This Forum & Physicalism
I've not been here for a long of time, but I can't help myself but notice the sheer abundance of focality given to the discussion of physicalism/materialism vs rival positions (idealism, dualism, etc) in this forum, whether it's with regards to the philosophy of mind or ontology in general.
This is not to say it accounts for a majority of discussions, rather, it's perhaps a plurality and it's especially dominant in metaphysical discourse especially compared to other topics
I'm slightly confused because while the debate of physicalism is not uninteresting, but it does not strike me to have such importance of a philosophical topic to be this dominant in general discourse. Surely, other subjects even within metaphysics itself like time or mereology are just as relevant as that topic
Is it that the focus given to physicalism is due because it is truly central to philosophical discourse, or is it just an accident that occurred by coincidence due to the interests of the forum's userbase?
This is not to say it accounts for a majority of discussions, rather, it's perhaps a plurality and it's especially dominant in metaphysical discourse especially compared to other topics
I'm slightly confused because while the debate of physicalism is not uninteresting, but it does not strike me to have such importance of a philosophical topic to be this dominant in general discourse. Surely, other subjects even within metaphysics itself like time or mereology are just as relevant as that topic
Is it that the focus given to physicalism is due because it is truly central to philosophical discourse, or is it just an accident that occurred by coincidence due to the interests of the forum's userbase?
Comments (207)
I can only take a guess. Physicalism/materialism is an interesting view in metaphysics and philosophy of the mind -- it is anti phenomenology and idealism. So given this brief description, your argument could take you very far as there's enough material (no pun intended) there to support your argument.
Physicalism of various stripes is the default in modern secular culture. Its assumptions are widely embedded even in many people who don’t know what the word means. So it’s a natural subject of debate.
Of course not. It is possible to engage in philosophical discourse that does not have physicalism as its subject. Physicalism is central to a philosophical discourse iff physical objects are contained in its predicates.
Good point! What kind of telescope is needed to observe dark mind matter or energy?
Quoting Wayfarer
I think what Wayfarer says makes sense. For many, physicalism/materialism is the philosophy of science, reason, and common sense.
Also - welcome to the forum. I've looked through some of your other posts. You write well.
Yes it is.The battle Materialism vs Idealism is the Major Philosophical Event. Imo, this question is in the core of human nature since its very beginning.
At the end it's the crossroad where all (or almost all) philosophical debates meet. Idealism is the hope for something Transcedental. For something "more" to exist(whatever that "more" could be). Materialism on the other hand, is merely based on facts,and that's why has an "advantage" on that fight. But idealists will never give up fighting for their hope so easily. Unless science brings something unquestionable one day.
Even materialists I think deep inside them have the very same hope also. To be proven wrong at the end.
Such a fight is normal to attend most philosophical thinkers. I would buy a ticket also.
It's a fact that bare facts don't exist. Even elementary particles need other particles to gain identity. Add to this the bare fact that the internal identity of those basic structures of nature can never be known apart from assimilating them to our own internal reality, and it becomes clear, like a shape in the fog rising above it in the bright blue moonlight, that both the ideal and the material, through interaction, are mutually shape-shifting.
Yeah, true. That's suspect -- all within 2 weeks. But, again, I think the allure of physicalism/materialism is that it is easy to grasp, and therefore easier to talk about. You have a strong foundation with physicalism. I mean, at least the rebuttal you're up against are manageable.
And that's exactly one of the main gaps in materialism, where idealists arguments throw their punches at.
I think this focus is simply science-induced and because in this focus the soul-like qualities of nature are burnt with the relentless shining of a once liberating Enlightenment, a strong reaction has to be expected from the contra side of the schism and destruction caused. The other side of the medal mostly resides on the dark side of the light that's sent out by the bright star classes of the sciences. But that side exists, and people feel that. It can't be ignored and it's a matter of time before the dark side will be turned to show its splendid and untouched face to shine in a light so sublime that its first reaction is to turn back to darkness. But it will show itself again. Timid, luring, yet determined.
It appears we're taking the mind for granted. The emphasis is on using it instead of studying it (NASA budget for 2020 was $20 billion while only $10 billion was spent on neuroscience). I haven't checked the the expenditure on AI (artificial minds) or how much money is involved in religions that have advanced meditative practices, for instance Buddhism and possibly Hinduism (Raja Yoga).
Most of us, myself included, I imagine are not professional philosophers. Ontology is the thing you're going to think of when you start thinking of metaphysics. For me, modality, universals, parts and wholes, propositions, etc. were all less apparent issues than "what is," at first. Later, I started to realize those other questions are sort of essential for answering the former question.
Physicalism is the dominant ontology of our day. Everyone had science in school, so it's sort of a default understanding of "how the world works." To be sure, there are plenty of scientists who don't embrace physicalism, but by far the most common view you see in the sciences is physicalism.
I think part of why it is such a big topic is that physicalism is a very successful idea, and explains a lot of things. I think the other, more problematic issue, is that it's easy to think a lot of philosophical questions have been "solved" by physical sciences, because an answer can be formulated to many "big questions," in terms of "well, X is actually just Y scientific phenomena." However, often, on closer analysis, Y turns out to be rather undefined. It's also easy to mistake complexity for correctness; I certainly make that mistake.
"Only" 10 billion? For such a small volume it's relative an infinite amount!
In fact it explains nothing. That's only part of the rhetoric and propaganda used, to pull the non-believers over the borderline and fool the children's minds.
The very act of you writing that the idea is successful proofs the trickery to lure you in worked.
I might've forgotten my math lessons there. I was looking at it from a relative standpoint. As an absolute amount, $10 billion is a lot! :smile:
I wish they spend that on my neurons! Could ask a fair fee!
none of which might have any bearing on philosophy of mind, as such. The major applications of neuroscience are medical and therapeutic. (Well, leaving aside Neuralink.)
It is also an important historical debate. The late 19th and 20th century are when materialism became a dominant political reality, with capitalism, communism and later fascism. We are still learning how to live without gods. It's been a rocky ride.
Sad but true. If the products of the mind (rockets, spaceships, the James Webb Space Telescope) are so marvelous, imagine how amazing the mind must be! We're distracted. The creations can't be more beautiful/grander than the creator, oui?
That humans are different to animals is not a matter of opinion. We show capabilities and attributes that no animal can come close to, I don't see how this can be glossed over or ignored.
As to the sense in which humans are physical, that depends on what physical means. And if the definition of physical is a matter for physics, then at this time it's wide open.
Quoting Agent Smith
Humans alone can peer into the realm of the possible and brings things back from it.
Quoting Olivier5
It is a facet of the 'culture wars', no question about that. But it is actually momentous. As to whether it's fanatical, there are fanatics on both sides of the divide, but there are fanatics to be found in other areas of life apart from this one.
It’s an age-old battle. The idea that things can be measured and detected is anathema to those who posit things that cannot be measured or detected, so it’s good to defend the principle at any chance we get. More than this, learning to value what is there rather than what isn’t is an important task of philosophy.
How true.
Certainly, we are the smartest animals we know of. But we share many traits with animals as well, and I don't see how this can be glossed over or ignored. There is nothing beyond your brain and body. It is a wish and desire that we are more than that, nothing more.
I'm not disputing the facts of evolution, but h. sapiens realises horizons of meaning which are completely unavailable to other creatures. In fact I don't really understand why this is something that has to be argued for, when the differences between h. sapiens and other species seems to blindingly obvious.
Interestingly, this is where Alfred Russel Wallace – co-discovered of natural selection – broke with Darwin. In his essay Darwinism Applied to Man, he summarises all of the ways in which the physical traits of h. sapiens can be traced back through our simian forbears, saying
This is what he then proceeds to argue against, referencing mathematical ability as a leading illustration. Regrettably, being Victorian, the essay is full of references to 'savages' but if you allow for the anachronisms I think it still stands up reasonably well.
I'm also not quoting that as an appeal to authority - only to illustrate that the typical neo-darwinist view, which you seem to swallow, is one amongst a number of possible interpretations.
Quoting Philosophim
Nothing, apart from the ability to weigh and measure the Universe. Amazing, the things you can pick up chasing wildebeest.
I'm not arguing that we aren't the best brained animal out there. I'm not arguing that we cannot do amazing things. But we're still animals, and brains and bodys at the end of the day. Its not beyond reality, its part of reality. And yet there is a desire in us that insists that we are somehow separate from our brain and body, with no evidence but a wish.
While the counter point to Darwin is fine, its old. Darwin's theory has come a long way since then, and we've discovered DNA. Want a human? Make the proper DNA sequence. Want a sheep? Proper DNA sequence. Our DNA is 99% similar to chimps. There is no evidence of anything "beyond" what we know of reality.
Its not a debate either. We are clearly physical beings with physical brains. Ever been drunk or buzzed? That was the physical alcohol affecting your body and brain to change your consciousness. There's nothing beyond or separate from that. Brain damage changes people's personalities. Drugs can help people become normal who have psychosis and see voices. Sleep is found to be restorative to the mind and aid in memory formation.
The evidence is high enough to bury a mountain. What does anyone have who believes we are somehow more than our brain and body? What? The silence of nothing is deafening. It is just our desire that we are more, nothing more; nothing less.
I can't be bothered arguing against that kind of complacency.
:lol: :up:
Physicalism was probably not a major intellectual issue for the Greeks & Romans & Jews. Because, except for a few unorthodox philosophers, they typically took Spiritualism for granted.
I'm not sure how far back the current physical vs non-physical contention can be traced. But a match was probably struck to the fuse when Enlightenment Science began to challenge the then-dominant Metaphysics of the Catholic Church. The subsequent separation of church & state may have cooled the flames for a while. But the resurgence of Creationism versus Evolutionism in the 20th century, stoked the latent fires of diametrically opposed worldviews : Spiritual vs Material. Around the turn of the 21st century, the Four Horsemen of Atheism began a concerted counter-attack. And the resultant polarization & politicization of worldviews is still reflected in debates on forums such as Quora and TPF.
Most of us on this forum seem to be open to polite exchanges of views. Unfortunately, those with black vs white attitudes have turned some philosophical dialogues into political diatribes. :sad:
Meta-Physical versus Anti-Metaphysical Agendas
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12649/meta-physical-versus-anti-metaphysical
Not at all. The Stoics, Epicureans and Atomists were materialists. Materialism has always existed as part of philosophy - even in ancient India.
Complacency? If I accepted something without evidence for my emotional gratification, that would be complacent.
Don't you think I would love it if we had immortality, or there was some viable evidence of our consciousness continuing to exist? Wouldn't it just be easy for me to pretend with a smile that I'm going to live forever? Of course it would. But there's no viable evidence Wayfarer, there's none.
"The Stoic system of physics was materialism with an infusion of pantheism. In contradiction to Plato's view that the Ideas, or Prototypes, of phenomena alone really exist, the Stoics held that material objects alone existed; but immanent in the material universe was a spiritual force which acted through them, manifesting itself under many forms, as fire, æther, spirit, soul, reason, the ruling principle.
