First and second order ethics
I've been getting my head round first order and second order this and that lately. Do I know I know, or do I just know, or do I have justified true belief and so I know? Do I do good to do good? Or do I do good to look good? All that stuff.
Adnan Khashoggi, pimp, thief, fraudster, international arms salesman, has just died. He said:
Is that even possible?
Adnan Khashoggi, pimp, thief, fraudster, international arms salesman, has just died. He said:
Khassoggi: What did I do wrong? Nothing. I behaved unethically, for ethical reasons.
Is that even possible?
Comments (82)
Anyway, re the quote, I think that's easily possible. It's basically the idea of all of those "rock and a hard place" dilemmas a la "You can save a train load of people from certain doom of you murder one 'innocent' child."
I stopped the battling though, the trying to be right and smart, and good, and I just forgot about all of that stuff, because I had more important things to do.
Remembering stuff is bad for you.
It seems like a straightforward contradiction to me. Individuals like this never want to admit unethical behaviour. Think Donald Trump. I think the statement you quoted arises for the speaker more from a political imperative than a philosophical one.
Doubt and certainty are compatible.
I'm uncertain of my knowledge, yet I rely on it to come to a conclusion regarding it.
To know something, you need to doubt your own certainty.
Quoting mcdoodle
Good from whose perspective?
Nonconformist.
Moral dilemmas? Those trick us into assessing the morality of the options they give, instead of helping us distinguish the moral from the immoral. Similary, I don't think we can morally judge Khassoggi on the basis of legality or any other kind of agreed conformity.
Quoting geospiza
I think that's reasonable, they would have nothing to gain from it.
At least they're sincere.
I just explained how full of shit they are. Not just to you, but to themselves as well. They're fucking gods that can do no wrong, on the biggest of power trips. The height of megalomania.
I have no idea what this is saying, really.
Trick us into assessing the morality of the options rather than distinguishing moral from immoral? No idea what that means.
Right, nothing. Except for maybe redemption and self-respect. But those things aren't important :-}
Do you talk to yourself? If yes then you are reflexive, if not then how do you do that?
When I take an ethical decision, it is because I want to be the sort of person that takes that decision (a Virtue Ethics perspective), or slightly differently, because I want to live in a world where that decision was taken the way I decided it (a Consequentialist perspective).
Khashoggi's statement makes no sense to me. It is the decision, not the reasons or the action, that is ethical, unethical or neither. Perhaps what he means is that he performed actions that other people would be likely to think stemmed from unethical decisions, but that were not unethical for him because of some other considerations he took into account.
A mafioso that kills an innocent person out of loyalty to their family is acting ethically according to their ethics, but not according to mine, which is why I want him incarcerated.
There certainly is, the first order view will enable us to discuss Khashoggi and global arms industry, warfare, defence vs aggression, et &c., and what we ought to do in general. Second order distinction would be to discuss whether there is any truth in Khashoggi' statement that his actions stemmed from an ethical reason. Is it an actual moral claim?
His justification is likely the suggestion that while armament kills and is thus unethical, he is providing armament that would enable political or religious groups with the adequate ability to defend themselves from an aggressor that would have otherwise (without such armament) resulted in something equally unethical, such as death or violence by this aggressor. Indeed, when one thinks of Bill Clinton and his administration' arms embargo in the balkans that tipped the scale to the detriment of the Bosnians, Khashoggi's statement may actually make sense.
But, is it ethical to provide armament to an aggressor, even though aggressors themselves - such as ISIS - assume themselves to be defending what they believe?
Thanks, that's the perspective I seem to have found myself looking from. The Aristotelian formulation would be that you train yourself, or are trained, to do the right thing in the right way for the right reasons, on order to make the good happen. In this sense one condones murky acts done for a greater good. I think for instance of LBJ making dirty deals behind the scenes with racist politicians in order to get civil rights legislation passed. Those are the sorts of deals I used to disapprove of strongly, but nowadays I think - LBJ did indeed, on this particular issue, have the greater good in mind, and in his dirty deals he did a marvellous thing.
