Ontology of Time

Quoting Tom Storm

Your general thesis doesn't seem that difficult to follow.

No, very easy to follow...just very difficult to agree with.

Quoting Janus

When are you going to wake up to the fact that I understand Kastrup's 'arguments' perfectly well, and yet do not agree, in fact find them nonsensical

Kastrup has PhD's in computer science and philosophy.

Where Kastrup entered the conversation again, was in the other thread, as the commentary you provided on Wittgenstein was from Kastrup's website, The Essentia Foundation. It contained this paragraph:

Moreover, not only is Wittgenstein self-conscious about the contingency of our sense-making; he is also self-conscious about a problematical idealism that it seems to entail, where by ‘idealism’ is meant the view that what we make sense of is dependent on how we make sense of it[Editor’s note: this is not the objective idealism promoted by Essentia Foundation, which does entail the existence of states of affairs that are not contingent on human cognition].

That was what prompted me to google 'Objective idealism', and the quote I gave here, was from an essay by Kastrup on that subject. It was provided to distinguish objective idealism from the trivalising way in which it is generally depicted as implying 'the world is the product of an individual's mind' or is 'all in the mind'.

Quoting Banno

what values does Kastrup set for each point in the subjective field?

Bernardo Kastrup's 'field of subjectivity' is a way of describing mind or consciousess as a universal that manifests through manifold particular forms. In plain language, he's saying that what we think of as individual minds—your or my consciousness, that of living beings generally—are not completely separate but rather are localized within a broader, all-encompassing field of awareness. But that should be a separate discussion. I brought up Kastrup because of a comment made in another thread.

Quoting Janus

In any case it is implausible that quantum mechanics has any determinable implications for the metaphysical realism vs idealism debate.

:rofl: The 'nature of the wave function' is the single most outstanding philosophical problem thrown up by quantum physics. To this day, Nobel-prize winning theorists still do not agree on what it is, and that disagreement is completely metaphysical as a matter of definition (i.e. cannot be resolved by observation, but related to the meaning of what has been observed.)

Reply to Tom Storm Thank you Tom.

Quoting Wayfarer

The 'nature of the wave function' is the single most outstanding philosophical problem thrown up by quantum physics. To this day, Nobel-prize winning theorists still do not agree on what it is, that that disagreement is completely metaphysical.

Quantum physics is a physical, not a metaphysical science...it is the paradigmatic physical science. What is observed is the behavior of putative microphysical entities. The disagreement about how to understand some of that behavior is not surprising, given that we have no reason to assume that the microphysical can be conceptualized using ideas that evolved in the macroworld.

Quoting Wayfarer

Bernardo Kastrup's 'field of subjectivity' is a way of describing mind or consciousess as a universal manifests through manifold particular forms. In plain language, he's saying that what we think of as individual minds—your or my consciousness, that of living beings generally—are not completely separate but rather are localized within a broader, all-encompassing field of awareness.

Which is not physics. That's becasue in physics a field is a space with a value at every point. If he does not present a way to understand what that value might be, he is talking through his hat.

And if he is not doing physics, then we ought not see his expertise in physics as supporting his argument.

Quoting Wayfarer

:rofl: The 'nature of the wave function' is the single most outstanding philosophical problem thrown up by quantum physics. To this day, Nobel-prize winning theorists still do not agree on what it is, that that disagreement is completely metaphysical.

The bit where you think you have the answer, but don't.

Quoting Bernardo Kastrup

under objective idealism there is nothing outside subjectivity, for the whole of existence is reducible to the patterns of excitation of the one universal field of subjectivity.

@Wayfarer

This could be so, and is similar to Whitehead.

Again, consider Einstein's Block Universe as a broadcast of the experiential…

Quoting Banno

The bit where you think you have the answer, but don't.

No worse than thinking there's no question.

Quoting Wayfarer

No worse than thinking there's no question.

There's a difference between recognising a question and accepting an answer. Sure there's a question here - a profound one. But you jump to a conclusion that does not work.

Handwaving waffle about physical fields of subjective experience does not help. It's too easy to show it to be garbage.

Reply to Banno As I said - it's simply an analogy. The atoms of physicalism are nowadays understood as 'excitations of fields'. The fact that the mind might be understood in terms of an excitation of a field is analogous. That is all.

Quoting PoeticUniverse

This could be so, and is similar to Whitehead.

Quite right .

Quoting Wayfarer

t's simply an analogy.

Then it doesn't help. Those "excitations of fields" have a value. What is the value of the subjective field three centimetres in front of of you nose?

Quoting Bernardo Kastrup

...the whole of existence is reducible to the patterns of excitation of the one universal field of subjectivity.

That's not presenting an analog. Calling it an analogy is what folk do when their explanation doesn't work. so that they can follow up with "you just don't understand... you can't see the analogy"

Like you did earlier.

Quoting Banno

What is the value of the subjective field three centimetres in front of of you nose?

The question is not apt, because the subject is ‘that to whom experience occurs’. The subject never appears as ‘that’. Another person may appear objective to you, but the fact that you refer to them with proper pronouns (he or she) recognises that they too are subjects of experience.

I can see I’ve opened a can of worms by bringing in Kastrup. I might start another thread on him. But I’m logging out for the evening, have a nice one.

Reply to Wayfarer The question is not apt because the notion of a field of subjective experience fails to match with what is meant by "field" in physics. It has no values.


Cheers. Have a good evening.

Reply to Banno Couldn’t resist - the values are qualitative. Hence, qualia. And goodnight.

Reply to Wayfarer :razz:

Not helping.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

Of course we're going to notice the difference, it changes the pitch. It's like Alvin and The Chipmunks. They take a recording and speed it up. It's noticeably not normal.

How do you know slowed or fastened reproduction of the music is not normal? I was pointing out, it is a priori concept of temporality in our minds which can tell they are not normal, rather than the music itself.
Hence human mind has innate temporal knowledge of time? Would you agree?

There is no ontology of time, simply because time as an independent entity simply does not exist.
Time is a concept derived from the change, the flux, the process and becoming of nature.
In a universe where there was no activity, no flux, the concept of time or the word time would simply become meaningless. Much the same could be said of the concept of empty space (no such thing).

Quoting Janus

When are you going to wake up to the fact that I understand Kastrup's 'arguments' perfectly well, and yet do not agree, in fact find them nonsensical.

You ought to consider that if an author's arguments appear nonsensical to you, you in fact, do not understand the author. This is because to understand requires acknowledging what the author intends, and no author intends to argue nonsense. So if you find an author's arguments to be nonsensical it implies that you do not understand the author.

Quoting Banno

A field is a mathematical function assigning a value to every point in the given space.

Quoting Banno

That's becasue in physics a field is a space with a value at every point.

Quoting Banno

The question is not apt because the notion of a field of subjective experience fails to match with what is meant by "field" in physics. It has no values.

You are clearly not distinguishing between "field" in mathematics, and "field" in physics. In physics, "the field" is the thing represented by the mathematical field. Here, you are insisting that the mathematical function called "field", is the field in physics. That is incorrect.

This is explained quite well by physicist Richard Feynman for example, when he explains how an electrical charge moves through the electromagnetic "field" which surrounds a copper wire, rather than moving through the copper wire itself. This is the principle which drives the induction motor for example.

