Is Meaning Prior To Language?
The question is as fundamental as they come. A discussion on meaning could transform into the endless common pitfalls of historical discourse, but this discussion need not suffer that fate, for that same discourse has also shed light...
Method is paramount. I will grant historical discourse in it's entirety and without prejudice by virtue of inviting current convention to decide the starting point. I will not revisit classical problems unless warrant for my doing so has been clearly, simply, and strongly argued for.
Convention places theories of meaning in two distinct categories; semantic, which sets out the meanings and/or semantic contents of linguistic expressions(within a community of speakers), and foundational, which sets out what it is about the community of speakers and their circumstances that gives those expressions of language semantic content. We can bookmark the difference between the two by looking into what sorts of questions each asks. The former pursues questions such as, "What is the meaning of this or that symbol (for a particular person or group)?", and the latter would ask, "What relevant facts regarding that person and/or group result in the symbol having the meaning that it does?" I'll not draw further contrast between the two because the question at hand requires further comparison. So I point towards their common basis:symbolism and confidently say that the spade does not turn up at this point. To quite the contrary...
By virtue of lifting the veil from atop symbolism, I intend to argue that all instances of symbolism are adequate for meaning, and that some instances of symbolism are prior to language. My answer to the question at hand necessarily follows...
Yes. Meaning is indeed prior to language as it must be.
Method is paramount. I will grant historical discourse in it's entirety and without prejudice by virtue of inviting current convention to decide the starting point. I will not revisit classical problems unless warrant for my doing so has been clearly, simply, and strongly argued for.
Convention places theories of meaning in two distinct categories; semantic, which sets out the meanings and/or semantic contents of linguistic expressions(within a community of speakers), and foundational, which sets out what it is about the community of speakers and their circumstances that gives those expressions of language semantic content. We can bookmark the difference between the two by looking into what sorts of questions each asks. The former pursues questions such as, "What is the meaning of this or that symbol (for a particular person or group)?", and the latter would ask, "What relevant facts regarding that person and/or group result in the symbol having the meaning that it does?" I'll not draw further contrast between the two because the question at hand requires further comparison. So I point towards their common basis:symbolism and confidently say that the spade does not turn up at this point. To quite the contrary...
By virtue of lifting the veil from atop symbolism, I intend to argue that all instances of symbolism are adequate for meaning, and that some instances of symbolism are prior to language. My answer to the question at hand necessarily follows...
Yes. Meaning is indeed prior to language as it must be.
Comments (257)
I don't think I'll have much to contribute to this discussion. Whatever you come up with and wherever you go, you should take into account the fact that the capacity for and structures of language are genetically wired into our nervous system before birth.
Interesting claim, particularly the part about "structures of language" being genetically wired into our nervous system before birth. Care to unpack that? I mean, what sort of thing can a structure of language be if it is something capable of being 'genetically wired'? And... what counts as being genetically wired?
I am not a cognitive scientist, so I will rapidly get in over my head. Here is a link to Wikipedia's write up on psycholinguistics. Look at the discussion of "language acquisition" for a discussion of the issue. See section 3.1.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Psycholinguistics
Prior is a tricky word, but I would argue that meaning is "inside" or "the driver of" language. The meanings of words change, which I think is evidence for meaning being "located" within language, or a catalyst for language. Consider other forms of expression, like art forms for instance. Creating art is driven by a need to express; the content of that expression comes after the fact, but the expression is prior. Language works the same way. Human experience is a situation in which we need to express things, and so language comes after that fact as a fulfillment of a requirement. But other forms of expression also exist.
Wouldn't the proper analogy here be "Is number prior to counting"?
Counting, and meaning, are the action; number, and language, the tool.
But that assumes that the capacity to grasp meaning and language is something that can be understood in biological terms - that it is the product of genetics. This naturally must see the evolution of language and the ability to grasp meaning as a kind of linear progression of abilities which exist in a more rudimentary form in other species, like the use of twigs to poke termite-nests being a rudimentary example of tool use.
However there is
Stephen Barr review of Why Only Us: Language and Evolution, Berwick and Chomsky
That suggests to me that what evolves is the capacity for language and abstract reasoning, which is inextricably intertwined with the capacity to recognise meaning. Perhaps in some rudimentary way, any living thing 'recognises' meaning, in the sense that 'sweet means nourishment' or 'heat means danger'; but it is only in humans (or other rational beings, should there be any) that language, thought and mind reach the point of being able to represent those things as facts or propositions.
Many other species have some ability to communicate, have calls and such that might qualify as symbols. I am coming to believe that the peculiarity of language is that it is a far more powerful tool than we could have needed just for communication at the time when language emerged. Granted, we now use it for more nuanced sorts of communication than any other species, but those other species get along pretty well with what they have. I think either language answered to other purposes (than communication) from the beginning, or, my guess, it's an accident that we ended up with so much more than we needed.
It's just speculation. But if you're going to explain what language is or how it works, you ought to try not to leave out whatever it is that makes language distinctive from other sorts of animal communication.
(I see @Wayfarer has chimed in with a related point as I was writing.)
I was thinking of number as a concept; quantity, not number(s). So Counting and language would be the action, meaning and "number" are the catalyst of the action. After all, numbers are just representations of quantity. Language seems to be a representation of meaning.
Right. So how is meaning an action?
Can you elaborate? I disagree; I say language is what we do with meaning.
I've read some of Investigations, but these days I'm not so into it. I was asking for your thoughts, not reading recs.
Creative and I have had much the same discussion for years. Do I know you of old, Nobel Dust?
I don't think words representing what we mean is equal to statements being the whole of language. If you're talking about "the whole of language", how does meaning being a function of language (what I interpret your argument to be) better deal with that whole?
Quoting Banno
So you're saying that because we don't know each other, but you and creative do, my argument's aren't worth your time? lol. But who's this Nobel guy?? Alfred "Dusty" Nobel??
What are we debating? I like debates.
I said meaning is not separable from language, and hence that it is an error to suppose that meaning can be prior to language.
Meaning is not separable from language because meaning is what language does; hence the example: counting is what numbers do.
What was your reply? I must have missed it.
Here:
Quoting Noble Dust
Yes I think very young, pre-linguistic children come to understand that if they cry someone will typically come around to see what's up, when they hear the word 'no' while initially I don't think they really understand it, they soon pick up the fact that this sound means that they need to aware of something.
The connection between language and computation is interesting. Do you think language is reducible to computation (for the most part), I didn't think so, but Google translate seems to be a pretty good refutation of that position. Counting may be more important for survival from an evolutionary standpoint than communication . Language is thought by many to be a fairly recent achievement, estimated at about 60000 to 100,000 years old.
But better: forget about meaning altogether and just look at what we do with language.
Corollary: not everything we do with language is making statements.
Quoting Banno
Quoting Banno
Quoting Banno
You seem to be saying several different things, Banno.
If language is a tool we mean things with, then it's conceivable we could mean things with something else. If you're saying there's nothing else we can mean things with, you'd need to argue for that.
Unless it turns out you were defining the word "meaning" here as "what we do with language." Then you could save the tool talk, I guess: "meaning" would mean "using the tool language." On the other hand, how informative would such a definition be?
Really? I'd understood that I said much the same thing four different ways.
It is more than conceivable that we could mean things in other ways than with language. Such as:
As for definitions - they are fraught. No, I am not defining meaning as what we do with words.
But the problem with that is, that if a consequence is that we have to derive the nature of meaning from within the limits of language and meaning itself - then there is always going to be a problem of the circularity of reference, in my view. I think what I'm getting at is that meaning seems like a kind of Indian rope trick - that it dangles down from 'above' in some sense, and we can use the rope to suspend all kinds of things from, but we can't really see what's at the top end, holding it up. Whereas the typical reductionist accounts of 20th century philosophy always want to understand it by looking 'downwards' into the apparently undirected activities of matter shaped by darwinian necessity.
So meaning is separable from language, because we can mean something with a painting, but language is not separable from meaning because all we can do with language is mean things. Is that right?
