Should we accept necessitarianism due to parsimony?
Necessitarianism is the position that absolutely nothing about reality could have been otherwise in any way whatsoever. The opposing position, what I will call contingentarianism, claims that at least something about reality could have been otherwise in some way or other.
Necessitarianism suggests there is exactly one way reality can be, which is the way it actually is. In contrast, contingentarianism suggests there is more than one way reality could have been.
When applying Occam’s Razor to these two positions, shouldn’t we accept necessitarianism over contingentarianism due to parsimony?
Necessitarianism suggests there is exactly one way reality can be, which is the way it actually is. In contrast, contingentarianism suggests there is more than one way reality could have been.
When applying Occam’s Razor to these two positions, shouldn’t we accept necessitarianism over contingentarianism due to parsimony?
Comments (21)
No, not on that basis because, if for no other reason, both positions posit only a single entity / principle. To paraphrase Einstein: "Everything should be made as simple as possible, but no simpler."
A couple of questions:
1) Are there any physical consequences if necessitarianism is correct and contingentarianism is not?
2) Is there any way to determine whether necessitarianism is true and contingentarianism is not?
If the answer to these two questions is "no," and I suspect they are, then the difference is either metaphysical or meaningless.
A third question:
3) Are there any philosophical consequences if necessitarianism is correct and contingentarianism is not?
If the answer to that question is "no," then the difference is meaningless.
Doesn’t contingentarianism suggest that there genuinely are, in some sense of the word ‘are’, ways reality could have been? It must hold this position because if it didn’t then it would collapse into necessitarianism.
So if contingentarianism holds to that, then it adds additional assumptions about reality that necessitarianism does not, thus making it less parsimonious.
Quoting T Clark
It depends on what you mean by physical consequences. If necessitarianism is true, then libertarian free will definitely cannot exist because all human choices and actions would have to unfold they way they do.
Quoting T Clark
There might be a way to determine which is true logically, but I do not think we can determine which is true empirically.
Quoting T Clark
It definitely negates the possibility of libertarian free will.
I think there would have to be proof that separates some fundamental laws from their derivatives for contingentarianism to work. We can only meaningfully speak about things in existence so I think that dictates everything.
I agree. Contingentarianism suggests multiple ways reality could have been, but there is nothing in reality that implies this is the case.
I've heard people try to say "if my arm was an inch away it would be possible" and it seems trivial but that entails different physical principles which entails different math then logic, ontology all the way back to the most fundamental law that we can perceive which is a change of "is" but I'm not sure that's coherent because all we can perceive is "is" so even if it changes it's an epistemic limit.
I don't understand why this would be true. I don't see why either philosophical option couldn't be consistent with determinism.
On the other hand, I did think of a potential philosophical effect - If necessitarianism were true, then the fine-tuning argument for God would never arise.
Quoting Paul Michael
To me, that means it is a metaphysical question. I won't inflict my oft preached sermon on metaphysical entities here.
If one takes libertarian (or even certain versions of compatibilist) free will to mean that one could have done otherwise, then necessitarianism being true would make this impossible because nothing in reality could have been otherwise, including our choices and actions.
Quoting T Clark
Yeah, that’s true.
Quoting T Clark
It is a metaphysical question without doubt, not going to dispute that.
By the way, the reason I posted this question in the first place is because I read Amy Karofsky’s recent defense of necessitarianism in her new book A Case for Necessitarianism. It’s a very interesting read if anyone is curious.
Necessarily: what is, is; what was, was; and what will be, will be That's ok. However:
What is, necessarily is etc. That will take some establishing.
Counterexamples:
I could have made this post longer. I could not have made it a million words long.
The ball could have broken a window. The ball could not have destroyed the whole house.
Hence: contingentarianism.
How is that different from plain old, vanilla determinism?
Yeah, more or less identically with actualism (a position I favor contra both possibilism & modal realism).
This is like saying that predictions such as "Black Holes" and the "Cosmological Constant" which are implied by, but not described in, General Relativity make the theory less parsimonius than Newtonian physics. As I understand the topic, contingentism, like necessitism, posits only one fundamental principle – acausality or causality (like 'stochastical or deterministic'), respectively – and the equivalent quantity of these respective posits do not themselves in comparison to one another raise the issue of parsimony. Ockham's Razor only pertains to posits, or assumptions, (of entities) and not to conceptual implications (or theoretical predictions) derived from them.
Necessitarianism is stronger than determinism because determinism allows for the possibility that the causal chain as a whole could have been different, even though every cause within the chain could not have happened differently, given the antecedent causes.
:lol:
To me, as the saying goes - it's a distinction without a difference.
So two different causal chains can lead to the same outcome?
Seems to me there is a difference, which is the cause for the two different words. Two different causal chains can lead to the same outcome. Determinism. Necessitarianism says there can be one such chain only.
Yes. The ball could have broken the window. Hailstones could have broken the window.
Quoting EugeneW
OK, but it seems to be false and there seem to be knock-down counterexamples. I could be wrong. But I could not be writing this from the moon. If I'm wrong, then I could have written something else that was not wrong. But I could not have written it - wrong or right - if I did not have lungs.
Necessitarianism would be simple and straightforward. All counterfactuals would be false. There would be no modality. Contingency entails all kinds of woulds, coulds and shoulds.
If parsimony is our only criterion, necessitarianism wins by a mile.
If we are not bothered whether our theory is true or not, let's go with necessitarianism.
Parsimonious people buy only the necessary. Only an object pushing can break the glass. The object is enough. Regardless you break it by hand, stone or hard wind.
Quoting Cuthbert
Why is that? If we're not bothered with how the window broke?
If we are not bothered whether our theory is true or not......
I prefer my theories to be true. So I'm giving necessetarianism a miss, despite its undoubted attractions.
Off the top of my head, I think we can come up with multiple hypotheses for both scenarios with varying levels of complexity and that would be our cue to whip out our novacula occami and shave off the superfluous and reduce to the bear essentials. I like beards though!