Now, the field is active, and this activity is represented by the changing values of the mathematical representation. What "a field" actually is, is not well understood by physicists. The field is active, and the activity of the field is understood, and represented as if it is a wave activity. That wave representation allows for predictive capacity. However, since the medium of these waves (the aether) has not been identified, the supposed "field" itself, within which the apparent waves are active, remains elusive to the human intellect.

Since "a field" in physics refers to a thing (not a mathematical construct but what is represented by that construct), and the existence of this thing has not been supported by principles which are logically coherent, its essence (what it is) remains a matter of speculation. This allows many different metaphysical theories, (such as the one Wayfarer proposes) to propagate.

Quoting Corvus

How do you know slowed or fastened reproduction of the music is not normal? I was pointing out, it is a priori concept of temporality in our minds which can tell they are not normal, rather than the music itself.
Hence human mind has innate temporal knowledge of time? Would you agree?

No, I do not agree with this. If the music is sped up or slowed down only a miniscule amount, I cannot tell the difference without comparison to a designated "normal". If given two different samples, of the same piece, one altered slightly, I would not be able to tell which one, I would be guessing.

In fact, fifty or sixty years ago it was common practise for recording artists to alter the speed a little bit, in some songs they released. As a listener you would never know that a song was altered, until you tried to play along, and found out that you had to change the tuning of your instrument.

So I do not believe it is an innate ability to recognize that the speed of a recording has been altered. I believe that to recognize that the speed has been altered requires comparison with some designated "normal". So this ability is a feature of learning how to compare a sample with a "normal". This itself, the ability to compare a sample with a normal, may be an innate knowledge, but it is a general capacity, and doesn't amount to the specific "temporal knowledge" which you are talking about.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

No, I do not agree with this. If the music is sped up or slowed down only a miniscule amount, I cannot tell the difference without comparison to a designated "normal". If given two different samples, of the same piece, one altered slightly, I would not be able to tell which one, I would be guessing.

I wonder if you are familiar with Led Zeppelin's Stairway to Heaven song. If you are, then the above recordings will demonstrate that they sound totally different from the top (30% slowed down) and bottom (normal) guitar solo in the song. And one can tell which one is the normal speed. and which one is slowed down in speed.

If you still cannot tell the difference, either you have never listened to Led Zepps in your life, or you are a tone deaf. :D

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

but it is a general capacity,

A general capacity for what? It sounds vague and unclear.

Quoting Corvus

If you still cannot tell the difference, either you have never listened to Led Zepps in your life, or you are a tone deaf.

You are comparing it to the norm.

Quoting Corvus

A general capacity for what? It sounds vague and unclear.

The general capacity to compare something to a norm. You don't seem to be paying attention to my post.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

You are comparing it to the norm.

Of course all comparison needs criteria for what is norm. If not, how can you compare anything?

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

The general capacity to compare something to a norm. You don't seem to be paying attention to my post.

Well, if you played the above 2x recordings to someone (a indigenous tribe man in a jungle or someone who doesn't like western classic rock music) who never listened the song in his life or a tone deaf, then he won't be able to tell the difference. In that case, where is the general capacity?

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

You don't seem to be paying attention to my post.

I do. But when I see vague points or ambiguities in the post, I will point them out. :)

Quoting Corvus

Of course all comparison needs criteria for what is norm. If not, how can you compare anything?

So the point is that the ability to recognize a piece of music as at a speed other than the norm, is not an innate ability. It requires the criteria of the example which serves as the norm, and this example is not provided innately.

Quoting Corvus

Well, if you played the above 2x recordings to someone (a indigenous tribe man in a jungle or someone who doesn't like western classic rock music) who never listened the song in his life or a tone deaf, then he won't be able to tell the difference. In that case, where is the general capacity?

The general capacity is not demonstrated here, because that capacity is the ability to compare, and there is nothing being compared in this example.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

So the point is that the ability to recognize a piece of music as at a speed other than the norm, is not an innate ability. It requires the criteria of the example which serves as the norm, and this example is not provided innately.

Listening is an empirical sensation, but the judgement on the listened music as normal or not normal is a mental operation from the innate capacity.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

The general capacity is not demonstrated here, because that capacity is the ability to compare, and there is nothing being compared in this example.

Not sure what you mean. There are 2x piece of guitar solos given above in the recording. The top one is 30% slowed down in speed, and the bottom one is the normal one. Anyone can have a listen to both recordings and make comparisons.

Quoting prothero

There is no ontology of time, simply because time as an independent entity simply does not exist.
Time is a concept derived from the change, the flux, the process and becoming of nature.
In a universe where there was no activity, no flux, the concept of time or the word time would simply become meaningless. Much the same could be said of the concept of empty space (no such thing).

Nonexistence is also existence.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

This is explained quite well by physicist Richard Feynman….

“….The fact that the electromagnetic field can possess momentum and energy makes it very real ... a particle makes a field, and a field acts on another particle, and the field has such familiar properties as energy content and momentum, just as particles can have....”
.....A “field” is any physical quantity which takes on different values at different points in space....
.....There have been various inventions to help the mind visualize the behavior of fields. The most correct is also the most abstract: we simply consider the fields as mathematical functions of position and time....”
(Feynman lectures, (CalTech, 1956), in Vol. II, Ch 1.5, 1963)
————-

Quoting Wayfarer

I can see I’ve opened a can of worms….

Nahhhh…I get it. Pretty simple, really. It all begins with an idea, in this case, “fields”. Forgetting the altogether unremarkable commonplace rendition of field as merely grass-y ground, the idea of fields as “quantitative values in space” or fields as “subjectivity”, are nothing but the idea under which distinguishing conceptions are subsumed, but without contradicting the bare notion itself.

This field possesses, e.g., momentum and energy, that field possesses, e.g., sensibility and discursive/aesthetic judgement;
This field is the condition of every object to which it relates, that field is the condition of every subject to which it relates;
That the relations are different does not contradict the validity of the respective conditions. That every particular kind of thing called a subject belongs to a subjectivity field is no less logically coherent than every particular kind of thing called an electron belongs to an electromagnetic field.

Whether that’s of any benefit or not, whether there’s any explanatory gain…..dunno. As my ol’ buddy Stephen says…..nobody’s right if everybody’s wrong.

Reply to Metaphysician Undercover You are not the person to be giving out physics lessons.

Quoting Wayfarer

. . . excitation of the one universal field of subjectivity.

From math to woo. A little like the aether.

Reply to jgill Reply to Banno Particles are the excitations of electromagnetic fields. But particle physics is wholly quantitative, it deals only with the measurable attributes of observed phenomena, something which is axiomatic to science generally. In physicalist philosophy, the observer is seen as being a consequence or outcome of those observed quantitative phenomena. But such observations leave out the subjective reality of existence and the role of the observing scientist, as a matter of principle. Which is why the qualitative nature of conscious experience is anomalous in this overall worldview, hence the significance of David Chalmer's 1996 paper on that topic.

Objective idealism begins from different premisses. It doesn't begin with the presumption that the quantifiable objects of empirical science are foundational or fundamental and that the observing mind can be explained with reference to them. In a sense, it incorporates the Cartesian principle of the primacy of mind, cogito ergo sum - that the existence of the observer can't plausibly be denied - even while eschewing the infamous mind-matter division that is also Cartesian. It points out that whatever is observed, measured, known, is always observed, measured and known by an observer, who as a matter of definition is not amongst the objects of analysis.

Aside from Bernardo Kastrup, other objective idealists are C S Peirce and (arguably) Plato (although the term 'idealism' was not coined until the early modern period.)

