A Uniquely Parsimonious and Skeptical Metaphysics
First, I’m glad to find other posts that describe and propose a metaphysics… which means that it’s permissible, and that this post isn’t improper or off-topic.
I’ll describe my proposed metaphysics after these few brief comments about it: It isn’t any kind of Physicalism or “Naturalism” (as that term is usually used); nor a Dualism. I guess that means that it must be called an Idealism.
I was dismayed to find out that physicists Michael Faraday (1844), Frank Tippler (1970s or ‘80s), and Max Tegmark (more recent) had beaten me to it, by pointing out the main point at the basis of this metaphysics. I also was a a bit dismayed to find that Litewave had brought it up at this forum before I did.
(Having mentioned Frank Tippler, who well described the principle that I’ll discuss, I should just add that I don’t agree with the notion of computer simulations creating worlds.)
Description:
Suppose I tell you that there’s a traffic-roundabout at the intersection of 34th & Vine. I could instead word it by saying that, if you go to the intersection of 34th & Vine, you’ll encounter a traffic-roundabout.
In fact, anything that can be said about our physical universe can be said as an if-then statement.
In fact, there’s no evidence that our physical universes consists of more than inter-related if-then statements.
When we say, “If this, then that”, that statement would be just as true (within our universe’s context of a set of inter-related abstract if-then facts) if there is nothing to our universe other than just the if-then facts themselves.
There’s no need for the supposed “stuff”. No particular reason to believe in it. I suggest that the alleged “concretely” fundamentally existent “stuff” is as unnecessary an assumption as the old phlogiston.
The assertion of its fundamental existence is an unnecessary assumption, making Materialism, Physicalism, Naturalism lose, in a comparison by Ockham’s Principle of Parsimony.
Above, I said, “…within the context of a set of inter-related abstract if-then facts”.
In what other, larger, context to you want it (statements about our universe) to be true in?? For our purposes, as protagonists in hypothetical life-stories, set in one of the hypothetical if-then possibilitly-worlds, all that is relevant is the fact that our hypothetical if-then possibility-world is real, and its facts true, in its (our) own context. What other context to you want it be real or true in?
Your life-possibility story, and the hypothetical if/then world in which it is set, needn’t be real or true in any context other than its own.
Is it valid in its own context? Sure. That’s uncontroversial.
I claim that the metaphysics that I propose here doesn’t need or use any assumptions, doesn’t make any controversial statements, and doesn’t posit any brute fact(s).
I realize that that’s a strong claim, and I make that claim.
Tell me if there’s any reason to say otherwise.
Here are some things that can be said as abstract if-then statements:
Logical statements, such as syllogisms; mathematical theorems; laws of physics.
So far as I’ve heard or read, the physicist Michael Faraday was the first Westerner to point this out, when he said that the physical world consists of logical and mathematical relation, and that there’s no evidence, or need, to believe in the “concretely”, fundamentally existent “stuff” that Materialists (now called Physicalists and Naturalists) believe in.
As I mentioned above, Tippler and Tegmark have made the same point.
Now, you might say: “Yes, but why me? …in this world?”
Why not? Obviously, you’re the Protagonist in a life-possibility story. That if/then story, with the if/then facts that it consists of, is uncontroversially “there” as such, in its own context.
Plainly the Protagonist is a particularly essential part of a life-possibility story. …arguably primary to, central to, that story—which of course is entirely from your point of view and your experience. It’s a story that (obviously) has a Protagonist who is someone about whom there can be a life-story. …and that’s you.
Other hypothetical if/then possibility-worlds? Sure, infinitely many. Obviously, from our point of view, as inhabitants of this possibility-world, the other possibility-worlds don’t look so real to us. But, to say that our particular hypothetical if/then world is fundamentally more real or existent than the others would be pre-Copernican. …as well as being an un-parsimonious, difficultly-justsified, unnecessary assumption.
There is, or at least was, at one time, a science-fiction magazine called “Worlds of If”. I like that phrase, and I adopt it to describe the infinitely-many if/then universes, such as ours.
Worlds-of-if. …as opposed to worlds-of-is.
Declarative grammar is convenient for expression, but I suggest that conditional grammar more accurately describes our universe. When a way to say things is linguistically convenient, it’s easy to start believing our grammar…believing that a convenient expression is a metaphysically-fundamental fact.
By the way, I’d like to add that, so far as I’m aware of, the words “Real”, and “Exist” aren’t metaphysically-defined. Better to not use them. Of, if I use them, it’s with the understanding that they don’t say anything definite or meaningful. You can define them as you like, and people do.
Of course I don’t claim to have proof that the metaphysics that I propose is the correct one. I suggest that there isn’t a definite provably correct metaphysics. It seems to me that Nagarjuna, a philosopher writing in India during late Roman times, said that.
So I merely point out that the metaphysics described here (as I said) doesn’t need or make any assumptions, doesn’t make any controversial statements, and doesn’t posit any brute-fact(s).
I realize that there was a Classical Greek philosophy called “Skepticism”. Is it alright if I borrow its name for this metaphysics that I propose? I suggest that that name is justified by what I said in the paragraph before this one.
I suggest that this metaphysics qualifies as a version of Vedanta metaphysics. …though it isn’t Advaita.
Vendanta is usually defined in 3 versions, the most popular of which is Advaita. I don’t know if this metaphysics has significant details in common with any familiar version of Vedanta, but it seems to agree with Vedanta in general aspects, conclusions and consequences.
Michael Ossipoff
I’ll describe my proposed metaphysics after these few brief comments about it: It isn’t any kind of Physicalism or “Naturalism” (as that term is usually used); nor a Dualism. I guess that means that it must be called an Idealism.
I was dismayed to find out that physicists Michael Faraday (1844), Frank Tippler (1970s or ‘80s), and Max Tegmark (more recent) had beaten me to it, by pointing out the main point at the basis of this metaphysics. I also was a a bit dismayed to find that Litewave had brought it up at this forum before I did.
(Having mentioned Frank Tippler, who well described the principle that I’ll discuss, I should just add that I don’t agree with the notion of computer simulations creating worlds.)
Description:
Suppose I tell you that there’s a traffic-roundabout at the intersection of 34th & Vine. I could instead word it by saying that, if you go to the intersection of 34th & Vine, you’ll encounter a traffic-roundabout.
In fact, anything that can be said about our physical universe can be said as an if-then statement.
In fact, there’s no evidence that our physical universes consists of more than inter-related if-then statements.
When we say, “If this, then that”, that statement would be just as true (within our universe’s context of a set of inter-related abstract if-then facts) if there is nothing to our universe other than just the if-then facts themselves.
There’s no need for the supposed “stuff”. No particular reason to believe in it. I suggest that the alleged “concretely” fundamentally existent “stuff” is as unnecessary an assumption as the old phlogiston.
The assertion of its fundamental existence is an unnecessary assumption, making Materialism, Physicalism, Naturalism lose, in a comparison by Ockham’s Principle of Parsimony.
Above, I said, “…within the context of a set of inter-related abstract if-then facts”.
In what other, larger, context to you want it (statements about our universe) to be true in?? For our purposes, as protagonists in hypothetical life-stories, set in one of the hypothetical if-then possibilitly-worlds, all that is relevant is the fact that our hypothetical if-then possibility-world is real, and its facts true, in its (our) own context. What other context to you want it be real or true in?
Your life-possibility story, and the hypothetical if/then world in which it is set, needn’t be real or true in any context other than its own.
Is it valid in its own context? Sure. That’s uncontroversial.
I claim that the metaphysics that I propose here doesn’t need or use any assumptions, doesn’t make any controversial statements, and doesn’t posit any brute fact(s).
I realize that that’s a strong claim, and I make that claim.
Tell me if there’s any reason to say otherwise.
Here are some things that can be said as abstract if-then statements:
Logical statements, such as syllogisms; mathematical theorems; laws of physics.
So far as I’ve heard or read, the physicist Michael Faraday was the first Westerner to point this out, when he said that the physical world consists of logical and mathematical relation, and that there’s no evidence, or need, to believe in the “concretely”, fundamentally existent “stuff” that Materialists (now called Physicalists and Naturalists) believe in.
As I mentioned above, Tippler and Tegmark have made the same point.
Now, you might say: “Yes, but why me? …in this world?”
Why not? Obviously, you’re the Protagonist in a life-possibility story. That if/then story, with the if/then facts that it consists of, is uncontroversially “there” as such, in its own context.
Plainly the Protagonist is a particularly essential part of a life-possibility story. …arguably primary to, central to, that story—which of course is entirely from your point of view and your experience. It’s a story that (obviously) has a Protagonist who is someone about whom there can be a life-story. …and that’s you.
Other hypothetical if/then possibility-worlds? Sure, infinitely many. Obviously, from our point of view, as inhabitants of this possibility-world, the other possibility-worlds don’t look so real to us. But, to say that our particular hypothetical if/then world is fundamentally more real or existent than the others would be pre-Copernican. …as well as being an un-parsimonious, difficultly-justsified, unnecessary assumption.
There is, or at least was, at one time, a science-fiction magazine called “Worlds of If”. I like that phrase, and I adopt it to describe the infinitely-many if/then universes, such as ours.
Worlds-of-if. …as opposed to worlds-of-is.
Declarative grammar is convenient for expression, but I suggest that conditional grammar more accurately describes our universe. When a way to say things is linguistically convenient, it’s easy to start believing our grammar…believing that a convenient expression is a metaphysically-fundamental fact.
By the way, I’d like to add that, so far as I’m aware of, the words “Real”, and “Exist” aren’t metaphysically-defined. Better to not use them. Of, if I use them, it’s with the understanding that they don’t say anything definite or meaningful. You can define them as you like, and people do.
Of course I don’t claim to have proof that the metaphysics that I propose is the correct one. I suggest that there isn’t a definite provably correct metaphysics. It seems to me that Nagarjuna, a philosopher writing in India during late Roman times, said that.
So I merely point out that the metaphysics described here (as I said) doesn’t need or make any assumptions, doesn’t make any controversial statements, and doesn’t posit any brute-fact(s).
I realize that there was a Classical Greek philosophy called “Skepticism”. Is it alright if I borrow its name for this metaphysics that I propose? I suggest that that name is justified by what I said in the paragraph before this one.
I suggest that this metaphysics qualifies as a version of Vedanta metaphysics. …though it isn’t Advaita.
Vendanta is usually defined in 3 versions, the most popular of which is Advaita. I don’t know if this metaphysics has significant details in common with any familiar version of Vedanta, but it seems to agree with Vedanta in general aspects, conclusions and consequences.
Michael Ossipoff
Comments (90)
That would simply be a fact about natural language semantics, at least per semantic interpretations amenable to it. It would be important to not conflate that with the world at large itself.
Quoting Michael Ossipoff
And that just seems comically absurd to me. Because for example, the sentence I just typed wasn't an if-then statement. Even if we feel that it could be acceptably translated into an if-then statement, that doesn't make it an if-then statement, so there would at least be statements that aren't if-then statements and their translations as if-then statements, or two different things. Of course, the act of translation is yet another thing, and on and on and on.
Quoting Michael Ossipoff
That's not at all the case in my view, because what it is for something to be true is for an individual to make a judgement about the relation of a proposition to something else.
Here I am, sitting in my chair. My fan is on. It's almost time for dinner. The sun is a bit low in the West. The chair arms are brown-stained wood, ash I think. It's smooth. The varnish and stain on the right side, which gets more use, is fading in some spots.
Please explain how this concrete expression of physical reality consists of interrelated if-then statements.
2) Are mathematical truths perhaps exceptionally irreducible (to if ...thens)? That would certainly give them a special place in existence - buttressing all of it in fact. And the latter consequence is, per se, a situation that Tegmark believes in ....
