Post-intelligent design
https://www.theguardian.com/science/2017/feb/12/daniel-dennett-politics-bacteria-bach-back-dawkins-trump-interview
Dennett in his latest book argues that we are heading into a world of post-intelligent design. For a long while we have had top-down human intentional design that could be understood and comprehended by one person. More and more, we are seeing bottom-up design in the form of genetic algorithms, deep learning et al.
Is having complete knowledge important? Or could humanity survive by existing within the dark without having to know the behind the scenes extras? If this happens what would a post-intelligent design world look like?
Dennett in his latest book argues that we are heading into a world of post-intelligent design. For a long while we have had top-down human intentional design that could be understood and comprehended by one person. More and more, we are seeing bottom-up design in the form of genetic algorithms, deep learning et al.
Is having complete knowledge important? Or could humanity survive by existing within the dark without having to know the behind the scenes extras? If this happens what would a post-intelligent design world look like?
Comments (197)
Humanity's survival is off the point, I think the proper question would be: "Could individuals thrive without understanding that which would enable them to do so?", in which case I would argue they couldn't because they would no longer hold the mastery needed to advance themselves.
I think Dennet makes a point. We can use machines, technologies and treatments and the whole panoply of what science and technology has given us and then have people thinking that the science is "fake", bogus or a political view.
Dennet (from the above interview)
If it would serve some political agenda or discourse to dispute let's say Einstein's relativity, then that dispute would rapidly spread in todays media getting strong support from those that believe in the political agenda behind it. The argument would be that it's something "unresolved" or biased. Scientists are just stooges in a huge conspiracy with evil intensions, if they talk that relativity is real. That would be the dismal and ugly way it would go.
8-)
It's about time. I don't see it as a regression, we've been under an ossified paradigm of official narrative, pundit consensus, and pluralistic ignorance for far too long. There's a growing awareness of the "treason of the clerks" which is forcing people to confront the fact that we never found and were never on epistemic terra firma in the first place.
I keep forgetting we don't have a "like" button here--I went to hit it for your comment.
All of the reviews note that Dennett is a very erudite guy - also a good enough jazz pianist to make a living from it before he became tenured - and obviously brilliant. But they all reject, or at least deeply question, the fundamental tenet of his life's work:
Turning it around - the problem Dennett has to explain away is the reality of first-person experience. If he can't explain it away, then materialism is false.
I find it an easy dilemma to resolve.
Quoting ssu
What Dennett cannot afford to admit is that the 'truth and facts' of which he speaks must always be of the kind that are amenable to quantitative analysis and measurement; and that, therefore, most or all of what is of value in the study of the humanities is excluded by these criteria, because of the 'fact/value' or 'is/ought' dichotomy, first articulated by David Hume. Dennett's work, again, relies on the ability to explain values - such as judgements of meaning - in terms of facts - such as the measurement of neurochemical transactions across synapses. If indeed the former is not reducible to the latter, then his project fails.
Is it an example of "post-intelligent design"?
I'd say intelligence is a condition for any design (aleatoric design even).
Yeah, some degree, I guess.
I think Dennett is exaggerating in saying that in the past the best minds could understand almost everything. Perhaps it might have been true regarding the sciences, but not also literature, the arts, history, philosophy, metaphysics, languages, and so on. And even if a very few of the very best minds could understand "almost everything"; what import could that have for the rest of 'ignorant' humanity?
I n any case, the notion that they would have understood everything relies on the premise that the science they understood was correct.
Even if it were possible,why would it be so important that everyone (or some people?, or most people?) should understand the currently accepted mechanical principles behind how everything works, as opposed to understanding how to do their jobs? This seems like some form of scientism, I would say.
What is the actual, practical difference between some very few exceptional individuals understanding how everything works and no one individual at all understanding how everything works, even within any given science?
There's no way that anyone understands everything in any field of consequence. That's certainly been true in Information Technology for a long time, even without genetic algorithms and deep learning. The field is constantly expanding, and nobody has the time to learn everything.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IZefk4gzQt4
Quoting Noblosh
Yep, individuals would become overly reliant on AI. So it would look similar to communism (or the closest thing to equal skill-set) with everyone having equal talents assuming all of the AI is of the same software.
Quoting Wayfarer
Dennett's views on consciousness are odd and border on the metaphysical. From what I get, his view is that consciousness reduces to its job and its functional role within the brain (teleofunctionalism). It models the brain data so the body can known what to respond to. But how does the model make itself known? Is there a secondary model? And why do abstract functional roles have a phenomenal first person pov?
His own theory falls into his homunclus fallacy he is always throwing around. But I made this thread mainly to discuss the black box science stuff. With this said, his theory of consciousness does relate and connect to this. See my reply to John below...
Quoting John
This is a good point so this is why I was asking. Dennett seems to think this is a use it or lose it scenario. That we will plunge back to the 19th century since eventually no one will understand anything. His solution is that we train the AIs to model themselves and so be able to tell us what will happen. However this (Dennett believes) will make the machines conscious and so they will need human rights which will overly complicate everything. Dennett thinks creating conscious machines is bad and so we need alternate solutions.
AI doesn't serve humanity, AI is a toolset. Not to mention an utopia is irrealizable...
I agree, and I was really asking what would be the difference even if they did.
Yes, but I don't see any reason to believe that we will create machines that will become conscious.
Intelligence. I read a story yesterday that Jeff Bezos believes that computers will very soon understand the whole of Wikipedia
Ray Kurzweil has been saying something similar for years.
But despite the fact that all these guys are billionaires, and I'm just a low-level offfice worker, I still say they're wrong, on the grounds that intelligence and information processing are fundamentally different some basic way. When you ask 'in what way' the answer is 'in just the way that all Daniel Dennett's books manage to ignore (and note that his book Consciousness Explained was dubbed 'Consciousness Ignored' by several philosophers.)
Anyway, what's involved in seeing through materialism is a true gestalt shift, a radically different way of construing the nature of experience and therefore reality. All materialists are obliged to defend that there is an ultimate material or physical entity. In Dennett's views those are organic molecules:
To which Richard Dawkins cheerily adds:
Frankly it amazes me that apparently clever people can believe such things. I think it is something like a botnet attack - there is a materialist meme, rather like mental malware, and when it finds literate minds devoid of any spiritual intuition then it infests them and attempts to replicate through the Internet. It's scarily efficient although not so hard to see through if you can change your wavelength.
So he's right about 'hyper-fragility', but this isn't something new or novel - this has literally been the condition of the Earth since the beginning of it's existence.
The difference would be one of dependence or independence. Dependence enhances social control. Artificial intelligence can be controlled, natural intelligence cannot.
Of course it is.
A prescient warning is contained in this observation.
Information control is mind control. To what extent is information being controlled on your social networks?
I don't see how. Intelligence is a measure of memory, knowledge, and controlled/automatic processing capacity.
Nothing to see here. Move along.
Nope. Don't accept that.
1) Cattell-Horn-Carroll Theory, Cross-Battery Approach (Flanagan, Ortiz, & Alfonso, 2007).
2) Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (WAIS-IV) (Kaufman & Lichtenberger, 2006).
But what do you think about intelligence? There's some interesting thoughts about it in this thread, for instance:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/1448/intelligence#Item_12
The etymology of the word 'intelligence' is interesting and worth contemplating.