Reply to Mww :up:

Quoting Wayfarer

Particles are the excitations of electromagnetic fields.

The electromagnetic field has vector values at every point in space. Photons are ripples in the field - the photon can be described by a frequency and a direction, or by its energy - values in that field.

If there is a field of subjectivity or consciousness or whatever, it would need to be defined by the values attached to the points in space across which the field is spread. Presumably zero for empty space, and then... what? How will subjectivity be measured or calculated? What are it's units?

Moreover, if it has no units, and yet is somehow to explain the physical world, how does one get from the field of subjectivity to the measurable values of the electromagnetic field? Where do they come from? What equations show the relation here?

An issue not unlike that faced by Cartesian dualism in its inability to explain how one consciously moves one's hand.

I still call bullshit.

And I don't think much of his friends.

Quoting Wayfarer

. . . excitation of the one universal field of subjectivity.

Isn't this a religious-like flaw of begging the question or an infinite regress?

Our consciousness is Hard to understand, so we push it onto a Greater Consciousness as the experiential basis underlying reality, making it really HARD.

Why presume the ultra complex as First when we can see the simplex as First and the more complex as coming later?

Quoting Mww

“….The fact that the electromagnetic field can possess momentum and energy makes it very real ... a particle makes a field, and a field acts on another particle, and the field has such familiar properties as energy content and momentum, just as particles can have....”
.....A “field” is any physical quantity which takes on different values at different points in space....
.....There have been various inventions to help the mind visualize the behavior of fields. The most correct is also the most abstract: we simply consider the fields as mathematical functions of position and time....”

You do see here that the points of the field each have an associated value, don't you?

So the question is, what are the values in the supposed field of subjectivity?

Quoting Banno

ou are not the person to be giving out physics lessons.

I was not giving a physics lesson, only pointing out your equivocation with the word "field".

Quoting Wayfarer

Particles are the excitations of electromagnetic fields.

Photons are the excitations of the electromagnetic field. Each different type of particle has its own type of field. The real difficulty for quantum physics is in establishing the relations between one field and another. For instance, quarks and gluons are supposed to be distinct fields, essentially massless, yet through the strong nuclear force they make up hadrons which are massive. And due to the nature of the strong nuclear force they cannot actually be separated in practise.

[quote=Wikipedia]After a limiting distance (about the size of a hadron) has been reached, it remains at a strength of about 10000 N, no matter how much farther the distance between the quarks.[7]:?164? As the separation between the quarks grows, the energy added to the pair creates new pairs of matching quarks between the original two; hence it is impossible to isolate quarks.[/quote]

So the gluon "field" actually represents the strong nuclear force which is responsible for creating massive hadrons from quarks which are almost massless.

The interaction between quarks and gluons is responsible for almost all the perceived mass of protons and neutrons and is therefore where we get our mass.

https://www.energy.gov/science/doe-explainsquarks-and-gluons

Quoting Banno

Moreover, if it has no units, how does one get from the field of subjectivity to the measurable values of the electromagnetic field? Where do they come from?

Since fields are massless, the real question is where does mass come from.

Quoting PoeticUniverse

. . . excitation of the one universal field of subjectivity.
— Wayfarer

Isn't this a religious-like flaw of begging the question or an infinite regress?

It would take a lot more explanation, or conversely, a great deal more reading, to elaborate on what this means, and as the various contributors here think it's all bullshit, I'm not inclined to try. There are plenty of other topics to talk about.

Reply to Wayfarer Well, you asked...

Quoting Janus

The argument that we all operate with similar mental structures cannot explain more than the common ways in which we perceive and experience, it cannot explain the common content of our experience. I've lost count of how many times that point has remained unaddressed or glossed over.

In any case we cannot understand those structures other than via science, and in vivo they are precognitive, part of the in itself, which would indicate that the in itself has structure, and so is not undifferentiated at all. Structure without differentiation is logically impossible.

If structure exists independently of any mind, then it exists independently of all minds, unless there is a collective mind, and we have, and could have, no evidence of such a thing.

The 'collective mind' is not a separate entity, not some ghostly blob hovering over culture. It's more like expressions such as “the European mind” or “the Western mind.” In these cases, there are, on the one hand, individual minds—each with its own personality and proclivities—but also a vast pool of meanings, references, and, of course, language, which is common to all of them. That is the 'collective' nature of mind, and it closely resembles ideas found in Hegel’s philosophy.

Whereas Kant emphasizes that knowledge is shaped by the individual mind’s cognitive structures, Hegel highlights the collective dimension of knowledge. For Hegel, knowledge is not merely an individual achievement but emerges through historical and social processes—hence concepts like the Zeitgeist (spirit of the times). There is a tension between individual perspectives and the need for universal concepts. This is why, in Hegelian thought, consciousness develops dialectically: individuals grasp reality through immediate, personal experience, but this experience must be mediated by shared categories of thought and language. The ideas we have of the world are not merely personal; they are shaped by a linguistic and conceptual framework that has been historically developed through collective reasoning and cultural transmission.

As for the concern about the common content of experience, the explanation lies in the interplay between shared cognitive structures and intersubjective meaning. While universal cognitive structures explain how we perceive, the content of our experience - and therefore the meaning we attribute to them - is influenced by common linguistic categories, shared cultural contexts, and biological constraints. This does not require positing a separate “collective mind” but simply recognizes that cognition is always situated within a web of inherited meanings and social interactions.

Finally, regarding whether this perspective can be empirically proven—this is not an empirical hypothesis but an interpretive model of epistemology. It is not something that can be tested in a laboratory but rather a framework for understanding how knowledge and meaning emerge in human experience. Demanding empirical validation for such conceptual frameworks is again an appeal to verificationism, a discredited aspect of positivism.

Quoting Wayfarer

The 'collective mind' is not a separate entity, not some ghostly blob hovering over culture. It's more like expressions such as “the European mind” or “the Western mind.”

Right, it's an abstract entity, an idea, not an ontologically substantive being then. Commonalities of conceptual schemas and worldviews, which do of course evolve and even radically change over time, as I already said cannot Quoting Janus

explain the common content of our experience.

so you haven't really answered the question.

Quoting Wayfarer

Finally, regarding whether this perspective can be empirically proven—this is not an empirical hypothesis but an interpretive model of epistemology. It is not something that can be tested in a laboratory but rather a framework for understanding how knowledge and meaning emerge in human experience. Demanding empirical validation for such conceptual frameworks is again an appeal to verificationism, a discredited aspect of positivism.

Quoting Janus

If structure exists independently of any mind, then it exists independently of all minds, unless there is a collective mind, and we have, and could have, no evidence of such a thing.

I'm not demanding empirical verification for a substantive collective mind, It is clear that empirical evidence in the sense of direct observation would be impossible in principle.

If we were all joined to a real collective mind that could determine the content of perceptual experiences rather than just the forms of perceptual experiences (which is itself explainable by the structural similarities between individual human bodies, brains, and sensory organs) then although that hypothetical entity, just like the individual human mind, could not be directly observed, we might expect to observe so called psychic phenomena that could lead us to infer the existence of such a collective mind.

I already know that the ideas of such collectivities exist, but such entities, if not substantive, are merely abstract concepts. I'm not asking for empirical evidence at all, but for an explanation as to how such socially and historically and biologically mediated commonalities of the forms of human perceptual experience could possibly explain the commonalties of content of human perceptual experience, and that you have certainly not provided. As I see it this is the central weakness in your position. You would be more consistent if you believed in a substantive (not merely abstract) "mind at large" as Kastrup does.