That hadn't occurred to me. I'd like to hear more about it.
It seems so to me.
Yes.
Michael Ossipoff
I don't think I have much to offer by way of expertise, or if I'm on the right wavelength, but I was thinking on the lines of
a) "If I look at the sun through binoculars I will go blind"
is derivable from
b1)"If my eyes receive a dose of radiation of [some amount] I will go blind"
2)If binoculars are used to focus on the sun the radiation intensity is [the above amount]
a is clearly derivable from b1 and b2. So if parsimony is the name of the game, then knowing the minimal set of if-thens would seem relevant, maybe??
Jake--
Yes, maybe the if/then facts consisting of the laws of physics (maybe along with some mathematical theorems and some abstract logical facts) imply many more if/then facts.
Michael Ossipoff
I'd said:
You reply:
Elswhere in that initial post, I clarified that everything that can be said about our physical universe can be said as an if-then statement... is equivalent to an if/then statement.
So, forgive me for calling them all if/then statements, for brevity.
Re-wording your statements (from your point of view, because of course that's the experiential point of view of your life possibility-story):
If you look down, you’ll find that you’re sitting in your chair. If you look at the clock, you’ll find that it’s time for dinner. If you look at the length and direction of a shadow (You shouldn’t look at the Sun), you’ll find that the sun is a bit low in the west. If you look at the arms of your chair, you’ll find that they’re brown-stained wood. If you feel their surface, you’ll find that it’s smooth. If you examine the appearance of the varnish and stain on the chair’s arms, you’ll find that the right arm’s finish is fading in some spots.
But wait, doesn’t my claim sound like one of those “unfalsifiable propositions” that debunkers like to point out?
Of course it’s an unfalsifiable proposition. …just like the proposition of the “Naturalist” ‘s or Physicalist’s “stuff”, and his “concretely” and fundamentally existent physical world that is the Ground of All Being.
I’ve said that I suggest that it isn’t possible to prove a metaphysics.
I was merely comparing some metaphysicses on the basis of the Principle of Parsimony.
By the Principle of Parsimony, Skepticism beats “Naturalism”.
Michael Ossipoff
A statement (proposition) can be viewed as a complex property with a subject-predicate structure and even with logical connectives such as "if-then". A statement is then true in that part of reality where this property is instantiated, and a true/instantiated statement is a fact, a property of that part of reality in which it is instantiated. But if a statement exists or is true (and if it exists then it must be true at least in some part of reality, because a property is always a property of something and so must be instantiated), then its structure and elements must exist too. This holds for any statement, not just for statements with the "if-then" connective.
For example, take a simple statement like "John is running". If this statement is true in some part of reality, for example in New York's Central Park, then John must exist (in that part of reality) and he must instantiate the property of running.
Litewave--
I like to avoid the word "Exist", because there isn't a consensus about a metaphysical definition for it.
Someone could say that any proposition exists as a proposition, meaning only that it is a proposition. Then every false proposition exists, such as the proposition that circles (by their usual definition) have four sides, or the proposition that if all Slithytoves are purple, and Joe is a Slithytove, then Joe is yellow, or that the shortest distance between two points on a Euclidian plane is along a semicircle.
I've often been saying that a hypothetical life-possibility-story "is there" (as a possibility-story). But I suppose that I should only say that about stories that are not demonstrably self-contradictory. (Otherwise it would be an "impossibility-story")
I must admit that you're probably more familiar with logic than I am.
About the possible objections to my statement that any fact about our physical universe can be said as an if/then fact (referred to from a Protagonist's own point of view), there's the possible problem of a fact about someone's current conscious mental state ((from his/her point of view). That can be called, indirectly, some kind of a fact about the physical world, because hir (his/her) mental state is related to hir physical configuration).
(Not being an Advaitist, i believe that someone is the person and the body.
From hir (his/her) point of view, that fact is a fact that doesn't have an "if". That person knows that fact about hir current conscious mental state as an un-conditional fact.
For that matter, what about a fact that the person has previously learned, and knows for sure (again, discussed from hir own point of view)? "The Earth's diameter is greater than that of Mars." ", or "My house is at a street-corner." Those are things that s/he knows without having to (again) find out.
I suppose you could always say, "If I'm right, ....", or, "If I check, I'll find verification that....", even when you're sure that you're right.
These things could suggest that my wording might need a small bit of touch-up, or clarifying wording, but I doubt that it presents a persisting fundamental problem for it.
Michael Ossipoff
That was basically my answer in my reply to T, and maybe it's ok. But I wasn't entirely satisfied with that, because a life experience possibility-story is about its Protagonist's experience, and so it seems desirable that the facts be said from T's point of view.
If T hasn't checked those facts yet, then of course they could be said as if-then facts from his point of view. That was actually how I worded my reply to T.
But maybe not appropriately, because, if he already knows those facts, they aren't conditional.
That was part of the problem that I mentioned in my previous post.
But I knew that it wasn't a proposal-spoiling problem.
Maybe it can reasonably just be said that T's facts are just the "then" parts of the if/then facts.
During our life-stories, of course there are always current facts, currently known by us. ...some "then'" conclusions of if-then facts in the workings and playing-out of our ongoing if/then life-experience possibility-stories.
If T looks down, he'll find that he's sitting in his favorite chair. T has looked down. He has found, and knows, that he's sitting in his favorite chair.(Of course he's known that ever since he sat down, in fact.) Of course his if/then life-experience possibility-story steadily continues from there.
T could have made his question more difficult by adding: "...and I feel comfortable, but a little tired, and I Iook forward to an interesting day.tomorrow"
Whoa--now what?
Maybe there are versions of Dualism or Idealism in which someone's internal feelings aren't considered facts about the physical world, but my proposed metaphysics isn't among those.
This posting is long, and so I'll resume this in a subsequent posting.
Michael Ossipoff
Reply to T Clark, continued:
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Some if/then conditions and their conclusions involve easy gross ordinary observations or actions on the part of the Protagonist of a life possibility-story. They’re the ones about which I answered more easily, in my previous post.
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But that isn’t true of some facts, including some internal states, such as feelings. If someone has sore place on hir skin, it might not be due to an action by hir or a cause known to hir.
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And that’s true of other facts in the physical world too, of course.
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But doesn’t it still come down to observations?
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If physicists perform certain experiments, probing matter in various ways, they can find out things about the structure of matter. …as Rutherford did, when he sent alpha particles (they’re positively-charged) into metal-foil.
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He was surprised to find the alpha particles scattered differently than he’d expected, based on Thompson’s theory that electrons were uniformly distributed in an otherwise positive atom, like raisins in a muffin.
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He expected the alpha particles to be weakly deflected by relatively uniform electrical charge. But most of the particles went right though the foil, un-deflected, with a few being bounced back in directions drastically different from their direction of entry, with some bouncing nearly straight backwards.
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Rutherford said that it was as if he’d fired a cannon-ball into tissue-paper and it bounced back.
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Rutherford was forced to conclude that an atom’s positive charge is concentrated in a very small region of the atom.
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Though atoms, electrons and atomic nuclei aren’t visible to us, physicists have found out things about them via special observations. …matter-probing experiments.
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If you make a certain observation, then you’ll get a result in which you’ll find out about a certain fact (and maybe others).
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And it can involve things that aren’t visible to a person.
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…such as the placement of an atom’s positive charge, or the cause of the sore place on someone’s skin.
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…or someone’s other internal feelings, of whatever kind. Maybe that cause can only be explained via chemistry (in principle a branch of physics), something not visible to the person involved. …or micro-biology, equally non-visible to the person.
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Then you might find out about the cause of the sore place on your skin via a doctor’s observations. Or you might find that it’s something that the doctor’s observations can’t find the cause of, and that’s a fact about it too, found by the observation.--Then that fact still tells the doctor (and, hence, you) something about the cause of the condition, even if it doesn’t tell exactly what the condition is. For example, it might tell you what the cause _isn’t_.
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So, in conclusion, your knowledge of facts about your internal feelings (or anything else) isn’t a problem for my proposed metaphysics that I call “Skepticism”.
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Michael Ossipoff
An inconsistent proposition is not true in any part of reality, but that means that it is a property that is not instantiated in any part of reality - a property without a thing it would be a property of - and so it is a property that is not a property - it is nothing.
What if you took an arbitrary statement A and formed a compound statement "if A then A"? It would be always true, a tautology. (same for "A if and only if A") What would that mean in your view?
That sounds right.
Sure, an untruth such as that doesn't count among the valid abstract facts.
By the way, it has been asked if there could have been a Nothing in which there weren't even any abstract facts.
But It's been pointed out that there couldn't have not been abstract facts, because then it would have been an abstract fact that there are no abstract facts.
I just meant that I don't like to use the word "exist", or "real" without qualifying them, or expressing, when using them, the understanding that people can and do disagree about what exists or is real.
You wrote:
Even if it's a tautology, and so it isn't useful or necessary to say, it's still one of the valid abstract facts.
...which maybe can be said about my answer, too..
By the way, it seems to me that, in the Physicalist's terms, there's Nothing, in the senses that there isn't the Something that the Physicalist or Naturalist believes in.
I suggest that there's Nothing other than the abstract facts, including the ones that constitute the hypothetical life-experience possibililty-stories, with us, their Protagonists, as a (primary, central) part of them.
But I emphasize that our hypothetical life-experience possibillity-stories are obviously incomparably more interesting and meaningful than the Western philosophers' abstract facts. It doesn't do our life-stories justice to speak of them in terms of the neutral, impersonal, dry general abstract facts. Something beautiful can be made of something that, by itself would character-less and impersonal. Something valuable and justifiable can be made of something that otherwise wouldn't be so.
Like the way a sculpture can be made of dirt or something.
Saying that there's nothing except for the abstract facts and the possibility-stories...
Some people would say that that's an expression of Atheism, but it isn't. It's only about metaphysics.
God isn't an element of Metaphysics.
I emphasize that that matter is an individual matter, not something subject to proof or an existence-issue. A matter of feeling (when it is), and not a matter of proof or debate.
It has been pointed out that the suggestion that God's existence could be proved by logic is an implication that logic is above God.
Martin Buber pointed out that God is above such distinctions as existence and non-existence.
For humans to debate whether God exists is like for mice to debate whether humans gnaw hardwood or softwood.
In their song, "5-D", the Byrds sang:
"I opened my heart to the whole universe, and found it was loving."
(Surely, by "universe", they were referring to all that is (what Western philosophers refer to as "the world".), rather than to our physical universe.)
Metaphysics is about what is. It can be felt, and is by many people, that what is, is so good that maybe there's a Principle of Good that's above metaphysics.
Being a feeling, it (as I said) isn't a matter of proof or debate, or convincing eachother.
Why do I bring all that up here? Partly to qualify and explain my statement that there's Nothing other than our hypothetical life-experience possibilily-stories, and the hypothetical if/then possiblity-worlds in which those stories are set, and the general abstract facts...which would otherwise sound like an expression of Atheism.
And partly as a reply to the threads at this forum in which the issue of God is being discussed. I claim that that matter is something above an "issue". It's a feeling for some. Feelings are above concepts, issues, proof and debate. ...and above metaphysics.
Michael Ossipoff
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I should emphasize that I got onto this topic justifiably from my mention of Nothing, and wanting to explain and qualify that mention.
People have sometimes expressed gratitude for the immense, timeless goodness and beauty of what is.
There isn't a debate-issue there, about terminology, or who is right or wrong.
Maybe I could say that the subject could be called Meta-Metaphysics
Michael Ossipoff
Well, I have made an argument that if there were absolutely nothing (absence of everything) then there would be the fact that there is absolutely nothing and a fact is something, which refutes the premise. Absolute nothing is therefore incoherent/impossible, but you can still have nothing in a limited sense, as the content of an empty set (the empty set itself is something - a thing without parts).
