Reason for believing in the existence of the world
I have been asked by Reply to Ludwig V in another thread, if I believed in the existence of the world, when I am not perceiving it.
My answer to that question was, when I am not perceiving the world, there is no reason that I can believe in the existence of the world. I may still believe in the existence of the world without perceiving it, but the ground for my belief in the existence is much compromised in accuracy and certainty due to lack of the warrant for the belief.
He kept asking me if I believed in the existence of the cup, when I was not seeing it. My reply was, I do believe in the existence of the cup when I am perceiving it, but when I am not perceiving it, I no longer have a ground, warrant or reason to believe in the existence of it.
I asked him what is his reason for believing in the world when he doesn't receive the world, but he never gave his answers to my questions. Instead this is what I got in his post to my reply.
Quoting Ludwig V
I would still like to hear his own account on the reason for believing in the existence of the world, when he doesn't perceive it.
To see what other folks think about this issue, I have opened this thread asking what is your reason to believe in the world, when you are not receiving it? Or do you claim that you have no reason to believe in the existence of the world when you don't perceive it? I would like to see the logical and epistemic arguments laid out for the reason for believing in the existence of the world.
My answer to that question was, when I am not perceiving the world, there is no reason that I can believe in the existence of the world. I may still believe in the existence of the world without perceiving it, but the ground for my belief in the existence is much compromised in accuracy and certainty due to lack of the warrant for the belief.
He kept asking me if I believed in the existence of the cup, when I was not seeing it. My reply was, I do believe in the existence of the cup when I am perceiving it, but when I am not perceiving it, I no longer have a ground, warrant or reason to believe in the existence of it.
I asked him what is his reason for believing in the world when he doesn't receive the world, but he never gave his answers to my questions. Instead this is what I got in his post to my reply.
Quoting Ludwig V
I didn't realize that your question to me was in the context of Hume. You did drop a hint, but I didn't pick it up. My fault. That does change things. However, your sketch above is an abbreviation of his argument, which does not reflect what he thought he was doing.
Hume was happy to employ sceptical arguments against the idea of "hidden causes" or "hidden powers", as he refers to them. But he was scathing about what he calls "pyrrhonist" (radical sceptical) arguments. Not that he thought that they could be refuted; he just thought they should be ignored. His argument about association of ideas, habit and custom was intended to provide, not a refutation, but a basis for ignoring such arguments. He relies on past experience, for example, as a "full and complete proof" when he argues that a naturalistic explanation of a supposed miracle will always be more plausible than the supernatural one. As Austin says in Sense and Sensibilia "There's the bit where you say it, and the bit where you take it back".
So I agree that there's no deductive argument for positing that things you don't perceive continue to exist (A). But there is a considerable weight of (reasonable) evidence against it. In my opinion, it is at least enough to put the burden of proof on the your idea that things cease to exist when not perceived - the contradictory of A. Curiously enough, there's no deductive argument for that, either. Stalemate. In another discussion, we could ask each other what's next, but perhaps that will do for now.
I would still like to hear his own account on the reason for believing in the existence of the world, when he doesn't perceive it.
To see what other folks think about this issue, I have opened this thread asking what is your reason to believe in the world, when you are not receiving it? Or do you claim that you have no reason to believe in the existence of the world when you don't perceive it? I would like to see the logical and epistemic arguments laid out for the reason for believing in the existence of the world.
Comments (1098)
The consequence of this is that even though we have strong a posteriori evidence for some scientific theory we can rule it out a priori. That seems quite significant.
See the argument here.
Either we know a priori that the universe will not succumb to heat death and expand forever or we know a priori that quantum fluctuations do not happen (or that if they do happen that they cannot form brain-like structures).
Does that seem rational? Or is it just more rational than accepting the possibility that we are most likely Boltzmann brains?
One possible solution is to reject the premise that we ought reason as if we are randomly selected from the set of all observers with experiences like ours (and so that there is some third alternative to SSA and SIA). We accept that heat death and eternal expansion will happen, we accept that quantum fluctuations will form significantly more Boltzmann brains than normal observers have ever existed, but we don't accept that we are most likely one of these Boltzmann brains. Although I'm unsure how to justify this.
The thing is that virtual particles are not observed.
I tried looking up some educative articles on the matter but none of them were complete. If it is in your interest, you can try. In any case, the short answer is that you can have as many "particles" as you want, it is simply less likely the more particles you want to have.
Your objection is roughly that we need a great number of particles before making a brain, that is something that was discussed starting here.
I had already seen the argument and commented on it previously. I like to keep it simple. The Heat Death may be the most favored current scenario, and it may be more rigorously supported than the idea of random particles forming Boltzmann Brains. So I don't think the two necessarily go hand in hand.
If we were Boltzmann brains all bets would be off and none of our theories would have any support. I see that as a simple refutation of the idea. If you don't agree that's fine then we are not going to agree is all. Does it even matter whether we are Boltzmann brains or not? Would it change anything about how you live your life?
Well, we say that memories are stored. It is common parlance. It's a useful but very misleading analogy. I suppose what I'm getting at with this point is that it is as a result of how memories emerge and 'persist' that we can know it is impossible to reconfigure them without also reconfiguring everything that they are existentially dependent upon. That includes far more than just the biological material/structures of the human brain.
