There is no consciousness without an external reality

Reply to Purple Pond So when I dream, what external things am I aware of? What are the objects of experience?

Reply to Michael It all depends on what you dreamed of. Let's say you dreamed about your friends. Your friends would be the object of that experience.

Reply to Purple Pond You're not really coming to terms with the original arguments from idealist and sceptical philosophers. If it was as obvious and simple as you say it is, then Bishop George Berkeley must have been a fool to believe otherwise - and really, Berkeley was no fool. These editions of Berkeley's works are presented in modern English, and it's worth your while to spend a bit of time reading them - especially the Three Dialogues. The opponent in those dialogues throws all these kinds of objections at the idealist, and the idealist responds to them quite ingeniously.

Now, the way I interpret the idealist claim is not that 'we are aware of experiences'. If you say 'we are aware of experiences', then you're saying that experience is one thing, and awareness is another. But if you go down that route, you will find many conundrums. When you ask 'what is experience?' it's not 'a hand in front of you', but your awareness of your hand in front of you. The hand is in front of you, but your experience of the hand is not 'in front of you'.

You can't stand outside of, or objectify, experience; you can't say that 'experience is the object of awareness', because awareness of an object is an experience. 'Experience' is a transitive verb, that is, requires an object; but all experience also requires a subject. The reality comprises the subject, the object, and the experience. In that sense, subject, object and experience are all aspects or poles of the totality.

Finally, it's worth noting that Immanuel Kant, who described himself as a transcendental idealist, differentiated himself from Berkeley, mentioned above. So whilst he was still an idealist, he claimed that Berkeley's form of idealism was problematical. And he did so by way of an argument that is not too disimilar to your own. But in order to understand why he differentiated himself from Berkeley, it's probably best to delve into some of Berkeley's actual writings, to see how he deals with objections to his contention that 'esse est percipe'.

What does it mean to be conscious? Consciousness is synonymous with awareness. To be conscious is to be in a state of awareness. And in order to be aware there are two requirements: the being that is aware, and the subject of the awareness. To say that I am aware of the hands in front of me, is to acknowledge myself, and the existence of my hands.The same is true for anything else.

I don't think consciousness is synonymous with awareness. I think consciousness is reflective awareness. We observe all sorts of creatures that appear to be aware, but I would not ascribe conscious intent to that awareness, that mosquito is not out to get me, it is driven by hunger alone. Scientific studies seem to show that awareness has a greater scope than consciousness, that we are aware of more than we are conscious of.

Logic has important but limited value when it comes to experience, it cannot account for what you are trying to make an account of, in my opinion.

Quoting Purple Pond

It all depends on what you dreamed of. Let's say you dreamed about your friends. Your friends would be the object of that experience.

What if I dream of something that doesn't exist in the waking world, like me having a child?

Or is such a thing impossible? How so?

Quoting Purple Pond

What does it mean to be conscious? Consciousness is synonymous with awareness.

You are already begging the question with this definition.

Quoting Wayfarer

You can't stand outside of, or objectify, experience; you can't say that 'experience is the object of awareness', because awareness of an object is an experience. 'Experience' is a transitive verb, that is, requires an object; but all experience also requires a subject. The reality comprises the subject, the object, and the experience. In that sense, subject, object and experience are all aspects or poles of the totality.

Then how can it be that we are aware, or know, that we have experiences? Is it not what differentiates us from other animals - that we can turn our own awareness back on itself - of being aware of being aware - to associate this awareness with my self and to say that I am self-aware because I can be aware of my own experiences? Descartes would seem to disagree with you when he said, "I think, therefore I am." His own awareness of his own thoughts is what gives him evidence of his own existence. How are you aware of your existence, and in what way do you exist?

Reply to Harry Hindu 'Objecitification' is not quite the same as self-awareness. Certainly I can reflect on my own experience, and indeed on what it is to be aware, but awareness and experience are not objects of experience in the sense that this pen or this chair is. The pen or the chair is a 'that' to me, or to any other observer, whereas the awareness to and in which the pen appears is not.

Quoting Purple Pond

Is it possible to have consciousness if there is no external reality?

External to what? The possibility to have consciousness is already assumed in talk of reality being external or internal to consciousness.

To have consciousness is to have the capacity to identify things in a network of things to be conscious of. We can call this network 'reality', and say that it includes things "external" to consciousness (e.g. the things we discover in our shared environment), as well as things "internal" to consciousness (e.g. thoughts and perceptions of things).

Reply to Wayfarer You can reflect on World History and ethical dilemmas just as you can reflect on your own awareness, or your circulatory system or neural system. "You" can also be aware of your arms and legs and even your heart, and interestingly enough, if "you" look in a mirror, "you" can be aware of your face and eyes. "You" may even come to be aware of how "you" have changed.

Reply to Purple Pond Quoting Purple Pond

Is it possible to have consciousness if there is no external reality? I don't believe it is possible.

What does it mean to be conscious? Consciousness is synonymous with awareness. To be conscious is to be in a state of awareness. And in order to be aware there are two requirements: the being that is aware, and the subject of the awareness. To say that I am aware of the hands in front of me, is to acknowledge myself, and the existence of my hands.The same is true for anything else.

An idealist or a skeptic might claim that all we are aware of is experience. Thus being conscious only proves the reality of experience - not an external world. To that I would ask: what is experience? Again, I experience a hand in front of me. There are two requirements for that experience: the being that has the experience (me), and the object being experienced (my hands).

What about illusions and hallucinations? For example, you are conscious of an bent stick in water when there is no bent stick. To that I say that you are not conscious of any actual bent stick. What you are really conscious of is a mental image of a bent stick.

But couldn't everything be an illusion just like the bent stick in water? What if everything you see is only mental imagery? This brings me back yet again to duality of consciousness. What is an image? An image is a representation of a thing. In order for there to be an image there must be two things: the representation, and the thing that is being represented. In order to have a mental image of stick there must exist a stick somewhere in the past present, or future.

I'll give my opinion for what it's worth. It's based on my studies of near death experiences, and what people have experienced while taking DMT. Reality seems to be far more fantastic than what most people believe, religious or otherwise. What seems to be at bottom of everything is a mind/s, or you could say consciousness. Consciousness probably gives rise to all reality. There seem to be different levels of consciousness, or higher and higher states of consciousness. Dreaming is an example of a low level of consciousness, nevertheless it's created by our minds. Waking reality is a higher state of reality, but it also seems to be created by our mind, or in conjunction with other minds. What people experience in near death experiences seems to be even a higher state of consciousness or awareness.

