English language working to point to other symbols in the English language to best represent the action of the tree.

Quoting Thanatos Sand

The tree physically moves in that way "it falls" aims to represent, but the action itself is not fully represented by the phrase "it falls;" "it falls" only fully represents the symbols of the English language working to point to other symbols in the English language to best represent the action of the tree.

Semantics. It falls just means that it falls. What else can be said?

Reply to Question

The tree physically moves in that way "it falls" aims to represent, but the action itself is not fully represented by the phrase "it falls;" "it falls" only fully represents the symbols of the English language working to point to other symbols in the English language to best represent the action of the tree.
— Thanatos Sand

Semantics. It falls just means that it falls. What else can be said?

No, that's not semantics; it's linguistic reality. I'm sorry you can't get that.

It's also physical reality since "it falls" doesn't come close to fully representing the action that occurs.

Quoting Thanatos Sand

No, that's not semantics; it's linguistic reality. I'm sorry you can't get that.

Then,

Quoting Thanatos Sand

It's also physical reality since "it falls" doesn't come close to even representing the action that occurs.

How is something a linguistic reality and then becomes a physical reality? If we assume that linguistic reality accurately depicts physical reality (for which there are no grounds to even doubt that fact), then there's nothing more that can be said about the tree falling.

How is something a linguistic reality and then becomes a physical reality? If we assume that linguistic reality accurately depicts physical reality (for which there are no grounds to even doubt that fact), then there's nothing more that can be said about the tree falling.

I hope you're being coy. Everything is part of physical reality, but some things are part of certain areas of physical reality, like linguistic reality as I showed in my original post. I can't believe I had to explain that to you. My second statement mentioned physical reality since it wasn't primarily a matter of linguistic dynamics but the physical reality that the phrase "it falls" does not fully capture the physical dynamics of the tree falling.

Quoting Terrapin Station

In other words, Physicalism's unsupported assumption is an assumption within Physicalism, rather than an external assumption about Physicalism, like an assumption that Physicalism is correct.

Skepticism doesn't share that un-parsimony,,,doesn't make an internal unsupported assumption.. — Michael Ossipoff


What in the world do "internal" and "external" refer to there exactly?

It's really not difficult, Terrapin:

There can be an assumption that one metaphysics true instead of another one.

Let's call that an assumption about metaphysicses--in particular, about which metaphysics is the correct one. It's an assumption that's external to the particular metaphysicses.

There could be an an assumption that a metaphysics depends on. Such an assumption could be said to be internal to that metaphysics. It's part of that metaphysics.

These are two entirely different kinds of assumptions.

Physicalism assumes that there's a physical world that isindependely existent, metaphysically-primary, and is the funamental-existent.

That's an assumption. Here's a homework problem: Which of those two kinds of assumption is it?

Alright, i'll give you the answer:

It's an assumption that's internal to a metaphysics, part of a metaphysics. It's an assumption that a metaphysics depends on.

Now, you've said that I assume that the metaphysics that i call Skepticism is true.

Actuallly, i don't ask any one to assume that.

In any case, it's an assumption that's external to the metaphysicses. ..an assumption that one metaphysics is correct instead of another.

I'm not saying that you should assume that metaphysics is correct.

I'm merely pointing out that Skepticism doesn't need, depend on, or make any assumptions.

If someone wants go assume that Skepticism is true, that's something else. I'm not suggesting that you assume that Skepticism is true.

But I suggest that a metaphysics that depends on an assumption, a metaphysics that posits a brute-fact, thereby incurs a distinct demerit, for the purpose of comparing it with a metaphysics that doesn't need, depend on or make any assumptions, or posit any brute facts.

Oh, and how about you explain why there's an independently-existent, fundamentally-exixtent, metaphysicall-primary physical world.

Michael Ossipoff

Quoting Thanatos Sand

the physical reality that the phrase "it falls" does not fully capture the physical dynamics of the tree falling.

The last line of the Tractatus is: “Whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be silent.”

If the issue is with representing the fact that the tree fell linguistically, then its representation will be fully elucidated by the observation that it fell.

Then you should be silent as you've shown a clear incapability of discussing the matter. And if you think observation fully elucidates representation, you should remain silent on those matters, too.

Quoting Thanatos Sand

Then you should be silent as you've shown a clear incapability of discussing the matter. And if you think observation fully elucidates representation, you should remain silent on those matters, too.

Yeah, but you haven't demonstrated that the representation of a tree falling by, 'it fell' or 'it has fallen', as incomplete. If it is, then you can always say more about the manner in which it fell.

Quoting Question

So, in my opinion, and in cohort with the pragmatists, it seems that facts are the physical laws and mathematical truths that govern the world at play.

Again, if a tree falls in a forest and nobody is there to witness it, it still falls.

I don't believe in supernatural forces that govern things and create truths such as a God, gods, or Laws of Nature.

However, there are scientific descriptions in the form of mathematical equations, that are useful for practical purposes. Quantum physics only describes quantum states of systems per the Schrodinger equation. There is nothing else there other than quantum states that continuously change over time. Descriptions and deductions about the tree in question are products of the human mind not any scientific theory. Concepts such as tree and falling do not appear in the quantum equations.

Reply to Question Actually, I did in my first post, and you just confirmed I was right by showing that another English phrase ("it has fallen") could represent the action, meaning "it fell" doesn't succeed in fully representing it. And there are thousands more such phrases in English that could partially represent the action but fail to fully represent it as my first post and your last posts have just shown.

So, thanks for the help and we're done. I'm aware you're mostly trolling, so I will move on to other conversations.

Terrapin:

Actually, what you said was:

That there's no "stuff" isn't any better-supported, haha

No, and I've made no claim to prove that there isn't "stuff", or that Physicalism isn't true. As I've often repeated, I doubt that any metaphysics can be proved.

It's just that I don't assume that there are such things a phlogiston or "stuff", and Skepticism needs no such assumption.

It's a question of whether a metaphysics depends on an assumption.