Quoting Michael Ossipoff
But if there is a fact that "if A then A", then there must also be A, the element of the fact "if A then A". But only consistent As are something; inconsistent As are nothing. So there are all consistent As.
As much as I disdain materialism, I feel an obvious rejoinder to this claim is that one cannot drop an if-then statement on one's foot. Sure, if one's foot is in such and such a place and you drop a brick there, then you will suffer pain and injury. But that is not the consequence of an if-then statement; it's the consequence of a physical interaction.
And if there were nothing in our universe, then there would be no-one to entertain any kind of proposition.
I generally favor the position you seem to be promoting here. You say (in a reply to litewave) that you like to avoid the word 'exist', but despite the lack of consensus on its definition, you need to supply one of your own.
My first and only thread (so far) attempted to deal with that question, and litewave suggested existence and possibility being the same thing, which I found unsatisfactory since it precluded almost nothing except trivial self-contradictions. But I saw few better attempts.
How is the cosmological argument resolved? The whole if-then seems to form a chain headed by an initial condition of some sort. From that, without further instantiation, yes, all, including consciousness, follows. Wayfarer's objection above assumes an unstated dualistic view, and I agree that the two views are not compatible with each other.
"This is the only abstract fact" .... as good as "nothing" perhaps?
I’d said:
— Michael Ossipoff
You reply:
There’s a broad if-then fact that if you drop a brick on your foot, then your foot will get hurt. …because the kinetic energy, to which the brick’s previous gravitational potential energy has been converted--as gravitational force acts on the brick and accelerates it--will inevitably do work on your foot, when your foot stops the brick’s motion.
That broad if-then fact is implied by other if-then facts consisting of various physical laws (and maybe mathematical theorems and abstract logical facts).
So yes, that broader if-then fact is, as you said, a consequence of physical interaction consisting of if-then facts.
Maybe just a little more should be said about the if-then nature of those physical interactions:
One of Newton’s laws says F = M*A.
But, if we choose to, Newton’s law of gravitation could be just stated as a relation between masses, distances and a time-rate-of-change of motion.
If there is a system of time and space, and if there are masses that have co-ordinate positions in that space-time, and if these quantities are related by Newton’s law of gravitation, and his laws (&/or definitions) of motion, then all of this implies that if you hold a brick high over your foot, and let go of it, the brick will do work on your foot.
Yes, Newtonian physics is only an approximation, and there’s more modern physics that applies more generally and more fundamentally. But Newtonian physics is true for many practical purpose. And modern physics, like Newtonian physics, consists of hypothetical if-then relations. …just different ones.
Given all those ifs, then the brick will do work on your foot, as part of a hypothetical if-then story. …based on various other physical, mathematical and logical if-then relations.
All of this is true and “happens”, in its own context, in the context of this story. As I said, there’s no need for this story to have any existence or reality in any context other than its own.
That’s worth repeating: The matter of whether all this is “real” or “concrete” in some larger context, is irrelevant. It happens anyway, in its own context.
…and it untroversially “is”, as a hypothetical story, and is valid and real in its own context.
You, as the Protagonist in your hypothetical if-then life possibility-story, therefore don’t want to drop a brick, cinder-block or boulder on your foot.
Of course if you want to examine why that is, it’s because that’s how the biological organism called “you” is instinctively designed, of course.
Why is there such an organism? No particular reason, other than that all possibility-stories, and all abstract facts just “are”, as possibility-stories and abstract facts. That’s uncontroversial.
So, for that reason, there is, and couldn’t not have been, a hypothetical if-then life-possibility-story with you as Protagonist.
That story necessarily has, as part of is chain of hypothetical causation, a world in which you the Protagonist live, and other organisms of the same species, and a background of evolution for that biological organism and his species…in which your ancestors survived long enough to reproduce and successfully rear their offspring. …partly because they didn’t drop boulders on their foot. …or or fail to take precautions against predation, etc.
You wrote:
I’m not saying that there’s nothing. There are possibility-worlds, settings for possibility-stores, including your own personal hypothetical if-then life-experience possibility-story.
...and of course all of the abstract facts, consisting of mathematical theorems, abstract logical facts.
...and, for each possibility world, a set of hypothetical relations called physical laws--hypothetical relations among the hypothetical quantities in that hypothetical possibility-world..
...the building-blocks of a possibility-world.
…including this universe as the possibility-world that is the setting for your life possibility-story.
(By “this universe”, I refer to our Big-Bang Universe (BBU), and any broader “multiverse” of physically-related sub-universes (such as our BBU) that it might belong to.)
(Things that would otherwise be universes are physically-related to eachother (and therefore are only sub-universes in a larger universe called a “multiverse”) if they’re physically causally-related to eachother, whereby one is physically caused in or by another, or they have a common physical causal origin; or if there can be any kind of physical interaction between them or their contents. So, as I use the word “universe”, a genuine universe isn’t physically-related to anything else.)
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But yes, as the Physicalist or Naturalist means the “something” that he believes in, there’s no reason to believe that there’s “something”.
There’s no reason to believe that there’s metaphysically anything other than the hypothetical possibility-stories, set in hypothetical possibility-worlds.
…and of course also all of the various abstract facts, including mathematical theorems, abstract logical facts, and the physical laws of the hypothetical possibility-worlds. …the building-blocks of hypothetical possibility worlds and the hypothetical life-experience possibility-stories that are set in them.
Michael Ossipoff
Sure, I'd agree with that.
Because of lack (impossibility?) of a consensus definition, I feel that "exist" or "real" should be accompanied by a qualification or a specification of the context in which something is said to exist or be real..
But yes, I feel that there wouldn't be any point in saying that our physical world and its contents don't exist. They exists in the context of our hypothetical life-experience possibility-stories. What more existence could someone ask for?
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Michael Ossipoff
I too have explored this idea although it is not often mentioned in analytical philosophy. But the definition I would propose is to look at the etymology of the word 'exist', which comes from 'ex- ' to be apart from or outside, and '-ist', to stand. So 'something that exists' has a particular identity, it is this thing as opposed to that thing, it is an entity, and so forth.
It sounds straightforward, until you start considering the way in which the elements of logic (and so on) exist. The if-then proposition you're speaking of, the law of the excluded middle, and so on - in what sense do they exist? Now I'm not proposing an answer to that question, simply asking it, to draw attention to a little-noticed attribute of thought and language; that it relies on an internal structure, be that grammar, syntax, or logic, which is, on the one hand, essential to rational thought, but is not, on the other hand, something which exists in the same sense as do the objects of perception (trees, stars, bowling balls, etc). Certainly you can study all the subjects, in that sense they exist as subjects, but it seems to me the nature of their existence, is of a different order to the nature of the existence of objects of perception.
One philosopher who did comment on this was Russell, in Problems of Philosophy, when he wrote:
I think a good deal of the debates about the reality of universals and numbers is based on just this problem, and that furthermore, it has never been resolved so much as simply forgotten.
In any case, I have formed the view that the laws of logic, natural numbers, and many other things of that kind, are in the general class of things that are real but not existent, i.e. they don't exist as objects of perception, but are aspects of both thought and the world, and without which rational thought and language would not be possible.
Quoting Michael Ossipoff
It ought to be recalled that metaphysics has a specific meaning, and was defined in relation to Aristotle's work by a later editor, who placed some of his volumes 'after physics' in the scheme of his work. Those were the works concerned with questions about substance, essence, being, becoming, and other very general philosophical topics.
The reason the Buddhist tradition eschews metaphysics is because it doesn't subscribe to the notion of substance, essence, and accident, in the Aristotelian sense, at all. But whether Buddhists and Aristotelians are talking about the same subject at all is an open question.
However there are certainly fundamental truths, if you like, in the Buddhist tradition, namely the truths of the reality, cause, cessation, and way to cessation, of suffering. That entails a metaphysic in the sense of a profoundly different and life-altering understanding of the nature of reality. However it is, as said above, not at all like the Aristotelian approach, and for that reason, is said to 'reject metaphysics'.
Quoting Michael Ossipoff
It has been argued that there was a relationship between the origins of Greek skepticism and Buddhism, in the person of Pyrrho of Elis, who was a wandering Greek, said to have visited 'India' (probably ancient Gandhara, nowadays Afghanistan) and conversed with Indian sages who may well have been Mahayana Buddhists. This idea is explored in books such as The Shape of Ancient Thought: Comparative Studies in Greek and Indian Philosophies, Thomas C. Mcevilley and Pyrrhonism: How the Ancient Greeks Reinvented Buddhism, Adrian Kuzminski
Uh-Oh.
Seemingly.
Maybe the person who originated the argument that I quoted had an answer to that. Maybe someone else has. Maybe someone here does. I hope so, because I agree with Dr. Kuhn, the interviewer in the Closer To Truth, when he said that It seems better if there couldn't have been (effectively) nothing.
Two possible approaches:
1. Is it possible for an abstract fact to forbid other abstract facts? As I was saying, a system of abstract facts needn't "exist" in any context outside itself. ...needn't have any validity or reality in any context outside itself. ...needn't be in any context outside of itself.
So, when there's an abstract fact that says "There aren't any abstract facts other than t his one.", could such a fact be true, given that a system of abstract facts is quite independent of anything outside its own context.
There can certainly be, as an abstract object, the statement "There are no abstract facts other than this one.". But the fact that it is, as a statement and an abstract object, doesn't make it an abstract fact.
It's a question of whether it could have been true.
The independence of a system of abstract facts from anything outside it, the seemingly undeniable validity of any such system in its own context, seems to say that an abstract fact that forbids other abstract facts isn't true, and therefore isn't a fact.
If it doesn't have the jurisdictional authority to forbid other abstract facts, "There aren't any abstract facts other than this one." can't be a fact.
2. Maybe there could be a valid quibble about the wording "...this one." Maybe it should have to say, "...other than the fact that there are no abstract facts other than the fact that there are no abstract facts other than the fact that there are no abstract facts...[and so on]."
Maybe a valid abstract fact has to not use a shortcut like "this one", and must be finite in length.
Michael Ossipoff
My 2nd objection doesn't work as well as I'd at first believed it to.
The fact could consist of "The only fact is the fact that there are no other facts.", avoiding most of the opportunity to object to it..
Or (and I like this one best):
"There is only one fact."
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My 1st objection seems stronger.
Could there have not even been any facts about what quantity-values would be implied if there were certain hypothetical relations between some only-hypothetical quantities, and if some of those hypothetical quantities hypothetically had certain hypothetical values?
All these "if"s aren't saying that there really is anything. ....aren't saying that there's anything to be ruled out by a fact about there not being anything. ...or so it seems.
...but I admit that I guess that Isn't rigorous, and I can't guarantee that it's sound.
Michael Ossipoff
I think this statement is inconsistent, because it needs a logic that generates also other facts. For example, it uses relations of abstraction (instantiation) and other-than (difference/similarity), which generate a vast world of possibilities.
Or you could say that they exist as abstract objects. They satisfy the identity condition for existence: they are identical to themselves and different from others.
I think, nowadays, the instinctive response from a great many people would be that they exist 'in the mind', to which many would add, 'and are therefore neurological in nature'. But I would disagree with that, on the grounds that they are more language-like, or sign-like, than object-like; so the nature of their existence can't be explained in terms of a configuration of matter, as they're essentially 'composed of meaning' in some sense.
For example, the abstract circle, which can be defined by the equation x^2 + y^2 = r^2, is instantiated in particular circles.