In any case, I maintain that intelligence has a qualitative aspect that will always defy measurement. There are people who are profoundly intelligent in some ways, and completely inept in others, like some artistic geniuses, or 'idiot savants'. I'm not say that to muddy the waters, but to argue the case that I believe 'intelligence' is in some sense always prior to any attempt to measurement, definition or specification. Even to say what it is, we have to specify what we mean by the word, which is what IQ testing does. And such tests might be quite effective, along some pre-decided criteria. But the general nature of intelligence will always be, I maintain, something that is beyond definition.
In any case, we agree that the social sciences and humanities do not reduce to neuroscience, physiology, biology, chemistry, or physics.
Now if we pause for a minute and think about non-symbolic intelligence - such as that of animals - then I don't know if they ever grasp that notion of '='. Their intelligence (or cognitive ability) seems to me to operate in terms of stimulus and response. So in one sense, they will know that 'fire means danger', but I don't think they could go the extra step and say that 'anything dangerous has "danger" in common with "fire".' So I don't know if an animal intelligence grasps the sense of meaning or equivalence, that is represented in the commonplace symbol "=".
It is that background ability to assess and equate and impute meaning - to say that 'this means that', that 'because of this, then that must be', that strikes me as being foundational to the operations of rational intelligence.
And then, 'rational' is derived from 'ratio', which again, is the ability to grasp proportion - to say that X is to Y, what A is to B, even if X, Y, A and B, are all different things. Which is related to the etymology of intelligence, which ultimately comes from 'inte-legere', meaning 'to read between', as in 'reading between the lines', or, maybe, 'seeing what something means'.
Now, as we have that ability, then we can create devices, such as computers, to execute enormous numbers of such judgements in blinding speed. In the same article that I quoted earlier, it was noted that Microsoft said the power of its Azure cloud platform was such that it could translate the entire contents of Wikipedia from English to another language, in .1 of a second. But regardless, computers are ultimately the instruments of human intelligence; and I am still dubious that they will ever know what all (or any) of that information means.
I would re-phrase it thus: reasoning (along with many other cognitive and intuitive functions) is a component of verbal modelling (which is the processing component of intelligence).
Animals sense, interpret, and nonverbally model their environment, whereas; human verbal modelling provides an infinite capacity for description. For those who like to think that animals possess a language faculty (hence, modelling capacity) similar to that possessed by human beings, all I can say is: they communicate by means of physical signals, but what do they manufacture?
So what is the agenda behind attempts to equate animal nonverbal modelling with human verbal modelling? Could it be to justify animal-like behaviour on the part of human beings?
This presupposes that AI is being developed to "know what all that information means". I think we need to go back to Noblosh's comment and ask who is developing AI, and for what purpose?
I think that explains a lot of evolutionary-style thinking. Not that I'm for one minute aligned to any form of ID or creationism, but I'm very much aware of 'biological reductionism' or biologism. And I think it does 'give you something to live down to', i.e. it conveys that we're really just animals. What is that saying, 'the tyranny of low expectations'?
From the Wikipedia entry on the philosophy of Michel Henry:
The fact that persons promoting these ideologies are looked upon as guides or 'public intellectuals' is both ironic and exasperating. But then, I suppose in a world where a man like Trump can be elected President, such degeneracy is only to be expected.
As if there would exist many kinds of possible knowledge... :-}
Science is the latin name for knowledge. What makes a belief possible as knowledge is whether it is justified (as in testable) and true. There can be no other kinds of possible knowledge than the justifiable and true kind.
But there are many ideologies that exploit current unknowns of the world, or attack scientific method for whatever insufficiencies it may have, as the means to market alternative unjustifiable beliefs.
Why do people keep repeating the same mistakes here? Not all materialism is eliminative materialism. Some materialism doesn't at all reject subjective experience. It just claims that subjective experience is what particular material, in particular relations, undergoing particular processes, is like--that is, it's simply the properties of that material in those relations undergoing those processes, from the reference frame of being the material in question.
Materialism is an interpretive paradigm - a model. It is quite consistent with the overall tradition of Western philosophy insofar as it is a tyoe of 'appearance vs reality' model: that what we take to be intentions, minds, and ideas are appearance only and that the reality is material organisms, atoms and forces. Mind is a product or output of matter that, in Dennett's model, is essentially self-organising, first due to physical laws and due to what he describes in terms of 'the genetic algorithm' (in Darwin's Dangerous Idea.)
There are different schools of materialism, or tendencies - Darwinian, Marxist, scientific, historical - but it's a recognizable trend throughout history. And for many people it is a natural and obvious attitude to take.
So what about that particular matter, in particular relations, undergoing particular processes? Even if we assume that this is the cause of subjective experience, rather than caused by subjective experience, we still need to explain the existence of all these peculiar particulars. Of course it cannot be random chance which causes all this, so now we must assume a cause of all these particulars, and the effect is subjective experience. That multitude of particulars, therefore, is just a distraction.
This is incorrect. Some materialists may very well see it as an appearance versus reality issue, but that's not necessary for it to be materialism, and certainly not all materialists see it that way.
It's not an issue of causality, but identity.
And that is an unsupported assertion. What are examples of materialism that are not interpretive paradigms?
How could you have read my response above and thought that what I was disagreeing with was the phrase "interpretive paradigm"?
LOL. I'd say that ship has already sailed.
To identify subjective experience as material is false identity.
Obviously I don't agree with that.
Well, to the extent I know, we are in the dark or is it that I'm not fully abreast of mankind's ''progress''? Whatever the case may be the question is moot precisely because we don't know whether all this knowledge is good for us (or not). For example take knowledge of nuclear energy - it is now possible to end ALL of civilization in say 30 minutes?? Perhaps we need the ever elusive *wisdom* that philosophers so energetically speak. But that's getting ahead of ourselves - the first question is ''are humans even capable of finding such wisdom?"
Quoting JupiterJess
Well, what of the rest of the living world? They seem to be doing fine without the kind of knowledge humans are in possession of. Why should we be any different?
You may not agree, but it's still obviously a case of mistaken identity. So you were wrong whether you admit to it or not. No matter how many particular materials you can identify, in whatever particular relations, involved in whatever particular processes, you have not identified subjective experience, so this is a false identity. "Subjective experience" refers to something which is common to many different individuals, therefore it cannot be identified by referring to particulars.
This is a classic example of category error, and such error indicates mistaken identity. Here's another example. Suppose someone asks you "what is 'red'?". No matter how many particular instance of red you produce, to demonstrate "what is red", you do not answer the question "what is 'red'?" with such demonstrations. Likewise, no matter how many particular instances in which you demonstrate material involved in particular relations, and particular processes, your producing these instances of subjective experience as examples, does not answer the question of what is subjective experience.
Whereas in my view, it's obviously a case of mistaken cleavage on your part.
The identity also has nothing to do with our abilities to name anything, pick anything out, etc.
I also disagree with "subjective experience referes to something which is common (as in identical) to many different individuals." Nothing is common to many different individuals on my view. I'm a nominalist. Only particulars exist.
Then what is identity in your view?