And no, neither do I advocate an assumption that thereisn't stuff.

The point is, that Skepticism doens't need to assume anything. Skepticism doesn't need any assumption, to explain our lives, the physical world, and the results of physics experiments and observations.

Physicalism posits an independently-existing, fundamentally-existent, metaphysically-primary physical world.

I've asked you to explain why there is one.

Michael Ossipoff

Quoting Thanatos Sand

Actually, I did in my first post, and you just confirmed I was right by showing that another English phrase ("it has fallen") could represent the action, meaning "it fell" doesn't succeed in fully representing it. And there are thousands more such phrases in English that could partially represent the action but fail to fully represent it as my first post and your last posts have just shown.

Well, if your purpose here is to prove that you're 'right', then you're in the wrong forum.

You have no ground to say that 'it fell' doesn't succeed in fully representing the fact that the tree has fallen. Besides, what does it even mean to say that something has been 'fully represented'? As if there were some measure or standard one could apply to the fact that it fell. No true Scotsman fallacy?

I mean, even if we assume that every object is a sort of noumena, then again nothing can be really said that would fully encapsulate the properties and characteristics of an object in discussion.

Quoting Question

Again, if a tree falls in a forest and nobody is there to witness it, it still falls.

As @Cavacava pointed out, this is just a trivial deduction, and doesn't address the issue at hand. The question is whether or not the antecedent can obtain ("a tree falls in a forest and nobody is there to witness it"), not whether or not the antecedent entails the consequent.

Quoting Michael

The question is whether or not the antecedent can obtain ("a tree falls in a forest and nobody is there to witness it"), not whether or not the antecedent entails the consequent.

Can you expand on that? I don't think I entirely see your position.

Quoting Question

Can you expand on that? I don't think I entirely see your position.

The question is "can a tree fall in a forest without witnesses?", not "if a tree falls in a forest without witnesses, does it fall?" The latter is just a logical matter, not a factual matter. Compare with "can pigs fly?" and "if a pig is flying, is it a pig?"

Terrapin:

Or, if it would be more helpful, I'll put it this way:

First, let me abbreviate "our lives, the physical world, or the observations and experimental-results of physicists" as "the physical observations".

Skepticism doesn't depend on the nonexistence of "stuff" or the falsity of Physicalism to explain the physical observations.

There could be "stuff", and Physicalism could be true, and consistent with the physical observations.

So the nonexistence of stuff isn't needed to explain the physical observations, and therefore, Skepticism doesn't need or use it to explain the physical observations. That's why Skepticism doesn't mention "stuff" at all.

Likewise, Skepticism doesn't need an assumption about the nonexistence of a stawberry-jam core in the center of the planet Jupiter, to explain the physical observations. That's why Skepticism doesn't mention that either.

But Physicalism's explanation of the physical observations posits a brute-fact: An independently-existent, fundamentally-existent, metaphysically-primary physical world. ...Often expressed as the brute-fact that reality consists of the physical world.

Michael Ossipoff

Quoting Michael

The question is "can a tree fall in a forest without witnesses?", not "if a tree falls in a forest without witnesses, does it fall?" The latter is just a logical matter, not a factual matter.

I tend to think that there can be no facts without deduction of some sort. This is independent of proper names and direct referants/rigid designators.

So, if you ask me, any observer-independent claim is a form of deduction based on facts about the world, in this case, the tree falling.

Quoting Question

So, if you ask me, any observer-independent claim is a form of deduction based on facts about the world, in this case, the tree falling.

But the claim is that the fact that the tree fell is a fact that depends on there being a witness. So the antecedent in your statement ("if a tree falls in a forest and nobody is there to witness it") can never obtain. That this antecedent entails the consequent is irrelevant.

Quoting Michael

But the claim is that the fact that the tree fell is a fact that depends on there being a witness. So the antecedent in your statement ("if a tree falls in a forest and nobody is there to witness it") can never obtain. That this antecedent entails the consequent is irrelevant.

Ok, I understand. Thanks for clarifying.

Thanatos:

You said:

You just supported its existence by writing on it and successfully communicating on it to me. Thanks

1. So, if someone says that there are purple unicorns in Cleveland, Ohio, and I ask them for verification of that claim, then the fact that I thereby "wrote on it" and "successfully communicated about it", i have thereby supported the claim that there are purple unicorns in Cleveland Ohio? :D

2. Thanatos has shown himself to be long on assertions and short on justification of them. In this instance, he isn't being very clear with us about what he's trying to say.

Shall I guess what he means? Alight, I'll guess that he's saying that the mere fact that I request that explanation proves that there's a physical world--because if there weren't a physical world, than there wouldn't be any people to have that conversation.

2a) I never said that there isn't a physical world. In fact, I've repeatedly said that it's reasonable to agree that the physical world is "actual", because it's real in the context of our llives. Metaphysicses disagree on the origin and behind-the-scenes nature of the physical world.

2b). I didn't ask you to verify anything. I asked you toexplain why there is an independently-existing, fundamentally-existent, metaphysically-primary physical world. ...or why reality consists of this physical world.

So:

Is it that we're confused about the difference between "explain" and "verify",

...or is it that we're trying to evade, in order to avoid admitting that we can't explain why there's an independtly-existing, fundamentally-existent, metaphysically-primary physical world, or why reality consists of a this physical world?

Michael Ossipoff

Thanatos:

You said:

You just supported its existence by writing on it and successfully communicating on it to me. Thanks

1. So, if someone says that there are purple unicorns in Cleveland, Ohio, and I ask them for verification of that claim, then the fact that I thereby "wrote on it" and "successfully communicated about it", i have thereby supported the claim that there are purple unicorns in Cleveland Ohio? :D]

The fact you even ask this is very sad. We were discussing material reality, not unicorns. So, you're writing on material reality that was conveyed to me in material reality supported the existence of material reality. So, your sad "unicorn" parallel is irrelevant and fails.

2. Thanatos has shown himself to be long on assertions and short on justification of them. In this instance, he isn't being very clear with us about what he's trying to say.