Quoting andrewk
I'm not so sure of this, especially in tragic areas that a benign thinker like Aristotle doesn't touch upon, and for which I feel I learn from Sophocles or Euripides rather than Ari. Take Agamemnon at Ephesus. Either he does as the gods wish and sacrifices his own daughter, or the fleet remains becalmed and the war is lost. He faces future regret whatever he does.
I do of course talk to myself in deliberation. At the moment of decision-making, I'm not so sure. For some reason I imagine people who are still thinking that way at the point of action as duplicitous swine - like Cassius about to assassinate or Iago plotting behind an arras.
Your body and your habits implicitly remember, they embody memories, or you wouldn't have learnt to do stuff, surely? Then the question is, should I just place some checks on what I do out of habit or bodily urge and if so why?
It is not ethical for me to do so, if I believe the aggressor's actions are harmful. What the aggressor thinks about it has no significance in my moral deliberation.
You should definitely place some checks on some habits, and what you may do of bodily urges. You may have the urge to do something, simply because the person standing next to you has that urge. Be ruled by reason, not whim and habit. That's my view at least.
How you define 'harmful' largely differs according to custom or tradition or culture; a terrorist could be a 'freedom fighter' and thus an aggressor' reasoning should add to your moral deliberation particularly in light of the sale of arms.
Maybe, but I like Hamlet and his father, the Ghost who I think represents Hamlet's intentionality, as an external need (as if an ideology) to compel him to perform acts in a certain manner, in this case revenge. Hamlet spends a lot of time reflecting before he acts. The Ghost tells Hamlet in the first act:
Of course, how to revenge the act of murder without "Taint" or guilt/sin became his problem. I think he became able to act because he was able sway his mother to be complicit in his enterprise, she agrees to Hamlet's demands becoming complicit with him, thereby freeing him to act without Taint, she becomes separate from his revenge and complicit in his intent (the Ghost's intent) which frees him to act out his revenge.
Hence, if I were an arms dealer (hard to imagine) I would use my determination of what is harmful to decide to whom I would supply arms. I would supply them to the French Resistance but not to Daesh. The fact that Daesh consider themselves to be highly ethical is not significant to me in making that decision.
Better public relations, you mean. Yes, you're right, reputation can be gained or can be lost through admission of wrongdoing, but in the case of those individuals, I really think they're better off denying any unethical behaviour.
Quoting andrewk
You make incarceration sound arbitrary.
I really think we can identify a common moral framework. For example, what's costly and unproductive is definitely immoral, I don't see how that can be argued against.
As indeed it is, if it depends just on the will of only one person. The history of any dictatorship is testament to that.
Those of us that have the privilege of living in Western democracies have protection from that, in that incarceration is governed by laws which are, ultimately, required to be reflective of the will of the many, rather than just the few.
This reduces the arbitrariness, just as the variance of the sample mean from a large sample is much smaller than the variance of individual data.
In my submission, it would be vastly better if all arms traffickers could admit that there is something wrong with what they are doing.
Whether one action or another is moral is a matter of preferences that individuals have. Moral dilemmas prod you into thinking about your preferences in difficult situations, where the choices are between a rock and a hard place. That can help you clarify just what your preferences are and why.
As in the end does never justify the means? Or is this specific to arms trafficking?
Quoting Terrapin Station
But wouldn't that reduce morality to subjectivity? Wouldn't there be just personal ways, no moral ways, then?
I think I have to grant you that. There would be a question to me about whether Hamlet deliberates or prevaricates. He comes to know what act he would at least half-like to perform: its justification holds him back. But he is all the same a counter-example to my prejudice, I concede.
Being costly and unproductive is definitely a utilitarian perspective, so I don't see how you claim it's a meta-ethical one.
