Is it possible to categorically not exist?
Harry Potter does not exist, we are told. Harry Potter is a fiction; Harry Potter is our imagination, the thinking goes.
But if Harry Potter does not exist, how are we able to talk about Harry Potter?
Harry Potter does not exist outside of our imaginations? Okay. But that is different than saying that Harry Potter does not exist, period.
Everything exists, right? The question is what form it exists in (as a concrete being; only as an abstraction in our minds; etc.), right?
Or do things categorically not exist? If so, how?
But if Harry Potter does not exist, how are we able to talk about Harry Potter?
Harry Potter does not exist outside of our imaginations? Okay. But that is different than saying that Harry Potter does not exist, period.
Everything exists, right? The question is what form it exists in (as a concrete being; only as an abstraction in our minds; etc.), right?
Or do things categorically not exist? If so, how?
Comments (87)
I should also add, fictive characters can embody real characteristics. A character who is a 'hero' would be expected to act in certain ways; if you were the dramatist,then you wouldn't depict your hero as being faint-hearted. That is one of the means by which fiction can communicate truths, even whilst being strictly speaking not about real characters. Mythological and symbolic stories plainly do something likewise. So to that extent what is real and what is merely existent, may not necessarily always coincide.
Inconsistently defined things such as triangular circles do not exist because they have no identity (triangular circle is a circle that is not a circle). They are nothing. We can think about them and our thoughts exist as a collection of qualia, but such thoughts refer to nothing.
Obviously the simple fact is that fictional characters are not real physical people. But the ideas that fictional characters express, and the way an audience interprets their experience of that character exists in the same way that an audience's interpretation of their experience of real people (John Lennon, Ghandi, Dostoevsky) exists. The idea of Harry Potter and the way audiences interpret him have measurable effects on culture and changes that occur in culture in the same way that famous (real) cultural icons have measurable effects on culture and changes that occur in culture. Real cultural icons are "characters" within a cultural narrative. They become symbols of cultural ideas in the same way that fictional characters do. The actual experience of the audience is less black and white than an ontological analysis would assume. And ideas exist within experience, not within an ontological metaphysic.
There's a sense of "exist," as well as a sense of "real," senses that were historically popular and that are still commonly found in philosophical talk, that have a connotation of "extramental." So, under these senses, if something is mental-only, it neither exists nor is it real.
One way to start is to say that Harry Potter is a person we pretend exists, or, better, that we pretend there's a world the novels describe in which Harry Potter exists. I don't exist in that world, and he doesn't exist in this one.
But the expression "Harry Potter" exists in both. In his world, it names a person; in this one, it doesn't. In this world, we use that expression in several ways: to talk about the cultural artifact created by J. K. Rowling, and to talk about Harry "in-world," pretending that his world is real. And we mix those up by saying things like, "On page 35, Harry says he knows who did it."
In the Potterverse, "Harry Potter" is the real, not pretend, name of Harry Potter (it might not have been); it bears the relation is-a-name-of to the object Harry Potter. In our world, although "Harry Potter" is a real expression, it does not bear that relation to any real object. Not a person, anyway. I suppose it's the name of a cultural object. But does it make sense, in our world, to also think of "Harry Potter" as the real name, a name in our world, of a pretend person, a person who happens not to exist in our world?
I don't think so. I think it's part of pretending that the Potterverse is real, to pretend that the linguistic expressions bear the is-a-name-of relation to objects we pretend exist. It's not only the person that's pretend; it's also the relation between that person and his name. That means that statements in our world that use the expression "Harry Potter" where a name would go are either "in-world" or taking about the cultural artifact, and otherwise not well-formed. "Harry Potter does not exist," is not actually a statement, because "Harry Potter" as used here is not actually a name.
Person 1: "A does not exist".
Person 2: "If A does not exist, how are you able to talk about A?"
It's easy enough to form expressions that seem to refer to something, like "the millions in my bank account." If you substitute that expression for one that does refer to something, say, "the dozens in my bank account," you can form sentences that seem to be about something that isn't. But they aren't. At least if you understand "about" in the most natural way.