The universe, then, is God, of whom the popular gods are manifestations; while legends and myths are allegorical. The soul of man is thus an emanation from the godhead, into whom it will eventually be re-absorbed. The divine ruling principle makes all things work together for good, but for the good of the whole. The highest good of man is consciously to work with God for the common good, and this is the sense in which the Stoic tried to live in accord with nature. In the individual it is virtue alone which enables him to do this; as Providence rules the universe, so virtue in the soul must rule man."
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/2680/2680-h/2680-h.htm
Some skepticism here:
What would you consider evidence for the reality of the non-physical?
A very good question. First, it needs to be something falsifiable. By that, I mean that there needs to be some way of clearly defining what the non-physical is, and testing it. A common example is if I say, "All apples are sweet" if I find a sour apple, then the claim could be wrong. If I found a sour apple and the evidence tried to say, "Well sour is a kind of sweet," Or that really all variations of flavor, including bitter and salty were some kind of sweet, then there's an issue.
Second, it must have greater evidence and logic than alternative ideas. If we have two ideas for why rain happens, one being Zeus, the other being the 5 stages of the rain cycle, the second, even if there are still unanswered questions in the 5 stages of the rain cycle, it is a more viable claim than the first.
Finally, not understanding something does not mean we can propose an explanation for it as evidence. If we don't understand something, than the reality is, we don't understand something. History is filled with people doing this, and its always wrong.
While falsifiability can definitely be proper of scientific discourse, for good reason even, I think it is seldom at all a good condition of philosophical or mathematical discourse which includes philosophical evidence that is sometimes given in the form of proofs. This is because some of the truths that philosophers and mathematicians deal with genuinely have no falsity conditions, i.e. all tautologies, like a=a or (p?(q?r))?((p?q)?(p?r)), simply cannot be falsified but are undoubtedly true.
In a similar manner, contradictions are falsums, and in classical logic or other logics that uphold noncontradiction, if we have a contradictory formula like p?¬p, then this always returns false whereas its negation ¬(p?¬p) will be a tautology: i.e. will always return true and cannot be false, thus is unfalsifiable.
How does this relate to materialism or to philosophical discourse in general? Well, a common objection in philosophical argumentation is a self defeat objection. If an opponent of a position finds a contradiction in its doctrine, then if that contradiction is genuine, the doctrine will be always false. And so the negation of the doctrine will be always true with no falsity conditions.
In the context of the materialism/physicalism, the thesis that there exists only the physical, then if an opponent of the doctrine found it to be contradictory and was hypothetically successful, his proof of the negation of physicalism will be unfalsifiable by definition due to the logic outlined earlier. And this trivially entails the existence of at least one non-physical entity granting physicalism as false.
But it seems very unreasonable to dismiss a self defeat objection, which warrants at least one non-physical entity in the context of physicalism/materialism, in virtue of the fact that it's unfalsifiable. In philosophy, your opponents may think that your position is not just wrong, but literally could not be correct, so a well-motivated objection is oft unfalsifiable when successful (i.e. objections to the Christian Trinity as incoherent, if successful, are unfalsifiable, but are still nonetheless sound objections in these instances where they succeed).
For these purposes, I think falsifiability is a terrible criterion in the context of philosophy, but may be more fit for other uses like science or other empirical inquiry, and therefore also urge that you reconsider it.
Incorrect.
If A=B, then a=a is false.
If P and it turns out that there is no p, q, or r, then the second statement is false. Logic is clearly falsifiable. Falsifiability does not mean, "It is necessary that it is false." It just means there can exist a condition in which it could potentially be false. An assertion must always allow the potential of its negation.
Quoting Kuro
Similarly, if something IS false, then it of course isn't true. That does not mean they are not falsifiable. For ¬(p?¬p), the falsifiable condition is if (p?¬p) existed. Again, the possibility of the condition for it being false, does not mean it IS false. Back to the original example, if there does not exist a single apple in the world that is not sweet, even though I can propose a condition where it could be false (an apple could be bitter), we cannot find that false condition. Therefore it is true that all apples are sweet, its just that it is falsifiable in the fact that there is a potential negation state to consider (an apple could not be sweet).
Quoting Kuro
So to be clear, if someone demonstrates that the negation of an assertion cannot be true, that makes the assertion true, but falsifiable. IE, there is a potential condition in which it could be false, but it if found that condition simply cannot exist.
Quoting Kuro
So I think you understand now. Physicalism is falsifiable by stating it could be the case that physicalism is false. For example, I could state, "Everything is all in the mind, there is no physical world." Of course, just because I can propose something that would potentially show it to be false, it does not mean it IS false. As it is clear that everything is not in the mind, and there is a world outside of our thoughts, this claim against physicalism which could show it to be false, is false itself.
Quoting Kuro
Now that you understand what falsifiability is, do you still have an objection to it?
Half the time it seems to be about religion and anti-religion. The other half of the time it seems to be about either taking a side in a venerable if tired game or trying to dissolve that game in a vat of semantic acid (itself an old hoarse).
Affirmative. Ten four. And also our words and various well-worn, inherited dichotomies are both semantically interdependent and mobile, a fog of the blob of our blab.
I think you are correct and that your capitalization is appropriate. Idealism is (often) a continuation of religion through increased abstraction. The visceral stories of yesteryear become esoteric ciphertexts. Instead of demons and angels, one learns to be satisfied with the ghost in the machine and its wonderful qualities.
The materialist is the guy who doesn't think he will win the lottery just because he bought a ticket. To the materialist, the (religious) idealist is often just rationalizing a hope with which it is easy to empathize but more difficult to share.
But the issue there is that the 'criterion of falsifiability' was devised by Karl Popper specifically to differentiate an empirical from a non-empirical claim (I notice @Kuro has made a similar point.)
You're assuming an empiricist position, and then demanding empirical evidence against it! In other words, you assume the sole criterion of truth is the demonstration of an empirical causal relationship. But objections to that may be made on logical, rather than empirical, grounds. (By the way, if you're familiar with the history of philosophy, a very similar issue was the central point about David Hume's criticism of the inductive method, and Kant's 'answer to Hume'. A very difficult topic in philosophy but relevant in this context.)
But anyway, to illustrate my point, consider the argument about the reality of numbers (see What is Math?). The argument is, on the one side, that numbers are real, independently of anyone who is aware of them - which is generally known as mathematical realism or mathematical platonism. It grants mathematical objects reality, albeit of a different order to empirical objects.
A counter argument might be that numbers are the artefacts of human thought and that they're only real in that context. They're effective for our ends, but they don't correspond with anything real beyond that. The reason this side of the argument is generally defended by empiricists, is because empiricists can't admit the reality of purely intelligible objects such as numbers, so they can only conceive of them as operations of thought.
Regardless of which side of the argument you take, the question is, how would you provide empirical proof of either case? I submit that it can't be done, because it's a philosophical, not an empirical, question. And there's a difference.
Quoting Philosophim
That's what I mean by 'complacency' - here's a wild generalisation, with the declaration that 'it's always wrong'. That is a quintessentially dogmatic statement. Case in point are the enormous conundums in current physics and cosmology. I'm not going to go into huge detail other than to say that in respect of fundamental physics, there are enormous divergences in the interpretation of what physics means - all the debates between many worlds interpretations, the Copenhagen interpretation, and so on (see The Most Embarrasing Graph in Modern Physics). All of the proponents of those arguments are possessed of the same set of facts, yet there are enormous divergences in what these are said to mean. And none of those have been settled empirically, nor is it easy to see how they will be.
I recommend you read more philosophy of science.
I see, so your definition of what non-physical is, is that it is not empirical. Meaning that there is no evidence of its existence or evidence of experience. I'm having to glean what you mean by non-physical, as no one has provided a definition of what it means so far. Give me claims of something that exists that cannot be experienced. Its falsification is that it can be experienced. If you can provide me an example of something that cannot be experienced, and I am unable to show that it can be experienced, then you've given valid evidence of something non-physical.
Quoting Wayfarer
I am not. I am asking you to provide evidence of something that is not empirical. Why is that so hard? To argue against it, I would need to demonstrate that the non-physical existence is indeed empirical. If I could not, then you have something.
Quoting Wayfarer
Again, we can falsify both of these positions. If numbers are real independent of people, then what is a number? Does it mean the symbol, "1"? Does it meant the concept of "an" identity versus "multiple identities? Can we demonstrate that numbers exist in a setting devoid of anything conscious but an observer?
The counter argument of course has its own falsification. That being of course that they could exist independently of human thought. I have no take on the matter, its an interesting topic I would need to think on. But first lets address this topic. The point is, I'm not a dogmatist. I'm open to other possibilities, no matter how wild and crazy. But, it needs to be logical. If you're going to claim something exists, please present evidence of its existence, and demonstrate that there is the possibility of its negation. The possibility of its negation does not mean it is negated, it means it is something we can test against to see if it exists.
I suggest you do that before reflexively reeling off an answer.
I did not reflexively reel off an answer. And that is not the topic. The topic is I provided what I would need as evidence of something non-physical that produced our consciousness. Now, are you able to do so, or can you not?
Not really. Many forms of idealism argue for a universal mind (essentially a primitive instinctive consciousness) which holds object permanence and provides us a shared reality independent of our minds. Humans are dissociated alters of the Great Mind - that kind of thing.
I did, and it went straight past you.
If it is backed by evidence, then there's something there. If there is no evidence, its just a made up wish. The falsification of the idea, is that there is no universal mind. Since there is no evidence of a universal mind, then it is false.
After that, nothing further to add.
As @Wayfarer will tell you, there are philosophers and scientists who would say there is no evidence of physicalism. I suspect both world views in the end come down to a kind of faith.
Not that an idealist should be also religious,but that transcedental thirst is common to both of them. You are right about that.
At the end some people can't except that there is nothing more than matter and what our senses tell us. I consider myself one of them.Not sure if there is that "more" indeed though, but i can't give up my lust for it.
I don't think it's that simple. Most scientific evidence is partial or inconclusive or unconvincing. For the sake of argument, let's assume a universal mind that computes the universe continuously at the quantum level, and its product is the universe as it is. What sort of evidence could one have that it is convincingly so or that it is not so? Is philosophical argument ever possible to prove or disprove the assertion?
I try and these days mostly succeed at finding the sacred in the dear dirty daily details. If we can't have (or deny ourselves the pleasure of having imaginary) 'skyhooks,' we can at least build 'cranes.' Personally I also deny 'matter,' at least when conceived as some sort of ultimate stuff. It's turtles all the way down (and all the way up), or might as well be for creatures like us.
Except there is evidence of physicalism. If Wayfarer would provide evidence of some type of non-physicalism, or provide evidence why physicalism is false, then there would be a discussion. Vague references and a lack of evidence will convince no one.
Quoting Wayfarer
Anyone who is serious in an argument would repeat it if that was the case, concerned that the other person has missed it or misunderstood. I spent a lot of time taking your requests seriously and laying out the groundwork. I replied that I did not expect empirical evidence against it. I told you to give me some evidence that the non-physical exists. Surely if you believe the non-empirical exists, then you can present evidence of it right? You did not return this, and give me evidence. And if you don't want to, that's fine. But don't tell me you did, when you didn't.
Great post! First, lets qualify that "most" scientific evidence is a biased stretch. There is some science which is inconclusive or unconvincing, but it notes this. Very rarely does actual science declare its found truth when it clearly has not. That would be called bad science.