Abstract objects seem to be features of objective/external reality but in our minds they may be represented by concrete typical/paradigmatic examples. At least for me, I am not able to imagine/visualize an abstract object such as an abstract circle, only concrete examples. But the specific similarity between concrete circles evokes in me the feeling or idea that there is also an abstract circle (the property of circleness), although I cannot perceive it directly.
I hope you're referring to the statement "There are no abstract facts other than this one", or "The only fact is the fact that there are no other facts", or "There is only one fact", etc.
If so, thanks--That's more like what I wanted to hear.
...because, if that statement could have been true, then that brings back the question, "Why is there something instead of nothing?"
There's just something distasteful, displeasing or wrong-sounding about the suggestion that there could have been a Nothing in which there weren't even abstract facts, like the ones that make our richly intricate possibility-worlds..
If I understand you right, you're saying that the concepts used in that statement imply the many other abstract facts that the statements claims that there are not.
I don't claim to approach this question with any rigor. As you can see, I'm just an amateur at this question, and I'd appreciate any comments about it, or any quotes from what's been written in answer to it.
I was wondering if maybe there's some reason why there couldn't be only one fact. So maybe you've answered that question, and provided a more solid objection to "only one fact".
Another hopeful possibility could be that there's just something about if-then facts that makes them inevitable. Any suggestions?
Because "only one fact" is a speculative putative possibility, could there conceivably have not been the opposite possibility?
Saying that there equally could have been or not been more than one fact, seems to mean that, if there were only one fact, then it could have been otherwise. ...another fact, about lots of other facts--so there wouldn't really be just one fact.
Even if there's be no one to say it, wouldn't there be the fact that if there were other facts, then there'd be hypothetical possibility-worlds?
I appreciate any suggestions or quotes that can improve on this non-rigorous amateur speculation that I'm posting about this question.
Michael Ossipoff
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Wayfarer--
The matter or question of the difference between the kinds of existence of material objects and abstract facts doesn't bother me, because it seems to me that there's no reason to believe that, metaphysically, there's anything other than abstract facts.
That certainly simplifies explanations.
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What I read about that statement by Nagarjuna agrees with my impression that there's no provably correct metaphysics.
But, when Buddhists sometimes seem to be suggesting a metaphysics, I don't understand what they're suggesting. That's just speaking for myself--I don't mean any criticism of Buddhism.
I've read important good points made by Buddhists. It's just that I haven't understood their metaphysics.
Interesting. I hadn't heard about that.
Though I agree with the suggestion that there isn't a provably correct metaphysics, no doubt there's more to Greek Skepticism than that, and so I can't say that I know about Greek Skepticism, or what it is; and I certainly am not claiming that what I call "Skepticism" is the same thing or similar.
I'm just borrowing the name "Skepticism" as a name for a particular proposed metaphysics,because avoidance of assumptions, controversial statements, and brute-facts certainly qualifies as skeptical.
Michael Ossipoff
Yes.
Quoting Michael Ossipoff
Yes.
That sounds like a very big claim, in need of good justification.
...maybe partly because, maybe it isn't even clear what it would mean to say that there could have not even been even that?
Michael Ossipoff
...I should have said, "the 2nd-order time rate-of-change of their positions." ...referring to acceleration, the rate of change of the rate of change of their position-vectors.
But the point was that if there were a space-time continuum, with those masses at those positions, then they'd accelerate in that space as described by a certain formula.
...all completely hypothetical of course.
If there were space-time, and those point-masses, and if the quantities were related by that formula...
So the hypothetical story proceeds.
Michael Ossipoff
I believe in answering any objection that is made, to a proposal that I’ve posted, such as the proposal in my initial post to this discussion-thread.
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Here’s T Clark’s objection again:
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I’d said:
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T Clark’s objection:
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In my initial reply, I told how T’s facts could be said as if-then statements, from T, by intercom, to someone else in his household, that if they come into his room, then they’d find the facts that T describes.
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Then, in a subsequent reply, I told how these if-then statements can be said about T’s expected experience, if he makes the necessary observations.
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So I told how T’s facts could be said as if-then statements.
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But that wasn’t enough, or satisfactory to me, because of course the Protagonist of a life sometimes already knows such facts--having already made the observations, for example. In such cases, the facts aren’t conditional for T, and so, though my initial claim can be supported, it plainly isn’t the whole story, and T’s question wasn’t yet fully answered.
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What I should have said is that every event and thing in the physical world can be described in terms of if-then statements.
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I’ve said some of this in other discussion-threads:
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The laws of physics are hypothetical mathematical relations between hypothetical quantities.
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Maybe life requires, or is facilitated by constancy of those physical laws, and constancy or at least near-constancy of the physical constants referred to in those laws.
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There are “if-then” statements/facts that, if those hypothetical relations between “physical” quantities be so, and if certain of the hypothetical quantities have certain hypothetical values, then there are conclusions regarding the values of other hypothetical quantities.
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Such if-then facts are uncontroversial. They aren’t saying that there is anything. They’re just uncontroversially saying “If this and this, then that.”
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…all hypothetical. All matters of “if-then”.
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And those uncontroversial systems of if-then fact have conclusions describing every state-of-affairs in this physical world, which could be the setting for one big hypothetical if-then story.
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There’s no reason to believe otherwise. There’s no reason to believe that there’s other than that possibility-world, and the hypothetical if-then life-experience possibility-story that has our possibility-world as its setting.
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T Clark’s statements of his facts are his statements about some of those conclusions (called “results”) of those if-then facts regarding the conditions for those conclusions.
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I never meant to say that T can’t mention a state of affairs that’s the conclusion of many if-then statements about many hypothetical relations among the values of quantities, and hypothetical values of many of those quantities. …”if” conditions whose conclusions are the state-of-affairs facts that T stated.
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T wasn’t talking about all the physical laws and quantity-values that have his facts as their conclusions. He mentioned some results…logical conclusions of many if-then facts.
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And those conclusions are, of course, also part of hypothetical conditions which (along with the hypothetical physical laws) imply still other conclusions. (Dinner will soon be served. Sunset will be soon. …etc.)
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T Clark’s statements describe a point in his ongoing life-experience possibility-story.
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Such a story, and the possibility-world that is its setting, can be examined as closely as (feasibly) desired, by physicists. What they find will, of course, always be consistent with our being here, and with previously-concluded conclusion-facts. …because a possibility-story has to be self-consistent. Otherwise, contradicting itself, it would be an impossibility-story.
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Of course the observations that we humans make aren’t usually the detailed probing of matter that the physicists’ experiments are. But the physicists’ observations, told to us (after being thoroughly verified as mutually-consistent by the physicists) must be, and are, consistent with ours. And when we read of the physicists’ observations, then they become, indirectly, our observations.
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T’s facts seem very “concrete”, because he’s part of his life-experience possibility-story (…the essential part, in fact), and of the possibility-world in which that story is set. That life-experience possibility-story is about T, so obviously it’s the one that’s real for T.
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Other possibility-worlds of course don’t seem at all real to us. Because the definition of “real” is an individual matter, I’d say that, for us, our possibility-world is “real”, and the other possibility-worlds are not. But that only seems so, and can be locally said to be so, because we inhabit this possibility-world. This possibility-world, as I said, is “real” to T, because it’s the setting of the life-experience possibility-story that is about T.
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(I use quotes for the word “real”, because I don’t like to encourage its use.)
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As I said, to say that our possibility world is intrinsically, objectively metaphysically more real or existent than the other possibility-worlds would be pre-Copernican.
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But, when the question comes up, I call our possibility-world “real”, because it’s real in the context of our lives. …with the understanding that that’s all I mean.
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I’m posting these answers so that it can’t be said that I haven’t answered the objections to my proposed metaphysics. …the genuinely parsimonious metaphysics.
Michael Ossipoff
If they want to define existence in terms of something else, then that something else cannot exist.
But it's rather trivial to exemplify, can't miss it, it's all over the place. ;)
It's one of those things, like truth perhaps, where you strand on rock bottom as it were.
I've become a bit wary of (always) demanding definitions; doing so may also be susceptible to a regress anyway.
Conversely, if we were to exemplify something that does not exist, it could only be by non-referring definitions or nonsense, something like that.
Incidentally, in some older thread, I tried to sort of assert "real on top of existence" as per:
• x is real ? x exists irrespective of anyone's definitions
Not sure it's any good though (maybe some day).
Maybe, but I don't try to define existence.
Existence is all over the place? By what particular definition?
I agree that it's reasonable to speak of our physical world as real and existent, because it's real and existent in the context of our lives. But I only say it with respect to a particular context.
Definitions can be helpful for expressing what we mean when we say something.
Michael Ossipoff
Not by definition.
You exist, I exist, my coffee cup exists ?, heck even my dreams exist, you're walking on it, your walking exists (when occurring), ...
Darn unavoidable!
Quoting Michael Ossipoff
Yes.
I'd said:
You reply:
Anything you say means something only if we both know the definitions of the words and phrases that you're using.
And the meaning of what you say can be different, depending on those definitions.
Or your statement can be true or false, depending on those definitions.
You said:
Suppose that, as I claim, our physical world and everything in it consists only of a system of interrelated hypotheticals, if;then statements.
Does anything in that physical world really exist?
I agree with you in saying that those things exist, because they exist in the context of our lives.
I'm saying that they exist in a particular context. I'm saying what I mean by "exist", when I call something "existent"..
We don't have any agreement about saying that those things exist.
But, if "exist" means some kind of fundamental, unconditional objective existence, then it's another matter. Then you, I, your table and your chair don't exist anymore. Or at least there's no particular reason to believe that they exist.
The physical world that the Physicalist believes in doesn't exist, I claim. The physical world that he believes in is the Fundamental, primary existent, the Ground of All Being. ...independently, objectively uncoditionally existent..
I suggest that there's no reason to believe that there's any such thing as the physical world that the Physicalist believes in.
So, if you're using "exist" to refer to the existence that the Physicalist believes in for the physical world and its contents, then there's no reason to believe that our physical world exists, by that definition.
Michael Ossipoff
I sounded a bit partisan in that most recent post, because I answered in terms of my proposed metaphysics. So let me say it more non-partisanly:
1. Metaphysics is about what is. There is a wide diversity of metaphysicses, and no proof of which of them is right.
2. The words "Exist" and "Real" don't have agreed-upon metaphysical definitions.
Given those facts, you obviously can't tell us for sure what exists and what doesn't.
You seem to take "physical" and "existent" as meaning the same thing. You're probably a Physicalist. Physicalists are maybe unique in their assertion of the proved certainty of their metaphysics.
I'm not an Advaitst, but many Advaitists say that the physical world is illusory. I mention that just to show that not everyone agrees that your chair and desk exist.
I emphasize that Sankara, considered Advaita's main authority, didn't say that the physical world doesn't exist. "Neo-Advaitists", mostly Western, tend to disagree with him, and with much of actual traditional Advaita.
As I said, I agree that your chair and desk exist, because the physical world exists in the context of our lives, and that's as much existence as we could ask for. But, when making a statement like that, I specify how I mean it.
Michael Ossipoff
You said that there are certain facts. Isn't it the same as saying that there exist certain facts?
You can if you have a mutual agreed upon definition. The intuitive definition of existence is more of a context-free property, which falls apart when you try to make sense of things like the universe or a god.
Yea, I threw away 'physicalist' long ago because of this. My 'realist' description is also slowly eroding. Planning a post soon that attempts to tie realism with idealism, despite their seemingly mutual contradiction.
Quoting litewaveHad you asked this question of me, I'd say facts exist in the same way anything exists: within some context. Are there no objective facts then? Not even the paradoxical "There are no objective facts"? This is a good way to destroy my definition of existence requiring a context. If no-context is a valid context, then there is objective existence. But the fact must be demonstrable without any empirical evidence at all.