I disagree with that. I can't imagine what the shape of triangular circle is like, but I can imagine the concept. And that is the case for imaginary things as well, isn't it? They don't and can't exist, but we can imagine the concept. Therefore triangular circles exist as well in similar way.
Another thing to consider would be whether it's possible for triangular circle to physically exist (yes) but that's completely another topic of discussion, and might deserve its own thread.
Everything exists. It is a question of what form it exists in (only in people's imaginations; as an autonomous physical being; etc.).
Or is there something that absolutely--in no way, shape or form--does not exist? Is it possible to categorically not exist? If it is possible to categorically not exist, how do we know? If something categorically does not exist, how are we able to talk about it?
Just trolling along:
Invent a new category, such as virtual reality.
Here is a hypothesis:
(1) If something does not exist, then we cannot talk about it.
It has a contrapositive:
(2) If you can talk about something, then it exists.
I believe (2) can easily be shown to be false, and I believe I have done so in this thread. Therefore (1) is false as well.
Quoting WISDOMfromPO-MO
Here is a different hypothesis:
(3) if something is impossible, then we cannot talk about it.
Its contrapositive would be:
(4) If we can talk about something, then it is possible.
It may very well be that the current consensus among philosophers is that (4) is true, because possible world semantics. I'm not in love with PWS, and lean toward (4) being false. "There's no ball of ice at the center of the Sun," feels to me like a statement that cannot possibly be false. Does anything turn on whether that statement is about the non-existent ball of ice?
EDIT: This is silly. Obviously people who make regular use of PWS talk about impossibility too. It just annoys me for some reason. Unnecessary aspersions on the character of PWS hereby retracted.
infidel
I am eternally damned! But I may have just coined an alternative IPU into existence. Maybe it will save me.
I tried to help you.
I agree.
We categorically deny that you were ever a member of the Church of the Invisible Pink Unicorn. It's all lies! Lies and falsehoods! And innuendoes! Icky ones, with little thingies growing on them.
My new church will categorically deny that categorical is necessary for existence. That is the great lie the the followers of the false IPU (which OP is clearly one) has propagated upon humanity.
We are able to speak about imaginary objects because language transcends reality.
I think the error you are making is that you are confusing the possibility of the existence of Harry Potter, with the existence of a possible Harry Potter.
No, that does not address the question of the possibility of something categorically not existing, which is the context that my words you quote came from.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
No.
I have been repeatedly talking about something that may be impossible: categorical non-existence. So that is not the issue.
The question is if it is possible for something to in no way, shape, form, constitution, state, etc. exist.
The statement "A does not exist, period" is contradictory. A must exist in some way, because a person is making a statement about it.
Statements like "A does not exist outside of people's imaginations" or "A exists only as an arrangement of neurons in certain people's brains" make sense. But "A does not exist, period" does not make sense. It does not exist, but you are able to put in in a sentence?
You used Harry Potter twice in a sentence, so Harry Potter must exist in some way, shape, form, constitution, state, etc.--even if it is only as symbols on a piece of paper, computer screen, etc.
The issue you're raising right here is known as the problem of "vacuous singular terms," that is, expressions that look like they refer to a real object, that are constructed just like expressions that do refer to real objects, but do not. Your interpretation, that they exist in some special way, is not the only interpretation available. I see the whole thing as a quirk of our language. Okay, maybe more than a quirk, but at any rate I do not feel compelled at all to say that whatever I talk about exists.
Quoting WISDOMfromPO-MO
I took this to mean, is there something that not only does not but cannot exist, and of course the answer for me will be, sure.
But for you, if anything you talk about or imagine, or whatever, exists in some fashion, then your question is more like this: could there be anything that cannot even be talked about or imagined? And that is a conundrum. If you know that to be true of something, you'd have thought of it, and there you are, it now exists. On the other hand, if there is something no one can imagine, then no one will. That seems to mean that if there is such a thing, you cannot possibly know that there is such a thing.
EDIT: Hmmm. The phrase "thing I cannot possibly know no one can think of" looks like it refers to something.
Straw man.
I never said that if we talk about something it "exists".
I said that if we are able to talk about something then it must exist in some form.