So what type of evidence do we need to provide for your assertion to prove or disprove your proposal? None, because you haven't set a condition for it to not possibly be disproved. Its not falsifiable. Its a story. A neat story. One that would be cool if it were true, not going to lie. I enjoy the creative exploration of the fantastic. But, one shouldn't get wrapped up in the emotions of the fantastic, and start thinking the positive emotions about it give you an excuse to believe that it must be true.
There's also nothing wrong with stating, "There is no evidence for this thought experiment, but what if..." Every played the game, "if you could pick any super power, what would you pick?" Great fun. Lots of philosophical spring boards can happen from it. But if someone starts saying, "Yeah, its possible we'll be able to alter our genetics to shoot laser beams from our eyes some day," the assertion has changed the notion of the discussion. At that point, you're not having fun about a thought experiment, you're claiming the thought experiment could be reality. And when you do that, you need evidence.
So if you are going to explore the notion that non-physicalism is real, you're going to need evidence. Even if you claim, "Well we know its not real, but what if," you should at least define what something non-physical is.
Well, clearly that's inaccurate. The world is made up of beliefs without evidence.
Ha! And I almost edited that out when I initially typed. I should know better on the philosophy boards. What I should have said was vague references and lack of evidence are not convincing arguments to a rational person.
Hang on. Where we started was with this exchange:
Quoting Philosophim
It was at that point that I brought up the significance of 'falsifiability'. I made the point that Popper's introduction of falsifiability was made in order to differentiate empirical claims from non-empirical claims.
It is true that this indirectly equates 'the empirical' with 'the physical', but I think that is a fair assumption. What is generally accepted as empirical evidence, is something that can be detected physically. Is that not so?
You then asked:
Quoting Philosophim
This is where I gave the examples of 'the ontological status of mathematical objects' (which is the argument about mathematical Platonism) and also 'interpretations of quantum physics' (which are arguments about the ontological status of the objects of physics.) I said that both of these arguments [s]are not about[/s] can't be resolved by empirical evidence, insofar as no empirical evidence can decide these cases one way or the other. So, just to make it clear, I'm arguing that if mathematical Platonism is valid, then there is a large class of non-physical objects, namely numbers, that we deal with on a daily basis.
And in the SEP entry on Platonism in the Philosophy of Mathematics, we read:
So, I'm providing an argument for the reality of non-physical objects, namely, numbers. But this is not an empirically falsifiable argument, as it's not an empirical argument at all. That is what I'm claming 'went by you'.
I see, the way it was presented, I thought it was an aside puzzle. That being said, an unsolved thought puzzle that might be true or false is not evidence. If I said, "It might be true that lava core is black at the center of the Earth," unless I show that is true, my supposition in no way challenges or presents evidence that the lava core at the center of the Earth is not black (currently we know it as yellow).
Quoting Wayfarer
No, I don't think that. I've noted that physical reality is matter and energy. If you can show something beyond matter and energy as existent, than that would be evidence of of something non-physical. I suppose what is laced into the assumption, is that what is non-physical must interact with the physical. And this is not a dogmatic assertion, but a logical consequence. Regardless of your opinion on consciousness, I think we can all agree that every sense that we have is physical, and that we are made up of physical bodies. And since consciousness is contained in our bodies, and not outside of our bodies, if consciousness is non-physical, it interacts with us in particular, and not in some random location apart from our bodies.
So an example in terms of consciousness, lets say a person was thinking, and we found something that was obviously interacting with the matter/energy in the brain, but could not be classified as matter and energy. At that point, I believe it would be safe to call that non-physical. But if we cannot detect anything that can interact with the brain, when obviously our consciousness must be interacting with the brain, we're inventing something that isn't there.
I don't think that's an unfair requirement for the concept of something that is non-physical. I'm not going for a "got ya" or rigging the game to where you can't win. But if the non-physical is impossible for the physical to detect, then its an imaginary idea because then it couldn't interact with the brain. That's a lack of evidence. Its fine if you want to play a game with it, and imagine if it was true, what it would entail. But if you're going to claim it exists, you need evidence. Again, this is not unfair or overly demanding.
How can materialism ever explain I see a world in colors while it looks like a dark world in which once in a while a ray of sunlight shows itself? A darkness due to a materialialistic outlook.
Quoting magritte
How is that computing done?
Interesting point. Materialism can't decide between traditional tactile objects, the ones we can touch, and the modern physical worlds of Newton, Einstein, and QM. Just look at the SEP entry. Color is not material because it is not a thing and it cannot be touched and it does not repulse other colors. Color is also not physical because nature is in shades of wavelengths and intensities like waves on the ocean. Color always requires interpretation. What then?
Quoting EugeneW
Sorry about having to resort to links but I just don't know enough to give a simple answer.
The idea is that the world is a quantum computer constantly seeking solutions to problems of its own development. This outlandish suggestion is actually taken seriously by many experts in the field. According to ?Wayfarer's link around 24% of quantum physicists support an informational interpretation of quantum mechanics. This is just an extreme extension of the discovery and implementation of quantum computation in physics laboratories to solve otherwise too difficult mathematical problems.
You haven't addressed the argument concerning the sense in which mathematical objects, numbers, and by extension also, scientific laws and physical principles, are real, but are not material. You haven't responded to that at all. You might look at that again.
Quoting Philosophim
I really can see why you're saying this, but again, what I'm trying to point out is that you're thinking of what the non-physical must be in terms of 'non-physical things'. You're saying if 'we found something that was obviously interacting...' You're trying to imagine a non-physical or immaterial thing, or substance, that acts as a cause.
The rationale behind that is because science only considers what is measurable and objective, then in order for there to be a non-physical thing it must also fall under that criteria; it must be measurable and objective, or else, what is it?
But we need to go back and examine what the basis is for those criteria. The fact that only what is measurable and objective is to be considered by scientific analysis is an assumption - the naturalist assumption. If you can't measure it, or discover it objectively, including by way of mathematical extrapolation on the basis of observation, then it's not considered evidential.
So, you're saying, if you want to show something non-material, you have to demonstrate its existence, like it's lava core, or a bitter apple, or some other sense-able object of experience that you've referred to in this discussion. Some thing.
That's why I started with the question of the reality of numbers. They're essential to science, on the one hand, but as to whether they ought to be considered real or not, is not necessarily amenable to scientific analysis, on the other. That is what makes this a metaphysical question. Mathematical platonism claims that number is real - but not real in the same way that chairs and tables are real. Hence, real but not material - which is a defeater for materialism.
Quoting Philosophim
As we both know, if your brain is affected by alcohol or a drug, or an injury, then that will have consequences - cognitive, motor, affective, and so on. No argument there, although the physicalist will say that it demonstrates, or proves, that the mind is reducible to the physical, because it can be subject to such physical influences.
But what if your mood is affected by something said to you? Or you form an incorrect belief that your life is in danger, as paranoids sometimes do? What if you develop a mood disorder or obsessive-compulsive disorder that literally makes you ill, that has physical consequences, glandular, adrenal and so on. But the cause of these maladies is not physical but affective or emotional - you've interpreted something in a way that causes these effects. Nothing physical has been done to you, you haven't taken a substance or a drug, but your mood, affect or thought patterns nevertheless can have profound physical effects (including death, in extreme cases.) This is why there is the discipline of mind-body (or psychosomatic) medicine.
So - no, I don't agree with that - or not unqualifiedly. The sense functions - sight, hearing, taste, smell, touch - respond to physical stimuli. But as rational sentient beings, we're also constantly judging, reacting, supposing, surmising, and so on. The intellect, the seat of judgement, is constantly weighing up, judging, and reasoning. Those are the faculties that I say are not meaningfully physical. They're bound up with the physical, but they're not completely physical. And I question whether anything is completely physical, because 'the physical' is not, as yet, fully defineable.
From debating with you at some length my observation is that you're committed to the framework of physicalism or scientific materialism. Please don't take that as pejorative, I'm not saying you're in the Klu Klux Klan or anything like that. It's the description of a philosophy, an outlook on life, which is very widespread in modern culture, it might even be the majority view, even though I myself don't agree with it.
But I'm arguing that the physicalist outlook is grounded in a methodological assumption about what ought to be considered as evidence in a scientific sense. But that methodological assumption is not really a metaphysic of what is and what is not real. Furthermore, there are real metaphysical debates, such as the nature of mathematical objects, or the nature of the wavefunction, that themselves are outside the scope of scientific method, even though in other respects they're central to today's science.
I'm not sure how familiar you are with logic, but this is pretty evidently untrue. I'll show you a truth-table if you don't believe me.
Notice how that in cases where a=b is true, a=a is true as well, and so the conjunction of both are true.
The only falsity conditions for the conjunction are when a=b does not hold, but notice how a=a remains a tautology regardless of the truth value of a=a
Logical equivalence is a transitive and symmetric relationship, so I'm not sure how you would even reach the conclusion that a=b would falsify a=a because you can just substitute the formulae around freely if they both hold. If not, then a=b simply doesn't hold.
Another example is probably from mathematical equality (which is not the same as logical equivalence, but a=a still is unfalsifiable even if = is understood as a mathematical equality and "a" as a variable). For example, 5=5 or 6=6 are still unfalsifiable truths. You can say 2+3 is equal to 5 too, so 2+3=5, but no one in their right mind would suggest that 5=5 is false because 2+3=5 is true.
I recommend this introductory course on logic from Stanford. In supplement, I'll also link this article explaining mathematical equality. I suggest that you familiarize yourself with these on your own freetime going onward with this conversation so that we have an easier time communicating.
Quoting Philosophim
I'm aware that falsifiability is not the same as impossibility, rather it is simply possible falsity. I'm not sure why you felt the need to tell me this. Clearly, some propositions like a=a or some mathematical formulae like 5=5 have no falsifiability conditions and simply cannot be impossible. Similarly, in modal logic, the necessitation rule of K says that if some proposition is a theorem then it is necessary in all possible worlds, i.e. it's negation is logical impossibility, a fact that does not align with your view.
Quoting Philosophim
In the case of my example, the opponent of physicalism does not simply falsify physicalism but allow for its logical possibility, rather find an internal contradiction in physicalism. All contradictory sets of facts are logically impossible in any consistent modal logic, i.e. they simply could not be true. There isn't a world with square circles, or vice versa.
Quoting Philosophim
I don't object to falsifiability in the context of the empirical sciences, where I believe it may even be beneficial. I think falsifiability as a philosophical or mathematical requirement is an incoherent position because both philosophy and mathematics have some facts that are given the status of being necessarily true and also unfalsifiable, like a=a or 5+5 and what not.
I noted earlier that stating, "We don't understand this, so I get to propose whatever I want" is not viable evidence. Demonstrate to me these things are non-physical, and I will agree. You noted there are some suppositions and debates about this. This means there are people who think these things are material. That isn't evidence. That's just indicating what we don't understand.
Are there things we don't fully understand? 100%. At one time we did not understand how rain formed. Did that mean if someone stated, "Its obviously mystical power of the Earth," that this is evidence? No. Could we sit and debate it back then? Sure. But for it to be viable, for it to be considered something real, it needed evidence.
