Being Stoned on Stoicism and Post-Modernism and Its Discontents
I think I realized one of my big beefs with Stoicism that I couldn't quite explain in the other thread "Pessimism vs. Stoicism". I am not trying to rehash old arguments and would rather entertain some new participants in this thread so none of the older emnities will cloud this dialogue. So, anyways, what I realized I did not like about Stoic principles is its goal of perfect equanimity. It reminds of me of what people are like when they are stoned. For some people who smoke pot, they do this to equalize their care about the world. They lack a certain attachment to any particular event, thing, person, etc. While this reduces anxiety, it also leads to a very "grey" existence of non-caring. The goal of Stoicism seems to want to have similar affects as the pot. It wants there to be less attachment (which is essentially eqivalent to care) for certain things of the world. Now, it will claim that it only asks for non-attachment to indifferents, but this still seems like an odd conclusion to want to aim for. Here is an example:
Person 1: "Your family passed away and is gone".
Stoic: "Oh, I am indifferent to the situation"
Person 1: Your girlfriend left you
Stoic: "Oh did she? Oh well, I am indifferent to the situation"
Person 1: "No one cares about you"
Stoic: "Oh really? I am indifferent to the situation"
This seems like an odd reaction. It goes perfectly well with the post-modern sensibilities of non-passion and non-attachment. Being non-attached, having no passion for one thing over another, not really "caring" about anything too much more than your average hobby (which you can replace with just anything else), seems to be a modern way of thinking. The same may be said of people- not caring about anyone more than another, or only caring in an ephemeral way that ensures there is indifference if this went away. The only thing passionate, nowadays, seems to be the passion for instruments to be non-passionate (cell phones so one is never fully committed, computers to distract from any real concern, etc.).
I am at an odd impasse as being a pessimist regarding the whole suffering thing.. you would think that this being stoned/ non-attachment/non-caring sensibility that many people of the modern world seem to hold would seem closer to the asceticism of Schopenhauer, but I am oddly put off by it.
Person 1: "Your family passed away and is gone".
Stoic: "Oh, I am indifferent to the situation"
Person 1: Your girlfriend left you
Stoic: "Oh did she? Oh well, I am indifferent to the situation"
Person 1: "No one cares about you"
Stoic: "Oh really? I am indifferent to the situation"
This seems like an odd reaction. It goes perfectly well with the post-modern sensibilities of non-passion and non-attachment. Being non-attached, having no passion for one thing over another, not really "caring" about anything too much more than your average hobby (which you can replace with just anything else), seems to be a modern way of thinking. The same may be said of people- not caring about anyone more than another, or only caring in an ephemeral way that ensures there is indifference if this went away. The only thing passionate, nowadays, seems to be the passion for instruments to be non-passionate (cell phones so one is never fully committed, computers to distract from any real concern, etc.).
I am at an odd impasse as being a pessimist regarding the whole suffering thing.. you would think that this being stoned/ non-attachment/non-caring sensibility that many people of the modern world seem to hold would seem closer to the asceticism of Schopenhauer, but I am oddly put off by it.
Comments (113)
Quoting schopenhauer1
Much rather:
Person: "Your family passed away and is gone"
Stoic: "As much as that grieves me, there is nothing that I can do to bring them back. Their existence is now outside of my control, and as saddened as I feel, to maintain my moral worth, I must pursue the good things that are still left in this world: my character, my desires, and helping my fellow human beings. There is nothing to be achieved from focusing on the tragedies of the past"
This is what I particularly have a problem with. No, that is correct there is nothing you can "DO", but not focusing on the such a personal tragedy of the past seems cold at best. Quickly moving forward is ALMOST as bad as not grieving at all. Grieving means there was a sentimental attachment. It is recognizing one cares about something. Even if it does mitigate the pain (if that can really happen by quickly moving forward after the bereavement), there is something to me, wrong with having such little care for things in a rush to move on to the next thing.
Why must I suffer to prove my attachment and love for something? Why do you assume that if I don't torture myself, then it means that I have not loved my family? It seems that you are saying that I have a moral duty to suffer for no reason other than to prove my love. That somehow, if I don't prove my love, then it doesn't exist.
I couldn't honestly tell you except it seems intuitively wrong not to FEEL some some sense of loss for family or people that you loved. The nature of this is going to be different for everyone but it would be APPROPRIATE at the BEGINNING to feel the hurt of loss as part of the caring and attachment you had with those people.
What does feeling hurt have to do with the fact of moving beyond it? The Stoic response does not prevent one from having a day each year to commemorate the loss of one's family, or to remember gratefully one's ancestors and what they have taught one, quite the contrary, Stoicism makes this a moral duty. So this idea of "indifference" that you're spewing is total anathema to the Stoic, as it goes against the notion of moral virtue. The difference between the Stoic and your average person is that whereas your average person focuses on their selfish desires (the negative, losing something they want to have), the Stoic focuses on the selfless, and positive (the importance of the loved one in their life, and one's duty towards the loved one and what they have done for one), realising that the Universe is not there to fulfill their selfish whims but rather they are there to fulfill the demands of universal Reason.
Yes, this is all well and good at an anniversary of death or a birthday, but to quickly move forward after the death doesn't seem appropriate. Rather than duty, it is the emotion of attachment one feels for a loved one. One doesn't love out of the duty to love (simply because they are your family) but because you have an attachment to that person. Stoicism seems to me to cut off those feelings just because they are negative. Sometimes it is appropriate to have negative feelings.
Similarly, if someone is attached to a project of some sort- something they care much about and worked super long on, to have it disregarded or lost would be probably bring about normal feelings of loss and frustration. To simply disregard to maintain a character of indifference, seems to disregard the fact that we care about things. Loss, frustration, etc. means at least we care and the idea of not caring for some abstract duty you call Reason seems odd and not a very great world.
Oh, so love then should be found on the fickleness of human emotion? I shall love my wife because I have a temporal attachment to her... if that emotional attachment vanishes one day, then I should kick her out of the house, and not care for her for another second. See, views such as this are the source of much suffering and immorality in the world, as it gives human beings the moral freedom to do whatever the fuck they want, regardless of other people.
Yes, but Stoicism doesn't mean that you won't have the feelings of loss and frustration. It just means you'll deal with them differently than your average person. And again, you assume without ever justifying that caring about something necessitates grief/sadness upon its loss.
I think you are expecting too much.
Of course if my dog died I would be filled with grief. It is a natural reaction to such circumstances, and it's probably unhealthy to keep it all bottled up.
A key concept in Stoicism is that a person has a duty. Ever been given a special job, even if it is menial? For some reason everyone seems to get perky when they have an important thing to do. It gives them a sense of purpose and pride. Move out of the way!, I'm here to deliver a very-important-package to a very-important-person!
So I think a Stoic would say the duty that someone has, no matter what, is to live virtuously. And if you cannot live virtuously anymore, it is time to die (which many voluntarily did so). And so no matter what happens to you, you can cope with it because it is your duty to do so, so you can continue to live virtuously.
Instead of interpreting Stoicism as an insta-cure to all pain and suffering, it might help to interpret it as a movement that advocates a certain perspective towards pain and suffering. I think this applies to other philosophies outside of Stoicism as well.
Well- so much for people for new people without enmity from the old thread answering...
Now who is strawmanning who? You are making so many category errors, I don't know where to start. In the whole cohabitation scenario that you present here, you are assuming if you stop having an emotional attachment to someone, that must mean that you have no obligations of fairness to that person. Where did you infer that from what I said? Rather, I was saying that it is appropriate to have emotional attachments to people- and the ensuing emotions from a loss of the recipient of that attachment. That has nothing to do with not treating someone with respect or fairness (a different issue) if your emotional status changes.
Quoting Agustino
Yep it is a description of what happens to people much of the time. Is it appropriate? It would seem if one cared about something, someone has a right to feel loss or grief or frustration. If it is debilitating the point of not functioning that is one thing, but I think at some level they are emotions that show people cared about something. To mitigate pain, the aim seems to become this muted existence of non-attachment. This just doesn't seem like an interesting life- even if it living by dictates of Reason or virtue. In fact, it might not be a life worth living as you are habituating your brain to essentially filter out the natural feelings that go along with being attached or caring about something or someone.
Anyways, historically, after Zeno of Citium started popularizing it, it became the device of choice for many rich aristrocrats in Greece and Rome, and then codified into Roman law and culture as a means to ensure some sort of cultural obedience. Really, it became this tool for them Roman fascists (hey, I know using that word is ahistorical in this situation, but to be fair, the word fascist came from the Roman word fasces after all) to retain power and justify their despicable actions under the guise of 'honor'. So, as a philosophical device, there really isn't a problem with it if you're into building codes of ethics through lifelong contemplation and creating a sort of theory to help you abide by them, but when Stoicism became a political movement, then it's ugliness manifests itself.