You never fail to mention positivism, apparently in an attempt to discredit what I argue, rather than dealing with it point by point on its own terms. Consequently, I've given up on addressing your posts, and was assuming you would do likewise with mine. However, if you continue to address me and yet still fail to address the critical points, then I will continue to call you out on that.

Quoting Janus

Right, it's an abstract entity, an idea, not an ontologically substantive being then.

You mean, not a thing, therefore, not real. What you mean by 'substantive' means 'can be verified scientifically'. There's no conflict between the fact that ideas and languages change, and that they are real.

Quoting Janus

so you haven't really answered the question.

Just be clear about this: I've answered it, but you either don't understand that answer, or don't accept, the answer. So instead of constantly complaining that I'm evading the question or not answering it, just recognise that. OK, you don't accept it, but don't say I'm not addressing it. I am saying that the cognitive systems through which we view the world are also constitutive of the world we view, meaning that the world is not really mind-independent in the sense that empiricism presumes.

Quoting Janus

You never fail to mention positivism, apparently in an attempt to discredit what I argue, rather than dealing with it point by point on its own terms

Because you constantly appeal to what is empirically verifiable by science as the yardstick for what constitutes real knowledge. If I had time, I could provide many direct quotes from you, saying that. It's not as if I'm accusing you of something radically objectionable: positivism is an identifiable and powerful influence in modern thinking, and you frequently appeal to it and to verificationism. Folllowed by 'and what about OSHO?!?' ;-)

Quoting Wayfarer

You mean, not a thing, therefore, not real. What you mean by 'substantive' means 'can be verified scientifically'. There's no conflict between the fact that ideas and languages change, and that they are real.

Social processes such as general changes of worldview are real, but they only exist in the individuals, books, computers and other media and so on, in which they are instantiated, manifested, recorded.

The fact that you and I may have generally similar perceptual organs, brains and worldviews cannot determine the content of perceptual experience, it can only determine its general form. If you believe that is wrong, then you would need to explain how those commonalities could explain the specific shared content of our perceptual experiences. You haven't done that.

Actually, you and I don't even share the same worldview, and yet I have absolutely no doubt that if we were together, we would be able to confirm that we both see precisely the same things in the surrounding environment.

Quoting Wayfarer

Because you constantly appeal to what is empirically verifiable by science as the yardstick for what constitutes real knowledge.

When it comes to understanding how the physical world works I believe science is the answer. I've already said many times that understanding human or even animal behavior cannot be achieved by physics. I've often said that the physical nature of the world is understood in terms of causes, and animal and human behavior in terms of reasons. So, it's obvious you don't closely read what I write, or at least do not comprehend it.

Quoting Janus

If you believe that is wrong, then you would need to explain how those commonalities could explain the specific shared content of our perceptual experiences. You haven't done that.

The fact that you and I see the same things is precisely because we belong to the same species, language-group, culture, and the rest. I'm not, again, saying that the world exists in your or my mind which is what you think I'm saying. We draw on a common stock of usages, meanings, and so on. But there are times when that breaks down - when individuals from two cultures meet, for example, with completely incommensurable understandings of the same thing, they will see different things. Again, I'm not denying objectivity or that there is an external world, but that all our knowledge of it is mediated.

Quoting Janus

I've already said many times that understanding human or even animal behavior cannot be achieved by physics. I've often said that the physical nature of the world is understood in terms of causes, and animal and human behavior in terms of reasons.

But you also say that those reasons are individual, that they're subjective, that they're matters of individual opinion. Again that can be illustrated with reference to your own entries. The point about philosophy generally, is to ascertain the nature of that framework - the space of reasons, as it has been called - such that it's not just a matter of opinion or individual proclivities. Metaphysics, originally, was intended as the foundation of that enquiry, the 'philosophy of philosophy'.

Quoting Wayfarer

The fact that you and I see the same things is precisely because we belong to the same species, language-group, culture, and the rest.

I think that is wrong or at least incomplete: you are leaving out the things which are actually in the world. Species, language-group, culture cannot determine what is there to be perceived. I know form observing their behavior that my dogs perceive the same environment I do, even though I cannot say how exactly the things in the environment look to them or even, for that matter to another person.

Quoting Wayfarer

Again, I'm not denying objectivity or that there is an external world, but that all our knowledge of it is mediated.

I've never denied that the ways in which we see things, the things we notice, as opposed to what is there to be noticed is mediated, as I've already said by biology and culture and even individual differences. An artist will notice different things in the natural environment than the hunter for example, but it doesn't follow that they inhabit different environments

Quoting Wayfarer

But you also say that those reasons are individual, that they're subjective, that they're matters of individual opinion. Again that can be illustrated with reference to your own entries.

Do you seriously want to deny that there are differences between individuals, that people may do different things for the same reasons and the same things for different reasons?
.

Quoting Janus

I know form observing their behavior that my dogs perceive the same environment I do

Something that is not in question.

Quoting Janus

Do you seriously want to deny that there are differences between individuals, that people may do different things for the same reasons and the same things for different reasons?

That's not relevant. What I'm criticizing is the view that matters OTHER than those that can be measured scientifically - such as values - are, therefore, up to the individual, that they're essentially subjective in nature.

Quoting Wayfarer

Something that is not in question.

What is your explanation for that? Quoting Wayfarer

species, language-group, culture

don't suffice.

Quoting Wayfarer

But you also say that those reasons are individual, that they're subjective, that they're matters of individual opinion.

Quoting Wayfarer

Do you seriously want to deny that there are differences between individuals, that people may do different things for the same reasons and the same things for different reasons?
— Janus

That's not relevant.

Well then what was your point?

Quoting Janus

Something that is not in question.
— Wayfarer

What is your explanation for that?
species, language-group, culture
— Wayfarer
don't suffice.

Everything we know about reality is shaped by our own mental faculties—space, time, causality, and substance are not "out there" in the world itself but are the conditions of experience. So when you blithely assume that

Quoting Janus

I've often said that the physical nature of the world is understood in terms of causes

In what does that causality inhere? Wittgenstein remarks that 'At the basis of the whole modern view of the world lies the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena.' Why does he call it an illusion? I say it's because the perception of causal relations is itself mind-dependent. It is because we can form ideas of what things are, and then perceive the necessary relations of ideas, that we can establish causality in the first place. It's not merely 'given' to us in the way that naturalism assumes. Which is also the basis of Husserl's criticism of naturalism:

In contrast to the outlook of naturalism, Husserl believed all knowledge,
all science, all rationality depended on conscious acts, acts which cannot
be properly understood from within the natural outlook at all. Consciousness
should not be viewed naturalistically as part of the world at all, since
consciousness is precisely the reason why there was a world there for us in
the first place. For Husserl it is not that consciousness creates the world in
any ontological sense—this would be a subjective idealism, itself a
consequence of a certain naturalising tendency whereby consciousness is
cause and the world its effect—but rather that the world is opened up, made
meaningful, or disclosed through consciousness. The world is inconceivable
apart from consciousness. Treating consciousness as part of the world,
reifying consciousness, is precisely to ignore consciousness’s foundational,
disclosive role. For this reason, all natural science is naive about its point
of departure, for Husserl (PRS 85; Hua XXV 13). Since consciousness is
presupposed in all science and knowledge, then the proper approach to the
study of consciousness itself must be a transcendental one—one which, in
Kantian terms, focuses on the conditions for the possibility of knowledge,
...