So, it's not even a possibility. Logical possibility perhaps, but what else would have to be the case in order for that to happen? It does not follow from the fact that we can imagine some possible world in which Boltzmann brains could emerge, that this world is that one.
Show that Boltzmann brains are not equivalent to normal human observers.
Quoting Deleted user
is just a case of (simplified):
A: My mind is the collection of things I am aware of.
B: There are things in the world I am not aware of.
C: Therefore there are things outside of my mind.
Which is that there is scientific knowledge to be learned, the fact I don't have this knowledge implies there are some things that I am not aware of, therefore there are things outside of my mind. There is some X I am unaware of, X is outside of my mind, there are things outside of my mind. But this only works because the implication {unaware of X} ? {X outside of mind} is accepted, and it can be assumed only if we define my mind in such a way (A) to rule out the existence of some unknown-to-me part of my mind. A semantic argument therefore.
Which I said here:
Quoting Deleted user
Furthermore, virtual particles are exactly the same particles as "normal matter" particles. Virtual particles are just normal particles that we artificially add to interactions when using a calculation method called perturbation theory.[/quote]If that person is right, then I don't see Boltzman Brains coming from virtual particles.
Wiki says this: If virtual particles did manage to form a BB, I have to wonder if the different mass would affect the brain's functioning.
Wiki also says this: If every particle in my brain suddenly got its antiparticle right next to it, would my brain continue to function? Would a brain formed by virtual particles, each of which is accompanied by its antiparticle, function for even the instant required, before the particles and antiparticles all annihilated each other?
But Brian Greene doesn't seem to be talking about virtual particles when he talks about Boltzman Brains. Like in this video:
https://youtu.be/gtlWS9TaCnQ?si=50MW6PmUcgQVq1jR
Could this be an implication of accepting the Kantian thing-in-itself in empirical world? Or does it mean just there are things that you have no experience of, therefore no awareness of them?
Not sure if B entails C. Because if you are not aware of the things in the world, then how do you know there are things outside of your mind?
Quoting Deleted user
Yes, you have given out your reason for the conclusion, but I am not sure if a semantic argument would be enough evidence for the ground. Because your language reflects the content of your mind, but not the other way around i.e. your belief is not based on what you said.
Quoting Patterner
Perhaps, but the quote says "necessarily", which implies it might have the same mass.
These links are not bad though some do represent writer bias.
https://sites.pitt.edu/~jdnorton/Goodies/Boltzmann_Brain/Boltzmann_Brain.html
https://bigthink.com/hard-science/boltzmann-brain-nothing-is-real/
https://clearlyexplained.com/boltzmann-brains/index.html
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Kn5PMa5xRq4
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E7pakDMnuMY
I, personally, don't think we are Boltzmann brains physically speaking, even though I am not completely convinced against solipsism as a metaphysical idea.
I think the Ding an sich is an epistemological being, not an ontological one.
Quoting Kant’s Multi-Layered Conception of Things in Themselves
But that is the matter of whether the Ding an sich is ideal or double or monadic or material or whatever. Whether the noumenon is automatically an outside world, whether mental or physical, is another question. Since the very idea of noumenon assumes of a world besides the perception of a transcendental agent, it would make sense that without the noumenon there is nothing to perceive. I think the semantics of Vorstellung pretty much imply an outside world, so solipsism implies no Vorstellung. Coming up with a view in which there are things outside of perception and yet solipsism obtain seems to be a contradiction of the semantics of solipsism.
So to answer your question, yes.
Quoting Corvus
I think this is somewhat answered above. You could say you have mental objects which you don't experience (in the sense of perceiving), but I think that sentence is nonsensical.
Quoting Corvus
Naturally language reflects mind (to some extent at least). But it is a simple argument that, if we redefine the word mind, solipsism in our vocabulary can be immediately tagged as 'false' as soon as a quick introspection shows there are things in my mind whose origin I don't know — whether these things come from the vat holding my brain, from idealism, I don't know. I believe a Roman philosopher would promptly accept that there must be things outside of his animus, as that is what the meaning of those words imply.
Edit: solipsism implies no Vorstellung.
Quoting Deleted userThis, too. :grin:
Quoting Deleted userI believe things are as they seem, until there is reason to believe otherwise.
And I think BBs are an absurd idea. I assume it will be proven impossible at some point. And I'm sure we'll never see a Boltzman anything, despite the fact that there are an infinite number of things other than brains that could be Boltzmanned.
Thanks for the links. I had only found one of them in my searches.
How could something be an epistemic being, if it is unknowable and has no physical referent? How could something be an ontological being, if it is unknowable? You wouldn't know whether it exists or not? Is it a being at all?
Quoting Deleted user :ok:
If you accept the existence of the Kantian Thing-in-itself in Noumena, then that would be a proof of the existence of the outside world. No? Because Noumena exists in the physical or external world. It cannot exist in your mind according to Kant, or do you believe it does exist in your mind?
Some folks seem to believe that the Thing-in-itself exists in the mind. The only problem is, again they don't know what it is. Isn't it contradictory to say, it exists but it is unknowable? How do you know it exists, if it is unknowable? But then some folks believe that Thing-in-itself can be knowable if you tried to perceive it, i.e. via intuition and imagination.