As always litewave, you are the wrench in my gears.
Every object, including facts, exists in relations to all other objects, even in objective reality. For example, a fact exists in relations to the objects it explicitely refers to: the fact that 1+1=2 exists in relations to number 1 and number 2. Or you can always define a collection of which this fact is a part, for example the collection with these two parts: "the fact that 1+1=2" and "London Bridge". So the fact exists in the context of this collection.
That's more like what I just said. The relation "is part of" is to the collection, but London Bridge is part of more than just that collection, so 1+1=2 does not relate to it directly. This is not your definition of existence. The relation "is part of
I defined existence as logical consistency (possibility), which I summed up as "being identical to oneself and different from others". This means that every thing has an intrinsic identity (being what it is) and an extrinsic/relational identity (being different from others). Being different from others entails having relations to others, and the most fundamental relation is similarity (difference), which is necessarily connected with two other fundamental relations (which are simultaneously special kinds of the similarity relation): instantiation and composition, because if two things are similar to each other then they instantiate some same properties and some different properties, and they also automatically compose a collection. Every thing has these three relations and any other relations are reducible to these three.
So, existence entails having relations.
An ontology that allows everything that is logically consistent is surely vast, but it may seem vaster than it actually is because many things that seem logically consistent to us may actually be inconsistent and therefore don't exist.
That's true. I usually uncomfortably, awkwardly say that the hypothetical if-then statements or facts "are there" (with the quotes)..
So sure, the facts exist, as facts.
But some Advaitists (mostly Western "Neo-Advaitists") say that the physical world is illusory, not really existent; and they can say that because they mean something different when (at least in that instance) they use "exist".
(As I've mentioned elsewhere, Sankara, the recognized Advaita authority, didn't say that the physical world doesn't exist; and I don't say that either, because it exists in the context of our lives.)
I suppose it could be argued that even plainly false statements and propositions exist as false statements and propositions. I mean, are there false statements and propositions? Sure.
It seems to me that it's a matter of context.
But yes, as you suggested, by the default meaning of "Exist", without qualification, context, or specific definition, a person would have to admit that pretty much anything that can be mentioned exists.
Michael Ossipoff
Well,at least all facts, statements and propositions, and anything that's a possibility in some hypothetical possibility-world.. (Or an impossibility in an impossibility-world?)
Michael Ossipoff
Yes, that's why I was saying that there couldn't have not been systems of inter-related hypothetical if-then facts: Their existence is in relation and reference to eachother, and there's no need to even consider whether they exist in any other context than that of their relation and reference to eachother.
Their reference and relation to eachother is their "existence", and it's inevitable, and couldn't have not been.
So the hypothetical possibility stories and worlds, such as ours, were inevitable and couldn't have not "been".
Michael Ossipoff
And facts are related to other objects, at least, obviously, to those objects that constitute the content of the facts. You may take an arbitrary fact, for example an if-then fact such as "If I jump of out window I will fall", but would this fact have any meaning without objects like "I", "window", or (temporal) objects/processes like "jumping" and "falling"? It seems that if such a fact "exists" then those objects should "exist" too, or else the fact would have no content and thus no "truth" or "existence" either.
So I would say that facts (or if-then facts) are not the only objects that exist; that there are also other existent objects, and facts (true propositions) are just a particular kind of existent objects. The most general ontology I can think of contains all consistently defined objects.
Quoting Michael Ossipoff
They seem to use a narrower definition of existence then. It seems to reflect their values, namely that the physical world is "inferior". According to the most general definition of existence (existence = logical consistency), only those things that are inconsistent do not exist.
Quoting Michael Ossipoff
A proposition may be false in some context (possible world) and true in another. I see a proposition as a kind of property, so if a proposition is false in some context it just means that the proposition is not instantiated in that context (is not a property of that context). The proposition itself may exist but is not instantiated in that context. A proposition that is false in every context is inconsistent. Such a proposition does not even exist as a false proposition because it is nothing. (a proposition should not be confused with statements in the sense of utterances or ink marks on paper though)
And, within a system of inter-related hypothetical if-then facts or statements, those hypotheticals have their validity in their reference and relation to eacother....and don't need any other validity or measure of their existence.
It sounds reasonable and right to say that existence needs (only) a relational, referential context.
The square-root of two has its meaning, relevance, and "existence" in relation to a larger system of relations of mutual reference among such things.
Yes, though we can speak of facts' existence without mentioning context, they only meaningfully have meaning and "existence" in relation to some system of such things.
I don't regard God as an element of metaphysics, subject to the issue of existence, or issues of proof or argument. Not a metaphysical topic. Many, including some philosophers, have expressed the impression of a Principle of Good.
"You seem to take "physical" and "existent" as meaning the same thing. You're probably a Physicalist. Physicalists are maybe unique in their assertion of the proved certainty of their metaphysics. "--Michael Ossipoff
Will be curious to hear it.
"You said that there are certain facts. Isn't it the same as saying that there exist certain facts?" — litewave
--noAxioms
I might have already made this comment in reply to that passage, where quoted in one of the subsequent replies, but:yes, I'd say that facts exist (only) in some referential relational context, among some system of other such hypotheticals.
In the statement, "There are no facts other than the one fact that there are no other facts." that use of "There are no..." wouldn't make sense and couldn't have any authority. because, hypothetical if-then facts don' t need to "be", other than in relation to a system of other hypotheticals. They couldn't not have that relational "existence" as part of such a system.
Michael Ossipoff
Applying metaphysical tools helps clarify such things, but no proof is to be had.
I find I am unable to define God with my definition. If God exists, the God is but one member of some context greater than God. This doesn't preclude our context from being the result of some act by a thing that cares for us specifically and wants to throw a party for us afterwards, but even I can create things.
If God is defined as the root context itself, then it isn't something that exists, and stands apart from nothing. There is no difference between that view and the same context not labelled God.
I think I will post it under advocatus diaboli, since it is not really a view I hold, but one I feel needs to be explored. I did a similar thing with presentism once.
Gave it some thought since posting that, and I think I agree. "There are no objective facts" is not an objective fact, since there are none. No paradox. The statement seems only true in a context where logic holds.
Maybe, but ours is of special interest to us.
" I don't regard God as an element of metaphysics, subject to the issue of existence, or issues of proof or argument. Not a metaphysical topic. Many, including some philosophers, have expressed the impression of a Principle of Good. "
But I was referring to a principle above metaphysics, Not an assertion, not subject to proof or disproof. An impression. People often express gratitude for how good what is, is.
Agreed. ...neither regarding that, nor even regarding any metaphysics either.
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It seems that Eliminative Ontic Structural Realism fills the bill, for a metaphysics combining Idealism and Realism.
I like the Eliminative Ontic Structural apart, but I don't agree with the Realism part.
You're the center of your life-experience possibiity-story. You're its essential component. It's about your experiences.
Could our possibility-world be there without you, could it have existence apart from you? Sure. But then we're talking about an entirely different story, and that doesn't have relevance to your own actual life-experience story.
So sure, the physical world without you has some sort of existence, as do all of the infinitely-many hypothetical possibilty-worlds and possibility-stories--but that doesn't matter because that isn't the story that you're living in. There are infinitely-many hypothetical possibility-stories, and only one of them is real for you. ...the one that you're in.
So I suggest that Realism is unrealistic.
By the way, I was pleased to find,in an Ontic Structural Realism article, that the article refers to Tegmark's Mathematical Universe Hypothesis (MUH) as Ontic Structural Realism (OSR), because that means that Skepticism is different from MUH, and so Tegmark didn't propose exactly the same metaphysics that I propose.
Had you asked this question of me, I'd say facts exist in the same way anything exists: within some context. Are there no objective facts then? Not even the paradoxical "There are no objective facts"? This is a good way to destroy my definition of existence requiring a context. If no-context is a valid context, then there is objective existence. But the fact must be demonstrable without any empirical evidence at all. — noAxioms
I'd said:
About the statement or argued-conceivable fact "There are no facts other than the fact that there are no other facts.", I'm just saying that that couldn't have been so, because systems of interrelated hypotheticals are self-contained, and so is their meanng, applicability and "existence" (in relation and reference to eachother).
Michael Ossipoff
Yes, and those "objects" (more specifically, certain hypothetical quantities that can be described as object-propertie) are among the hypotheticals that I was referring to.
Yes, the hypothetical if-then facts are about those hypothetical "objects", and, specifically, about the hypothetical quantities that "are" their mass, positions, motions, etc., and the hypothetical "physical-law" relations among those facts.
The hypothetical if-then statements do have content. They're about relations among other hypotheticals, as I described above.
I emphasize that a fact needn't be about anything other than relations among hypothetical things.
Referring to other possible metaphysicses, you write:
Of course you can propose such metaphysicses, such as Physicalism. No metaphysics can be proved, and there are probably many that can't be disproved.
Do you subscribe to Physicalism?
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That's a special definition of "exist". As I said, people can and do define "exist" how they want to.
Yes, "exist" could be defined so that only consistent propositions "exist"., and that's one possible definition for "exist".
Certainly only the consistent propositions or consistent facts relating hypotheticals are important or relevant to us.
Inconsistent facts can be ignored as soon as their inconsistency is pointed out. Do they "exist"? Certainly importantly. Not in a way that makes them useful or relevant.
So your definition is reasonable in a practical way.
Michael Ossipoff
But if there are relations between objects then there must also be the objects. So it seems to me that the objects that constitute the content of facts are ontologically just as real as the facts.
Quoting Michael Ossipoff
I would say that the existence of inconsistent objects is absurd. These would be objects that are not what they are, for example square circles.
I meant to write, "Certanly not importantly..."
Sure, propositions known to be inconsistent are absurdly un-useful, so a conventional definition that they don't "exist" seems fair. But, because such propositions don't matter, then the issue of their existence of nonexistence doesn't seem to matter.
Michael Ossipoff
Of course. Such as the hypotheticals that I referred to.
Are you claiming that there can't be hypothetical facts about hypotheticals and their relations?
Fine, but that doesn't mean that there can't be hypothetical facts about hypotheticals, or that (to say it in another wording) hypotheticals can't be what facts refer to.
Do you advocate Physicalism?
Michael Ossipoff.
I agree. I just thought that your ontology was limited to facts but now it seems that it also contains other existent objects.
Quoting Michael Ossipoff
No, I advocate the existence of whatever is identical to itself and different from what it is not.
No, I'd been speaking about hypothetical values for hypothetical quantities, and hypothetical relations (physical laws) between those quantities..
It hadn't occurred to me, but I guess those hypothetical values could be spoken of as facts about hypothetical values, and the hypothetical relations between them could likewise be spoken of as hypothetical facts.
I've been speaking of a system of inter-related and inter-referring hypotheticals. Maybe I could subsitute "hypothetical facts" for "hypotheticals".
Even if so, it's just a matter of wordings.
Michael Ossipoff
Well, for it all to be facts, it would be a matter of speaking of the quantities, the values, as facts. The matter of what they're the quantities or values of or for could be spoken of as merely those facts' names or labels.
Then it could be spoken of as just hypothetical facts about other hypothetical facts.
But I don't know that wording-differences like that are important. I don't think the viability of Skepticism depends on it.
Michael Ossipoff
That is the gist of the new thread I'm working on, once I seem to have time to attend to it.
Nonsense. You've just described existence in sort of idealistic terms. Inferred things exist, even to you. The far side of the moon makes no difference to my life, but that doesn't mean I think it doesn't exist.
Tegmark himself did a post or two on the old forum, and actually referenced my post where I noted that a determined structure need not be instantiated (computed say) for the elements within (us) to be functional. My tiny little claim to fame I guess. I think that statement is the gist of what you're saying with this if-then terminology of this thread.