No, the one who has shown himself to be long on assertions and short on justification of them has clearly been you, and you prove it with this unjustified assertion of yours above.

The rest of your post is rambling, barely coherent nonsense that doesnt' address anything I said. I did see you erroneously accuse me of not explaining what I explained many posts ago. So, your thinking is lagging along with your reading.

Tighten those up and maybe we can have a discussion.

P.S. This is the definition of explain: "make (an idea, situation, or problem) clear to someone by describing it in more detail or revealing relevant facts or ideas:" So, when I pointed out your commitment to material reality by depending on it to send your post, I was revealing relevant facts or ideas about it. You need to work on your vocabulary as well.

Wolfram|Apha: Fact

Quoting Michael Ossipoff

Then explain why there is the metaphysically-primary, fundamentally existent material reality that you (or at least some people) believe in.

What would an explanation look like in this case? More words.

I could throw spit balls at you until you agree that there are indeed spitballs.

Would that help?

Reply to Cavacava Nevertheless, it is correct, no?

Quoting Thanatos Sand

It's also physical reality since "it falls" doesn't come close to fully representing the action that occurs.

Is the argument here that unless a statement fully represents the action that occurs, it is not true?

It's also physical reality since "it falls" doesn't come close to fully representing the action that occurs.
— Thanatos Sand

Is the argument here that unless a statement fully represents the action that occurs, it is not true?

Reply to Banno

My argument in my statement was concise and clear.

Quoting Banno

Is the argument here that unless a statement fully represents the action that occurs, it is not true?

...because if it is, then surely it is misguided. It is true that the kettle is boiling; we don't need to list the physical states of each particle in the kettle and associated system to correctly make that assertion.

There's a knot that philosophers sometimes get tangled in. They set themselves the task of explaining the stuff around them. They notice that both the thing being explained and the explanation or justification is presented in a language.

Through thinking about this, they reach the conclusion that all there is, is language.

Hence, they adopt some form or other of idealism.

Reply to Banno

Is the argument here that unless a statement fully represents the action that occurs, it is not true?
— Banno

...because if it is, then surely it is misguided. It is true that the kettle is boiling; we don't need to list the physical states of each particle in the kettle and associated system to correctly make that assertion.

You're just arguing against yourself here since you're not addressing anything I said.

Quoting Banno

There's a knot that philosophers sometimes get tangled in. They set themselves the task of explaining the stuff around them. They notice that both the thing being explained and the explanation or justification is presented in a language.

Through thinking about this, they reach the conclusion that all there is, is language.

Hence, they adopt some form or other of idealism.

That's a fascinating tale. Unfortunately it doesnt' apply to me or to any of my posts.

Reply to Banno Sure

If the keys are locked in the car, they will be locked in the car regardless of how you present or represent them.

Reply to Cavacava So, I would think that there is something more going on here than just language. If, regardless of how the fact is represented, it remains true, than there is something more to the fact than just representation.

Quoting Thanatos Sand

Unfortunately it doesnt' apply to me or to any of my posts.

Indeed, if it does not you might explain how it does not.

But it seems instead that you expect us to take your writing as "concise and clear", and hence you seek to avoid placing it under any analytic scrutiny.

Should we be scribing your comments in stone? Are you here to discuss, or just to prescribe?

Reply to Banno Do you think that something is in us, language, the world or maybe in the relationship between these?

Reply to Cavacava Meaning is use.

A consequence of that view is that meaning is embedded in what we do.

It is tempting to say that language is both in us and in the world; but even that juxtaposes "us" and "the world" in an erroneous fashion. We are not separate from the world.

Hence, it would be a grievous error to suppose that all there is, is language. It would also be wrong to suppose that all there is, is things.

Reply to Banno

Unfortunately it doesnt' apply to me or to any of my posts.
— Thanatos Sand

Indeed, if it does not you might explain how it does not.

But it seems instead that you expect us to take your writing as "concise and clear", and hence you seek to avoid placing it under any analytic scrutiny.

I'm sorry, if you feel your tale applies to my posts, it is your responsibility to show how, not mine to pre-emptively show it does not. You have yet to do so.

And my correct statement that my argument in my previous statement was concise and clear does not prevent you from placing it under any analytic scrutiny. You have yet to do so; feel free to knock yourself out.

You would do both if you actually wish to discuss and not just prescribe...:)

Reply to Thanatos Sand I wasn't directly addressing you. I just dropped in a comment that came to mind after reading your post.

Quoting Banno

So, I would think that there is something more going on here than just language. If, regardless of how the fact is represented, it remains true, than there is something more to the fact than just representation.

A reasonable hypothesis.

First one has to ask whether a fact had to be represented in some way. Possibly not. Maybe a fact
Is limited to one's own thoughts. This would lead to one branch of analysis.

If facts only exist as representations, the key question to ask is how to freeze reality, so that the fact is remains a fact despite any changes in the ongoing movement of reality.

I have reasons to believe whatever form a so-called fact may take, it cannot be declared such without accepting that information is incomplete and this the fact is subject to change depending upon a given observer's perspective.

From the OP:
Quoting Question

When we assume that facts exist, we are implicitly committing ourselves to a form of nominalism as opposed to viewing things as mutually dependent and holistic. When we assert the ontology of the universe as facts and not things, we seem to be saying that objects are nominalist, but, as opposed to what?

Would that we could avoid "...isms"; it's not clear what sort of nominalism Q. meant.

I don't think that Q's conclusion follows. As I mentioned before, Wittgenstein is setting out that the primary metaphysical consideration is not things, but predications to things. Now predicates include relations between things. It's not obvious that this is a rejection of holism.

Indeed it is arguable that the conclusion of the Tractatus is holistic.

Quoting Rich

First one has to ask whether a fact had to be represented in some way.

Excuse me for breaking this reply into seperate bits.

I have no objection to there being unrepresented facts. All that would mean is that there are things we do not know, and that seems obvious.