But can knowledge come from imagination or intuition? It wouldn't be very accurate knowledge if it was from imagination and intuition alone without sensibility and reason. Or if you were a religious, then you could say, you experience Thing-in-itself via your faith.
Quoting Deleted user
For example, what are they? What are the things that you find in your mind whose origin you don't know?
Having said all that, I can see the point that language is a significant factor in connecting self and external world. If there were no external world, how could one have acquired the language? How could one communicate linguistically with other minds at all? How could one make any semantic expressions about the outside world at all?
By epistemic being (odd phrase admittedly), I mean a being whose defining property is of epistemological nature. The Ding an sich is that which begets experience.
Quoting Corvus
Yes.
I am not persuaded by Kant's argument. But it basically runs that, because I have a temporal awareness such and such, there must be objects that allow/cause such awareness. Because of this awareness, solipsism is false; and that object would be noumenal or at least have a noumenal source. But I imagine that for Kant the noumenon is always outside of the mind, and to prove the existence of a noumenon is to disprove solipsism.
Solipsists would have to deny noumenons.
Quoting Corvus
I think the concept of noumenon is necessarily (semantically) outside of one's mind.
Quoting Corvus
For example, perceptions, hunger, pain.
Neither, overall, but...
Quoting Corvus
It is defined as otherwise. So thats incoherent.
Quoting Corvus
The Noumena is not hte thing-in-itself. It is the existent as perceived by something other than human sense-perception. So, unknown to us, but theoretically knowable. The Ding-en-sich is that existent without any perception of it is my understanding.
So perhaps it (the argument of Kant) is not being adequately outlined.
It looks to be difficult to prove the existence of noumenon if not impossible. And logically, if a noumenon was proven to be existent, then would it be still a noumenon? Or a phenomenon?
Semantic proof may not be taken to be conclusive, because there would be a solipsist who claims that his noumenon is in his mind, and he visits there every night in his intuition. It would be difficult to disprove his claim.
Ok, was just trying to see the concept from a solipsist's point.
Quoting AmadeusD
Since this is not about interpreting Kant accurately, it was an attempt to see it from a solipsist's perspective. But would you say that your claim is the officially accepted interpretation of Nounmena and Thing-in-itself in Kant?
I have various commentaries on Kant by different authors, but the one I accept and follow is the commentary books by Graham Bird. His 2x books on Kant are my favourite, which are "Kant's Theory of Knowledge" and "The Revolutionary Kant".
I wonder what books and commentaries you are using for your readings or studies on Kant. But this issue in TI can be contentious and a new thread on its own.
Anyhow Graham Bird says there have been different interpretations on Noumena and Thing-in-itself in Kant, and he propounds the both concepts are same entities, which is opposite views of yours. But if you could present your arguments for your points with the source information, that would be helpful.
Aren't they the obvious sensations from your biological bodily workings telling your senses, that it needs food and something is pinching you, or why are you using your hair dryer too close to the skin? :grin:
Did you read the “Multi-Layered Conception….” paper linked on the previous page?
Not the paper itself (Is there a link for the full paper?). Just the quote. The following is the point I used to agree with, and still do. What is your own point?
Quoting Kant’s Multi-Layered Conception of Things in Themselves
Didn’t have one; just curious.
Quoting Corvus
That’s fine, provided proper account is taken for it.
I'm unsure what an 'officially accepted' interpretation is, but it seems to be the most common.
Ding-en-sich = The thing, simpliciter
Noumena = that same thing as perceived by something other than Human, spatio-temporal perception
Phenomena(of something) = the same thing in human perception only.
at any rate, the above conceptions work for reading the Critique. Most don't.
https://www.wikiwand.com/en/Noumena this page contains a fairly good overview of the disagreement around the concepts - but within Kant, they are kept separate**. Particularly, Palmquist, as a secondary source, I would take, but largely because (as discussed in this article) it is essentially aligned with Kant's actual writing. Not that that's the be-all-end-all, but I tend not to take much secondary material which expressly alters the plain meaning of the OG text on board. Might be something I'll get over. Very much smoething i've learned reading law.
** From CPR:
"if, however, I suppose that there be things that are merely objects of the understanding and that, nevertheless, can be given to an intuition, although not to sensible intuition (as coram intuiti intellectuali), then such things would be called noumena (intelligibilia). (A249)"
and
"But if we understand by that an object of a non-sensible intuition then we assume a special kind of intuition, namely intellectual intuition, which, however, is not our own, and the possibility of which we cannot understand, and this would be the noumenon in a positive sense. (B307)"
(from the SEP Article )
Indeed. That was what I meant. When you said that my post was not adequately outlined, I was wondering then what is the right outline on the topic? Was there the officially accepted and verified outline on noumenon and thing-in-itself? No. There is not, and you agreed with that. In that case, every interpretation is more plausible, plausible or less plausible. No interpretation is wrong. If it was felt as wrong in someone's mind, that doesn't mean it is objectively wrong. It is not a matter of an analytic judgement. It is a matter of belief, understanding and opinion.
I have around 20 different books on Kant, and they all have somewhat different interpretations on the topic, but I found Graham Bird's books were more plausible, and were agreeing with my ideas, hence I kept on sticking with the books as the bible of understanding Kant's CPR. I don't have the book by Palmquist by the way.