No, I think meaning ought to be reified, and it can be reified so long as it is not understood to be any particular thing, it is more like relations between things. It's value which cannot be reified, and when we interpret, we bring values to bear upon meaning.
Very much so.
Hence the distinction between showing and telling; You can show someone the rope; from there, they can climb up or down.
Hmmm. Doesn't Austin point out that when the judge says, "Guilty," he has done something with words besides mean something?
More to the point of the thread, if meaning is something we can do by various means, language among them, then doesn't that suggest that meaning is "prior" to language? I'm not wild about "prior" talk, but it seems your position would lead you to agree with him.
Do we do this again? So, if as you say meaning is a relation between things, what sort of things is it a relation between? Words and...?
Indeed; it depends entirely on what "prior" might mean...
I guess I'm okay with it as indicating what's being explained in terms of what. If A is explained in terms of B, then B is prior to A. That could be conceptually prior, metaphysically prior, who knows. If we've ruled out circularity, or mutual dependence, etc.
If there's no way to explain what language is, how it works, how it's used, whatever, without talking about meaning, then I guess that would make meaning prior to language.
Sure; only we can pretty much drop "meaning" in favour of "use"... Look at what we do with words rather than mean with them.
This is fairly well what I was arguing, Banno.
Agreed.
What does "...unless" reference in that sentence? Are you assuming that my argument is invalid "...unless"?
As far as what meaning means, that's the beauty of meaning. It's self-referencial. It's not a metaphysical concept to be defined by reason, but rather the basis of metaphysics in general. Everything needs a referent. We can't use the English language on this internet forum without meaning. If we can't define meaning, as you so coyly suggest, then we can't debate. It's really not complicated.
A symbol represents...
But we do more with words than just represent.
Hence, the analysis of symbols is inadequate to explain language.
Change of vocabulary is no help, as they suffer from almost exactly the same ambiguity.
There's what words mean, as used in sentences, and then there's what we mean by them, as used in, you know, life. There's the use of words in sentences, and the use of words to tell people stuff, ask them questions, pronounce them guilty, etc.
We have good reasons for distinguishing between these sorts of things, but they are intimately linked, so it's no surprise that the same words end up smeared across the whole domain. Word-meaning and sentence-meaning are pretty different, but they're far from unrelated. And they're different again from what we mean by uttering a sentence in a particular context, but the meaning of the sentence, and hence of the words of which it is composed, is usually far from irrelevant.
Take a look at this paragraph again, but see if you can see it as I do.
It looks to ma as if you have assumed that every word (you say thing, but that would be very odd...) has a referent; and then when you cannot find the referent of "meaning" you propose that it refers to itself.
That is special pleading. Drop the assumption that all words refer, and you do not need the rather convolute conclusion that meaning refers to itself.
I think I can see it from your view. But I still disagree. Do you disagree that every word has a referent? If a word has no referent, it tends to die off. That, to me, suggests that meaning carries the "lives" of words; meaning is what gives words life. When meaning ends, a word dies. It's referent is no longer relevant.
As far as special pleading, I don't think it applies to meaning. I'm not avoiding the fact that the word meaning doesn't have a concrete definition, I'm underlining the fact that meaning as a concept is the metaphysical basis for language, if language is to have any use at all.
We ought pay more attention to the distinction between foundational and semantic in the OP.
The best account of semantic meaning I am aware of is found in Davidson. But it has been around for forty-odd years and nit had much success.
Another curious approach is found in those who see language as information transfer; but I'm not able to see much depth in that.
Hence the need to reflect on the foundation; which I take to be the difference between showing and telling. One does not show that one understands a rule by stating it; but by following it.
Why not say that use is what gives words life? Obviously, the words that die are those that are no longer used.
If all words have a referent, to what does "Hello" refer?
Some of the issue here may be terminological, because it's perfectly clear that not every sort of word has anything to do with things: the logical constants, syncategorematic words, the list goes on.
In general, it's only names that carry the reference to some thing with them; other words can be combined to form expressions that refer, such as "my truck."
That's not to say that words that don't refer don't mean anything, only that there's more to meaning than referring to things.
Again, I'm not un-fond of Wittgenstein. But I don't fully buy his ideas. But I'm probably less educated than you on language. I'm working through my ideas. Are you saying "use" and "meaning" are synonymous, or are you saying that "use" is more accurate than "meaning"? For instance, I think that use is determined by meaning. The concept of use doesn't supersede the concept of meaning. I can argue, for instance, that use is situational in relation to meaning. The use of the word "together" could refer to a romantic couple, a sandwich (bread and cheese together), a family reunion, sexual intercourse...use of the word "together" varies, but it's meaning is a broad concept that connects it's separate uses. We see connections across the disparate uses.
Quoting Banno
It refers to the acknowledgement of another human being.
Right, I don't think I was saying that meaning equals reference. It seems that you and Banno might be moving the goal posts here? My main argument is about meaning. I brought in referents as part of my argument; maybe that part of my argument isn't as strong. I take your criticisms in stride. But that's not the thrust of my argument.
Me, too.
I'm repeating Wittgenstein's point that we can get further by looking to the use to which an utterance is put, than we can by an analysis of the meaning involved.
"Hello". Look at what is going on here, not at what you expect. It does not refer to greeting; it is a greeting.
Ok, yes, I agree with you here, but again, I never meant to say that referent equals meaning. Maybe I phrased something badly? (If I did, what is that? Is it a case of bad use, or incorrect meaning? :P )
I would say this: the meaning of a word is the contribution it makes to the meaning of a sentence in which it is used. (That's more or less Dummett's version of Frege, and I'm happy with it at the moment.) The key word there is "used": in distinction from "mentioned" of course, but also in the sense that the sentence is the unit of doing something linguistically--making a statement, placing a bet, asking a question, etc.
That said, "Hello" also refers in a context of culture. So, in a way, all language refers within it's expected context. The only way a word wouldn't refer was if it was foreign, or a specialized word that can only be recognized by specialists (Srap's reference to syncategorematic words)
Yes; exactly. 8-)
This is what Davidson tried to bring out by translating natural languages into first order language. It didn't quite work. But it was fun.
What to?
Fine, I can go with that (tentatively), but then the question of the OP becomes: "Is the meaning of sentences prior to language?" We still haven't properly dealt with meaning if we just assign it to sentences. The meanings of individual words assign to sentences, but the meanings of individual sentences assign to what? Broader paragraphs or conversations, but what do those assign to? It brings up, again, the context of language itself, and we're back to square one.
Eh? (Use your words! As my mother used to say).
Quoting Banno
To acknowledgement of another person, as I already said.
Both.
But Davidson wants to treat language as purely extensional. We Fregeans have sense as well as reference.
Also, not to nitpick, but just in good faith, how accurately can we do this? Is this a deal-breaker? I could take the entire following paragraph that you wrote in your post that I just quoted and analyze the terminology, but could I nail down the terminology beyond a reasonable doubt? If we had to do this with every paragraph written and communicated, we wouldn't actually communicate anything.
That's one of the things that made it interesting. Perhaps we need a seperate thread on where Davidson went wrong.
Quoting Srap TasmanerCool. But what is sense? How do we fill that out?
I appreciate your Wittgensteinian brevity, but your meaning would be more clear if you actually used more words. (Or should I say your "use"?)
Both. Bad use amounts to incorrect meaning.
So are you saying I specifically did that, or are you using my joke in that context to illustrate your point? Fine if so, but you'd need to elaborate further (use more words!).
I think it's clearest with an example: "2+2" and "4" both refer to the same object, 4, but have different senses. Thus "2+2=4" and "4=4" express different thoughts. Just as "2+2" and "4" have the same reference, so "2+2=4" and "4=4" have the same truth-value.
I'm not clear about this. Are you talking about the impossibility of defining everything, or about some sort of indeterminacy?
Again, it was just a nit-pick about "nailing down terminology", and it may be tangential to the thread. But I was just questioning your admonishment that you were "just nailing down terminology". I'm saying that I don't think we can accurately do that in an exhaustive manner. I guess that's somewhat relevant to the thread topic, but I don't want to de-rail the thread.