Quoting Terrapin Station
So why is it that we say that many different individuals have subjective experience if different individuals cannot have anything in common? Is subjective experience something which only I have, or only you have, or neither of us have and someone else has, or no one has? If it is something that no one has, then this supports my claim of mistaken identity.
Quoting Terrapin Station
So, does "subjective experience" refer to something that a particular thing has, or is it just a nonsense notion to you? If it is a nonsense notion, then I think I am correct to say that your claim to be able to identify it, is a case of mistaken identity.
It's not like this is an idiosyncratic view. I'm referring to identity in the 2+2 is identical to 4 sense.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Because it's useful to think in "type" terms and language couldn't work without type terms. I'm not sure that you're clear that I'm simply denying that multiple people have a single, numerically identical subjective experience. They don't literally have a single unit that they somehow share. One person's subjective experience is different than another's. It's just like one person's nose is different than another's. They don't somehow share just one nose.
Very funny.
Well that's a standard way to refer to it. There are other ways, but I was trying to make it as simple as possible, as it seems weird to me that there's so much apparent confusion over such a common, simple idea.
There is a difference between equal and identical 2+2 is equal to four, but it is far from identical to four.
Quoting Terrapin Station
If "subjective experience" refers to a "type" of thing, then how can you identify it as particular material in particular relations? How can you not see this as category error?
Quoting Terrapin Station
So if a nose is a type of thing which many different animals have, how could you claim to identify a nose as particular material in particular relations? Wouldn't it be more correct to identify a nose as a part of an animal?
There's no difference on the conventional usage of "identical" in philosophy. But in your view, the difference is what?Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
And I'm just going to stop here for the moment, because this is going to be pointless if we can't even read. Did I say that it refers to a type of thing?
You said:
Quoting Terrapin Station
Don't you think that "type" refers to something?
Quoting Terrapin Station
You do philosophy without differentiating between identical and equivalent? The former is the same, unqualified, the latter is a qualified same. So one playing card is equivalent to another playing card, allowing us to count 52 cards in the deck, but no two cards are identical. I'm going to stop and wait for you to grasp this simple difference.
"Equals" and "equivalent" are identical in your view, and are both denoted by the "=" sign?
Quit the distraction, we're discussing identity, not equivalence.
You're deflecting from the fact that you just substituted "equivalence" for "equals."
Correct, "=" signifies "equals", or "is equivalent to", the two are synonymous. Do you have difficulty with the English language?
Back to my question. Do you not recognize the difference between "equals" (is equivalent to), and "is identical to"?
I don't agree with that re equals and equivalent. I agree with this: "Equal means two entities are the same entity; equivalent means that two entities have the same EFFECT, in some sense."
Your view is not a conventional view in philosophy, but I acknowledge that it's your view.
Your view is extremely bizarre. I've never heard "equal" used to signify that two entities are the same entity. That idea is simply contradictory. If they are two entities, then clearly they are not the same entity, and to say that two entities are one entity is contradictory. Your statement is contradictory.
To say that two instances of particular entities are equal is to say that they are the same in some respect. But this does not mean that they are the same in every respect, and that is what is necessary in order for us to say that two instances are instances of the same entity. So, "equal" implies distinct entities which are, according to certain criteria, the same. It does not imply that the two entities are the same entity.
Perhaps my view is not the conventional view in philosophy, but your view is not conventional in any sense, and it is simply absurd, as contradictory.
They do not reference the same entity though. 2+2 signifies two distinct entities each with the value of two. Those two distinct entities, with the value of two, when taken together (signified by +) have the same value as one entity with the value of four (4). 2+2 signifies two distinct entities added together, while 4 signifies one entity. 2+2 is equal to 4, it is not the same as 4. The two entities signified by 3 and 1 when added together also have the same value as 4.
Numerically the same? Or the two distinct numerical values?
Numerically identical means one and the same. Clearly 2+2 is distinct from 4, so they are not numerically identical. They are however equivalent, meaning that with respect to some quality (in this case a quantitative value), they are the same. Therefore 2+2 and 4 are qualitatively identical.
The accepted distinction, which I know of, is the distinction between numerical identity and qualitative identity. Numerical identity means the same, absolutely, referring to nothing other than the thing itself, the thing is identical to itself. Qualitative identity means the same in some particular way, so it refers to similarity.
I've never heard of "quantitatively identical", but I assume that what you mean by this is the same in reference to quantity. As I said already, this is a form of qualitatively identical. Having the same quantity is a qualitative identity, just like having the same colour, or having the same size, or being made of the same type of material. These are all similarities by which we can identify things, but it does not mean that the things which are classed in these groups are the same absolutely (numerically identical).
"2 + 2" and "4" are, usually, different ways of referring to 4. They have different senses, but the same reference. For mathematics and logic, the reference is what matters, so identity is identity of reference, hence we say "2 + 2 = 4." That they have different senses, explains why an equation can be informative. "2 + 2 = 4" does not express the same thought as "4 = 4." (That's Frege's take, and I don't have a really good reason to disagree with him.)
That's not true. "4" has its own reference, "2" has its own reference, and "+" also has its own reference. Therefore it is false to say that "2+2" and "4" have the same reference. They each mean completely different things, just like "7-3", and "2x2" mean something different, and refer to something different.
Sense is "meaning", reference is what is being "pointed at"
If "4" points at something, then so does "2". Clearly they point at something different.
Sure, "4" refers to 4, "2" refers to 2.
I think Frege construes 2 + 2 as a function. "2" has a sense, and refers to 2. "+" has a sense, but doesn't refer to an object. You can put them together to make a function you could call "... + 2," which also has a sense, composed of the senses of "+" and "2," but no reference because it's incomplete--there's a gap. By putting an object where the gap was, you can get "2 + 2," which has a complex sense, and now has a reference, which is the value of the function, namely 4.
Frege considers 4 a simple object. "4" is a name for 4 with a simple sense, but 4 also has infinitely many names with complex senses, but still the simple reference 4.
If "4" refers to something, and "2" refers to something different, then it is impossible that "2+2" refers to the same thing as "4".
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
It doesn't make sense to say that "2" and "4" refer to something, but "+" does not refer to anything. Each of these refers to an intelligible object, a concept, and therefore, in your terms, they have a sense. None of them refers to a physical object, and therefore they do not have referents according to this distinction, they only have senses.
So, either "2", "4", and "+", each refer to something, mathematical objects, or they all refer to nothing, and only have senses. It is inconsistent, and therefore illogical to say that one of them has a referent yet another does not.
Quoting Srap Tasmaner
I don't see how you can justify this claim that "4" has a reference unless you adopt Platonic realism, and allow for the existence of the mathematical object, the idea of 4. If this is the case, then also "2" refers to a different Platonic object, and "+" refers to a different Platonic object.
I'd be happy to try to explain what I understand of Frege's philosophy of mathematics, if you'd really like me to, but honestly Frege's writings are a way better source than I am. Some of this stuff I struggle with.
I had no intention of converting anyone or "winning an argument." I stopped by because you were talking about something there's prior art for. Just offering a way of thinking about this stuff that you might find helpful. If you don't, no harm no foul.
If you find these sorts of questions interesting, then you really ought to read Frege. (If, on the other hand, you find them an annoying waste of time that gets in the way of doing more interesting stuff, then probably not.)