Quoting Wayfarer
No, I'm not. Can there be something non-physical Wayfarer? I'm not stating it has to be a thing in the sense of what's physical. I'm saying "thing" as "what exists". If you're saying something non-physical can't exist, then the conversation is over. Now, I'm not doing that to you because I want you to know I'm being charitable to your argument. I know you believe something non-physical exists. If it exists, what is it? In this case, it is consciousness. And in this case, we know it must interact with the brain. And if it can interact with the physical world, we can detect something non-physical, in the physical world.
Quoting Wayfarer
No assumption, just logic. If the brain can interact with the non-physical, then we can detect it. It doesn't even have to be fully known. It just has to be something we detect that is not matter or energy. If you deny that the brain can interact with the non-physical, then you lose. You've just cut the non-physical from ever being experienced by the physical. It then, does not exist. No assumptions. No bias. No "the physicalists will say." Ignore that crap. Talk to me, not them.
Quoting Wayfarer
I'll clarify again. I'm saying that to show that consciousness is non-physical, you need to show it interacting with the brain in some manner. It must not be matter or energy. You are proposing, that something that is not matter or energy exists. You state you have evidence of this as consciousness. Our current understanding, manipulation, healing, and destruction of the brain is built upon our understanding of matter and energy. Is there something that we can detect interacting with the brain that is not matter or energy? Yes or no?
Quoting Wayfarer
But we already know that's not true. Depression is something that can be fixed with medication. Emotions are tied to brain states that can be altered by changing your physical interactions. You can watch a movie, eat good food, get good sleep, etc. These cause changes in the communication of your brain. Emotions are physical expressions. They are physical reality. Reduce a man's testosterone and you'll see him feel powerless. Increase it and he'll feel powerful and aggressive. Again, we can manipulate this physically.
Quoting Wayfarer
But Wayfarer, they are. We see the brain react to stimulous. We know certain areas of the brain are needed for sight. We know that you can become brain damaged and no longer see or imagine color, even though your eyes work perfectly. Here's just one example from 2013. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/brain-researchers-can-detect-who-we-are-thinking-about/
Take a brain damaged patient Wayfarer, and their capacity to judge and reason diminishes substantially. That's a physical result from a physical change.
Now again, if there are gaps in places that we don't understand about the brain, that doesn't mean there is evidence for something we can make up. If there is a gap in understanding about how the brain works, and we can find something interacting with the brain that is not matter or energy, then we can say, "There is evidence of something non-physical in our brain, this might be consciousness." But absence of understanding, is not evidence for anything. It just means we can say, "We don't understand what is going on."
Quoting Wayfarer
I've clearly defined it here. Matter and energy are physical. Again, talk to me, not to "the physicalists".
Quoting Wayfarer
I'm actually not. I'm committed to what is most logical. Wayfarer, I have argued against a LOT of assumed theories and questioned and changed many assumptions about myself in life. That's what being intelligent is. Those who cannot consider alternatives and are set in their ways, are not rational people. They are emotional animals who crave the satisfaction of feeling right more than the cold and sometimes emotionally devastating act of learning what is right.
Quoting Wayfarer
Which is fine. But we can invent whatever we want in our heads and be emotionally attached to it. Does that make it real? No. Evidence of its existence and use in the world makes it real. And if you have no evidence when someone asks? Just say you don't have it. Nothing wrong with that either. If you feel you have to do word puzzles and jumbles to avoid saying those words, then realize you're more interested in lying about something for other to accept your idea, then telling the truth and letting them decide on their own. I haven't had to use fancy words, concepts, or complex ideas to convey my point, because I'm more concerned about clarity and seeing a correct outcome then emotional gratification.
Quoting Wayfarer
Meta means "self reference" Metaphysical as a word basically means self reference to the physical. Another way to view it is meta means "Talking about", so basically talking about the nature of the physical. And again, debates are fine. Ideas are wonderful! But claiming ideas are reality, when there is no evidence for it, is not.
An example of a non-falsifiable argument would be, "A = A" and someone made it impossible for ~A to be a consideration. So lets put some examples instead of letters here.
"God exists and made the world" = A. If I said, "Could I attempt to show that something else created the world?" I would receive a response. If the person said, "Well yeah, I guess that's fine," I would then ask, "So what would be enough to show that God did not make the world?" Here they need to give me an answer.
If they say, "God is beyond our understanding and definition," then there's really nothing to falsify. There's no definition or understanding of God to claim, so there is nothing to refute either. In short, non-falsifiable." If they say, "Why yes, there was this fine fellow name Jesus, and he said this, and did this, and that's God," then we have something that could be false. It could be that Jesus did not exist. That he wasn't sane or trustworthy. That the book that tells his stories isn't verifiably correct. That sort of stuff.
Now it very well could be that God exists and created the world. It could be that the bible is completely accurate, Jesus did come and do some things, and that's why we know God exists. It being true does not mean it is not falsifiable. Being falsifiable does not mean it is false. It just means we have something that could potentially be refuted, because that is naturally what happens with anything that exists.
Back to your example.
Quoting Kuro
No, they are very falsifiable. When would 6 not be 6? When 6=5 is one example. Basically if 6 = ~ 6, then 6=6 is false. We can test this. It turns out that ~6=6 isn't true, but a contradiction. Therefore while we have a means of falsifying, we cannot show that 6=6 is false. Therefore, it must be true.
Quoting Kuro
Much appreciated, but we don't need it for what we're talking about as I think you can see from my examples above.
Quoting Kuro
I felt the need to tell you this, because I felt you did not understand falsifiability. I didn't take offense to your recommendation to read up on logic, don't take offense on me telling you things I don't think you understand either.
Quoting Kuro
Recall you just mentioned that you understood falsifiability was not the same as "impossibility". If physicalism is contradictory, then its false. That is a clear and identifiable way it can be false. Therefore it is falsifiable. Now is it actually false? That's a different debate.
Quoting Kuro
Again, those are both falsifiable statements. But, we cannot meet the requirements to show they are false. Therefore they are proven to be true.
Not at all what I said. If you're going to paraphrase something, you need to understand it. The statement I made was supported with a reference to the Stanford Encyclopedia entry on Platonism in the Philosophy of Maths. The topic is 'the ontological status of math.' It is a debate with a long history, and you haven't shown the least evidence that you understand it.
Quoting Philosophim
Yes. That would be judgement.
Quoting Philosophim
There are abundant counter examples. Man with tiny brain shocks doctors. And research into neuroplasticity shows that neural configuration can be changed by volitional activity. These demonstrate that not all causation is 'bottom-up' from the physical to the mental, but that there's a top-down effect as well.
Quoting Philosophim
That's not the definition of metaphysical. You don't get to make it up.
What was it Nietzsche said - 'If you believe in grammar, you're a theist." The possibility of us making meaning and having reliable cognitive facilities may be just as 'miraculous' as the abstract, seemingly transcendental status of math.
I bought a really expensive textbook on the subject, which I was just starting to absorb, but haven't been able to find it since moving house. :groan: The author, James Robert Brown, is the one who defends Platonism in the Smithsonian Institute article What is Math? I love it that one of the empiricists says in response:
Why indeed!
Indeed. Math is arguably a less impressive product of abstraction from a far richer linguistic ability, like bony driftwood next to a living tree. It's poetry just the same but stuffed in a alluring straitjacket .
First, for context, I'm a moderate on this issue.
Language is a huge part of human reality. We live together in something like a historically and symbolically structured lifeworld. We bury or burn the corpses of the same loved ones we nurture when alive, so clearly the fine details or the structure of brains/bodies is important to us. The structure the sound waves we bark at one another is also crucial. I suppose it's plausible to stop at these patterns and say (speculatively or economically) that we are only such patterns. And perhaps you include all this implicitly in your 'we are only bodies and brains' position.
But your opening post doesn't emphasize what encourages the hopes for something more that you go on to criticize. I do agree that, naturally enough, people want to go to heaven, or a piece of the Absolute, etc. But there are also philosophical reasons to argue for 'something more' that do not include any such comforts and only seek a more comprehensive and consistent account.
'Those who have ears, let them hear'
How is that possible? If you remove the anxiety from Garrett, there is nothing left.
Have you heard of the phrase "when pigs fly?" It is a adynaton, namely in that when it postulates a subjunction believed to take on a highly implausible (or impossible) premise to ridicule on whatever follows. A is A in any valuation of A, so A is not A is simply never true. But entertaining A is not A simply entails trivialism in classical FOL, where any proposition you want to follow follows. (This is well known as the principle of explosion).
You don't find some empirical evidence for why things aren't themselves. You're just forcing a proposition that's already taken to have no truth-conditions in FOL to somehow be true. It's incoherent.
Quoting Philosophim
A is just a placeholder. A unicorn is a unicorn. It doesn't matter if it exists or not. It's not an existential claim, it's an identity claim.
Quoting Philosophim
~A is considered in A=A. But A=A returns true even granting ~A. ~A is literally just a negative truth valuation for A. So in both cases if A is false then the other A is also false, and so on. Like I've shown you earlier in the truth table, you can value A with any combination of truth and false and it'll always be equivalent to itself. There's no way out of it.
Quoting Philosophim
It would be a counterexample to the proposition "God exists and made the world" because that proposition is not a tautology. But "God is God" or "Making the world is making the world" is a tautology that is always true regardless of whether God existed or not. In the same fashion that "Santa is Santa" is a tautology with no falsity conditions.
Quoting Philosophim
While this may be a claim you can't empirically falsify, it's not a tautology in logic. This is just beating a strawman.
Quoting Philosophim
"When" 6=5? There is no time where 6 is equal to 5. I'm actually appalled that we're debating such a simple notion. Simply asserting falsities with no truth conditions is not an argument. There are no conditions where 6=5 holds, so there isn't a time that you can reference where you say "when 6=5" because it's simply never the case. On the converse, 5=5 will always be true. You can literally manually check this if you don't believe me: that's what I gave you in my earlier response, which seems insufficient for your purposes
Quoting Philosophim
Conceding on trivialism still wouldn't falsify 6=6, it'd just make everything (including negations) trivially true.
Quoting Philosophim
I'm fairly certain we do. You make very bold assertions with regards to the fields of logic and mathematics, but do not seem to grasp explanations of why these assertions are quite literally incoherent. I'm sure that further familiarity would not work against you and perhaps will lead you to the same conclusions I'm trying to communicate to you in this interaction.
Quoting Philosophim
I'm sorry if you felt this way, but I want to be clear I was simply inquiring for the reason why you did so, i.e. what lead you to the impression I did not understand falsifiability. This is not the same as me taking offense. Generally, assume that I take no offense unless I indicate otherwise :).
Quoting Philosophim
If a proposition is impossible, it is necessarily false, whereas if a proposition is false it is not necessarily impossible.
All impossible propositions are false, but not all false propositions are impossible.
Quoting Philosophim
You can't meet the requirements to show they are false because there are no such requirements. Propositional calculus is truth-functional, meaning the truth-value of a formula is a function of the semantics of the operators and the truth value of the propositions contained within it. All you're doing is exhausting all possible truth values. So tautologies return true having exhausted all possible truth values of false or true to all the propositions embedded within it. So there are no conditions where they're false.
My point is a debate is not evidence to understand. The conclusion of a debate is evidence to understand. I see evidence that there is a debate. And if there is a debate, the outcome is not known. Stating, "We don't know the outcome on something" again, is not evidence.