If you want to refute the latter, show something that absolutely; unconditionally; no ifs, ands or buts; categorically does not exist--in no way, shape, form, constitution or state does it exist.
Of course, if you are able to show it to us then it must exist. And if you show us a something then it exists at least as a something.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
If A categorically does not exist, every modification of the statement "A does not exist" will be true. "A does not exist as a mental image" will be true. "A does not exist as an object that can be held" will be true. "A does not exist as a symbol representing something else" will be true. And so on.
Is such categorical non-existence possible?
You use existence in a very broad sense - in fact I think your meaning of existence involves ALL domains of human experience - be it mental or physical (have I left anything out?).
If this is your definition, a few things happen:
1. It voids the naturally accepted meaning of existence as something that is physical. Many posters have clarified this point.
2. It leads to the weird(?) conclusion that everything exists. This may seem profound but is practically useless and dangerous. Losing the distinction between existence and nonexistence is usually a sign of madness or stupidity (like me). Maybe I'm missing something. Please clarify
Your idea of categorical nonexistence is empty of meaning because you won't allow us to speak of anything - the moment we do, it, according to you, exists (in some way, shape, form, constitution, state).
It's an interesting thought and if I can think of anything new I'll let you know (if you're interested).
If Harry Potter exists, then tell me, what size shoes does he wear?
That's what the ladies have to wear when I'm in charge.
One does not have to wear shoes to exist. Right now I I'm not wearing shoes.
Everything is energy and everything that we perceive is in the form of some memory that exists in some form of energy. The difference between memory (Harry Potter, the Empire State Building) is merely the difference in substantiality. Some are more tangible (outwardly shareable) than others. The energy forming the object it's more or less substantial. It's all energy no matter what.
Presumably though you have feet that are of a certain dimension.
This is just one illustration of your existence and Harry Potter's non-existence. One of the features of an existing person is that there is an infinity of details we can describe about them. The amount of description we can produce about Harry Potter is limited to what J.K. Rowling has included in her books. There is no answer to the question of what shoe size is worn by Harry Potter (unless it is given by his author). Even where there are answers to questions like this, they are not based on existence but rather on what the author has imagined. So J.K. Rowling could have it that Harry Potter wears size 9 shoes, but that does not somehow cloak Harry Potter with existence.
I see nothing but confusion and mischief arising from the notion that imaginary objects are part of the furniture of the universe, or that "possible worlds" are worlds actually in existence somewhere. I am not ruling out all non-physical entities from existence, but Harry Potter is purely imaginary.
Yet, if anything significant differentiates fictions/fantasies/hallucinations/dreams and perception, then it must be the perceived.
We sometimes come up with fictions and share them among us, which language and whatnot are sufficiently flexible to do.
Such fictions, fantasies, hallucinations and dreams are still confined to us, though, and could perhaps be contrasted with "real" things, depending on how we use the term "real".
@Wayfarer might have a dream in which he slapped Donald Trump, though (unfortunately perhaps) the real Trump never felt a thing. :)
I get what you're talking about it here; I just don't think it's the best approach. You're thinking of existing "as an idea" or "as a concept" or "as a social construct" as the sort-of fall-back position for things that don't physically exist. So, Santa Claus and Harry Potter exist "as ideas," or something. And that seems to make sense, because how can you talk about something that doesn't exist?
I've focused so far on that last part, to try to nudge you in another direction. Let's talk about the first part.
Donald Trump does exist, and so do people's ideas about him. Does Donald Trump, besides just existing as himself, as a person, also exist as people's ideas about him? You could say that, but there's not much need to: you can just say people have ideas and some of those ideas are about Donald Trump. That seems to cover everything and there's little temptation to say he also exists as an idea. You can do everything you want--distinguish between what he's really like and what different people think he's like, for instance--without giving him an extra way of existing besides the one he's already doing.
But what about Santa Claus? Here we only have people's ideas about Santa Claus, people pretending to be Santa Claus who aren't (people who sit on a throne of lies), people talking about Santa Claus. Santa Claus does not exist as a person in just the same way that Donald Trump does. But here the temptation is strong to say that Santa Claus exists somehow, because otherwise what are people's ideas about? What do we talk about when we talk about Santa Claus? It's tempting to say he exists "as an idea."