I was watching a movie the other day about the British raid on the occupied French port of St Nazaire in WW2, and was troubled by the commandos sneaking up on German sentries and killing them in cold blood. Given that the raid, if successful (and it was) would save thousands of lives by hampering German U-boat operations in the Atlantic, I think most consequentialists would conclude that the actions were ethical. But it still troubled me to see the sentries killed. As far as we know they were innocent, being just non-Nazi conscripts that would much rather have been hanging around in Berlin studying architecture and trying to chat up girls.
Consider: would it be unethical if, say, you suppled non-lethal support such as clothing and food to ISIS? The distinction is dubious to say the least, just as much as it is attempting to ascertain the meaning behind 'defence' and whether your ethical position is really an ideological one. You may consider the French Revolution as 'freedom fighters' just as Khassoggi would consider the Daesh. Not good enough. There is no ontology, no way of ascertaining the validity of the nature of your judgement, which renders first/second distinctions necessary. It is just too subjective.
I think moral rationalism can reach a more prominent answer to the Khassoggi problem then virtue ethics, despite the former being so sterile.
Then take: wishing for criminals to suffer. Can that be considered immoral on its own? Maybe yes, because it lacks a good motivation. And what would that be? Maybe to add something of value to the world or to preserve what's of value. But I think the effects should act as a necessary reinforcement when judging the morality of something. Still, can anything that is predicted to be costly and unproductive ever be considered moral? That was what I meant.
Quoting jamalrob
But I don't get why killing an innocent would be an inherently immoral act. I get the feeling but even an innocent person can be in the way. Maybe there are higher priorities than preserving innocent lives, would any such priority also be inherently immoral? Would you kill someone innocent but condemned to death, to save other innocent lives? What about choosing who to live from 2 innocent but condemned to death persons, wouldn't that be indirect murder of the one you didn't choose?
Moral dilemmas can be unreliable, I know, but I think they can reveal our faulty moral assumptions.
Yes, of course. That's what morality is.
It is subjective. I am not a moral absolutist. I see morality as personal - and hence subjective. In the eyes of a moral absolutist, that may seem too subjective. To me it does not.
As I now see Terrapin Station has just observed.
The mistake that some (not all) moral absolutists make is to hold on to the unexamined presupposition that believing one's values are subjective renders one powerless, or disinclined, to act on them. The presupposition is wrong, but it is very widely believed.
Let me guess: says.. you! So, would you be so nice as to clarify that view for me?
Do you claim there's nothing in common between all versions of morality, subjective as they may be?
Nothing inherent to morality? No way to distinguish someone's morality from their preferences?
Would you agree, for example, that someone who doesn't stay true to their moral beliefs is immoral?
Says me because that's what facts (states of affairs in the world) say.
Just to clarify here, all that noting that it's subjective is saying is that morality is a phenomenon that only occurs in the minds (which are specific aspects of functioning brains) of persons.
And right, there's no way to distinguish morality from preferences, because preferences--namely, about certain types of interpersonal behavior--are what morality is.
Someone "not staying true to their moral beliefs" is probably someone who has stated moral stances that aren't what they really feel. Maybe because they were kowtowing to social norms, for example.
Absolutism? Perhaps more moral anti-realism. :-} The problem here is the following statement:
What is 'wrong'? And how does his reasoning that justified unethical behaviour to paradoxically be ethical relate to this interpretation of 'wrong'? You are saying that there is no such thing as 'wrong' considering your view that '(t)o me it does not.'
Quoting andrewk
If you think of introspection and your conscious awareness of phenomenal properties, what you understand of your inner experience is limited and reliance on such subjectivity when the quality itself is lacking and thus the transparency required therewith, how can you trust in these values when making an ethical decision, a decision likely to impact others?
No, I am not. That is the classic moral absolutist mis-step, to conflate denial of absolute right and wrong with denial of personal morality. I believe there is no such thing as absolute, mind-independent, objective wrong. But I have a very strong personal sense of right and wrong, on the basis of which I strive to act.