But don't ask for proof.

Quoting Rich

If facts only exist as representations, the key question to ask is how to freeze reality, so that the fact is remains a fact despite any changes in the ongoing movement of reality.

So facts do not exist only as representations. Hence it is not necessary to "freeze the world".

But I'm puzzled that freezing the world would be considered an issue. What more would be involved than adding indexicals? "The kettle was boiling at 11:15pm on my stove".

Quoting Banno

I have no objection to there being unrepresented facts.

In light of current understanding of the universe as a quantum state (admittedly a gigantic one, but nothing more) what type of facts would you find embedded in the universe? It's just a constantly changing state.

Quoting Rich

I have reasons to believe whatever form a so-called fact may take, it cannot be declared such without accepting that information is incomplete and this the fact is subject to change depending upon a given observer's perspective.

Hm. This is more difficult.

I submit that some things must be taken as undoubted in order for discussion to take place.

Roughly, on can doubt anything, but not everything.

Quoting Banno

"The kettle was boiling at 11:15pm on my stove".

I would call this an observation by you. Since it is passed there is no way for any verification of time or temperature. I would think that facts have to have persistency so that a consensus can develop. Without verification then one would have to claim infallibility.

Reply to Rich I think it a fact that you are writing to me in English.

Reply to Rich Then we are using "fact" in different ways.

Quoting Rich

Without verification then one would have to claim infallibility.

I don't see why.

Quoting Banno

Hm. This is more difficult.

I submit that some things must be taken as undoubted in order for discussion to take place.

Roughly, on can doubt anything, but not everything.

Ok. I think we have reached the crux of the issue. At this point, only further contemplation of the issue by you and me will lead us to a different understanding than the ones we currently hold. Suffice to say we understand each other's current understanding of the issues.

Quoting Banno

?Rich Then we are using "fact" in different ways.

Without verification then one would have to claim infallibility.
— Rich

I don't see why.

As understand it, it i is your position that it is enough for an observation to be called a fact if the observer felt all of the facts were true as represented. No verification or consensus of any sort is required. In such a case, a fact would be totally dependent upon how the observer represented it.

Reply to Banno

Meaning is use.

A consequence of that view is that meaning is embedded in what we do.

It is tempting to say that language is both in us and in the world; but even that juxtaposes "us" and "the world" in an erroneous fashion. We are not separate from the world.

Hence, it would be a grievous error to suppose that all there is, is language. It would also be wrong to suppose that all there is, is things.

You're boobing and weaving here, "the something more going on here" is a claim which based on a deduction, and is not intrinsic to the situation of locking your keys in the car. The validity of your claim would be impossible with out a plurality of observes who can potential verify it.

Reply to Cavacava And yet the keys are still in the car.

There is more going on here than "The keys are in the car".

Quoting Rich

it i is your position that it is enough for an observation to be called a fact if the observer felt all of the facts were true as represented.

No, but this will take a longer post and I am off to lunch.

It is enough for an observation to be called a fact if it is true.

It is enough for an observation to be believed if... well, that depends.

Quoting Banno

No, but this will take a longer post and I am off to lunch.

It is enough for an observation to be called a fact if it is true.

It is enough for an observation to be believed if... well, that depends.

I think we have reached the end of our discussion. Nice conversing with you. Enjoy your lunch!

Quoting Banno

There's a knot that philosophers sometimes get tangled in. They set themselves the task of explaining the stuff around them. They notice that both the thing being explained and the explanation or justification is presented in a language.

Through thinking about this, they reach the conclusion that all there is, is language.

Hence, they adopt some form or other of idealism.

Have you looked into enactivism? It's an interesting theory that seems to bridge realism and idealism. It suggests that a statement like "the keys are in the car" (which we can see to be true) doesn't refer to the environment sans-observer, but to an observer-environment interaction. It accepts that there is an environment that is separate from us (or, if you prefer, that there are parts of the environment that are separate from us), but that perception is an interaction with the environment, and not simply information about that environment being presented to us.

Reply to Banno

St. Paul said

For now we see only a reflection as in a mirror; then we shall see face to face. Now I know in part; then I shall know fully, even as I am fully known.

There is a difference between knowing something deductively and actually viewing the keys in the ignition.

Quoting Michael

that perception is an interaction with the environment, and not simply information about that environment being presented to us.

If one envisions the human brain as actively evolved in the process of perception, i.e. as the source of a reconstructive wave, and the environment as holographic in nature, them the whole process of perception becomes an interactive, holographic process.

This is a completely new way of envisioning perception, but it does eliminate all of the subject/object problems and explaining how images in the environment emerge from a brain. There image is actually "out there" and we perceive it out there, not in here.

This is all as Bergson described it, pre-holographic discovery. This is not enactivism though though somewhat akin.

Suppose you did an experiment in which people answered questions about the colors they see. You'll probably find there are differences among your subjects, and you could say color is observer-dependent in that sense.

Now do an experiment where you put some keys in a box and ask your subjects if the keys are in the box. Let's imagine they all assent. Then we describe keys being in boxes as not observer-dependent.

But wait -- what about non-human observers? Don't know how to test them, so we'll be content to say the result only applies to human observers -- if you're human, we predict you'll agree the keys are in the box.

What about when there's no observer at all? Tricky to test, but maybe we can at least form an hypothesis: if it doesn't matter which human makes the observation, then it doesn't matter whether any human actually does. We might feel bad about forming an hypothesis that's unfalsifiable, but then all hypotheses that exclude observation probably are. At least this one feels like a natural inductive step from our observations.

Quoting Banno

Would that we could avoid "...isms"; it's not clear what sort of nominalism Q. meant.

I don't think that Q's conclusion follows. As I mentioned before, Wittgenstein is setting out that the primary metaphysical consideration is not things, but predications to things. Now predicates include relations between things. It's not obvious that this is a rejection of holism.

Indeed it is arguable that the conclusion of the Tractatus is holistic.

What makes you say that the conclusion in the Tractatus is holistic?