Quoting Wayfarer

Everything we know about reality is shaped by our own mental faculties—space, time, causality, and substance are not "out there" in the world itself but are the conditions of experience.

You are blithely assuming that. How do you know it's true?

Quoting Wayfarer

In what does that causality inhere?

From the point of view of science that question doesn't matter. It may well be unanswerable. Whatever the explanation, the fact is clear that we understand the physical world in terms of causation, which includes both local processes and effects and global conditions.

Quoting Wayfarer

'At the basis of the whole modern view of the world lies the illusion that the so-called laws of nature are the explanations of natural phenomena.'

As I read that he's just pointing out that the so-called laws of nature don't explain anything—they are merely formulations that generalize observed regularities. 'The Law of Gravity" doesn't explain anything it is just a statement that gravity always obtains and does not explain why gravity obtains. Newton was puzzled by such 'action at a distance'. Then Einstein came along and spoke of spacetime as a real existent thing that could be warped by mass, leading to the gravitational phenomena we observe. But again, this does not explain what mass is or why it warps spacetime or how we can visualize three dimensional space warping into a fourth dimension.

Science doesn't explain everything. It might even be said it doesn't really explain much, but it's the best we have, and it's really just an extension of ordinary observation and understanding. Of course, when you consider all the sciences it does form a vast and mostly coherent body of knowledge and understanding. We can understand how things work without needing to understand why they work the way they do in any absolute sense. The search for absolute knowledge appears to be a vain pursuit.

The Husserlian approach, and the phenomenological approach in general I am fairly familiar with on account of a long history of reading and study. It is rightly only concerned with the character of human experience, and as such it brackets metaphysical questions such as the mind-independent existence of the external world. Whether phenomenology yields any useful or substantive knowledge is a matter of debate. If Husserl makes absolutist metaphysical pronouncements based on how things seem to us, then for my money he oversteps the bounds of cogent reasoning. In any case I don't have much interest in phenomenology anymore since it didn't for me, to the extent I studied it, yield any knowledge I found to be particularly useful or illuminating.

Science for me offers a far more interesting, rich and complex body of knowledge. I'm not concerned with questions of 'materialism vs idealism' or 'realism vs antirealism' because I think these questions are not definitively decidable. I have views which are based on what I find most plausible, but I acknowledge that there are not definitive criteria for plausibility, which are not based on the very presumptions which are in question.

Apart from an interest in science and the arts, my main interest is the cultivation of critical thinking. That's the only reason I post on here—to hone those skills as well as my writing skills in general.

Quoting Janus

Everything we know about reality is shaped by our own mental faculties—space, time, causality, and substance are not "out there" in the world itself but are the conditions of experience.
— Wayfarer

You are blithely assuming that. How do you know it's true?

It's not an assumption, it is a philosophical observation and nowadays with ample support from cognitive science.

Quoting Janus

In what does that causality inhere?
— Wayfarer

From the point of view of science that question doesn't matter. It may well be unanswerable. Whatever the explanation, the fact is clear that we understand the physical world in terms of causation, which includes both local processes and effects and global conditions.

Right! 'The question doesn't matter'. And yet, you continually defer to science as the arbiter for philosophy.

Quoting Janus

The Husserlian approach, and the phenomenological approach in general I am fairly familiar with on account of a long history of reading and study. It is rightly only concerned with the character of human experience, and as such it brackets metaphysical questions such as the mind-independent existence of the external world.

But notice that Husserl says that consciousness is foundationally involved in world-disclosure, meaning that the idea of a world apart from consciousness is inconceivable in any meaningful way. That is the salient point.

Quoting Janus

I'm not concerned with questions of 'materialism vs idealism' or 'realism vs antirealism' because I think these questions are not definitively decidable.

But you have long since made up your mind, going on what you say.

Quoting Wayfarer

It's not an assumption, it is a philosophical observation and nowadayds with ample support from cognitive science.

Nonsense you don't know they're not "out there"...how could you when such knowledge is impossible in principle according to your own arguments?

Quoting Wayfarer

Right! 'The question doesn't matter'. And yet, you continually defer to science as the arbiter for philosophy.

That's bullshit too. I'm always saying that much about the human cannot be understood adequately by science. The only areas I would say that science has something to contribute to philosophy would be metaphysics and epistemology. Certainly not ethics or aesthetics.

The great irony is that you are always saying I don't understand your position, when I do very well since I used to hold a very similar position myself, whereas you constantly show by your misrepresentations of my arguments that you either don't understand them, or else deliberately misrepresent them.

Quoting Wayfarer

But notice that Husserl says that consciousness is foundationally involved in world-disclosure, meaning that the idea of a world apart from consciousness is inconceivable in any meaningful way. That is the salient point.

This is again your own and perhaps Husserl's prejudice. I can readily conceive of a world absent consciousness. Of course, my consciousness is involved in the conceiving, but that is a different thing, an obvious truism. What you say is stipulative, it is not a logical entailment. You have no business stipulating to others what they can or cannot conceive of or what is or is not meaningful to them. It's dogmatism pure and simple.

Quoting Wayfarer

But you have long since made up your mind, going on what you say.

I don't think the question is of much importance, my views are not "hard and fast" but I know what seems most plausible to me at my current stage of understanding. You on the other hand seem absolutely obsessed with it and rigidly attached to your views. I've seen no change as long as I've been reading your posts.

It's virtually all you talk about (apart from your political concerns), continually repeating the same mantras. I don't know what motivates that, but I'm guessing that for you it's a moral crusade, and if so, i think that's misguided.

Anyway, we've been over this same old ground too many times, so I think it would be best to desist from now on, since it never goes anywhere.

Quoting Janus

perhaps Husserl's prejudice

:roll:

Quoting Janus

It's virtually all you talk about

It's a philosophy forum. I write about philosophy.

Quoting Wayfarer

perhaps Husserl's prejudice
— Janus

:roll:

I don't share your reverence for authority figures, and I said "perhaps" because it's a while since I read Husserl, I don't want to assume that your interpretations of his views are the correct ones and I have no interest in researching his work in order to determine whether or not they are. Life is too short.

Quoting Wayfarer

It's a philosophy forum. I write about philosophy.

You write about your conception of philosophy imagining it to be "philosophy proper", and not very cogently at that in my view.

You make that clear. At least I try and articulate a philosophy rather than hanging around just taking potshots at other contributors, just for the sake of it.

Quoting Wayfarer

You make that clear. At least I try and articulate a philosophy rather than hanging around just taking potshots at other contributors, just for the sake of it.

Rubbish, I say what my views are and defend them, with a great deal more argument than you do. Most of what you do consists in quoting your "authorities" instead of presenting your own arguments. And the fact that you think my questioning of your views consists in merely "taking potshots" just shows how superficial and lacking in any critical dimension your thinking is.

Reply to Corvus I agree with the gist of what you are saying.

I'm not referring to what we may or may not call time as physicists. I mean for uniquely humans.

I think at the sensory level of our experience, sensation and feeling, like it is for the rest of nature, there is no time. Sure, we say "only the present" or "successive nows," but its because "we" humans are not at the sensory level so we can't but incorporate time.

We're at the level of perception, where Mind conditioned by history, displaces sensation and feelings with code evolved to project in dialectical (this/that) linear form,(narrative--subject and predicate, cause and affect) evolving "time" as a necessary mechanism of that moving process.