Hence, in my analysis, whether Khashoggi acted wrongly is a matter that in the end only he can assess. The only way in which a judgement on my part of his actions makes sense is:
(1) if I am on a jury and am called upon to judge whether he has committed a crime. In this case all that matters is what the law says; and
(2) if I want to use his case as an example to encourage or discourage certain types of behaviour to others. In this case all that matters is my assessment of his behaviour according to my values, not those of anybody else.
Quoting TimeLine
I do not understand the question, as 'trusting in my values' is a concept that does not mean anything to me.
For values to be trustworthy or non-trustworthy would require that there be a 'correct' set of values against which mine can be measured, and I do not believe there is such a thing.
I understand, of course, that many people believe there is such a thing, and I do not say they are wrong, just as they are in position to say with any justification that I am wrong.
We do however make judgments of others in formulating policies, for instance. An industry should not imply child labour except under certain stringent conditions, say. In such cases we seek common ground with others about what we think would be wrong, surely?
So are you saying that you're always acting according to your moral beliefs (or according to what you really feel or your personal preferences, if you will), for example? If you're not, I'd argue that you're sometimes acting immorally, would you agree? Accounting for subjectivity or not, I think we should be able to come to a definite consensus at least about what immorality is.
No, I wouldn't say that.
For one, people often act in ways that are expected of them, ways that won't rock the boat, etc.rather than following their own views. People often just don't want hassles from others, they don't want to be ostracized, they don't want to be jailed, etc.
But also, people don't always know their own dispositions that well. You usually figure them out better when you're in situations that challenge superficial reactions--situations that post some moral dilemma for you, so that you have to really think about how you feel on a "gut level."
Quoting Noblosh
Defnitely in a situation where you're acting against your moral dispositions just to acquiesce to social norms, you'd feel that you're acting immorally, yeah, so I'd agree there.
Quoting Noblosh
That should be easy at least in terms of what it is functionally--it's behavior that you feel its wrong, impermissible, etc.
If I would know you well (enough), would I be able to know when you're acting immorally? Also, would all kinds of constraint that would prevent you from acting according to your moral dispositions be immoral?
I'm asking you these because I'm curious if you consider morality having any objective aspects. Maybe you're just saying that all ethics are subjective since we're choosing which to follow and which to dismiss.
You mean would you be able to know per my judgment whether I'm acting immorally? I'd say you'd have a very good idea of that if you knew me well enough, sure. (You wouldn't be able to know with certainty, though, as I might have changed my mind, for example.)
Quoting Noblosh
It just depends on how an individual judges those constraints. I wouldn't personally say that all constraints are immoral, unless they force behavior that I consider immoral--some wouldn't do that. They'd just not allow action.
Quoting Noblosh
No, not at all.
Quoting Noblosh
Ethics/morality is only ethics/morality if someone makes a judgment about behavior. You can't just follow it.
This contradicts your basis of striving to act according to your personal morality whereby you believe that Khashoggi is the only one who can assess whether his actions are deemed immoral, which is thus an objective, mind-independent decision and your 'very strong personal sense of right and wrong' leads to counter-intuitive implications. You are denying your personal morality and so your 'very strong personal sense of right and wrong' on the basis of which you strive to act is false, as you are acting with inaction.
Watching someone get hurt and doing nothing does not save you from your moral responsibility. Inaction is immoral as it is still a decision you make not to act.
I understand the very importance of this subjective assessment, namely that only by ones own conscience can a person feel guilt or remorse and thus change their values to adhere to a strong personal sense of right and wrong as you do, but this itself manifests through empathy and reason alike, through a characterisation of 'wrong' and 'right' that is epistemic despite the realism of such properties. It is why a combination of first and second order ethics becomes necessary. The law is moral knowledge justified as part of this combined epistemic structure.
Quoting andrewk
But you do. You said it yourself, that believing one's values are subjective renders one powerless, or disinclined, to act on them.
What is belief?
Contradicts how?
Denying how?
False why?
What inaction?
Nothing I have said implies that I would not take action to prevent harms committed by someone else. In fact I have said quite the opposite.