All good, I realize I didn't quite use the word "admonish" properly there, I was thinking of it in less critical terms. (ah, meaning! and ah, using words you have a sense of in your head, but they turn out to be not quite right! again, meaning...) I didn't at all think you were suggesting me to be a dunderhead, or whatever. All that being said, apparently we agree that "reference" and "meaning" aren't synonymous. I must have said something to suggest the contrary when I initially referenced "reference".
I'm more or less just defending Fregean orthodoxy these days until I'm convinced to stop.
There was a time when I was inclined to say that words never refer to things, but that people, by their utterances, refer to things. Only I think logic needs reference and doesn't need utterance, so I can't hand reference over to utterance.
I'm admittedly very much an autodidact, and so I'm not familiar with Frege. Perhaps that contributes to the seemingly wide-spread confusion I tend to wreak on this forum...
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
Wait but what is "utterance"? Is it just verbally saying something?
So is that a philosophical argument?
Yeah, utterance is actually saying something, in a particular situation. Or at least that's how I use the word, and I think it's at least close to standard.
In general, you can mean something by what you say, and have it be different from what you literally say. Example I was cooking up: You and four other folks are heading for a life raft that will only safely hold four; when you point this out, one of the others points a gun at you and says, "Five minus one is four." Okay, the literal meaning of that is one thing, but what's meant by it is another. The literal meaning is what logic deals with; the other is pragmatics or something.
Yeah, reference and extension on one side; sense and intension on the other.
The argument would go, "when one learns that 2+2 is 4, one learns something". I'm not so sure. If one knows that 2+2 is, doesn't one already know what 4 is?
Exactly. It's why an equation can be informative. Remember that Frege came up with the whole sense/reference business to explain why saying "The morning star is the evening star" is different from saying "Venus is Venus." The first could be informative, but the second couldn't. That takes some explaining if reference is all that matters.
Ok, so utterance is intended meaning, right?
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
I would go so far as to say that the other meaning is poetic, in that it says more than the logical meaning could possibly say. Poetic meaning unveils further possibilities from the standard meaning of a logical proposition.
Sure. You could also say it's the stuff that logic can ignore, lovely though it may be, just as it ignores the difference between "and" and "but."
Unfortunately-- or fortunately, since I find this stuff interesting-- it's not perfectly simple to say what logic can ignore and what it can't. Indexicals (I, here, now, etc.) are hard to ignore. If a sentence is elliptical, so that some of it is understood from context, you have to drag in what was understood but not stated. It's still a distinction you have to make if there's to be any point to logic at all.
That Phosphorus and Hesperus are the same is a better example for your purposes. But again, when we find out that Hesperus is Phosphorus, did we really find out something more than a novel use for the words "Hesperus" and "Phosphorus"?
That is, is sense any more than use?
Having read Austin's How To Do Things With Words, I readily agree with the notion that not all words refer. That is of no consequence to what's been set out thus far. However, it seems that you want to argue that not all meaning is based upon symbolism. That could get interesting.
Not all language is representation.
All symbolism is representation
Therefore not all language is symbolism.
Not all meaning is representation.
All symbolism is representation
Therefore not all meaning is symbolism.
I hope not? Use is what we expect here, so I'm not sure why that's a problem.
To start with expressions: "my" and "car" have senses, but not until you combine them into "my car" do you also have a reference, namely the car I own, the object. The senses of "my" and "car" determine what the expression "my car" will refer to.
With a sentence, the sense is the thought expressed by the sentence, and for Frege this is completely objective, public, shared. Reference for sentences is just truth-value. We don't go around just telling each other "True" and "False."
So yes, the sense of a word is its use.
Depends on what you mean by "represent" doesn't it? In one sense of the term only icons represent what they symbolize, insofar as they bear some visual resemblance to it. In another sense, all symbols represent, insofar as they stand for what they symbolize.
How can a thought be shared?
Now, a use - we could share that. But a thought? You are not able to see the beetle in my box.
Representation and symbolism differ in their necessary elemental constituents.
Indeed. It is often thought/believed that a symbol stands for what it represents. The problem with this focus, and indeed... most discussion thus far... is that we're already actively engaged in metacognition. That is, we're reporting upon thought/belief. Prelinguistic meaning does not - cannot - consist of metacognition. It consists of the symbol, the symbolized, and an agent capable of drawing mental correlation(s) between the two. Notice here there is no need for intent, whereas representation requires it.
Exactly. Frege argues that what you happen to have in mind, your ideas, associations, and so on, cannot be the meaning of what you say, because that's non-transferable. He calls whatever it is that is transferable, the thought. You could call it semantic content. Whatever. But he argues at length that there is something transferable and that it cannot be just reference.
Hm. I think, rather, that he solved it by pointing to the basis of language in following, not stating, a rule.
I'm not clear what point you are attempting to make here. Symbols are taken by convention to stand for what they symbolize. I don't think the idea of a "pre-linguistic symbol" makes any sense. A pre-linguistic icon or sign, sure, but not a symbol.
For example...
My cat has drawn mental correlations between the sound of certain plastic bags and treats, much like Pavlov's dog with the bell and food. The symbol is the sound, the treats are the symbolized, my cat is the agent capable of drawing correlations between the two. The sound has meaning to the cat, via the cat's own attribution by virtue of drawing correlations. The sound of the bag cannot be said to stand in for the food...
We've talked past one another my friend... Following a rule rather than stating it says nothing at all about what's 'beneath' language. Whereof....
Unless I've missed something?
There's something mysterious about the notion of something being transferred - why think along those lines?
Why not just suppose that we learn the use?
But it does. There is a way of understanding language that is not stated in philosophy forums, but shown in the ordinary act of talking.
The rope Wayfarer mentioned.
Here you are blurring the perfectly good distinction between sign and symbol. I would say the sound does not have meaning for the cat; meaning is proper to symbols, and perhaps icons. It's more appropriate to say that the sound has significance for the cat; thus it is a sign.
Indeed. There is most certainly a way of understanding language(and of showing that much) by way of using it. I fail to see the relevance that that has to whether or not some symbolism and thus some meaning is prior to language.
That claim requires justification. Care to elaborate upon both, the proper distinction between sign and symbol, and then show the relevance?
Employing a symbol is already using language.
If you're saying that intent is necessary for meaning but not for significance, then I'll note that you're simply begging the question... affirming the consequent. Arguing by fiat. If significance is meaning without intent then...
They both consist of(are existentially contingent upon) mental correlations drawn between sign/symbol and signified/symbolized.
Indeed Banno. Employing a symbol is already using language... Note here that intent is required. That was not the case with my cat. I do not make sounds with plastic bags in order to alter her behaviour, and yet there are certain bags which make sounds that are so similar to her treat bag that she forms false belief. Those sounds are meaningful to her, and yet she's not using them, nor am I... at least in those cases.
It's very basic. For example, clouds may be a sign of rain, but they do not symbolize rain. There are countless examples like this in nature. Nothing symbolizes anything without some established convention.
Presuming this is addressed to me; I'll say it again; you are losing a perfectly coherent distinction between sign and symbol; a distinction that certainly does make a difference.
"Meaningful' is not monosemous, though. Significance is a kind of meaning, and symbolization is another kind, the former may be pre-linguistic, and the latter cannot, I would say. So, re your OP pre-linguistic meaning may certainly be prior to language, both temporally and in terms of dependence; that is to say, I believe no language could ever get started if there were no pre-linguistic signs and icons.
So, while I may agree that there's a (purely conventional)distinction between what counts as "signification" and what counts as "symbolism", your pointing that much out makes no difference to the thrust of my argument... the sound is meaningful to the cat. Yet that's what you initially objected to...
I ought to expand on that a little. I think that Wittgenstein was generally opposed to any species of metaphysical idealism - this is in large part what he meant by his celebrated remark about 'that of which we cannot speak...'. The Vienna Circle seized on that and tried to use it in support of positivism. But I don't really think that Wittgenstein was positivist at all. Rather he was recommending a kind of circumspection, something much nearer to the original intent of scepticism, rather than to declare that only what can be stated is useful, or real.
