Reply to Agent Smith Fallacious. An omnipotent person has free will, but it does not follow that a person who has free will is omnipotent.
Also, being able to do what you want is not sufficient for free will. Consider Jack, who has been programmed only ever to want to do what he can, in fact, do. Well, Jack does not have true free will, even though he always does what he wants. So, true free will does not just involve doing what one wants, it also involves being unconstrained by others. That's true of an omnipotent being, but it is not true of Jack.
It can also be true of beings who are not omnipotent, so long as the way they are is not due to external causes.
Can a being be omnipotent without free will?
If I can do anything, but someone/something else decides what I'll be doing, what's the point of being omnipotent?
Can a being possess free will and not be omnipotent? Restrictions on being able to do what one chooses/wants to do. What's the point of just being able to want to do things, but being unable to do those things?
I asked the same question! Can an omnipotent god kill himself? Yes! I wouldn't be surprised if he's done that already!
Yeah, I don't think we are the originators of such questions towards that which is proposed omnipotent. But my question was less gender-biased than yours. :rofl:
There are many such questions:
Can that which is omnipotent create something more powerful than itself?
Can it reproduce at all?
Would it be aware of its own existence and its own status as omnipotent?
How did it reach this conclusion/gain this knowledge that it became omnipotent, did it 'become' at all?
Is Omnipotence possible without omniscience and omnipresence?
Yeah, being omnipotent, omnipresent, omnibenevolent, and omniscient makes one omni-impotent, omni-absent, omni-malevolent, and omni-ignorant. Those omnigods have got it all!
I asked the same question! Can an omnipotent god kill himself? Yes! I wouldn't be surprised if he's done that already!
So, if it killed itself, I take it that it just sprung back to life instantly. Any 'in-between' time would be a period of 'oblivion' and in the human definition of oblivion, there is no moment of awareness within which you can enact your own recreation. If the recreation is instant then was this omnipotent actually dead at any point during the time it was killing itself? At least in the way that humans perceive dead.
I have asked these questions of others before, regarding omnipotence, and I usually get the answer 'You are trying to conceive that which the human conscience cannot conceive.' Which is a total killjoy response! In my non-omnipotent opinion.
Free Will (can do anything one wants) = Omnipotence (can do anything one wants)
I don't think your definition of "free will" is accurate. First of all, I am presuming that you are referring to libertarian free will, because compatibilism has no problem admitting that a being can have "free will" without ever being able to do whatever they want (i.e. soft determinism). Second of all, in relation to libertarian free will, at its most basic definition, it is not the ability to do whatever you want: it is the ability to do whatever you want in relation to oneself. I could, hypothetically, have full control over my own thoughts (thusly will them as I please) and yet have zero control over objects: I would still be an agent of "free will" even though I cannot do as I please in relation to the totality of existing things. Third of all, omnipotence can be interpreted two ways: that which is literally all powerful or that which is logically all powerful. In regards the former, it is equivalent to holding that a square circle exists and, therefore, that is how odd, logically impossible, paradoxes arise (due to non-truth-apt claims being evaluated as if they are truth-apt): great example is can an omnipotent being create a rock it can't lift? This is only puzzling, just like asking "how far can I throw a square triangle", if one doesn't realize that it isn't truth-apt due to its logical impossibility. With regards to the latter interpretation of omnipotence, the rules of logic and reason dictate not that the being necessarily does or does not have "free will", but that it cannot "have and not have" "free will". I think a key aspect to consider here is the fact that tying will to complete power (as I think you did in your definition:"can do whatever it wants", so to speak) requires that we consider the motive when contemplating whether such a being would require "free will" or not (as it can't have both). Imagine there's two omnipotent beings: the first's will is motivated towards controlling the second's actions. As long as the second's will never fixates (becomes motivated) on breaking from the grasp of the other, there's no contradiction here to be found and, logically subsequently, the second would be omnipotent without "free will", whereas the second would have "free will" (as far as the given context provides). And since the first is omnipotent and is fixated on controlling the second, the second will will never become fixated on the first and, therefore, will never acquire free will as long as first persists. The reason this is the case is because when you define "free will" in relation to the will and its produced action, then it is a matter of what that being's will exerts, not that that being is aware of all the possibilities that it could, being omnipotent, exert. If the omnipotent being's will fixates on knowing all logically possible exertions it could perform, then it would necessarily acquire them. But, however, if that being's will never fixates on it, then it will not acquire such knowledge. In other words, a logically omnipotent being has full power to do as he wills, which is in relation to the motive behind that will: if the will manifests that action A should occur, then it will, but if it doesn't manifest it, then it won't. This means quite literally that an omnipotent being is necessarily of "free will" if it wills that it should be--prior to such, it is only known, given what I have hitherto stated, that the being either (1) has "free will" or (2) it does not (but not both).
hird of all, omnipotence can be interpreted two ways: that which is literally all powerful or that which is logically all powerful. In regards the former, it is equivalent to holding that a square circle exists
That's false. Being able to make a square circle is obviously not equivalent to actually making one, and thus in holding - as I do - that an omnipotent being can do absolutely anything at all, I am not affirming the actual existence of square circles. That's like thinking that becasue I 'can' throw the boiling hot cup of coffee into my own face, I have just done so. No I haven't.
When it comes to free will, it is - of course - contested exactly what it involves. But it doesn't matter what it involves, for no matter what it involves, an omnipotent being is going to have it.
Free Will (can do anything one wants) = Omnipotence (can do anything one wants)
No...
Frankfurt style free will and libertarian free will differ starkly. The latter, I'd wager, is far more characteristic of an omnipotent agent's free will, although the majority of theists would take a Frankfurt interpretation in relation to that agent's interaction with logic or morals (to be part of his nature).
Omnipotence is understood in the sense of bringing about states of affairs or actualizing potential in virtue of the possibility of that states of affairs or existence of that potential (unless you're a Cartesian).
Yes. An omnipotent person can kill themselves. Why would you think otherwise?
Not necessarily: if the omnipotent agent was necessary, and the omnipotence was essential, most metaphysicians would hold that this is not possible (once again, barring Cartesians).
Not necessarily: if the omnipotent agent was necessary, and the omnipotence was essential, most metaphysicians would hold that this is not possible (once again, barring Cartesians).
That just demonstrates the falsity of those ideas. An omnipotent person can always divest themselves of their omnipotence, else they would not be omnipotent (it is absurd to suppose that a person who is unable to do something is nevertheless omnipotent). Thus, no omnipotent person is omnipotent 'necessarily' but rather they are omnipotent contingently. Indeed, there will be no necessary truths if there is an omnipotent being, for the omnipotent being will have the power to render any truth false if they so wish. Thus, all truths - including the truth that there is an omnipotent being - will be contingent if, that is, there is an omnipotent being (which there is).
An omnipotent being is able to do anything at all. Destroy itself. Make a square circle. Anything. Those who insist otherwise are demonstrably confused. I do not deny they exist, of course. I deny they are thinking very clearly.
What you said about Frankfurt type cases was mistaken. One can be a libertarian 'and' a Frankfurtian (plenty are). What Frankfurt type cases do - if they are successful, that is - is show that you do not need to have alternative possibilities in order to be morally responsible. But one could still argue that determinism undermines free will for other reasons.
That's false. Being able to make a square circle is obviously not equivalent to actually making one
You are correct here: I should have said "possibility" not "exists". However, this doesn't negate my point whatsoever: I can refurbish my statement as "it is equivalent to holding that a square circle is possible" and nothing changes in my argument.
I am not affirming the actual existence of square circles
Fair enough. However, a being that is literally an omnipotent being is self-contradictory, therefore my point pertained to it being equivocal to claiming a square circle is possible. I would say a square circle cannot exist, not simply that it doesn't exist in the real world right now.
But it doesn't matter what it involves, for no matter what it involves, an omnipotent being is going to have it.
As I've hopefully demonstrated in my previous post, this is not the case when one dissects it at a much deeper level.
I can refurbish my statement as "it is equivalent to holding that a square circle is possible" and nothing changes in my argument.
On the contrary, your argument now fails. For you can generate no actual contradiction from that claim. I claim that it is possible for there to be square circles. Not epistemically, of course - we can be totally certain none exist, for their existence would constitute an actual contradiction and we can be sure there are no actual contradictions. But it is metaphysically possible for there to be some, for God exists and God can do anything.
However, a being that is literally an omnipotent being is self-contradictory
No it isn't. This is the point: to generate an 'actual' contradiction you're going to have to make the mistake you previously made: you're going to have to confuse being 'able' to do something with actually doing it. There is nothing contradictory about an omnipotent being. If you think otherwise, show it without assuming that the omnipotent being has actually realized a contradiction.
That just demonstrates the falsity of those ideas. An omnipotent person can always divest themselves of their omnipotence, else they would not be omnipotent (it is absurd to suppose that a person who is unable to do something is nevertheless omnipotent). Thus, no omnipotent person is omnipotent 'necessarily' but rather they are omnipotent contingently. Indeed, there will be no necessary truths if there is an omnipotent being, for the omnipotent being will have the power to render any truth false if they so wish. Thus, all truths - including the truth that there is an omnipotent being - will be contingent if, that is, there is an omnipotent being (which there is).
This is just as the same Cartesian doctrine I was speaking about earlier. Yes, I said that /unless/ you're a Cartesian, you'd generally tend to think that omnipotent agents cannot actualize any potential that is non-logical because such potential does not exist in the first place, or bring about a contradictory state of affairs because it is not possible in the first place. Of course, a Cartesian takes the opinion that is otherwise, hence why I mentioned this in my initial comment as I am in perfect recognition of this position.
I'm of the opinion that it is not sensical to speak about any agent who is purportedly omnipotent in the Cartesian sense, because they can undermine any primitive conceptual schema we commit to (including the very idea that it can actualize any potential). It makes most sense first and foremost, for me, to stay wholly agnostic on any intrinsic features of this kind of entity. To be more clear, it is that I think supposing this kind of agents poses a bigger epistemic problem in virtue of the very claim supposing it (and any other claim).
What you said about Frankfurt type cases was mistaken. One can be a libertarian 'and' a Frankfurtian (plenty are). What Frankfurt type cases do - if they are successful, that is - is show that you do not need to have alternative possibilities in order to be morally responsible. But one could still argue that determinism undermines free will for other reasons.
Frankfurt /cases/ initially have to do with moral responsibility without free will, I agree. I'm referring to Frankfurt style /free will/, where free will is interpreted to be the actualization of whatever is in accord with an agent's higher-order volitions such that an agent can be free without being able to do otherwise. In other words, what matters is that an agent is the source of their actions. These conceptions of free will are collectively referred to as "sourcehood free will" and are primarily motivated through Frankfurt's work in two prongs: one, through Frankfurt cases, and two, through separation between internal and external reasons WRT volition. For these purposes, I call this "Frankfurt style free will".
This is just as the same Cartesian doctrine I was speaking about earlier. Yes, I said that /unless/ you're a Cartesian, you'd generally tend to think that omnipotent agents cannot actualize any potential that is non-logical because such potential does not exist in the first place, or bring about a contradictory state of affairs because it is not possible in the first place. Of course, a Cartesian takes the opinion that is otherwise, hence why I mentioned this in my initial comment as I am in perfect recognition of this position.
What's in a word? Yes, one can label positions and one can say that some would define 'omnipotence' as 'being able to make a cup of tea'. But if one is merely able to make a cup of tea, then one is not able to do anything, but just make a cup of tea. And someone who can make a cup of tea and do a whole load of other things is 'more powerful' than the mere tea-maker. So, someone who is able to do anything is more powerful than someone who is able to do most things, bar contravene the laws of logic. Thus, if we are talking about a person who has the most power possible, then we are talking about a person who can do anything whatsoever. Those who are using the label 'omnipotent' to denote a person who is not able to do everything and anything are simply using the word in a misleading way - which is, of course, their right. But it is misleading and it is not what God is. God is all powerful (omni - all - potentia - powerful: omnipotent). Again, one can use the word 'omnipotent' to mean 'a person with red hair' if one wants, but it will then not be being used to describe a defining property of God.
So, you and i both know full well that some 'define' omnipotence as being able to do all things logically possible. But when it is used in that way, it is not being used to describe an 'all powerful' being, but a being who is able to do some things and not others. Which is fine - but it is now not being used to describe 'God' and it is also, of course, not being used in a way that accords with the original meaning of the term (which means 'all powerful').
I believe in God precisely because I believe in an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good person. And an all powerful person can do anything - because it is contradictory to maintain that an all powerful person lacks the power to do some things.
I'm of the opinion that it is not sensical to speak about any agent who is purportedly omnipotent in the Cartesian sense, because they can undermine any primitive conceptual schema we commit to (including the very idea that it can actualize any potential).
That's because you are confused and have once more conflated being 'able' to do something with actually doing it. He has not actually undermined anything, has he? So everything still makes sense. And thus it is not nonsensical to talk of a person who has the ability to make everything cease to make sense (unless you are supposing him actually do have exercised the ability in question - which he hasn't). This is what you have to do to generate nonsense - to generate actual contradictions. You have to suppose him to have done what he merely has the ability to do. Ironically it is those who think an all powerful being cannot do some things who are affirming a contradiction and thus talking actual nonsense.
To be more clear, it is that I think supposing this kind of agents poses a bigger epistemic problem in virtue of the very claim supposing it (and any other claim).
That's just an article of faith on your part. What if I could prove to you that such a person exists? Would you decide, in advance, that no such proof exists? Is your agnosticism unreasonable?
I'm referring to Frankfurt style /free will/, where free will is interpreted to be the actualization of whatever is in accord with an agent's higher-order volitions such that an agent can be free without being able to do otherwise.
You seem to be confusing Frankfurt-style cases with Frankfurt's heirarchical model of moral responsibility. Someone can accept that Frankfurt-style cases refute the principle of alternative possibilities without thereby being committed to Frankfurt's heirarchical model of moral responsiblity. And the reverse is true too, for one could accept Frankfurt's heirarchical model of moral responsibility but see it as a necessary condition, not sufficient and add to it the requirement that alternative possibilities be available to the agent at decision making moments.
Anyway, Frankfurt-style cases, if they work, refute the principle of alternative possibilities. They do not thereby demonstrate compatibilism to be true (even if they help that cause) and so they do not demonstrate incompatibilism to be false (and so tehy don't demonstrate libertarianism to be false).
The sourcehood condition is neutral between compatibilist and incompatibilist conceptions of free will. That's precisely why a Frankfurtian might nevertheless be a libertarian (or incompatibilist).
Free Will (can do anything one wants) = Omnipotence (can do anything one wants)
Discuss.
Go into a Pizza Hut and Order a Big Mac.
Discussed.
How did the mods even let this thread continue? The OP does not fulfill the basic requirements.
Or is this a ploy to prove that you can do whatever you want.
On the contrary, your argument now fails. For you can generate no actual contradiction from that claim. I claim that it is possible for there to be square circles. Not epistemically, of course - we can be totally certain none exist, for their existence would constitute an actual contradiction and we can be sure there are no actual contradictions. But it is metaphysically possible for there to be some, for God exists and God can do anything.
A square circle is a logical contradiction epistemically and metaphysically: metaphysics is simply the extrapolation of the overlying instantiation of the physical world via reason which abides by logic (which are epistemic claims, unless you aren't claiming to "know" the metaphysical assertions you put forth, then it may just be beliefs). The shape of a circle cannot be that of a square, a "square circle" is a contradictio in adjecto. When you say it is metaphysically possible, what exactly do you mean? Likewise, what do you mean by epistemically impossible? When you say "we can be sure none exist", that is an empirical claim (pertaining to the objects) and a claim pertaining to the mind (a circular triangle, for instance, can't exist in the mind either), but it is important to note that we can only obtain metaphysical claims via logic and reason. Metaphysics is directly constraint to the basic principles of logic. Furthermore, if you agree that we "know" there cannot be square circles (which would be an epistemic claim), then God can't instantiate one in the universe (we "know" this).
to generate an 'actual' contradiction you're going to have to make the mistake you previously made: you're going to have to confuse being 'able' to do something with actually doing it.
If a being is 'able' to make a square circle, then it is epistemically possible for a square circle to exist. It is not epistemically possible for a square circle to exist, therefore a being is not able to make a square circle. The idea of a square circle is a contradiction, metaphysically (whatever you are implying there) and physically (whatever may be implied there).
There is nothing contradictory about an omnipotent being.
There is if one is positing literally an omnipotent being. Can it create something so heavy it cannot lift it? Can it make a nonbrick brick? No. An omnipotent being is constrained or inherently supplied with logic.
If you think otherwise, show it without assuming that the omnipotent being has actually realized a contradiction.
I am not following you here. "being has actually realized a contradiction"? The realizations of a being have no effect on the fact that it will never be able to conjure up a square circle.
What I would ask you is: what distinction between metaphysics and eptistemology makes you think a square circle is possible in one, but not the other?
Those who are using the label 'omnipotent' to denote a person who is not able to do everything and anything are simply using the word in a misleading way - which is, of course, their right.
These individuals make up the majority of how omnipotence is understood, from Thomists to Avicenna to many others. Descartes seems to be the only prominent philosopher in dissent here.
Those who are using the label 'omnipotent' to denote a person who is not able to do everything and anything are simply using the word in a misleading way - which is, of course, their right.
As I explained earlier, a Thomist still would say that God can bring about any state of affairs or actualize any potential. They simply would say that the potential to violate the laws of logic is not an existing potential, so there's nothing to actualize. On a similar avenue, being good is understood as part of God's nature, so simply God is acting as himself by never doing anything evil. Other theists use that same avenue to argue that rationality is part of God's nature to produce an orderly universe, i.e. God is simply acting as himself as to be logical. So it is not anything they understand to limit God.
That's because you are confused and have once more conflated being 'able' to do something with actually doing it. He has not actually undermined anything, has he? So everything still makes sense. And thus it is not nonsensical to talk of a person who has the ability to make everything cease to make sense (unless you are supposing him actually do have exercised the ability in question - which he hasn't). This is what you have to do to generate nonsense - to generate actual contradictions. You have to suppose him to have done what he merely has the ability to do. Ironically it is those who think an all powerful being cannot do some things who are affirming a contradiction and thus talking actual nonsense.
There's no confusion. Ability to do something entails that it can possibly occur, not that it actually occured. So God being able to change the laws of logic or create contradictions does not mean he already did so, but can do so if he wants to i.e. it is possible that this can occur. You've done nothing but misrepresent what I said.
In any case, contradictions are fortunately not possible, so there's not any instance where God can possibly create a contradiction.
If you define your God as that which has the potential to actualize contradiction or other violations of logic, I will simply default to the nonexistence of your God in virtue of my commitment to logic:
1. Contradictions are never possible.
2. If (your) God exists, contradictions are possible or can become possible
3. Therefore your God can never exist.
That's just an article of faith on your part. What if I could prove to you that such a person exists? Would you decide, in advance, that no such proof exists? Is your agnosticism unreasonable?
No such proof can exist because you can never trust any absolute rule of reason, because any absolute rule of reason can be possibly false in the presence of a God that can possibly change these rules of reason if he wishes to do so. And from the perspective of a mortal, finite agent it is not possible to differniate between what rules of reason are the case versus what rules of reason simply appear to be the case in the same fashion as the former class but are deceivingly supposed to us by the kind of God that can undermine the very laws of logic and our thoughts about them.
If you go the Cartesian route, you get the Cartesian result. It's not hard. This is just another kind of Cartesian demon but made to collapse all kinds of knowledge, including logical and mathematical facts. Therefore agnosticism is simply necessitated: you can do nothing but rationally suspend judgement if any judgement is inherently unjustifiable. But we know some judgements, like ones in virtue of the fact of my experience being an experience, are justified. Therefore, your God does not exist since he'd entail not even these judgements are justified (since even basic conclusions, like my experience being my experience, can be undermined by this God who can supposedly change the behavior of identity).
Anyway, Frankfurt-style cases, if they work, refute the principle of alternative possibilities. They do not thereby demonstrate compatibilism to be true (even if they help that cause) and so they do not demonstrate incompatibilism to be false (and so tehy don't demonstrate libertarianism to be false).
The sourcehood condition is neutral between compatibilist and incompatibilist conceptions of free will. That's precisely why a Frankfurtian might nevertheless be a libertarian (or incompatibilist).
I don't disagree with this, I elaborated in my earlier comment that I called it Frankfurt style free will not because I'm referencing Frankfurt style cases themselves rather I'm saying that it's Frankfurt style free will precisely because Frankfurtian notions (including Frankfurt cases as well as theory of volitions, which I highlighted as /different avenues/ meant to support the conclusion, not as one thing) are most often what is employed to support that conception of free will.
A square circle is a logical contradiction epistemically and metaphysically: metaphysics is simply the extrapolation of the overlying instantiation of the physical world via reason which abides by logic (which are epistemic claims, unless you aren't claiming to "know" the metaphysical assertions you put forth, then it may just be beliefs). The shape of a circle cannot be that of a square, a "square circle" is a contradictio in adjecto. When you say it is metaphysically possible, what exactly do you mean? Likewise, what do you mean by epistemically impossible? When you say "we can be sure none exist", that is an empirical claim (pertaining to the objects) and a claim pertaining to the mind (a circular triangle, for instance, can't exist in the mind either), but it is important to note that we can only obtain metaphysical claims via logic and reason. Metaphysics is directly constraint to the basic principles of logic. Furthermore, if you agree that we "know" there cannot be square circles (which would be an epistemic claim), then God can't instantiate one in the universe (we "know" this).
For something to be epistemically possible, is for us simply not to know whether it is, or is not the case. It is epistemically possible for next week's lottery numbers to be 1,2,3,4,5,6, for instance. When I say 'metaphysically possible' I simply mean that nothing stops it from being actualized in reality. I would use 'logically possible' to describe what the laws of logic permit.
Now, God is the author of the laws of logic. How do I know that? Well, two ways, but one will suffice here. I know it because the author of the laws of logic can do anything, including things forbidden by those laws, for they are her laws to make or unmake as she sees fit. And a person who is not bound by the laws of logic - not bound to be able, at most, to do all things logically possible - is a person who is more powerful than one who is. And thus God, as an omnipotent being, will be the author of the laws of logic. And thus God can do anything, include making square circles. And you can point out that a square circle violates the logical laws until you are blue in the face, the simple fact is that those laws do not bind God. And thus though logically impossible, square circles are metaphysically possible, for God could make one if she so wanted.
Incidentally, 'empirically' means 'by means of the senses'. When I said that we can be sure no square circles exist - an epistemic claim (epistemionium claimonium) - it was on the basis of just how strongly our reason represents them to not exist (nonium existio). It was not because I have looked, smelt, touched, listened to and tasted everything and concluded that no square circles exist.
If a being is 'able' to make a square circle, then it is epistemically possible for a square circle to exist.
No, it is not epistemically possible for a square circle to exist. You are confused. It is metaphysically possible for a square circle to exist if an omnipotent being exists. It is not thereby made epistemically possible. For instance, it is certain I exist. I, anyway, can be certain I exist. But it is metaphysically possible for me not to exist. So, you are confusing different sorts of possibility.
Now, I literally believe in person who can do anything. Show me how I am committed to affirming an actual contradiction. Don't keep pointing out to me that square circles involve a contradiction - I know they do. But I don't think any exist - so I am not affirming any actual contradiction. THis is unlike those who insist that an all powerful being can't do some things - they are saying something that is actually contradictory and thus being totalium idiotiums.
I am not following you here. "being has actually realized a contradiction"? The realizations of a being have no effect on the fact that it will never be able to conjure up a square circle.
What i mean by that is that you must no invalidly go from 'metaphysically possible that x' to 'x' . So, it is metaphysically possible for God to make the law of non-contradiction false. That does not mean it is false. What you are going to do is continually make this mistake.
Now, you asked, I think, whether God could commit suicide, to which the answer is a straightforward 'yes'. You have not yet explained why this answer is false.
These individuals make up the majority of how omnipotence is understood, from Thomists to Avicenna to many others. Descartes seems to be the only prominent philosopher in dissent here.
So what? Incidentally, if Descartes thought I was right, that's pretty damn good indirect evidence that I am. You do realize he's one of the greatest minds of all time?
Now, rather than citing, let's argue. For you seem more keen to tell me things I already know than to engage with my case. What matters is what is actually the case, not what labels you put on it.
If Tom can do more things than Roger, then Tom is more powerful than Roger, yes?
Now, a god who can do anything whatsoever - including things the laws of logic say cannot be done - is more powerful than a god who is bound by those laws. That's obvious, I'd have thought. ("Oh, oh, but Thomywombists would say that something forbidden by the laws of logic is 'no thing' and thus not being able to do it is no problem". Yes, and that's called 'begging the question'. Note, I do not deny that square circles are forbidden by the laws of logic. I deny that this makes them impossible. It makes them logically impossible - for label lovers - but it does not make them 'metaphysically impossible'. Why? Because God is not bound by the laws of logic.
Why?
Because they're his laws.
Why?
Because a) they are someone's and b) the person whose laws they are would not be bound by them, and thus that person would be able to do things logically forbidden.
Remember Tom and Roger? Now the Thomywomby god is bound by the laws of logic and so can't make a square circle. Pathetic. My god can. So my god is.....more powerful than the Thomywomby god.
Contradictions aren't true, are they? So, if my god is more powerful than the Thomywomby god, then the Thomywomby god can't be the omnipotent one, can he? For that would be to affirm a contradiction.
It is deeply ironic that though I seem to be the only one here who thinks that contradictions are capable of being true, I am also the only one who makes sure not to affirm any.
Ability to do something entails that it can possibly occur, not that it actually occured. So God being able to change the laws of logic or create contradictions does not mean he already did so, but can do so if he wants to i.e. it is possible that this can occur. You've done nothing but misrepresent what I said.
Yes, so, once more, no contradictions are actually true. You said that if there was a god who could make everything not make sense, then nothing actually makes sense. So you're just flipping and flopping.
God can make a square circles. There are no true contradictions. See? Things make sense. It is possible for them not to. They do though. See?
No such proof can exist because you can never trust any absolute rule of reason, because any absolute rule of reason can be possibly false in the presence of a God that can possibly change these rules of reason if he wishes to do so.
Ah, so you're a dogmatist. You know already that there is no proof of God. Good job! There is.
And once more with the same mistake (am I the only one who doesn't commit it? What is it with you people??). 'Can be mistaken' doesn't mean 'is mistaken'. Christ almighty.
I don't disagree with this, I elaborated in my earlier comment that I called it Frankfurt style free will not because I'm referencing Frankfurt style cases themselves rather I'm saying that it's Frankfurt style free will precisely because Frankfurtian notions (including Frankfurt cases as well as theory of volitions, which I highlighted as /different avenues/ meant to support the conclusion, not as one thing) are most often what is employed to support that conception of free will.
Then you're misusing terms. You did reference Frankfurt-style cases. And you said that libertarianism is incompatible with them. It's not. It's not even clear that Harry Frankfurt himself is not a libertarian. He's never, to my knowledge, said explicitly that he's a compatibilist. And if you say introduce 'frankfurt-style free will' after having mentioned Frankfurt style cases, then you're inviting us to think that by 'frankfurt-style free will' you mean free will taht does not require alternative possibilities, yes?
Anyway, that's by the by. God has free will regardless of which theory about free will is true. For his will makes whichever theory is true, true. And free will - whatever it turns out to involve - is morally valuable. So that means God values it, for God valuing something is what makes it morally valuable. And so God values free will. And God is omnipotent, so he can reasonably be expected to have it himself, as it is unreasonable to believe God would deny himself anything he valued having.
Yes. An omnipotent person can kill themselves. Why would you think otherwise?
I think otherwise, for reasons I have already stated above and the fact that I also reject the concept that such an entity has ever or can ever exist. Your vote for is merely equal in status to my vote against.
As a person who is interested in philosophy but is not academically qualified in the field, I find the exchanges in this thread 'entertaining.' The logical tennis is 'interesting,' you can follow the logic and you can mentally cast your vote at the end of your personal analysis.
For what its worth, I vote with the dissenters. @Bartricks will type things like Quoting Bartricks
What's in a word?
and then go on to insist that words like 'omnipotent,' 'god' and even 'god labeled as a PERSON!' are in fact of great significance to the human condition.
I do think any attempts at logical discourse with those who are quite chiseled in their viewpoint, sooner or later reduces to a panto exchange of 'oh yes it is' and 'oh no it isn't.'
After that, reading the exchanges becomes quite boring. I freely admit that my Atheism is quite chiseled.
Chiseled, but easily dispelled, by a scientifically scrutinised appearance/manifestation of the omnipotent. I have little more than scorn to offer such concepts as the Omnis.
I place them alongside my need/will to know the biggest number.
For me, omnipotence is only important in its subjective use. 'Strongest guy in the tribe,' etc.
None of the Omnis are objective, they are all relative and subjective. Same as biggest, fastest etc.
Light speed is fastest but inflation was probably faster as is the expansion rate at the edge of the universe, RELATIVE to us. God remains nothing but a fable for those who fear things that go bump in the night, the concept as presented by human organised religion is pernicious and logically the god presented is a coward and a weakling and simply holds back human progression. But I only type of the god(s) as described by human storytellers, when I type such an opinion. I am not criticising the 'superhero' that YOU believe cares about YOU and protects YOU and YOURS from the evil YOU think exists in YOUR ID(as in Freud). If it gives you comfort then, hey ho, and off to life you go.
Reply to universeness Yes, but you are not engaging with any argument. Obviously an omnipotent being can kill itself. An omnipotent being can do anything. That includes that. Obviously. If you think an omnipotent being can't kill itself it must be due entirely to you not grasping the concept of omnipotence.
?universeness You didn't mention 'invisible friend' in your hackneyed philosophy free rant
So, does your invisible friend comfort you?
If your rhetoric is produced from qualifications in the study of philosophy then I am glad that there are other philosophy stalwarts (as demonstrated on the threads on omnipotence) who think your viewpoint on omnipotence is pretty vacant.
Nonsense! You haven't got past qualification 1 yet. No omnipotent entity has, can or ever will exist,
anywhere at anytime, except in your mind and in the mind of anyone who subscribes to your viewpoint. That is the full extent of the power of your omnipotent entity. To me, that's almost no power at all.
Omnipotence is a label for a concept that is espoused by you and your like. You need to demonstrate that your concept has power and not just power, but more power than anything else in this Universe can demonstrate. All you have to offer are your musings. The musings of a human mind.
As a source of knowledge, the human mind is not the most reliable, especially if it has been through all sorts of influences since birth. Other human minds have to pick and choose carefully between which musings to listen to and which to disregard. Those who seem to be the most balanced are the ones I would pay most attention to. I would also pay great attention to what they actually do rather than what they say they will do or what they claim to believe.
For something to be epistemically possible, is for us simply not to know whether it is, or is not the case. It is epistemically possible for next week's lottery numbers to be 1,2,3,4,5,6, for instance.
Although I don't find anything necessarily wrong with this, I want to clarify that epistemology does not solely pertain to what exists or does not exist (if that is what you are referring to by "is, or is not the case"): it is also whether something could exist. So, given your lottery example, I would state that the consideration of (1) the lottery numbers could be 1,2..., (2) the lottery is 1,2..., and (3) the lottery is not 1,2... to all be epistemic claims. If that is what you were stating by "is, or is not the case", then we agree here.
When I say 'metaphysically possible' I simply mean that nothing stops it from being actualized in reality.
Although I understand better what you mean now, my problem with this is that it isn't clearly defined. I don't think you mean it this way (correct me if I am wrong), but the epistemic impossibility of a square circle prevents a square circle "from being actualized in reality". If I am correct, I don't think this is what you are trying to convey: I think "reality" probably encompasses much more for you than I am envisioning. So a further elaboration on your definition of "metaphysical possibility" would be much appreciated.
Now, God is the author of the laws of logic. How do I know that? Well, two ways, but one will suffice here. I know it because the author of the laws of logic can do anything, including things forbidden by those laws, for they are her laws to make or unmake as she sees fit. And a person who is not bound by the laws of logic - not bound to be able, at most, to do all things logically possible - is a person who is more powerful than one who is. And thus God, as an omnipotent being, will be the author of the laws of logic. And thus God can do anything, include making square circles.
If I am understanding you correctly, you are essentially positing that there is a metaphysical instantiation of the physical world, which is governed by God, and thusly is the origin of the "laws of logic" (as you put it) that are in the physical world. Therefore, supposing that God is omnipotent, then God, being the metaphysical instantiator of the physical (thusly "laws of logic"), is the determiner of that very logic itself. Am I correct here? If so, I think the fundamental flaw here is that you are trying to posit via logic that there's a realm of which isn't constraint to that very logic. In other words, you are always inevitably, in even giving this argument (if I were to grant it in its entirety, hypothetically), utilizing the "laws of logic" to even put it forth (to conclude it is valid): therefore, at best, the metaphysical possibility of that which is illogical is only true (again, if I grant it here hypothetically) in relation to the logic utilized to provide the argument in the first place. You are essentially positing a Logic (I'm just arbitrarily denoting it with a capital L to distinguish it from the logic within the physical world) that exists completely separate from logic wherein God can metaphysically instantiate whatever she desires in the physical world because she can alter the "logic", but this entire argument is completely contingent on the logic utilized to get to that conclusion: positing something overlying or beyond logic completely is a contradiction in itself, because any argument given to attempt to prove it inevitably utilizes that very logic it is supposed to proving isn't required whatsoever. Likewise, when you say:
it is metaphysically possible for God to make the law of non-contradiction false
This is contingent, if granted as true (at best), on the principle of non-contradiction. You are claiming that there is a metaphysical reality, so to speak, where it is not a contradiction to hold that square circles are possible: thereby you are utilizing logic to try and prove something that is allegedly out of bounds of logic itself. Any argument either of us can utter is in relation necessarily to the principle of non-contradiction, therefore a truly completely separable Logic which allows for the principle of noncontradiction to be false is not even actually possible: that very argument just used the principle of noncontradiction, therefore it is still relative to the principle of noncontradiction. Furthermore, this is also evident in the claim that the law of non-contradiction can be false, since the falseness is contingent on there either being a contradiction or no contradiction in the argument. In other words, positing a realm in which logic is not fundamentally bound to the law of non-contradiction is impossible to even posit (without it being contingent on the principle of noncontradiction in the first place).
Incidentally, 'empirically' means 'by means of the senses'. When I said that we can be sure no square circles exist - an epistemic claim (epistemionium claimonium) - it was on the basis of just how strongly our reason represents them to not exist (nonium existio). It was not because I have looked, smelt, touched, listened to and tasted everything and concluded that no square circles exist.
This is completely fair enough, and I agree that we can claim there are no square circles without every empirically testing it everywhere.
For instance, it is certain I exist. I, anyway, can be certain I exist. But it is metaphysically possible for me not to exist.
If you exist, then it is impossible for you to metaphysically exist unless you are referring to God revoking your life hereafter, but the very moment you "know" you exist, you "know" necessarily that it is not metaphysically possible for you not to exist right now. In terms of God maybe never metaphysically instantiating you, that would entail that you never existed at all (which you concede you exist).
Show me how I am committed to affirming an actual contradiction. Don't keep pointing out to me that square circles involve a contradiction - I know they do. But I don't think any exist - so I am not affirming any actual contradiction.
As noted earlier, if it is epistemically impossible for a square circle to exist, then it is metaphysically impossible necessarily. This is because any logically argument you can attempt to provide justification for a separate Logic which allows for different logics necessarily depends on logic itself. You thereby are always operating under one universal, fundamental form of logic which neither of us can escape. Likewise, you nor I can claim that the principle of noncontradiction can ever be false because that would require our argument to be contingent on the principle of noncontradiction in the first place, which would mean we didn't get any closer to negating it whatsoever.
THis is unlike those who insist that an all powerful being can't do some things - they are saying something that is actually contradictory and thus being totalium idiotiums.
This is not only disrespectful towards those who hold that logic at least fundamentally comes into play with omnipotence, but it is also unproductive. I don't mind if we end up never agreeing on anything, except the principle that we should treat each other (and others) with respect. Calling someone a "totalium idiotiums" is obviously insulting. I have no problem if you think that it is indeed a contradiction, but please do not start name calling. I am genuinely attempting to understand your position while equally trying to convey mine, with as much respect as I can possibly give: that's how philosophy should be.
What i mean by that is that you must no invalidly go from 'metaphysically possible that x' to 'x'
Although I understand (I think) what you are trying to say, I don't think this is equivocal to what we were discussing (in terms of "metaphysical" vs "eptistemic" possibility). Although I originally misspoke in my first post to the OP maker (by claiming "square circle exists"), I quickly refurbished it to "square circles are possible". Stating that epistemic impossibility directly entails metaphysical impossibility is not to "go from 'metaphysically possible that x' to 'x'", it is to go from 'epistemically impossible that x" to "metaphysically impossible that x". "to 'x'" refers to it actually existing in the objective world (or in the mind as conjured by it in the imagination), whereas possibility simply notes that it could exist, not that it does. So if I am making some sort of mistake, it will be related to the relation between "metaphysical possibility" and "epistemic possibility", not "metaphysical possibility to epistemically true that it exists".
Now, you asked, I think, whether God could commit suicide, to which the answer is a straightforward 'yes'. You have not yet explained why this answer is false.
I think you have me confused with someone else: I never mentioned that example. I mentioned the example of God making a rock so heavy she/he/it/them cannot lift it (which you never responded to). But in relation to killing himself, the more pressing dilemma is: can God kill himself and then rise himself from the dead metaphysically? I think your answer is yes, which leads us back to the more fundamental dispute about positing Logic which allows for multiple kinds of logic.
So what? Incidentally, if Descartes thought I was right, that's pretty damn good indirect evidence that I am. You do realize he's one of the greatest minds of all time?
I don't care if he's one of the great minds of all time. I'm mainly making a comment with regards to words and their usage in the sense that the most common philosophical understanding of omnipotence is actualizing whatever is logically possible.
If Tom can do more things than Roger, then Tom is more powerful than Roger, yes?
Sure. This doesn't forward an argument to your case namely in that the antecedent cannot be correct in terms of being able to actualize anything including changing logic. So this is literally the same as "if [something that'll never be true], then [my argument is true!]". Accepting it doesn't hurt me.
Now, a god who can do anything whatsoever - including things the laws of logic say cannot be done - is more powerful than a god who is bound by those laws.
Sure. The former God is incoherent whereas the latter God isn't. Quoting Bartricks
Oh, oh, but Thomywombists would say that something forbidden by the laws of logic is 'no thing' and thus not being able to do it is no problem". Yes, and that's called 'begging the question'. Note, I do not deny that square circles are forbidden by the laws of logic. I deny that this makes them impossible. It makes them logically impossible - for label lovers - but it does not make them 'metaphysically impossible'
It's generally understood that metaphysical modality is a smaller modality subcontained within logical modality, in a smaller fashion to how nomic modality is encompassed within metaphysical and logical modality.
hy? Because God is not bound by the laws of logic.
Why?
Because they're his laws.
Why?
This does literally nothing if you're shifting the logical modality to a hypothetical metaphysical modality that encompasses the logical modality, because now I can just suppose my god "Timmy" who happens to be capable of changing the laws of metaphysics (which "supersede" logic! supposedly) such that Timmy is stronger than your god Joshua despite Timmy not violating the laws of logic while yours does. See? We can play this game forever. It's silly.
Remember Tom and Roger? Now the Thomywomby god is bound by the laws of logic and so can't make a square circle. Pathetic. My god can. So my god is.....more powerful than the Thomywomby god.
I'm not sure why you're making a logical inference here. It could simply be the case that your god changed the laws of logic such that despite changing the laws of logic he's still less powerful than my god Timmy. Remember? Not even logic is absolute, supposedly.
Contradictions aren't true, are they? So, if my god is more powerful than the Thomywomby god, then the Thomywomby god can't be the omnipotent one, can he? For that would be to affirm a contradiction.
I'm not sure why you care about a contradiction being true.
Yes, so, once more, no contradictions are actually true. You said that if there was a god who could make everything not make sense, then nothing actually makes sense. So you're just flipping and flopping.
God can make a square circles. There are no true contradictions. See? Things make sense. It is possible for them not to. They do though. See?
I think you're just awfully unfamiliar with modal logic to think this. Contradictions being possible is a contradiction, namely because contradictions literally /are/ impossible. So to say they're possible is to say contradictions are possible and not possible, which is a conjunction of a proposition and its negation, i.e. a contradiction.
Ah, so you're a dogmatist. You know already that there is no proof of God. Good job! There is.
And once more with the same mistake (am I the only one who doesn't commit it? What is it with you people??). 'Can be mistaken' doesn't mean 'is mistaken'. Christ almighty.
No one ever made the confusion between "can be mistaken" and "is mistaken," only the former was the premise of my argument, not the latter, and in either case simply the possibility of contradictions being possible is a contradiction in of itself. I'm not sure what of this is hard to parse.
Although I don't find anything necessarily wrong with this, I want to clarify that epistemology does not solely pertain to what exists or does not exist (if that is what you are referring to by "is, or is not the case"): it is also whether something could exist. So, given your lottery example, I would state that the consideration of (1) the lottery numbers could be 1,2..., (2) the lottery is 1,2..., and (3) the lottery is not 1,2... to all be epistemic claims. If that is what you were stating by "is, or is not the case", then we agree here.
Epistemology is about knowledge. To say that something is 'epistemically' possible, is to say something about our state of knowledge. So, I can be certain that I exist. My non-existence is therefore not epistemically possible (not for me). Nevertheless, it is metaphysically possible and logically possible for me not to exist.
So, when I say that square circles are possible, I am not thereby expressing the idea that 'for all we can tell' there are some. No, for I accept that it is not epistemically possible that there are any - we can know for certain that there are not (which is all it takes for it to be the case that something is not epistemically possible).
When I say that square circles are possible, I mean that they are metaphysically possible. It is possible for them to exist. I say that about anything - it is metaphysically possible for anything to exist.
It is not logically possible for square circles to exist, as the idea contains a contradiction and that violates the law of non-contradiction. But it is metaphysically possible for them to exist, for God is not bound by the law of non-contradiction and thus can create some if he so wishes.
Although I understand better what you mean now, my problem with this is that it isn't clearly defined.
It was clearly defined. For something to be metaphysically possible, is for it to be capable of existing. There really is no way I can make that any clearer.
When I say that it is not epistemically possible for there to be square circles, I am simply expressing the idea that we can be absolutely certain there are not any in reality.
So: there are certainly no square circles in reality. It is possible for square circles to exist. I really have no way to make these notions any clearer.
If I am understanding you correctly, you are essentially positing that there is a metaphysical instantiation of the physical world, which is governed by God, and thusly is the origin of the "laws of logic"
That bears no relation to anything I've said. I haven't mentioned the physical world once! I believe God exists. I believe God is the author of the laws of Reason. Those laws constitutively determine what is and is not possible. Thus God - as author of those laws - is not bound by them and can do anything.
You are claiming that there is a metaphysical reality, so to speak, where it is not a contradiction to hold that square circles are possible
No. You're making stuff up! It is 'possible' for there to be square circles is not equivalent to 'there is a metaphysical reality where there are square circles'. There's just reality. When it comes to things existing, the things that exist constitute reality. And there are no square circles in existence. So, there is no reality where there are square circles.
I don't care if he's one of the great minds of all time. I'm mainly making a comment with regards to words and their usage in the sense that the most common philosophical understanding of omnipotence is actualizing whatever is logically possible.
You don't seem to understand what omnipotence means. It means 'all powerful' (omni - all - potentia - power). That's what everyone - everyone - understands it to mean. Some then 'argue' - not define, but argue - that this amounts to being able to do all things logically possible. They 'argue' that it is no lack of power to be unable to do the impossible.
I am arguing that their view is false. Tom is more powerful than Roger if he can do more things. That's true, yes? Now, if God is in charge of the laws of logic - if they're his to make or unmake as he sees fit - then he is not bound by them and thus can do things the laws forbid. So, wait for it, that makes him 'more' powerful than a god who is bound by the laws of logic, yes? And so as God is 'all powerful' and it is a manifest contradiction to assert that a person who can do fewer things is more powerful than one who can do more, 'God' can violate the laws of logic and make square circles etc.
The case for thinking he can't relies entirely upon one thing: that the laws of logic forbid these things. And that's all you're going to be able to do - you're just going to say 'modal this and noodle that' , when I know already that the laws of logic forbid what I am saying God can do. That's the point!!! That's what being all powerful involves: it involves 'not' being bound by those laws. I mean, what do you think those laws are? Weird webs that prevent God from doing things? Forcefields? What? You think God is 'bound' by something? Then you're just confused: you don't know what you're talking about. It's like insisting that there is a man taller than the tallest man. No there isn't: he's the tallest man. And likewise, there is nothing 'binding' God - there is no cosmic glue or straightjacket he's stuck in. He is the author of the laws of logic - they're his dictates and express his power - and as such he is not bound by them. This it not hard to understand: how can someone make a square circle? Well, the first thing they need to do is 'not' be bound by the laws of logic - and how can someone do that? Well, they can be the author of those laws.
Contradictions being possible is a contradiction, namely because contradictions literally /are/ impossible.
What total rubbish. All you're doing is insisting - not arguing - that the law of non-contradiction is necessarily true as opposed to just 'true'. I think it is just 'true', not 'necessarily' true. This is going to get you all hot under the collar and all you are going to do, I anticipate, is tell me over and over that if it is possible for a contradiction to be true, then it is true. Which is, as I say, to keep confusing possible with actual.
God is not bound by the laws of logic. And thus God can do anything. And thus there are no necessary truths. For any truth God can make untrue if he wishes. That doesn't mean there are no truths (you will make this mistake). It means there are truths, it's just that they're capable of being false. And that includes the truth that says there are no true contradictions.
Now, in saying that it is true that there are no true contradictions, I am not contradicting myself. If you think I am, explain. Generate the contradiction, do not just assert it like a dogmatist.
Free will, it appears, exists in that we can consider all possible options in our minds. I can even mentally simulate every possible pathway from a given choice node, make a virtual choice and use my knowledge and experience to get an idea of what all possible options will look like.
Actually making the choice, however, may be determined.
Free will, it appears, exists in that we can consider all possible options in our minds.
How can we consider all possible options? How would we know they will be all?
Regardless of that, even if we think of and select just a single option, wouldn't that indicate free will?
Anyway, this is all theoretical. In practice, we just act by choice. That's all. There's nothing more to it. "By choice" means of our own accord. The process of considering and selecting choices is redundant.
I can even mentally simulate every possible pathway from a given choice node, make a virtual choice and use my knowledge and experience to get an idea of what all possible options will look like.
Again, free will is something much more simple than that. It's just acting by choice.
Comments (44)
Also, being able to do what you want is not sufficient for free will. Consider Jack, who has been programmed only ever to want to do what he can, in fact, do. Well, Jack does not have true free will, even though he always does what he wants. So, true free will does not just involve doing what one wants, it also involves being unconstrained by others. That's true of an omnipotent being, but it is not true of Jack.
It can also be true of beings who are not omnipotent, so long as the way they are is not due to external causes.
Yes, that's exactly what I wanted to convey. There's a thread around here somewhere that asks the question "Does God have free will?"
However, there's something more interesting going on. Can you figure it out? You seem quite active today. Too much coffee?
It is not at all clear to me what you're trying to convey. Does God have free will? Yes. Obviously.
Do you need to be omnipotent to have free will? No.
If you're omnipotent, will you have free will? Yes.
If I can do anything, but someone/something else decides what I'll be doing, what's the point of being omnipotent?
Can a being possess free will and not be omnipotent? Restrictions on being able to do what one chooses/wants to do. What's the point of just being able to want to do things, but being unable to do those things?
I asked the same question! Can an omnipotent god kill himself? Yes! I wouldn't be surprised if he's done that already!
Yeah, I don't think we are the originators of such questions towards that which is proposed omnipotent. But my question was less gender-biased than yours. :rofl:
There are many such questions:
Can that which is omnipotent create something more powerful than itself?
Can it reproduce at all?
Would it be aware of its own existence and its own status as omnipotent?
How did it reach this conclusion/gain this knowledge that it became omnipotent, did it 'become' at all?
Is Omnipotence possible without omniscience and omnipresence?
Yeah, being omnipotent, omnipresent, omnibenevolent, and omniscient makes one omni-impotent, omni-absent, omni-malevolent, and omni-ignorant. Those omnigods have got it all!
You cant have more than one Omni, can you? Two omnipotent's would have to fight it out!
Quoting EugeneW
So, if it killed itself, I take it that it just sprung back to life instantly. Any 'in-between' time would be a period of 'oblivion' and in the human definition of oblivion, there is no moment of awareness within which you can enact your own recreation. If the recreation is instant then was this omnipotent actually dead at any point during the time it was killing itself? At least in the way that humans perceive dead.
I have asked these questions of others before, regarding omnipotence, and I usually get the answer 'You are trying to conceive that which the human conscience cannot conceive.' Which is a total killjoy response! In my non-omnipotent opinion.
I don't think your definition of "free will" is accurate. First of all, I am presuming that you are referring to libertarian free will, because compatibilism has no problem admitting that a being can have "free will" without ever being able to do whatever they want (i.e. soft determinism). Second of all, in relation to libertarian free will, at its most basic definition, it is not the ability to do whatever you want: it is the ability to do whatever you want in relation to oneself. I could, hypothetically, have full control over my own thoughts (thusly will them as I please) and yet have zero control over objects: I would still be an agent of "free will" even though I cannot do as I please in relation to the totality of existing things. Third of all, omnipotence can be interpreted two ways: that which is literally all powerful or that which is logically all powerful. In regards the former, it is equivalent to holding that a square circle exists and, therefore, that is how odd, logically impossible, paradoxes arise (due to non-truth-apt claims being evaluated as if they are truth-apt): great example is can an omnipotent being create a rock it can't lift? This is only puzzling, just like asking "how far can I throw a square triangle", if one doesn't realize that it isn't truth-apt due to its logical impossibility. With regards to the latter interpretation of omnipotence, the rules of logic and reason dictate not that the being necessarily does or does not have "free will", but that it cannot "have and not have" "free will". I think a key aspect to consider here is the fact that tying will to complete power (as I think you did in your definition:"can do whatever it wants", so to speak) requires that we consider the motive when contemplating whether such a being would require "free will" or not (as it can't have both). Imagine there's two omnipotent beings: the first's will is motivated towards controlling the second's actions. As long as the second's will never fixates (becomes motivated) on breaking from the grasp of the other, there's no contradiction here to be found and, logically subsequently, the second would be omnipotent without "free will", whereas the second would have "free will" (as far as the given context provides). And since the first is omnipotent and is fixated on controlling the second, the second will will never become fixated on the first and, therefore, will never acquire free will as long as first persists. The reason this is the case is because when you define "free will" in relation to the will and its produced action, then it is a matter of what that being's will exerts, not that that being is aware of all the possibilities that it could, being omnipotent, exert. If the omnipotent being's will fixates on knowing all logically possible exertions it could perform, then it would necessarily acquire them. But, however, if that being's will never fixates on it, then it will not acquire such knowledge. In other words, a logically omnipotent being has full power to do as he wills, which is in relation to the motive behind that will: if the will manifests that action A should occur, then it will, but if it doesn't manifest it, then it won't. This means quite literally that an omnipotent being is necessarily of "free will" if it wills that it should be--prior to such, it is only known, given what I have hitherto stated, that the being either (1) has "free will" or (2) it does not (but not both).
That's false. Being able to make a square circle is obviously not equivalent to actually making one, and thus in holding - as I do - that an omnipotent being can do absolutely anything at all, I am not affirming the actual existence of square circles. That's like thinking that becasue I 'can' throw the boiling hot cup of coffee into my own face, I have just done so. No I haven't.
When it comes to free will, it is - of course - contested exactly what it involves. But it doesn't matter what it involves, for no matter what it involves, an omnipotent being is going to have it.
No...
Frankfurt style free will and libertarian free will differ starkly. The latter, I'd wager, is far more characteristic of an omnipotent agent's free will, although the majority of theists would take a Frankfurt interpretation in relation to that agent's interaction with logic or morals (to be part of his nature).
Omnipotence is understood in the sense of bringing about states of affairs or actualizing potential in virtue of the possibility of that states of affairs or existence of that potential (unless you're a Cartesian).
Quoting Bartricks
Not necessarily: if the omnipotent agent was necessary, and the omnipotence was essential, most metaphysicians would hold that this is not possible (once again, barring Cartesians).
That just demonstrates the falsity of those ideas. An omnipotent person can always divest themselves of their omnipotence, else they would not be omnipotent (it is absurd to suppose that a person who is unable to do something is nevertheless omnipotent). Thus, no omnipotent person is omnipotent 'necessarily' but rather they are omnipotent contingently. Indeed, there will be no necessary truths if there is an omnipotent being, for the omnipotent being will have the power to render any truth false if they so wish. Thus, all truths - including the truth that there is an omnipotent being - will be contingent if, that is, there is an omnipotent being (which there is).
An omnipotent being is able to do anything at all. Destroy itself. Make a square circle. Anything. Those who insist otherwise are demonstrably confused. I do not deny they exist, of course. I deny they are thinking very clearly.
What you said about Frankfurt type cases was mistaken. One can be a libertarian 'and' a Frankfurtian (plenty are). What Frankfurt type cases do - if they are successful, that is - is show that you do not need to have alternative possibilities in order to be morally responsible. But one could still argue that determinism undermines free will for other reasons.
You are correct here: I should have said "possibility" not "exists". However, this doesn't negate my point whatsoever: I can refurbish my statement as "it is equivalent to holding that a square circle is possible" and nothing changes in my argument.
Fair enough. However, a being that is literally an omnipotent being is self-contradictory, therefore my point pertained to it being equivocal to claiming a square circle is possible. I would say a square circle cannot exist, not simply that it doesn't exist in the real world right now.
As I've hopefully demonstrated in my previous post, this is not the case when one dissects it at a much deeper level.
On the contrary, your argument now fails. For you can generate no actual contradiction from that claim. I claim that it is possible for there to be square circles. Not epistemically, of course - we can be totally certain none exist, for their existence would constitute an actual contradiction and we can be sure there are no actual contradictions. But it is metaphysically possible for there to be some, for God exists and God can do anything.
Quoting Bob Ross
No it isn't. This is the point: to generate an 'actual' contradiction you're going to have to make the mistake you previously made: you're going to have to confuse being 'able' to do something with actually doing it. There is nothing contradictory about an omnipotent being. If you think otherwise, show it without assuming that the omnipotent being has actually realized a contradiction.
This is just as the same Cartesian doctrine I was speaking about earlier. Yes, I said that /unless/ you're a Cartesian, you'd generally tend to think that omnipotent agents cannot actualize any potential that is non-logical because such potential does not exist in the first place, or bring about a contradictory state of affairs because it is not possible in the first place. Of course, a Cartesian takes the opinion that is otherwise, hence why I mentioned this in my initial comment as I am in perfect recognition of this position.
I'm of the opinion that it is not sensical to speak about any agent who is purportedly omnipotent in the Cartesian sense, because they can undermine any primitive conceptual schema we commit to (including the very idea that it can actualize any potential). It makes most sense first and foremost, for me, to stay wholly agnostic on any intrinsic features of this kind of entity. To be more clear, it is that I think supposing this kind of agents poses a bigger epistemic problem in virtue of the very claim supposing it (and any other claim).
Quoting Bartricks
Frankfurt /cases/ initially have to do with moral responsibility without free will, I agree. I'm referring to Frankfurt style /free will/, where free will is interpreted to be the actualization of whatever is in accord with an agent's higher-order volitions such that an agent can be free without being able to do otherwise. In other words, what matters is that an agent is the source of their actions. These conceptions of free will are collectively referred to as "sourcehood free will" and are primarily motivated through Frankfurt's work in two prongs: one, through Frankfurt cases, and two, through separation between internal and external reasons WRT volition. For these purposes, I call this "Frankfurt style free will".
What's in a word? Yes, one can label positions and one can say that some would define 'omnipotence' as 'being able to make a cup of tea'. But if one is merely able to make a cup of tea, then one is not able to do anything, but just make a cup of tea. And someone who can make a cup of tea and do a whole load of other things is 'more powerful' than the mere tea-maker. So, someone who is able to do anything is more powerful than someone who is able to do most things, bar contravene the laws of logic. Thus, if we are talking about a person who has the most power possible, then we are talking about a person who can do anything whatsoever. Those who are using the label 'omnipotent' to denote a person who is not able to do everything and anything are simply using the word in a misleading way - which is, of course, their right. But it is misleading and it is not what God is. God is all powerful (omni - all - potentia - powerful: omnipotent). Again, one can use the word 'omnipotent' to mean 'a person with red hair' if one wants, but it will then not be being used to describe a defining property of God.
So, you and i both know full well that some 'define' omnipotence as being able to do all things logically possible. But when it is used in that way, it is not being used to describe an 'all powerful' being, but a being who is able to do some things and not others. Which is fine - but it is now not being used to describe 'God' and it is also, of course, not being used in a way that accords with the original meaning of the term (which means 'all powerful').
I believe in God precisely because I believe in an all-powerful, all-knowing, all-good person. And an all powerful person can do anything - because it is contradictory to maintain that an all powerful person lacks the power to do some things.
Quoting Kuro
That's because you are confused and have once more conflated being 'able' to do something with actually doing it. He has not actually undermined anything, has he? So everything still makes sense. And thus it is not nonsensical to talk of a person who has the ability to make everything cease to make sense (unless you are supposing him actually do have exercised the ability in question - which he hasn't). This is what you have to do to generate nonsense - to generate actual contradictions. You have to suppose him to have done what he merely has the ability to do. Ironically it is those who think an all powerful being cannot do some things who are affirming a contradiction and thus talking actual nonsense.
Quoting Kuro
That's just an article of faith on your part. What if I could prove to you that such a person exists? Would you decide, in advance, that no such proof exists? Is your agnosticism unreasonable?
Quoting Kuro
You seem to be confusing Frankfurt-style cases with Frankfurt's heirarchical model of moral responsibility. Someone can accept that Frankfurt-style cases refute the principle of alternative possibilities without thereby being committed to Frankfurt's heirarchical model of moral responsiblity. And the reverse is true too, for one could accept Frankfurt's heirarchical model of moral responsibility but see it as a necessary condition, not sufficient and add to it the requirement that alternative possibilities be available to the agent at decision making moments.
Anyway, Frankfurt-style cases, if they work, refute the principle of alternative possibilities. They do not thereby demonstrate compatibilism to be true (even if they help that cause) and so they do not demonstrate incompatibilism to be false (and so tehy don't demonstrate libertarianism to be false).
The sourcehood condition is neutral between compatibilist and incompatibilist conceptions of free will. That's precisely why a Frankfurtian might nevertheless be a libertarian (or incompatibilist).
Go into a Pizza Hut and Order a Big Mac.
Discussed.
How did the mods even let this thread continue? The OP does not fulfill the basic requirements.
Or is this a ploy to prove that you can do whatever you want.
A square circle is a logical contradiction epistemically and metaphysically: metaphysics is simply the extrapolation of the overlying instantiation of the physical world via reason which abides by logic (which are epistemic claims, unless you aren't claiming to "know" the metaphysical assertions you put forth, then it may just be beliefs). The shape of a circle cannot be that of a square, a "square circle" is a contradictio in adjecto. When you say it is metaphysically possible, what exactly do you mean? Likewise, what do you mean by epistemically impossible? When you say "we can be sure none exist", that is an empirical claim (pertaining to the objects) and a claim pertaining to the mind (a circular triangle, for instance, can't exist in the mind either), but it is important to note that we can only obtain metaphysical claims via logic and reason. Metaphysics is directly constraint to the basic principles of logic. Furthermore, if you agree that we "know" there cannot be square circles (which would be an epistemic claim), then God can't instantiate one in the universe (we "know" this).
If a being is 'able' to make a square circle, then it is epistemically possible for a square circle to exist. It is not epistemically possible for a square circle to exist, therefore a being is not able to make a square circle. The idea of a square circle is a contradiction, metaphysically (whatever you are implying there) and physically (whatever may be implied there).
There is if one is positing literally an omnipotent being. Can it create something so heavy it cannot lift it? Can it make a nonbrick brick? No. An omnipotent being is constrained or inherently supplied with logic.
I am not following you here. "being has actually realized a contradiction"? The realizations of a being have no effect on the fact that it will never be able to conjure up a square circle.
What I would ask you is: what distinction between metaphysics and eptistemology makes you think a square circle is possible in one, but not the other?
These individuals make up the majority of how omnipotence is understood, from Thomists to Avicenna to many others. Descartes seems to be the only prominent philosopher in dissent here.
Quoting Bartricks
As I explained earlier, a Thomist still would say that God can bring about any state of affairs or actualize any potential. They simply would say that the potential to violate the laws of logic is not an existing potential, so there's nothing to actualize. On a similar avenue, being good is understood as part of God's nature, so simply God is acting as himself by never doing anything evil. Other theists use that same avenue to argue that rationality is part of God's nature to produce an orderly universe, i.e. God is simply acting as himself as to be logical. So it is not anything they understand to limit God.
Quoting Bartricks
There's no confusion. Ability to do something entails that it can possibly occur, not that it actually occured. So God being able to change the laws of logic or create contradictions does not mean he already did so, but can do so if he wants to i.e. it is possible that this can occur. You've done nothing but misrepresent what I said.
In any case, contradictions are fortunately not possible, so there's not any instance where God can possibly create a contradiction.
If you define your God as that which has the potential to actualize contradiction or other violations of logic, I will simply default to the nonexistence of your God in virtue of my commitment to logic:
1. Contradictions are never possible.
2. If (your) God exists, contradictions are possible or can become possible
3. Therefore your God can never exist.
Quoting Bartricks
No such proof can exist because you can never trust any absolute rule of reason, because any absolute rule of reason can be possibly false in the presence of a God that can possibly change these rules of reason if he wishes to do so. And from the perspective of a mortal, finite agent it is not possible to differniate between what rules of reason are the case versus what rules of reason simply appear to be the case in the same fashion as the former class but are deceivingly supposed to us by the kind of God that can undermine the very laws of logic and our thoughts about them.
If you go the Cartesian route, you get the Cartesian result. It's not hard. This is just another kind of Cartesian demon but made to collapse all kinds of knowledge, including logical and mathematical facts. Therefore agnosticism is simply necessitated: you can do nothing but rationally suspend judgement if any judgement is inherently unjustifiable. But we know some judgements, like ones in virtue of the fact of my experience being an experience, are justified. Therefore, your God does not exist since he'd entail not even these judgements are justified (since even basic conclusions, like my experience being my experience, can be undermined by this God who can supposedly change the behavior of identity).
Quoting Bartricks
I don't disagree with this, I elaborated in my earlier comment that I called it Frankfurt style free will not because I'm referencing Frankfurt style cases themselves rather I'm saying that it's Frankfurt style free will precisely because Frankfurtian notions (including Frankfurt cases as well as theory of volitions, which I highlighted as /different avenues/ meant to support the conclusion, not as one thing) are most often what is employed to support that conception of free will.
With great POWER comes great RESPONSIBILITY
For something to be epistemically possible, is for us simply not to know whether it is, or is not the case. It is epistemically possible for next week's lottery numbers to be 1,2,3,4,5,6, for instance. When I say 'metaphysically possible' I simply mean that nothing stops it from being actualized in reality. I would use 'logically possible' to describe what the laws of logic permit.
Now, God is the author of the laws of logic. How do I know that? Well, two ways, but one will suffice here. I know it because the author of the laws of logic can do anything, including things forbidden by those laws, for they are her laws to make or unmake as she sees fit. And a person who is not bound by the laws of logic - not bound to be able, at most, to do all things logically possible - is a person who is more powerful than one who is. And thus God, as an omnipotent being, will be the author of the laws of logic. And thus God can do anything, include making square circles. And you can point out that a square circle violates the logical laws until you are blue in the face, the simple fact is that those laws do not bind God. And thus though logically impossible, square circles are metaphysically possible, for God could make one if she so wanted.
Incidentally, 'empirically' means 'by means of the senses'. When I said that we can be sure no square circles exist - an epistemic claim (epistemionium claimonium) - it was on the basis of just how strongly our reason represents them to not exist (nonium existio). It was not because I have looked, smelt, touched, listened to and tasted everything and concluded that no square circles exist.
No, it is not epistemically possible for a square circle to exist. You are confused. It is metaphysically possible for a square circle to exist if an omnipotent being exists. It is not thereby made epistemically possible. For instance, it is certain I exist. I, anyway, can be certain I exist. But it is metaphysically possible for me not to exist. So, you are confusing different sorts of possibility.
Now, I literally believe in person who can do anything. Show me how I am committed to affirming an actual contradiction. Don't keep pointing out to me that square circles involve a contradiction - I know they do. But I don't think any exist - so I am not affirming any actual contradiction. THis is unlike those who insist that an all powerful being can't do some things - they are saying something that is actually contradictory and thus being totalium idiotiums.
Quoting Bob Ross
What i mean by that is that you must no invalidly go from 'metaphysically possible that x' to 'x' . So, it is metaphysically possible for God to make the law of non-contradiction false. That does not mean it is false. What you are going to do is continually make this mistake.
Now, you asked, I think, whether God could commit suicide, to which the answer is a straightforward 'yes'. You have not yet explained why this answer is false.
So what? Incidentally, if Descartes thought I was right, that's pretty damn good indirect evidence that I am. You do realize he's one of the greatest minds of all time?
Now, rather than citing, let's argue. For you seem more keen to tell me things I already know than to engage with my case. What matters is what is actually the case, not what labels you put on it.
If Tom can do more things than Roger, then Tom is more powerful than Roger, yes?
Now, a god who can do anything whatsoever - including things the laws of logic say cannot be done - is more powerful than a god who is bound by those laws. That's obvious, I'd have thought. ("Oh, oh, but Thomywombists would say that something forbidden by the laws of logic is 'no thing' and thus not being able to do it is no problem". Yes, and that's called 'begging the question'. Note, I do not deny that square circles are forbidden by the laws of logic. I deny that this makes them impossible. It makes them logically impossible - for label lovers - but it does not make them 'metaphysically impossible'. Why? Because God is not bound by the laws of logic.
Why?
Because they're his laws.
Why?
Because a) they are someone's and b) the person whose laws they are would not be bound by them, and thus that person would be able to do things logically forbidden.
Remember Tom and Roger? Now the Thomywomby god is bound by the laws of logic and so can't make a square circle. Pathetic. My god can. So my god is.....more powerful than the Thomywomby god.
Contradictions aren't true, are they? So, if my god is more powerful than the Thomywomby god, then the Thomywomby god can't be the omnipotent one, can he? For that would be to affirm a contradiction.
It is deeply ironic that though I seem to be the only one here who thinks that contradictions are capable of being true, I am also the only one who makes sure not to affirm any.
Quoting Kuro
Yes there is!
Quoting Kuro
Yes, so, once more, no contradictions are actually true. You said that if there was a god who could make everything not make sense, then nothing actually makes sense. So you're just flipping and flopping.
God can make a square circles. There are no true contradictions. See? Things make sense. It is possible for them not to. They do though. See?
Quoting Kuro
Ah, so you're a dogmatist. You know already that there is no proof of God. Good job! There is.
And once more with the same mistake (am I the only one who doesn't commit it? What is it with you people??). 'Can be mistaken' doesn't mean 'is mistaken'. Christ almighty.
Quoting Kuro
Er, what?
Quoting Kuro
Then you're misusing terms. You did reference Frankfurt-style cases. And you said that libertarianism is incompatible with them. It's not. It's not even clear that Harry Frankfurt himself is not a libertarian. He's never, to my knowledge, said explicitly that he's a compatibilist. And if you say introduce 'frankfurt-style free will' after having mentioned Frankfurt style cases, then you're inviting us to think that by 'frankfurt-style free will' you mean free will taht does not require alternative possibilities, yes?
Anyway, that's by the by. God has free will regardless of which theory about free will is true. For his will makes whichever theory is true, true. And free will - whatever it turns out to involve - is morally valuable. So that means God values it, for God valuing something is what makes it morally valuable. And so God values free will. And God is omnipotent, so he can reasonably be expected to have it himself, as it is unreasonable to believe God would deny himself anything he valued having.
I think otherwise, for reasons I have already stated above and the fact that I also reject the concept that such an entity has ever or can ever exist. Your vote for is merely equal in status to my vote against.
For what its worth, I vote with the dissenters.
@Bartricks will type things like Quoting Bartricks and then go on to insist that words like 'omnipotent,' 'god' and even 'god labeled as a PERSON!' are in fact of great significance to the human condition.
I do think any attempts at logical discourse with those who are quite chiseled in their viewpoint, sooner or later reduces to a panto exchange of 'oh yes it is' and 'oh no it isn't.'
After that, reading the exchanges becomes quite boring. I freely admit that my Atheism is quite chiseled.
Chiseled, but easily dispelled, by a scientifically scrutinised appearance/manifestation of the omnipotent. I have little more than scorn to offer such concepts as the Omnis.
I place them alongside my need/will to know the biggest number.
For me, omnipotence is only important in its subjective use. 'Strongest guy in the tribe,' etc.
None of the Omnis are objective, they are all relative and subjective. Same as biggest, fastest etc.
Light speed is fastest but inflation was probably faster as is the expansion rate at the edge of the universe, RELATIVE to us. God remains nothing but a fable for those who fear things that go bump in the night, the concept as presented by human organised religion is pernicious and logically the god presented is a coward and a weakling and simply holds back human progression. But I only type of the god(s) as described by human storytellers, when I type such an opinion. I am not criticising the 'superhero' that YOU believe cares about YOU and protects YOU and YOURS from the evil YOU think exists in YOUR ID(as in Freud). If it gives you comfort then, hey ho, and off to life you go.
So, does your invisible friend comfort you?
If your rhetoric is produced from qualifications in the study of philosophy then I am glad that there are other philosophy stalwarts (as demonstrated on the threads on omnipotence) who think your viewpoint on omnipotence is pretty vacant.
Quoting Bartricks
Nonsense! You haven't got past qualification 1 yet. No omnipotent entity has, can or ever will exist,
anywhere at anytime, except in your mind and in the mind of anyone who subscribes to your viewpoint. That is the full extent of the power of your omnipotent entity. To me, that's almost no power at all.
Omnipotence is a label for a concept that is espoused by you and your like. You need to demonstrate that your concept has power and not just power, but more power than anything else in this Universe can demonstrate. All you have to offer are your musings. The musings of a human mind.
As a source of knowledge, the human mind is not the most reliable, especially if it has been through all sorts of influences since birth. Other human minds have to pick and choose carefully between which musings to listen to and which to disregard. Those who seem to be the most balanced are the ones I would pay most attention to. I would also pay great attention to what they actually do rather than what they say they will do or what they claim to believe.
Although I don't find anything necessarily wrong with this, I want to clarify that epistemology does not solely pertain to what exists or does not exist (if that is what you are referring to by "is, or is not the case"): it is also whether something could exist. So, given your lottery example, I would state that the consideration of (1) the lottery numbers could be 1,2..., (2) the lottery is 1,2..., and (3) the lottery is not 1,2... to all be epistemic claims. If that is what you were stating by "is, or is not the case", then we agree here.
Although I understand better what you mean now, my problem with this is that it isn't clearly defined. I don't think you mean it this way (correct me if I am wrong), but the epistemic impossibility of a square circle prevents a square circle "from being actualized in reality". If I am correct, I don't think this is what you are trying to convey: I think "reality" probably encompasses much more for you than I am envisioning. So a further elaboration on your definition of "metaphysical possibility" would be much appreciated.