My job is not to understand a debate. I am not going to read a long storied history to prove your point for you. Your supposed to convince me right? Your job is to clearly present evidence of the non-physical as a cause of consciousness that is something you and I could debate. To show that I am holding the same standard towards you, I'm not saying, "Well there are debates that show there is no non-physical. There's a long storied debate of only the physical being true. You haven't demonstrated to me you've understood the entire history of this, go read it, you're ignoring, etc."
We're making clear points with each other. If I want to cite evidence in neuroscience, I will show evidence of things which are conclusive, not under debate. I will also cite specific outcomes, and not debates themselves as evidence. I ask the same in return.
Quoting Wayfarer
No, that would be an opinion. If you want to say you've judged your opinion to be true, then you need to supply some evidence. Otherwise, I could come back with my opinion without evidence that there is no non-physical with the same response, "Yes. That would be judgement". No, that would be silly.
This is evidence! Its falsifiable with clear claims. Lets examine your evidence to see if it demonstrates there is clearly something non-physical going on.
So, if the brains reduction was not correlated with the reduction of consciousness, we would find that the man was just as intelligent as a person with an average brain. Except in the article we see, "Intelligence tests showed the man had an IQ of 75, below the average score of 100 but not considered mentally retarded or disabled."
Further, the article notes, "The findings reveal “the brain is very plastic and can adapt to some brain damage occurring in the pre- and postnatal period when treated appropriately,” he says.
“What I find amazing to this day is how the brain can deal with something which you think should not be compatible with life,” comments Max Muenke, a paediatric brain defect specialist at the National Human Genome Research Institute in Bethesda, Maryland, US.
“If something happens very slowly over quite some time, maybe over decades, the different parts of the brain take up functions that would normally be done by the part that is pushed to the side,” adds Muenke, who was not involved in the case."
So it doesn't appear that researchers and scientists are seeing something at odds with matter and energy in the brain. Everything still seems explainable with a matter and energy model. And again, if they didn't understand why this was possible, that just opens it up to debate. An opinion of a solution to a debate, is not evidence that the solution exists, even if it is a satisfying opinion or "seems perfect".
Your second reference notes that thought can rewire the brain.
"When the scientists compared the TMS data on the two groups--those who actually tickled the ivories and those who only imagined doing so--they glimpsed a revolutionary idea about the brain: the ability of mere thought to alter the physical structure and function of our gray matter. For what the TMS revealed was that the region of motor cortex that controls the piano-playing fingers also expanded in the brains of volunteers who imagined playing the music--just as it had in those who actually played it."
But this is not evidence of the non-physical. We already know thoughts are composed of matter and energy. Just like when you use your muscles, the brain rewires itself to compensate. The brain itself is adapting based on what is happening up there. Nowhere in the article does it claim that there is something outside of the brain, or outside of matter and energy causing the brain to change. I suppose Wayfarer you must find it odd that thoughts are essentially a combination of matter and energy. But that is what the current physical model of the brain presents. Thoughts are physical. its your job to give evidence that they are not.
Quoting Wayfarer
You are correct. I noted a branch of metaphysics, and applied that to all metaphysics. I want you to see I can admit freely when I am wrong. Its very important that both of us take this mindset, or emotional and personal feelings get in the way. My real point again is that debates are not evidence. Now, if you would like to explain to me why debates are evidence, we can consider this. But so far, you have not.
Quoting Wayfarer
Lets keep it to debating the claims eh? Otherwise I would come back with something like "Remove the plank from your own eye before pointing out the splinter in your neighbors," That back and forth gets us nowhere.
When did I say empirical evidence? All I'm noting for the condition of falsification, is that we have a clear postulate we can put forward that would show when the proposition was false. If A=~A, then A=A would be false right? Take the simple note above and try to explain to me why A=~A is not a negation of A=A.
Quoting Kuro
Then you agree with me. The potential for something to be proven false, does not mean it can be proven false. Falsification does not mean, "It is false". It means there is a condition we can propose in which our claim would be false. If A=~A was true, then A=A would be false. If you agree with this, then you understand. If you don't, please explain how if A=~A were true, then A=A would not be false.
Quoting Kuro
And again, if something is provably true, it doesn't mean we can't invent a scenario in which it would not be true. The invention of the scenario in which it is not true, also does not mean it can be concluded that it is not true. You seem to be under the impression that falsification means "likelihood or chance" that it can be proven false. That's not what it is. Its just the presentation of the condition in which a claim would be false. And A=~A is that falsification presentation. It is of course, NOT true, which means that A=A is not false. But it can still be falsified. Does that clear it up?
Quoting Kuro
That is because you are not understanding what I am saying. I am not saying 6=5. I'm just noting a case that IF 6=5 was true, then 5=5 would be false. Thus 5=5 can be falsified. It doesn't mean that 5=5 is false.
Quoting Kuro
Same here! Without non-verbal, it can be difficult to understand what another person is feeling, thanks for clearing that up.
Quoting Kuro
Correct. But in both cases, there is a possible negation to consider. We may conclude that negation is impossible, but we can conceive of its negation, and what it would entail.
Quoting Kuro
Correct, there are no conditions in which they are found to be false. This does not mean there is not a potential condition in which we could consider it being false.
Can you address the point in which I provided an example of God vs. Jesus when it was not possible for there to be falsification? In the God example, there is not a consideration of anything which could be considered falsifiable. Let us not forget this debate is about providing evidence that is falsifiable for or against consciousness being physical vs non-physical.
Yes. This doesn't make human interactions any less meaningful. How we function does not change the reality of our function.
Quoting lll
I agree. I was just answering why in particular this topic tends to pop up more than others. In my discussions on this topic over time I simply find a pattern that you find a lot more people of a religious and spiritual nature in the camp of the non-physical, then you do in the camp of the physical. Further, generally these arguments are ill-defined, and will not actually provide what they mean by non-physical. You can find genuine people who are willing to engage the subject rationally, but I would say a lot of the motivation is not rational curiosity, but a desire for a particular emotional outcome. This is of course an opinion, and should not be taken as fact.
You're not showing any sign of understanding any of the points that I've made, even in principle.
Quoting Philosophim
Your commitment to that falsehood colors everything you say about it. Thoughts are composed of the relationship between ideas, and ideas are not physical. A logical proof is not dependent on anything physical, neither is pure mathematics. I'm done talking to you.
Upon reviewing, I have. Maybe you haven't understood mine?
Quoting Wayfarer
I've been asking you repeatedly to show me evidence of what non-physical is, and you haven't. If thoughts aren't composed of matter and energy, what are they composed of Wayfarer? We have evidence through physical manipulation of the brain that thoughts can be triggered and changed. Give me evidence that thoughts are composed of something besides matter and energy, or I'm right, and not holding a falsehood. You want to demonstrate that what I hold is a falsehood, prove it.
As a philosophical naturalist, I'm all for whatever works better, more probatively and reliably, than methodological physicalism.
Quoting lll
:100:
You said nothing about mathematical platonism.
You simply dismiss the idea of psychosomatic effects on the basis that thoughts are physical. The point of that 'piano practice' experiment, was that subjects who simply thought about doing piano exercises, showed measurable neural changes to the subjects who had a physical piano. But of course, you will say that, as thought is already physical, this shows nothing. You're in essence claiming there's no difference between an imagined piano and a physical one, because an imagined piano is also physical.
Quoting Philosophim
They're composed of ideas. Your dogma is that ideas are brain-functions. That is called neurological reductionism. There are volumes of books that critique neurological reductionism, but there's no point referring to them, because you already know - and it's the only claim you make - 'everything is physical'.
I said plenty. And I said why it wasn't evidence. And you didn't refute this.
Quoting Wayfarer
Lets define "psychosomatic effects". Any result pertaining to the influence of the mind or higher functions of the brain upon the operations of the body, particularly bodily disorders or diseases.
I didn't deny that. What I said was that this doesn't show that thoughts aren't matter and energy. No, I am not saying there is a difference between an imagined piano and a physical one in terms of thoughts. Wayfarer, your mind doesn't touch a real piano. Your nerves interpret that touch, then travel to the brain where the brain makes some sense out of it. Your brain doesn't need nerves, or a piano, to have thoughts about a piano, and practice strengthening neural pathways. Nothing in that article claims that consciousness isn't physical, or that the brain and thoughts are not physical.
Quoting Wayfarer
What are ideas composed of Wayfarer? Its not dogma for me to claim that thoughts and ideas are composed of matter and energy, its a conclusion based on the evidence I know.
[quote="Wayfarer;668534"it's the only claim you make - 'everything is physical'.[/quote]
Don't be dishonest now. I clearly stated that what is physical, is matter and energy. If you find something that isn't matter and energy, you've found something non-physical. I've asked you to provide me an example of something that is not matter and energy. You claim ideas aren't made of matter and energy, give me evidence. If its not matter and energy, what is it? If you don't answer in the next reply, then you and I will both have clearly determined that you don't know. Be honest and address the request.
[quote=Twilight of the Idols]I am afraid we are not rid of God because we still have faith in grammar.[/quote]
You haven't addressed it.
When I brought up the idea, and linked to an article on What is Math, you said only this:
Quoting Philosophim
At least that was a start - but it doesn't develop. The expression 'a setting devoid of anything conscious but an observer' is very confusing, indicating you hadn't really come to terms with the basic problem.
I then tried again in this post to which your response was
Quoting Philosophim
Again indicating you have no grasp of the philosophical issue. So, no, you haven't addressed 'the issue of mathematical platonism' and why it is relevant to the question as to whether all that exists is matter and energy.
Quoting Philosophim
It's a metaphysical stance, namely, philosophical materialism. Again - what are numbers composed of? What are the rules of logic composed of? All of these are ideas that can only be grasped by a rational intelligence. That is why platonism is rejected by materialists.
Since you did not reply with any evidence of the non-physical, then we both know you don't have any at this point.
Quoting Wayfarer
Then why didn't you engage with me then? Why didn't you point out where I was wrong? I'm not here to read other theories. I'm here to get evidence from you about non-physical reality. You can type all of these other replies avoiding the issue, but you can't type out showing where in this theory there is proof of the non-physical?
Quoting Wayfarer
That is on you. If you expect to throw a linked set of debates that would require me hours of reading without any guidance or lead on your part, then its just a convenient excuse for you to run away from the issue. I've clearly addressed everything straight with you. I haven't asked you to read the entirety of neuroscience. That's dishonest. I've held you to everything I've written here, not vague theories and debates.
You also avoided the greater point I made. I stated, "Quoting Philosophim
I asked you to point out where the non-physical was noted. You did not. I noted that because there was no conclusion, it was a debate, and that would mean that there are also people in this debate who think things are material. If it is inconclusive, then that means neither side knows. You did not say I was wrong here either. And if I was not wrong here, then I was surely right in not spending hours reading up on what amounts to an inconclusive debate.
You're lying to yourself Wayfarer. Do you think a good God would want such a thing? Do you think you have to deceive yourself and others because your personal emotional feelings are more important than integrity? I'm a former Christian Wayfarer. I'm not saying you shouldn't be a Christian. But I am noting you aren't acting like one now.