So in search of a rope to hang that idea off, I googled 'Wittgenstein and Positivism', and found a rather splendid short essay on same on the Philosophy Now website (and not paywalled, or at least not for me), which included this observation:
Now I don't claim to 'know what is transcendental' - because after all to know it would be to render it no longer transcendental. But I dimly suspect that amongst the whatever-it-is that 'transcendental' signifies, is whatever holds the rope up in the first place - which in turn is the reason that language has use in the first place.
And I am gratified to read, in that same piece, that in this matter, Wittgenstein was very much in the lineage of Kant, and motivated by the same concerns.
Quoting creativesoul
My real objection was to your claim that the sound was a symbol, that symbolized the "treats". I was rejecting that claim, and the associated idea that the sound has meaning for the cat in the fullest sense associated with understanding symbols.
Whether or not significance is defined as a kind of meaning is not really important here, because if your whole argument was that there is pre-linguistic meaning, or significance or whatever you might want to call it, in the lesser sense of merely responding to signs, then you would have done no more than mounted a trivially true argument that would have warranted no response
Your intentions here are becoming suspect.
Not sure how one can read my example, which clearly lays out some of the most rudimentary thought/belief and meaning imaginable and interpret such a description to be on par with the fullest sense of symbolic meaning that we normally associate with understanding symbols.
Well, you referred to the sound as symbolic; so I thought you were arguing that meaning in some purported 'complete' sense (not understanding in the linguistic sense, obviously) is present in your cat's 'reading' of the sound as symbol. As I said, otherwise, you are not arguing anything that anyone would disagree with, I think.
Well, it could be relations between words and other things, what we call reference, or it could be relations between words and other words, what we call context, and definition.
The point though, which is relevant to creativesoul's op, is that not only is there meaning in the relations which words are involved in, but there is meaning in the relations of all things. This is the assumption of information theory which necessitates the conclusion that meaning is prior to language.
No more mysterious than information, or energy, heh heh.
Analogies for language always come up short in some way. The sharing of semantic content just is exactly what language is for. When I speak to you, there's stuff in my mind you don't get, can't get. But there's something you do get that doesn't belong to me; Frege calls that the thought expressed by what I say. Like our mental contents, it's invisible, but like physical objects it's, um, objective.
I think from my side, the question is whether you take seriously the word "use." The words we utter to ourselves or others have content; they aren't just signals. Compare:
Where the word "go" is mentioned, it does not have its usual content. But to understand either of these instructions, you have to understand the content, which includes the word "go" being used. (Notice the similarity of (1) to a T-sentence.)
Wittgenstein's quasi-behaviourism is just continuing Frege's fight against psychologism. Understanding (1) or (2) has nothing to do with getting the same images or whatever I have in mind when I speak them. Understanding means acquiring the content, which is not peculiar to me or to you. If you leave content out, you're leaving out what makes language different from signaling.
It's not at all the case that meaning only occurs in response to natural languages.
I just have a resistance to Quine.
And the label doesn't matter. I don't think doing philosophy should be like choosing a breakfast cereal. ("I really like this one, but I know this other one is supposed to be better for me.")
Many people do not accept the notion that meaning is prior to language. Even more, perhaps, reject the idea that truth is as well. I would think that those go hand in hand. Be that as it may...
I am arguing that the sound was meaningful to the cat in some complete sense. I've set out a criterion which, when met, counts as an example of the attribution of meaning. That was the bit regarding what it takes...
A symbol. That which is symbolized. A creature capable of drawing mental correlations between the two.
You've objected to my calling the sound "a symbol" and suggested instead that the sound be properly called "a sign". Your objection is grounded upon the lack of convention prevalent in the example, basically saying that where there is no convention there can be no symbol, by definition.
My reply to such a line of argument is that 1.)it could be the case that I'm not using the term "symbol" correctly if the correctness of use is determined by convention and what you've said about it is true, and 2.)symbolism, if it requires such a conventional standard, cannot be prior to language.
And yet signs would necessarily become symbols precisely when the meaning becomes shared; at the moment that a plurality of capable creatures draws the same correlations between the same things(sound and food). My having observed my cat has allowed me to be aware of my cat's attribution of meaning to that particular sound. So then, without her agreement I can use the sound to alter her behaviour accordingly... and it is repeatable... consistently. Am I using language here? Is she? You see the problem with the conventional requirement?
It would be much more accurate to say that not all meaning is social.
I see "social meaning" as a category error. I'm the anti-Putnam. Any way you slice it, meaning is just in the head.
In my view it's rather incoherent to posit anything that does not have a location. "Inside the head" is most certainly sufficient for meaning. It looks like we have very different views.
I don't recall previous interaction with you--I don't even recall your user name at all, but I wouldn't have been offended by anything. (Edit: I see you just joined three days ago, though, so this would have had to be recent . . . I'll check your posting history.)
I may not have answered something, but I'd do that because either (a) in my view I had asked something where I didn't consider any response an answer or (b) one was typing long responses bringing up what I considered to be a bunch of different tangents and I was addressing one thing at a time. It's almost always one of those two reasons why I'd not answer something (as long as i noticed a post in the first place).
I'm late to this party, I was out enjoying myself. One thing that happened earlier today was, I was watching a bunch of children and their carers play in a pavement set of fountains, soaking in the heat. One infant in a push chair, aged about 1, was eating an ice cream. I smiled, she smiled back. I mimed munching, a couple of times. She pushed forward in her seat and offered me the ice-cream. I held my hands up in genial refusal.
Now, I think we spoke in the language of gesture to each other. But do you think that this sort of gesture is 'prior to language'?
Just depends on how loosely we're willing to define "language," doesn't it?
Yup. I believe that that's what you said before. There is a relationship between a mother and child. What is the location of that relationship?
I'm curious then... What counts as an example of meaning? I mean, what criterion which, if met, counts as an example of meaning?
I would concur.
No. Have you another word for the medium of such adult-infant communication? Or would you just say it's 'gesture' which is not 'language'?
There are a lot of relations between mothers and children. If you're talking about the biological parent relation, the location is in the mother's womb initially (and we can peg that location to 21 Main Street at a particular time, and then follow it as the mother moves around), then it's where the child exits the womb, etc.
Quoting creativesoul
An individual making a particular kind of signifier/signified mental association.
Interesting question. Applying what's been set out thus far...
The child seems to have drawn correlations between your behaviour and your wanting the ice cream. Hence, she offered. Seems to me to be a clear case of language acquisition/creation in process.
So then, if I grant the above...
The biological parent relation no longer exists in the womb once the child is born. It is located wherever the child is afterwards?
In the child's head? In the mother's head as well?
I asked:
Terrapin answered:
Are all elements of the association located inside the head?
We treat children as potentially competent speakers of our language right from the start, in part because they begin understanding speech earlier and faster than they can produce it. (Talking's hard.) I think this charming scene fits in this general pattern of behavior. We also use lots of gestures and facial expressions with children as they learn our language.
It's in the womb because we're talking about the development of a child with respect to the mother. The womb is where that occurs. When you talk about the relation after that, you're referring to the fact that there was that physical development connection.
Quoting creativesoul
All elements of the association, qua the association, are in the head, yes. The mental association is what meaning is.
I think the belief that some of the "higher" animals employ signaling to a considerable level of sophistication is common, but there remains a distinction between mere signalling, no matter how sophisticated, and symbolic language, however basic, and the kinds of meaning associated with each. I mean, think about it; we even say that music has meaning. Perhaps we can say there is symbolic meaning, associative meaning and affective meaning, as different 'species', for example ( there might be others, too). With your cat and her treats I would say it is associative meaning at work, although there might be a bit of affective meaning in play as well. >:O
I'd reply to you more quickly if you hit the "reply" button--that way I get a notification that you responded to me.
We'd need to clarify exactly what we're talking about. We could be talking about (i) the fact that the child developed in the womb of the mother, etc. Or we could be talking about (ii) DNA connections. We could be talking about (iii) social interaction. There are a number of things we could be talking about--that's not an exhaustive list. I told you where the (i) is located. After childbirth that particular relation is a historical fact. It no longer exists. (ii) is located in the cells of the people in question. (iii) is located wherever those people happen to be when they're interacting--in their home on Main Street, etc.