Bird clearly says Thing-in-itself and Noumena are the same concept, and I agree with the point. Kant makes various different remarks on the concepts in CPR in various different places in the book depending on the context, hence it would be difficult to say, this or that is the correct definition of them. It really depends on what you are talking them with in what context and what arguments you are presenting with, which makes either more plausible, plausible or less plausible.
And whatever definition one comes up with, there will be someone who will disagree with it, and prove the definition is illogical, or come up with quotes from the CPR which says exactly the opposite.
It is not something that anyone could prove logically right or wrong, hence they are in the category of the antinomies. They are still very useful concepts, if one had some thoughts on epistemic, ontological or metaphysical ideas, and those concepts fit nicely for explaining or positing something which would be difficult otherwise to do due to the abstract nature of the arguments or ideas.
What would be the proper account in your opinion?
I was thinking about this today, and this idea came to my mind. If something is an existence, how can it be without ontology or epistemology? They go together. Without perception, ontology is not seen and not known. Without ontology, there is nothing to perceive. If something is an ontological being, then it must be also epistemological being for it to be qualified as an existence. If something is an epistemic being, then it must be also ontological being. If not, then it would be unknowable even whether it exists or not. No?
Because the point was…..
“….we do not have to conceive of the ‘something’ that underlies appearances as a material object. It might as well be considered as something that is immaterial and can only be thought….”
….and because to conceive is a logical function of understanding, it follows that the something that underlies appearances, if considered as merely something immaterial and can only be thought, whatever that conception might be, cannot be phenomenon. And if not phenomenon, it is impossible for that conceived something to be an experience or a possible experience, which means there will be no empirical knowledge of it.
“….. For, otherwise, we should require to affirm the existence of an appearance, without something that appears, which is absurd….”
(Bxxvii)
My opinion on that account: the use of transcendental conceptions of reason, re: that which underlies appearances as immaterial or simply conceived as something, is what the critique was all about, that is, an exposition on what not to do. Or, technically, what reason has no warrant or entitlement to do, in the pursuit of empirical knowledge, which is all that appearances concern.
I have provided where, in Kant, the two concepts are objectively removed from one another. Not sure what else to say, but I very much respect your dedication here.
I understand what you’re getting at, but I’m not able to see secondary sources who disagree with direct statements in the source as valuable personally.
From what I have heard there is no scholarly agreement on the (in)equality of noumenon and Ding an sich. Some are confident in their interpretation that they are absolutely distinct. But being that the problematic of Kant's language is that you don't know when something is being used as a synonym of a word or of another, as is the case with "object", I don't think we will ever know. Ecce maledictio linguarum naturalium.
The writer of Kant's Transcendetal Idealism on the SEP thinks they are clearly distinct:
It is possible some scholars merge the two because of:
Quoting Corvus
Using the terminology above and taking this:
into consideration, Kant proves the outside world by showing that some appearances are indeed phenomenons, and due to their causal relationship, phenomenons imply real world objects.
Quoting Corvus
Here we have things outside of my mind, at least a brain.
Quoting Corvus
I am trying to achieve natural curls.
It does have the meaning of 'having through the senses', which is contrary to how Kant uses it, but it also shows "given by the spirit", which is how some dictionaries define the (modern) word noumenon.
This sounds like the point I was getting across to RussellA in the other thread. But I am not sure if reason has no warrant or entitlement to do in the pursuit of empirical knowledge, because it is all that appearance concern. Reason still does warrant on all the appearances coming in via sensibility - in the case of the bent stick in the glass of water, some people think the stick is bent. But reason when applied to the appearance, tells them no it is the refracted light by the water which makes it look bent. It is not really bent.
In the cases of perception with appearance, but the perceiver still thinks or intuits on the unobservable objects, Kant tells us that is the limit of our reason. We then have to transcend reason, and employ some other mental faculties such as imagination, beliefs and faith to deal with the perception.
The cases of the unobservable physical objects exist in Scientific enquiries in reality. I think I have written about it before somewhere in the TPF. It is a planet called Vulcan. It is not observable in physical form in the sky, but with all the calculations of the movements based on the gravities of the other planets, there must exist this planet called Vulcan. This unobservable planet had been in existence for many years in the scientists calculated conjectures and imagination.
I am not sure if they have actually confirmed the existence of the planet Vulcan yet. But even the scientists don't rule out the existence of unobservable physical objects just because it is invisible. I am sure it is the rational induction of reasoning which has been applied in this case of believing in the existence of the object which has no appearance by the scientists.
Ok, we agree to disagree. That is fine.
Quoting AmadeusD
Thanks. I thought this thread had ended when it had around 600 posts. It disappeared for a while, but then it reemerged with the new points continuing the discussions. I wasn't following the batman brain stuff as I know nothing about it, but when Kant was being mentioned, I thought I could join again for a wee reading and discussing.
I agree with this. There is no such a thing as the officially accepted definition or interpretation of Ding-An-Sich and Noumenon even in the academic communities. Insisting that the one in SEP or some other internet site definitions are right, and the casual readers or students definitions and points are wrong, just because they are hobby readers and students has no logical ground for the argument.
Quoting Deleted user
I think this is a good point. I could go with that. However, G E Moore proved the existence of the external world by waving his two hands - saying, "Here is one hand, and here is another hand." Seeing the hands and being able to wave them proves that there exists the external world.