But that doesn't really do what you want. Now that you have Santa existing as an idea, what do you do with that? Can you say what people's ideas about Santa are about? It doesn't look right to say people's ideas about Santa are ideas about Santa as an idea, no more than people's ideas about Donald Trump are ideas about Donald Trump as an idea. Children don't believe that the idea of Santa Claus comes down the chimney; they believe a person does that.
We also don't seem to feel this temptation in the same way when we're talking about things that really do exist in some non-physical or abstract way. The United States is a real thing, but it's not exactly physical. Social institutions are abstract. This again is not the same as being an idea, because someone's ideas about the United States are neither the United States itself, nor are they ideas about the United States as an idea. They are ideas about an abstract thing, the United States. The same goes for numbers. The same goes for voices, traditions, habits, migrations, wars. Those are real things, objects you can talk and think about, but still aren't physical things like a car or Donald Trump.
Is Santa Claus one of those sorts of things? Now we have language problems. If you believe, or if you pretend, that Santa Claus is a real person, you have a belief or a pretense, but those are not the thing you are believing or pretending. Those are still just what they are, your beliefs and pretenses. And those beliefs and pretenses are about a person, not something like a number or a concept or social construct. They are about a person who doesn't exist. His not existing does not change what the content of your thoughts and words is.
But in the case of Donald Trump, we want to say that the content of our ideas about Donald Trump come, however indirectly, from the object Donald Trump. Where could our ideas about Santa Claus come from, if what they're about doesn't exist? Of course, for most of us, our ideas about Santa and about Donald Trump come from other people, and we don't have direct access to the object. Some people do with Trump, but nobody does with Santa. What we really want to know is what the very first thought about Santa was about.
Which brings us back to Harry Potter. J. K. Rowling writes a whole book about someone she made up, with lots of other stuff in there she just made up. Fiction, pretending, imagining, hypothesis-- they're all on a spectrum that includes lying. All ways of saying something is so that isn't, or of talking as if something were the case, whether it is or not. I'm just going to point out that the content of a lie has to be exactly what it seems to be and not something else. If I tell you there's a tiger in the bushes, so I can swipe your dinner, I want you to have a belief that there is a tiger in the bushes. The content of that belief has to be [ tiger in the bushes ] for the lie to be successful.
I can imagine the concept, not the shape. I can imagine a triangular circle physically existing within this universe, but I don't believe that to be possible. I can imagine myself imagining something I can't imagine but that's still not actually possible.
Btw if someone knows how to subscribe to a thread in these frums instead of only seeing notifications about responses to your personal comments, let me know.
So you cannot. Because if there is no difference between a circle and a non-circle then there is no difference between imagining and not imagining.
But there is.
Quoting litewave
Non sequitur. That "if-then" is incorrect, you can't conclude that. What you can conclude from that I can imagine a circle being non-circle, is that I can imagine imagining equaling not imagining.
Again - a lot rides on the meaning of 'to exist'. Bugs Bunny exists - as a cultural reference, a cartoon figure, that will be recognised by billions of people. But Bugs is not real in the sense of being an actual animal or individual. Perhaps fictional characters have a kind of 'conventional existence' (although we're stretching it, with cartoon characters.)
But then, as I said before, even fictional characters can embody real qualities. Bugs is the archetypical New York wise guy - he's always going to get the better of country bumpkin Elmer Fudd. That is in his character. And we recognize that character even in fictional form.
What interests me is the kind of reality that numbers and logical forms have. They are also real in a different way to fictional characters. But what does 'real in a different way' mean? There's the rub. Most folks will say that something is either real or it isn't. But if fictional characters, numbers, and physical objects are real in different ways, then what is that saying?
This doesn't answer your questions, but I can't pass up the opportunity to post it:
Quoting Paul Grice
Quoting Paul Grice
...of any but physical objects. If Platonic realism is the case, materialism fails. Hence centuries of obfuscation.