Can't you read? It's difficult to have a conversation like this if someone can't read basic English. I wrote "All elements of the association, qua the association, are in the head, yes. The mental association is what meaning is." The bell is not the association. Also, note that the association is not two objects. It's a uniquely mental phenomenon.
John wrote:
That's the one I'm interested in. Care to set it out?
Sigh...
The bell is a necessary part of the association.
Agree?
I have no doubt you can work it out for yourself. Hint: it has to do with reflexivity and generality.
It's part of what the association is about. It's not itself the association qua the association.
If I write the sentence "The cow jumped over the moon", a cow is part of what the sentence is about. But the cow isn't part of the sentence, part of my typing, qua the sentence or qua my typing.
I'd rather you clear it up for me. It seems that we're in agreement as far as he thread topic is concerned, however I am curious about this distinction.
I would add here that it is obvious that some senses of the term "meaning" cannot be prior to language, whereas others are. I think that that bit of knowledge is important.
I disagree that the bell is part of what the association is about for the exact same reason that the association is not about any of the other elemental constituents. However, I'm not inclined to argue about the framework you've put to use. According to it, that all just very well make perfect sense(be completely coherent). As you noted earlier, we have different positions. That said...
It is interesting to me though that we agree on the basic question in the OP. It is also interesting that the framework you're using seems to have a physicalist bent, aside from the talk about "mental" stuff.
I do strongly think that meaning is shared, whereas you reject that notion. That is a fundamental disagreement between us, that ought be avoided if there is any progress to be made. Unfortunately, I think that that is the basis of your talk about the location of meaning, so we may have nothing further to discuss, unless you've something aside from these things in mind.
There is one question I'd like to ask you:What does a mental association between a bell and food consist of on your view?
OK. my thought is that the kind of meaning associated with language, made possible with language, is reflective, generalized meaning. The idea represented as 'tree' is an example.
A particular tree may have some meaning for a cat, because she, for example, climbs the tree, sharpens her claws on it or hunts birds in the tree. But in this case the meaning is associative; a kind of significance, for want of a better word; the tree stands out to the cat as a gestalt, you might even say.
We must be careful in such discussions, lest we fall victim to unjustifiable anthropomorphist claims. It does seem apparent that in order to make sense of rudimentary thought/belief and meaning we must carefully describe the only candidates at hand; statements thereof.
Agree?
I'm not sure what you're referring to here. For sure, we cannot get into the head of a cat in order to experience the meaning we might think a tree has for her. The notion that the tree has meaning for her is based partly on observing her behavior, but also on analogy with our own experience of things which have meanings for us, meanings that do not seem to rely on our linguistic abilities.
I agree with what's overtly expressed above.
I agree that we cannot get into the head of a cat.
We can know stuff about pre or nonlinguistic thought/belief(human).
Sure, counting can occur without language.
Sure, but I can't see the reason for your disagreement, since I already acknowledged what you say here. Having said that I also want to acknowledge that at least sometimes what is known pre-linguistically may be distorted by being expressed in language.
The last bit I would agree with as well.
Curious then, do you hold that all knowledge is JTB?
That's a difficult question for me. I'm guessing that you would be referring to propositional knowledge here. There is the well-known tale (from Chryssipus?) about the dog chasing a rabbit, who comes to a triple forking of the path, sniffs down two of the paths, and detecting no scent runs headlong in pursuit down the third. Firstly, (assuming for the sake of argument that the story is not apocryphal) is his belief that the rabbit went down the third path truly a propositional belief, and if not, then what kind of belief is it? Is the dog's belief, assuming that the rabbit really did go down the third path, a JTB? Could the dog's belief ever be justified? What if the rabbit went off into the bushes and the dog failed to detect her scent?
Perhaps it's better to forget the dog, and think about our own beliefs. None of our propositional beliefs are absolutely certain, which means that we do not really know if any of them are true. So, perhaps it would be safe to say that, if any of our beliefs are true (even though we can never know whether they are true) and justified; then we sometimes have knowledge, but then it seems to follow that we can never know whether or when we have it. Can we know when our beliefs are justified? Can a false belief ever really be a justified belief in any case?
Given all this uncertainly I tend to think in terms of humans believing, rather than in terms of humans knowing.
How would you know whether someone can count without language?
Indeed, why choose to speak in terms which may add nothing more than unnecessary confusion. That said, perhaps that stuff can be discussed some other time, because I'm fairly certain that understanding certain aspects of all thought/belief allows one to provide satisfactory answers to many, perhaps all, of those questions. By my lights, there are several different topics of conversation in their own right being mentioned. The one we're having has consequences that rightfully apply to each.
I'll gladly plan on returning to this discussion tomorrow. In the meantime, perhaps the following question will pique further interest from you...
Given all that's been talked about thus far, how important is our methodological approach in terms of providing the strongest possible ground for positing the existence and the necessary elemental composition of pre and/or non-linguistic thought/belief and/or meaning?
Oh, and I hope you can pardon my lack of proper greeting. Too many discussions, I suppose, that I ought to have ended participating in much sooner than I did. This one looks rather promising. It's a welcome change, because it's been a while to say the least.
The idea of quantity is basic in nature Wikipedia
Perhaps language evolved out of our sense of sense of size, our ability to convert quantity into meaningful expression vs instinct. Language is largely reducible to computation, as translation programs demonstrate.
I don't understand that sentence. What's "the reason that the association is not about any of the other elemental constituents"?
And yes, I'm a physicalist.
Re this: Quoting creativesoul
If you're asking me what it is physically, it's a dynamic set of brain states. We don't know exactly what states yet, if we'd ever know, and it's not going to be identical states in two different people (though it could be similar).
If "meaning is not prior to language" is the case, then that must be the case prior to you saying it, or typing it up on a screen.
If a bird sees two people go into the brush and sees one exit but continues to wait for the other to exit before it enters the brush, it has successfully counted. I'd guess it could count higher than 2, but I don't know how high.
No, I don't agree with that, for the reasons given by John Searle, et al, through such arguments as the Chinese Room argument. Besides, computers are instruments created by humans and programmed accordingly, computers don't understand or make judgements in the same way that humans do. I know that fans of AI don't see it that way.
Quoting Hanover
It responds to stimuli - whether that amounts to 'counting' is moot, in my view.
I think his concern is that a computer can't understand what it does with its code. Machines simply manipulate symbols, no disagreement on my part, however that's not my point. If a machine can digitize language and generate meaningful translation, then at some level it suggests that language, as a system of symbols, is reducible to simple computational symbols (I believe Chomsky holds this position), and perhaps our semantic ability developed out of some very basic inherent computation abilities.
I doubt it. Have a look at the book review I posted earlier this thread - it is of a recent book co-authored by Chomsky on just this question.
My view is: obviously h. sapiens evolved along the lines known to evolutionary biology. But at the time we reached the capacity to 'grasp meaning', then at that precise moment, our faculties are no longer explicable in purely biological terms.
creative wrote:
Terrapin replied:
Short answer...
Because the dog isn't capable of thinking about stuff.
Long answer...
Talking about Pavlov's dog's mental association being about something or other presupposes that the necessary preconditions required for thought/belief being about something or other are present in the case of Pavlov's dog. That is a false presupposition.
In order for thought/belief(mental associations) to be about a bell, the thinking creature must first have some rudimentary and/or basic notion/concept/idea of a bell. That requires that the bell be previously identified, which requires that the bell be isolated and somehow bookmarked in the dog's thought as something. It is only then that thinking about something is even possible.
We first identify what human thought/belief consists in/of. We then separate the elements not existentially contingent upon language from the ones that are. If the elements of thought/belief not existentially contingent upon language are - in and of themselves - sufficient for thought/belief, then we have the strongest possible ground for positing the core of all human thought/belief. If all thought/belief formation consists of the same elementary constituents(there's no good reason to doubt it), then that core would also be the core of all other non/pre-linguistic thought/belief. There is no valid objection to our establishing such a core, for there is no stronger ground than that which is universally extant after all cultural, historical, and/or familial particulars are removed. That is precisely what is necessary in order to identify and posit such a core.