You're maybe not "eager," but let's say "comfortable" concluding that if Joe and Pete both assert that 2 + 2 = 4, then there must be something similar about the states of their respective brains.
You seem to be missing the point Terrapin. I believe that Joe's subjective experience is similar to Pete's. And, according to this similarity, we can identify them both as having "subjective experience", through the principles of what is called qualitative identity. Likewise, we can say that "2+2" is similar to "4" through the principles of qualitative identity.
You on the other hand, have claimed that subjective experience is particular material involved in particular relations and particular processes. According to your claim, it is impossible that both Joe and Pete have subjective experience, because they each have different material in different relations and distinct processes. Joe and Pete are distinct.
Are you ready to dismiss this idea, that subjective experience is particular matter involved in particular relations, and particular processes, or have you figured out another way to justify the idea that both Pete and Joe are have subjective experience?
So you're not saying that Joe and Pete have subjective experience that's numerically identical.
What I don't get is why you have a "qualitative identity" that can't obtain via material.
I don't recall what you said about noses earlier. Do you believe that noses aren't "qualitatively identical" (I'm putting that phrase in quotation marks partially because I don't use it), or do you believe that there's something about noses that isn't material?
Say you have two distinct material entities. What's to say that they are similar except a mind making that judgement? You might say "they just are similar", but that's just you making an assertion. In reality they are distinct and therefore different.
Quoting Terrapin Station
No, noses clearly are qualitatively identical, that's why we can call each one a nose. The different noses are not numerically identical, by the very fact that they are different.
It's not that there is something about noses themselves, which isn't material, it's the fact that they can be readily identified by the same name "nose", which is immaterial. Since "nose" does not refer to one particular nose, there is no particular material which "nose" refers to. Therefore "nose" does not refer to any particular material thing. If it did refer to a material thing, it would refer to that particular material thing and nothing else. It does not, it can be used to refer to many different instances of material things. Therefore it is false to say that "nose" refers to a material thing.
It sounds to me like you're getting extremely confused by language/by how language works.
At any rate, so things that are material can be qualitatively identical in your view.
Also, similarity is simply things being relatively more alike than different in some respect. That's an objective quality.
Of course material things can be qualitatively identical, it's the identity which is immaterial, not the thing itself. That's the difference between numerical identity and qualitative identity. With numerical identity, the identity is nothing other than the thing itself. With qualitative identity, the identity is necessarily something other than the thing itself, because numerous things have the same identity.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Whether the quality is said to be subjective or objective is irrelevant. It still requires a mind to make the comparison, and determination, that two distinct things are objectively similar, classifying them together, giving them the same name (qualitative identity). The identity which the thing has, in the case of the qualitative identity, is a property of the mind which assigns that identity.
Right, so you can't object that consciousness can't be material because if so, it can't be "qualitatively identical."
(Again, not that I agree with the notion of "qualitative identity" as you're presenting it. I'm just stating the above under the umbrella of your views.)
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Which makes whether it's subjective or objective hardly irrevelant. If it requires a mind it's subjective. Per my usage, that's the definition of subjective.
What I objected to is you saying that consciousness is particular material, involved in particular relations, and particular processes. Such particularity denies the possibility of qualitative identity.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Then I will conclude that per your usage, all such similarities are subjective. There is no such thing as an objective similarity, because the fact that two things are similar, not the same thing. implies that they are different. Only a mind can say that they are similar, and therefore if we adhere to your usage, you produce inconsistency with your claim that there are objective qualities. There is no such thing as objective qualities if we adhere to your usage.
So you believe that noses are not particular material, in particular relations, undergoing particular processes?
That's right, "nose" is defined as "an organ above the mouth...". To define "nose" as "particular material, in particular relations, undergoing particular processes" is kind of ridiculous don't you think?
Why would we suddenly be talking about definitions per se?
We are talking about "what" something is. I am just demonstrating how ridiculous your description of subjective experience, or noses, or whatever, as particular material, in particular relations undergoing particular processes, is.
Right, that's ontology. So why would you bring up definitions all of a sudden and whether something would make a good definition? We're supposed to be doing ontology. We're not pretending that we're writing a dictionary.
Do you believe that noses are material?
Noses are partially composed of material, but material does not make up the relationships, nor the processes which that material is involved in. These are immaterial. So a nose is both material and immaterial.
Insofar as they're composed of material, it's not particular material, in your view? Is it some sort of general material?
Actually, I don't believe there is such a thing as particular material. I think "matter" is purely conceptual, and therefore by nature, a universal, general. It is a concept initiated by Aristotle in an effort to account for the observed continuity of temporal existence.
So to answer your question, since all physical objects are changing with each passing moment of time, exchanging material with their environment, it is impossible that any object, noses included, could consist of particular material. We would have to be able to stop time at a particular moment, and say that the nose consists of this particular matter, at this particular time, in order to conclude that such an object is composed of particular matter. Since it is impossible to stop time, time keeps passing with each moment, and the material keeps changing with each moment, it is impossible that such an object is composed of particular matter.
Do you believe there are any particulars?
Yes, there are particular forms. But if a particular form is given to matter, the temporal nature of matter denies the possibility that this form could maintain its existence as a particular. In other words particulars exist prior to the passing of time, and as time passes each particular form loses that status of being particular through its commingling with other forms. This commingling is what we call material existence, or temporal existence.
Particular forms? What sort of thing, ontologically, is a form in your view?
I don't know why you're mashing up "particular" and the idea of something permanent or static, by the way, but I'm trying to figure out your views one piece at a time. The more you type the crazier/more incoherent it seems to me, but in not at all convinced yet that you're not just having fun and staving off boredom.
A form is "what" a thing is. Let's say it's a quality.
But what sort of ontological item is it? An idea?
What do you mean what sort of ontological item? It is an ontological category itself. Ideas are commonly believed to be a type of form, but not all forms are ideas.
So you take "form" to be a kind of ontic simple then. That doesn't make much sense to me, but not much of your view does. Where do forms exist, exactly?
Forms do not have spatial existence, so your question doesn't make much sense to me. As I said, they are prior to the passing of time, and spatial existence refers to what is now, as time is passing. So they are in the future, always prior to now. You do realize that there is no spatial existence in the future don't you?
I can't make any sense of positing things that have no location or that are somehow "outside of time"
Consider a temporal model of the universe. All that we experience is at the present, so spatial existence, existence as we know it, is at the present. But the present is a very insignificant, tiny slice of the temporal existence of the universe, our model must allow for all that has been in the past, and all that will be in the future. Do you not agree that there must be something in the future?
When we speak about what will occur in the future, we speak about possibilities, because we can change things, and influence what will occur. So the location of a thing in the future is only a possible location because actions at the present may determine that things future location. If a thing has only possible locations, such as when we refer to the future location of a thing, then it is impossible that it has an actual location. Therefore future things have no actual location. But it still makes sense to talk about, and refer to future things, despite the fact that they have no location Can you make sense of that?
I don't agree that there's a past or future that exists and in which "there are things." Only the present exists. Only the changes that are currently happening exist.
But yeah, it defiitely makes sense to speak of the future. Anything that happens in the future will have a location, of course, once it happens. But it's not that the future exists and doesn't have a location. The future doesn't exist. It rather will exist.