Better invisible pink than nothing at all. We have to keep Augustino's sensibilities in mind.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
It seems to me that if categorical non-existence is possible then everything about the world is random. That seems to go against the naturalist worldview that has dominated the past several centuries and says that the world is predictable.
Let's assume that there was a point at which the Empire State Building came into existence. What was that point? Judging by the majority of the responses here, people will probably say that the Empire State Building did not exist until it took on a tangible, external form. But one could argue that the Empire State Building existed before it took on any tangible form--that it existed in the minds of the capitalists who conceived it, the minds of the architects who designed it, the blueprints that the design was represented through, the minds of the engineers who had to turn those blueprints into a building, etc. Even if it did not exist before it took on any tangible form, at what point then did it come into existence? When ground was officially broken? When the first square inch of the foundation was dug out? When materials used in its construction were first purchased?
Again, a case could be made that in some way, shape, form, constitution, state, etc. the Empire State Building has a long existence--the beginning of which cannot be demarcated.
Somebody might say that the thing in the minds of business people, architects, etc. was the idea of the Empire State Building or the design of the Empire State Building, not the Empire State Building itself. At what point did that idea or design come into existence? I think that any attempt to answer that question is going to end up like the original question (at what point did the Empire State Building come into existence?). We get an infinite regression with no demarcation ever emerging, it seems.
Maybe the Empire State Building has always existed--as a potential idea, then an idea, then a design, then a contractor's plan, then a square inch of foundation, etc.--and the only variable is way, shape, form, constitution, state, etc. Maybe everything is teleological and the existence of the Empire State Building started unfolding at the beginning of space and time.
Or maybe everything is random.
I think that saying that the Empire State Building did not exist until some external physical structure took shape is absurd. If I could travel back in time before that physical structure took shape I would probably hear people talking about the Empire State Building even though there was nothing "out there" to touch, taste, see, etc. that corresponded with the Empire State Building. And I would argue that to say that Harry Potter is not a physical being like Vladimir Putin and therefore does not exist is extremely narrow-minded, near-sighted, narcissistic, or whatever better adjective you can think of. It could be that Harry Potter is just passing through our minds as a concept, image, idea, etc. at this stage in the evolution of the universe and, like the Empire State Building, will at some point take the shape of a physical being.
If categorical non-existence is possible then that seems to mean that things randomly, spontaneously come into existence and are not in any way connected to anything that preceded them.
I have answered the question. Not just in this post, but throughout this discussion.
There are several lengthy responses here, but it is not clear what their answer to the question is.
Is it possible to categorically not exist? Yes or no?
I gave a clear illustration of what categorical non-existence would be like: Every modification of "A does not exist" is true. "A does not exist as an idea" is true. "A does not exist as a potential idea" is true. "A does not exist as a symbol representing something else" is true. And so on.
Does it bother you that people often report the exact moment when an idea occurred to them?
This still just looks like the copula to me. "A is not an idea." "A is not a potential idea." "A is not a symbol representing something else."
There is weirdness here even Frege couldn't get around. Something that can be said to fall under or not fall under a concept is an object. What's a concept? Yuck. We have no choice sometimes but to talk about them as things, because grammar, but insofar as you talk about a concept this way, you're talking about it as an object, not as a concept. It doesn't really matter, so long as you get the knack of working with objects and concepts, and we all do.
So there is an "easy" answer to your question: Fregean concepts are predicated of objects but are not themselves objects and are not predicated of. They're never on the left-hand side of the copula, always on the right.
And the other easy answer is, everything that doesn't exist. I don't have a sister. The phrase "my sister" when spoken by me is a vacuous singular term. You can choose between saying all statements of the form "My sister is (not) ..." are false or not well-formed, as you like, but none of them will be true.
There is so much stuff that categorically doesn't exist, you couldn't begin to count it.
Google an essay called 'Frege on knowing the Third Realm', Tyler Burge. Interesting read on these topics.
A triangular circle is a circle that is not a circle, so a circle and a non-circle are the same thing: there is no difference between a circle and a non-circle.
Quoting BlueBanana
Once you assume the existence of a circle that is a non-circle you abandon the principle of non-contradiction. From that moment, all your arguments automatically refute themselves.
That tells us at what point A occurred to somebody, not at what point A came into existence.