Other important considerations...
If all linguistic thought and belief have common denominators; some existentially contingent upon language, and others not, then we're justified in saying that the latter are universally extant, sufficient/adequate, and thus necessary(for there is no imaginable example to the contrary) elemental constituents of all thought and belief.
Language is a means of expression. Any thought is a thought of x or that x, with x being a proposition. Whether or not a thought must be expressed, as part of an internal monologue if not externally communicated, is something neuroscientists ponder and seek to research.
If you want to disregard the empirical/scientific approach, then what are your options? You could approach it as a rationalist, in which case you'll need to lay out the principles you'll be using to draw your conclusions. Otherwise: phenomenology?
Chomsky said language is "a computational system" one month ago, at 4.40 into the following.
https://youtu.be/OPCGmsUTAlc
It counted without language.
I don't believe that we have the faintest idea whether that's true.
And if the dog is making a mental association, then the dog is capable of thinking about stuff.
That is, Ginger understood what I was talking about (Fiona and going outside) and her behavior was future oriented, fully expecting her current behavior to lead to an anticipated result. I am quite sure she has no language going through her brain, but the thought of her and her little buddy running outside was in her head as she went looking for her.
I wouldn't be so sure of that. She has to understand something about the sounds "Where's Fiona?" in order to behave the way she subsequently does. It seems to me that that would count as "having language in her brain." She'd not be able to make the sounds "Where's Fiona," and who know what those sounds are like qualitatively to her, but she has to be able to parse those sounds versus other sounds.
I'm not sure what you have in mind by "methodological approach"; I see it more as a matter of commitment. The assumption of an "elemental" real that provides the conditions for actual experience is essential. The assumption that actual experience, both pre-and post-linguistic is an expression of the real is essential. Without those commitments, everything we say will be, to quote Gurdjieff, nothing more than "Pouring from the empty into the void".
It seems you wanted to point out how important it is that post-linguistic ideas are strongly connected to real pre-linguistic feeling, belief and experience, and, implicit in this seems to be an injunction to avoid empty reification of mere "imaginaries" that are made (at least more) possible by language. I would agree with that, but it is a task that is not overly easy. And it is complicated by the fact that what is purely imaginary can certainly lead to real feeling, belief and experience. We're merely human, so perhaps we're never going to nail it, but to surrender to the merely arbitrary imagination is not an option, either. Welcome to the discomfort of uncertainty. :)
You wrote:
The above is false, albeit quite popular. All thought consists entirely of mental correlation(there are no imaginable exceptions to the contrary). All propositions are correlations. Not all correlations are propositions. The same is true regarding predication.
I'm not sure why you've said this. Does it seem to you that I disregard an empirical/scientific approach? If so... how so?
You're neglecting to draw and maintain the crucial distinction between thinking and thinking about stuff. I suspect that you've also neglected to consider the difference between pre-linguistic thought and linguistic. I would even go as far as to guess that you also neglect to consider the difference between thought/belief and thinking about thought/belief.
You neglected to address the long answer, which argued for the short. Gratuitous assertions aren't acceptable.
I don't really understand what you're saying.
You wrote:
Hey Hanover!
I see nothing obviously problematic with this account aside from being perhaps a little too loose. Generally speaking, it makes perfect sense. If I were to place it under the scrutiny of my own position, I would question only the parts regarding the specifics of thought being attributed to Ginger.
A couple of questions come to mind...
1. What pre-existing thought/belief of yours grounds the certainty that Ginger has no language going through her brain?
2. What pre-existing thought/belief of yours grounds the certainty that Ginger had thoughts of her and Fifi running outside in her head?
It seems to me that we could certainly draw some valid(perhaps even sound) conclusions about Ginger's mental ongoings, but I'm not at all certain that what you've claimed counts as such. Could you show the reasoning/argument which leads to what you claim Ginger is thinking?
I could be much more specific, but it may not be helpful. What part is troublesome?
You're offering another a report of your own thought/belief. The ability to do such a thing requires untold numbers of prior correlations. Roughly, it seems you would be drawing correlations between the word "square" and what the word identifies. Or perhaps, your thinking of a square was more picture-like, in that you had envisioned one. That would also require an untold amount of past correlations be drawn. So...
Once language acquisition begins in earnest, and certainly after one is fluent, the correlations become 'entangled' so to speak. Web-like, I suppose. Not literally. Rather, operatively...
Operatively... yes. Many triggers. All products of physiological sensory perception. Memories. The woven life.
One's mind... prior to gaining one's initial worldview... is.
Why do you think that?
Other parts of one's mind are not existentially contingent upon language. Those aren't blank.
You wrote:
Committing oneself to a conceptual scheme(linguistic framework) is being methodological.
Elemental... I'm fine with using here as a means to denote the category of basic things(pre-linguistic) necessarily presupposed by and/or within all spoken and/or written statements of thought/belief.
The overly-used "real"... I'm not always...
The "actual" is always superfluous in light of knowing the difference between what being true requires and being called "true" requires.
If - when we use the term "real" - we're discussing the category of things that have an affect/effect, then I may be willing to speak in such terms.
Yes. Logical possibility alone is insufficient warrant to believe.
I don't think so. The actual is what makes the difference between being true, and merely being thought to be true. As I see it. truth both speaks and reveals actuality; in the propositional as well as the alethic senses.
Quoting creativesoul
I think of the actual as the twin categories of things which act, which "have an effect", and which are acted upon, which are affected. Of course, the two are not mutually exclusive. The real I think of as both the actual, and the conditions that are necessary, whatever they might be, for the actual to be.
I think you're right about "logical possibility", in one sense, but I do think that logic is sufficient warrant to believe that things must be certain ways (at least if they are to be objects of experience). But there will always be some problem(s) with anything we say. The real, and even the actual are not the same as anything we can say about them. As the old cliche would have it: "The map is not the territory". That's a hard truth to live with.
That I didn't quote your entire post doesn't imply that I wasn't addressing it.
Again, to be making a mental association would require that there's some sort of identificational idea--at least some sort of rudimentary concept in mind, otherwise the notion of a mental association would be incoherent. This is the same thing I said, I'm just saying it in a wordier way here.
Is a dog making a mental association? We at least have no grounds at all for definitively saying it's not.
And enough with the patronizing attitude bs. You might be fit to be my student. You're certainly not fit to be my teacher.
Why wouldn't making mental associations with the sounds amount to language?
Is Meaning Prior To Language? Yes, meaning comes from sensation first. What we feel, see, taste, smell and hear is what we experience first. What the first man heard was a buzzing sound – then the bite of a mosquito. As time when on this man pieced together associations of his sensations. He understood the buzzing and bite go together. This is the beginning of cognition. Further on in time he heard the mosquito and saw his neighbor slap it dead. So, the associations got more and more complex in his cognition. Perhaps over time he made a buzzing sound to indicate the presence of the mosquito. This is the beginning of language.
Well put for simplicity's sake...
Ah yes, I had suspected we work from different conceptual schemes.
What you are calling "the actual" requires further reduction into what I call "fact/reality" and "truth". Being true requires correspondence with/to fact/reality. Being believed(thought to be true) presupposes it.
On my view, saying that "truth both speaks and reveals actuality" is mistakenly attributing agency to a relationship. For poetry, that's beautiful... For philosophical rigor, not so much.
It seems to me that that is unnecessarily confusing.
Would I be correct in surmising that your use of the terms "real", "actual", and "actuality" indicate awareness of our own fallibility? I mean, do they include the unknown realm?
You wrote
You did not directly address what was written. Directly addressing what was written requires a participant to provide a meaningful, relevant, appropriate rejoinder and/or counterargument to what was written. You've done no such thing.
Anyone can go look for themselves.
I don't want to argue with this except to say that I understand the word 'fact' to be equivocal. It is variously used to mean both 'true proposition' and 'actual state of affairs'. I think the first usage is the more common and consistent one, so I stick to that and avoid using 'fact' to mean state of affairs or actuality.