Everything seems to get back to the idea of some kind of oneness, but at the same time it seems to allow us to have our individuality, and yet remain connected to this oneness or consciousness. It's as though we are individuals amongst a sea of consciousness. But it's even more fantastic, I believe, than this. It seems that who we are is much greater than who we are as humans, i.e., we are beings of light that are having human experiences for a variety of reasons.

I know it sounds crazy. Our memories seem to be suppressed, just as our memories are suppressed in a dream state. The analogy between dreaming and waking and what we experience in higher states of consciousness is quite remarkable.

Reply to Sam26 (Y)

Quoting Purple Pond

In order to have a mental image of stick there must exist a stick somewhere in the past present, or future.

I agree with that statement, with one picky modification: There need not be a stick, but something external to us. If I have a mental image of a unicorn, it does not follow that unicorns exist (past, present or future), but that I have experienced the basic objects that the image is made of: e.g. a horse + a horn.

To put your argument in a different way:
- Nothing can come from nothing: even our imagination cannot create images from scratch;
- we perceive an external reality;
- therefore an external reality must exist.

Quoting Sam26

What people experience in near death experiences seems to be even a higher state of consciousness or awareness.

What reasons do they give for claiming to experience a 'higher state of consciousness'? Is it a self evident experience?

On a similar note, what reasons do we have to claim that our waking state is a higher state of consciousness than our dreaming state? I can think of two reasons:
1. Our waking state is continuous from one day to the next, where as our dreaming state appears to change every night.
2. We can analyze our dreaming state during our waking state, but we cannot (at least I cannot) analyze our waking state during our sleeping state.

Many or most claim that their sensory experiences are heightened, viz., their ability to see, hear, understand, etc. Also that it's this reality that seems dreamlike in comparison to the experiences they have in an NDE or a DMT experience. I compare it to waking from a dream, generally in a dream our experiences seem dumbed-down. When one has an NDE, this reality seems dumbed-down.

Quoting Purple Pond

external reality

It's odd how when you drive a car through a narrow space, you squeeze your shoulders closer to compress yourself. Wittgenstein had a question about feeling one's way with a stick: if the stick taps hard ground, where do you feel the hardness?

As jkop said earlier, if you start with an assumption of external reality you're bound to find it necessary. But what justifies your starting there? I can close my eyes and inhabit Mahler's Fifth: am I not conscious in that orchestra there with old Gustav?

I find consciousness every bit as strange as Sam, though I conjure it in my mind differently, that each of us is almost constantly (though with pauses for breath) re-inventing their world, as we move through shared space among familiar objects. Either way, Sam's or mine, this oddness seems to fit quite well both with quite a lot of neuroscience about how human creatures act, and with something that's on the mystical slant of understanding.

Quoting mcdoodle

It's odd how when you drive a car through a narrow space, you squeeze your shoulders closer to compress yourself. Wittgenstein had a question about feeling one's way with a stick: if the stick taps hard ground, where do you feel the hardness?

Feelings appear only in consciousness as a representation of the state-of-affairs that is the ground.

Quoting mcdoodle

As jkop said earlier, if you start with an assumption of external reality you're bound to find it necessary. But what justifies your starting there? I can close my eyes and inhabit Mahler's Fifth: am I not conscious in that orchestra there with old Gustav?

You are conscious of the fact that you are imagining things. Does the orchestra sound exactly like you were there? Doesn't it sound less raw, or vivid, that you actually being there? How is it that you are conscious of the fact that you are imagining something and not really there and how do you reconcile that with saying "I am conscious in that orchestra"? Aren't you conscious of an imagining, and not really of an orchestra?

If there isn't an external world, then all of our words don't refer to, or mean, anything. We would never be talking about things that exist independent of the words themselves, or states-of-affairs that exist independent of our experience of them. Language is built on the premise of object permanence.

Reply to Harry Hindu Quoting Harry Hindu

If there isn't an external world, then all of our words don't refer to, or mean, anything. We would never be talking about things that exist independent of the words themselves, or states-of-affairs that exist independent of our experience of them. Language is built on the premise of object permanence.

Yeah, I think this is one of the few settled things we can say in all this area. Things like Idealism and phenomenalism are actually incoherent, since they're using shared language, which presupposes the validity of the concept of external objects, to cast wholesale doubt on external objects (in a "discussion" no less! :) ). The very idea of doubting the external world is incoherent because "the game of doubt" itself presupposes an external world. You can only cast doubt on (one) external object by accepting the existence of (some other) external objects.

The Argument from Illusion, which is usually where these sorts of lucubrations start, moves from the possibility of illusion, to the possibility of wholesale illusion, but that move can't possibly be made, because the very existence and concept of illusion is only possible, only has meaning, in a context where we sometimes do experience reality.

IOW, the only reason we can peg a given experience an "illusion" at all, is because we've had a corrective perception that induces us to believe the previous experience was illusory; but that corrective perception must itself be non-illusory otherwise it couldn't correct the illusory perception, and it couldn't be illusory.

Reply to Purple Pond

Yes, consciousness, experience, will, are associated with a body in a physical world. I'm an Idealist, and I feel that the Anti-Realist view makes the most sense. But, though experience is primary, and though there's no reason to believe in a fundamentally existent, objectively existent physical world, there's also no disembodied consciousness that was there without body and world. (...even if the physical world is a complex logical system rather than an objectively-existent collection of objectively existent things.)

You're the central, essential component of the possibility-world that is the setting for your life-experience possibility-story.

I don't think Realism vs Anti-Realism has to be an issue. I don't claim that either view is wrong. That's because the words "Real" and "Existent" aren't even metaphysically-defined. So how can there be an issue about what's real?

The Anti-Realist view, from the individual-experience point of view makes the most sense to me. All we know about the physical world is from our experience. It's best, most simply, most elegantly and parsimoniously described as a life-experience story. A possibility-story, consisting of a logical system.

The world from our personal experience point of view is the view that's relevant to us. For us, it's what there is. I's right for us to define and describe the world from that point of view. But that doesn't make it all that's "real" in some objective sense. To claim that would be chauvinistic. It's possible to reasonably objectively speak of abstract facts "being" without regard to anyone.There's what's there for us, and there's what can be discussed more objectively and distantly.