But the rules of your game preclude any such possibility. We must speak/write of things but the moment we do, the things we speak/write about exist. It's like inventing a game where you, the inventor, can't lose. The commendable creativity aside, you won't find people who'll play this game. Even if they do, they'll spend most of the time commenting on your rules (as you can see)
I also don't understand how if categorical nonexistence is possible, everything has to be random. Please explain.
What I can see from your posts is you're drifting, purposely(?), into some kind of determinism. Can you elaborate on that?
And concepts exist.
What about the possibility of categorically not existing?
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
And I don't own a planet made of crumbled feta cheese with moons made of grape tomatoes.
But a planet made of crumbled feta cheese with moons made of grape tomatoes does exist--as an idea. Therefore, it is not categorically non-existent.
Somebody once said to me (I am not saying he is right) that the Catholic church invented the idea of people spending eternity in a place (Hell) and that the Bible really says that people will be "blotted out of existence". That is the closest thing to the possibility of categorical non-existence that I have heard.
So beings come into existence; exist in only one way, shape, form, constitution, state, etc.; and then, while in that same way, shape, form, constitution, state, etc., lose their existence and cease to exist?
A is a small puddle of water. We place A in an ice cube tray and freeze it. A ceases to exist? Or A exists in a different form: an ice cube?
If A ceased to exist then the ice cube must be a completely different being, B. How did B come into existence?
One minute B did not exist. The next minute B existed. Therefore, one minute B categorically did not exist.
But I don't think that that is how anything works. A changed form. Nothing more, nothing less.
Quoting TheMadFool
If B did not exist and then suddenly came into existence, what non-random thing explains the latter?
Quoting TheMadFool
I thought I was being a philosopher and going wherever reason takes me, not purposefully following some script.
And the more I wrote the more I thought, "I am starting to sound like Ken Wilber". I have never heard of Ken Wilber being a determinist.
I want to know how we don't know that Harry Potter has always existed, has been evolving since the beginning of space and time, at this stage in the evolution of the universe is in the form of mental images in certain people's minds, and later will be in the form of an autonomous physical person like Vladimir Putin.
Maybe at some point everybody here was like Harry Potter is now?
Suppose I have the thought that Earth might have another moon, call it "Luna2." If I determine that there is no celestial object that actually qualifies to be called a moon of Earth, I'll say, "Luna2 does not exist."
You will say that Luna2 does exist, as an idea. Okay, Luna2 is an idea. What sort of idea? Is Luna2 an idea of something? If so, what?
You're assuming that triangular circle exists (as in exists physically). It doesn't and can't exist in our universe.
Quoting litewave
Within where a circle that is not a circle exists, yes. The concept of a circle that is not a circle exists within my imagination, not physically (because it's logically impossible for such a thing to physically exist). That means I can abandon the principle of non-contradiction within my imagination, not within physical reality. That means I can imagine my arguments refuting themselves, but in reality they don't.
Secondly, if I could abandon the principle of non-contradiction within our physical reality that'd mean my arguments would also automatically not refute themselves.
Thirdly, you yourself have shown to be capable of imagining the abandoning of the principle of non-contradiction
It can't exist anywhere, not just in our universe.
Quoting BlueBanana
Your word "concept" seems key here. When you imagine a circle that is not a circle, in your imagination is a collection of thoughts that refers to nothing, because a circle that is not a circle is nothing. If you don't assume that this "nothing" exists, you can be consistent.
Quoting BlueBanana
I don't think that works. If you abandon the principle of non-contradiction within something, what is the difference between "within" and "without"? From a contradiction, anything (and the opposite of anything) follows.
Quoting BlueBanana
I don't think I can imagine that. It would be to imagine nothing.
The way I see it is a particular form of a thing acquires an identity over and above that given by its composition. For example, take metal, plastic, rubber and glass and make a car. These materials have their own existence and yet, they interact to create a car whose identity as a vehicle is something more. Further interaction with its owner and his/her family will add to this identity. However, a time will come when it will be discarded, dismantled into its composite parts. We could say that it has simply changed form but it has lost the identity it acquired over its lifetime as a car. We could then say it changed its form into, hopefully, fond memories, pictures, etc. But these to will fade away over time - pictures decay, people die. Eventually, the car will literally vanish both from the physical and mental planes. It is then that the car will be categorically nonexistent. I think if we take something closer to home, like a person, the message becomes even poignantly clearer, for in death lies the answer to your question of categorical nonexistence.