If this were the case, that only the present exists, and only changes which are currently happening exist, then it would be the case that any random thing could be currently happening. The past and the future, having no real existence could not have any influence on what happens at the present, so absolutely anything could happen at any moment of the present.
But it is not the case that any random thing is currently happening, as is evident from our observations of a continuity of from the deep and distant past. Because of this observation of a continuity of existence in the past, we also assume a continuity into the future. This observed contiuity is why any reasonable ontology must allow that existence is composed of more than just the present.
That doesn't follow. The present IS a set of changes, a set of processes. That includes causal relationships.
Causal relations require a prior and posterior time, a before and after. There is no such before and after at the present unless they are past and future.
Time requires change, which can be a casual change, of course. If there's no change, there's no time.
Right, so if only the present is real, there is no time. Time requires before and after, future and past, as does change.
No. That's incoherent nonsense. The present is comprised of the changes that are happening.
If that's really what you believe, then I challenge you to describe a change which isn't one of the following three: all in the past, all in the future, or part in the past, and part in the future.
Any change would do. To have time, period, you have to have a change. Change is what time is. Changes that are happening are the present. The scope of that is simply relative to other changes.
You haven't addressed my challenge.
Just name any change--a clock moving from one state to another--say a digital clock changing numbers. I said any change counts.
OK, so my clock just changed from 9:31 to 9:32. How is 9:31 not in the past?
No, it's not the change, it's part of the change, the part that's in the past.
You don't have time if you don't have a change. So 9:31 isn't time. 9:31 changing to 9:32 is time.
Right, and that whole change is in the past now. I want an example of a change which has no part in the past or in the future. Otherwise we should agree that the past and future are just as real as the present.
The change (A) would be in the past relative to some other change (B), when relative to that other change (B), change (A) happened but is no longer happening.
Again, ANY change is an example of a present change. You could pick a mountain eroding to nothing.
I don't see where you pull this notion of "a present change" from. You've described (A) as in the past relative to (B), so I assume that (B) is in the future relative to (A). I assume that the temporal existence of all changes would be described in these terms, past and future, or before and after, relative to other changes. What validates "a present change"?
Quoting Terrapin Station
This is what you keep insisting, but you've given me no reason to believe that "a present change" even makes sense.
No, relative to any change, there can't exist changes that haven't happened yet, and relative to any change, there can't still exist changes that happened already (past changes existed, they no longer exist). Present changes are changes that are happening, Relative to either themselves or relative to other changes.
I don't want to say anything too cruel, but I'm not of the opinion that it would be my problem if it doesn't make sense to you.
So back to my question. If a change is happening right now, how is it possible that part of the change is not already in the past?
Part of the change isn't the change. You'd need to specify some other change.
You seem to be thinking of time as something other than specific, particular changes, but that's all that time is.
I'm not thinking of time in any particular way, I'm trying to understand how you're thinking of time, trying to make sense of it. I understand before and after, future and past. I also understand the present as a division between future and past. What I don't understand is how a change can occur at the present because the present is a simple division between future and past.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Are you saying that a change is indivisible? If a change is divisible, then part of the change will always be before the other part which will be after. If a change is divisible, it cannot be all at the present. Is this what you're trying to say, that a change is indivisible?
The present is changes that are happening. If there's no change, there's no present.
The past is changes that happened.
The future is changes that will happen.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yes. Relative to the change in question, any change is indivisible. It can be divisible relative to other changes. It's always relative to some specific change.
Think of it this way: How would a change be temporally divisible?
Don't you think that a change can be divided into parts, just like an object? Have you ever seen slow motion films of what appears without the slow motion, as a rapid change? When I see such slow motion films, like a drop of water landing in a pool of water, creating waves, it makes me think that what appeared to me as one change is really numerous changes.
So I think that just like we can divide an object into molecules, we can divide a change in the same way. Suppose an object hits a pane of glass, breaking it. That change takes a period of time, maybe a half a second. If we break that down into milliseconds, we might be able to observe the interaction of the molecules of the object, and the molecules of the glass. Each of these is itself "a change", but it requires a whole lot of these changes (molecular interactions) to produce the change which is the glass breaking.
Physicists commonly work with the interaction between photons and electrons. Each of these is a change. These interactions take place in a period of time much shorter than a millisecond, so it takes many of these changes to create a change which is visible to the human eye.
So the answer to how a change would be temporally divisible is relative to some other change, right?
A change is temporally divisible into other changes, just like an object is divisible into other objects. And of course there is a matter of the changes being relative, because in order for parts to make up a whole, they must exist in specific relationships.
You can't temporally divide 9:31 to 9:32 where you're talking about the same change. So 9:31 to 9:32, relative to itself, is not temporally divisible. It's only temporally divisible relative to other changes.
Likewise with objects. They're only divisible relative to other objects.
Of course it's divisible relative to itself. There's sixty seconds in a minute. Therefore it takes sixty seconds for 9:31: to change to 9:32. So we have 9:31:01, 9:31:02, 9:31:03, etc.. Each of these is a smaller change which occurs within the bigger change of 9:31 changing to 9:32. We could go to even smaller changes, by dividing the seconds, or we could go to an even bigger change, and say that the change from 9:31 to 9:32 is just one change within the bigger change between 9:00 and 10:00.
But thats not the change of 9:31 to 9:32. It's a different change.
No, that is the change between 9:31 and 9:32. There must be something between these two which is not evident in either one, which qualifies as "the change". You just claim it is "different", because it is neither 9:31 nor 9:32. Of course it is neither of these, and something completely different, because it is "the change" between them.
If that's how you interpret this, then there is no change of 9:31 to 9:32. This is not an example of a "change". They are distinct numbers One does not "change" into two, they are distinct. "Change" refers to the act which makes something different from what it was before. All we have here is two distinct numbers, not an act of change.
I was referring to the change of 9:31 to 9:32. Clearly there must be something between these two which qualifies as the "change" between them. This "change" is necessarily other than 9:31, and other than 9:32. You seem to be just talking about two distinct numbers, 9:31 and 9:32, which is not a change at all, it is just two different things
This sentence makes no sense to me as a response to my comment.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That's not a view I share, and I have no reason why anyone should believe it. That the clock face says 9:31 and then 9:32 is sufficient.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It's either different or it's the same (as in identical). if it's the same, but just another name for the same change, then we're not subdividing it. If it's different, then it's not subdividing that specific change with respect to itself. It's naming another, different change.
This is not at all sufficient. You don't seem to have any understanding of what a change is. You have described two distinct states; the clock says 9:31, and , the clock says 9:32. Do you not recognize that "change" refers to the process whereby the clock "changes" from saying 9:31 to saying 9:32?
Suppose I describe two distinct states. The moon is high in the sky. The sun is high in the sky. Naming these two distinct states is not a description of a change. A description of a change would be to describe how the sun replaces the moon, in the sky. So in your example, a description of a change would be to describe how 9:32 replaces 9:31 on the face of the clock. That would be the description of a change. Naming two distinct states is not a description of a change.
Quoting Terrapin Station
As soon as you actually describe a change, and not just two distinct states, then we can discuss whether that change is divisible or not.
Sure it is. When the clock face reads 9:31 and then 9:32 we don't say it stayed the same. It changed.