Michael Ossipoff

Quoting Harry Hindu

If there isn't an external world, then all of our words don't refer to, or mean, anything. We would never be talking about things that exist independent of the words themselves, or states-of-affairs that exist independent of our experience of them. Language is built on the premise of object permanence.

This isn't necessarily the case. It's possible that a very powerful mind/s could create a reality that's a virtual simulation, and while you're experiencing that reality with others you might refer to things in that reality as objective. That is to say, language would dictate how you would refer to that reality, because you have no other reality to compare it to.

Language isn't built on objective permanence, language generally takes hold as people agree on the use of words. Although a reality does have to have some permanence, whether it's a simulation or not.

Reply to Sam26 Even the powerful mind that created the VR would still use it's language to refer to the objects in the VR, just as computer programmers and computer users use their language to refer to the objects in a 3D computer game.

Reply to Harry Hindu Yes, but my point is that we might assume, for example, if we lived in a virtual world that it had an objective nature, but that's only true within that reality. If you were looking at that reality from outside, like outside a virtual reality, then you might not say it's objective. It just depends on where you're standing in relation to that reality. So in a sense the answer to the question is both yes and no. So what we call objective is relative.

If the answer is both yes and no, then you have problem called inconsistency.

Being inside the VR or outside of it doesn't matter. The VR exists objectively for everyone. For the person in the VR, their tree would refer to an objective aspect of the world - the computer code of the VR. To say that one is subjective and one isn't is really just talking about making category errors, where those that are making "subjective" statements are making category errors, while those making objective statements aren't.

Quoting Harry Hindu

If the answer is both yes and no, then you have problem called inconsistency.

Being inside the VR or outside of it doesn't matter. The VR exists objectively for everyone. For the person in the VR, their tree would refer to an objective aspect of the world - the computer code of the VR. To say that one is subjective and one isn't is really just talking about making category errors, where those that are making "subjective" statements are making category errors, while those making objective statements aren't.

No, it's not inconsistent, it's similar to a contingent truth, that is, it can be true in one setting and false in another depending on the state-of-affairs. I didn't say it was subjective, I said it was relative, there is a big difference.

Quoting Sam26

No, it's not inconsistent, it's similar to a contingent truth, that is, it can be true in one setting and false in another depending on the state-of-affairs. I didn't say it was subjective, I said it was relative, there is a big difference.

This doesn't seem to be much different than my explanation in making category errors when referring to something in the VR as if it weren't a representation of a computer program. You seem to be saying that it is true from a VR person's perspective that there really is an enemy robot chasing them, but isn't that because they don't have access to more knowledge - that they are in a VR program? So, it would be more accurate to say that the computer user has more knowledge than the VR person, which means that they have access to the truth, while the VR person doesn't.

It's no different than dreaming your girlfriend broke up with you and when you see her the next day, she acts like that never happened, because it didn't actually happen. You only had a dream that it did. Which is the truth - that your girlfriend broke up with you, or that you had a dream that she broke up with you?

Quoting Harry Hindu

This doesn't seem to be much different than my explanation in making category errors when referring to something in the VR as if it weren't a representation of a computer program. You seem to be saying that it is true from a VR person's perspective that there really is an enemy robot chasing them, but isn't that because they don't have access to more knowledge - that they are in a VR program? So, it would be more accurate to say that the computer user has more knowledge than the VR person, which means that they have access to the truth, while the VR person doesn't.

It's true that the person in the VR program has less knowledge than the computer user, but it's much more I believe. For example, let's suppose that you know you're in a VR, but you don't have access to the same reality the user has, you are still going to refer to things in your VR as real, and rightly so since you're living there. You can still refer to things in the VR as objective even if you know it's not as real as the reality the user has access to. So things are objective within a reality, much of this is relative and dependent on how we describe, or use the term reality. Reality is a vague term, and is subject to a wide variety of uses. I don't think there is going to be some definition that will solve this problem. I also don't really think it's a category error, although I can see how someone might think so. A lot of this also depends on one's ontological or metaphysical outlook.

Reply to Sam26Once I know that I'm in a VR, then it would only be useful to refer to the things inside the VR when speaking to others inside the VR that AREN'T aware they are in a VR. In other words, I'd have to speak on their level of understanding, which would be different than mine. Ignorance doesn't make one's objective language actually true. We can make objective statements about reality all the time that simply aren't true. Just look at the rest of this forum. Every post is filled with objective claims about reality - most of which, if not all, aren't true.

Quoting Harry Hindu

Once I know that I'm in a VR, then it would only be useful to refer to the things inside the VR when speaking to others inside the VR that AREN'T aware they are in a VR. In other words, I'd have to speak on their level of understanding, which would be different than mine. Ignorance doesn't make one's objective language actually true. We can make objective statements about reality all the time that simply aren't true. Just look at the rest of this forum. Every post is filled with objective claims about reality - most of which, if not all, aren't true.

I agree with much of this Harry, and I agree that people make claims about reality thinking their claims are objective when they're not. I think what's important is understanding that objectivity is contingent on many things, it's especially contingent/dependent on what we're experiencing within a given reality. What about the one who creates the VR, isn't that program objective for him/her? It has an existence, it's just a different kind of reality, a different metaphysical domain, so to speak.

Reply to Harry Hindu Getting back to the title of the post, what if everything is simply a construct of consciousness, then everything we're experiencing could be within that consciousness or mind. There would be no reality outside that mind, every reality that's experienced could be a kind of holographic reality that we simply engage with from within a mind. There are some physicists who think that at the bottom of everything is simply consciousness, that reality is part of that consciousness. Consciousness may be the unifying theory of everything. In fact, the very particles themselves may be part of that consciousness. Of course much more needs to be done in terms of science, but it's very interesting.

https://tmhome.com/news-events/unified-field-of-consciousness-onemany/

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Mst3fOl5vH0

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QI66ZglzcO0

Quoting Sam26

I agree with much of this Harry, and I agree that people make claims about reality thinking their claims are objective when they're not. I think what's important is understanding that objectivity is contingent on many things, it's especially contingent/dependent on what we're experiencing within a given reality. What about the one who creates the VR, isn't that program objective for him/her? It has an existence, it's just a different kind of reality, a different metaphysical domain, so to speak.

Well, does the VR simulate experiences as well? If so, the those experiences would be programmed, determined. The "people" inside the VR would have no control over their perceptions, or what they say about it.