I was reading "A Kant Dictionary" by H. Caygill last night, and it says, Noumenon is not a being or existence in Kant. But it is a boundary of human knowledge and pure reason for the limitation. Phenomenon presents us with the appearance to our sensibility, but not in full. It does so only to a certain degree, then there is a boundary that reason cannot handle due to the non appearance of phenomenon. The boundary and beyond of phenomenon is called Noumenon. In that case, it sounds like Noumenon is just part of Phenomenon where the appearance ends and beyond.
Quoting Corvus
Given that empirical knowledge just is experience**….
(“… to convert the raw material of our sensuous impressions into a knowledge of objects, which is called experience…”)
**translator-dependent, as we are all so familiar.
“…. Reason never has an immediate relation to an object; it relates immediately to the understanding alone. It is only through the understanding that it can be employed in the field of experience. It does not form conceptions of objects, it merely arranges them and gives to them that unity which they are capable of possessing when the sphere of their application has been extended as widely as possible. Reason avails itself of the conception of the understanding for the sole purpose of producing totality in the different series. This totality the understanding does not concern itself with; its only occupation is the connection of experiences, by which series of conditions in accordance with conceptions are established. The object of reason is, therefore, the understanding and its proper destination. As the latter brings unity into the diversity of objects by means of its conceptions, so the former brings unity into the diversity of conceptions by means of ideas; as it sets the final aim of a collective unity to the operations of the understanding….”
(A643/B671)
Quoting Corvus
Reason has nothing to do with appearances as such, as shown above, inasmuch as immediate relation to an object IS its appearance to sensibility alone.
Illusory or outright mistaken understandings relative to real things, is a function of judgement, not reason.
That reason has for its object understanding, and understanding has for its object experience, it does not follow that reason has to do with experience or empirical knowledge itself.
How can judgement function for arriving at rational conclusions, if it were severed from reason?
From Hume to Kant, they all agree on the connection theory that all the mental faculties operate on the basis of the causality between each and every mental functions and events. Reason can serve nothing useful or rational if it stood itself in the mind with no connections to experience, appearance, intuitions and judgement.
This point had been confirmed, upheld and propounded by William James 200 years later for establishing his Psychological Theories of Human Mind. Even this day and age, this perspective has not changed. Without the causal operations between reason and judgement, AI system would have no logical footings for their design ideas and operandi principia.
Judgement doesn’t conclude, it synthesizes.
“…. Conceptions, then, are based on the spontaneity of thought, as sensuous intuitions are on the receptivity of impressions. Now, the understanding cannot make any other use of these conceptions than to judge by means of them. (…) All the functions of the understanding therefore can be discovered, when we can completely exhibit the functions of unity in judgements.…”
(A68/B93)
“…. General logic is constructed upon a plan which coincides exactly with the division of the higher faculties of cognition. These are, understanding, judgement, and reason. This science, accordingly, treats in its analytic of conceptions, judgements, and conclusions in exact correspondence with the functions and order of those mental powers which we include generally under the generic denomination of understanding.…” (A131/B170)
So it is, in merely representing the higher powers of the overall human intellectual program, re: as a means to expose and enable discussions of it, a speculative tripartite logical system in the form of a syllogism, the order or sequential procedure of which understanding is the major, judgement is the minor or assemblage of minors, and reason is the conclusion.
————-
Quoting Corvus
Just ask yourself….what did Hume say reason couldn’t do? And if the major raison d’etre of CPR was to expose what reason can do, such that Hume’s philosophy was proved incomplete, then it is the case reason has nothing to do with experience, appearance, intuitions and judgement, which Hume’s empirical philosophy covered well enough on its own. It has to do with, not all those, but how the use of those in non-empirical conditions is not only possible but necessary, and they are so only iff it is the case synthetic, and altogether pure a priori cognitions are themselves possible.
THAT….is what reason does, and we call them…..waaiiiitttt for itttttt…..principles!!!!!
Why does it synthesise? What is synthesis for, if it doesn't offer conclusion?
Quoting Mww
I have a few AI book here, and all of them talk about the association theory of mental faculties in Hume and Kant. Of course reason has limitations for its capabilities, and that is what Hume and Kant professed. But it doesn't mean that reason has nothing to do with the other mental faculties.
Crap, I spoke too fast. Imagination synthesizes; judgement merely represents the synthesis. My badly stated shortcut, sorry. Productive imagination synthesizes conceptions, that is, relates the conception in the subject of a possible cognition, to the conception in the predicate, the unity of that relation is then called judgement.
Reason certifies the relation as logical iff it accords with the corresponding principles, by which we consider ourselves positively certain, re: knowledge, and illogical otherwise, by which we find ourselves negatively certain, re: confused.
————-
Quoting Corvus
That each member of a system operates in conjunction with the others, does not make explicit any have to do with the other. Pretty simple, really: the engine in a car has nothing to do with the rear axle, each being specific in itself for purpose and function, but without both, the car goes nowhere.
:ok: Every mental operation is actually synthesis of the other mental operation and the sensibility. And human perception is not all automatic process. They must make efforts to perceive better in the case of perceiving tricky looking objects or the world objects with the scarce data due to the remote distance or the size of the objects which are difficult to observe.