Logically, changes can obtain if there are only two states and nothing else.
And changes are processes.
Now, a change that we describe via noting two states can sometimes be compromised of a set of smaller changes, often from another reference point. That's not always the case, but it sometimes is.
So let's say that our change from 9:31 to 9:32 has a change to 9:31:30 in between. So we have a change from 9:31 to 9:31:30, and then a change from 9:31:30 to 9:32. That has no impact on whether 9:31 is in the past with respect to 9:32 relative to the change from 9:31 to 9:32. Relative to the change from 9:31 to 9:32, 9:31 is not in the past. Relative to the change from 9:31 to 9:32, we only have the present--the occurring change of 9:31 to 9:32.
Now relative to the change of 9:31:30 to 9:32, 9:31 is in the past. But that is a different change. The change of of 9:31:30 to 9:32 is not identical to the change from 9:31 to 9:32. Only the change from 9:31 to 9:31:30 to 9:32 is identical to the change from 9:31 to 9:32. And relative to the change from 9:31 to 9:31:30 to 9:32, 9:31 is not in the past.
That's not true, two distinct states are two distinct states. There is no change unless there is also continuity. Continuity is provided for by the thing which is changing. In this case, the clock. The two distinct states must be attributed to the changing thing, then we can say that there is change to that thing. Without this thing, the source of continuity, there is simply two distinct states. So change only occurs relative to something which stays the same. The thing which is changing remains the same thing, "the clock", despite changing
Quoting Terrapin Station
In your example here, the clock is the thing which is changing. At one time it has the property of reading 9:31, at another time it has the property of reading 9:32. Taken by themselves, the two readings are distinct states, but as a property of the clock, we can say that the clock has changed. It no longer has the one property, it has the other. The clock, as "the clock" remains the same, being "the clock". It has lost one property, and gained another, so it has changed, despite maintaining its identity as the clock.
Quoting Terrapin Station
I suggest we agree that the clock has changed. It has changed from reading 9:31 to reading 9:32. If this particular clock does not have the capacity to read 9:31:30, then that is not a possible property of the clock. Therefore we do not need to consider 9:31:30.
Quoting Terrapin Station
How can you say this? When the clock has the property of reading 9:32, clearly the property which it had, of reading 9:31, is in the past. If this property (reading 9:31) is not in the past, how can you claim that there was a change to the clock?
Quoting Terrapin Station
You seem to be focused on the particular time, when the clock is changing from having a reading of 9:31, to having a reading of 9:32. I agree that this is when the change to the clock is actually occurring. Do you agree with me, that what this change consists of, is the mechanism within the clock causing the reading of 9:31 to be replaced by a reading of 9:32? That is what the named change consists of, and if we were to describe this change, that's what we would need to describe. So if we want to describe this change, we must describe the mechanism within the clock which is causing this to occur.
When the clock face reads 9:31 then 9:32, is it the same?
(We're not getting anywhere, so baby step time)
Yes it continues to be the same clock no matter what time it says. That's what a change is, the thing continues to be the same thing, but some property, or properties are lost to be replaced by others. You continue to be the same person all your life, despite many significant changes
Quoting Terrapin Station
I could foresee this, you're very quick to use the word "change", but as I said, you don't seem to have an understanding of what a change is.
So the clock reading 9:31 is the same as the clock reading 9:32?
No! Of course not! You have described a different reading, how could that ever be construed as "the same"? Did not you read what I said? The clock is the same clock.
Have you no idea what a change is? Without "the clock", there is no change. There is 9:31, and 9:32. These are two distinct numbers, not a change. It is the clock which changes, not the numbers, 9:31 is always distinct from 9:32, one does not change into the other. But the clock changes from reading 9:31 to reading 9:32, despite maintaining its identity as the same clock.
Here's what I asked you again:
Quoting Terrapin Station
The clock face, which is what reads 9:31 and then 9:32, is it the same when it reads 9:32 rather than 9:31?
Is your answer to that yes, it's the same, or no, it's not the same?
Ok, the "clock face" has changed, but it is still the same clock face. You have just identified a slightly different continuity, "the clock face", rather than "the clock". The thing which continues to exist, "the clock face", continues to be the same clock face, despite showing different numbers. What's the difference? The clock face is still the same clock face, just like the clock is still the same clock, regardless of which numbers it shows.
We're getting off track here for a minute, but maybe it's worth pursuing. Wouldn't you say that the numbers displayed on the clock face are part of the clock face? If not, what are they part of?
Yes of course the numbers on the clock face are part of the clock face, but that's irrelevant because it doesn't alter the fact that the clock face remains the same clock face despite displaying different numbers. I can smile, frown, or make all kinds of different expressions with my face, but this doesn't contradict the fact that it is still the same face, my face. The clock face is still the same clock face, because "clock face" refers to the face of that particular clock, the numbers which are displayed is irrelevant to this fact.
If the numbers on the clock face are part of the clock face, and the numbers change, then the clock face changes. It doesn't completely change in the sense of (possibly) being completely unrelated, but it changes. It's not identical when it reads 9:31 and when it reads 9:32. It's different.
Yes, the clock face changes, we are in agreement there. But that "change", in order that we may call it a change, is dependent on the clock face, as "the clock face", maintaining its identity, or staying the same, and continuing to be the clock face. The clock face continues to be the same clock face, but changes.
Suppose we remove the clock face, then all we have is two distinct instances of numbers, 9:31, and 9:32. This is not a change, it is two distinct instances of numbers. But when the numbers are part of the clock face, and the clock face remains the same, as "the clock face", then we have a change, the clock face is chaging. So a change only occurs relative to something which stays the same. That is a necessary condition for the concept of "change", the two different instances must be related to each other, through something which stays the same, in order that there is a proper "change", rather than just two distinct instances.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Yes, the clock face changes. That is what we are talking about, a change to the clock face. But it is only a change to the clock face if we maintain the claim that the clock face is the same clock face. If we allow that it is a different clock face at 9:31, from the clock face at 9:32, then we are not talking about a change to the clock face, we are talking about two distinct clock faces.
Sure it is. Say you have a universe with just one item, a number of the form x:yz (Say that it just appears in the manner of a digital display floating in a vacuum)
If 9:31 is the number, then it disappears and 9:32 appears instead, that's a change, even if the two numbers have no causal connection whatsoever.
Who would be around to count it?
How is that relevant in your view?
(Paul Davies, The Goldilocks Enigma: Why is the Universe Just Right for Life, p 271)
Quoting Wayfarer
That would be psychological projection on your part (to claim that it's impossible wholesale).
By whose definition? What's the argument for "If x is defined D way by S, we must adhere to that when doing philosophy"?
It is change, and it's relative, but it need not be relative to something other than itself.
Ignoring what I consider a misconception of "meaning," that's a restatement of his premise, not an argument for it.
The conventions of quantum cosmology are irrelevant to what I was talking about above. They're also irrelevant to arguing for why time must invole a change of one physical system relative to another.
Again a claim without an argument.
Why is his paucity of imagination anyone else's problem?