Quoting Sam26

Getting back to the title of the post, what if everything is simply a construct of consciousness, then everything we're experiencing could be within that consciousness or mind. There would be no reality outside that mind, every reality that's experienced could be a kind of holographic reality that we simply engage with from within a mind. There are some physicists who think that at the bottom of everything is simply consciousness, that reality is part of that consciousness. Consciousness may be the unifying theory of everything. In fact, the very particles themselves may be part of that consciousness. Of course much more needs to be done in terms of science, but it's very interesting.

If this were the case, then calling it a mind would be incoherent. If there is no reality outside a "mind", then the "mind" would essentially become reality. We use different terms to refer to minds, and reality. To switch the meaning of the two is ridiculous and unnecessary. One simply needs to follow the implications of what they are saying. If "mind" is the only thing to exist, then the "mind" is simply reality and there is no such thing as "mind".

Quoting Michael

What if I dream of something that doesn't exist in the waking world, like me having a child?

Or is such a thing impossible? How so?

I’m not exactly sure what his point might be but it may have something to do with the fact that we can’t imagine or dream of things that are beyond our experience. Our experiences of the physical world provide the basic contents or building blocks of our minds, without which there could be no minds.

You can dream of having a child because you possess the basic conceptual elements to form that dream, or simulate it in imagination. It would not be possible for you to dream of or imagine things that consist of conceptual elements that are beyond your knowledge or experience.

This limit in imagination indicates the mutually dependent nature of mind/matter, I believe.

There is no meaning without something external to thought. So, if consciousness consists of thought, then there is no consciousness without something external to it.

One finger cannot point at itself...

Spatiotemporal distinction requires a plurality.

Quoting Harry Hindu

If this were the case, then calling it a mind would be incoherent. If there is no reality outside a "mind", then the "mind" would essentially become reality. We use different terms to refer to minds, and reality. To switch the meaning of the two is ridiculous and unnecessary. One simply needs to follow the implications of what they are saying. If "mind" is the only thing to exist, then the "mind" is simply reality and there is no such thing as "mind".

Quoting creativesoul

There is no meaning without something external to thought/belief. So, if consciousness consists in/of thought/belief, then there is no consciousness without something external to it.

One finger cannot point at itself...

Spatiotemporal distinction requires a plurality.

I'll address both of these together. Basically you're argument is that since we refer to reality and mind as two separate things, then it doesn't follow that they could be one thing, as if the words point to two different objects. Thus, since object X is separate from object Y, then my argument is incoherent or possibly inconsistent. This, to me is just a misunderstanding of how language is used. Use is key (Wittgensteinian use) here. It's true that sometimes words do refer to objects, but words don't exclusively point to objects. There are two many uses of the words mind and reality to give them such precise definitions. If you define these words as you have done, of course you're conclusion is going to be, " If 'mind' is the only thing to exist, then the 'mind' is simply reality and there is no such thing as 'mind'." It's like (Wittgensteinian e.g.) defining all games as board games, and thus someone who calls "playing catch" a game is incorrect because it doesn't fit the definition, or their definition.

This, it seems to me is a perfect example of how many of us create problems that don't exist. Part of the problem here is with the word reality, it's just to vague a term to try to fit it into some precise definition, that is, as something definitely separate from the mind. And since reality is objective, then it has to be separate from the mind. You're definition is keeping you locked into a particular view, as if the word has some definite sense (word = object).

I think both of you have fallen prey to this problem.

Nah Sam...

I understand Witt's point about "game", and grant it. Moreover, I understand how conceptual frameworks limit and/or delimit what can be sensibly said according to them. I'm also a fan of the Speech Act theorists. There's more to it than comparing senses of a term...

My point was on the level of existential contingency. All meaning requires something to become sign/symbol, something to become signified/symbolized, and an agent to draw the correlations/associations between them.

Reply to creativesoul Well, then you need to demonstrate that. I don't see how your argument works here.

Do you have an example/candidate of meaning that does not require and/or consist in/of what I just wrote?

Quoting creativesoul

My point was on the level of existential contingency. All meaning requires something to become sign/symbol, something to become signified/symbolized, and an agent to draw the correlations/associations between them.

This is my point, this idea, that all meaning requires something to be signified is just incorrect. Some things fall into this category but not all things. The term reality is just such an example, so is the word game. By signs I take it you mean the sounds we make when talking, or the marks we make when writing, and the symbol is that which correlates with the sign. But many words have no symbol, other than how we use them in different contexts. For example, what is the symbol that correlates to the sign reality. There are just rules of use (or grammatical rules) determined by different language-games. Language is simply a form of human behavior, thus, what we do with words, and how we use them in practical situations is what's important more often than not. There is no symbol that correlates with the word five. Wittgenstein points this out in his example "buying five red apples," and what's important here is the use of the word five. Thus the idea that there is something that exists, an ontology associated with the word is wrong-headed. Now you know this, so maybe I'm misinterpreting what you mean by sign and symbol.

You also said, "All meaning requires...and agent to draw the correlations/associations between them," but again this is something Wittgenstein would have said in his early philosophy (Tractatus), but it's not something that he would have said in his later philosophy (PI). You seem to be saying what many have believed throughout history, that the meaning of a word is associated with some thing, or some object out there in reality.

Quoting Sam26

I'll address both of these together. Basically you're argument is that since we refer to reality and mind as two separate things, then it doesn't follow that they could be one thing, as if the words point to two different objects. Thus, since object X is separate from object Y, then my argument is incoherent or possibly inconsistent. This, to me is just a misunderstanding of how language is used. Use is key (Wittgensteinian use) here. It's true that sometimes words do refer to objects, but words don't exclusively point to objects. There are two many uses of the words mind and reality to give them such precise definitions. If you define these words as you have done, of course you're conclusion is going to be, " If 'mind' is the only thing to exist, then the 'mind' is simply reality and there is no such thing as 'mind'." It's like (Wittgensteinian e.g.) defining all games as board games, and thus someone who calls "playing catch" a game is incorrect because it doesn't fit the definition, or their definition.

This, it seems to me is a perfect example of how many of us create problems that don't exist. Part of the problem here is with the word reality, it's just to vague a term to try to fit it into some precise definition, that is, as something definitely separate from the mind. And since reality is objective, then it has to be separate from the mind. You're definition is keeping you locked into a particular view, as if the word has some definite sense (word = object).

I think both of you have fallen prey to this problem.

Meaning is not use, and I have made that argument over and over again on these forums.