Quoting WISDOMfromPO-MO
You have a point but it doesn't help your case because it matters not how something, anything arose. What matters is, well, cateogrical nonexistence.
Quoting WISDOMfromPO-MO
Please read above.
You're imagining a scenario where imagining and not being capable of imagining something are the same thing. That is impossible, just like a triangular circle. By imagining that situation you're proving me right.
Your hypothetical situation is:
1) I can imagine the concept
2) I can not imagine the concept
3) 1&2 do not contradict each other
Two conditions that we know for sure do contradict each other, but in the hypothetical situation do not.
Now let's see the triangular circle:
1) The shape is round, has no corners and all of it's points are the same distance from its centre.
2) The shape has three corners
3) 1&2 do not contradict each other
The same thing.
But 1&2 contradict each other in any situation.
That's what makes the situation fully hypothetical. Yet you talked about the situation and described it and imagined it.
That's what makes the situation impossible and therefore such a situation cannot exist. I just wrote a collection of words on the screen that refers to no situation.
No, they refer to an impossible situation, which is different from no situation. Since the situation was described the thought of it exists.
Suppose in a few centuries no living person has ever encountered the Harry Potter stories. It's a thought experiment. All that remains of them is a dusty box with the (by then) old books, hidden away somewhere, all else long since having been recycled.
Can it then be said that Harry Potter still exists (as a fictional narrative), perhaps as a kind of extended memory found in that dusty box?
Or, can Harry Potter only "come back to life", as it were, once someone has read the old books?
Can one speak of any ontological status worth mentioning?
It is said that Zeno devised 40 thought experiments, paradoxes, though only 9 are known, and only second-hand. We might suppose they could still be uncovered in ancient texts of course, perhaps even Zeno's own words, however unlikely it seems by now.
What might be the ontological status of these alleged 31 thought experiments supposedly devised by Zeno?
After all, I just referred to them, hypothetically at least.
No, they describe a contradictory situation.
Here's a list:
1.) An idea: A as manifested in your mind.
2.) A physical embodiment of A outside of your mind.
You ask what if it is determined that there is no 2.).
Okay, let's delete 2.) and update the list.
Here is the updated list:
1.) An idea: A as manifested in your mind.
We still have A.
Harry potter would exist out of the context in which we now know Harry Potter. Either:
1.) The present context would be reconstructed enough that Harry Potter would be manifested the same as today. That would probably take quite an archaeological feat.
2.) Harry Potter is incorporated/assimilated into a different context.
I think you already answered your second question. They would be things that allegedly / hypothetically exist.
Fine. It's an idea. What is it an idea of?
Someone recently told me how often the material that a human is composed of is replaced. If I recall correctly, he said every 13 years. So a human alive today is not composed of the same matter he/she was composed of 13 years ago.
I think that the car is the same. The car preceeds any material that makes it tangible. Even if the car lost all physical manifestation and ended up absent from all other forms such as photographs, the car could be physically reconstituted at a later time.
If the latter is false and the car can never again appear in any form, what was the process that took it completely out of existence? How does it work?
Quoting TheMadFool
But if something spontaneously comes into existence rather than simply moving from one form of existence to another, then that means that it previously was categorically non-existent.
Quoting TheMadFool
The process through which something is taken out of existence is missing.
I think we're veering towards the concept of identity here. To my knowledge the issue remains unresolved in philosophy. All that means, to me, is that identity is a nebulous idea - look up Ship of Theseus.
It seems you think that the identity of an object is indestructible throughout the process of change from one form to another.
My answer to that is:
Take a human being Mr. X. You will agree that there's a difference between the living Mr. X and an urn containing his ashes. I pin my argument on this difference - something has become nonexistent during the transformation from Mr. X to the pile of ash. This something may persist in memories, books, photos, videos, audio, etc. However, these too will fade and vanish. Then we have the categorical nonexistence you're looking for.