If I am understanding you correctly, you are essentially positing that there is a metaphysical instantiation of the physical world, which is governed by God, and thusly is the origin of the "laws of logic" (as you put it) that are in the physical world. Therefore, supposing that God is omnipotent, then God, being the metaphysical instantiator of the physical (thusly "laws of logic"), is the determiner of that very logic itself. Am I correct here? If so, I think the fundamental flaw here is that you are trying to posit via logic that there's a realm of which isn't constraint to that very logic. In other words, you are always inevitably, in even giving this argument (if I were to grant it in its entirety, hypothetically), utilizing the "laws of logic" to even put it forth (to conclude it is valid): therefore, at best, the metaphysical possibility of that which is illogical is only true (again, if I grant it here hypothetically) in relation to the logic utilized to provide the argument in the first place. You are essentially positing a Logic (I'm just arbitrarily denoting it with a capital L to distinguish it from the logic within the physical world) that exists completely separate from logic wherein God can metaphysically instantiate whatever she desires in the physical world because she can alter the "logic", but this entire argument is completely contingent on the logic utilized to get to that conclusion: positing something overlying or beyond logic completely is a contradiction in itself, because any argument given to attempt to prove it inevitably utilizes that very logic it is supposed to proving isn't required whatsoever. Likewise, when you say:
This is contingent, if granted as true (at best), on the principle of non-contradiction. You are claiming that there is a metaphysical reality, so to speak, where it is not a contradiction to hold that square circles are possible: thereby you are utilizing logic to try and prove something that is allegedly out of bounds of logic itself. Any argument either of us can utter is in relation necessarily to the principle of non-contradiction, therefore a truly completely separable Logic which allows for the principle of noncontradiction to be false is not even actually possible: that very argument just used the principle of noncontradiction, therefore it is still relative to the principle of noncontradiction. Furthermore, this is also evident in the claim that the law of non-contradiction can be false, since the falseness is contingent on there either being a contradiction or no contradiction in the argument. In other words, positing a realm in which logic is not fundamentally bound to the law of non-contradiction is impossible to even posit (without it being contingent on the principle of noncontradiction in the first place).
This is completely fair enough, and I agree that we can claim there are no square circles without every empirically testing it everywhere.
If you exist, then it is impossible for you to metaphysically exist unless you are referring to God revoking your life hereafter, but the very moment you "know" you exist, you "know" necessarily that it is not metaphysically possible for you not to exist right now. In terms of God maybe never metaphysically instantiating you, that would entail that you never existed at all (which you concede you exist).
As noted earlier, if it is epistemically impossible for a square circle to exist, then it is metaphysically impossible necessarily. This is because any logically argument you can attempt to provide justification for a separate Logic which allows for different logics necessarily depends on logic itself. You thereby are always operating under one universal, fundamental form of logic which neither of us can escape. Likewise, you nor I can claim that the principle of noncontradiction can ever be false because that would require our argument to be contingent on the principle of noncontradiction in the first place, which would mean we didn't get any closer to negating it whatsoever.
This is not only disrespectful towards those who hold that logic at least fundamentally comes into play with omnipotence, but it is also unproductive. I don't mind if we end up never agreeing on anything, except the principle that we should treat each other (and others) with respect. Calling someone a "totalium idiotiums" is obviously insulting. I have no problem if you think that it is indeed a contradiction, but please do not start name calling. I am genuinely attempting to understand your position while equally trying to convey mine, with as much respect as I can possibly give: that's how philosophy should be.
Although I understand (I think) what you are trying to say, I don't think this is equivocal to what we were discussing (in terms of "metaphysical" vs "eptistemic" possibility). Although I originally misspoke in my first post to the OP maker (by claiming "square circle exists"), I quickly refurbished it to "square circles are possible". Stating that epistemic impossibility directly entails metaphysical impossibility is not to "go from 'metaphysically possible that x' to 'x'", it is to go from 'epistemically impossible that x" to "metaphysically impossible that x". "to 'x'" refers to it actually existing in the objective world (or in the mind as conjured by it in the imagination), whereas possibility simply notes that it could exist, not that it does. So if I am making some sort of mistake, it will be related to the relation between "metaphysical possibility" and "epistemic possibility", not "metaphysical possibility to epistemically true that it exists".
I think you have me confused with someone else: I never mentioned that example. I mentioned the example of God making a rock so heavy she/he/it/them cannot lift it (which you never responded to). But in relation to killing himself, the more pressing dilemma is: can God kill himself and then rise himself from the dead metaphysically? I think your answer is yes, which leads us back to the more fundamental dispute about positing Logic which allows for multiple kinds of logic.
Bob
I don't care if he's one of the great minds of all time. I'm mainly making a comment with regards to words and their usage in the sense that the most common philosophical understanding of omnipotence is actualizing whatever is logically possible.
Quoting Bartricks
Sure. This doesn't forward an argument to your case namely in that the antecedent cannot be correct in terms of being able to actualize anything including changing logic. So this is literally the same as "if [something that'll never be true], then [my argument is true!]". Accepting it doesn't hurt me.
Quoting Bartricks
Sure. The former God is incoherent whereas the latter God isn't. Quoting Bartricks
It's generally understood that metaphysical modality is a smaller modality subcontained within logical modality, in a smaller fashion to how nomic modality is encompassed within metaphysical and logical modality.
Quoting Bartricks
This does literally nothing if you're shifting the logical modality to a hypothetical metaphysical modality that encompasses the logical modality, because now I can just suppose my god "Timmy" who happens to be capable of changing the laws of metaphysics (which "supersede" logic! supposedly) such that Timmy is stronger than your god Joshua despite Timmy not violating the laws of logic while yours does. See? We can play this game forever. It's silly.
Quoting Bartricks
I'm not sure why you're making a logical inference here. It could simply be the case that your god changed the laws of logic such that despite changing the laws of logic he's still less powerful than my god Timmy. Remember? Not even logic is absolute, supposedly.
Quoting Bartricks
I'm not sure why you care about a contradiction being true.
Quoting Bartricks
I think you're just awfully unfamiliar with modal logic to think this. Contradictions being possible is a contradiction, namely because contradictions literally /are/ impossible. So to say they're possible is to say contradictions are possible and not possible, which is a conjunction of a proposition and its negation, i.e. a contradiction.
Quoting Bartricks
No one ever made the confusion between "can be mistaken" and "is mistaken," only the former was the premise of my argument, not the latter, and in either case simply the possibility of contradictions being possible is a contradiction in of itself. I'm not sure what of this is hard to parse.
Epistemology is about knowledge. To say that something is 'epistemically' possible, is to say something about our state of knowledge. So, I can be certain that I exist. My non-existence is therefore not epistemically possible (not for me). Nevertheless, it is metaphysically possible and logically possible for me not to exist.
So, when I say that square circles are possible, I am not thereby expressing the idea that 'for all we can tell' there are some. No, for I accept that it is not epistemically possible that there are any - we can know for certain that there are not (which is all it takes for it to be the case that something is not epistemically possible).
When I say that square circles are possible, I mean that they are metaphysically possible. It is possible for them to exist. I say that about anything - it is metaphysically possible for anything to exist.
It is not logically possible for square circles to exist, as the idea contains a contradiction and that violates the law of non-contradiction. But it is metaphysically possible for them to exist, for God is not bound by the law of non-contradiction and thus can create some if he so wishes.
Quoting Bob Ross
It was clearly defined. For something to be metaphysically possible, is for it to be capable of existing. There really is no way I can make that any clearer.
When I say that it is not epistemically possible for there to be square circles, I am simply expressing the idea that we can be absolutely certain there are not any in reality.
So: there are certainly no square circles in reality. It is possible for square circles to exist. I really have no way to make these notions any clearer.
Quoting Bob Ross
That bears no relation to anything I've said. I haven't mentioned the physical world once! I believe God exists. I believe God is the author of the laws of Reason. Those laws constitutively determine what is and is not possible. Thus God - as author of those laws - is not bound by them and can do anything.
Quoting Bob Ross
No. You're making stuff up! It is 'possible' for there to be square circles is not equivalent to 'there is a metaphysical reality where there are square circles'. There's just reality. When it comes to things existing, the things that exist constitute reality. And there are no square circles in existence. So, there is no reality where there are square circles.
You don't seem to understand what omnipotence means. It means 'all powerful' (omni - all - potentia - power). That's what everyone - everyone - understands it to mean. Some then 'argue' - not define, but argue - that this amounts to being able to do all things logically possible. They 'argue' that it is no lack of power to be unable to do the impossible.
I am arguing that their view is false. Tom is more powerful than Roger if he can do more things. That's true, yes? Now, if God is in charge of the laws of logic - if they're his to make or unmake as he sees fit - then he is not bound by them and thus can do things the laws forbid. So, wait for it, that makes him 'more' powerful than a god who is bound by the laws of logic, yes? And so as God is 'all powerful' and it is a manifest contradiction to assert that a person who can do fewer things is more powerful than one who can do more, 'God' can violate the laws of logic and make square circles etc.
The case for thinking he can't relies entirely upon one thing: that the laws of logic forbid these things. And that's all you're going to be able to do - you're just going to say 'modal this and noodle that' , when I know already that the laws of logic forbid what I am saying God can do. That's the point!!! That's what being all powerful involves: it involves 'not' being bound by those laws. I mean, what do you think those laws are? Weird webs that prevent God from doing things? Forcefields? What? You think God is 'bound' by something? Then you're just confused: you don't know what you're talking about. It's like insisting that there is a man taller than the tallest man. No there isn't: he's the tallest man. And likewise, there is nothing 'binding' God - there is no cosmic glue or straightjacket he's stuck in. He is the author of the laws of logic - they're his dictates and express his power - and as such he is not bound by them. This it not hard to understand: how can someone make a square circle? Well, the first thing they need to do is 'not' be bound by the laws of logic - and how can someone do that? Well, they can be the author of those laws.
What total rubbish. All you're doing is insisting - not arguing - that the law of non-contradiction is necessarily true as opposed to just 'true'. I think it is just 'true', not 'necessarily' true. This is going to get you all hot under the collar and all you are going to do, I anticipate, is tell me over and over that if it is possible for a contradiction to be true, then it is true. Which is, as I say, to keep confusing possible with actual.
God is not bound by the laws of logic. And thus God can do anything. And thus there are no necessary truths. For any truth God can make untrue if he wishes. That doesn't mean there are no truths (you will make this mistake). It means there are truths, it's just that they're capable of being false. And that includes the truth that says there are no true contradictions.
Now, in saying that it is true that there are no true contradictions, I am not contradicting myself. If you think I am, explain. Generate the contradiction, do not just assert it like a dogmatist.
Quoting Agent Smith
Free will is not being able to do anything one wants! It is the ability and power to act by one's choice.
Omnipotence is not being able to do anything one wants! It is a quality of having unlimited power.
The first is a human attribute. The second is pure fiction.
Like a road roller, you are compacting things you are stepping on! In this case, concepts.
Free will, it appears, exists in that we can consider all possible options in our minds. I can even mentally simulate every possible pathway from a given choice node, make a virtual choice and use my knowledge and experience to get an idea of what all possible options will look like.
Actually making the choice, however, may be determined.
How can we consider all possible options? How would we know they will be all?
Regardless of that, even if we think of and select just a single option, wouldn't that indicate free will?
Anyway, this is all theoretical. In practice, we just act by choice. That's all. There's nothing more to it. "By choice" means of our own accord. The process of considering and selecting choices is redundant.
Quoting Agent Smith
Again, free will is something much more simple than that. It's just acting by choice.