The nominalism in the Tractatus seems to be with the subject who observes the world, not objects themselves per se, which I incorrectly stated in the OP...

A la, the picture theory and the resulting picture one perceives is entirely dependant on the observer's relation to the object's of interest.

I would call this sort of subject based nominalism as a sort of psychological nominalism which Wittgenstein greatly elaborates in the Investigations. E.g family resemblances, language games, the beetle in a box, meaning as use.

Quoting Srap Tasmaner

What about when there's no observer at all? Tricky to test, but maybe we can at least form an hypothesis: if it doesn't matter which human makes the observation, then it doesn't matter whether any human actually does.

Yes, one can embrace this belief, but it is only that. How a real external quantum state is transformed interested a "thing" is unknown. I would postulate, that the mind with the brain creates a a reconstructive beam which manifests the thing in holographic form. Without the reconstructive beam it is just a entangled quantum state.

A quote in support of what I have mentioned in my previous two posts could be;

If a lion could speak, we could not understand him. (PI, p.223)

Reply to Michael Interesting. No, i had not seen it before.

Reply to Cavacava I don't see that what you said differed from what I said.

Quoting Question

What makes you say that the conclusion in the Tractatus is holistic?

Arguably...

He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright.

To understand the Tractatus is to transcend the text, to see the whole picture.

Nominalism has many meanings.

The core is that something is no more than a name; that it has no independent existence.

To use the term effectively we need to be clear about what the something is.

To me it is not clear wha the something is in the nominalism of the OP.

Reply to Srap TasmanerYep.

I would add that if you put the key in the box, wait a bit, and then open the box to find the keys still there, then it seems to me unreasonable to suppose that, while you waited and the keys were unobserved, the keys were not in the box.

It seems equally unreasonable for one to say that, because we could not see them directly, we do not know that the keys are in the box.

This goes back to Rich's thinking that the world is in a state of constant change; while I agree that the world indeed is in a state of flux, the changes are not so great that we cannot know anything.

Quoting Banno

To understand the Tractatus is to transcend the text, to see the whole picture.

I strongly doubt that even the early Wittgenstein thought there was one whole entire picture of the universe or reality. Again, each and every picture is subject dependent.

Reply to Question Perhaps.

Can you explain what it is you think Wittgenstein thinks is only names?

Reply to Rich
I would say one difference between my hypothesis and yours is that mine is motivated. I don't have a definition of "motivated" handy, but at least the conditional I've tacked on repeats a claim I've established by induction.

My conditional has a contrapositive, the conclusion of which I believe has been shown to be false: if it matters whether a human makes the observation, then it matters which human. Now that could still be false, if its antecedent is true. I can't test that. But at least I'm still talking about the same thing as when I was showing inductively that for some things, it doesn't matter who makes the observation.

And I think we want to keep the distinction between observations that depend on the observer in a way we can understand (can find mechanisms to explain) and observations that don't seem to be observer-sensitive.

Quoting Srap Tasmaner

My conditional has a contrapositive, the conclusion of which I believe has been shown to be false: if it matters whether a human makes the observation, then it matters which human.

Yes. There are similarities and differences, so a hypothesis has to be developed to account for both.

Seems like we could discuss ...

• the Moon
• perception of the Moon
• linguistic practices of Moon discussion

They're not the same, so shouldn't we keep them as such?

Reply to jorndoe It's impossible to discuss the moon without discussing both our perception and the linguistic dynamics of our perceptions and representation of the moon. There may be an object preceding those things, but it's impossible for us to access that except through our perception and language, which are greatly linked.

Quoting jorndoe

• the Moon
• perception of the Moon
• linguistic practices of Moon discussion

They're not the same, so shouldn't we keep them as such?

They all seem to be entangled in some way, which would be the basis of subjectivity and why each one of us view and label things in our own way but at the same time are able to reach consensus on some matters.

Quoting Thanatos Sand

It's impossible to discuss the moon without discussing both our perception and the linguistic dynamics of our perceptions and representation of the moon. There may be an object preceding those things, but it's impossible for us to access that except through our perception and language, which are greatly linked.

Let me try to misquote you for the occasion:

It's impossible to discuss jorndoe without discussing both Thanatos Sand's perception and the linguistic dynamics of Thanatos Sand's perceptions and representation of jorndoe. There may be a jorndoe preceding those things, but it's impossible for Thanatos Sand to access that except through Thanatos Sand's perception and language, which are greatly linked.

If anything significant differentiates fictions/fantasies/hallucinations/dreams (which do exist) and perception, then it must be the perceived (the Moon, jorndoe).
Hopefully you wouldn't (rudely) suggest that I'm not self-aware because you cannot experience my self-awareness? :)

Reply to jorndoe

I cannot discuss you without utilizing my perceptions of you. We both use the name jorndoe because we agreed to it.

If course, you can mediate or be aware of about yourself without me, but that is not a discussion.

Reply to jorndoe

It's impossible to discuss the moon without discussing both our perception and the linguistic dynamics of our perceptions and representation of the moon. There may be an object preceding those things, but it's impossible for us to access that except through our perception and language, which are greatly linked.
— Thanatos Sand

Let me try to misquote you for the occasion:

It's impossible to discuss jorndoe without discussing both Thanatos Sand's perception and the linguistic dynamics of Thanatos Sand's perceptions and representation of jorndoe. There may be a jorndoe preceding those things, but it's impossible for Thanatos Sand to access that except through Thanatos Sand's perception and language, which are greatly linked.

If anything significant differentiates fictions/fantasies/hallucinations/dreams (which do exist) and perception, then it must be the perceived (the Moon, jorndoe).
Hopefully you wouldn't (rudely) suggest that I'm not self-aware because you cannot experience my self-awareness? :)

You didn't just misquote me, you completely misrepresented what I said. And I never suggested what you said I did. Instead of "misquoting" and strawmanning me, try to address my actual post. That works much better for discussion.

Quoting Rich

I cannot discuss you without utilizing my perceptions of you.