It's not 'hours of reading'. I linked to a popular recent article, What is Math? which is about, I would think, 1500-1700 words. You asked for 'evidence of the non-physical', and I responded in terms of philosophical argument, mathematical platonism. You basically ignored it, apart from one brief remark. I'm not proposing the existence of spooks or ectoplasm, which is what I think you mean by 'non-physical'. You need to understand why mathematical Platonism is incompatible with materialism. That article spells it out in two different quotes.
How about you just tell me and link those quotes? I'm not going to do your work for you Wayfarer. I didn't ask you to do my work for me.
Quoting Philosophim
I first addressed the point about falsifiability, pointing out that it's not necessarily relevant to metaphysical question. And then I said:
Quoting Wayfarer
So - have a read of that essay. At least it introduces the concept.
I thought we had already resolved falsifiability and were simply talking about evidence of something non-physical at this point. But ok, if that is your problem, I read it. Its a debate I'm well aware of. Where is the evidence against falsifiability? I have no idea what you're trying to show with this article on an age old problem.
If you believe falsifiability is not a criterian I should hold, please explain to me what in this article backs that.
Karl Popper introduced the idea of falsifiability in order to distinguish empirical hypotheses from other kinds of theory. His point was that if a theory could not be falsified by evidence then it was not a scientific theory. The two examples of theories he presented as non-empirical were psychoanalysis and Marxist economics. According to Popper, a theory has to be testable against evidence in order to count as scientific. No amount of evidence could challenge the basic tenets of those schools, as they could simply introduce further terms or adjustments to accomodate whatever they encountered.
But mathematical platonism not an empirical theory. There is no empirical finding that could either confirm it or falsify it. It's a conjecture about the nature of reality - a metaphysical view of what is real.
The argument for platonism in that article is given in brief by James Robert Brown:
The article also mentions Roger Penrose, who is platonist, and you could also mention Kurt Godel, who is another, but there are many platonist mathematicians.
The empiricist objection against platonism is stated as:
And that is the issue in a nutshell.
So - what evidence can there be for either side? I don't think it's an empirical question, as the platonist view is not a scientific hypothesis. But then, neither is the objection. The Platonist view is an argument for 'something non-physical', as described in the philosophical significance of platonism in the SEP article.
I personally am persuaded by the platonist attitude. I see the elements of reason, numbers, logical laws, scientific principles, etc, as the constituents of reality - because reality is not something that exists outside of or separate to our being. I think physicalism fails because there is no coherent definition of what 'physical' means - all it amounts to is 'faith in science', that science will 'one day' join all the dots. It's a cultural attitude, more than a philosophy as such.
You said I shouldn't use falsification. None of what you wrote, shows me that I shouldn't use falsification as my criterion for evidence.
Look, math is real easy. Its about our ability to identify. I can look at "1" field of grass, and "1" blade of grass, and "1" piece of grass. 1 identity and another 1 identity together are the identity we call 2. As we observe the world with identities, or discrete experiences, it follows the logic of our capability to do so.
Notice how we say 1 blade of grass and 1 blade of grass are two? That's because its how we make sense of the world. Is 1 blade of grass exactly the same as the other? No. Its the notion of combining 2 things together for us to convey an idea.
If humanity did not exist, it doesn't mean the world would go away. It doesn't mean that something else that could create identities, couldn't create an identity that would work out for them in the same way. But does the concept of "1" exist apart from our invention of that identity? Of course not. There's no evidence of that at all. Just like the concept of "embigination" doesn't exist without me in the world. It doesn't mean that what I am describing as "embigination" doesn't exist, it means my concept of it would not exist.
But regardless of all that, we're looking for a reason why I can't use falsification right? If you want to discuss what I just mentioned we can, but I don't want to get off topic.
Lets see, for the Platonic theory. If they propose that numbers exist apart from human concepts, lets first get them to clearly define that. Do they mean a floating symbol? Probably not, but feel free to interject. They probably mean that "oneness" itself would still exist. In other words, if we didn't know what the symbology of "1" is, what the symbology of 1 describes would1 still exist even apart from our ability to understand this. So, its falsification would be if we should show that oneness did not exist apart from our ability to conceive of the concept.
So all we would need then is a rational agent that did not understand or know about numbers, and then see if they acted as if "oneness" existed right? Turns out, you take kids and even animals, and they can construct and understand "whole identities" (What 1 is). Now perhaps you would like another go at the definition of what they mean by math existing apart from human understanding. That's fine. But this number concept of Platonism can clearly be falsified.
As such, I'm not seeing why this article implies I cannot use falsification as a criterion. And the point is not whether I'm correct or not about Platonism. The entire true point, the heart of it, is that I can create a claim using Platonism that can be falsified.
Yes. That's why I said "physicalism" was not an issue for them. They seemed to assume that Reality was both Material & Spiritual. But they didn't worry about how a spiritual Mind could emerge from a Material substrate. They just assumed that "god did it".
Only when our improving understanding of Matter found no obvious connection between Body & Mind, did Cartesian dualism become a philosophical problem. So, Descartes postulated that the Pineal gland in the brain was the "seat of the soul. But that didn't pan-out.
However, Einstein discovered that intangible Energy & tangible Matter (Mass) are correlated mathematically. And, post-Shannon Information theory has found a logical/mathematical relationship between Energy & Information. Hence, some scientists & philosophers have concluded that Energy, Matter, & Mind are inter-related forms of the same fundamental "substance". :nerd:
Physics Is Pointing Inexorably to Mind :
So-called “information realism”
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/physics-is-pointing-inexorably-to-mind/
Again - the reason that Popper devised the falsification criterion, was to differentiate scientific from non-scientific theories. So, what you're asking for is a scientific theory.
If you think you can explain maths in a couple of paragraphs, that it's 'obvious' and 'natural' what maths is, what numbers are, then you need to do more reading.
Quoting Gnomon
:down: No, you're on the wrong track here. And that's not even supported by the post you provide from Bernardo Kastrup (of whom I'm a keen reader, having just finished his Schopenhauer.)
Notice this:
[quote=Kastrup]To say that information exists in and of itself is akin to speaking of spin without the top, of ripples without water, of a dance without the dancer, or of the Cheshire Cat’s grin without the cat. It is a grammatically valid statement devoid of sense; a word game less meaningful than fantasy, for internally consistent fantasy can at least be explicitly and coherently conceived of as such.[/quote]
which is something I just said in another thread.
He goes on
[quote=Kastrup]...we don’t need the word games of information realism. Instead, we must stick to what is most immediately present to us: solidity and concreteness are qualities of our experience. The world measured, modeled and ultimately predicted by physics is the world of perceptions, a category of mentation. The phantasms and abstractions reside merely in our descriptions of the behavior of that world, not in the world itself.
Where we get lost and confused is in imagining that what we are describing is a non-mental reality underlying our perceptions, as opposed to the perceptions themselves. We then try to find the solidity and concreteness of the perceived world in that postulated underlying reality. However, a non-mental world is inevitably abstract. And since solidity and concreteness are felt qualities of experience—what else?—we cannot find them there. The problem we face is thus merely an artifact of thought, something we conjure up out of thin air because of our theoretical habits and prejudices. ....
The mental universe exists in mind but not in your personal mind alone. Instead, it is a transpersonal field of mentation that presents itself to us as physicality—with its concreteness, solidity and definiteness—once our personal mental processes interact with it through observation. This mental universe is what physics is leading us to, not the hand-waving word games of information realism.
[/quote]
but don't expect to find an appreciative audience for that article.
Wayfarer, I'm not Karl Popper. I don't care why he wanted to use falsification. I'm not asking you for the standard of a scientific theory, which is MUCH more than falsification.
Quoting Wayfarer
Irrelevant as I already noted. I showed you where falsification can be applied to Platonism. Ignore my points on math if you like, that was an aside. Stop saying I'm asking for a scientific theory, and please explain to me why I can't use falsification as a requirement for viable evidence.
Agreed, though I think the bias cuts both ways. I'm a longtime atheist, and it'd be quite an inconvenience for me if I had to rewire myself to take god chatter seriously again (as I did when exposed as a child to it.)
https://iep.utm.edu/gadamer/#SH3b
I think another way to put this is that we all arrive having been trained by a past with certain expectations and inclinations. What we philosophers share (or at least occasionally claim to share) is a drive toward an ideal objectivity. It's our 'inflexible point of honor' that we offer reasons for claims and let our ideas do our dying for us when they've been shown inferior to others.
I agree. I'm personally interested in celebrating how 'miraculous' the so-called ordinary already is. I was arguing lately with a person who thought we must have telepathy or something because the brain uses electricity. I told them that our eyes human eyes are radiation detectors and obviously play a huge role in communication. It's as if whatever is relatively well understood is no longer exciting. What is the obscure object of desire which seems to bend some people against a scientific attitude that likes details and acknowledges ambiguity and uncertainty?
Sometimes I think on the fact that I exist at all, and am filled with absolute wonder. It is truly astounding that existence "is", and that I am one of the lucky few bits of material existence to realize it all.
Quoting lll
I would not have a problem with it. I did not leave Christianity in anger, I simply left because I couldn't rationally accept it anymore. As such, my actions honestly haven't changed very much from where I was a Christian except for going to Church.
Very well put. Especially when I was young I would be almost overwhelmed with a sense of the beautiful absurdity of stuff just being there. One such Sartrean vision of a chestnut tree (as in Nausea, a great little novel) was that of clear water tumbling over slate, when I was a kid alone having wandered off. A creek was running wild after days of rain. It was just there, magnificent.
I've explained this several times in my earlier post that I can only refer you to what I've already written.
Quoting Kuro
Quoting Philosophim
I've never implied that potential to be false is the same as falsity and I've clarified this an awful amount of times in my earlier post once again... you're beating the same strawman that I clarified isn't my position.
My position is that propositions like "a=a" simply /don't/ have the potential to be false. Yes, "a" can be false, but "a=a" is still true even if "a" is false.
Quoting Philosophim
No, Philosophim, I'm /not/ under the impression that falsification means likelihood or chance. The very fact that you reach this conclusion just to me shows, without any offense, your complete lack of understanding to any word that I've said, which is why I strongly feel like you should've picked up the introductory course I've linked you, or at the very least examined them, prior to this reply because I some of that information is genuinely necessary as a prerequisite for this conversation.
So let's start with the basics. Let's look at the truth table of a generic wff like "p ? q"
Let's exhaust all the combinations of p and q's valuation to look at the valuation of the formula "p ? q". Oh look! It seems that under the valuation of p being true and q being false, "p ? q" returns false!
This will be our countermodel. Our counterexample. In this valuation, or in this combination of values, our formula returns false.
Ok, are you following me so far?
Now, certain types of formulas, known as tautologies, are special kinds of formulas. They're special precisely because /no matter/ the valuation, they will always yield true.
For example, let's look at "p ? p"
Oh wait. It's still true even if p is false. And it's true even if p is true. In other words, there are /no/ countermodels.
No counterexamples. No conditions where this proposition can be false. No possibility of being false.