As is so often the case with moral absolutists, you are arguing against what you think moral relativists believe, rather than putting the effort in to carefully read what I've said and trying to understand what I actually believe.
Quoting TimeLine Umm.
Here is the passage from which you took those words
Quoting andrewk
Can you spot the difference?
I agree. If we have a difference, perhaps it is one of emphasis.
I think of it as seeking common ground with others as to what constitutes a harm. That takes the form of a judgement about an act rather than a judgement of a person or their intent. If I can find enough others that agree with me that child labour is a harm, we can form an effective movement to agitate for change.
The lobbying may take the form of making loud, emotive verbal judgements of the employers of child labour, if the advice from the best spin doctors we can afford is that that tactic is what is most likely to succeed. But that would be purely pragmatic - and also unfortunate in my view (a 'necessary evil'), as I would prefer to lobby without having to say that certain people are bad. I would not believe the employers are bad. I would just wish that they ceased employing children, and do what I can to make that come about.
On the contrary, you have. You said it yourself;
That is not action in part of your values, as you say you apparently have a very strong personal sense of right and wrong, on the basis of which I strive to act. That is merely compliance.
Is there validity in Khassoggi statement vis-a-vis his sale of arms or not? You haven't solidified your point and clearly your most recent post exemplifies nothing more than a rhetorical sting.
Quoting andrewk
And? Answer the reasoning behind it, that you do measure your values because you believe in them. What is belief?
It's merely compliance with what?
Okay--his (1) you mean. What about his (2)?
That inference is incorrect.
It's the difference between
(a) stopping somebody from mugging an old person, and
(b) condemning the mugger.
I would do (a) (if I had the courage) but usually not (b).
The reason for your confusing the two might be that in both cases a judgement is made. But they are different judgements. The judgement in (a) is about harm. The judgement in (b) is about guilt.
In my moral framework it is essential to make judgements about harm, but not about guilt.
What exactly do you mean by prevention? It may be after it has occurred but the sale of lethal weaponry clearly has greater ramifications than merely Khassoggi alone and therefore if one is unable to show the harm of his indirect actions, one is unable to see the greater ramifications. Two words: Lockheed Martin. And exactly how can you seek to prevent further actions if you do not view his actions as wrong? It is harmful and thus your choice of action is inaction.
Quoting andrewk
That is the purpose of the law and by setting a precedence prevent other Khassoggi's - your judgement in (1) enables the judgement in (2) and so, you are also (2).
So you would do prevention but not punishment? Is that what you're saying?
As for arms dealers: you tell me what power I have over them and I'll tell you in what circumstances I'd use it.
The rest of your post appears to be about judgements under the law. This discussion is about moral, not legal judgements.
Yes. I see punishment of law-breakers as the job of the state, not of individuals, else we descend into Philippines-style vigilantism.
Injunctions can be useful because they request that the court make an order for somebody to perform or not perform a non-financial action - for instance to not publish something. The purpose of the injunction is to prevent a harm, so there is no need for assignation of guilt, merely for a court order requiring or forbidding the action.
Damages suits, on the other hand, usually involve the assignation of blame. I am very anti-blame, and do not like damages actions. I find it hard to imagine myself ever taking out a damages action against somebody. Bad things happen all the time, and the search for somebody to blame rarely helps us cope with them. If I lost my wealth and livelihood and a successful damages action was the only way I could provide for my family, I might do so. But that would purely be a mercenary tactic, not a moral judgement on the party I was suing (regardless of how much my barrister, as hired sophist, would present it as such).
I am not saying that damages suits never have any benefit, but I feel that the vast majority of them cause social harm. Defensive medicine is the classic example of the harm done by such actions - where the doctor makes decisions that minimise the risk of being sued, rather than what is best for the patient. Children's playgrounds with all the fun toys removed is another example.
How is this related to the meta-ethical problem at hand? No one is discussing your powerlessness in fighting injustice but ascertaining your position on Khassoggi. You have been unable to answer anything; what is 'wrong', what is 'belief' viz., your values, and how 'prevention' is related to the subject of your moral position? The answer to that is because you have no answer because your position is baseless.