Right. What other than perception would you suggest?

Quoting Banno

Can you explain what it is you think Wittgenstein thinks is only names?

I think everything with an ostensive definition. Are there things without ostensive definitions? Yes, but nominalism applies to them also in terms of reducing their abstractness. I'd imagine that would be something Witty would agree with.

Edit: Although, I have read some more about the mystic Wittgenstein. He seemed to assume that there are facts and things that have a property of abstractness that cannot be found in the world. Namely, ethics, aesthetics, and the similar; but, this seems to talk about epiphenomena and not phenomena per se. Emergent properties of a system are thus mystical, at least that's my take from reading Wittgenstein.

Quoting Question

Although, I have read some more about the mystic Wittgenstein. He seemed to assume that there are facts and things that have a property of abstractness that cannot be found in the world. Namely, ethics, aesthetics, and the similar; but, this seems to talk about epiphenomena and not phenomena per se.

It's because they're all discursive. They may arise from and deal with material realities, but the discourses have no immediate correspondents in material realities, only in discourses themselves. It's why Wittgenstein's Language Games work so well with analyzing and evaluating ethical and aesthetic discourses. It's also why Lyotard relied on them to argue why they're being forced to congeal into Meta-narratives is artificial.

Reply to Question It seems odd to suppose that ostensive definitions lead to nominalism.


"That thing over there is nothing but a name..."

Is the OP asking only for exegesis on the early Witti? Because his treatment of ostension became quite different, and pivotal, as he grew up.

Quoting Banno

Is the OP asking only for exegesis on the early Witti? Because his treatment of ostension became quite different, and pivotal, as he grew up.

Yes, that is of interest to me. If you care to elaborate I would appreciate that.

Reply to Question Sam26 would be a better guide.

Quoting jorndoe

Seems like we could discuss ...

• the Moon
• perception of the Moon
• linguistic practices of Moon discussion

They're not the same, so shouldn't we keep them as such?

Harry Potter and "Harry Potter" are not the same. A painting of an angel isn't a painting of paint. There's clearly a semantic or intentional difference between these things. But we can't then infer an ontological difference. That would be a non sequitur.

Within the narrative of the story, Harry Potter is a wizard. Within the "narrative" of the painting, the angel is a winged man. But from an outside analysis of the story and the painting, Harry Potter is a fictional character and the angel is a mixture of paint.

Idealists and other anti-realists take this approach to everyday life. Within the "narrative" of our ordinary experiences and descriptions, the things we see are separate entities, distinct from sense-data and language, but from an outside analysis of these things, they're not.

Arguments like yours against this are akin to saying that the angel isn't just a mixture of paint because there's a difference between a painting of an angel and a painting of paint. It conflates the in-narrative account of the painting with the outside analysis.

Realism, by its very account, can't argue itself to be the case simply by pushing semantics.

Reply to Michael Sure. Think I said something similar to:

Quoting Michael

Realism, by its very account, can't argue itself to be the case simply by pushing semantics.

But what's to argue? If you do not understand that "the cat is on the mat" is about the relation between the cat and the mat, you haven't understood quite a bit. In restricting themselves only to "cat" and "mat" the antirealist is in danger of missing the rather vital bit; it's about cats and mats.

The rubber is not on the road; the gears are spinning but the clutch is on; idealists see the rabbit, but not the duck.

Quoting Banno

If you do not understand that "the cat is on the mat" is about the relation between the cat and the mat, you haven't understood quite a bit. In restricting themselves only to "cat" and "mat" the antirealist is in danger of missing the rather vital bit; it's about cats and mats.

What the statement is about isn't what matters. The Harry Potter story is about going to a school for wizards, and the painting is about an angel visiting Joseph. But we're not concerned with intentionality; we're concerned with ontology. Is the angel in the painting more than just a mixture of paint? Is the wizard in the story more than just a fictional character? Is the cat that I see more than just a collection of sense-data? Is the Standard Model more than just an instrumental tool?

Quoting Michael

Is the angel in the painting more than just a mixture of paint? Is the wizard in the story more than just a fictional character? Is the cat that I see more than just a collection of sense-data? Is the Standard Model more than just an instrumental tool?

Is the rabbit more than just a rabbit?

It depends on what one is doing.

I'd said:

Then explain why there is the metaphysically-primary, fundamentally existent material reality that you (or at least some people) believe in. — Michael Ossipoff

What would an explanation look like in this case? More words.

Translation: "I can't explain why there is the metaphysically-promary, fundamentally-existent material reality that I believe in."

Yes, explanations typically use words.

So yes, Physicalism has a brute-fact. ...is based on and dependent on a brute-fact.

Skepticism makes no assumptions and doesn't posit a brute-fact.

I could throw spit balls at you until you agree that there are indeed spitballs.

Would that help?

It would certainly support your claim about as well as you're supporting it now.

Michael Ossipoff

Banno's "spitball" analogy suggests that he's confused about the difference between verification and explanation.

Michael Ossipoff

Reply to Michael Ossipoff I didn't name-call. I said you posted blather, which isn't calling you a name. And you are the one who wasn't specific at all. So, you're just being hypocritical. And you're particularly hypocritical here where you become the only one name-calling here, calling me two names.:

"Thanatos" 's wasn't discussing philosophy. His conduct in this instance is just that of the ordinary usual internet-abuser and flamewarrior, sadly ubiquitous on the Internet.

Michael Ossipoff

And you're the one who was unable to name where I made mis-statements and errors and then show how. You accused me of having made a "brute-fact," and I asked you to show how and you continually failed to do so, as I pointed out to you:

Nothing you say in your "counter" to my quote above it counters or even effectively addresses what I said at all. I never made a physicalist belief; I just correctly said our facts are our reflections of the material reality of the universe; I never said they weren't part of our reality as well.

And the only big, blatant brute-fact is your statement calling my statement one, as my statements can and have been explained, and you don't explain or support yours at all. And your referring to your outside in-supported topic with the interesting name does not suffice or stand as explanation or support.