Quoting creativesoul
To elaborate a bit, what I wanted to express in saying that truth speaks actuality is to say that to speak the truth is to speak actuality, along much the same lines as Aristotle's formulation:
"To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true”.
To say that truth reveals actuality is to say that actuality 'comes to fruition' in our true speaking of it. I admit that there is something of poetry in all this, but I think philosophy is more of an art than a science, so that is not inappropriate, as I see it.
Quoting creativesoul
Can you tell me what is in it that confuses you?
I maybe inadequately understand your questions here. I'm not sure if it is relevant to the intention of them, but I will say this: I believe we know the real, the actual, actuality, intimately. Here I mean knowing in the 'Biblical' sense, knowing by intimate relation. For various reasons, though, what we say does not always reflect the real, the actual; and once we begin to argue (with ourselves or others) about it; then we begin the descent into confusion.
I tend to distinguish between the real and the actual; I think of the latter as meaning something like 'the totality of what we humans experience' and of the former as 'containing, but not limited to, the actual'. The actual is what we humans experience because that is what acts upon us, and what we act upon, as actual beings ourselves; it is the world of interaction. It is real, but we also must think that what lies beyond our sphere of interaction is real, and that it includes the conditions that give rise to our sphere of interaction.
Of course objections may always be made on terminological grounds; that is due to the imprecision of language.
I am not sure if that is a compliment – put down – or both? Do you think my explanation of the origin of meaning – cognition – language is cogent? Could you add some subtlety to my scenario? Do you have an alternate theory of how meaning arrived – cognition and language? Perhaps cognition should come before meaning – we must have had cognitive power first before we could derive associative meaning. How did we acquire cognition? I would like to hear what you think.
Thinking about it – cognition was first. The mosquito stung the first man. He cognized the sensation……
Strictly speaking, I think it is important to remind ourselves here that most words have multiple accepted uses. I have no issue with that situation, in and of itself. It is when the same speaker begins to use multiple different senses of the same word that we have a problematic situation.
I reject using the sense of "fact" that you're using while I'm doing philosophy, because I find that using the term "fact" to mean true statements creates an inability to account for what sorts of things can be true, and what makes them so. However, your use of "actuality" could take the place of "fact", and it seems that that's the case with your view. That's why I asked about your use of "actuality"...
An artform... Indeed.
I see Aristotle's formulation as a criterion for making true/false statements. I find no flaw in Aristotle's formulation, other than it's scope. It cannot account for true/false prelinguistic thought/belief for it paints itself into a linguistic corner. Correspondence and the necessary presupposition thereof that is contained within all thought/belief(including statements thereof) is prior to language.
I cannot find similarity between the Aristotle quote and what you've written, so I'm having a hard time understanding why you think/believe that it is along the same lines as what you've written.
My summation was...
...was followed by your having asked the following question:
What the use of the term "actual" is if what's real exhausts it. Necessary existential pre-conditions are quite distinct from that which they give rise to. Real things are their own existential necessary pre-conditions that give rise to themselves which are not?
I am being reminded of Spinoza's substance... if memory serves me, it was defined in his Ethics. Seems that it and what you've offered is on the basic level as an uncaused cause, or perhaps the first cause. I cannot quite put my finger on it yet, perhaps you can elaborate...
How can something be both itself and it's own set of necessary existential pre-conditions?
You answered:
I was wondering if the real included that which cannot be known.
Given the crucial importance of logical argument, I would temper the last part above by further qualifying/quantifying it. If descending into confusion can result in clarity then I've no issue. Not all argument descends into confusion. Some does.
The above is steeped in language use that leaves me guessing. What is the word "that" referring to in the following?
"The actual is what we humans experience because that is what acts upon us, and what we act upon, as actual beings ourselves."
Language is certainly sometimes imprecise and can have many different results, that being but one.
Neither.
Yup.
Yup.
Nope.
Perhaps they arise simultaneously.
I do not think that that question leads to greater understanding. Better to focus attention upon what cognition requires. What is the bare minimum criterion? What must be the case in order for cognition to happen? Does that include things that require other things? What is included within the set of necessary existential preconditions?
This wasn't a reply to me, but I don't see a distinction between thinking and thinking about something. When thinking, it is always about stuff. If thoughts weren't about things then the thoughts would be the things themselves, similar to how words must be about things or else the words are the things themselves.
Your thoughts must take some form. They take the form of sensory impressions. You can only think in shapes, colors, sounds, etc. Words are simply colored shapes and sounds. In order for them to mean anything more than just being colored shapes and sounds, they must be about something that isn't the colored shape or sounds. There is an aboutness to our experiences and hearing or seeing words is no different than seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting or feeling anything else and establishing an association between, or aboutness to, them.
I think John explained the difference between real and actual very well. For example - the universe is real, but my perception of it may be a little different from what it actually is. In my example that would be the universe. I get his meaning quite clearly.
I don’t think I can take this comment at face value because it leaves me guessing at what you mean. Your previous comment – “well put” – leads me to understand complimentary approval. I am still not sure what you meant by – “for simplicity's sake...” Did you mean a simplistic explanation - or something else – I honestly don’t know? If simplistic, I would infer – put down. If in fact you do mean “neither” - now – please explain what that means. Then correlate what you mean by neither with your original comment. We are talking about language and meaning – right? Please clarify.
Quoting creativesoul
I take yup to mean affirmative – my thoughts are cogent - then I would reference back to your original comment – well put.
Quoting creativesoul
Yup again – ok – are we playing cat and mouse? If you have something to add – please do.
Quoting creativesoul
I am getting the feeling your one word comments are dismissive of our interaction. If talking about the origin of cognition, meaning and language is not pertinent to - Is Meaning Prior To Language? – I am at a loss. You are new to this forum, but not to philosophy. I have read all your comments in this thread and you do not come across as warm and gentle. More like a cross between a philosophy professor and a tyrannosaurus rex. I am not trying to put you on the defensive – I feel I could learn a lot from you. However, respect has to go both ways.
Quoting creativesoul
This is the first comment where I feel you genuinely interact with me. You may be right that cognition and meaning are simultaneous. However, if we go back way before the first Homo sapiens – back to the beginning – and ask the same questions about cognition and meaning. The first primate-like mammals, or proto-primates, evolved in the early Paleocene Epoch (65.5-55.8 million years ago) at the beginning of the Cenozoic Era. Did they have cognition of their senses? Yes, but I am not so sure they had meaning. If we look at simple cell organisms today - we can see they will respond to stimuli – they have a rudimentary cognition, but I don’t think they have meaning. So, I think cognition comes first – then meaning somewhere down the line.
Quoting creativesoul
I think these are good comments. Perhaps we can do both – understand what cognition requires and how we acquired it. I think it is safe to assume that cognition needs a neural network – a brain. The following is from Wikipedia:
“The vast majority of existing animals are bilaterians, meaning animals with left and right sides that are approximate mirror images of each other. All bilateria are thought to have descended from a common wormlike ancestor that appeared in the Ediacaran period, 550–600 million years ago.”
We, as bilaterians, are descendent from a wormlike ancestor. Something I find very comforting. Somewhere in our lineage our ancestor’s developed a brain with a neural network sufficient to cognize sensory stimulation. This is the beginning of our ability to think. Over time the neural network got more and more complex to derive meaning from complex stimulation.
A bird can play a role in human thought/belief formation without the resulting thought/belief being about a bird.
It seems that your notion of cognition is not equivalent to my notion of thought/belief. On my view, not all stimulus/response situations involve thought/belief. Detection alone is insufficient for drawing mental correlations between 'objects' of physiological sensory perception and/or one's own state of mind. All such mental correlations constitute thought/belief formation. Simple cell organisms have no state of mind, for they do not have the complexity that seems obviously necessary for it.
You wrote:
That doesn't follow from what was written.
You wrote:
It's not that difficult to understand. When one says "Well put, for simplicity's sake" it need be neither a compliment nor a put down. You see, both of those require a focus upon the author, whereas "Well put, for simplicity's sake" focused upon the content of the expression.