I don't see any category errors in the quote that you replied to. Please point out these supposed category errors.
Others have done a pretty good job of setting the record straight regarding Stoicism in this thread and elsewhere, and you said that you'd rather entertain new participants in this discussion anyway, so I think I'll let it be.
In short, you think life ought to be this particular kind of suffering, a restlessness, a desperation, to be something we are not in the moment. Without it, you suppose, a person doesn't care for anything.
You misrepresent the Stoic because they, one degree or another, got out this existential anxiety. They care in ways which don't involve this suffering. A conversation with a stoic goes something more like this:
Person 1: "Your family passed away and is gone".
Stoic: "Yes. It was a tragedy. I am sad. That's sometimes how the world goes. No point beating myself-up about it."
Person 1: Your girlfriend left you."
Stoic: "Yes. I loved her and it was upsetting. I didn't get what I deeply care about. Maybe I'll care for the rest of my life. Still, that's how I exist. Worrying about that which I will never get is just useless suffering"
Person 1: "No one cares about you"
Stoic: "I'm lonely and afraid. Still sometimes people exist without anyone. Cursing myself to be otherwise in this moment would just be needless pain and damage my ability to act in ways I care about."
It's not but not feeling. It's about not having damaging feelings.
I think there is an interesting question about Schopenhauer's asceticism here. Something the practice of the Stoic (and other similar practices which abandon Will, which quell the notion our existence is wrong) is helpful to deep caring. Supposedly, the problem with caring, according to Schopenhauer, is that we are always desperately disappointed because we don't get everything we might want. It just leads us into more horrible suffering.
But what if it doesn't? What is we are capable of accepting our failures without collapsing in a mess of self-loathing (or existence-loathing)? If we can, like Stoic, come out of tragedy with our sense of worth intact, the limits caring sort of disappear. To become emotionally invested in something or someone is no longer a problem, for failure holds no soul-destroying consequence. No matter how bad things might turn out, how much suffering might occur, our self-worth does not collapse. Without Will, we are free to care.
Schopenhauer's asceticism is indicative of him realising there is a problem (Will) and doing everything to hide from it (care about nothing, limit the times Will hurts him), rather coming to an understanding of the world, accepting its inevitable suffering and getting past the idea (Will) we need to be something we never are.
I guess you used the word seem, so I can't fault you completely. But, that is not what I am saying at all. Rather, I am saying that it is ok to feel the natural reactions of loss and frustration in certain things we are attached to and that if we don't feel these feelings, we are not living a full human life, but a mere robotic one that is perpetually "stoned" on stoicism :). Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
As much as some of your other posts have irked me in the recent past, you finally put an example which I find to be more or less accurate. I think this dialogue reflects more of the middle ground of taking into account an event- feeling its natural effects, but not letting it become so damaging as to cause complete paralysis. Notice though that feelings were felt (at least as how I read your dialogue) and it was worked through rather than trying to be bypassed completely and moving on with no attachment or care.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
I never really thought Schopenhauer's prescription held up. While I think he described the problems very well- being an ascetic never seemed like an ultimate conclusion. However, to defend old Schopy, I would say I think there is a difference in his approach of asceticism with stoicism, though it is fine line. For example, he wants us to have empathy and compassion with others, as they suffer like we do. We are the same Will according to this, so we must see that in others as well. Asceticism, following this line of thought, is not meant to live life with a muted sense of emotion (negative or otherwise), but to completely caste off existence. His asceticism is an almost impossibility to reach, but is the only lasting "solution" to suffering according to him. Nothing short of it would solve the problem as Will never ceases unless one has gone through the somewhat tortuous path of the ascetic.
So one one aspect of his ethic comes from feeling and emotion and another comes from a complete denial of the will for the very few individuals who are able to do so. Either way, in this thread I am not necessarily trying to compare Stoicism to Schopenhauer's pessimism, as much as give some reasons what my "beef" is with some of Stoicism's approach or aims.
I can see how Stoicism could be used to ensure people are content even if their empire is abusing them.
I can see how pessimism could be used to convince people that it's no use trying to even be content, because everything sucks anyway. Potential for abuse != necessity of abuse.
That's the point- Pessimism knows the "empire" is abusing them and is not content with it.
Schop's version says complete and full out asceticism in an all out denial of will (something most cannot reach). Otherwise, get out of individuated will-to-live through compassion, and/or aesthetic contemplation.
This would be violating the principle of charity.
That isn't quite my critique although he has a good point which is that it desire/goals themselves create suffering not wrong reactions to excess. So it is a matter of where the suffering resides. At the end of the day Schopenhauer thinks the efficacy of Stoicism and its diagnosis is wrong.
My critique is coming from another angle. My critique is saying that Stoicism is replacing one bad thing (anxiety and excess dwelling on pain) with an attitude of non-attachment and non-care which could be its own horror. I'll simply refer back to my first post as I would just restating my critique here.
Yet another critique I have is sometimes things in life are too annoying or repulsive to have perfect equanimity- no matter how great the effort. I suspect if a Stoic fell into a fetid sewer, filled to their mouth with raw sewage, with little escape, equanimity goes out the window- though contemplating equanimity in an internet forum will surely continue.
You said: Quoting schopenhauer1
So on what are your "obligations of fairness" based? On duty perhaps? It seems to me that if your moral obligation to be upset and to grieve at the loss of a loved one is based on emotion, equally your moral obligation to your wife must be based on emotion - if it isn't, then on what is it? You don't have much choice left...
But it's not doing this though... I have explained over and over again that Stoicism is not about not feeling, or escaping your negative feelings. It's more about being indifferent to their presence or absence, and not letting them overcome your reason.
Your characterization of my premise is incorrect though. I am not saying it is a "moral obligation to be upset and to grieve at the loss of a loved one is based on emotion". Rather, I am saying it is natural to feel grief and loss to someone you care about and that a life where one is indifferent to every passion, especially ones that have to do with things or people one cares about quite strongly, may be not worth living- even if in order to follow the dictates of Reason. Fuck Reason and its dictates then (not that I believe there is Reason or its dictates to follow..but I will for the sake of indulging the Stoic conception of things). To live a life without much passion at all is a very stultifying life- one I compare to being stoned all the time. See my previous posts for more detail.
What does it mean for something to be "natural"? Is it just that most people do it?
Quoting schopenhauer1
The Stoic doesn't live a life without passion - insofar as it's impossible to avoid passion. What is your idea of a good life?
I was going to reply using my own words but I found a source that words it better than I could:
In the briefest of outlines, the Stoic theory held that the only good thing is virtue (aretê, ‘excellence of character’) and the only bad thing is vice, its opposite. Everything else is ‘indifferent’ between virtue and vice, being in no sense at all good or bad. Thus the Stoics maintained that the bulk of humanity, in pursuing wealth and material goods, status, health and anything at all that is popularly conceiving of as good is making a mistake so long as that pursuit is based on the belief that these things really are good, or are desirable because they are good. Living virtuously is necessary and sufficient for living well and being happy, and the ‘indifferent’ things, although worth pursuing to the extent that it is appropriate for human beings to seek adequate shelter, sustenance and companionship, are in no way required for eudaimonia.
So pleasure and suffering only become "good" or "bad", ethically, when they are associated with virtue or vice. Otherwise they are indifferent, neutral, and are not required to obtain eudaimonia.
Of course if you consider yourself a hedonist then I suppose this doesn't have much bearing on your conception of the world. But for those who do not subscribe to a strictly hedonistic philosophy of living, Stoicism might be of aid.
I do not think what is good depends on what you think is good, or what philosophy you ascribe to. In other words, I do not see hedonism as a kind of attitude one adopts toward the world which somehow makes pleasure good; rather, pleasure is good, and hedonism is the recognition of this, and it is true whether you recognize it in a doctrine or not.
So it makes no sense to say that what will be of aid to you depends on which philosophy you adopt, if by 'be of aid' you mean 'be good,' and what is good isn't dependent on your philosophical worldview.
And yes, Stoicism says pleasure and pain aren't inherently good or bad, but this is wrong. Pleasure and pain are the only things that are good or bad on their own terms. Things like virtue, and so on, are only good in virtue of certain arbitrary opinions, customs, consequences, social norms, etc., and then only insofar as they are efficient causes of pleasure. In other words, virtue is always 'good insofar as...' whereas there is no 'insofar as' for pleasure and pain. Virtue is sometimes an efficient cause of both pleasure and pain, and so intrinsically is neither good nor bad, but indifferent.
No offense but this is a total cop-out argument. I mean, how am I supposed to have a discussion with someone who will just say that I'm blind to the obvious (that pleasure is good)? It won't matter if I disagree with the proposition that pleasure is an intrinsic good.
Furthermore, this line of argument is not only applicable to hedonism. It's applicable to any position.
Quoting The Great Whatever
I might disagree that pleasure is intrinsically good. And when I say "aid someone" I mean to help someone with problems they might be facing.