Now you've assume a universe. That universe is the principle of continuity, the thing that remains the same throughout the change. First it was "the clock" that provided the continuity. Then you replaced "the clock" with "the clock face". Now you've replaced "the clock face" with "a universe". Why don't you just face the facts, and accept the reality that the concept of "change" requires that there is something which stays the same, a principle of continuity? Change only occurs relative to something which stays the same. Without that something which stays the same you simply have two distinct states, and not change.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Causal relationship is irrelevant, although cause/effect, implying a temporal continuity may sometimes be cited as the continuity which the change is relative to.
Look what you've done here though. 9:31 disappears, then 9:32 appears. You have divided the change into two changes. Wasn't the point you were arguing that a change is indivisible? But let's assume that a change is like this, the prior thing disappears, and is replaced by the later thing. Wouldn't this imply that there is a time when there is nothing, when the 9:31 disappears? Surely a change is not really like this. At the point when 9:31 disappears, there must be something going on, and that something must be producing the 9:32.
The universe in the thought experiment doesn't exist aside from the number.
The universe doesn't exist aside from which number, 9:31 or 9:32? If the universe disappears when 9:31 disappears, then there is nothing. Where does 9:32 come from if there is nothing? If the universe exists for both 9:31 and 9:32, then it is that thing which stays the same, which I've been trying to explain to you, is a necessary aspect of the concept of change. Without the universe in the thought experiment, there is no change, only two distinct numbers, 9:31 and 9:32.
Aside from 9:31, which disappears,then 9:32 instantaneously appears in its place instead. "Where it comes from" is irrelevant in this thought experiment. It instantaneously appears in place of 9:31, which disappeared. There's no causal etc. connection between them.
Again there isn't something that exists (a universe) aside from the number and only the number in this thought experiment. The numbers are identical to the universes in question.
Now you are describing a temporal continuity with the word "instantaneously". With the use of that word, you have referenced the passing of time, and the passing of time is now that thing which bridges the gap between 9:31 and 9:32. The passing of time is the same for 9:31 and for 9:32.
We only have a "change" described here because you are relating 9:31 and 9:32 to the passing of time. If you remove your reference to the passing of time, the word "instantaneously", then we have two distinct states, 9:31 and 9:32, and there is no change described.
There's no time aside from the succession of numbers described. You're thinking of time so that in your view, it's something other than particular changes. That it's instantaneous is just stressing that no other changes occur in between the two events. You keep wanting to add stuff to our universe(s)--you're making the universe something other than the number in question, you're making time something other than the change in question, etc. In this thought experiment, at least, nothing exists except for one number, which disappears, and then a different number, which appears acausally.
What did "instantaneously" mean in you thought experiment then? Let's just remove it, because it's redundant according to what you are now asserting. We need to remove "succession" as well, because it has the temporal referent of before and after. So, we have two distinct numbers, 9:32 and 9:31. I don't see any change here, just two distinct numbers. Do you agree?
Quoting Terrapin Station
I'm only thinking of time because you used the word "instantaneously" two times in your short post. And clearly "instantaneously" refers to an extremely short period of time. So I am only thinking of time because you mentioned time. Now you use "succession", so you again refer to time. If you don't want me to think of time, then don't refer to time.
Quoting Terrapin Station
Of course no other changes occurred, because it's already been stipulated that these two numbers are all that exist. Let's just remove "instantaneous", and "succession", so that I am not tempted to think that it refers to time, when you are asserting that these terms really are redundant, they refer to nothing other than what you've already said.
Quoting Terrapin Station
I'm not the one adding stuff, you clearly used the word "instantaneously" twice in that post. now you've replaced it with "succession". Since the conventional use of these words imply a temporal referent, it is you who adds "time" to your thought experiment, not I. How was I to know that what you really mean is something totally unconventional?
So, are we now in agreement? We remove "instantaneously" because it is redundant. The impossibility of any other change has already been stipulated. We remove "succession" because it implies before and after, time. All we have is two distinct numbers, 9:32 and 9:31. Do you agree with me, that all we have is two distinct numbers, 9:32 and 9:31? There is no change being described here.
If there's one thing and then something else replaces it, that's not a change?
How so?
In reference to the further comments, of course it's impossible to observe anything if you're absent.
You mean you can't imagine something you're not observing?
That seems a bit like incredulity.
What actual entity is a simple unity? Objects themselves are always composite. 'The atom' was supposed to be a simple entity, but atoms in that sense don't exist, they're ideal objects rather than real things.
The only point at which the Universe could be thought of as a unity would be the aptly-named 'singularity' but as I understand it, at the point of the singularity, there was no Universe.
Sure , but "then" in this context is referring to a temporal succession, so you have still assumed the passing of time. You have only replaced "succession" with "then". You only have "change" by referring to this other thing, the passing of time. Remove that temporal reference, and you have one thing, 9:31, and you have another thing, 9:32, but you have no change.
And clearly time is not the same thing as change in your example, because "then" is implying after, or later, it is not implying that 9:31 is changing into 9:32. "Then" refers to something other than the change, it refers to later.
Your 'one' doesn't seem contradictory to me, not "impossible to conceive".
But if you're thinking physics, well, then who knows, things are a lot more complicated, and I'd tend to agree (though something like a photon seems indivisible, in a manner of speaking).
Was that what you meant by "impossible to conceive"?
Right, so on your view, 9:31 obtains, it disappears and 9:32 obtains in its place--that's not a change?
On my view, and this is no thought experiment, space isn't something separate from particular existents. Space isn't something existents are "in." It's those existents' extensions and their extensional relations to each other.
But in a 'universe of one thing', how can there be any relations?
Yes on my view that could be called a change, because you've referred to a succession. Therefore it is implied by what you say, that there is something distinct from 9:31 and distinct from 9:32 causing, or allowing, the one to disappear and the other to appear. The point is that without this distinct third thing there is no change. If you proceed to deny the third thing, then I will insist that there is no change, and you speak in deceptive terms, terms which do not represent what you mean.
Right. so it's not a change on your view, because we specified that there is no third thing, that it's acausal, etc. I just want to confirm that on your view, it's not a change. Would you say that 9:31 to 9:32 is the same then?
Would it be easier to imagine a universe with only one thing if that one thing were a simple, point-like object, with no spatial extension or internal structure? That would negate any problem with whether edges, boundaries, etc constitute "things" in their own right.
Quoting Wayfarer
Things stand in certain (reflexive) relations to themselves. For instance, everything is identical to itself; identity is a relation.
When a response begins with "On my view, and this is no thought experiment, space isn't . . ." it should clue you in to the fact that I'm not talking about the thought experiment at hand--I'm rather making a general statement about what space is.
A given thought experiment might present a completely different view of space. I'm not saying that the thought experiment I presented was doing that, but as a thought experiment, that's certainly something it could do. Thought experiments present fictions.
Obviously a universe with just one item won't contain extensional relations between different items, but it will contain extension re the one item that obtains. That would exhaust that universe's space.
Quoting Wayfarer
Logical impossibility isn't implied. Can you derive a contradiction?
As an aside
[quote=Davies]in the absence of observers, our universe is dead[/quote]
Notice that Davies does in fact presuppose (imagine?) an unobserved universe here, namely a "dead" one, by his own words. But Davies is writing about our universe, with us and lovely green trees in it, and a hypothetical "theory of everything" thereof.