And then you again failed to support your claim, as I requested, that my statement was a "brute-fact," instead providing a tautology not backing your claim at all.

A primary, fundamentally-existent material reality is a brute-fact. Physicalism and "Naturalism" need to posit that brute-fact. That's what makes it unparsimonious...not the fact that someone assumes that Physicalism is correct.

And I made specifically clear, as you wrongly claimed I didn't, how that was wrong:

A primary, fundamentally existent material reality Is not a "brute-fact," as a brute-fact is something that cannot be explained and a primary, fundamentally existent material reality can be explained. Michael doesnt' know what "brute-fact" means.

So, the only one who has been doing philosophy in this exchange has been me, and the only one name-calling has been you. Very ironic.

Reply to Michael

I think the issue gets resolved when we make the claim that something just is the same thing as it is. Tarskian semantics also does help. The liar just is lying.

Here is a proposition in support of my assumption that the Tractatus professes a nominalist tone.

2.0.2.4. The substance is what subsists independently of what is the case.

What is the case are state of affairs. State of affairs is constituted by the substance and properties of objects.

Then Wittgenstein proposes:

2.0.2.7. Objects, the unalterable, and the subsistent are one and the same.

Now, this seems to smell of monism or the logical atomistic theory made by the logical positivists.

Further;

2.0.2.7.1. Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their configuration is what is changing and unstable.

Reinforcing the logical atomism and monism in the Tractatus.

Then confusingly he states;

2.0.6.1. States of affairs are independent of one another.

This isn't confusing if we assume that states of affairs are observer dependent, thus the variation in their pictorial form relative to each observer, this also applies to epistemological beliefs.

Now, if we think of pictures as names of situations and states of affairs, then that would seemingly close the loop of a nominalistic interpretation of the Tractatus.

I'm sorry, the previous is untrue due to the following proposition.

3.1.4.4. Situations can be described but not given names. (Names are like points; propositions like arrows—they have sense.)

Ok, here's the killer:

3.2.0.3. A name means an object. The object is its meaning. (‘A’ is the same sign as ‘A’.)

So, nominalism or not? I think nominalism, yea?

Thanatos says:
.

I didn't name-call. I said you posted blather, which isn't calling you a name.

.
Instead of name-calling a post that you don’t like, pejoratively characterizing it, and thereby violating forum guidelines, it would be better to specify what you think is wrong with it. You did the former, but forgot to do the latter.
.
Typical standard behavior of a flamewarrior who can’t otherwise support his claims.
.

And you are the one who wasn't specific at all.

.
So you say, repeatedly, without pointing to a particular instance. I invited you to tell us specifically what error, mis-statement or vagueness you found in a post of mine. Instead, you’re still just repeating the same unsupported angry noises.
.

So, you're just being hypocritical. And you're particularly hypocritical here where you become the only one name-calling here, calling me two names.:
"Thanatos" 's wasn't discussing philosophy. His conduct in this instance is just that of the ordinary usual internet-abuser and flamewarrior, sadly ubiquitous on the Internet.”—Michael Ossipoff

.
To send in my complaint, it was necessary to tell what behaviors I was complaining about. I included that information in my post too, because, after flagging your post, I wanted there to be an explanation for that near the end of the posts in the topic.
.

And you're the one who was unable to name where I made mis-statements and errors and then show how.

.
I asked if you could specify which of my statements was/were “blather”, and tell why you think so.
.
You couldn’t.
.
Then there was nothing more to be said.
.

You accused me of having made a "brute-fact,"

I said that Physicalism has a brute-fact. You said you didn’t think so, and I pointed out that the independently-existent, objective, fundamentally-existent, metaphysically-primary physical world that you (or at least someone) believe in is a brute-fact, unless you can explain it or quote from someone who has.
.

and I asked you to show how and you continually failed to do so.

.
See above. In fact, I’ll re-copy it for you again:
.
…and I pointed out that the independently-existent, objective, fundamentally-existent, metaphysically-primary physical world that you (or at least someone) believe in is a brute-fact, unless you can explain it or quote from someone who has.
.
I have no idea about whether or not you’re a Physicalist, or just a typical troll. It doesn’t matter. That’s why I said “…that you (or at least someone) believe in.”
.
We can replace that with “…that Physicalists believe in.”
.
So yes, I did tell what Physicalism’s brute-fact is.
.
(I’d already stated it in numerous posts to various topics)
.

I never made a physicalist belief

.
I didn’t say that you were a Physicalist. I merely told about Physicalism’s brute-fact.
.
My wording that I quoted above, showed that I didn’t claim to know if you were a Physicalist.
.
I have no idea what you are. It’s irrelevant.
.

; I just correctly said our facts are our reflections of the material reality of the universe; I never said they weren't part of our reality as well.

.
Forgive me if I thought that that statement (quoted directly aboves) suggested a belief in the primacy of a “material reality”, of which facts are a reflection. :)
.

And the only big, blatant brute-fact is your statement calling my statement one

.
A “material reality” that is related to facts by their being a reflection of it, because it’s metaphysically prior to them, is a way of asserting Physicalism’s brute-fact.
.

, as my statements can and have been explained, and you don't explain or support yours at all.

.
I’m always willing to explain &/or support any particular statement that I’ve made. Directly above, I’ve explained some things that I’d said.
.
Your statements are explained? Oh really. Then, specifically, which earlier statement(s) was/were the “blather” that you were referring to? (…statements made before you expressed that characterization)
.
You joined a conversation in which I’d spoken of Physicalism’s brute-fact. You tried to deny that Physicalism has a brute-fact, because you were confused about the difference between an explanation and a verification.
.

And then you again failed to support your claim, as I requested, that my statement was a "brute-fact," instead providing a tautology not backing your claim at all.

.
If you’re saying it’s a tautology, you’re also saying that it’s true. No, we needn’t debate whether it’s a tautology.
.
I’d said:

A primary, fundamentally-existent material reality is a brute-fact.