Even calling it linear or dialectical is just as illusory as time itself. But as long as we're born into history, we can't but move in that world of codes.

Quoting ENOAH

as long as we're born into history, we can't but move in that world of codes.

That’s one for the scrapbook! :clap:

Reply to Banno On further reflection, there is a self-evident subjective field immediately experienced by every subject, namely, the field of their own conscious awareness. Things appear within it, and disappear from it, without literally being either inside or outside of it in any spatio-temporal sense. It is demonstrably a unified field, insofar as to be aware of oneself a subject, is precisely to be the subject in whom a single field of awareness exists.

So the question for you is, does every point in that field have a mathematical description, as do the points within physical fields? And if not, does that disqualify its description as ‘a field’?

Reply to Janus Reply to Wayfarer For what it's worth, I very much enjoy reading your conversations here. For me this is a place to understand what people believe and why. Your dialogues are particularly interesting as they are so reasonably argued.

I don't know whether idealism is real or not, but I have some sympathy for the arguments. I am keen to have a better understanding of philosophical ideas and to see how they are defended in discussions like yours. It does strike me that most people on this forum don't seem to change their views. They simply uncover more arguments and tools to defend them.

Reply to Tom Storm Thanks, nice of you to say! Glad someone does ;-)

Quoting ENOAH

I agree with the gist of what you are saying.

:up: :cool:

Quoting ENOAH

Even calling it linear or dialectical is just as illusory as time itself. But as long as we're born into history, we can't but move in that world of codes.

Agreed.

Quoting Wayfarer

...does that disqualify its description as ‘a field’?

No.

Quoting Wiki: Field

...a field is a physical quantity, represented by a scalar, vector, or tensor, that has a value for each point in space and time.[1][2][3] An example of a scalar field is a weather map, with the surface temperature described by assigning a number to each point on the map. A surface wind map,[4] assigning an arrow to each point on a map that describes the wind speed and direction at that point, is an example of a vector field, i.e. a 1-dimensional (rank-1) tensor field.

Why call it a field? What is the use of such language, if there are no values attached to points in space?

Seems to be no more than a veneer of the scientism we reject.

Quoting Wayfarer

So the question for you is, does every point in that field have a mathematical description, as do the points within physical fields? And if not, does that disqualify its description as ‘a field’?

Field as a mathematical term or field as an area of land devoted to growing crops? Or field as an encompassing environment of some sort, a philosophical notion. Spacetime is not a math field, but contains various entities like magnetic fields that can be represented as math fields.

"Understanding" quantum theory means following the math, as Feynman said. Perhaps that is true of time as well. The math of relativity theory weaves an astounding vision far beyond what we might have imagined. If one entertains Tegmark's speculations that the universe is a mathematical structure, then time is one also. A reification of mathematics.

Quoting jgill

'field' as an encompassing environment of some sort, a philosophical notion

The field of conscious awareness is how I intended it. Aside from physical fields in biology there are morphogenetic fields. "A morphogenetic field is a region in a developing embryo where cells communicate and coordinate to form a specific organ or structure. The spatial organization of cells within these fields is controlled by chemical gradients (morphogens), gene regulatory networks, and cellular signaling (biosemiosis). Morphogenetic fields guide pattern formation, ensuring that tissues and organs develop correctly in relation to the body plan." It would hardly be surprising if 'field' used to describe consciousness has resonances with the biological rather than the way it is understood in physics.

Quoting Banno

Why call it a field?

Because it's an apt description of the nature of conscious awareness. In this context it is being used phenomenologically rather than physically referring to the way awareness manifests as a unified, continuous whole rather than as collection of discrete elements (per the 'subjective unity of perception'). Within that field, specific phenomena - specific aspects of 'phenomenal consciousness' - manifest as qualia, the qualitative attributes associated with specific stimuli or circumstances or cognitive challenges.

Reply to Wayfarer So your description of the "field of consciousness" is apt becasue it does not match the definition of "field"...

Others seem to think that this works. But you will have to forgive me if I continue to be sceptical.

Reply to Banno Not forgiven so much as expected ;-)

Reply to Wayfarer So far as explanations go, saying that something is an example of a field exactly becasue it does not meet the criteria for being a field is... odd.

Quoting Banno

So far as explanations go, saying that something is an example of a field exactly becasue it does not meet the criteria for being a filed is... odd.

You limit "field" to "a physical quantity", then complain because Wayfarer's proposed "field" doesn't meet the criteria of your definition. But your definition is incoherent because "physical quantity" is self-contradicting.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

You limit "field" to "a physical quantity"

No I. and not to "physical" but to "quantity". That's the definition of "field" in science and mathematics.

Let's do it again. A field has a value at every point in the space it describes. That is what a field is.

Subjectivity does not have a value at every point in some space. Indeed, it is not the sort of thing that can have a value. Moreover, from what I can work out, Wayfarer and others agree with this.

Hence subjectivity is not a field.

Reply to Banno The context was this quotation:

Quoting Bernardo Kastrup

Under objective idealism, subjectivity is not individual or multiple, but unitary and universal: it’s the bottom level of reality, prior to spatiotemporal extension and consequent differentiation. The subjectivity in me is the same subjectivity in you. What differentiates us are merely the contents of this subjectivity as experienced by you, and by me. We differ only in experienced memories, perspectives and narratives of self, but not in the subjective field wherein all these memories, perspectives and narratives of self unfold as patterns of excitation

What precisely is the matter with that again?

This bit:
Quoting Bernardo Kastrup

The subjectivity in me is the same subjectivity in you.

is exactly wrong.


Quoting Bernardo Kastrup

We differ only in experienced memories, perspectives and narratives of self, but not in the subjective field wherein all these memories, perspectives and narratives of self unfold as patterns of excitation

We differ in "experienced memories, perspectives and narratives of self"... so what is left that is shared? What are those "Patterns of excitation" that are not "experienced memories, perspectives and narratives of self" and which also do not have a value?

There is nothing left here, for the field to consist in.

Quoting Banno

The subjectivity in me is the same subjectivity in you.
— Bernardo Kastrup
is exactly wrong.

Why? What's wrong about it? A mere assertion does not an argument make.

Reply to Wayfarer... Quoting Banno

There is nothing left here, for the field to consist in.

You cannot know what the subjective "patterns of excitation" in someone else are, let alone they are the same as your own.

Reply to Banno You're not answering the question, you're simply deflecting.

Reply to Wayfarer Your question is a nonsense. You want a shared subjectivity that is also private.

Reply to Banno Still not an argument....

Quoting Banno

..so what is left that is shared?

The fundamental level of self-awareness that characterises beings. What would remain if you had complete amnesia and forgot who you were.

Reply to Wayfarer Well, I've presented a counter case to your notion of "field" for several pages now. If you have not followed that, there's not much more to be done.

Quoting Banno

Let's do it again. A field has a value at every point in the space it describes. That is what a field is.

Subjectivity does not have a value at every point in some space. Indeed, it is not the sort of thing that can have a value. Moreover, from what I can work out, Wayfarer and others agree with this.

Hence subjectivity is not a field.

Reply to that, if you would, instead of changing the topic.

Quoting Wayfarer

The fundamental level of self-awareness that characterises beings. What would remain if you had complete amnesia and forgot who you were.

Not a field.

Quoting Banno

Reply to that, if you would, instead of changing the topic.

You're the one who changed the topic, and you're now trying to shift it back within your comfort zone.