The thing is that there is a consensus on the use of the terms, "mind" and "reality". Look them up in the dictionary and you will see that they are mutually exclusive. Sure you can use any word you want to refer to whatever you want, but if you expect me to understand you, then you'd need to use the words how I understand them, not how you understand them.

Not only that, but saying that reality is actually a mind, just obliterates the definition of mind, and makes it the definition of reality. So to say that there still is a mind, is to confuse to the two. I don't see how a mind can exist all by itself and then you'd an all new explanation for the relationship between the contents of the "mind" reality, which includes the will and attention.

Reply to Harry Hindu I'm sorry but you're way off on this. Read some Wittgenstein.

Quoting Sam26

You also said, "All meaning requires...and agent to draw the correlations/associations between them," but again this is something Wittgenstein would have said in his early philosophy (Tractatus), but it's not something that he would have said in his later philosophy (PI). You seem to be saying what many have believed throughout history, that the meaning of a word is associated with some thing, or some object out there in reality.

While i'm not myself within this camp of opinion, there are many self-proclaimed Wittgensteinians who interpret Witty's supposed "private language argument" as a 'transcendental argument' for the existence of the external world that attempts to turn the language of idealism against itself. And this interpretation sounds along the lines of what I understand creative soul to be saying.

Recall Wittgenstein's comparison of the meaning of a word with something you walk up to.

Aren't such examples of "meaning as use" the essence of transcendental arguments for realism?

If the nouns of one's language are spoken in order to convey information, either to oneself when one talks to oneself in introspection, or to other people when one speaks to others, then the nouns of one's language must be referring to something outside of one's immediate experience when one speaks - for otherwise one is merely re-signalling one's immediate experience in a private language that is defined purely in terms of his immediate experience - a pointless task surely?

Ergo, to be motivated to say a noun with the objective of discussing the existence of a fact is part of what it means to assert that something exists externally to one's immediate experience. Hence, the realist hopes, scepticism of the external world in the sense of doubting that nothing lies outside of one's immediate experience, is meaningless and nonsensical. For to doubt the external world is to already objectify it.

The reason I don't fall for this argument and doubt that Wittgenstein would have supported it, is because I understand Wittgenstein to be a verificationist in spirit who sought to treat illnesses of the mind as opposed to legitimising pseudo-philosophical problems.

For it is nonsensical for a verificationist, who rejects both the meaning of non-empirical premises and the meaning of non-empirical arguments based on pure reason, to speak of non-empirical truths that cannot eventually be grounded in first-person experience, since all so-called 'truth's must be verifiable either a priori in the imagination or a posteriori in the sense of walking up to and confirming something. The above transcendental argument I presented above isn't an empirical argument based on philosophers actual use of language, and neither is the absolute notion of an external world empirically meaningful.

Perhaps we could say, transcendental arguments are potentially useful therapies for treating anxieties over idealism, while skeptical arguments against realism are potentially useful therapies for treating nihilistic despair over realism.

But since the arguments used in both philosophical therapies not empirically verifiable arguments, they purely consist in propaganda with an intended remedial effect.

Reply to sime There is a lot of philosophy written in the name of Wittgenstein that's not really representative of his thoughts on language. I've done a lot of study over the years on Wittgenstein and most of it is done using primary sources. Much of what some philosophers believe about Wittgenstein is based on what others have interpreted, some of it's good, some not. I have a good grasp of his philosophy, but I'm sure that my own interpretations have fallen short too. To neglect his philosophy, or to sell it short, is akin to neglecting Einstein if you're a physicist. He was probably one of the greatest philosophers in the past two to three hundred years. Moreover, to not understand what he said about meaning as use, and to think that a dictionary is something other than a guide, is doing a disservice to oneself and to those who read the posts. I'm mainly referring to what Harry posted above. It's fine to disagree with Wittgenstein, but to misunderstand this very important point is to remain in confusion as far as I'm concerned. I disagree with some of Wittgenstein's metaphysics, and also what he said about ethics, but not with the core of what he wrote in the PI. On Certainty is another important work that has important implications for what it means to have knowledge.

I posted hundreds of pages of Wittgenstein in another philosophy forum, and started to post it here, but most of the philosophers in here have already read most of my posts, so it didn't get much attention. It's mostly an exegesis of Wittgenstein.

Quoting Sam26

This is my point, this idea, that all meaning requires something to be signified is just incorrect. Some things fall into this category but not all things. The term reality is just such an example, so is the word game.

I think you're misunderstanding me Sam.

The terms "reality" and "game" have meaning by virtue of how they've been used to talk about, refer to, symbolize, and/or signify all sorts of different things. The fact that there is nothing that all games have in common aside from the fact that we call them "games", doesn't bear upon the fact that the term "game" is meaningful in all of the ways that it is solely by virtue of our using it to signify and/or symbolize something other than the term itself.



[quote] Quoting Sam26

By signs I take it you mean the sounds we make when talking, or the marks we make when writing, and the symbol is that which correlates with the sign. But many words have no symbol, other than how we use them in different contexts. For example, what is the symbol that correlates to the sign reality.

I should clarify here as well. The term "reality" would be a symbol or sign. The definition would be the signified/symbolized, and the use of the term would show it's meaning by virtue of showing what's being signified/symbolized(what's being talked about).



Quoting Sam26

There are just rules of use (or grammatical rules) determined by different language-games. Language is simply a form of human behavior, thus, what we do with words, and how we use them in practical situations is what's important more often than not. There is no symbol that correlates with the word five. Wittgenstein points this out in his example "buying five red apples," and what's important here is the use of the word five. Thus the idea that there is something that exists, an ontology associated with the word is wrong-headed. Now you know this, so maybe I'm misinterpreting what you mean by sign and symbol.

The word "five" is a symbol. It symbolizes a specific quantity, as does the number. Numbers are names of quantities. The word "red" is also a symbol. It symbolizes a specific color.

The point I take Witt to be making is not that words do not symbolize/signify, but rather that not all words do in the same way. We can glean understanding regarding the roles that things other than nouns have in our language by virtue of looking at how we use language for things other than denoting.


Quoting Sam26

You also said, "All meaning requires...and agent to draw the correlations/associations between them," but again this is something Wittgenstein would have said in his early philosophy (Tractatus), but it's not something that he would have said in his later philosophy (PI). You seem to be saying what many have believed throughout history, that the meaning of a word is associated with some thing, or some object out there in reality.

That would be a more narrow reading than intended, although given the history surrounding the notion of meaning, and the inherent philosophical baggage of almost any key term, it's not at all surprising nor unexpected.