You wrote:
Thoughts are things. Some thought is about stuff. Others are more simple in constitution and facilitate the very ability for our thinking about stuff.
Yes, thoughts are things too, which is why we can turn our thoughts on themselves - of thinking about thinking.
I don't understand the last part. Why don't you try to show ANY thought that DOESN'T consist of sensory data.
My notion of cognition can be viewed in a “line of continuation”. We started as single cell organisms. We progressed to where we are now. Somewhere in this continuum we developed the ability to think – cognize. Did cognition and ability to hold meaning – what you call thought/belief – develop simultaneously? I do not know – all is speculation. If we look at dinosaur predators and ask – did they have thought/belief? It seems so because they looked at another animal and saw food. Food is meaningful. Did they have state of mind? I doubt it. My question is whether or not there is a fulcrum between thought and belief in the “line of continuation”? I think it is worthy of speculation to a certain degree – and – I think we have reached that degree. There is another fulcrum in the “line of continuation” for the question of state of mind. When did beings start to think about their own thoughts?
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Thank you for your abundant objection and explanation.
Thank you for being generous with your ideas and praise – well done.
What is sensory data, and does containing it equate to being about it?
I think you may be right that written language is indicative of state of mind. I define state of mind as the ability to contemplate one’s own thoughts. Here is an interesting look at Koko. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SNuZ4OE6vCk
A remarkable being. Sign language is a type of written language. How far back can we go in the animal kingdom and see self contemplation?
The ability to contemplate one's thought/belief is metacognition. Metacognition is existentially contingent upon the ability to isolate one's own thought/belief. Isolating one's own thought belief requires two having two symbols for the same thing. A state of mind does not.
This works from the dubious presupposition that being a thing is what allows introspection(metacognition).
We can think about our own thought/belief because of the terms "thought/belief". That is how.
You wrote:
Gestures are not marks.
Just like with all other forms of reasoning, general security, confidence, health, age, social strata, sex, gender, height, weight, and a million other things will also effect the process, and predispose one to certain conclusions (to say one's constitution).
Self requires other. Not sure if all problems point to an excess or deficiency, but that's an interesting thing to say...
I didn't say that.
...? L2r bro...
Quoting Wosret
He edited his previous comment which omitted excess, and only said deficiency...
On my view, you seemed to be saying "Just like all problems(in any other area of life)... emotional and social ones always point at an excess or deficiency.
Got any other suggestions?
You're only interested in how you appear obviously.
Ah well...
I still question whether all problems point to an excess or a deficiency.
Sensory data is the sounds, colors, shapes, smells, tastes, and tactile sensations that appear in the mind. If we didn't equate the data as being about something then, the sensory data would be the things themselves (solipsism). There would be no causal relation between the "data" and some external cause of the data. There would be no world for the data to be about. Our minds would effectively be the world. Making the distinction of sensory data being about something as opposed to not being about something is making the distinction between realism and solipsism.
Quoting creativesoul
I would think a person interested in language development and meaning – you would know a lot about Koko. Koko demonstrates self-reflection and feelings. She makes art, asks questions and uses a computer and telephone in elemental ways. Hand signs are like writing on the beach before a wave comes in and washes it away. Koko is the first animal we have ever really talked to – that is extraordinary just in itself.
I don’t know where you wish to go in this thread. I have presented a few worthy ideas, as have others, which you either ignore or dismiss. You do have a fine mind, but there is something suspect about your agenda. I don’t have the time or inclination to find out what it is – best of luck to you.
Indeed... Koko's story can be compelling. I haven't carefully examined it in a while, and when I have, I quickly found that Koko's trainer seemed to be clearly projecting her own thought/belief onto Koko. The interactions were very similar to what happens in a court of law when counsel is said to be "leading the witness". That said... Koko most certainly gestures as a means to get what she wants. That, on my view, qualifies as rudimentary language use as compared/contrasted with the simpler sort of stimulus - response we see from other creatures capable of learning. Rats and levers.
Several folk have presented ideas. All are relevant in some way. I do not judge those in terms of being worthy/unworthy. I am but one person with limited time to reply, and I attempt to do that as much as possible when I can.
I do try to keep the focus upon the topic and not the participants. This isn't a chat room.
What counts as cognition on your view?
You wrote:
By and in large Thinker, our viewpoints seem to be in agreement. It seems that they may differ a bit in the details(taxonomy perhaps).
These are all interesting questions. By my lights, in order to answer them we must first know what counts as thought, belief, cognition, meaning, and/or state of mind. Are these simply terms defined by us, and thus we cannot get them wrong? Or do they consist(s) in/of elements which are not existentially contingent upon language?
I'm not sure if there is a point(fulcrum) where upon reaching it we cross over from thought to belief or to a state of mind, etc. If the line of continuation were a timeline, it seems that that could be a helpful means of pursuit. However, on my view there is no difference between what thought and belief consists in/of. The terms are certainly used differently, and that use is metacognition at work. While we distinguish between thinking and believing by virtue of the difference between suspending one's judgment(thinking can be and often is contemplation of something or other) as compared/contrasted/opposed to believing that something or other is the case(is true). So, here we could say that those are two distinct states of mind, and it would make perfect sense.
May I suggest that we focus on the topic rather than each other. You've no warrant for questioning my participation. You're also sorely mistaken for even assuming that I've any kind of specific agenda here. Suffice it to say that I'm prone to cast a very critical eye upon this subject matter. I do the very same thing to my own work, and look for others to do the same. It's nothing personal. That, I can asure you. Being able to answer valid criticism is imperative.
You wrote:
Children come to know and learn language through first watching it's use, drawing correlations between situation and state of mind.
This last statement presupposes that we have understanding and/or some knowledge of the emergence of language within our species. There are little to no artifacts available for examination. Thus, I think it is crucial to employ what little evidence we have with considerable scrutiny. We have current language, all sorts of theory.
By my lights, there's no reason to presuppose intention where none is warranted. I wouldn't have any justification for claiming to know what counts as "more than we needed". Animal needs differ according to the animal. The differences between the languages of different species does not serve to ground, justify, and/or warrant concluding anything in particular about the complexity of language that we need.
I would say that we need exactly what we have. Language has vestiges, mind you... But we have no justificatory ground to claim we have a more complex language than necessary.
What's different is complexity of correlations.
It's not that I'm leaving differences out as a means to not consider them. To quite the contrary, what I'm setting out are the necessary existential conditions for that. I'm setting out how that comes to be the case. I'm actively setting out the common denominators extant within all statements of thought/belief after we set all of the subjective particulars aside. I am doing so because that is the only method of arriving at justification/warrant for the claims being made. Complexity is a subjective particular of human language, as is the written aspect. Those are unique to us. The target is that which is common to all.
Whoa. I missed this bit...
How could we go about setting out the cat's meaning? Saying that she sharpens her claws on it and hunts birds in it reports facts involving the cat's behaviour. What sort of justificatory ground could we pave in order to acquire knowledge of the extent and/or complexity involved in the cat's meaning based upon such behaviour(s)? Not much, but thankfully that's not the only place to look.
Seems to me that we would be hard pressed to be able to say much at all if we had not first acquired a knowledgable understanding of thought/belief itself. Then, and only then, could we have 'insight' into her mental ongoings by virtue of knowing what they are/were made up of; by virtue of knowing the necessary elemental constituents of all thought/belief.
It is my contention that the whole of philosophy has gone horribly astray by virtue of never having gotten thought/belief right.
Yes, but we know that she responds differently to that particular tree than she does to others, that it figures in her daily awareness and activities in ways that many other trees and objects don't at all. Of course if we had not our own prelingual experience to draw upon upon we could not have this intuition, about her, but then we could not have any intuitions at all in that case, and nor could we ever have collectively developed or individually learned language in the first place, so the fact of our prelingual experience goes without saying, it is simply indispensable, and must be assumed as a condition of, all our doings and knowings, of all our perceptions, thoughts and beliefs.
I would question something however...
If it is the case that prelingual experience consists, in part at least, of thought/belief then that experience cannot rightfully be called a precondition thereof.
Would you agree with that?