Did Heidegger save Philosophy from Psychologism?
I've read somewhere that Heidi aimed to save philosophy from Psychologism.
Psychologism is a family of philosophical positions, according to which certain psychological facts, laws, or entities play a central role in grounding or explaining certain non-psychological facts, laws, or entities. (Source: Wikipedia)
I never got to read the entire B&T. Before i venture on reading the rest of the book, I would like to know if he succeeded in saving philosophy from psychologism from those who have certain expertise in Heidi. If yes, then how did he manage to do it?
Psychologism is a family of philosophical positions, according to which certain psychological facts, laws, or entities play a central role in grounding or explaining certain non-psychological facts, laws, or entities. (Source: Wikipedia)
I never got to read the entire B&T. Before i venture on reading the rest of the book, I would like to know if he succeeded in saving philosophy from psychologism from those who have certain expertise in Heidi. If yes, then how did he manage to do it?
Comments (3)
I'm not a continentalist at all but I believe the distinction was between phenomenology (there are objective ways to understand viewpoints, so requiring an external to communicate perspectives) vs psychologism as you've explained.
I can't speak to what Heidegger said particularly.
Nice
Considering that the alternative is between
- logic depending just on unrealiable states of mind and
- logic depending on how things actually work in reality
we cannot think that Heidegger would ever criticize psychologism by choosing the second chance. Choosing the second chance would mean considering reality as objectively independent, which Heidegger didn’t think: for Heidegger being is not being, for Heidegger being is being there, which is, being somewhere, in some time context, which makes reality not stable and independent.
I think that Heidegger criticized psychologism because he perceived it as equivalent to the realistic option: thinking that everything depends on our mind appeared to him just like another realism, which is, the realism of our mind.
In order to escape from the trap of 1) realism of reality and 2) realism of our mind, he refused both, psychologism and realism, choosing instead a unified idea of being conceived as relative not mechanically to our mind, but relative in itself, which is, being depending from its relationship to time, being conceived as something that is relative even if we as subjects do not exist.