I would only clarify here by virtue of noting that that which becomes symbolized can range from an object such as a tree to an emotional state of mind such as the happiness of a newlywed couple after hearing the pastor's pronouncement, and any and all combinations thereof.

Reply to creativesoul In the Tractatus what Wittgenstein means by sign are 'perceptible sounds or inscriptions,' and symbols, are signs that have been projected onto the world or reality. And propositions have a sign, because of their projective relation to the world, and a sense because it is associated with a situation. Moreover, a name is a sign that has been associated with an object. Of course Wittgenstein is using name and object as the smallest parts of propositions and facts respectively.

Symbols are signs that have a projection in the world, so, since I'm writing about Wittgenstein, I'm using these terms in the Wittgensteinian sense.

In Wittgenstein's later philosophy he continues to talk about signs, and what gives signs meaning, but what gives signs their life is not some thing associated with them, as he thought in the Tractatus, but their use.

You seem to be confusing signs and symbols, and in places are referring to symbols as signs. Thus the term tree is a sign, and the symbol is the tree. The sign points to the symbol (the thing) associated with the sign. When we type or write, we type or write the sign. Propositions are also signs that have a sense, and in the Tractatus, that sense is associated with some thing, but in the PI, it's use that gives the proposition its sense.

So when referring to reality, there is no thing to associate with the sign, the key is how we use the term in a variety of ways. Some philosophers want to give the word a definite sense, that is, a precise definition, however, that doesn't exist. There are just a multiplicity of uses that have a sense in a particular context.

And to get back to my point with Sime, definitions are just guides, they don't give us, nor could they cover all possible uses, there are just too many possible uses. This can be seen in trying to use dictionary definitions to cover each and every possible use of the term game. The term reality is just like the term game, probably more so.

I'm using the terms differently and rightly so Sam. I reject logical atomism.

On my view, symbols symbolize, and signs signify. Symbolic meaning arises from the former and significant meaning arises from the latter. Modern convention has it that all theories of meaning are based upon one, the other, or both.

They both require an agent to draw correlations between that which becomes sign/symbol and that which becomes significant/symbolized.

Or, to translate that into the scheme you're implementing...

Meaning requires an agent to draw correlations between that which becomes sign and that which becomes symbol.

Quoting creativesoul

Do you have an example/candidate of meaning that does not require and/or consist in/of what I just wrote?

Is @Sapientia messing around with people’s quotes again? :)

Reply to creativesoul The later Wittgenstein is not a logical atomist. I'll stick with his later philosophy when it comes to language, because, I believe, it clarifies linguistic problems, such as the ones we're talking about.

Sam, I honestly do not find that later Witt is incompatible with my position.

Reply to creativesoul But your replies don't to seem to fit with my understanding of the later W., and much of the reading I've done on W. Who are you reading? I haven't seen anyone describe sign and symbol the way you do. Maybe you can refer me to someone.

I think our conversation would be more helped by virtue of my pointing out that nothing I've said negates and/or refutes Witt's insight into looking at how we use language as a means for understanding different ways that we attribute meaning.

The difference between the use of "sign" and "symbol" have no bearing that I can see. They are tangential and seem irrelevant. Although, it very well may be problematic at the level of discourse that begins discussing the content of thought/belief. I mean, he does hold to the historical conventional notion of proposition, and propositions are not equivalent to thought/belief.

To directly answer your question...

As far as Witt's stuff goes, I've read the Tractatus, On Certainty, PI, The studies for PI(blue and brown books), KT Fann's Wittgenstein's Conception of Philosophy, Remarks on Colour, Culture and Value, and a couple of other compilations... I still have hard copies of them all, if you wonder which versions...

HarperPerennial, UC Press Berkeley,University of Chicago

Reply to creativesoul I was just wondering because we're pretty far apart on some of this stuff, so I thought you may have been reading something other than what I was reading. I too have read most of those books, although I haven't read completely through Remarks on Color, and very little on Culture and Value. Two really good books that I recently read are Ludwig Wittgenstein by Monk, and Wittgenstein, by Schroeder. KT Fann's book is really good if you want to get a good overview. I spent a lot of time reading and re-reading On Certainty, I find it fascinating.

Lately though I've been caught up in the arguments about consciousness.

On Certainty shows the trouble Witt had with explaining the relationship(s) between certainty and knowledge. I think that that may be a result of treating belief as equivalent to propositions. The fascinating part of it, to me at least, surrounds the remarkable insight that paying careful attention to what counts as 'doubt' can render, particularly with regard to his quest to set out a foundational basis, what he called "hinge propositions"; the bedrock as it were.

Reply to creativesoul Like I said, we're far apart, even your ideas of what Wittgenstein is saying in On Certainty.

I still suspect that we're not as far apart as you may think. I'll take the time to set out the ways in which my position is compatible with Witt's notion of meaning as use sometime in the next few days. I'll use PI...

Reply to Sam26 That's not an argument against anything I said. I can just say that you're way off on this because you read Wittgenstein. Meaning is not the use of words.

Quoting Harry Hindu

Meaning is not the use of words.

Witt doesn't say that. No one that I know of holds to that simplistic notion at face value.

Using words does both shows and attributes meaning.

Witt from the Investigations...

When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards something, I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out. Their intention was shewn by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of all peoples: the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movement of other parts of the body, and the tone of voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding something. Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified; and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires.

Witt also from the Investigations(referencing Tractatus)...

These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence of human language. It is this: the individual words in language name objects—sentences are combinations of such names.——In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands. Augustine does not speak of there being any difference between kinds of word. If you describe the learning of language in this way you are, I believe, thinking primarily of nouns like "table", "chair", "bread", and of people's names, and only secondarily of the names of certain actions and properties; and of the remaining kinds of word as something that will take care of itself."

Quoting creativesoul

The point I take Witt to be making is not that words do not symbolize/signify, but rather that not all words do in the same way. We can glean understanding regarding the roles that things other than nouns have in our language by virtue of looking at how we use language for things other than denoting.

Quoting creativesoul

I think our conversation would be more helped by virtue of my pointing out that nothing I've said negates and/or refutes Witt's insight into looking at how we use language as a means for understanding different ways that we attribute meaning.

Quoting creativesoul

Witt doesn't say that. No one that I know of holds to that simplistic notion at face value.

Using words does both shows and attributes meaning.