I can answer some of your other questions though.
Quoting TimeLine I call that potential action 'wrong' which would violate my ethical framework if I were to do it. I try to use the term publicly only in relation to my own actions, not those of others, as I see moral judgements of others as usually unhelpful.
Quoting TimeLine I call 'belief' any proposition that is sufficiently plausible to me that I am prepared to act in accordance with it.
Quoting TimeLine
My moral framework will lead me to decide to take certain actions. Some of those actions may involve imposing my will on others, including preventing them from doing things - eg preventing the mugger from completing their mugging. Such interventions will be prompted by the perception that I am in a position to be able to prevent harm from occurring.
Quoting TimeLine My primary value is compassion. Beauty is another. I sometimes muse over the extent to which they overlap.
Does that clear up the confusion?
Quoting andrewk
You also say:
Quoting andrewk
How do you measure this 'ethical framework' with your beliefs and whether your values that enable you to act against what you consider 'wrong' as being aligned 'correctly'? Are you saying that you have direct access to your judgements and experiences that enables an introspective glance of indisputable accuracy, that there is no sociological or epistemological basis to this ethical framework in which you have formed? Since you muse quite regularly on the concept of Beauty, how does this conceptualisation form?
Quoting TimeLine I wasn't saying that. But I do have that direct access.
Quoting TimeLine No I am not saying that.
Quoting TimeLine I'm afraid I don't understand that question.
I wasn't saying that you were saying that. I was asking whether you have direct access to your judgements and experiences that enables an introspective glance of indisputable accuracy. Your behaviour is rather unbecoming. :-}
Quoting andrewk
You said that beauty - along with compassion - is a primary value that you hold. How do you believe your conception of beauty is formed?
Quoting andrewk
Explain how you form this 'ethical framework' and why you believe it is correct? Since you think that 'wrong' is what would violate this framework, in order to ascertain what you mean by 'wrong' I would need to understand the validity of your ethical framework.
I don't know how it is formed. It is just there, and that is enough for me.
Quoting TimeLine
Haven't we been here before? I have explained that I don't think the word 'correct' applies to ethical frameworks. It's a category error, like trying to measure the length of an idea. The same goes for 'validity'.
With all these questions, you seem to be searching for something, but I honestly cannot tell what it is. If you could tell me what you are searching for, perhaps I could help. But then it is often the case in philosophy that one feels one is searching for something, but one does not know what it is.
Quoting andrewk
When you say this:
Quoting andrewk
This is not good enough. I am not 'searching' for anything, I am merely trying to point out that your position is baseless. You are intrinsically motivated and make moral judgements without any reflection on the cognitive and socio-psychological limitations that may impact on the validity your decision. Hence the Cartesian 'Evil Demon' - as I said earlier, a terrorist could consider himself a freedom-fighter. Not good enough.
Quoting andrewk
You said that a 'belief' is any proposition that is sufficiently plausible to you and where you are prepared to act in accordance with it. A belief is measured by something, something that enables you to believe that the action is 'correct' in order to act thus. What is it?
It is based in my values. If you regard that as baseless then I am not disposed to argue. I would simply observe that, as far as I can tell, every position I have ever seen espoused by anybody else is equally baseless.
Quoting TimeLine Not good enough for what? To convince you? So I see.
Quoting TimeLine
Certainly. The measurement is the assessment of plausibility, to which I alluded. That will generally be a process of assessing whether the proposition that is a candidate for the honoured position of 'belief' can be deduced with high confidence from the axioms that I accept instinctively - axioms such as the Principle of Induction, that there are other Consciousnesses, and that Suffering should be minimised.
So, are you saying there no universal morals and that thou shalt not kill is equally baseless? What about linguistics and moral predicates?
Quoting andrewk
Values need to be measured in some way as ethics is not about 'me' but about 'us' and it is not good enough that you are convinced in non-objectivism only because you are ok with that. There is observable moral intuitions that people combined hold and it is common sense that one should dispute the reliability of their values since the acquisition of moral beliefs and the motivation to act involves a range of factors that challenge the quality of the agent' cognition.