In the case of the bent stick, initially it appears bent when it is not. It is a tricky case. Some folks wonder if the stick is really bent. This is due to reason has not been applied to their visual perception. Or they applied their reasons but not correctly. They synthesise into the wrong conclusions. Synthesis is the process of combining all the data available, but judgement concludes for the best validity or what appears to be truth with the available data with the help of reason.
Quoting Mww
The association theory of mind for Hume and Kant doesn't say different mental faculties are the same entities. It means they work together just like the different car parts working together to get the car running example as you presented. But you seem to misunderstand the association theory of mind. It doesn't say different mental faculties are the same. It says that they work together under the principle of causality.
What….so the associative theory of mind works like the relation of car parts, I understand the relation of car parts….obviously, since I presented it…..yet I don’t understand the associative theory of mind which is just like it?
Didn’t I mention that each member of a system works in conjunction with the others?
Maybe you did. Not sure. Anyway the point is that judgement needs reason for its proper operation.
Without reason, judgement will work. But without support of reason judgement will arrive at irrational conclusions.
Depends on what you think proper operation of judgement entails. Pretty sure I made clear, according to the original transcendental philosophy, it doesn’t need reason.
Judgement needs conceptions for its operation, proper or otherwise, such operation being the functional unity in understanding.
It sounds absurd to say judgements only need conceptions for its operation. It needs more than conception to operate. How can you judge if the apple taste good without having eaten it? Just by conception of apple, it is impossible to judge if the apple tastes good.
How can you judge if the Eiffel tower is taller than the Tokyo tower without measuring the heights and comparing the measurements of them? Can you do that with just the concepts of the towers?
All and each sensation, depending on its mode of intuition, is represented by its own conceptions. The compendium of those conceptions, synthesized in an aggregate series of relations to each other, gives the cognition of the thing as a whole. For those singular sensations, by themselves, not in conjunction with other modes of intuition, only judgements relative to that mode of intuition, that sensation, are possible.
Sufficient to explain why not all possible sensations are necessary to judge an object, and, that each sensation manifests in a possible judgement of its own, in accordance initially with its physiology, henceforth in accordance with the rules implicit in the faculty of understanding.
Yet another example of the exceptionalism of North trans-Atlantic philosophy. Almost as good as the typical Quinean argument of "Well we (I) want it to be true so it is true". In Ancient Athens, there would be no disagreement, Plato and Diogenes would join forces in mockery.
Quoting Corvus
Voilà, another interpretation of the term.
Not quite clear what you are trying to say here. Could you give some real life examples, where you can make judgements with conception only without any other mental faculties associated?
Yes, there are many different interpretations even in the academic communities. Which one is the absolute true one?
All judgements having to do with things, are of conceptions only.
Quoting Corvus
I never said no other faculties were associated. In fact, other faculties must be, given the previous comments.
We will have to bring Kant back from the dead, but even then it is possible he would not be able to fully explain it, after all he failed to do in his several books. Denuo, ecce maledictio linguarum naturalium.
You could join the time travel thread, and travel into the 1700s. :nerd:
If you already have the concepts of things, why do you need further judgements on them?
What are there to judge with things?
Further? This implies concepts are judgements, when they are in fact only representations.
For why judgement is needed, when there are already conceptions, consult A67-76/B92-101.
It breaks the traditional meaning of judgement and concept. I am not sure if there is a point for insisting on the point apart from creating confusion.
Quoting Mww
If that is really what Kant said, then you, as a serious reader of CPR, should be in a position to criticise the point, rather than blindly accepting it, and worshiping CPR as if it were a bible. If concept were judgements, then is the Sun the Moon? Is a dog a cat? Is an apple a bucket? It just creates unnecessary and unacceptable confusions.
CPR is not a bible to be worshipped. It has to be interpreted and understood in the making sense way for the present days. If it is not making sense, it is not worth it. I try to read it making sense way. Someone said "To understand Kant is to transcend him." I think he was right in saying so.
For a few hundred years, it is, for all intents and purposes, the bible for critical human thought.
Quoting Corvus
Why wouldn’t it? Knowledge has certainly evolved, but the human intellectual system, in whichever form that actually is…. by which knowledge evolves, has not changed one iota in these few hundred years. Or even if a couple iotas, still not enough to make a difference. Given current education and peer review, Kant would understand “qualia” just as well as anybody these days.
Quoting Corvus
Nahhhh. To understand Kant is to think as if in his place and time. Work with what he worked with. You didn’t read in that link, where the author said pretty much the same thing? That people are apt to misunderstand him because they’re using asymmetrical conditions in attempting to arrive at congruent conclusions. Sadly, Kant must be wrong because he’s three hundred years old?
(Sigh)
Judgement is an act of judging. Concept is more close to definition. Judgement can have concepts in its content, and it is always in propositional form. That is what Bolzano said in The Theory of Science. I think that makes sense. If one says concept is judgement and they are the same, then it doesn't sound right logically. If that is what Kant said, then one should point it out as an absurd idea.
Anyways, ok, we agree to disagree. :) Worshipping Kant as if he is some God, and CPR is the bible is not a good philosophy. It is, rather, a religion in disguise of the philosophy. :grin:
While this is correct, do you see the fault in judgement in supposing it has been the case with respect to this conversation? And if there’s no evidence for the case other than mere observation of the disparity in our respective comments, and even if that assertion never was directed towards this conversation in the first place, what purpose is served by stating the obvious?