This was also asked of me, and it seems irrelevant to the thread. Physicalism isn't really any ontological stance. It is mostly a view that the mental supervenes on the physical, and yes, I think that is the case. If the other way around, it is idealism of sorts, and if neither, then some sort of dualism. None of the three assert a foundation for ontology. Materialism does I think, the view that nothing is more fundamental than, well, material.
Didn't I do that?
If I understand you correctly, you're saying that, because "real" is undefined, and "real-ness" is a matter of opinion, then Realism isn't a factual claim...if the advocate of Realism acknowledges that "real" is just a matter of opinion.
Of course.
So I'm just saying that I don't agree with that opinion or impression expressed by Realism.
You're the center of your life-experience possibiity-story. You're its essential component. It's about your experiences.
Of course they can be said to exist in some way. But, it's also arguable that the possibility-world in which we actually live, which includes your solid desk and chair, exists in a sense that the infinitely-many other possibility-worlds don't.
That's all I was saying.
The far side of the Moon is definitely part of your life-experience possibility-story. The Soviets photographed in in 1959, if I remember correctly.
(Not that it's relevant to this discussion, but the far side of the Moon is relevant to your life, if the Moon's tidal forces made possible the tide-pools, and if the tide-pools were necessary or helpful for the developement of life, as some have theorized. Of course an object like the Moon inevitably has a far-side (whether or not that far-side always consists of the same part of the Moon's surface.)
Yes, that's a way of saying something that I'm saying.
You're saying that Physicalism is only a position in the philosophy of mind, not in metaphysics. That's contrary to what seems to be the consensus regarding what Physicalism means.
Yes, Physicalism can refer to a position in the philosophy of mind, but it's also fully recognized as a metaphysical position.
"Supervenes"? :) Western academic philosophers have exhibited a need to invent expanding terminologies, evidently to obfuscate, to justify continual publishing.
You're the body. The Eliminative Physicalists are right about that, and about the fact that the philosophy of mind is balderdash.
The first error of the philosophy of mind is the fact that there's even a philosophy of mind at all.
Each person is the body, and that's it. Supposing there is or might be a separate metaphysical substance called "Mind" is the basis of philosophy of mind, and is--as I said--philosophy of mind's first error. In other words, philosophy of mind is, itself, an error.
...an error that leads to the nonsensical "Hard Problem of Consciousness", which is a problem only to some Physicalists (by whatever name) and Dualists.
Call it what you want, but I advocate an Idealism, the metaphysics that I call Skepticalism , and I don't doubt that the each of is nothing other than a body. (...recognizing, of course, that the body is a system, a device, if you like, rather than just an ordinary object.)
That's metaphysial Physicalism too. (...as opposed to philosophy-of-mind Physicalism)
If you don't want to say whether or not you subscribe to that view, then I respect your right to your privacy and your personal secrets.
The only difference between metaphysical Physicalism (as opposed to philosophy-of-mind Physicalism) and Materialism is that the word "Physicalism" acknowledges that the physical includes such a thing as a field, which isn't pieces of matter.
So, in its metaphysical meaning (its only meaning that I recognize) "Physicalism" is just a modern extension and update of Materialism.
I'll say that I must admit that I'm probably what you'd call a "philosophy-of-mind Physicalist".
Henceforth, when I say "Physicalism", I'm referring to metaphysical Physicalism, because I feel that the philosophy-of-mind, itself, is an error.
Though I'm not a Physicalist there are matters on which I agree with Physicalists.
Michael Ossipoff
But in this thread we've been getting picky not so much about if it is a cup or something else that is real, but what we mean by 'is real' or 'exists' itself. The root definition of those concepts is 'stands apart', which is why I didn't like litewave's definition since I could thing of nothing that isn't identical with itself without first setting up a context with rules about what might make it not identical with itself.
I'm not sure if you offered your definition of 'exists'. Maybe it is buried up above.Quoting Michael OssipoffSo let's pick something the Soviets can't measure for me. How about really distant planets (say 30 billion light years away). I can make a case for their existence, and I can make a case for their nonexistence. I can drive both arguments to apparent inconsistency, mostly by not having a stable definition of existence. Point is, all the models of the universe that work imply their existence, but such planets cannot have relevance to me personally.
Metaphysics includes more than just hierarchy of ontology. The definition by google says "the real world consists simply of the physical world". The word 'simply' is the mind part, asserting lack of a second mental substance. The reference to 'the real world' carries implication that it is the only real world, with no existence beyond it. So yes, ontology is in there. My definition of existence makes that statement not wrong, but incoherent.
I am unaware of another word for it, but am open to suggestions if you have one.
I thought that was the difference between materialism and physicalism, which is whether material is fundamental or not. No, I don't think it is, especially since nobody has every actually found material. I keep reading articles stating that say rocks are 99.
Nevertheless, I am a physicalist in the sense that I think the stuff we see is real and we're made of only it.
Doesn't 'stand apart' mean 'being different from others'? That's part of my definition of existence.
I thought about it, and our definitions are the same, boiled down. It seems I just word it differently, and assert that a context is required to assess the consistency of whatever is in question, and it is incoherent to ask if the context has objective existence, lacking a context to give meaning to the consistency of it.
So unicorns don't exist in the context of my personal empirical experience, but they do exist in the context of imagination, language, and perhaps somewhere in this universe, if one's delimitation of 'this universe' is more than just one's personal empirical experience.
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I don’t have a metaphysical definition of it. When I use it with metaphysical meaning, I usually use it with quotes, and emphasize that I’m talking about an impression or an agreement, rather than a fact.
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My definite statements don’t use “exist” or “real”
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But, when I do use “real” or “existent”, I use them with the same meaning. I feel that anything that’s real and existent in the context of our lives is as real or existent as we could ask for, so I agree about such things being real and existent, though I don’t consider those words to really mean anything in metaphysics.
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NPR news and tv have no relevance to me, but I don’t call them nonexistent.
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As I described, above, about what I agree about “exist”, I’d say that almost surely planets exist 30 billion lightyears away, because, as you said, physical science predicts them.
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Ok, of course, now that you mention it, the metaphysical definition of Physicalism, seems to imply the philosophy-of-mind definition. If I understand it correctly, I agree with philosophy-of-mind Physicalism (though I consider philosophy of mind to be pointless and unnecessary) But I don’t agree with metaphysical Physcalism, which believes in a big brute-fact.
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When I was in Junior High School (pre-secondary school, now called “Middle School”), I’d never heard of “Supervene”, but I didn’t perceive any “Hard Problem of Consciousness”, or any need for a philosophy of mind.
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We’re biological organisms. …animals, to be more specific. Animals have evolved—been designed--, by natural selection, to respond to their surroundings so as to maximize the probability of their survival, reproduction, and successful rearing of offspring. We can be regarded as purposeful devices.
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Other purposefully-responding devices include the other animals, and such things as mousetraps, refrigerator-lights, thermostats, etc.
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That was obvious to me in Junior High School. It didn’t even occur to me that there could be some “Hard Problem of Consciousness”, or a need for a philosophy-of-mind, even though I’d never heard the word “Supervenes”.
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Academic philosophers like or need to make things complicated, allegedly difficult, so that they’ll have something to write about.
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Of course we’re remarkable and amazing devices, and I certainly don’t mean to belittle us.
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As I was saying, what I’ve understood about metaphysical Physicalism, vs Materialism, is that Physicalism is just the modern extension and update of Materialism, to include something physical but not material, such as fields.
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That sounds like a reasonable expression of what’s wrong with Physicalism/Materialism.
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I agree about calling it “real”, because it’s real in the context of our lives.
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I agree with that too. Everyone is a body, and nothing more.
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(But we’re still primary, in the sense that we’re the essential component of the hypothetical life-experience possibility-story that we’re in.)
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So I fit your definition of “Physicalist”, except that I don’t really regard “real” or “existent” as having meaning in metaphysics.
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But I call myself an Idealist, not a Physicalist, because I don’t believe that the physical world is primary, fundamental, objective, or independent. It’s merely the hypothetical setting for our hypothetical life-experience possibility-stories.
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By the way, regarding the word “conscious”, of course it isn’t obvious or clear where “consciousness” starts, in the hierarchy of life, from viruses up to humans. At what point can an organism be said to be conscious. Surely mice are. Insects too, right?
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Bacteria swim in accordance to what they seek or avoid.
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Viruses do purposefully-responsive actions, when they perceive a cell that is the kind that they can use, and drill into it.
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And, as I mentioned above, mousetraps, refrigerator-lights and thermostats are purposefully-responding devices too.
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How do we draw the line for consciousness?
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I suggest that the difficulty of drawing that line tells us that “conscious” isn’t really a useful or meaningful word.
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I suggest that all that can really be said for sure about that is that everything from humans down to mousetraps is purposefully-responsive.
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As for “conscious”, that’s purely a matter of opinion and individual labeling-choice. I consider it obvious that insects should be called conscious, but I don’t know if I’d apply that word to viruses.
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Maybe a good definition of a conscious being is “Something that a humane person wouldn’t want to harm, unless in self-defense, or to protect someone or something else.”
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I don’t squash insects when they enter my apartment. I put them out. If an ant is on the counter or table, I brush it onto the floor instead of squashing it. If any insect, including an ant, is drowning in water, I fish it out with tissue, and leave it on the tissue, to give it the opportunity to dry and recover.
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I do squash spiders, because, for one thing, each spider you squash means lots of insects that won’t die in a particularly unpleasant manner. …so it more than balances out. Also, of course some spiders dangerously bite us humans.
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But I don’t squash Fire-Ants, in spite of their great propensity to bite (sting, actually) us. And, in fact, I protest the extermination of them However I feel justified in squashing a fire-ant that has just bit me. In fact, if you have a dozen or two of them biting you, then there’s really no other practical way of avoiding continuing to get bit by them, other than by squash-rubbing them all off you with one swipe.
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I don’t have a feeling of doing harm, when we protect ourselves from viruses and bacteria, and so that would mean that I don’t feel them to be “conscious”, as I defined it above.
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But I emphasize that that’s just an arbitrary definition.
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Michael Ossipoff
But an abstract four sided triangle is defined only in such a context.
Quoting Michael OssipoffYour're evading the question and also disproving your own statement by posting about something you say has no relevance. I'm asking if something outside your causal influences (a distant object) is real (part of the context of the universe). Answering tells me what you consider to be that context.
Pretty much my answer as well. The 'me' that everybody seems so bewildered by is actually an illusory carrot on a stick leading you to behave in a fit manner. Not recognizing it as such seems to lead to that hard problem. At least that's how I see it.
Quoting Michael OssipoffWell I suppose I don't regard them as having meaning either, since my prior thread was exactly about my inability to pin down the metaphysical meaning of those words.
Quoting Michael OssipoffI've been torn apart by others when I express my opinion on that. I put it on a scale from zero on up. Insects are more conscious than a mousetrap, but less than the mouse. It is arrogant to presume that there cannot be something more conscious than us.
So it isn't something that is a line crossed, a thing that you have or don't. The dualists invented the binary consciousness since it means you have the mind thingy or you don't. But they're largely in charge of the vocabulary, so the question becomes "is a bug conscious?" and not "how conscious is a bug?".
Funny. I kill most bugs indoors, but leave the spiders, only putting out the scariest looking ones. Are you vegan, that you consider it inhumane to kill even bugs?
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Surely mentioning something that’s existent but irrelevant to me needn’t contradict a statement of mine, unless I’ve said that there’s no such thing. When the relation between relevance and existence came up, I mentioned NPR and tv, as examples of something existent but irrelevant.