Quoting The Great Whatever
Hypothetically speaking I could disagree. You could call me out and say I'm wrong, but how would you actually formulate an argument except by simply copping out and proclaiming that you are right even if I don't recognize it?
Quoting The Great Whatever
Pleasure may be defined differently. Obviously a Stoic is going to disagree with your assessment that all pleasure is good no matter what. Also, pleasure being a "good" is really only based on the arbitrary basis of our conscious experiences and our opinions of them. A nihilist could just as easily say this is all bullocks and that there is no good or bad experiences.
Quoting The Great Whatever
Insofar that it leads to eudaimonia, which is not equal to pleasure.
For the record, I am sympathetic to preference utilitarianism.
I'm not saying you're blind to the obvious, I'm saying that the above defense of Stoicism seemed to operate on the premise that what is good in some sense depends on what you think is good, and so what is helpful will depend on what philosophy you adopt. But I am denying this.
Quoting darthbarracuda
You can disagree with whatever you want. But if you disagreed, you would simply be wrong.
It may be that a philosophy that is wrong about what is good nonetheless is an efficient cause of good things. But it can't be so on its own terms, if you like -- only by accident.
Quoting darthbarracuda
I would ask you to elucidate your position on what is good, and because it would be internally inconsistent, draw out a contradiction from it.
Quoting darthbarracuda
No it may not. 'Pleasure' is a word of English whose meaning arises from usage. You cannot stipulate that its definition is whatever you want it to be.
Quoting darthbarracuda
No, it is not. It doesn't matter if your opinion is that e.g. pain is not bad, it still will be. To see, this just note that someone can't make what is bad about pain go away by deciding to have the opinion that it isn't bad.
Quoting darthbarracuda
They can say whatever they please -- but they would be wrong. There are good and bad experiences, regardless of what the nihilist thinks -- i.e., pleasant and painful ones.
Pain is intrinsically good, whether it leads to eudaimonia or not. Eudaimonia, on the other hand, is in itself indifferent, and only good insofar it leads to pleasure.
You are wrong. ayy
Quoting The Great Whatever
Like I said, I'm sympathetic to preference utilitarianism.
A man rapes a woman. This woman does not want to be raped, even though she might actually be feeling pleasure. Does this mean it is good?
It would disgusting if you said it was good because she was feeling pleasure, and pleasure was good.
Oftentimes our preference are motivated by pleasure. But not always. Satisfied Preference is my conception of good.
The reason rape is bad is that it is traumatic and highly painful, both during and for a long period of time afterward.
Quoting darthbarracuda
I never said our preferences are always motivated by pleasure. But it does follow, quite obviously, that not all of our preferences are motivated by what is good.
Prove it.
No, just like you, Stoicism operates on the principle that virtue is the only good REGARDLESS of what you think. If you think differently, then you are simply wrong.
I don't think so. Someone who does not subscribe to a hedonistic philosophy of living hardly needs anyone telling them good is only about feeling pleasure. They already know. No aid required.
For someone to be aided by the discovery of Stoicism, by the realisation good was not equivalent to only pleasure, they would have to find themselves disgruntled by their own understanding of good and its relationship to pleasure. Stoicism aids those who hate the idea of good being about only pleasure, but nevertheless still think that's what defines good. It consists of a new understanding which they can feel comfortable with, the realisation good doesn't have to be about just feeling pleasure, unlike one has previously thought and hated themselves for doing so. Stoicism is of aid to those hurt by the philosophy of hedonism.
The opposition you and TGW are squabbling over here is incoherent. Good, by definition, always involves pleasure. When something good happens, there is an absence of the hurt, of the pain, that some terrible event which ought to have been avoided is present. In any instance of good, of virtue, of eudaimonia, there is pleasure. Good feels nice. Always. Even when it hurts.
Someone giving-up a once in a lifetime opportunity to their favourite musical act, so they can help their sick friend with something they need, still feels good about doing it, even as they might be furious at the world for aligning events in such a way. It is this state which constitutes their understanding they do good, that something which ought to have been done happened.
TGW is half right: doing good is always about feeling pleasure.
Where TGW goes wrong is in separating pleasure from the act which creates it. Performing good is about more than just feeling pleasure. As many example shows, the fact something feels nice or gives pleasure doesn't indicate either that a person wants it or that it is a good act. Otherwise killing someone for fun would be just as good as listening to your favourite band.
Good is always indexical. It is defined not merely by the presence of pleasure (though that is always there), but by the specific feeling of pleasure with other events of the world. The sort, timing, origin and environment of a sensation of pleasure are all important. Some of those moments are good. Others are very bad indeed. Good is not given by anything (e.g. pleasure, taking some action, a stated principle). It is an expression of a moment and cannot be given by anything else. Each instance of good is inseparable from what exists in that moment. If I am do the good of writing this post, it must not only feel nice, but it can only be achieved in performing this specify act of writing.
When good is viewed in these terms, the point you are fighting over, whether there is good without pleasure or if pleasure constitutes good, disappears. Good is simultaneously about feeling pleasure (as understanding and performing good always feels nice), but is never about only feeling pleasure, as one is acting in the (good) manner which feels nice, rather than seeking to gain pleasure through "efficient action."
The non-attachment part is correct (but how is this a bad thing?), but Stoicism certainly does not promote non-care, this is a technical term you've added entirely by yourself. A third of Stoic philosophy, its ethics, is dedicated to devoting yourself to others and society as a whole. There is nothing in the philosophy that tells you not to care about anything, that is to say, to be indifferent. This is a big misunderstanding that needs to be corrected, so I'll help to do that.
There is a major problem with discussing Stoicism in a language that is foreign to it, as we are doing. Stoicism was developed in the Greek language, the words used in ancient Greek are not perfectly translatable without the English term having common-usage 'baggage'. This applies to more or less every word in Stoic philosophy when converted into English.This is why these conversations are best done with the most charitable of intentions -- so as to be fair to the philosophy itself -- and with a clear and definite understanding of key technical terms. If you want to have a worthwhile conversation about Stoicism, then you need to really know exactly what particular terms mean.
Stoicism uses two very similar words but with distinctly different meanings, "????????" and "???????".
The term "????????" is translated as such from the word "indifferents", or adiaphora. It is generally translated as "indifferents", but the full meaning of the word can be better understood as "things indifferent" - things that are indifferent. Remember that in Stoicism, things are only good or bad insofar as they are morally good and bad. There is no good or bad outside the moral sphere. Wealth is not good and poverty is not bad, because they do not have any moral value. Therefore, they are things that are morally indifferent.
The term "???????", or "apatheia", is slightly but importantly different. It means, literally, "without pathos", but is more generally understood as "without passion" or "without suffering". This is the key term you are misusing. Because it so closely resembles the word apathy, it is mistaken to mean indifference in the common-usage sense. But this isn't the case in the Stoicism. When the term indifference is used regarding Stoicism, is means a state of mind that is without suffering or passion, rather than an attitude or not caring towards external things, whether they be people or otherwise. Passion is used to mean irrational or overwhelming emotion - given that Stoics seek to live according to reason, it follows naturally that they use their reason to control their emotions so they operate at rational levels. The point of this control is not to abolish or repress emotions, as per the classic straw man against Stoicism, but to keep them within the bounds of reason. I don't think it's controversial to claim that no one who doesn't have their Descartes hat of absolute scepticism would find this objectionable, once properly understood. It's self-evident to me at least.
This conversation simply shouldn't continue unless these terms are both properly understood in the context of Stoicism and used as such from here on out.
My objection to your second paragraph is one that has been levelled at pessimists on PF before - that of exceptionally high expectations, and second, of throwing out the baby with the bathwater. You say that Stoicism is worthy of rejection because it isn't a perfect system - because it doesn't work in some hypothetically horrendous circumstances. These exceptionally high standards have previously lead to you being criticised for rejecting anything but a perfect world in the anti-natal threads. Then you tend to throw the baby out with the bathwater, as do other pessimists. From book II paragraph 15 of Marcus Aurelius' Meditations, "There are obvious objections to the Cynic Monimus' statement that 'things are determined by the view taken of them'; but the value of his aphorism is equally obvious, if we admit the substance of it so far as it contains a truth.", emphasis mine. So here, we can see that your objection has already been made some 2300 years ago, and addressed by Marcus Aurelius himself. No, it may not be an absolute truth that things are determined by the view taken of them (absolutely true as opposed to generally true) because in your estimation there are some circumstances where it may not work, but there are innumerable day to day scenarios where it does work and is true, and I won't condescend your imagination by pointing them out. It is a maxim that should be used as true only as far as it is true - your mileage may vary. It's simply unreasonable to deliberately attempt to extend this maxim to situations where it doesn't fit, and then reject it when it doesn't work. It's like complaining that your bicycle makes a terrible boat; it's a fine mode of transport when used where it works. However, there is nothing to say that one shouldn't make every effort to exhaust the potentiality of this maxim wherever possible. which, theoretically speaking, is in every scenario. The only limitation to it is your own mind, as James Stockdale can confirm. Therefore, any limitation to the maxim is the fault of the philosopher, not the philosophy.