Quoting andrewk
Instinctively? Don't you mean intuitively?
Mind-independently it's baseless, yes.
Quoting TimeLine
People don't think "combined." They think individually. That's not to say that people can't be influenced by things they observe or that they can't utter agreements, but that's not thinking in a combined way. You don't literally acquire moral stances as if you're getting them from somewhere else. You develop your moral stances. Again, there is obviously some influence from one's environment, but that's not the same thing as acquiring the stances from somewhere else.
Moral judgments aren't valid or not. And yes, someone considered a terrorist by some may consider himself a freedom fighter. That's a fact and you can't make it not a fact just because you'd rather it not be a fact.
It's necessary.
Quoting TimeLine I've already answered that too. See first sentence of my previous reply.
I can't help but observe that it looks like almost nobody - except maybe a few Jains - believes that rule, based on their actions and the actions of the governments and parliaments they elect.
Quoting TimeLine The question mark at the end of this suggests it's a question, but I don't know what you're trying to ask.
Quoting TimeLine
If there's a disagreement on this point, I suspect it's one of expression rather than of substance. I too believe it is important to challenge the moral beliefs and the recommendations of others when I judge that they cause harm. But I do not think of that as questioning the reliability of their values.
In some cases two disputants will share the same values but have reached different conclusions as to how to maximise satisfaction of those values. An example is two politicians arguing about immigration. They may both wish to maximise the benefit to society, but one may believe that immigration will ultimately help that while the other thinks it will hinder it. The dispute is over implementation, not over values, and hence it is possible for one to be right and the other wrong. But often only time will be able to tell us which one it is, and by then it will be too late.
Other disputes may come down to core values - for instance the value of freedom vs that of equality. A socialist will argue for higher wealth redistribution while a libertarian will argue for less. The difference is one of values, not implementation. Neither value is wrong. Neither is valid nor invalid. They are just different. I'm on the socialist side and argue for that, but I don't think that makes me correct and the libertarians incorrect.
Well, and here I was thinking that an essential for cognition is communication, the epistemic connection between language and knowledge, that our personal values and beliefs are in influenced by others, that ideologically 'individuality' is fallaciously a direct referential, that people blindly move in masses, that introspection cannot be accurately achievable. What was I thinking!
Why not put the following advertisement up in meetup?
'Solipsists unite! Come join a fellow solipsist at a local cafe to have a coffee and chat about mental states and morality."
:-O
Quoting Terrapin Station
The point is whether or not you are aware that your moral stances have been influenced by those around you, such as religiously or from your family etc., and such cognitive awareness requires exercising a free-will that enables conscious introspection, but even then we yield to a socially epistemic framework where our representations of reality is translated from collectively doxastic perceptions.
You are in others; indeed, it is your brain and cognition, but your thoughts, values, perceptions and representations are no doubt socially epistemic, that only through communication becomes justified as having possession of truth-values. The validity is a completely different story to this discussion, whether the properties itself is actually real, but to assume that your moral judgements are entirely your own is gobbledegook.
Quoting Terrapin Station
You are saying that it is a moral fact that a terrorist is a freedom fighter.
So, a terrorist who believes he'll go to heaven if he commits mass murder and thereupon will be granted with a group of lovely young virgins that will keep him company for eternity is in fact a freedom fighter because he believes it? What just happened to commonsense?
Communication doesn't work via thinking in some combined way.
And it's not solipsism. People don't breathe in a combined way, either.
Quoting TimeLine
Whether you think about it or not, you don't literally acquire moral stances from others.
Quoting TimeLine
No you don't. That nice, flowery metaphor perhaps, but it's extremely misleading re what's really going on. (And okay, I'm being facetious with "nice")
Quoting TimeLine
It's gobbledygook rather to claim that they're anything but your own
.Quoting TimeLine
I never cease to be amazed just how crappy folks' reading comprehension can be here.