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But I didn’t mean to evade the question. I replied that if physicists and astronomers, the people who’d know about that matter, say that there are almost surely planets that are billions of lightyears from us, then I’d say that almost surely they exist.
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…because, though I try not to use “exist” and “real” in a definite statement, I feel that it’s perfectly reasonable to say that our physical universe and its contents “exist”. …because they exist in the context of our lives.
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So those very distant planets exist. Or, more accurately, they almost surely exist if physicists and astronomers say that they’re almost surely there.
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It is.
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If the people whom I trust to know about such things say that it’s almost surely there , then I accept that it is almost surely real and existent, because I regard the physical universe and its contents to be real and existent, because they’re real and existent in the context of my life.
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Those distant planets become part of my experience when the physicists &/or astronomers tell us about them almost surely being there.
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Likewise subatomic particles, etc.
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I’d said:
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You replied:
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“Me” isn’t illusory (unless you say the physical world is illusory). “Me” is a physical human, a physical biological organism.
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But yes, what’s illusory is a “Me” that consists of a separate metaphysical substance.
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But that’s probably just a wording-difference, rather than a disagreement.
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Yes, the Hard Problem is a made-up problem based on a belief held by the people who express that “problem”.
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I’d said:
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You replied:
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Yes of course there isn’t really a definite line, for what’s conscious.
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We just take different wording-approaches:
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I call everything from mousetrap to human “purposefully-responsive”, in order to avoid the controversy and flak that you’ve drawn.
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And then I say that what we call “conscious” is an arbitrary individual choice, an arbitrary line that I place just below insects.
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But, strictly-speaking, you’re right: a demarcation-lined doesn’t really make sense, and it would make sense to say “conscious” where I (uncourageously) say “purposefully-responsive”.
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I’d said:
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You replied:
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Then it averages out, and you cancel-out my effect on the arthropod-population.
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I used to leave the spiders, partly because the “Daddy-Longlegs” (Long-Bodied Cellar Spiders) weave webs from which long single strands can be easily gotten (I didn’t take it till the web was dis-used). Those strands are fascinatingly-useful for detecting and roughly-measuring the smallest air-currents.
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For example, in the morning, when one external wall of my apartment had just begun to receive sunlight, measurement with a web-strand revealed a brisk wind blowing in at the bottom of a door to the rest of the apartment, and out at the top of that door. …a convection current that registered as a powerful convection current, with the web-strand flapping in the breeze.
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Likewise, a web-strand will be “flapping in the breeze” when held close to one’s body, due to the body-heat convection current, which the web-strand registers as a powerful convection current.
In fact, those sensitive air-current measurements with the web-strands can sometimes have practical value, for judging how well a room or apartment is ventilated.
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But then there was a big proliferation of winged termites, which swarmed into the apartment. Everywhere around the apartment, the spiders were eating the termites, in a distinctly inhumane manner. So I squashed all the spiders, except probably for some that were unnoticeable somewhere.
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You ask:
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No. I don’t live alone, and I can’t unilaterally choose our diet. I will say that we don’t eat animals every day. Maybe about every 3 days Yes, ideally I should be vegan, and I admit that I’m unethical by not being vegan, or even always vegetarian. But I feel that it would also be unkind to pressure my girlfriend about all-the-time vegetarianism.
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Am I hypocritical to spare insects while eating vertebrates, which of course are practically our cousins in my opinion? No, but eating vertebrate animals, our cousins, admittedly feels like cannibalism. Maybe we can try vegetarianism.
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But there’s no household social mandate to make me kill insects, and so I don’t kill them.
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Michael Ossipoff
You really should consider fleshing out your replies a bit more.
Well, maybe you need to flesh-out that statement more. It's easy to make vague criticisms, without giving an example of what you're talking about.
Feel free to specify a particular reply of mine that didn't adequately answer the comment to which I was replying, or was incomplete or not sufficiently detailed
But do so politely, calmly,objectively, and within this forum's behavioral rules. I don't reply to flamewarriors.
(It seems necessary to say that, due to your first reply to me.)
Michael Ossipoff
lol -- classic
I try to reply respectfully to everyone, but, in this instance, that respect was undeserved.
Alright, then, there will be no more replies from me to the terrapin, who has demonstrated an inability to abide by conduct-guidelines.
As I always say at this point, when I don't reply to some reply from terrapin (and I won't reply to any), it doesn't mean that he's said something irrefutable. It's just that, as I said, I don't reply to flamewarriors.
Michael Ossipoff
What about a conscious electronic AI?
Sure, that too. Change "body" to "chassis"? No problem.
Better, just call it "the physical AI", to avoid philosophy-of-mind issues.
...just as you could call the body "the physical organism", when referring to the body of a biological organism. The reason for saying "body", or "physical organism (or physical person) is to emphasize that we aren't playing the philosophy-of-mind game...to distinguish what we're talking about, from some other metaphysical substance hypothesized in the philosophy-of-mind.
This apparent need to even speak of someone's body (as opposed to what??) in these discussions, is symptomatic of the fact that we're dealing with fall-out or spill-over from the philosophy of mind.
Michael Osspoff
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Quoting Michael OssipoffThe definition of exists is one of choice, and physicists often switch between a subjective and a more holistic inclusion of all the parts of the universe.
To illustrate, a live T-rex exists on earth (is part of the universe), but does not exist now (an arbitrarily defined slice of the universe that goes through a reference point, typically the point of the statement being made.
In the same way, the distant planets exist, so you seem to take that more holistic view. The distance place is not a different universe, just another part of this one like the Jurassic is part of Earth. But it doesn't exist now since if it did it would be receding faster than light. It doesn't exist in our reference frame, and never will. No violation of light speed since only two things in the same frame are confined to sub-light speed. But these places do exist, I agree. If find it offensive to describe it as a multiverse, which is like calling the USA multi-country because the map is a book with a page for each state.
In the subjective view, the universe is only some max size (about 27bly across) because it has not yet had time to expand beyond that. It still has infinite mass, meaning almost all of it is bunched up at the edge.
The subjective view is also often 'what I see' and not 'what is now'. So the article read that the merging of two black holes was about to occur and they were going to measure the gravity waves. That statement said that we were about to observe it, and ignored the fact that it happened over a billion years ago. It would not be of any interest if it were happening now.
You asked:
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I answered:
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We’ve already agreed that “exists” can mean what anyone wants it to mean, as long as s/he specifies what s/he means by it.
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But, as Litewave pointed out, “exist” has a broad default meaning that includes every valid non-inconsistent fact, including abstract facts and hypothetical facts about hypothetical things, and inter-referring systems of such elements.
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(The “things” can be regarded as part of the facts.)
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So I don’t think that there’s any point in quibbling about what “exists”.
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No it doesn’t. You’ve used a present-tense verb, and live T-Rex no longer exists on Earth.
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You could say that it “exists” in spacetime. But the meaning of a present-.tense verb implies this time, unless there’s an understanding
otherwise. You can make a mess by mixing mutually-contradictory definitions.
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Yes.
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I agree with calling something physically “actual” (a stronger word than “existent”) if it physically exists in the context of your life.
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This physical universe, and everything in it, exists in the context of your life. No, you don’t directly sense-perceive the more distant parts of it, but you experience scientists of various kinds telling you about their observations and conclusions about it.
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If you’re driving, and there’s an obstruction that prevents you from directly perceiving a car coming, on the boulevard that you’re about to drive across, then you slow down and proceed cautiously, because, though you don’t directly perceive that possible car, you know that there nevertheless might be one. What you don’t directly sense-perceive can still be actual, as you might find out if you don’t slow down in that intersection.
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T-Rex lived in the Cretaceous period, not the Jurassic. …Jurassic-Park notwithstanding.
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I guess “Cretaceous Park” wouldn’t have as good a sound to it.
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What doesn’t? The live T-Rex, or the distant planet.
The live T-Rex doesn’t. The distant planet does.
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I assume you’re referring to the distant planet, not the T-Rex.
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First you say that science predicts planets billions of lightyears away, then you say that they don’t exist unless they’re receding super-lumnally?
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Nothing that distant from us exists? That’s a novel minority position.
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I don’t know how you determined that a planet a billion lightyears from here would be receding faster than light if it existed. But please, we needn’t go into that.
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Obviously our telescope observations of very distant objects are showing those objects as they were when the light now received by our telescopes was leaving those objects. But that doesn’t mean that they don’t still exist now. Things very distant exist right now, even though it will be a long time before we receive the light that they emit. …and even though we have little information about them.
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It doesn’t share the same motion as our solar system, if that’s what you mean. But distant things nevertheless exist, and are actual.
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Yes. I must have misunderstood you, above, when I thought that you said that they didn’t exist unless they’re moving super-luminally.
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Unfortunately, “multiverse” implies that it consists of some separate universes. I personally don’t call something a “universe” if it’s physically-related to something outside it.
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So, if our big-bang “universe” is part of a multiverse, then it’s that multiverse that’s really our universe, and our big-bang “universe” is really a sub-universe.
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But “multiverse” could reasonably refer to a universe consisting of sub-universes.
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A Scientific American article about 14 years ago said that it wasn’t known whether our big-bang universe (BBU) is finite or infinite.
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But the article said that evidence is beginning to pile up in favor of the BBU being infinite.
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Of course new information could have been discovered since then. Maybe, during the last 14 years, it has been determined that the BBU is finite, and is about 27bly across.
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Not very likely though. Surely that major discovery would have been in headlines of all sorts of publications, and would have been mentioned a lot on radio, etc. too.
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Are you sure that you aren’t referring to the observable universe?
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…the part of the universe whose recession-speed from us isn’t red-shifting its radiation to unobservably low energies?
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Of course there’d really be no edge, even if the BBU is finite. …any more than the surface of a globe has an edge.
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But yes, from any point on a globe, or in a finite but unbounded BBU, there’s a most distant place.
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But if the universe is finite in size, wouldn’t one expect only sub-luminal speeds of recession from us? …and only finite mass?
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What source would one consult, to find the fact that a finite BBU has infinite mass? Or that the BBU is finite, and about 27 bly across?
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If they’re distant, then it wouldn’t be visible if it were happening now.
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But there are still very distant things that exist and are real and actual right now, even though we can’t observe them, and have little information about them.
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How did this topic turn into a physics topic? The metaphysical discussion doesn’t need physics argument.
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Michael Ossipoff
That claim of equivalence would need some justification. ...which you haven't supplied.
But yes, the observations of Physics don't require or establish that the physical world consists of any more than the system of inter-referring hypotheticals that I described. That was first pointed out by Michael Faraday in 1844.
Such a system, referring to nothing outside itself, doesn't need any external explanation, and couldn't not be (because no one's saying that it "is", in any context other than its own). ... for the reason that I've explained earlier in this topic.
Is that an "unfalsifiable proposition"? Sure. But it's one that doesn't make any assumptions or posit any brute-facts.
Any reasonably well-written proposable metaphysics is an unfalsifiable proposition, because no metaphysics can be proven.
Michael Ossipoff
Quoting Michael OssipoffThe verb is tenseless. The Tintanic sinks in 1912. Betelgeuse goes supernova in 2700. The tensed version would be "a live T-rex is existing on earth".
If the universe doesn't include spacetime, then it isn't a very holistic definition: It exists only if I'm present with it. It is valid to do that, but when questioning the existence of something beyond reach, we can't use that one.
I stand corrected. Guess it wasn't important to the point, and I didn't bother to actually look it up.
No, it is simply a different choice of coordinate systems. The distant place exists in spacetime, but doesn't exist 'now', and we don't exist in their 'now'. Two different coordinate systems, usually left unstated because locally they're the same thing. In the 'now' view, the planet is so young, it's galaxy has yet to form, so that region of space has yet to form stars and such. In the comoving coordinate view, the planet is there, 30bly distant, but the system allows speeds greater than light. Most of the physics equations cease to apply. For instance, an object in motion tends to slow down in the absence of forces, which is why all the galaxies are not going anywhere fast.