Where was it you lost those car keys? ;-)

Quoting Banno

Not a field.

Why not? If you were amnesiac, you would presumably be conscious, even if you didn't know who you were. Your autonomic and parasympathetic nervous systems would be functioning. You would see things around you in the room, and other people, even if you didn't know who they were. All of those would be part of your field of awareness.

Balls.

Here's were you invited my comment:

Quoting Wayfarer

Kastrup puts it much better than I could:

Under objective idealism, subjectivity is not individual or multiple, but unitary and universal: it’s the bottom level of reality, prior to spatiotemporal extension and consequent differentiation. The subjectivity in me is the same subjectivity in you. What differentiates us are merely the contents of this subjectivity as experienced by you, and by me. We differ only in experienced memories, perspectives and narratives of self, but not in the subjective field wherein all these memories, perspectives and narratives of self unfold as patterns of excitation; that is, as experiences.

As such, under objective idealism there is nothing outside subjectivity, for the whole of existence is reducible to the patterns of excitation of the one universal field of subjectivity. Therefore, all choices are determined by this one subject, as there are no agencies or forces external to it. Yet, all choices are indeed determined by the inherent, innate dispositions of the subject. In other words, all choices are determined by what subjectivity is.
— Bernardo Kastrup

@Banno

To which I replied:

Quoting Banno

Dreadful stuff, seeing as you asked for my opinion. The phrases "unitary and universal" and "bottom level of reality" and "prior to spatiotemporal extension" ought set one's teeth on edge; they are vague to the point of incoherence. The magic hand wave of "The subjectivity in me is the same subjectivity in you" contradicts the very use of terms such as "subjective" from which it derives.

Wayfarer, you do not have my memories, nor I, yours. That's kinda what "subjective" is. It is not shared.

The science you castigate and beg to become more "subjective" functions exactly because it works to overcome subjectivity by building on what we do share.


This is what I tried to explain on our little walk.

Quoting Wayfarer

Why not?

...becasue a field has a value at every point...

Quoting Banno

The science you castigate and beg to become more "subjective" functions exactly because it works to overcome subjectivity by building on what we do share.

Hence my essay on the superiority of philosophical detachment to scientific objectivity. Here's a gift link for you.

Quoting Banno

...becasue a field has a value at every point...

Dogmatic? Me?

I find it odd that you are insisting on the silly scientism of explaining subjectivity in terms of fields.

An almost complete backflip.

Quoting Banno

The magic hand wave of "The subjectivity in me is the same subjectivity in you" contradicts the very use of terms such as "subjective" from which it derives.

That is also part of the point of the essay I've referred to:

we must... differentiate the subjective from the merely personal. The subjective refers to the structures of experience through which reality is disclosed to consciousness. In an important sense, all sentient beings are subjects of experience. Subjectivity — or perhaps we could coin the term ‘subject-hood’ — encompasses the shared and foundational aspects of perception and understanding, as explored by phenomenology. The personal, by contrast, pertains to the idiosyncratic desires, biases, and attachments of a specific individual. Philosophical detachment requires rising above, or seeing through, these personal inclinations, but not through denying or suppressing the entire category of subjective understanding.

Quoting Wayfarer

Dogmatic? Me?

You are welcome to produce an alternative definition of "field" that does not invovle a value at every point in a space.

But if you do, you will not be able to claim that your field is anything like an electric, gravitational or other physical field.

And your analogy or metaphor or whatever it is will thereby lose any validity.

Quoting Banno

You are welcome to produce an alternative definition of "field" that does not invovle a value at every point in a space.

Already done: morphogenetic fields.

Stop blurting things out, just take a little time to actually think about it. I'll leave it with you.

Quoting Wayfarer

morphogenetic fields

:rofl:


Quoting Wayfarer

Stop blurting things out, just take a little time to actually think about it.

Sound advice. Cheers.

"Morphogenetic fields" cause me some amusement because it suffers much the same issues as "Subjective field". Morphogenetic fields could not specify a value at every point in the space. It commenced with Gurwitsch attempting a mathematical analysis that did involve a vector field, but this fell apart, replaced by a model of differentiation involving gene expression and differentiation by transcription and growth factors - specific proteins.

But at least Gurwitsch understood what a field is.

Reply to Banno We've been through all of this already. Fields in physics specify mathematical values for every point, as physics is quantitative in nature, comprising the measurement of objects and forces. Where 'field' entered the discussion was in a different sense, also discussed, as a 'field of awareness', which is a perfectly legitimate expression, albeit not describing a physical field. The remark that I made that precipitated two days of eye-rolling, was that physicalism (or materialism or what have you) attempts to resolve everything about the mind to the product of physical forces. In times past, this would have been understood atomistically, but since the quantum revolution, 'fields' have replaced atoms as the fundamental ground of physical existence. Hence, the analogy went, if physical fields can be understood as the ground of existence, as physicalists intend, then what of the nature of awareness, consciousness or mind, understood as a qualitative field?

Of course I understand that in the Austin/Davidson/Wittgenstein field of philosophy, no consideration whatever is given to the issue of the nature of the subjective unity of consciousness, and as you never tire of pointing out, hardly anyone in the academic world takes philosophical idealism seriously. Hence the eye-rolling. But the analogy stands as far as I'm concerned.

Reply to Wayfarer

Quoting Wayfarer

...for the whole of existence is reducible to the patterns of excitation of the one universal field of subjectivity.

That's not an analogy. Not a metaphor.

Reply to Banno Yes, I think you're right. I think it's a fact. Matter of fact, I've got one now. It's called 'irritation' ;-)

Quoting Wayfarer

Matter of fact, I've got one now.

A hard-earned thirst?

Seems to me you are looking for a veneer of scientific credibility, which is odd. But in the end it's the bit where folk want, incoherently, to detail the ineffable, in this case the subjective.

Quoting Banno

You are welcome to produce an alternative definition of "field" that does not invovle a value at every point in a space.

But if you do, you will not be able to claim that your field is anything like an electric, gravitational or other physical field.

This may not be relevant to your discussion with Wayfarer, but you are still confusing the map with the terrain.

The physical field is represented mathematically in quantum field theory, as having a changing value at every point. The points and values are a representation, of the thing which is known to physicists as a field. The physical field does not consist of points with a value at each point, the representation has points which have values assigned to them. The field appears to be more like a wave action.

The problem with your argument is that as points with values is one way of representing a physical field, but that does not exclude the possibility of representing the very same field in a completely different way. So it may be the case that Wayfarer has a different way of representing physical fields, which does not involve points with values. This simply would not be the conventional way of representing fields, which is commonly used by physicists.

For example, the classical way of representing an electromagnetic field is as an activity of waves. However, since there is no known medium (aether) therefore no way for the wave activity to be represented as interacting with physical objects, many features of the electromagnetic field cannot be accurately represented as wave activity. So quantum field theory uses the representation of points with changing values at each point. Therefore as active waves, and as points with changing values, is two different ways of representing the same electromagnetic field.

Quoting Metaphysician Undercover

waves

The two-slit experiment reveals the wave nature of field quanta like electrons and photons.

Quoting Banno

So your description of the "field of consciousness" is apt becasue it does not match the definition of "field"...

Others seem to think that this works. But you will have to forgive me if I continue to be sceptical.