It's not the use of words that is meaning, as the same string of words can mean different things. Meaning is tied to the cause of the words being spoken or written, which would be the intent of the speaker or writer.

Quoting creativesoul

"When they (my elders) named some object, and accordingly moved towards something, I saw this and I grasped that the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out. Their intention was shewn by their bodily movements, as it were the natural language of all peoples: the expression of the face, the play of the eyes, the movement of other parts of the body, and the tone of voice which expresses our state of mind in seeking, having, rejecting, or avoiding something. Thus, as I heard words repeatedly used in their proper places in various sentences, I gradually learnt to understand what objects they signified; and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my own desires."

This was Wittgenstein quoting Augustine.

These words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence of human language. It is this: the individual words in language name objects—sentences are combinations of such names.——In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands. Augustine does not speak of there being any difference between kinds of word. If you describe the learning of language in this way you are, I believe, thinking primarily of nouns like "table", "chair", "bread", and of people's names, and only secondarily of the names of certain actions and properties; and of the remaining kinds of word as something that will take care of itself.

And this is him describing Augustine's view.

He then spends a lot of time showing the problem with this view.

Reply to Harry Hindu Consider the following Harry: When we teach a child the use of certain words we sometimes do it by using the ostensive definition model, that is, by pointing to an object and giving it a name. For example, I say cup, and I then point to the object associated with the the word cup. We may do this a number of times before the child starts to associate the word with the object. However, note that the way we are able to tell if the child has used the word correctly, is if they demonstrate the proper association - word/object. So do they use the word correctly in a particular context? For example, you tell them to get a cup, and they bring the cup. If they brought a pencil, then they would not have used the word correctly. One does not teach the meaning of the word cup first, one teaches the child how to use the word first, meaning comes later.

This would also be seen in primitive man, before the advent of writing. Primitive man may have a sound associated with a particular action, a grunt or some such noise. However, if you don't perform the correct action associated with the sound, then you don't understand how the word is used within a community of language users. It's the community who establishes the correct use of the words, that is, they have established implicit rules associated with the noises they make. Note that there are no dictionaries at this point, they don't come along until much later in history. Moreover, when someone decides to write down meanings, these meanings come from how words are used in a variety of ways and contexts.

Ah. Yeah. That may be right. Turns out I do not have a hard copy of the PI.

Reply to creativesoul Sorry, had to edit out that link. The book is still in copyright, so I'm pretty sure it's illegal to host (and link to, I guess).

Quoting Sam26

Consider the following Harry: When we teach a child the use of certain words we sometimes do it by using the ostensive definition model, that is, by pointing to an object and giving it a name. For example, I say cup, and I then point to the object associated with the the word cup. We may do this a number of times before the child starts to associate the word with the object. However, note that the way we are able to tell if the child has used the word correctly, is if they demonstrate the proper association - word/object. So do they use the word correctly in a particular context? For example, you tell them to get a cup, and they bring the cup. If they brought a pencil, then they would not have used the word correctly. One does not teach the meaning of the word cup first, one teaches the child how to use the word first, meaning comes later.

When you say, "Bring me the cup." and all they learned was the action of pointing to the cup when the sound, "cup" is heard, then why don't they just point to the cup, when you say that command? Wouldn't they need to learn the meaning of "bring" and "me"? Doesn't that require different actions and different lessons? Again, what they would be learning is what the words refer to. "Bring" is an action, not an object, and "me" refers to the self speaking the words. Your words refer to an action, which is why the child would perform an action, not recite more words.


Quoting Sam26

This would also be seen in primitive man, before the advent of writing. Primitive man may have a sound associated with a particular action, a grunt or some such noise. However, if you don't perform the correct action associated with the sound, then you don't understand how the word is used within a community of language users. It's the community who establishes the correct use of the words, that is, they have established implicit rules associated with the noises they make. Note that there are no dictionaries at this point, they don't come along until much later in history. Moreover, when someone decides to write down meanings, these meanings come from how words are used in a variety of ways and contexts.

To say that an action has to be performed in concert with a spoken sound in order to teach someone what the word means, shows that words mean what it refers to, not it's use. The cup is a perfect example. If you teach child the meaning of "cup", you end up having to show them a cup, not just use the word in a sentence. This shows that the meaning of a word is what it is referring to, not how it is used. If you are showing a child how to use the word, you'd have to use every sentence that the word "cup" can be used in. If you want to show what the word means, you have to show them a cup.

Quoting Michael

?creativesoul Sorry, had to edit out that link. The book is still in copyright, so I'm pretty sure it's illegal to host (and link to, I guess).

It said as much, with exception(s) in the US...

Quoting Harry Hindu

No one that I know of holds to that simplistic notion at face value.

Using words does both shows and attributes meaning.
— creativesoul
It's not the use of words that is meaning...

I didn't say it was.

...the same string of words can mean different things. Meaning is tied to the cause of the words being spoken or written, which would be the intent of the speaker or writer.

Indeed. Some of it is. Not all. That's Witt's insight. Not all meaning is attributed in the way that history - at his time - held it to be...

Quoting Sam26

One does not teach the meaning of the word cup first, one teaches the child how to use the word first, meaning comes later.

Perhaps we do differ a bit on important matters Sam...

On my view, and I took Witt to be skirting around it as well, teaching the child how to use words teaches them meaning.

Reply to creativesoul How we use words tells us something about what we mean. My point is that it's not dependent on a dictionary or objects. It's dependent on the language-games associated with language users.

What's not dependent on objects? Meaning?

Well, that may be a point of contention. Maybe not. What counts as being dependent on objects?

Existentially dependent?

I would say that, as a matter of complexity, all meaning is existentially contingent upon objects. I would also say that not all meaning is attributed by virtue of naming objects.

Since questions have become apparent in terms of how meaning emerges within language, I've decided to give a more in depth analysis of this idea in terms of how I believe Wittgenstein handles this question.

In Wittgenstein's Tractatus (his early philosophy) meaning is associated with an object, that is, the object for which the word stands is it's meaning. This was the traditional view of language since Augustine, and to be fair the ostensive definition model (associated with certain words) does account for a large class of words, but not all words. Thus, mastering the use of language consisted in learning the names of objects according to many traditionalists. Wittgenstein points out that one seems to be mainly thinking of specific words like chair, pencil, cup, etc, but not words like soon, five, that, this, time etc.