Wait, what if you don't trust the table? Luckily for you, there's something called a /truth tree/. A proposition can be verified to be logically valid, i.e. a tautology, in that if you assume its negation, you will always get a contradiction. Since contradictions are never true, the negation of the negation must be true. And the negation of the negation is the same as initial proposition, therefore the initial proposition must be true otherwise we have a contradiction, i.e. there are no falsity conditions. Don't believe me?
Okay, so let's find the feature that differentiates tautologies, like ("p ? p") and non-tautologies, like ("p ? q"). Wanna guess what this feature is? It's that non-tautologies have falsity conditions, countermodels where given certain valuations they /can be/ false. Tautologies on the converse do not have falsity conditions. They have no counterexamples. No conditions where they are false. In other words, their falsity is necessarily a contradiction.
Quoting Philosophim
Have you heard of a vacuous truth? This doesn't matter because not only is the antecedent (6=5) false, which you agree, it simply /can't/ be true. You'll never, ever, in this universe, ever find that it becomes the case that 6=5. In fact, that is never the case in any possible world either.
This is different from, for example, the statement "all swans are black is false if there was a white swan." This is a falsity condition namely in that it is possible. It could be the case that we find a white swan right here on Earth and come to discover that our thesis "all swans are black" is false. Better yet, there are possible worlds where the conditions of a white swan existing are the case: the falsity conditions are /possible/.
This is different from saying "all swans are black is false if there was a green square circle number." This doesn't matter. This "falsity condition" is impossible and incoherent. Not only will we never find it to be the case in the actual world, it simply cannot and can never be the case in any possible world
Quoting Philosophim
Of course you can /consider/ the negation, who said you couldn't. Remember the truth trees I just told you about?
In a contingent proposition that is /not/ a tautology, when assuming the negation you produce a /countermodel/: a set of valuation that is logically consistent but entails the falsity of the proposition.
However, in a tautology, assuming the negation /always/ results in a contradiction: i.e. it is impossible for the negation to be true. Because if the negation was true, and by consequence, there was a true contradiction, then trivialism entails which simply makes everything true. This is the principle of explosion I told you about earlier, didn't I?
And this method is exactly the method that lets you tell whether something is a tautology or not (there are actually more methods, like truth tables, but you get the point).
Quoting Philosophim
Yup. I addressed this point earlier.
Quoting Kuro
Both I think. There's some (2009) evidence about this from Philpapers survey metaphysics questions, here. If you need me to write something on factor analysis, I can. As a summary, those factors in order split philosophers on what they disagree about the most. Naturalism/non-naturalism (physicalism/non-physicalism) comes out as the strongest contrast of philosophical opinion over topics. It would thus be a strong promoter of debate. So it isn't surprising that it is a prevalent discussion.
As for why it's 'so' prevalent... It could equally be that the userbase splits along the axis particularly strongly, or that the contrast between naturalism/non-naturalism is of broad enough scope to touch on almost everything.
The study population for philpapers' analysis is professional philosophers though. We're not represented well by it I think, so our drivers may be different. I would guess that the breadth and centrality of physicalism/non-physicalism conceptual tensions make it simultaneously easy for amateurs like us to wander into a discussion about and also easy to intuit strongly, thus spilling more ink.
God talk's popular, I think, for the same reason.
Kastrup is interesting.
I've tried to make a similar point. The temptation is to look 'behind' some kind of 'peel.'
To me this starts well and goes wrong at the end. 'Perception' points into a secret interior space which must remain epistemologically useless. Let's start with statements. 'The dial read 200 nanometers.' 'That man climbed in through the kitchen window.' 'Her lips were blue.' Note that observation statements are already theory laden, so it's not about the utter absence of interpretation but only that of 'extra', controversial interpretation.
This whole 'we should dodge grammatically-logically private entities' attitude has a simple justification. We should be able to check the 'bricks' of our inquiry.
I don't read it that way. Remember Kastrup describes himself as an analytical idealist. He's therefore questioning the normally-assumed primacy of the objective - that the so-called 'objective domain' is the fundamental reality.
There's a Schopenhauer passage which expresses the same insight very pungently.
[quote=Schopenhauer, The World as Will and Idea] All that is objective, extended, active—that is to say, all that is material—is regarded by materialism as affording so solid a basis for its explanation, that a reduction of everything to this can leave nothing to be desired (especially if in ultimate analysis this reduction should resolve itself into action and reaction). But we have shown that all this is given indirectly and in the highest degree determined, and is therefore merely a relatively present object, for it has passed through the machinery and manufactory of the brain, and has thus come under the forms of space, time and causality, by means of which it is first presented to us as extended in space and ever active in time. From such an indirectly given object, materialism seeks to explain what is immediately given, the idea (in which alone the object that materialism starts with exists), and finally even the will from which all those fundamental forces, that manifest themselves, under the guidance of causes, and therefore according to law, are in truth to be explained. To the assertion that thought is a modification of matter we may always, with equal right, oppose the contrary assertion that all matter is merely the modification of the knowing subject, as its idea.[/quote]
That's pretty well exactly what Kastrup is saying.
I think we might be talking past one another unintentionally. I think you misunderstand that I am not referring to falsification as a logic chart. You're missing what I'm trying to communicate.
And by the way, it is very lovely and a massive credit to you for spending the time to clearly write those logic charts. I did read all the information, and was not dismissive of it. Lets use your chart as an example.
In the case that p -> p, the result is always true. Yes, I understand this. This isn't targeting what I'm trying to tell you however. I can falsify that by positing that p -> ~p. If p -> ~p exists, then p->p is false. It doesn't mean p->~p exists. It means it a clear counter condition that would show p->p doesn't exist. The topic we are talking about is whether non-physicalism exists. The falsification of that ideal, is that non-physicalism does not exist.
I am talking about falsification for evidence. The only pre-requisite for something that is falsifiable is that it has a clear and distinct definition. That's really it. Because if you claim "x exists" then the alternative, "x doesn't exist" is always a falsification that can be considered.
Quoting Kuro
Santa doesn't exist. I'm asking for evidence that Santa exists. We are not talking about tautologies. And to do that, I need something falsifiable. What is Santa? What are the traits? How can I tell Santa exists? There needs to be something that would indicate a reality in which Santa did not exist.
So for example, "Santa exists in the North pole in a factory where he makes toys all day". So all I have to do is go up to the North pole and look for a factory where some guy is making toys all day. If I go up to the North pole and don't find any factories, then I know Santa doesn't exist.
Now, lets apply this to non-physicalism. I've asked Wayfarer to give me evidence of non-physicalism, and he has tried in every conceivable way to avoid doing this. That is because he knows he doesn't have any. And he knows if he admits that, his entire world view crumbles. Non-physicalism only works as something you can possible consider if it has no traits one could look for.
I've even made it easy for him. Physicalism is simply the analysis of the rules of matter and energy. I've asked him to show me one instance in which matter and energy wasn't involved in consciousness. He can't do it. That's because he can't assert non-physicalism as anything, because then people could actually look for it, and find that it isn't there. That's the whole goal of holding non-falsifiable ideals. Its a self-gratifying ideal that people hold precious to their chest, terrified that others might point out its flaws. If you can avoid having to think about it too much, or present it in a way that makes it real, then you can lie to yourself and tell yourself you're holding to something that is true. I am very familiar with this myself, and see it clear as day in other people.
Wayfarer is literally telling me Santa exists, and when I persist on a definition of who Santa is and how I can know he exists, he can't. That's non-falsifiable, and I am valid in asking for falsifiable evidence. It is also quite telling that when I asked for evidence that could be falsified, I've spent more time explaining falsification then hearing evidence. Now perhaps Kuro that's because you're more interested in the perceived logic. And that's fine, but its distracted from the point long enough. People don't have to do large debates about falsification for things that are easy to show are real.
Suffice to say, I am completely unconvinced that I am wrong to ask for evidence that is falsifiable, so I will. If you don't understand that, so be it. If you can give me evidence that the non-physical exists, feel free to reply. I don't want to hear anything more about falsification, as this distraction has gone on long enough. Give me your evidence, and I'll be the judge.
The 'objective domain' is perhaps best understood as that realm about which we can reliably make objective (unbiased) claims. Noumena (things in themselves) are just as useless as qualia epistemologically. The problem with solipsistic idealisms is related to the self-cancelling 'it's all just opinion' thesis, which pretends to be an opinion-transcending fact. Any 'critical' or 'rational' dialog tacitly presupposes a shared reality about which one can be (something like) righter or wronger. The 'primacy of the objective' is best understood not as the primary of dead junk external to and perhaps an illusion of dreaming ghosts but as the most general context of serious inquiry. What does doing philosophy presuppose? If there are no others in a shared world, then the babble is self-tickling onanism (ignoring for the moment that the concept of a self depends on the concept of the other.)
Of course. No disputing that.
Quoting lll
[quote=Bernardo Kastrup;https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/observations/physics-is-pointing-inexorably-to-mind/]As I elaborate extensively in my new book, The Idea of the World, none of this implies solipsism. The mental universe exists in mind but not in your personal mind alone. Instead, it is a transpersonal field of mentation that presents itself to us as physicality—with its concreteness, solidity and definiteness—once our personal mental processes interact with it through observation. [/quote]
compare:
Quoting lll
There is indeed a shared reality, almost in the sense of a collective consciousness - what Hegel called the zeitgeist. It transcends but includes the objective domain.
You did not actually quote an argument.
One of the more famous challenges to math platonism is the question of which set theoretic construction of the positive integers of many possible is the correct one, the one that exists immaterially? https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benacerraf%27s_identification_problem
One might also ask where 'really existing' platonic entities end and stuff we cook up from them begins. For instance, are the real numbers just synthetic mush that we invented using the genuinely angelic technology of the rational numbers? Fair question, since the measure of the computable numbers (the ones we can talk about individually) is zilch.
Math platonism looks like a leap of faith. How can we see around our own cognition and check if numbers are 'really' there, assuming those signs have sense ?
I'd change this to 'with equal wrong.' 'Mound' and 'mutter' are two sleights of the same con.
I think a softer version of @Wayfarer's point would be something like: our world is intelligible. We can talk about stuff. Our physical theories themselves are 'meaningful.' Some people come across (correctly or not) as denying the existence of 'meaning' or 'consciousness' and talking as if only 'dead junk' exists. Any comprehensive map or theory of our reality has to acknowledge that mapmaking itself and the conditions of its own possibility.
Which is fine, I have no issue with that. My point is matter and energy is able to interplay in such a way as to create a thinking human being. Its incredible honestly. If he wants to think its something else, that's fine. But when I ask for evidence, the honest thing to reply is, "I don't have any, its just a belief of mine," I would accept that. It is when he refuses to answer or divert, which is lying by omission, I see a problem.
But all those kinds of arguments are similar in kind to the 'multiverse' conjectures - that there might be 'other universes' where the fundamental laws of physics are different. If you read down that Smithsonian article, Rovelli's response is similar to that - that Euclidean geometery only seems to have a sense of the inevitable about it, because of 'strangely flat' nature of the natural environment.
Of course one can always imagine that 'things could be completely otherwise' - but they're not. I find those kinds of arguments entirely void of merit.
