Allegory of the Cave and Global Skepticism
Plato thought that the philosopher was someone who can realize what everyone else is seeing is merely shadows and can walk out of the metaphorical cave and into reality. By understanding reality, the philosopher acquires knowledge, that is (in my definition here), beliefs about the world that are accurate to how the world is. So, for example, if A-theory of time is correct, and we believe in A-theory of time, this counts as knowledge. Thus, the philosopher becomes wise and enlightened. Sounds nice, but is this even possible?
If our brains are the product of evolution, then they have been tuned to react to stimuli local to our frame of reference. We cannot assume that we can understand the secrets of the cosmos. In fact, we cannot assume that anything we consider "knowledge" today, is even an accurate representation of reality as we know it.
Furthermore, if there is a possibility that something could be disproved, then it does not count as knowledge. Someone could read as much as they want regarding any topic in, let's say philosophy, and still not have acquired any knowledge whatsoever except for maybe a history of ideas. Without complete, absolute certainty (an impossibility - is absolute certainty incoherent?), there cannot be any knowledge. It's not as if someone can read about A-Theory and B-Theory about Time, and then look in the back of the book for answer key. It's unknown. It is impossible to know if we have ever come to the correct conclusion.
But since there cannot be any certainty about anything, does this mean that any opinion is equally valid? Does this destroy the entire enterprise of rational inquiry?
The radical subjectivist dilemma is something I have been struggling with for a long time now. It's very contradictory and self-refuting, but at the same time appeals to my skepticism.
If our brains are the product of evolution, then they have been tuned to react to stimuli local to our frame of reference. We cannot assume that we can understand the secrets of the cosmos. In fact, we cannot assume that anything we consider "knowledge" today, is even an accurate representation of reality as we know it.
Furthermore, if there is a possibility that something could be disproved, then it does not count as knowledge. Someone could read as much as they want regarding any topic in, let's say philosophy, and still not have acquired any knowledge whatsoever except for maybe a history of ideas. Without complete, absolute certainty (an impossibility - is absolute certainty incoherent?), there cannot be any knowledge. It's not as if someone can read about A-Theory and B-Theory about Time, and then look in the back of the book for answer key. It's unknown. It is impossible to know if we have ever come to the correct conclusion.
But since there cannot be any certainty about anything, does this mean that any opinion is equally valid? Does this destroy the entire enterprise of rational inquiry?
The radical subjectivist dilemma is something I have been struggling with for a long time now. It's very contradictory and self-refuting, but at the same time appeals to my skepticism.
Comments (8)
This is the bit I agree with. But you have the allegory backwards entirely. It is the crass materialist who is stuck in the cave of facts and knowledge of what you are calling 'reality'. The philosopher concerns himself with the contemplation of the forms.
After the first paragraph, it all gets too confused to respond to properly. Except this:
Quoting darthbarracuda
Which I can quite confidently answer in the negative. I am not certain, of course, but I am pretty damn sure.
Mathematical?
The form of the good, primarily. But maths is good.
One could flip the cave allegory so that the forms are the shadows on the wall, and our experiences are being in the sunshine. So it's the philosopher (or the scientist) who is in the cave. Consider that the forms, be they mathematical, the good, or universals, are abstracted from experience.
I can agree with this. From Charles Sander Pierce, father of pragmatism:
We cannot begin with complete doubt. We must begin with all the prejudices which we actually have when we enter upon the study of philosophy. These prejudices are not to be dispelled by a maxim, for they are things which it does not occur to us can be questioned. Hence this initial skepticism will be a mere self-deception, and not real doubt; and no one who follows the Cartesian method will ever be satisfied until he has formally recovered all those beliefs which in form he has given up. It is, therefore, as useless a preliminary as going to the north pole would be in order to get to Constantinople by coming down regularly upon a meridian. A person may, it is true, in the course of his studies, find reason to doubt what he began by believing; but in that case he doubts because he has a positive reason for it, and not on account of the Cartesian maxim. Let us not pretend to doubt in philosophy what we do not doubt in our hearts.
So, pretty much, yes we can doubt all we want, but there's no good reason to apply this doubt. There's always the chance everything we think we know is simply make believe, but there's no actual good reasons to believe that everything we know is wrong simply because there's no cosmic answer key.
Opinions can be opined within the confines of specific contexts such that the context provides validation for some opinions over others. For instance, within the context of the English language, my opinion that all bachelors are happily unmarried holds more validity than an opinion that some bachelors are happily married.