I think it's fair to say that 'field' is used in many contexts: different disciplines in science and the humanities are commonly referred to as fields. The philosopher Markus Gabriel presents an interesting pluralistic philosophy where the central concept is "fields of sense", and he mans by that something like 'fields of sense-making'.

That said a magnetic field, gravitational field, quantum field or grassy field are understood to be real, concrete entities, whereas the metaphorical application of the term 'field' to various disciplines including probably "visual field" or 'the field of consciousness' are kinds of abstractions which are easily reified.

Reply to Janus A field of study is not a mathematical or physical field, yes. Nor is it a field of wheat.
In so far as Quoting Wayfarer

...the whole of existence is reducible to the patterns of excitation of the one universal field of subjectivity.

would pretend to a physical field, not an area of study or a paddock, it is muddled.

Quoting Wayfarer

if physical fields can be understood as the ground of existence, as physicalists intend, then what of the nature of awareness, consciousness or mind, understood as a qualitative field?

What’s continuous means a field that waves,
Naught else; ‘Stillness’ is impossible.
A field has a changing value everywhere,
Since the ‘vacuum’ e’er has to fluctuate.

Change, change, change… constant change, as fast as it
Can happen—the speed of light being foremost
The speed of causality—o’er 13 billion years now,
From the simple on up to the more complex.

The ‘vacuum’ has to e’er jitter and sing,
This Base Existent forced as something,
Due to the nonexistence of ‘Nothing’;
When it ‘tries’ to be zero, it cannot.

At the indefinite quantum level,
Zero must be fuzzy, not definite;
So it can’t be zero, but has to be
As that which is ever up to something.

The fields overlap and some interact;
So, there is one overall field as All,
As the basis of all that is possible—
Of energy’s base motion default.

From the field points ever fluctuating,
Quantum field waverings have to result
From points e’er dragging on one another.
Points are bits that may form ‘letter strokes’.

As sums of harmonic oscillators,
Fields can only form their elementaries
At stable quanta energy levels;
Other excitation levels are virtuals.

[hide="Reveal"]From time’s shores toward oblivion’s worlds,
The quantum ‘vacuum’ fields send forth their whirls,
The sea parting into base discrete swirls,
Unto stars and life—ephemerals pearled.

Quantum fields’ Presence, through transient veins,
Running Quicksilver-like, fuels our gains—
Taking all the temporary shapes as
They change and perish all—but It remains.

Since the quantum fields are everywhere,
The elementaries, like ‘kinks’, can move
To anyplace in the realms of the fields.
As in a rope, only the quanta move.

At each level of organization
Of temporaries in the universe,
New capabilities become available,
And so they take on a life of their own.

The quantum vacuum field waves are the strokes
That write the elementaries’ letters
As the Cosmic alphabet for wording
Of the elements and the forces that

Phrase the molecules’ interactions
Unto the cells’ sentences that make for
The lives’ paragraphs of the species that
Experience the uni-versed story,

In a book from Babel’s Great Library:
The epic tales of the temporaries,
Their glorious triumphs and sad failures,
Amid complexity’s unwinding spring.

The great needle plays, stitches, winds, and paves
As the strands of quantum fields’ webs of waves
That weave the warp, weft, and woof, uni-versed,
Into being’s fabric of Earth’s living braids.

Quantum fields are the fundamental strokes
Whose excitations at harmonics cloaks
The field quanta with stability
To persist and obtain mobility.

As letters of the Cosmic alphabet,
The elementary particles beget,
Combining in words to write the story
Of the stars, atoms, cells, and life’s glory.

The weave of the quantum fields as strokes writes
The letters of the elemental bytes—
The alphabet of the standard model,
Atoms then forming the stars’ words whose mights

Merge to form molecules, as the phrases,
On to proteins/cells, as verse sentences,
In to organisms ‘stanza paragraphs,
And to the poem stories of the species.

Of this concordance of literature,
We’re the Cosmos’ poetic adventure,
Sentient poems being unified-verses,
As both the contained and the container.

We are both essence and form, as poems versed,
Ever unveiling this life’s deeper thirsts,
As new riches, through strokes, letters, phonemes,
Words, phrases, and sentences—uni versed.

We have rhythm, reason, rhyme, meter, sense,
Metric, melody, and beauty’s true pense,
Revealed through life’s participation,
From the latent whence into us hence.

A poem is a truth fleshed in living words,
Which by showing unapprehended proof
Lifts the veil to reveal hidden beauty:
It’s life’s image drawn in eternal truth.[/hide]

Reply to Banno I agree; "universal subjective field" is something we can say, but we don't really know what we are talking about, and so it has no explanatory power. It's a kind of confabulation, hand-waving.

Reply to Tom Storm Thanks Tom, I appreciate your comment, but I'm afraid I cannot agree that Wayfarer's position or idealism in general is well-argued. The arguments always seem like, as I say above, mere hand-waving.

Quoting Janus

It's a kind of confabulation, hand-waving.

We can test it! I'll wave, and you vibrate.

Reply to Wayfarer Ho Ho Ho, off to fantasyland we go...

Quoting Janus

I'm not concerned with questions of 'materialism vs idealism' or 'realism vs antirealism' because I think these questions are not definitively decidable....Science for me offers a far more interesting, rich and complex body of knowledge.

Probably just as well, as you show little aptitude in philosophy.

Reply to Wayfarer :rofl: Coming from you I'll take that as a compliment.

Reply to PoeticUniverse Sorry PoeticUniverse, whilst I appreciate what you're trying to express, it doesn't capture my interest, as I don't know if poetic meter is really an appropriate medium for exploring ideas of this kind.

Reply to Janus You're welcome.

Quoting Janus

I think it's fair to say that 'field' is used in many contexts: different disciplines in science and the humanities are commonly referred to as fields

Even mathematics is a little sloppy in this regard. A vector field is not a mathematical field. The reason I prefer the expression vector space. And if that vector space changes values at each point over time it is a time dependent vector space (or field).

Quoting Janus

I agree; "universal subjective field" is something we can say, but we don't really know what we are talking about, and so it has no explanatory power. It's a kind of confabulation, hand-waving.

Likewise, we say "quantum field" but it's just "a kind of confabulation, hand-waving". And, because we don't really know what we're talking about, it has little if any explanatory power, as evidenced from the fundamental self-contradictory principle of "wave-particle duality". "Quantum field" is an incoherent description. And, depending on which model is referred to, the total number of fields assumed to be in existence varies dramatically, as described below.

In modern physics theory, one can picture all subatomic particles as beginning with a field. Then the particles we see are just localized vibrations in the field. So, according to quantum field theory, the right way to think of the subatomic world is that everywhere- and I mean everywhere- there are a myriad of fields. Up quark fields, down quark fields, electron fields, etc. And the particles are just localized vibrations of the fields that are moving around. Theoretical physics simply imagines that ordinary space is full of fields for all known subatomic particles and that localized vibrations can be found everywhere. These fields can interact with one another, like two adjacent tuning forks. These interactions explain how particles are created and destroyed – basically the energy of some vibrations move from one field and set up vibrations in another kind of field.
So, here’s a possible tally for the number of quantum fields:

2 (quantum electrodynamics [QED]) – the electron field and the electromagnetic aka photon field
17 (Standard Model [above])
24 (Standard Model including all gluon colors) — 12 fermion fields and 12 boson fields
25 (24 + Graviton)
Even more if include anti-particles?
Even more if include handedness?

https://www.physicssayswhat.com/2019/06/05/qft-how-many-fields-are-there/

Reply to Janus :wink: