Must Philosophy instruct science?
I agree that philosophy has to take into account the empirical evidence discovered by science, however the scientific theories used to account for the empirical evidence must necessarily require the instruction of philosophy. For example, a theory as absurd as the Big Bang - which claims an absolute beginning to the Universe is problematic. Logically speaking, this very theory requires the existence of a multiverse, or at least of a cyclic nature to this single universe. An absolute beginning to existence as such makes absolutely no sense, and it is a monstrous absurdity. It would require either the existence of an interventionist God or a beginning with absolutely no reason, both of which are unimaginable stupidities. Physicists mistaking physical time with chronological time is also absurd. Imagine a space with only two particles, which nevertheless have consciousness, in them. There is no way in such a space for either particle to measure time, as it would require at least an additional particle which can act as the clock. But does it follow that time doesn't exist? Of course it wouldn't! It would still be possible to say that "some time ago the particles were closer to each other" and "now the particles are farther from each other". In other words, there would still necessarily be a chronological time even when no physical time exists. In fact, any world without chronological time is absolutely unimaginable, and therefore absurd and impossible.
Hence, it is clear that the universe (or replace this with whatever word accounts for all existence) must be eternal and cyclic. What do you think the relationship of philosophy and science should be?
Hence, it is clear that the universe (or replace this with whatever word accounts for all existence) must be eternal and cyclic. What do you think the relationship of philosophy and science should be?
Comments (37)
No, but I'm saying the Big Bang should a priori be excluded as a model. It is absurd to say that existence itself has a beginning.
No you should only reject models which imply that existence itself has a beginning. As far as I am aware, the Big Bang model as traditionally understood does imply a beginning to the Universe, which is traditionally thought to be the equivalent of all that exists.
A better way to phrase it would be, which is scientifically thought to be the equivalent of all that exists. Which is only to say, the Universe is the limit to our scientific observation. We cannot comment about existence outside our Universe with science because it is currently not accessible to observation or empirical measurement so is outside the domain of science. Other traditions might have their own interpretations of the Big Bang and what we can say beyond our Universe, but we should be concerned with and only with the scientific view here.
Good - then it follows that the scientist should not believe that the limits of scientific observation is equivalent with the limits of the world. In other words, a priori and metaphysical investigation can reveal something more from the structure of the world.
This doesn't follow at all. It introduces a term not mentioned previously, in particular I'm not sure where the normative declaration "should" is coming from.
It is true that the question of whether the universe has a beginning is philosophically problematic, indeed still a subject of debate:
New Scientist Why Physics Can't Avoid a Creation Event.
11 January 2012, Lisa Grossman
So it's interesting that Hawkings will shy away from theories which imply a beginning, in much the same way that science generally shys away from suggestions of cosmological 'fine-tuning': uncomfortably close to natural theology. SO the question is, will scientists even give such ideas a fair hearing? Or will they refuse to contemplate them as a matter of principle? And, would such refusal be scientific?
I think the problem is that they are giving such ideas a more than fair hearing. In my opinion, the Big Bang should be a priori ruled out. A beginning of existence makes absolutely no sense, and is just as irrational as the existence of square circles.
2. The story of how the Big Bang theory was published and gained acceptance is worth reading in it's own right. It was the work of a Belgian Catholic priest and physicist, Georges Lemaître, who published his theory in an obscure journal, in which he referred to the concept as 'the primeval atom' or 'cosmic egg'. And, as it happens, the notion of a 'cosmic egg' or 'bindu' (point) is also a creation mythology that is found in the Vedic religions (indeed the point between the brows of pious hindus is called a bindu.)
I have always found the big bang idea quite a mystical notion. The idea that the vast Universe could sping into existence from a single point in a single instant, seems awfully close in meaning to creation ex nihilo. So much so, that the idea was vigorously resisted by many scientists on a priori grounds for decades after it was published. And indeed the Catholic Church declared the Big Bang theory quite compatible with its own doctrines:
Admirable stance, in my view.
3. I notice there are suggestions that the Big Bang was really a Big Bang - that it might actually have been one of a sequence of such 'events'. I must say, from the viewpoint of 'natural philosophy', that would appeal to me, not least because like everything else in nature, it is cyclical. Again, the myth that this most resembles is that of the 'eternal return', as explicated by Mircea Eliade in his book of that name.
But as I say, I'm always open to the possibility that there's a lot about this stuff that I don't get. The ideas involved are mind-boggling and need to be handled with some diffidence, I would suggest.
This is pure nonsense. The limits of science can be freely admitted without having to appeal to superstition to fill a supposed void.
The notion of science as distinct from philosophy hails from around the 1830's - according to Walter Isaacson's recent history of technology, The Innovators, the term 'scientist' was coined to describe the learned company that gathered in the salon of Charles Babbage, the forefather of the computer, to discuss the latest ideas. Prior to this time - in the writings of Newton for example - what we now call 'science' was routinely described as 'philosophy'. I think the perceived division between the two, was very much a consequence of movements such as positivism, and also the 'essential conflict between science and religion thesis' of scientists such as Tyndall.
Please explain to me how the idea of a beginning to existence is any bit less absurd than the idea of square circles. Because by the "Big Bang", I am referring to whatever theory claims a beginning to existence. If existence had a beginning, it follows that it must have a reason why it began when it began and not sooner or later. But such a reason is incoherent. Therefore existence could not have a beginning. Neither could chronological time go infinitely back, because if it did, we would never get to the present. Therefore existence must be eternal, and cyclical.
I do understand from my sketchy amateur physics, that physicists can 'see' back until this minute fraction of a second after the 'singularity'. (All the facts about this kind of research are mind-boggling, mind you, for instance the divisions of time they're discussing are in the trillonths of seconds.) There is a vast amount of observational evidence for this event, but even so, there is an absolute barrier which prevents any kind of analysis of 'moment zero'. It is literally beyond science, possibly forever. (Any physicist here please correct me if I'm mistaken.)
Hence the difference between chronological time (which philosophers talk about) and physical time (which physicists claim began to exist at the Big Bang)
[i]This might be an unpopular opinion, and if you disagree I would love to hear your arguments. But honestly, many philosophers need to stop being so obsequious to scientists. I don't think scientists need philosophers to get by. I love philosophy as much as anyone else here, but I can't help but cringe when philosophers feel the need to justify their field or force it into a field. (Ornithologist-bird analogy). Scientists aren't worried about those questions.
People who say philosophy is worthless are philistines. Philosophy is great in coming up with interesting questions, but bad at answering them, which isn't a stab at philosophy, it's just the nature of the questions (as far as we know). They are outside the realm of empirical observation. But it needs to keep up to date with contemporary science, in case science happens to burst into the bubble of philosophy unexpectedly. But contemporary science doesn't necessary have to keep up with philosophy because science will keep plugging and chugging regardless.
The scientific method is a well-established method of obtaining data even if the operator is incompetent in analyzing it. But philosophy requires someone to have the cognitive capabilities to be able to analyze data like that and make interesting conclusions about it. And possibly this is a counterargument to my argument, that fields like theoretical physics rely on data to make theories, just like...philosophy?
But sometimes I often wonder if one day much of philosophy will become irrelevant, or a product of the past, kicked in the dust by the verifiable and reliable scientific method, which seems to be what is happening here.
(EDIT:)
I think philosophy has the potential to be applied, but I'm not sure if it has the potential to find "truth" (which is a metaphilosophical question itself). Can any system of inquiry find "truth", other than the Heideggerian way of knowing "how" to do something, like a blacksmith knows how to melt steel? But anyway, back to the point, political and ethical philosophy are definitely some examples of how philosophy has been applied. Just look at the Cold War, an ideological conflict. But in these cases, these people don't know that they are right, they just are very self-assured that they are right and feel concerns around them motivating them to act upon this assurance.
This is the problem with consulting someone who is an expert in philosophy, other than being able to explain the subject: there is no consensus on things.
Now, both a scientific and a philosophical theory have a potential to be disproven, the former by evidence and the latter by rational argument (or evidence as well I suppose). The issue is that in science, the data is collected, evidence presented, theories stacked against each other until we come to a consensus. This may take decades. But it happens. Often. With great success. You can go to Biologist A for an explanation of Darwinian Evolution and you will get the same explanation if you go to Biologist B.
But in philosophy, like I described above, there is no "philosophical method" that everybody follows and will get the same results. Theories abound and nobody ever seems to come together to a consensus. So how on earth can someone go to a philosopher for advice? Going to Philosopher A for an explanation for the problem of universals in metaphysics will give you one of many realist explanations, while going to Philosopher B will give you one of many nominalist explanations.