Wittgenstein uses the example of someone going to the store with a note that reads "five red apples." Now we can imagine the objects associated with apple and red (a color chart for e.g.), but no such object appears for the number five. The word five belongs to a different category of words, and although one can associate the objects in terms of apple and red, no such thing emerges in terms of the word five, only how the shopkeeper uses the word. So in terms of the ostensive definition model, what does the word five refer to? I suppose one could have an ontology of numbers that associates number words with abstract objects. Nevertheless, there is a distinction between objects associated with apple, that is, a thing with spatial extension, but nothing like this emerges with the word five, it has no spatial thing associated with it.

The problem of course is that certain words cause a kind of "mental cramp," we feel that there must be some thing directly associated with these words - something we can point to. For example, "what is truth," "what is beauty," and "what is time," and thus we come up against the source of philosophical bewilderment, as Wittgenstein pointed out.

The tendency is to want to lump all words into the same category, that is, something exterior to the word, as if all words get their life from something external. Of course it's not just that we want to associate words with some objective thing, sometimes we are tempted to associate words or propositions with internal mental events, which is just as incorrect.

Words have a variety of uses in a variety of contexts, thus we understand them by understanding this multiplicity. We should think of language as an activity of uses, like tools in a tool box which have a variety of uses.

It's not that use necessarily drives meaning, because one can always use a word incorrectly. It's use coupled with language-games within and amongst language-users, and the implicit and sometimes explicit use of rules associated with such use.

The other problem of course is our need for precision, which is why philosophers and others are always trying to find definitions that add precision to a word or theory. Again, it's true of some words that there are very precise definitions, triangle for example, but not true of words like perfect, exact, game, etc. There are so many philosophical problems that could be eliminated if one simply understood how language works. Most or many of the philosophical problems in these threads are related to misunderstandings of language.

Reply to creativesoul Perfect, then we we agree that meaning has to do with causation. A cause can be an intent, or some other cause, like the growth of a tree throughout the year causing tree rings. The tree rings mean the age of the tree, just as a spoken or written word is caused by the intent of the speaker or writer and mean what the speaker intends.

Reply to Harry Hindu

Meaning is related to causation, but it is not absent thought/belief. In other words, when there is no thought/belief there can be no meaning. Meaning is attributed.

Reply to Sam26

Nice post Sam. Taken the the beginning of the PI, particularly the part I posted and what immediately followed(five red apples)... I find no disagreement. Still wondering what I've written(aside from using the terms "sign" and "symbol" in a different sense than Witt) that you find incompatible with what Witt was getting at?

Quoting creativesoul

There is no meaning without something external to thought. So, if consciousness consists of thought, then there is no consciousness without something external to it.

I'm not sure I agree with this. I guess it depends on what you mean by external to thought. Let's consider a thought experiment. Let's suppose that there are a group of us existing as brains in a vat, and let's further suppose that the reality we are experiencing is fed into us via electrodes. Thus, everything we experience is within the mind/brain, all of us could be linked into a reality that we perceive to be independent of us, but actually all of it is happening within our minds. All of us can communicate via language, thus the meaning we attach to the words would have the same impact as any language, but it would be all internal, even though we believe we are seeing real things, objective things, it wouldn't really be external to what we thought. It would appear to our senses to be external, it would feel like we could move from place to place, but it would be a kind of illusion based on what our brains were fed via the electrodes.

Thus according to this thought experiment meaning wouldn't be external to what we thought, that is, we would derive all meaning based on the illusion of reality, the illusion of an objective reality.

Quoting creativesoul

Meaning is related to causation, but it is not absent thought/belief. In other words, when there is no thought/belief there can be no meaning. Meaning is attributed.

So, if there wasn't anyone looking at the tree rings, then the tree rings don't mean the age of the tree? What you are saying is that there isn't any cause and effect relationship independent of a mind. What you are arguing for is solipsism.

Quoting Harry Hindu

So, if there wasn't anyone looking at the tree rings, then the tree rings don't mean the age of the tree?

Tree rings become meaningful by virtue of an agent making a connection between them and an other thing or things. In this case, tree rings have been connected to the tree's age. Until that connection is drawn/made, the rings have no meaning.

What you are saying is that there isn't any cause and effect relationship independent of a mind. What you are arguing for is solipsism.

That's neither what I'm saying nor a consequence of what I'm saying.

Quoting Sam26

Let's consider a thought experiment. Let's suppose that there are a group of us existing as brains in a vat, and let's further suppose that the reality we are experiencing is fed into us via electrodes. Thus, everything we experience is within the mind/brain, all of us could be linked into a reality that we perceive to be independent of us, but actually all of it is happening within our minds. All of us can communicate via language, thus the meaning we attach to the words would have the same impact as any language, but it would be all internal, even though we believe we are seeing real things, objective things, it wouldn't really be external to what we thought. It would appear to our senses to be external, it would feel like we could move from place to place, but it would be a kind of illusion based on what our brains were fed via the electrodes.

Thus according to this thought experiment meaning wouldn't be external to what we thought, that is, we would derive all meaning based on the illusion of reality, the illusion of an objective reality.

Even in this absurd case, the electrodes are external to the thought/belief.

Reply to creativesoul The point is to show that your awareness can be completely internal. One could even imagine, without contradiction, everything completely generated by a mind or minds, without external stimulus at all. All reality could be generated by a mind.

One cannot imagine, without contradiction, that everything is completely generated by a mind/minds. The position itself requires thinking about thought/belief. That requires language. Language... shared meaning. Shared meaning... a plurality of minds. A plurality of minds... well...

Witt's beetle in a box applies here... no?

Reply to creativesoul I'm not talking about one mind. I'm talking about minds (plural) sharing a reality, as in the thought experiment above. By the way, thinking or thought does not require language. Are you saying that primitive man before the advent of language couldn't think, or didn't have thoughts? Wittgenstein also mentions this in On Certainty. Animals show their beliefs, by what they do, and so do we. You can observe someone's belief through the way they act, so beliefs aren't dependent on language.

Thinking about one's own thought/belief requires language.

A plurality of minds presupposes something external to thought/belief.

Reply to creativesoul Well, I mean you can keep repeating yourself, but that doesn't mean you're correct.

I agree. Repetition of 'X' does not make 'X' true.

Logical possibility alone constitutes neither adequate justification nor warrant. Brain in vat arguments aren't at all compelling to me for that reason.

You and I can have differences in what we believe Sam. No problem. I simply do not see how Witt's writing(later years) causes an issue with/for my own. That's all I was getting at.