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Light from there will never reach us, even given infinite time. Look up Hubble-sphere, which has little meaning in classic coordinate system. Things outside that sphere recede (have a divergence speed, not velocity) greater than light. A short ways beyond that is the event horizon (15bly) beyond which signals from objects the same age as us can never reach us, even given infinite time.
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All the physics crap aside, the physicists say these distant places exist: There are no viable models where they do not. But the places are permanently beyond reach, so some consider this to be a multiverse situation despite lack of boundary between ours and the next one over. 'Universe' is one of those words that means a lot of different things in different contexts. It usually doesn't make a difference, but in cosmology it does.
Same here. Tegmark categorized them.
Type 1 is distant places, all from the same bang, very physically related, but too distant to every make a causal difference to us. I don't consider this a multiverse.
Type 2 is other inflation bubbles, which are related only through quantum mechanics. Different spacetimes, some without space or time or both. Some with multiple temporal dimension. Those I consider 'other universes'.
Type 3 is alternate worlds from Everett interpretation. These lack boundaries like type 1, but I hold no identity if it is one universe. They are very related to us and all part of the one common bang, so in that way, one thing. So it is context dependent if I consider the other worlds to be part of the universe. If the interpretation is wrong, then there is no type 3 in our physics.
Type 4 is other structures, and to say they have any kind of objective existence seems to carry as little meaning as saying our universe has objective existence, but I certainly don't consider them part of 'the universe'. Some do, making the word synonymous with 'all objective existence'. I have no word for that since it carries no meaning to me.
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So, if our big-bang “universe” is part of a multiverse, then it’s that multiverse that’s really our universe, and our big-bang “universe” is really a sub-universe.
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But “multiverse” could reasonably refer to a universe consisting of sub-universes.
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In the subjective view, the universe is only some max size (about 27bly across)
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Sounds like they're mixing coordinate systems, like one of them is more correct than the other. Bad form by SI if that's the case.
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Not very likely though. Surely that major discovery would have been in headlines of all sorts of publications, and would have been mentioned a lot on radio, etc. too.
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That term has nothing to do with red-shift or real limits. It is about the subset of material/energy that can in principle have any influence on us now, even if beyond the CMB wall through which light does not penetrate. Most matter in the observable universe is seconds old. The SI article might have been talking about this, but the current figure is about 90 bly, meaning that the most distant observable matter (seconds old as we observe it now) is 45 billion comoving light years distant in when that matter is about 13.7 billion years old in its own frame. The matter is in our reference frame, but only a few more seconds old than what we're observing now. There is no planet there 'now'. Still going blam.
What I've been talking about is the set of events whose light/influence can reach us ever, at whatever energies. My distant planet is outside that set, meaning light sent from there goes at c, but since the place recedes faster than c, the light actually still moves away from us, thus never reaching. That's the event horizon, which doesn't have a concept of 'now'. Those events are beyond causal reach, and are as inaccessible as events in the alternate world where I have a sister.
I may not be able to,but I will dip my toes in these waters and wade in slowly.
Quoting Michael Ossipoff
Presumably the whole point of metaphysics is that it is thinking largely detached from scientific analysis - or at least from scientific falsification. I don't think complete detachment is necessary - even your Skepticism is based on Occam's Razor, for example, which is, arguably, a scientific principle. Also,. there must be some metaphysics that are potentially falsifiable (or realizable ) in the future through discovery - either of knowledge of new scientific concepts, or through new knowledge of a general sort. For example, a fifth dimension could be discovered that confirms a certain metaphysics, or Alpha Centauri could be reached and shown not to have the planet Zog orbiting it, and controlling a huge simulation containing ourselves as proposed by the Zoggist metaphysics.
Solipsism is presumably a metaphysics - but one that is completely detached from scientific thinking, and also unlikely ever to be falsifiable ever (though Witt. had a go I understand, based on assumed knowledge of the principles of language acquisition).
So where am I going with all this? I think I'm trying to generate classes of metaphysics, based on 1) amount of scientific content - some or none; 2) potential for being declared falsifiable/realizable or not now or in the future - if not why not - logical or through knowledge 3)means of being declared falsifiable/realizable - e.g. new scientific concept or new knowledge.
BTW, is it valid to speak of a metaphysics as being potentially realizable (declared "true")...?
I’d said:
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You reply:
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Yes, though I guess someone could propose a metaphysics that conflicts with physical observations.
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Though it seems to me that Occam was speaking of physics, the Principle of Parsimony seems independently relevant to metaphysics. In fact, isn’t it more even compelling in metaphysics than in physics?
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...to the point where only the more parsimonious metaphysics should even be considered?
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That’s my feeling.
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That’s why the suggestion of all possible metaphysicses—including unparsimonious ones--obtaining, in various domains of infinite-Possibility doesn’t seem convincing to me, because wouldn’t the Principle of Parsimony apply to discussion about infinite-Possibility itself? So wouldn’t we expect it to not have an additional unnecessary metaphysical substance, anywhere?
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Sure, it seems like someone could propose a metaphysics that contradicts observations.
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One thing like that that stands out for me was the book by a physicist who is a recognized academic authority on quantum mechanics (Its title was “Quantum _________”, where I don’t remember what was in the blank. I don’t remember his name either. It was a long time ago that I saw the book. He said that quantum-mechanics lays to rest the notion of an independently-existent objective physical world.
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That seemed like physics saying something about metaphysics, something that I hadn’t thought possible.
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Well, the theories about our universe being a simulation say that the simulation is being run in a different universe.
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(I don’t believe that a simulation could create a universe, because possibility-worlds are “there” already, and don’t need a simulation to create them. The only thing a simulation could create would be an opportunity for the operators of the simulation to observe a possibility-world.)
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Each person is the center of their life-experience possibility-story. Obviously your experience-story must be set in a possibility world in which there are other members of your species. And, among the infinity of life-experience possibility-stories, of course there’s one for each of the other beings in that possibility-world (…and all the other ones, of course).
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It seems to me that that fits some, but not all, definitions of Solipsism. But someone can’t discredit a metaphysics by applying a name to it.
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Even if there are exceptions in which science can say something about metaphysics, I don’t know if science could be part of a metaphysics. Isn’t physics and its findings, for the most part, just a [consequence of a metaphysics?
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I don’t think there could be anything during life that can distinguish Physicalism from some Idealisms. …from Skepticism in particular.
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Pairs of metaphysicses could have different predictions, conclusions or consequences for what will be experienced at the end of a life. …Physicalism and Skepticism in particular.
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But, coming to the rescue of indistinguishableness, most likely when the body has shut down sufficiently for there to be a difference, the person no longer knows that there was ever such a thing as metaphysics. So one can’t expect to find out, at that time, which metaphysics is better confirmed.
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That question has occurred to me too. Can it be said that one of the metaphysicses is true, but just can’t be proved?
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So important and conclusive does parsimony seem, to me, that I’d say “Yes” to that.
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Michael Ossipoff
Yes. As the Physicalist means "something", there isn't something; there's nothing.
But I don't think it would make sense to call the life-experience possibility-stories, or their possibility-worlds "nothing".
So I'd say that there's something.
And I've told why I claim that there couldn't have not been those life-experience possibility-stories.
But life might be temporary, and the maybe temporary duration of life would then be small compared to the approach, and maybe arrival at, the timelessness that, at least in some ways, sounds a lot like Nothing..
So I suggest that, if so, that timelessness, "Nothing", is the most natural state of affairs (Apologies to "Naturalists")
...natural, right, and good, if and when it's time for it.
(...natural in the dictionary sense of "ordinary or usual".)
Michael Ossipoff
Quoting Michael Ossipoff
Well if a metaphysics has to become more elaborate in order to avoid refutation then certainly it becomes more suspicious... But at the other extreme, can high parsimony become tautology? As I mentioned earlier, I have a feeling that your Skepticism borders on the tautological .. "it [existence] is what it is". You quite fairly asked me to justify this claim... I'm still working on it, albeit rather lazily...
Quoting Michael Ossipoff
also true of a tautology!
But what's wrong with that? If the world could be explained essentially without saying anything (much less assuming anything), then wouldn't that be even better?
Yes, I can say that Skepticism doesn't need any explanations. It would be even better if I could show the world doesn't even need any explanation, because there's a complete explanation that's a tautology, that would be even better. But I don't claim to be able to say that. But I'd appreciate any help, if you can help me to justify such a statement.
Maybe that's the best that I an claim. . ...that Skepticism borders on tautology.
...and, if I could say that, then what nicer, neater explanation could I offer, than showing that, not only does Skepticism not need any assumptions, but it shows that the world doesn't even need any explanation.
Well, yes, I see what you mean: Maybe Skepticism is an explanation that shows that no explanation is even needed.
I like that. It doesn't get any neater.
I'd said:
But it's still a good thing. ...and even better if it's close to being tautology.
...or, even more ideally, if it fully were tautology. (But I'm not claiming that it is.)
Michael Ossipoff
But now I must admit that I can't say that Skepticism is a tautology, because:
A tautology is true no matter how things are. But Skepticism would be false if Physicalism were true.
And, unlike the absolutely unquestionable certainty of a tautology, no metaphysics can be proved.
A tautology doesn't state any information or make a substantive claim, but Skepticism says that our physical world is just a system of inter-referring hypothetical or abstract facts, including some that are always true, such as mathematical theorems and abstract logical facts; and (as conditions in if-then facts), some hypothetical facts, such as physical laws, and hypothetical quantity-values which (because they're those facts' topic) are part of those facts; and if-then statements referring to and relating all these things--facts about conclusions that some particular fact is true if a set of other facts are true..
So Skepticism is an explanation for our physical world, but, because no metaphysics is provable, Skepticism doesn't have the absolute certainty that a tautology has.
And Skepticism is a substantive propositiont that contradicts other metaphysicses.
Yes, not needing, using or including any assumptions, and not positing any brute-facts is something that Skepticism has in common with a tautology, but it seems to me that I can't go so far as saying that Skepticism has the absolute certainty of a tautology.
Michael Ossipoff
But all metaphysicses would LIKE to be proved ...there is nothing special about being non-provable is there?
Sure, metaphysicses aren't the only unprovable propositions. And no doubt all proponents of metaphysicses would like to prove them.
I just meant that unprovability surely distinguishes Skepticism from a tautology, because a tautology is true with complete certainty.
But I just feel that parsimony is the standard for comparing any two metaphysicses.
...and that the absence of assumptions or brute-facts--a rare attribute for a metaphysics--counts strongly in a metaphysics' favor.
Michael Ossipoff
First, replace "statements" with "facts". ...because "statements" misleadingly implies that I'm speaking of an utterance.
Of course an if-then fact consists of two parts: Its "if" clause and its "then" clause.
(I call them "clauses" for want of a better word. ...with no intention of implying utterances.)
Some of those "if" clauses or "then" clauses could, themselves, be if-then facts.
...but of course they needn't.
So, the parts of an if-then fact, the two clauses, needn't, themselves, be if-then facts.
So, when I said that there's no evidence that our physical universe consists of more than inter-related if-then statements, i should have said, "...including their parts, hypotheticals which needn't, themselves, be if-then statements."
Those facts that you listed in your example are hypothetical facts, suppositional facts, that are parts of the "if" clauses of some if-then facts, and part of the "then" clauses of other if-then facts.
(An if-then fact's "then" clause can be called "hypothetical", because it might not be true. It isn't necessarily true if the "if" clause isn't true.)
Michael Ossipoff