No, the reason rape is bad is because the act is severely disregarding the preferences of another person. It can presumably still be rape and not "feel bad" in terms of pain.
Quoting The Great Whatever
Well, you said your position was that pleasure is the only good.
I don't know what this means "in the bounds of reason". Is it not "in the bounds of reason" to mourn the loss of a loved one? What does it mean to be without passion? Excessive emotion? We have to define what the boundaries of excessive and reasonable are here. I would agree that mourning to the point of paralysis is no good, but mourning in itself for something one cared about doesn't seem "unreasonable" (whatever that means). My premise earlier is that a life without caring, is possibly a life not worth living, and part of caring is dealing with loss of what one cares about- which does not mean being completely equanimous in the face of a loved one's death. So perhaps we agree as long as we agree on the boundaries of where this "reasonable" and "passionate" distinction lies.
Quoting WhiskeyWhiskers
Yes, this world is non-ideal and thus not worth starting. Once alive, my preferred mode is rebellion against the condition of non-ideality. I don't see how filling one's time with "virtue' or following the dictates of universal "Reason" (an existence of which is obviously debatable), necessarily follows. One can say any number of things necessarily follows from non-ideality. I personally don't see how thinking or doing virtuous things (can anyone "really" tell if they are doing these things?) means one has found the key to ideality in a non-ideal world. To me, it is like "defining" the standards of morality based on ancient Greek definitions and then just showing off (to oneself but most definitely to others) that one is following them.
I rarely advocate for an actual methodology and I indulge Schopenhauer's asceticism because it is completely world-denying. However, I have always doubted the efficacy of such methodology (along with Buddhism proper) on actually doing anything to get rid of suffering (especially in achieving things like Nirvana-state, etc.). I have the same doubts with Stoicism. In fact, I abhor the idea that I am born into a non-ideal world and that the way to ideality is not having passion except for virtuous things. This seems like a vicious circularity. I am being virtuous to be virtuous to be virtuous. Somehow the elusive term Eudaimonia is supposed to follow from this, but I don't see how. I can imagine someone being virtuous and not feeling satisfied. I am sure you can then say that this means that the person isn't truly virtuous, but then the idea that someone feels satisfied when doing non-virtuous things comes up. But then you might say that this isn't truly satisfied or long-lasting, in which case one can question how one knows. Then it just becomes "one knows it". Then everything becomes self-justified and the system is simply encapsulated in its own self-justification.
Granted, but the point is that this methodology is highly contingent on various situations. The sewage example was extreme but I can be more subtle and say that certain people might be in situations that are not amenable to easily access the methodologies of Stoicism (mental conditions, temperaments, situations, etc.). Thus, when the rubber meets the road, it can be useless in that regard. Perhaps for a certain norm-defined condition, situation, personality-type, etc. its efficacy is useful.
You say this world is non-ideal. This implies you have a standard of ideality, you know what would be ideal. But how can you have such a standard? All standards are necessarily prisoners of this world, because they presuppose the world, or at least it's logical structure. To me a world with no suffering is an abomination: absolutely incoherent and incomprehensible. No world that is anything like what we understand by world can be like that. To me, an ideal world must have the potential for suffering always present. The only reason why I enjoy few moments in life is because of all the other moments I don't enjoy. The only reason I enjoy when people are nice to me is because there's always the possibility of them not being nice. And i cannot even conceive of a world in which everyone was nice and I was happy about it. As Schopenhauer put it, if that was the case, I would start wars, violence, divisions, aggression etc. myself
I think I agree with Schopenhauer that non-ideality can be likened to an always "becoming". There is in a certain sense a "lack" which presupposes the world. There are annoying things, painful things, frustrating things, and a need for things which we "lack" for no better term (desire/goals/survival). Opposed to this would be "being". Being and not becoming is a strange concept as you note, because it is not the condition of our world. A completely ideal world would be one of being and not becoming. This is probably the elusive state that Buddhists and ascetics are trying for (not to say they are getting it or will come closer to it, or even be able to attain it in principle).
Schopenhauer has a quote describing this state:
[quote=Schopenhauer]Accordingly this is a finite existence, and its antithesis would be an infinite, neither exposed to any attack from without nor in want of help from without, and hence [Greek: aei hosautos on], in eternal rest; [Greek: oute gignomenon, oute apollymenon], without change, without time, and without diversity; the negative knowledge of which is the fundamental note of Plato’s philosophy. The denial of the will to live reveals the way to such a state as this.[/quote]
But you forget that any concept of ideality already presupposes the logical structure of this world - becoming. Hence, a world of being is incoherent and cannot be ideal. I cannot even imagine such a world, much less find it ideal.
What do you mean by 'preferences?' One thing you might mean are pleasures and pains, which doesn't help. Another thing you might mean is what people, when asked, say they approve and disapprove of; but this is clearly of not help, since you can't make something good or bad just by holding a certain opinion or saying it is. If that were true, there would be no problems, since you could just decide to approve of everything that happened and make it good. So 'preferences' must be something in that sense beyond your control. But then, what are they?
Quoting darthbarracuda
Yes.
One way to test whether something is intrinsically good or bad, rather than merely relative to something, is to do the 'so what?' test. The question is, given that something happens that someone claims is intrinsically good, can one sensibly ask 'so what?' and force to be given an intelligible answer? If so, then it seems there is some external reason for holding that the initial thing is good.
Suppose, for example, I claim money is intrinsically good. If I then hold up some money I got and say 'look, I have money!' I might ask, 'so what?' What's good about that? And there is an answer to this question: so, I can buy things, I can show off my status, etc. But then, it is being able to buy things, and showing off one's status, that is good, and money is only an efficient cause of this, that is, good only insofar as it leads to those things, and not good insofar as it doesn't. Money therefore stops being good in an apocalyptic wasteland where it no longer affords me those purported goods. When whatever I answer 'so what?' with can't be acquired, then the value of the merely extrinsically good thing disappears.
Notice that this is impossible with pleasure or pain. If someone is in pain, then to ask 'so what?' is pointless. There is no other reason that pain is bad, and nothing that can be added to it, that is not pain, that can make it worse. That is, the pain itself already answers that question, as by virtue of it being pain, it is impossible not to care about it precisely to the extent that it is pain, and not because of anything else. Pain's value, its badness, is thus intrinsic. Notice that virtue is not like this: we may find virtue instrumentally bad where it is not serviceable to something else.
Why not?
Quoting The Great Whatever
Bullshit, we don't have that kind of omnipotent control over our preferences. I can't just say that being stabbed is okay to make it okay. It's not okay. I would prefer not to get stabbed because I prefer to not feel the sensation of suffering. But suffering alone without any preference has no value. Same with pleasure.
Interesting. I can see this working for pain. You can't ask "So what? What's bad about that?" to someone who says they're in pain. The very asking of the question is impossible.
But, the same cannot be said about pleasure. If someone says they're having great pleasure, I can proceed to ask "So what? What's great about that?". There will be no acceptable answer to me, if I don't already consider pleasure to be intrinsically good. I might think that you're wasting your time, as pleasure itself is empty - neither good, nor bad - as such it is to be expected that you will not be able to answer in any way as pleasure itself is a dead-end for you. Notice that this underlies that "the good" is more than just simple pleasure. Maybe it's pleasure associated/derived from virtue. Maybe virtuous pleasure. But certainly pleasure alone is not sufficient to qualify as good.
For example, if someone could be given a pill to feel intense happiness and pleasure all the time - and they decided to take it - and then proceeded to sit on the couch for their whole life - I would not consider them to be living a good life.
Because if you could, all problems would be trivial, and in effect there would be no problems, since you could just decide that they were not problems. But this is not so.
Quoting darthbarracuda
So you seem to be making a strange claim here:
1) We cannot control our preferences.
2) The reason we cannot control our preferences is because we cannot control what causes us to suffer.
3) Yet our preferences are in some sense independent from this suffering.
But how so? Note that 'suffering' sounds a lot like 'pain,' and if you believe this, you will collapse into the hedonist position.
So it is our preference that we not feel suffering, but that preference might be different? But how? How is it possible to prefer suffering? And is this meta-preference itself something that can be changed at whim? If not, and we have no control over it, what is this preference? And if the preference collapses just into feeling suffering itself -- viz., feeling suffering itself means a kind of 'dispreference,' then we have hedonism yet again.
But insofar as pleasure is good, there is no extrinsic reason for its being good. It is not 'good because of...' and nothing can be added to it other than pleasure itself to make it any better (as with pain).
Quoting Agustino
First, the question is what is good, not what a good life is -- the latter presupposes that a 'life' is the appropriate unit of consideration for what counts as good. Second, your consideration that this is not good is a mere extrinsic opinion, while the pleasure itself is good on its own terms, and so external opinions as to whether it is good don't matter to it (since nothing external can 'make it bad').
Well said, only insofar as it is good, which is admitting that pleasure is not always good :)
Quoting The Great Whatever
But if I myself lived such a life I would be unsatisfied, and unhappy. Why is that?
I don't see how you can claim this unless you think pleasure is either always good or always not good. After all, the features of it relevant to its goodness are always the same qua pleasure. It is good in virtue of being pleasant, and pleasure is of course always pleasant. So it seems to me to take this position you must claim that being pleasant is never a good thing. Which is what the Stoic says, but this is not true.
Are dissatisfaction and unhappiness kinds of pain? If not, then what are they? If they are, then ex hypothesi haven't you stipulated by your very example that you are not unsatisfied or unhappy?
Erm, no. I don't claim to know how preferences work, although I might actually end up pursuing a degree that may help solve this.
Pain by itself is not worth anything. There must be an entity that attributes a value to this experience. This is why pain is not necessarily equal to suffering. A person who is into BDSM, for example, wouldn't consider the pain associated with it to be suffering. They would actively pursue it.
Pleasure by itself it not worth anything in the same way as well. For example, let's there's a box of chocolates next to me. Eating them will stimulate my taste buds, release some dopamine to be sure, and give me a "pleasurable" experience. But say I want to lose weight. What then? Am I still enjoying this box of chocolates if I know I need to lose weight?
The problem I see with pure hedonism is that it inevitably leads to unsavory scenarios. Situations such as being jacked up on drugs simply because they make you feel pleasure. Even if I don't want to take these drugs, I would still be obligated to as a hedonist because pleasure is seen as good no matter what. This is otherwise known as the experience machine thought experiment.
But why would this be bad? To say this scenario would be bad would be to appeal to something other than the experience of pleasure. This is, as I have said, the preferences of the individual.
I have suspended judgement on Stoicism at the moment, to permit an investigation into this. Do not take my agreements as final. However, pleasure, as meaning is use, is used in quite a few different ways, and it refers to quite a few different things. There need to be more distinctions applied. I could see a quasi-Stoic agree with what qualifies as virtuous pleasure, but not what is most often thought as pleasure by the common lot of mankind for example.
Quoting The Great Whatever
Yes to the first question. However - here lies the problem. Some distinctions need to be made about pleasure, because, as it can clearly be seen, some pleasures inevitably bring pain along with them. (like taking and living on the pill) Hence only some pleasures are good (those which never bring pain). Am I getting something wrong?
Sure, it is. Pain is intrinsically bad.
Quoting darthbarracuda
What do you mean by, attributes value to? If you mean that someone must feel the pain, then of course, otherwise it wouldn't be pain, since pain is a feeling.
What else would 'attribute a value to it' mean? Have an opinion on it? Put a price on it? But none of these things alter what is relevant to pain being bad, i.e. its very painfulness. So what difference does it make if you e.g. have an opinion that pain is not bad? So long as it's still just as painful, it's still just as bad.
As to BDSM, first, there is no contradiction in saying people actively seek out or want to inflict bad things on themselves. Second, there is no contradiction in saying that some bad things might be pursued because they are intermixed with good things (i.e., one can find pleasure in pain, but then one must in some sense find the act pleasant, or they are not 'into' BDSM to begin with).
Quoting darthbarracuda
Of course you are. This might extrinsically cause some other bad thing, like gaining weight, but that too is only bad insofar as it is somehow painful to have more weight. Put anther way, eating the chocolate is not bad insofar as it is pleasant, but insofar as it causes you to gain weight. To see this, note that the dilemma disappears if the chocolate no longer causes you to gain weight, but is still just as pleasant.
Quoting darthbarracuda
Hedonism as such is a claim about the good, and so makes no claims about obligations.
Quoting darthbarracuda
Why would what be bad? Again, the point is not to elicit intuitions from external viewpoints about something being bad -- the point is, is the thing itself bad on its own terms? If your answer is no, what do your extrinsic, arbitrary opinions that nonetheless it is bad matter?
If pleasures bring pain with them, then they are not bad insofar as they are pleasant, but insofar as pain is bad. Thus it is still the pain which is bad, not the pleasure, though pleasure may be an effiicient cause of bad things.
Stop asserting. Try arguing instead.
Quoting The Great Whatever
So you admit that pleasure and pain are not simply black and white labels for what is good and bad. There must be first a subject to experience them, and two, an opinion/preference about these experiences.
Quoting The Great Whatever
But that's just what I'm saying, the circumstances are what dictate whether or not a pleasurable experience is desirable! The preference must come first. First, I must want to eat the chocolates. Then I can count it as a pleasurable experience.
Forcing me to eat the chocolates would be immoral because I would not want to eat them. It doesn't matter that I will inevitably taste the smooth, milky texture of the chocolate and get a spike in dopamine. That pleasure lacks any meaning towards me, and might as well not exist.
Quoting The Great Whatever
Okay, here we go, scenario time!
You, a hedonist, are walking down the street one afternoon when you bump into me. I tell you that I have a great offer that you won't be able to deny: an experience machine! You'll feel pleasure beyond your wildest imagination, but if you plug in, you will be in for the rest of your life. You will not be able to leave. But don't worry about your family or friends, I have plenty more of these machines back at my shop that I will hook them up to as well.
Being a hedonist, and professing that pleasure is the only good, you would be obligated to plug in to this machine on pain of contradicting your own philosophy. The only reason you wouldn't plug in would be because you don't desire to, even if there is pleasure available. Desire-satisfaction is a far better theory than hedonism.
Agreed, but where do we go from here? You're not using pleasure as commonly used. The activity of taking the pill is called pleasurable in everyday discourse, even though it also brings pain in the long term.
Yes I am. 'Pleasure' is a non-technical term whose meaning is established independently of philosophical investigations. It is called pleasurable, and it is: and if it causes pain in the long term, we say that as well. Yet it is the pain which is bad, not the pleasure.
No. It follows that often pleasure can cause or be associated with bad things.
Besides, as I said before, this presupposes that the meaningful unit of inquiry is a 'life.' This is dubious since one never experiences a 'life,' which is more of a moralizing abstraction.
Hedonism, as I view it, is a position on what is good, not on what you should or should not do.
I don't think these are important questions. What matters is what you are going to do, not what you should do, since even if you resolve the latter, you won't have taken even a step toward resolving the former (since you can just do what you shouldn't anyway), which is all that actually matters. And as for what you are going to do, it is a category error to ask for a philosophical position that says what you are going to do, since by definition only actually doing it can decide that. Actions, so to speak, do not follow from philosophical doctrines, and so it is a mistake to ask a philosophical doctrine to make you do something.
Quoting darthbarracuda
Hedonism is not in my view a moral position, and I don't think ethics primarily has to do with morality. Morality is a kind of social convention that deals with strictures on behavior. Ethics is, in the Greek sense, an inquiry into what is good, and also the practice of cultivating a good life. 'Moral' and 'good' clearly don't mean the same thing in the sense, that, even if something is good, the question 'is this moral?' is unanswered. Personally, I think morality is a kind of epiphenomenon, and not philosophically important.
Sure only actually doing it will in the end decide, but that doesn't mean that one shouldn't have goals for which to strive, and deciding on those goals is an enterprise of thought, not of doing.
I would like to address what you are saying, but first let me ask you something. Do you think that something that is "meaningful" trumps what is good? Why or why not? I ask this to Agustino as well as @The Great Whatever.
I don't think it's necessary. These are my own Cyrenaic biases showing, but I think a good praxis can be one that doesn't make any use of abstract goals. Rather, acting toward the future is itself a kind of moment-by-moment mastery. In any case, it's not the job of an ethical doctrine to tell what to do: as I've argued, I don't think this demand even makes sense. Nothing can tell you what to do, only doing something can make you do something.
I bring this up because I find it an odd paradox that some things that are "meaningful" require suffering or pain. The fact that suffering might bring meaning, though possibly true, is not necessarily good in itself. Oddly enough, I don't think just because suffering (usually in HINDSIGHT) creates or enhances meaning, it is good that some meaning requires suffering to create meaning or enhance meaning. Suffering doesn't get a pass because of this. Similarly, existence doesn't get a pass because we live in such a condition whereby suffering can elicit meaning or enhance one's experience as more meaningful. The odd fact that we must suffer for meaning tells you something of the world itself.
I will add that though some suffering elicits or enhances meaning, not all of it does. There are some situations where suffering is just suffering.
Anyways, going back to @Agustino's previous post about ideality. Schopenhauer's conception of absolute ideality is incomprehensible insofar as we can positively conceive it, but we can get at it from what we know from our current condition, which is to say what ideality is not.
I can think of two scenarios:
1) The first scenario is one in which a person did not suffer much and had a meaningful relationship for 60 years with a romantic partner. These two people enjoyed each other's company, only fought little but nothing stressful, and helped each other in need. In fact, even the courting process was very easy-going. Both parties didn't make it excessively hard for the other at the beginning, both found each other attractive, both found each other's company good at first and better as they hung out more.
2) The second scenario is one in which a person had a terrible time being in any romantic relationship- for contingent reasons of timing, place, etc. the courting process never worked out. This person lived a relatively unromantic life for 60 years. This person had some friends, some closer than others, but never an "intimate" partner as in the first scenario. This person was not content with this situation, but at the end of their life said that the struggle that he/she had to go through maintain a good life despite not having an intimate partner.. even learning to being STOICAL (I'm sure y'all would be happy I mentioned that), and suppressing the original desire and reworking into helping charities instead of developing personal relationships instead gave meaning.
In both cases, meaning was occurring in people's lives. One through developing a strong relationship with an intimate partner, the other through the struggle to overcome the fact that one will not always get what one wants (even something as basic and desirable as romantic intimacy). Now, a cynic might say "hey, meaning was obtained in both cases, it's all equal". But is it really? I mean, yeah the second scenario did provide for a meaningful life but, was it something they would have preferred?
What's the point of providing this scenario? The point is that suffering- though (usually in HINDSIGHT) may be an impetus for meaning does not always mean it is good that one suffered.
At the same time, I can think of another scenario:
1) Someone stumbles upon a $1 million dollars, they buy a house, a lot of goods.. gives some to charity, goes travelling, takes up new expensive hobbies..They had a lot of meaningful experiences involving charity, relationships, travel, etc.. Nothing that took a lot of suffering although maybe it did take up their time.
2) Someone agonizes over a new invention, an app let's say, they spend thousands of hours thinking, developing, tinkering, researching.. and finally they sell it for a modest $10,000 dollars. Along that way, it was not just "hard work" but a lot of set backs, anger, frustration, rage, lost relationships, hair falling out..after many years they finally finished their project and sold it but did not get the money they wanted. They still found meaning in developing the app, they were a bit disappointed, and also could not afford some of the other things they were planning on.. but meaning was found in the struggle.
In both cases meaning was occurring in people's lives. One through charity work, travel, etc. with little struggles.. and one through agonizing pain and setbacks. In this case, it is a bit harder to choose, but there might be a slight advantage to scenario 2 due to the "added" quality of suffering before the reward. In this case, though the suffering was intense, the person (in HINDSIGHT) saw how the struggle was meaningful to them even if they did not get the reward. However, scenario 1 did have more opportunities for experiences without struggle, so this may be the one with a slight advantage.
One may be super apathetic and just say- "One's gets what one gets in life". This means that a life can't go another way than it goes- kind of fatalistic. This is to deny that people have preferences (often for pleasure as TGW explains). There is a whole tangle of a mess here that suffering adds because:
1) Suffering MIGHT be preferable if it enhances meaning, AND that is the preferred efficient cause to obtain that meaning
2) Some people LIE to themselves and others (don't want to face their true feelings) that they ACTUALLY preferred the scenario with LESS suffering (no STOICISM is going to make those true feelings go away).
3) Life is certainly not fair, because from a far away vantage point, we can see suffering is not distributed equally, and we can also see that some scenarios can be quite meaningful without much suffering, even if other scenarios were meaningful with suffering.
Certainly, one of my "methodologies" (if that's what you want to call it) would be to realize that people are suffering in both very familiar ways (desire/survival/goals) as well as very personal ways (contingent/very dependent on a person's background, environment, and personal history). Life is certainly non-ideal. How we confront this, discuss this, and interact with each other about it, is what is important. When we don't do so, we will be avoiding the very large elephant in the room and constantly be mired in the thick of things without ever confronting why we are mired in the thick of things. So simply discussing the suffering, recognizing it, dealing with the fact that life is non-ideal is at least a good start. Perhaps it will elicit more compassion since we are all essentially in the same situation.
Kinda shot yourself in the foot there, didn't ya?
I used it as a diving off point. I still maintain I don't like discussing much with you for various reasons.
Say someone has a relatively annoying situation (a physical ailment, mental health condition, bed bugs, whatever), they KNOW, absolutely that they would be happier without it. They would think more clearly, they wouldn't have to go to as many hospital visits and spend their time doing other stuff (more "virtuous stuff" I guess if you are a Stoic :-} ). No meaning was derived from this. In fact, it is almost 100% certain that without the condition, that person's life would be more fulfilling in every way. This is a case where suffering is just suffering. There isn't even a story after-the-fact that could make it such that the condition made the sufferer's life more fulfilling. Here is an example of suffering just being suffering.
From what you wrote, this means suffering just beings suffering requires it to have no additional purpose behind it. Meaning cannot be derived from it.
Now I am not denying that there are certainly cases of suffering (usually extreme) that would add no value or meaning to a person's life, but I struggle to understand how the person is "burdened" with this everyday.
Something about making suffering meaningful makes it easier to cope with.
People may find fulfilment in the passing of suffering and achieving something. Frequently, people are happy about experiencing an annoyance of hard work to finally achieve something which wouldn't have happened otherwise. But what exactly is fulfilling for these people? Is it the annoyance of work? Is it the suffering? Not at all. In such cases, it is the end of suffering and creation of something worthwhile which is fulfilling. The suffering itself was just a useless burden.
You and darthbarracuda are approaching the question of Stoicism from the wrong angle. Stoicism isn't a question of making suffering "worth it." Nothing can to that. It's an oxymoron. Rather Stoicism is about holding a particular stance which brings fulfilment regardless of suffering. Or in some cases, to replace (e.g. someone's understanding life is now worthless because the were dumped) some instances of suffering with fulfilment (e.g. "sometimes bad things happen. I shouldn't let that conquer me" ) .
And that's is their error. The problem lies in that, while they are no doubt correct an absence of "becoming" would eliminate suffering, they are not as to clear why. As we are finite states, states which are always becoming, the absence of becoming is a solution precisely because it eliminates us. If we did not exist, if there was no becoming (i.e. only logic and no existence), then there would be no suffering people that exist.
The problem is, of course, this is utterly useless to any living being. Since we do exist, we cannot escape becoming. The advice of Schopenhauer/Buddhism cannot help us with respect to telling us a solution to suffering. We can never do what it proposes. It is not "nearly impossible." It is impossible. While Schopenhauer/Buddhism may act to end or replace a person's suffering (just as any philosophy, religion or ideology might), it will never do so by the means it proclaims. Schopenhauer/Buddhism is telling falsehoods about ourselves, our suffering and how we might live with instances absent of suffering. Our suffering or otherwise is always "becoming." Whether we are suffering or not is a state of existence. If we are to eliminate instance of suffering, it is a question of having particular moments of becoming, not suffering, as opposed to other moments of becoming, suffering.
This is what Stoicism seeks to achieve. To have us exist, to react, to be "becoming," which is the absence of suffering rather than the presence of suffering in as many instances as possible.
Fair enough. I was just trying to address the issue of "meaning through suffering" that has become the usual retort when explaining away the problem of suffering. Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
Here is where we have to be nuanced in HOW this is so. I think "in the moment" people are suffering and wishing they did not have to feel the pain. After the fact, they tend to Pollyannize the situation and say it was for the better even though they PREFERRED that it did not occur while it was happening. I don't know, I am sure someone will bring up the exercise example or dieting or something. Painful but leads to pleasure, etc. You may disagree that this is suffering, but I guess some sort of pain is occurring so maybe not suffering but certainly a negative aspect of "feels hurty" is happening. There is also (as you pointed out), suffering that is just suffering with very little to no meaning attached at all. Conditions one just knows they would have been better without. No meaning was gained- more meaningful moments would have been had otherwise.
It is also a way to address the idea that some people think that a life without pain is a life not worth living. Someone gave the example of being hooked up to a computer that provided only pleasant feelings and I think this was to point to the idea that life, with its contingencies (of where, how, and how much pain will occur), and the goals it makes us works towards somehow make life more meaningful than the case of being constantly stimulated with happiness.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
Again, I point to what I said above. Some people think the annoyances, tribulations, pain, what have you give them meaning (usually in hindsight). I agree with you in a really roundabout way that, this in itself is telling of life if we can't handle even just tranquility that we must gain meaning from painful experiences.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
To me, this is equivalent. I mean, making lemonade out of lemons.. all that jazz. But I think you are trying to say the super-hero Stoic variety that Agustino seems really into- the idea that we can be come impervious to pain. I brought up several ideas in objection to this:
1) Does this "really" work when the rubber meets the road? Certain people might be in situations that are not amenable to easily access the methodologies of Stoicism (mental conditions, temperaments, situations, etc.). Thus, when the rubber meets the road, it can be useless in that regard. Perhaps for a certain norm-defined condition, situation, personality-type, etc. its efficacy is useful.
2.) I abhor the idea that I am born into a non-ideal world and that the way to ideality is not having passion except for virtuous things. This seems like a vicious circularity. I am being virtuous to be virtuous to be virtuous. Somehow the elusive term Eudaimonia is supposed to follow from this, but I don't see how. I can imagine someone being virtuous and not feeling satisfied. I am sure you can then say that this means that the person isn't truly virtuous, but then the idea that someone feels satisfied when doing non-virtuous things comes up. But then you might say that this isn't truly satisfied or long-lasting, in which case one can question how one knows. Then it just becomes "one knows it". Then everything becomes self-justified and the system is simply encapsulated in its own self-justification.
3.) Perhaps Stoicism deals with mitigating excess responses, but I think his point was that desiring itself- even if it is just for preferred indifferents, still produces suffering so to completely cut it at its root, one has to give up even that. After all, any accomplishment needs the fuel of the desire to complete it, to see it done a certain way, etc. I am pretty sure that in this critique there is a subtle understanding that desire can never be without its negative consequences of frustrated desire, disappointment, boredom, etc.
That isn't quite my critique although he has a good point which is that it desire/goals themselves create suffering not wrong reactions to excess. So it is a matter of where the suffering resides. At the end of the day Schopenhauer thinks the efficacy of Stoicism and its diagnosis is wrong.
4.) Stoicism is replacing one bad thing (anxiety and excess dwelling on pain) with an attitude of non-attachment and non-care which could be its own horror. I'll simply refer back to my first post as I would just restating my critique here.
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
I think I agree? You have a peculiar way of making something that we mostly agree on seem totally inimical to each other. Why be so belligerent?
Quoting TheWillowOfDarkness
Honestly, I did not really understand this. You are going to have to elaborate or clarify. Also, I did write a good deal in regards to those scenarios, I think they can be useful here, whether agreeing or disagreeing.
If I was to take a stab at it, I think you are trying to say that Stoicism is trying to teach us how to live in becoming without suffering. Again, I go back to my objections above and throughout this thread. I also think you are definitely missing Schopenhauer's point that becoming (for humans at least) entails suffering. Desire does not go away. In fact, it cannot.
Finally, why do your posts always have this "frothing-at-the-mouth" animosity tone to them? How do you expect to convince anyone with that? Is it just bludgeon the interlocutor at all costs with you?
Assuming that what I'm going to do isn't influenced by what I think I should do. Which it is, for everyone but sociopaths.
Sure it is, otherwise, what's the point in having ethics? That we don't always live up to our ethical standards is a different matter.
Quoting Teh GreatWhatever
But it can and it does, otherwise I'd just do whatever the hell I wanted all the time without consideration for what's right. But I don't do that., and neither do most people.
True, I think people have a moral sense (stemming from a combo of environment and innate fairness), of justice, fairness, compassion, etc. However, I have brought up the idea of what if everyone were to be completely virtuous in all actions. What is the point of virtuousness at all costs- including happiness? The problem when I pose this question is people will assume, that it MUST be good because virtuous acts are being performed, but if we were to take this to the broadest extent, where everyone was always virtuous, it becomes a circularity. I help to help to help. We help to help to help. Always helping, always doing "the right thing".
1) This leaves little room for self-interest other than pursuing more virtue. and
2.) What happens if one doesn't have any Eudaimonia or satisfaction from virtuousness? Doesn't some self-interest come into play? Doesn't some attachment to people and things come into play as well- even "healthy" things like attachment to exercise or competitive sports?
3.) If one were to say a virtuous person would do what he feels is best for him, then are we not making virtue a catchall for happiness in general, and thus conflating Eudaimonia with virtue itself? Virtue then becomes (helping others, being just, being temperate, etc. but also doing things that makes one happy above and beyond that for oneself).. That is giving virtue almost everything that "well-being" "flourishing" and Eudaimonia mean, thus subtly changing the definition from developing a good character to a sort of limited hedonism.
If all the "preferred indifferents" were taken away, a dreary world it would be. Therefore, I feel, it seems like what Stoics called "preferred indifferents" are part of the equation for a "life worth living" not accidental to a life of Eudaimonia. Perhaps one can learn through the "methodology" how to survive it with dignity and grace, but I think it is a conceit to say it is actually a life worth living. To point to the practically self-evident fact that humans can survive and habituate to shitty conditions or a less-than-optimal situation, doesn't mean that it is a good life. It just means we can learn to live with. People even try to push the conceit far more absurd levels (pace Nietzsche) that overcoming pain is what counts anyways, so "bring it on". Meaning here counts more than mere happiness.. Meaning that one gets from having a "cross to bear"- the bigger the better. However, for me at least, I see something wrong with this picture where
1) We have to settle for less optimal situations in the first place
2) Meaning is derived from suffering
This is where my pessimism towards life itself comes in. Life certainly isn't created "for us" though it is an obvious fact that we can withstand some of the shit life gives us (and even this might not be true in all situations, people, temperaments, conditions, etc.). It can be postulated that this is simply a basic outcome of our evolutionary history.
I don't have time to give a long response to everything this morning, but I want to reposed to this because misunderstands virtue.
Virtue is always a question of an embedded state in the world. Eudaimonia is formed not out of a transcendent notion of a "virtue (whatever that's supposed to mean)," but rather states of the world. It frequently involves attachment to people and things. It always involves self-interest, as the person pursuing their well-being wants to act in such a manner.
Thus, it is also a question of a particular person's certain feeling of happiness. Eudaimonia feels good. When one acts virtuously, with good character, they feel good. By definition, to seek Eudaimonia is to BOTH act for a certain states of existence ( e.g. helping others, being just, being temperate, etc. ) and to feel good (as that feeling is inseparable from acting virtuously). The question of "why act" or "what do I need to gain now by action" isn't present. Virtue is performed for itself, in which is embedded both the state of action and what it achieves.
Both 2. and 3. have always been part of virtue. It is misleading to describe it as "limited hedonism" because virtue is not merely a question of seeking what feels good. Feeling good may be sought all the time, but it is not merely the generation of that feeling which defines an act as good.
I think this is not a realistic view of human psychology, but okay. The wider point is that you can't derive a 'do' from a 'should.' People do what they more or less have to, not what they abstractly feel they ought to.
Quoting Marchesk
To know what the good is, and to live well. If you can't imagine a way for that to happen that's not on the model of a command, then that's your failing.
Quoting Marchesk
But you literally do. People do whatever they do, whether it's 'right' or 'wrong;' that's just a tautology. There is no other standard for what you do than, whatever you want, or more accurately whatever you do. That is not a moral injunction of some sort ('do whatever you want'), but just a plain fact.
— Marchesk
Quoting The Great Whatever
Hmmmm, not a realistic view of human psychology, you say,
It seems that what we are going to do is influenced by what we were just told to do, think we should do, what we want to do, what we think other people expect us to do (whether we think we should, or want to do that) what we are in the habit of doing, what we know how to do, and what we are afraid of doing. On a bad day, these are all in play at once.
We experience conflict in deciding what to do because we have wishes and we have ethics. No wishes, no ethics, no conflicts. Even if we have no ethics (rare) we find that we can't satisfy all our wishes at once (common).
What we end up doing depends on ethics, wishes, and external factors. Cameras and lights are likely to reduce the opportunities for action. Supervisors on the floor strengthen our performance of doing what is expected of us. Low grade temptations are easy to resist. "I wouldn't think of stealing your disgusting lunch." Given the cover of darkness or solitude, lots of high quality temptations, and our ethics may not stand the test.
In general, we are a little more crooked than we will admit. (But... we're not psychopaths because we do feel guilty, quite often.)
I don't think you sufficiently answered my questions above and you make a few more perplexing claims. How is "virtue" good in itself other than self-reference to itself which is to say no explanation. Is it because it is helping others? Why is building a good character "good" other than it looks good to other people? If you say, because it just is, you mine as well reference religion. If you say because it feels good to oneself, then you are not addressing my question of what happens if someone does not feel good being completely virtuous? Notice, I left room for virtue but added to this is the idea that a life worth living also has to include the "preferred indifferents", not just virtue in and of itself.
Prove it is a brute fact.
What is good then? That doesn't make sense. Good is virtue is not like saying ice cream is ice cream. The latter is a fact, the former is an opinion.
Also, this is a circularity because there is no "why it is good". Something is good because it is pleasurable, because people are emotionally happier, people have pleasant feelings, people feel a sense of community, there is a sense of wholeness, suffering is being reduced, etc. There is a sense that virtue needs to lead to something where, let's say something like ice cream does not.
It is more than that. Something is good because it is a state of existence which is the moment of pleasure, pleasant feeling, sense of community, sense wholeness, the absence of suffering, etc., etc. Good cannot be given without the action or state of existence which constitutes the moment of good. The point of virtue is it leads nowhere. One doesn't have to go anywhere because they are present in a good state in the moment. That's is well-being. I can't have the pleasant feelings of sense of wholeness from making this past without making this post. I can't have the pleasure of eating a raspberry without the moment of eating a raspberry. It is not merely about what I get, but about what I do and what I am too.
The idea of "why it is good" is exactly what virtue is trying to get past. Virtue is, indeed, about being in one-place (well-being) rather than another, but it is not about "trying to get somewhere." One doesn't need to go anywhere, for they are already there, in the moment where, they are virtuous.
Notions that one must "get to" a good state though action are poisonous. That's Will. One's never content because however they exist, they are obsessed about obtaining the next moment, about getting to the "why it is good" which not the state of existence of an action. The sense virtue needs to lead somewhere is entirely your sense of what human life and action needs to be about. It's not how virtue ethics work.
That's incoherent because the presence of virtue is not defined sans one's feelings. Virtue cannot be present in such a state because the individual feels terrible. Well-being is not present. I did not address it directly because, I thought, I covered that point by pointing out virtue isn't defined irrespective of our feelings, as it makes "acting virtuously" while "feeling no good" impossible.
And what distinguishes that line of argument from mere existence by definition? We can apply bruteness to anything we like and then when challenged, just say that it's true by definition.
In addition, the 'shoulds' are philosophically uninteresting, because in principle they can't lead anywhere. Trying to argue that people actually do use them to lead somewhere isn't so relevant for a philosophical defense of a certain kind of ethics.
I think the question is wrong. Something that is "good" in my eyes, must necessarily include the "meaningful".
I disagree. That is why we have principles, in arts as diverse as love-making, seduction, or making war. We use them to guide our actions. A principle itself can be formless, and thus allow for the infinity of techniques available to be included under it. However, keeping a principle in mind, allows the mind to be focused on what is necessary for achieving one's goal.
In fact, I would go forth and employ @180 Proof's concept of metaphysics being a determination of elements of the "empty set" to say that the role a principle plays is simply to determine and focus the mind on the possible and useful and away from the impossible and useless :) Without principle, the mind is confused, and not efficient.
So what's the point? A man cannot drink all the vodka in the world. One has the opportunity to enjoy a great sensual relationship because he has forfeited the opportunity to become a great philosopher, or a world-conqueror, opportunities that simply aren't available to him precisely because he's busy enjoying that relationship instead of preparing to do anything else. Who is to say which is preferable? One cannot know if becoming a great philosopher is better than having a great sensual relationship, or the other way around, unless they can do both. But nobody can do everything there is to do. Therefore no one can know which activity is better than any other. However, we are each constrained by circumstances... the circumstances of one demand that he be in a sensual relationship, the circumstances of another that he discover the secrets of nature, the circumstances of yet another that he become a leader of men. Each shall go forth and do his duty, which is preferable to wondering about which is the better path - the latter option will ensure that no path is taken, and hence even the possibility of the good forfeited.
This cannot be determined for the reasons I have illustrated before. But if you require yet another argument, here it goes. A man cannot experience all of life, and cannot exhaust all its possibilities. Hence, to say that life is non-ideal means by implication that one has determined with certainty that life's possibilities hold nothing good. But how can one make such a determination outside the bounds of experience? And even if one could, how can one go forth and attempt to fight for this "negatively defined" ideal, which is, in truth, incoherent and unimaginable to begin with - how can he judge the world in front of this standard, which is completely impossible? I will respond about world-weariness in the other thread :)
http://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/171/on-weltschmerz#Item_3
As I stated in the other thread:
Even if pleasure is the only inherent good:
It can certainly be stated that:
-pleasures can change with circumstance.
-preferred pleasures can often be frustrated or not achieved
-some pleasures lead to pain
-preferred pleasures are not distributed evenly in human lives.
Perennial strategies for dealing with non-evenly distributed pleasures include:
-trying not to be attached to achieving pleasures
-trying to aim one's focus on something different than one's preferences for pleasure
Possible complications with strategies:
-trying not to be attached to achieving pleasures may be an impossibility in terms (except if one has conditions like anhedonia or are on certain drugs perhaps?)
-trying to aim one's focus on something different than one's preferences for pleasures may be an impossibility. One may SUPPRESS one's pursuit of one's preferences for pleasures, but it may not really get rid of one's frustration. One can conceive of a sage that suppresses all pursuits of pleasure, but then even this is a preference for the pleasure of not having pleasure, and this too can be frustrated thus going back to the idea that not all suffering is distributed evenly.
Yes, but why did he become unsatisfied and remained attached to his ideal of a romantic relationship? Why did he go on preferring it? And if he indeed preferred it, why did he not mobilise his intelligence, and train in order to make it a reality? Perhaps he lacked intelligence, perhaps he lacked courage, who knows. But the fault doesn't lie with the world, it lies with him. Either due to lack of ability, or due to obstinacy in clinging to the desire of something that was unfit to his nature.
Of course there are tragedies, which are bad and can't be avoided, but even in those cases there are good things that would not have been POSSIBLE (note that I did not say happen) lest for the tragedy.
Can you conceive of a circumstance where nothing simply works out? Some people don't have the capacity (even with effort), or do not have the right contingent conditions. Saying that just putting in more effort will make anything happen is naive at best and dishonest at worst. Also, it may be nigh impossible to change one's preferences so easily as you imply here. Oh, I am unable to do this, move on. I agree one can think it up and talk about it, I just don't think it is something I have seen very often in practice. It is also extremely hard to get information because it is anecdotal and relies heavily on what people say. People can be internally frustrated but not show this externally.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Many things seem impossible to the untrained. Of course, some things really are impossible. That is why the wisdom to distinguish the two is required. Different things are to be done in both cases.
Why not rather find a way to achieve what you want? That requires intelligence and work, but who says it can't be done? It certainly took intelligence, courage, and work for Alexander the Great to build his empire... most would have said it's impossible when asked. Sure after you achieve what you want, you'll want something else. Why is that a problem? Just employ your intelligence again, and find a way to achieve it. This is the lot allotted to us mortals.
So my points are as follows:
1. In most situations, what one desires is not impossible to achieve, nevertheless, most lack the wisdom to determine this. Hence it is important to develop such wisdom.
2. If it is possible, then one must develop the right strategies, and find the right tactics/techniques of implementation to achieve their aims. All this requires knowledge of the right principles, which can help guide one and focus one's mind on the important aspects at hand.
3. If it is not possible, then one must consider what possibilities are opened up by this impossibility, and hence pursue the possibility that they deem best, using the same way outlined in 2.
4. If the situation is inescapable, and absolutely nothing can be done, one being guaranteed to effectively be killed or gravely impaired by the situation, then one must face it with courage and virtue, taking care to maintain the last freedom one still has.
That is a bit fairytale sounding. A lot of time other circumstances are available, but they were not ranked as the most preferable. Again, I refer you back to the idea that one may suppress their preference, it doesn't mean they weren't frustrated or disappointed.
Quoting Agustino
Ok, so we both agree some things are impossible given contingencies of capacity and environment of the individual.
Quoting Agustino
I feel this doesn't need comment. I don't think the outcome is always "meeting our preferences" simply by intelligence, courage, and work which AGAIN may be different for different people. Not everyone can be an Einstein or Edison. If that was one's goal. Perhaps no matter how hard you try, it just doesn't work. Same with relationships, etc. etc.
Quoting Agustino
Right, and this is not easy as you say. You just moved the goal post from the actual achievement being hard to the development of wisdom being hard. If one is the key to the other, they are both hard to achieve.
Quoting Agustino
This is what many people do to achieve their goals. It is not saying anything that new. Also, goals don't just happen because you have a plan. Also, this is essentially what you said before with wisdom and thus falls under the same critique- you have moved the goal post from achieving the goal to achieving the right strategy to achieve the goal.
Quoting Agustino
This is what people do. It doesn't mean that the original preference wasn't more preferable.
Quoting Agustino
This just sounds like a way to impress people. It won't matter once you're dead.
But surely, if new possibilities open up, they should be investigated, otherwise one may miss a possibility which is actually preferable to the one which one is currently holding on to.
Quoting schopenhauer1
How do you know this prior to trying? Again, it just betrays a lack of confidence, and self-doubt, and lack of courage to pursue one's ambitions.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Sure, I never said excellency would be easy. If salvation were at hand, as Spinoza wrote, everyone would achieve it. But it is as difficult as it is rare.
Quoting schopenhauer1
Surely it doesn't. But to have a preference for that which is impossible is just silly. It is the sign of a mind that doesn't function properly, and it is alike having a preference to have been a fish, or a lion, or why not a rock? So if whatever you have a preference for becomes impossible, then how can you still have a preference for it?
Quoting schopenhauer1
But I'm not doing that to impress anyone, or because it would matter after I'm dead. It matters in the moment that I do that. I feel better if I do that, then if I don't.