.
…because a thing posited but not explained is a brute-fact.
.
So yes, it’s a brute-fact unless you (or someone) can explain it.
.
Shall we wait for your explanation?
.
And no, a verification isn’t an explanation.
.
Thanatos quotes me:
.

Physicalism and "Naturalism" need to posit that brute-fact. That's what makes it unparsimonious...not the fact that someone assumes that Physicalism is correct.

.
…and says:
.

And I made specifically clear, as you wrongly claimed I didn't, how that was wrong:
A primary, fundamentally existent material reality is not a "brute-fact," as a brute-fact is something that cannot be explained, and a primary, fundamentally existent material reality can be explained.

.
Then I invite Thanatos’s to explain it..
.
Michael Ossipoff

Michael, This is a statement of fact and not an insult. That was a long rambling rant that failed to counter any of my points and was barely coherent. It's clear my posts upset you, even though I never called you a name as you erroneously claimed I did. I suggest you relax a bit, gather your thoughts and try again.

Reply to Thanatos Sand

I won't say that your post doesn't contain any information. It says that you can't explain what you said can be explained.

My post was long because I was answering a long post. You know, answering, something absent from your posts.

But enough of this.

I've answered you all that I intend to, and more than your posts deserve. I've more than fulfilled any obligation to reply to you.

Discussion concluded.

Michael Ossipoff

No, it was long because it was long. Unlike my post, it made no answers. Ending our discussion, however, is a smart idea.

Ciao.

Reply to Terrapin Station Ok, but you could say a thin man not being in a doorway has nothing to do with a fat man not being there. Or, if they do have something to do with each other, then I guess we can drag in other locations, characters and even Julius Caesar. I'm talking about the problem of identity-criteria for facts.

Quoting Cuthbert

Ok, but you could say a thin man not being in a doorway has nothing to do with a fat man not being there. Or, if they do have something to do with each other, then I guess we can drag in other locations, characters and even Julius Caesar. I'm talking about the problem of identity-criteria for facts.

We're talking about the same doorway and what, if anything, is there in the one case.

Quoting Posty McPostface

What is the ontology of 'facts'.

The early Wittgenstein postulated that the world is the totality of facts, not things.

And it's true. Or at least the Materialist's "things" or "stuff" would be superfluous if it exists. The proposition of objectively-existent universe, and its objectively-existent stuff and things is unverifiable, unfalsifiable, and would be a brute-fact if true.

Michael Faraday pointed that out in 1844.

What does he mean by asserting the existence of facts in logical space? Does he mean to say that the world is everything that is the case, which means that the world is what configuration objects have in the world between one another?

I don't suppose that any of us can answer for him, unless he answered that question somewhere in his writings.

But aren't the "objects" to which you refer, the the same as the "things" that Wittgenstein said aren't?

The "objects" themselves are just part of the system of facts, all deriving from abstract logical facts.

I have a hard time seeing these facts about the world as observer-independent

Observer-independence is a separate issue, without as clear an answer as is sometimes assumed.

Obviously, all we know about the physical world around us is via our own personal individual experience. For that reason, it makes sense to speak of our world as an individual life-experience possibility-story, consisting of a complex system of inter-referring inevitable abstract if-then logical facts about hypotheticals.

...an Anti-Realist view.

But, looking at it more generally and objectively, the logical facts that make up our life-experience possibility-stories aren't really different from all the other abstract logical facts. So, if ours are there, then the others are there too.



So I don't think absolute Anti-Realism can be right.

But we can speak of whatever logical facts systems we want to, and of course the one that makes the most sense is the one that's about your experience. Hence my preference for my emphasis on the individual experience point of view, when describing a metaphysics.

I agree with those who say that Reality beyond metaphysics is unknown, unknowable and indescribable. ...suggesting another reason to not say anything definite and all-encompassing about Realism vs Anti-Realism.

When we assume that facts exist, we are implicitly committing ourselves to a form of nominalism as opposed to viewing things as mutually dependent and holistic.

"Exist" isn't metaphysically-defined. But certainly there are facts, including abstract logical facts. No one would deny that. As for what you call "real" or "existent", that's entirely your individual subjective choice.

As for Nominalism, it was being espoused by a Materialist here, and it was his way of expressing his Materialism. When I looked that word up, Nominalism sounded a lot like Materialism, a re-statement of it, or nearly-so.

Speaking about there being facts doesn't imply Materialism, or anything like it.

You said:

as opposed to viewing things as mutually dependent and holistic.

Things? But the Wittgenstein quote said that there aren't things, only facts. (And I say he was right.)

When we assert the ontology of the universe as facts and not things, we seem to be saying that objects are nominalist, but, as opposed to what?

Aren't we saying that objects are only a name for a local aspect or part of the system of facts?

Are all of these facts observer dependent?

Strictly-speaking, no. ...for the reason stated above. ... but with the caveat stated with it.

Because otherwise, everything would consist of thing's and not facts if it weren't.

Not sure why that would follow, unless you think that facts have to be about (more fundamentally-existing) things.

Michael Ossipoff

Well, of course facts are things too. But, from the usage in the Wittgenstein quote, we can take things, for the purpose of this thread, to mean "things other than facts", or maybe even "material things".

I suggest that the accepted meaning for "things" is: "Whatever can be referred to". But, in this thread, a more limited meaning is intended, as described in the paragraph before this one.

Michael Ossipoff

Upon further thought, I think what the issue here is, is treating facts as a correspondence between the world, so-to-speak, out there, and the mental representations that we have about the world. Hence, the confusion between the fact and the mental representation of the 'thing' or 'object' spoken of, when one and the other are in essence the same thing. Otherwise, there would be little content to speak-of in general.

If one simply does away with a correspondence theory of facts as things out there, then the issue resolves itself, I think?

The Wiki entry on 'fact' is just shit.

Someone do something about it.

Reply to Posty McPostface Perhaps; I haven't worked on it for years. But it's Wiki, so fix it.