I can't understand how philosophers say they are needed in the process of science when science requires consensus on matters that philosophers cannot decide upon. This isn't a jab at philosophers or philosophy itself, but merely shows the limitations of the field.
I honestly think philosophers should not go into research wondering how it can be applied to the real world; to do this is the limit the scope of the field and make it philistine. I think philosophy should be something that is pursued for the sake of our own curiosity, not because it can yield results. But sometimes I find this answer to be lacking. :\
(EDIT 2):
I think I might have committed a self-defeating argument here, because theoretically if everyone agrees with me in my argument above, then technically philosophy has progressed. whoops. Maybe it's just very, very rare for it to progress.[/i]
, credit goes to you for the inspiration for the term "philistine".
I have a super computer working on whether that was a compliment or an insult. No results yet.
Db, I think it must be admitted that there will always be aspects of human behavior which cannot be understood in scientistically reductive terms. This is because human decisions, desires, actions and so on are only intelligible to us in culturally and linguistically mediated terms that cannot be translated into physical terms. As I said in the other thread this is just another example of how, in general, 'higher level' subjects like geology, biology, animal behavior and so on cannot be reduced to 'lower level' descriptions without loss of information. There is no mystery in this; it does not point us to anything supernatural. The supernatural is itself unintelligible on every level, and so is philosophically useless.
(Not saying that you are promoting the supernatural, of course, this is merely to defuse what I see as a common polemic against the naturalism of science, and against, of course, supposedly science-instigated philosophical naturalism. For me, the dichotomy 'human/natural', and the attendant dichotomy 'higher/ lower' are aberrant (and abhorrent) philosophical malformations).
I can see this is an apposite time for one of my favourite quotes, namely, the passage by Thomas Nagel, in his essay Evolutionary Naturalism and the Fear of Religion, where he says:
Quoting John
Which is exactly what I am referring to by chronological time.
This only applies to physical time. Don't forget that for physicists time is that which you can measure by a clock; in this case an atomic clock. If you can't measure it, there's no time for them.
Likewise, with the 'big bang', even though imaginatively, it appears to be a vast explosion, actually I'm sure that can't be correct at all, because 'an explosion' is something that occurs relative to other objects. But as all space, time and matter are contained within that event, then the event itself is not really an 'explosion' or even a 'big bang'. They're simply analogies.
I don't think you know what you're saying. This would be the case if space is finite and geometrically "spherical". So likewise it would be the case for time: it would have to be cyclical, and then it would have no beginning and no end.
I don't think so. Chronological time is clock time as measured, not lived or phenomenological time. The idea that chronological time exists beyond the measuring of it, is just that; an idea.
Phenomenological time begins with the advent of sentient beings and ends with their extinction. Phenomenal time is physical time; the unfolding of physical process. It began with the Big Bang and will end with the Heat Death or maybe the Big Crunch. There may be many separate Big Bangs and Heat Deaths or Big Crunches. There would seem to be no conceivable way to relate separate instances of phenomenal time to each other either intra-universally or inter-universally.
Then if that's clock time, what is physical time?
As I said, it is phenomenal time (process) which incorporates phenomenological time (experience). Of course, as Hegel noted with his 'inverted world' this can be conceptually inverted to make it look as though phenomenological time incorporates phenomenal time.
Either way, it's all just perspectives...
Besides which, and in a more philosophical vein, one of the original meanings of 'logos' was precisely the 'order of things'. Hence the suffix -logy for the various divisions of knowledge. Reason itself was intimately connected to perceiving the 'ratio of things' as discerned by Pythagoras (although he probably learned it from Egypt). So the roots of Western philosophy are in that very sense of a cosmic order; but now that has been rejected on the grounds that it seems too close to 'theistic'. You note a real hostility on these forums to any such idea; which culminates in nihilism, subjectivism or relativism. So it's your ego talking about being scared, because from a Darwinian perspective, it is primed to proliferate, and anything that appears to undermine that is a threat.
You really ought to see if you can get hold of the essay I mentioned, Darwinian Naturalism and the Fear of Religion by Thomas Nagel, it has a very cogent discussion of these ideas.