But never fear; it’s ok. It’s covered in the bible (of critical human thought):
(those finding themselves in a dialectic corner) “…must either have recourse to pitiful sophisms or confess their ignorance…”.
Your misunderstanding seems to come from thinking judgements are concepts, and judgements have no association with reasoning in the operation. If this is the case, what is the purpose of reason in CPR? What does reason supposed to be doing in the minds?
Good luck finding where I said judgement are concepts. If I didn’t say it, what possible ground could there be for you to claim a misunderstanding of mine related to it?
Quoting Corvus
What operation? For this operation it doesn’t, for that operation it does. I’m not going to guess which one you’re talking about.
It would be much helpful if you could / would just explain the unclear things in straight forward manner instead of keep beating around the bush.
If you traced back what you wrote, you just kept on saying that judgement has nothing to do with reason. But then now you seem to have changed your words talking about "the other operation.", and tell us you won't guess which one. It is not a straight forward way of discourse.
Yeah, ok. All my fault. Sorry.
Good luck.
Kant's TI was opposed and criticised by many of the other Philosophers after his time such as Nietzsche, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Bolzano, Heidegger ... etc. His TI wasn't absolutely perfect. But then which philosophy is?
Quoting Mww
Thanks. To you too. :ok:
Quantum mechanics (QM) cannot explain everything, but it gives a lot of very good predictions. Unfortunately there is no way to understand it as traditionally physical, in the sense of particles controlled by forces through cause and effect. In the math a very distant object can be changed instantaneously by something happening here. That can't be due to forces because by the rest of physics, forces operate locally.
This makes it difficult to believe QM because no one can see how that can happen - but there are theories. One is that QM is just a bunch of formulas for prediction, but there is no real quantum world. That is a lot harder to accept now that we know that there is no traditionally physical universe. If the quantum world is not real, neither is our familiar physical world. This approach thus ends up in idealism - only the experienced observations are real. That is one alternative we might entertain but do not have to believe it - or anything else.
Other theories extend the physical world to include things we never thought were real, physical things, like for instance information. Another approach is that only the math is real - the physical world is part of the set-theoretcial universe and exists if sets do. None of these theories are particularly believable, but they are all possibilities worth exploring and some might be useful.
Secondly, the observed physical world is a structure created by our brains. People are not born being able to see in 3D - the incoming visual information is 2D. Sometime during infancy the brain creates neural structures that make this information appear to be 3D. This has to be done in the very unformed infant nervous system. Adults born blind cannot later after sight-restoring surgery learn to see in 3D - they see a very flat world. Seeing in 3D does not come from inference or reasoning of any sort. But evolution has found it useful for human survival and reproduction to produce our internal movies in 3D.
Plus 3D might not last as a physical framework either. Trying to cope with QM and relativity has produced non-3D models. A highly curved 2D surface seems to work reasonably well. But so does a universe existing in 10^400 or so dimensions which has some information structures that have good 3D approximations.
We don't have to believe in the existence of anything - doing so doesn't have much advantage - but exploring and entertaining the possibilities of competing theories - and developing new ones - can be useful to life.
An interesting post. :up: It is interesting, because it was unusual to read about the sceptical world view, which is based on, and coming from science and QM perspective, not some idealistic immaterialism. I used to have the idea (still do), when science especially physics and QM knowledge get mature and deepen to the limits culminating its level of knowledge in the domain, that would be a kind of views on the world and universe, rather than being absolutely certain about them. There are lot of points in your post to go over, mull over, reading up, and return for further discussions. Thank you for the great post. Welcome to TPF. :pray: :cool:
Him and hundreds of other people before him.
What does it mean to say that models are wrong? Wrong in relation to what? If a model is useless it is useless, which means it doesn't accord with experience. Newtonian mechanics is useful, albeit not quite as useful as Einsteinian mechanics in some contexts.
We don't know whether either of them are right, in the sense of true, or even what it could mean for them to be right beyond observations showing that the predictions that are entailed by them obtain.
It is simply the tired metaphorical dichotomy of map and territory. The territory is not the map, so it is "wrong", but some maps are better at guiding you around the territory than others.
Surely some Ancient Greek wrote something along those lines, and surely some Mesopotamian 2000 years before that said something along those lines too.
Some nations have relevance mania and need to make one or two things every one of their intellectuals said into a quote, an idea, a thought, a "law", a piece of content — a meme —, even if it is not interesting or true or original at all, so that they pretend more national merit than it is due. Think of how some Hindutvas claim that Indians invented most things in the world, but now imagine that with more cunning memetic tactics.
Welcome. Yes, it is. :)
"The logical ground for belief in the existence of the world can be approached from various philosophical perspectives, each offering different arguments and justifications. Here are a few key approaches:
1. **Empirical Realism**: Empirical realism is the view that the external world exists independently of our perceptions and experiences of it. This position is based on the idea that our senses provide us with reliable information about the world, and that we can trust our sensory experiences as a basis for forming beliefs about reality. From this perspective, the existence of the world is grounded in the evidence provided by our senses and the consistency of our observations across different perceptual experiences.
2. **Metaphysical Realism**: Metaphysical realism holds that the external world exists objectively, regardless of our perceptions or beliefs about it. This position is based on the idea that there is a mind-independent reality that exists independently of human consciousness. Metaphysical realists argue that the world has an intrinsic nature and existence that is not contingent upon our subjective experiences or interpretations of it.