There is definitely a third thing involved, according to your description. This is the perspective from which 9:31 and 9:32 disappear and appear. As I said before, if 9:31 disappeared absolutely, then there would be absolutely nothing left. And it's nonsense to think that 9:32 could come into existence from absolutely nothing.
If it is stipulated that there is not a third thing involved, then yes 9:31 is the same thing as 9:32 because there is nothing to differentiate between them. But that's why the concept of "change" requires that third thing which the change is relative to, without that third thing, the changing world is illogical, unintelligible. Without the third thing, change cannot be apprehended with logic and that's why the third thing it is an essential aspect of the concept of change.
I really do not understand your attitude of resistance. Change is not a simple concept, it is a very complex concept which philosophers have worked on for thousands of years. Instead of trying to understand the concept of change, you insistently resist any attempt to understand it. Why?
I don't believe that's nonsense at all, and not just per a thought experiment. I don't buy the notion that everything must have a cause.
I'm not talking about cause, I'm talking about coming into existence. Do you believe that something can come from nothing? How would you make sense of that? Suppose there is absolutely nothing. How could something come into existence?
I guess, in that case there couldn't have been anything preventing it either?
How is that not asking for a cause? You're asking what the mechanism would be, what would trigger it, etc.
Interpret it as "cause" if you want. But a cause is not necessarily a mechanism, so I'm not necessarily asking for a mechanism. The free will is said to be an immaterial cause it is not a mechanism, it sets the mechanism into motion. But even with willing, it is not a case of something coming from absolutely nothing because the immaterial soul is not nothing.
Do you presume that something could come from absolutely nothing? If so, please explicate. Anyone can claim to believe any sort of absurdity, but without an explanation it is hard to believe that the person really believes what is claimed. You've already claimed to believe that change could happen which was not relative to something else, but I've demonstrated that this is not "change" according to how "change" is normally conceptualized. So it appears like your absurd looking beliefs are actually a case of changing the concepts which the words refer to, thus making your belief appear to be absurd. Do you really hold such an absurd belief, or can you explain it?
The question was "How is that not asking for a cause?"
You didn't answer that.
I said call it a cause if you want. What difference does it make? Can you explain something coming into existence without a cause?
I had already written, "I don't buy the notion that everything must have a cause." So yes, there's no reason to believe that something can't come into existence without a cause.
Which is, as I mentioned, very much like 'the singularity' that preceded the big bang, isn't it? Georges LeMaitre's original paper was called, I seem to recall, 'the hypothesis of the primeval atom'.
Quoting jorndoe
Something indivisible can't have dimensions.
So I'm still waiting for you to make sense of this. Can you explain how something comes into existence from absolutely nothing?
There wouldn't be some mechanism or cause to it, would there?
It could be physically indivisible with dimensions. That you could imagine dividing it isn't the same thing.
No, these are the conditions of your thought experiment. When 9:31 "disappears", there is absolutely nothing. Can you explain 9:32 coming into existence from absolutely nothing?
That's where I cannot agree with your concept of "change", and I am insisting that it is not the proper concept of "change". You misunderstand "change", and resist any attempt to understand the concept of "change" in the conventional way.
Again, this is asking for a cause (otherwise explain what it's asking). But if there's no cause, one can't give a cause.
At any rate, it seems like you don't really get the fundamental concept of a thought experiment, as you're wondering how it could obtain in the real world.
If it has dimensions, then how can it be a simple unity? That is exactly what 'the atom' was supposed to be.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
A note on this from a modern Catholic philosopher
[url=https://www.catholic.com/magazine/print-edition/aquinas-vs-intelligent-design]Thomas Aquinas vs Intelligent Design, Michael W. Tkacz.
By it being physically impossible to divide it, and by it having no smaller parts.
Your thought experiment was introduced to explain how you understand "change". If it demonstrates that "change" is something which cannot obtain in the real world, then why not switch, and start to understand "change" in the conventional way? That's why philosophers had to conceive of "change" in the way that they did, to represent what happens in the real world.
No, not at all. It was introduced to counter some odd things that you were saying.
Change can logically obtain with two events that have no causal connection to each other and that aren't states of some other thing. The thought experiment is a very simple logical case of this.
You're changing the subject. What was at issue was the question of whether it is necessary to assume a third thing, relative to the two different states of change. You claimed a change could be relative to itself.
So when the clock changed from 9:31 to 9:32, it was "the clock" which was that third thing. Then you replaced "the clock" with "the clock face". Then you replaced "the clock face" with "succession", assuming that there was just the numbers following each other in "succession", without the clock face.
Now you appear to want to change the subject altogether and talk about "cause". But as Aristotle demonstrated, "cause" is far to ambiguous, requiring us to distinguish many distinct usages.
It's not changing the subject. You're just not following along very well. Again, the thought experiment was a means of countering some strange tangents on your part--a service for attempting to help you focus, on the charitable interpretation that you're not just trolling. It didn't work very well for helping you to understand anything, which isn't surprising, but again, I'd not bet that you're not just trolling, either. I'm willing to maintain the attempt, though. But I don't know how arguing over whether the "subject is being changed" is going to help you understand anything.
I've read this about five or more times now and I still can't figure out what you're trying to say. You're talking about two events with no causal connection. Am I not correct to assume that "an event", being a happening, is itself a change? So you are talking about two distinct changes, with no causal connection to each other. I would say that each of these changes, in order that they are changes, must be related to some other thing. It is not necessary that they both be related to the same thing though, and since they are not causally related, they are probably not related to the same thing.
Quoting Terrapin Station
That's right, you've gone from being difficult to understand, to being extremely difficult to understand.
I'm using "event" so that it's the same as "state of affairs."
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I know you think that, but I just don't know why you do . . . I'm guessing that it's something that Aristotle must have said. It doesn't seem to be something we could move you away from without a lot of work.
I explained it all to you, though you refused to acknowledge. You couldn't give me an example of a change which wasn't related to some other thing. Finally, you gave me an example of something coming from nothing, but you admitted that this wasn't a "real world" change.
So I'll reiterate my claim. You simply refuse to understand "change", insisting on some fantasy notion of "change" which is does not correspond to real world changes.
Quoting Terrapin Station
I suggest that if you want to move me away from the concept of "change" which I presently understand, that you either show how it is incorrect, or you come up with a better one. I admit that the concept has some problems (which we haven't yet touched upon because you haven't gotten to the point of understanding the concept well enough to apprehend the problems). Insisting on a notion of change which doesn't at all correspond to how change actually occurs in the world is not helpful.
If you're not trolling, it's inexplicable that you got as far as you did studying philosophy while having basically zero understanding of the idea of thought experiments. Thought experiments are presenting fictional/fantasy scenarios, but they're not presenting fictional/fantasy conceptual clarification . . . although it's pretty amusing that you're (at leat pretending to be) reading it that way.
As I recall the purpose of your thought experiment was to demonstrate a change which could be occurring without being relative to something else. If such a change is fictional/fantasy, and could not be conceived of as occurring in the real world (I.e. is impossible), then what purpose does the thought experiment serve? It appears like your thought experiment is just an exercise of your imagination, a practise of fantasy. Unless you can make sense of something coming from nothing, how is that thought experiment supposed to add anything to our discussion?
My training in philosophy did not include fiction/fantasy. One could study fiction/fantasy in the department of literature.