The key factors in your mind-game are the two realms of existence - the mental and physical. In my example above I've shown you an entity, a car that straddles both realms. It's a mental-physical entity. Well, now that I think of it, ALL objects are like that. In effect, identity necessarily requires aspects of both realms of existence - the physical AND the psychical. Losing the physical and/or the psychical part entails loss of identity i.e. the object becomes nonexistent. It's like the set of integers - made of positive numbers AND negative numbers. If you remove either/both, the concept/identity of integer becomes nonexistent.
So, you may reconstitute the car from its parts but that's just the physical aspect of identity. You can't restore the psychical component of the car's identity because people forget, people die. Isn't this categorical nonexistence?
Quoting WISDOMfromPO-MO
I think you're begging the question, as in you're already assuming categorical nonexistence is impossible.
You can use the same rationale I provided above that the car was categorically nonexistent before it was made. It lacks the physical component of identity, existing only in the mental realm.
If something is categorically non-existent there are no traces of it.
That's not the same thing as saying humans do not have the tools to find traces or the intelligence to connect traces and recognize the being that they compose. To say the latter would be extreme anthropocentrism.
All of this even applies to identities. Just because humans do not have any further knowledge of an identity, such as Harry Potter, does not mean that traces of it do not exist.
The Empire State Building could be a trace of something and humans lack the perspective to see the whole being that it partially constitutes.
99.9999999999999999999999999999% of that trace could disappear. There could be only one electron left. But we would still have one small trace of the Empire State Building left--a trace of a trace. Just because humans do not have the perspective to see that that electron is part of the Empire State Building does not mean that the Empire State Building categorically does not exist. Just because humans have to have the presence of an identity to recognize a being does not mean that if only one electron is left and the identity has disappeared that the being is categorically non-existent.
This is starting to sound like holons--everything is simultaneously a whole and a part of another hole.
Another moon of the Earth named Luna2.
You know that's not going to work, don't you? Can Luna2 be the idea of Luna2? That way, infinite regress lies...
It is an idea, I, of a being, B, that is, M, another moon of the Earth, and has the name, N, Luna2.
It is conceivable to see the second one, B, as a constant and all of the others as variables. It is conceivable being able to modify or eliminate some or all of the variables without removing the existence of B. I could be changed to P, physical object, and B would still exist. M could be changed to D, dust after a collision with an asteroid, and B would still exist. And so on.
Something way back in my memory tells me what you're talking about here as B is what Aristotle called substance, that of which properties are predicated.
The question here is whether your particular take on such a metaphysics is reasonable.
You say the Empire State Building exists as an idea and then exists as building. I suppose when it's torn down, it goes back to existing as an idea. It seems perfectly clear to me that there are ideas of the building existing before, during, after the Empire State Building's existence as a building. None of them are the Empire State Building itself, and it is not any of them.
If it really bothers you that the Empire State Building can come into and go out of existence, then you should look at that. What does it mean to say that? We're not talking about miracles. All we really have here is the rearrangement of stuff that already exists, on the one hand, and how we talk about it, on the other.
Do you know the sorites paradox? the problem of the heap? You've got a pile of sand. Take away a grain, still a pile of sand. Take away another, or another ten, or another hundred, and it's still a pile of sand. But how far can that go? When you get down to a hundred grains, is it still a pile of sand? Maybe. Down to ten? Doesn't seem like a pile, maybe a very small pile. Three? At what point did it stop being a pile? Was there a number? Is it plausible that there's a cutoff -- 256 is a pile, but 255 isn't?
Do you see here a pile of sand springing into existence and disappearing? Or the pile of sand being first a physical thing and then an idea as we take away grains? What idea? How many grains of sand in the idea of a pile?
1 a fact of living
2 a fact of objective reality
3 a state of living
4 a state of objective reality.
all 4 must exist to be an intelligent being existing in the universe, in time, the continuum.
If you exist in Einstein Relative reality you are not an intelligent being, its precluded by objective reality being required. TIME MAN.
Now for the climax--in a new thread.