What is communication if it doesn't involve others?
Quoting Terrapin Station
No, it is misleading to assume your individuality as somehow removed from a social system since epistemic quality is indeed a result of our interaction with one another. You are a part of a complex whole; dark matter exists, but just because you are unable to see it does not suddenly make space empty. What would you be if since birth you were hidden from other human beings and fed intravenously? How knowledge is acquired ultimately influences your beliefs and values. It is a combined 'you' and 'others' - both first and second order ethics. It is irrational to be just one.
I mean, that's not even shitty reading comprehension. It's simply a complete inability to read. "Doesn't work via thinking in some combined way" doesn't say "Doesn't involve others."
Charming. Clearly you are unable to provide any rational arguments that justify moral anti-realism and now resort to rather pithy retorts. It is not 'comprehension' by the way. :-}
Why don't you concentrate on mastering the basics of reading prior to worrying about how you can stick phrases like "pithy retorts" in a sentence? It's similar to music students who can't play in time yet a la being in the pocket and grooving, but who couldn't care less--they want to learn how to shred and in their minds, sound like Yngwie Malmsteen.
You want a rational argument justifying moral antirealism, but you can't even read a simple sentence like "Communication doesn't work via thinking in some combined way" without majorly screwing it up. I suppose it's amusing that you wouldn't see the absurdity of that.
Nevertheless, I will concede that I was I was not adept enough to appreciate your red herring earlier on that has lured me to partake in a conversation with someone trying to win an argument rather than actually have one.
You say that people think individually. You then continued with:
What does that even mean? And then you go harping on about reading and comprehension when it is you that says "no you don't" to arguments on collectively doxastic perceptions, which is no argument at all.
If you believe in moral anti-realism, saying 'yes it does' or 'no it doesn't' before whinging like a child with insults as a way to pretend to yourself that you are winning the argument, well that is just boring now isn't it. Run along now.
It is frustrating that people want to talk philosophy yet can not even reasonably read. That's more frustrating when they have a ridiculous amount of arrogance.
Here's another pet peeve. You supposedly read that sentence of mine, and you even quoted it and responded to it. Why in the world would you do that if you're not even sure what the sentence is saying? I'm not asking this rhetorically. I'm interested in you telling me why you'd do that.
Again, it's completely absurd that you expect someone to feel that it would be worth trying to get into any sort of detailed philosophical discussion with you when these sorts of problems are arising with something so simple. Why wouldn't anything just as simple be met with equal reading comprehension problems, equal "I really couldn't care less whether I understand what you're saying--I'm going to argue with you anyway" problems, etc.?
What do you do with a scratched record?
Quoting Terrapin Station
You're playing with words intentionally and you are doing it again.
Perhaps it is semantics, but I have been clearly speaking of social epistemology and not collective effervescence nor the mental properties of conscious states, that our values and beliefs are socially formed through language and we are sometimes unaware that our values are a result of culture or our social environment, hence collectively doxastic perceptions. While 'you' may be thinking, what you are thinking, the contents itself, is collectively formed; 'you' may exist, but the concept of 'individuality' is socially constructed. Introspection is perhaps an attempt to examine the content of your thoughts towards a self-awareness, but this is still limited and never absolutely accurate.
So tell me, what do you mean when you say communication doesn't work via thinking in some combined way.
Quoting Terrapin Station
3.2k posts of saying the same thing over and over again? You are like a nagging wife.
Again, the question about why you'd quote and respond to a sentence that in the next round you'd claim to not have any clue about wasn't rhetorical. So why would you do that?
It is your turn now. What do you mean when you say communication doesn't work via thinking in some combined way.
You can't answer it, can you.
Why would you address that sentence as if you have some idea what it's saying if you do not? Why wouldn't you ask for clarification before just plowing on?
This is just golden. You made a statement you don't even understand. That is like spelling your own name incorrectly.
And the reason you'd respond to a statement you don't even understand as if you did understand it is?