3. **Inference to the Best Explanation**: Some philosophers argue for the existence of the world based on the principle of inference to the best explanation. According to this principle, we should believe in the existence of the world because it provides the best explanation for our experiences and observations. The existence of the world is posited as the simplest and most coherent explanation for the diversity and regularity of our sensory experiences.
4. **Pragmatic Justification**: Pragmatic approaches to belief in the existence of the world emphasize the practical consequences of adopting such a belief. From a pragmatic perspective, belief in the existence of the world is justified because it is necessary for successful navigation of our environment, interaction with others, and attainment of our goals and desires. Belief in the existence of the world is seen as a useful and necessary assumption for engaging effectively with our surroundings.
These approaches provide different justifications for believing in the existence of the world, ranging from appeals to sensory experience and empirical evidence to arguments based on metaphysical realism and pragmatic considerations. While each approach has its strengths and weaknesses, belief in the existence of the world is generally regarded as a foundational assumption of human cognition and inquiry, underlying our understanding of the natural world and our place within it."
I wonder if these views provide the solid enough grounds for the beliefs, or do they have some logical flaws in their views.
Now after some reflection, this argument appears to have a weakpoint that is what it means for ideas to have an "origin". By origin it would mean how the contents of my mind come to be, their cause that is. If I take a snapshot of my mind at a given moment, I cannot establish what the causes of {the ideas there} are without looking at a past snapshot, but then, the classic Humean question: what is the necessary connection between the idea at time t and at time t-1? Why can I trace the thought "I am hungry" to the subjective experience of hunger, but I can't trace the perception of a laptop to the experience of hunger, beyond a mere regularity?
I wasn't expecting that.
Quoting Gary Venter
Never heard of it.
Quoting Gary Venter
Hardly an original idea.
Is Santa Clause real? Is God real?
1. It was a question about if the existence of God and Santa are real. Not the ideas.
2. Does it make sense to say that for us to be able to imagine and understand it, it has to be real?
3. Does the world care if we can or cannot imagine or understand it?
Philosophy has become a classifying system for concepts and lines of reasoning, and all the branches the definitions and arguments could take. For instance there must be at least 20 types of panpsychism by now. New research, such as PhD dissertations, consists of following a line as far as it can go and then extending it in some way, probably by further splitting the track. Philosophy ends up having the same organizational structure as a book of chess openings.
ChatGPT has adopted the philosophical approach. Everything seems factual and devoid of evaluation, at least until the conclusion that "belief in the existence of the world is generally regarded as a foundational assumption of human cognition and inquiry, underlying our understanding of the natural world and our place within it," for which no support is provided.
Do you think the statement is lacking in support? I would think randomly polling people on the question would show general agreement with ChatGPT.
At the very least, it's fairly easy to prove that *most philosophers* are realists about the world
https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/all
Accept or lean towards non-skeptical realism
79.54%
That may not satisfy the full sentence in question, but it's at least a start towards it.
Some physicists are now saying that physics does not support the existence of the quantum world, which the classical physical world is made of. All it does, and all we need it to do, is predict our observations.
I expect that most people would agree that acting like the physical world is real would would work well in practice.
I personally take a skeptical viewpoint that there is no reason to accept any theories about the reality of anything, including the reality of the quantum world and everything built from it. Still there are appealing theories about quantum reality, all worth entertaining.
This are real delusions.
Interesting point. :ok:
Quoting Gary Venter
ChatGPT seems to be ok for getting quick summarised info on the topics. But it is not for anything more detailed, deeper or serious source of info. What portion of the info from ChatGPT and all the online based description source would be reliable and objective knowledge in terms of the factual and verified truths is another matter.
The post was just asking you for clarification on your claims, which sounded confused and muddled. How can "asking for clarification" be delusions?
https://chat.openai.com/share/a3c86a67-ff27-4ec9-8ffa-ebc8fb95e01c
https://chat.openai.com/share/96378835-0a94-43ce-a25b-f05e5646ec40
https://chat.openai.com/share/b5241b53-e4d8-4cab-9a81-87fa73d740ad
https://chat.openai.com/share/f924090e-a7eb-4b67-9e62-389db1f6c87b
https://chat.openai.com/share/025521ed-ac2b-4156-bd15-e74053f66cba
https://chatgpt.com/share/239b3d25-6ec1-4268-af0b-609a47c25d2c
Philosophers often seem to quibble about definitions, when the definitions are unclear for the arguments. :nerd: But shouldn't the AI Knowledge Expert System be able to present with the correct definitions at the press of the button instead of quibbling about them? :D
Presenting someone with a correct definition will look like quibbling to a person who is using the word a different way. It's not like the AI described itself as quibbling -- don't forget the principle of untrustworthy narrator.
Sure, it can be done.
"That world is there before all belief." (Heidegger, Prolegomenon, GA20, p.295)
It's a funny metaphor in a way, because ordinarily we can know both map and territory.
Quoting SEP's platonism
If an SEP article about an unrelated topic seems to bring up skepticism about the outside world as an unproblematic analogy, it is unlikely that laymen would be justified in seeing realism as self-evident.
Relevant for the discussion surrounding solipsism and action:
Quoting SEP's Descartes' Epistemology