As you're philosophically literate, one of the best articles on this whole question is on the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy on The Indispensability Argument for the Philosophy of Mathematics. It starts:
If you read on, you find that 'our best' epistemic theories are, of course, naturalistic. And, of course, rationalist philosophy is a challenge to that, because it has trouble explaining why reason has a grasp of such things:
Well, to me, the obvious solution, and the one that I have been arguing against someone who has not the least comprehension of the subject, is that, as the Greek dualists argue, we're not simply physical creatures, but have a faculty of reason which transcends the physical.
[quote=The Powers of Pure Reason: Kant and the Idea of Cosmic Philosophy, Alfredo Ferrarin].'...we may be sorrrounded by objects, but even while cognizing them, reason is the origin of something that is neither reducible to nor derives from them in any sense. In other words, reason generates a cognition, and a cognition regarding nature is above nature. In a cognition, reason transcends nature in one of two ways: by rising above our natural cognition and making, for example, universal and necessarily claims in theoretical and practical matters not determined by nature, or by assuming an impersonal objective perspective that remains irreducible to the individual I.'[/quote]
Quoting lll
You know Husserl's criticism of 'the natural attitude'? Well, you're falling for it here. You're saying, if these exist, where are they? Where is 'the domain of natural numbers'? It's not anywhere, obviously - but there are things within it, the natural numbers, and things outside it, like the square root of minus 1. So, 'domain', 'inside', 'outside' 'thing', and 'exist' are all in some sense metaphorical when it comes to these 'objects'. They're more like the constituents or rational thought, they inhere, or subsist, in the way that we reason about experience. They don't 'exist' - they precede existence, that is why they inhabit the realm of the a priori.
Quoting lll
How can we explain the astonishing progress of mathematical physics since the 17th century? Why is it that mathematical reasoning has disclosed previously unknowable aspects of the nature of reality? That is the subject of Wigner's Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences. The 'fictionalist' accounts seem to have no answer to that.
I understand where you are coming from. I imagine a kind of continuum that runs from the especially abstract to the relatively concrete. On the abstract or speculative side of this continuum the 'evidence' we can provide is more like rhetorical support. For instance, mathematical platonism cannot be proved or disproved by looking behind a moonrock and seeing whether or not 23,546 is hiding there. (I argue against mathematical platonism by (trying to show) contradictions or plotholes in the story it tells.) As I understand @Wayfarer, he'll defend a metaphysical theory of the subject but not any traditional religious beliefs. (He can say more.) I guess the point is that we're stuck on the abstract end of the spectrum where even the concepts of evidence and reason are not solid and unchanging.
I was not referring to Kastrup's article in the excerpt above. It was a top of the head remark.
Does Kastrup think E & M are not correlated mathematically? What does the "=" sign in E=MC^2 mean? :chin:
Consider, though, that taking this attitude to the extreme is a sanctification of whatever the tribe happens to believe at a given time. Philosophy is and ought to be haunted by possibilities.
To me this is just a fancy acknowledgement that the human world is not just stupid junk. We can talk about our talk about our talk. I do of course agree with and have been emphasizing reason's transcendence of any individual 'I' that it arguably makes possible in the first place. The 'ego' is a ripple, one might speculate, upon the surface of our shared semantic field, a sort of layer of our lifeworld. Even those junky ordinary objects mentioned above imply the breaking up of the world into little unities, presumably in a way useful to creatures such as ourselves. This 'softwhere' is nowhere in particular, any more than a dance lives in any particular dancer.
I don't disagree that they are part of our softwhere, and of course I myself emphasize the centrality of analogy or metaphor in human cognition. The so-called 'a priori' is often the product of a previous generation's creativity. Note that math has evolved over the centuries. As I'm sure you know, zero and negative numbers and imaginary numbers and Cantorian set theory were all controversial once. Folks were outraged and swatted them away like horseflies. This is an argument against their priority to experience. Why couldn't our faculty of immaterial reason immediately grasp them as real?
:up: Simple once you see it.
Quoting Gnomon
He does, and of course that's true. But I was leery of the 'intangible energy' idea, as if that amounts to anything more than or other than physics. But I'm considering the idea that even the humble "=" sign has no physical equivalent, it's a purely rational idea, but without it maths couldn't even begin.
Quoting lll
Damned if I know. There's lots of really hard questions around this point. The only, the sole, point I'm always making is that 'number is real but not material', where 'number' amounts to a kind of token for 'rational intellection' or the operations of nous. It's hardly a new idea.
Quoting lll
If only because, through scientific reasoning, we were able to invent streetlights.
I agree that it's a fact that deserves speculation and investigation. One immediate reaction I have is to stress the simple genius of just counting things and looking for patterns in what happens without trying to explain (poetically) why they happen. Stuff just is attracted to stuff according to an inverse square law. It's like looking for your keys under the streetlight. Fortunately we found something there. For all we know there's a wealth of yet unexploited patterns invisible to us because our hardware and/or softwhere is just not tuned for it. Neural networks are finding such patterns in our own chatter, so that translation becomes automated. Amazing! But the models are 'black boxes' in their complexity, with billions of parameters.
I'm not a fictionalist, by the way. I haven't settled on an 'ism,' though I do like aspects of structuralism.
I can join you at a certain level of blurriness. We live in a lifeworld with something like a layer of significance, and language including math is part of that.
I agree, so we meet there and perhaps diverge on what we make of this recognition.
I take this metaphor to gesture toward the exploitability of quantitive pattern finding that maps from uncontroversial observables now to uncontroversial observables later. Finally prognostication was made reliable, at the cost however of any poetically satisfying Explanation.
I relate to much of this, especially the blurriness of the word 'physical.' Wittgenstein asks in On Certainty when exactly a child learns that their are physical objects. I think you'll agree that there's seemingly or plausibly some vague postulated 'stuff' that preceded and 'grounds' our species, 'stuff' which is mapped and modeled in a framework that includes 'quarks' and 'energy.' This 'stuff' might just be a sort of point at infinity, indicating the tendency of a certain kind of mapmaking toward impersonality.
I assume you got that idea from Kastrup's Materialism is Baloney, which I haven't read. But, I have read The Idea of the World. His worldview seems to be similar to my own Enformationism, in which Information (meaningful relationships) is the Ontological Primitive. However, I locate that "primitive" in the mind of the Programmer, not in the multiple minds of her avatars or creatures. Therefore, what seems "tangible" to me, should also seem real to anybody else.
In other words, Reality is objective, not Subjective. So, what I experience as Energy or Matter is actually out there. It's only my interpretation, my model of reality, that exists subjectively in my mind. Yet, we all -- energy, matter, & me -- exist in the imaginative Mind of God (the Enformer), so to speak. In which case, the "Idea of the World" is generated by the Cosmic Mind, not by me. Consequently, I have to take Einstein's word for it that Energy is mathematically (logically) correlated with Mass, but neither is itself a material object, but merely a Potential for causation and for materialization. :nerd:
Do we know what matter is? :
That leaves the question of mind vs. matter. What is primary? What is, in Kastrup’s words, the “ontological primitive”? Rovelli says it is all relations, yet there can be no relations that we know of without stuff. Relations don’t operate in a void. What is the stuff that makes relationships work? Kastrup says it is mind. That mind, or Mind, generates the perturbations of energy in the medium of mind and we call those perturbations the stuff of reality.
https://medium.com/top-down-or-bottom-up/do-we-know-what-matter-is-f05a335ac874
This sounds like a variety of deism. The philosophical problem, which I don't think you've address, is the trust you put in the word 'mind' to do so much lifting for you. If you look into philosophers that your own ancient foes (scientism's scimitar welding scions) also fear and despise, you might be surprised at what you find (for instance 'Went-gone-slime.') There are understandings of the world that are neither visions of only junk nor visions of only dreams.
Again, your perception is accurate, but your interpretation is off-target. My personal worldview is similar to Deism, but more specifically PanEnDeism. So, the "Universal Mind" is infinite & eternal, hence prior to, and outside of the space-time world. PED is an abstruse philosophical concept, not a popular religion. Unlike, the Abrahamic god, the hypothetical (mythical) deity of PED does not interfere in the workings of the world. Instead, like a Programmer, S/he created an evolutionary program, stored it in the Singularity, and executed it in the Big Bang. Metaphorically, you and I are avatars in the game, living by our wits, not by faith.
This is not a scriptural revelation, but a reasonable interpretation of 21st century science, especially Quantum & Information theories. However, if you have negative emotions about any god-concept, you can imagine the PED as a material Multiverse, or tower-of-turtles Many Worlds, or a Big Ball of creative Power, or a Flying Spaghetti Monster. Whatever floats your boat. In any case the Energy & Laws that enform the material stuff, necessarily existed before the Beginning. Nobody knows for sure what caused our space-time universe to pop-out of who-knows-what-or-where. And nobody is going to condemn you to hell for denying the existence of a mystery that predates your world of experience. We are all just guessing here. :joke:
Panendeism : holds that God pervades and interpenetrates every part of the universe and also extends beyond space and time, but does not intervene in its self-organizing evolution.
I don't think he would endorse the idea of 'multiple minds'. Like all idealists, he says that the ground of existence is subjective in nature - that the subject of experience is the one indubitable reality (e.g. Descartes), whereas the reality of apparently external objects is inferred on the basis of sensory experience (e.g. Berkeley). But as we are a single species and inhabit a generally uniform linguistic culture, then the experiences of individuals tends to be uniform across a wide range (c.f. Hegel) - Kastrup talks of 'mind' in the sense of 'the mind' - not your or my mind. Your or my mind is an instance of mind in that broader sense (although mind in that sense is not something objectively existent.) But I would say that makes the ground of reality neither objective nor subjective, that these are the poles of the nature of experienced reality; rather that it transcends the self-other distinction which is the fundamental condition of embodiment (c.f. Buddhism)
Quoting Gnomon
I don't think Kastrup is theistic. (Neither, for that matter, is Yog?c?ra Buddhism which is an idealist Buddhist school.) I think that these kinds of schools say something like: the degree to which we identify experience as 'mine', as 'my' mind and 'my' sense of reality, is a measure of our sense of 'otherness', which ultimately is the fundamental source of our grief, as it results in our identification with the shifting sands of our particular perceptual experiences (compare both Schopenhauer and Buddhism although I think it's much better elaborated in the latter.)
I get that. I've always understood it as your own invention, a brew or a stew or superscientific postreligious goo, and I like the taste of my poetry too. I've challenged you not because I resent such a harmless creation (I respect he creativity), but only philosophically for (in my eyes) being rather complacent about the concept of 'mind.' As I said initially, my nudges are from a place of 'semantic pragmatism' that generally finds folks way to satisfied where I scents ambiguity. Mind and matter? These tour in the path dump chew gather.
Yes. In my hypothetical worldview the "ground of reality" is a singular timeless spaceless whole, which encompasses all possibilities in the form of Platonic Forms or un-formed Potentials. So it is not characterized by the particulars & polarities of human experience. But then, I have no personal experience with Ideal perfection. And, I only think outside the "fundamental condition of embodiment" for the sake of philosophical argument. For all practical purposes, I am a materialist & realist. For the "trolls" though, that non-creedal position statement may sound oxymoronic.
However, on this philosophical forum, rather than take them for granted, we still debate what's "real" and what's "material". The only way I know to reconcile disagreements on such impractical questions is to put them into a larger context. To view the variety of things & beings against a hypothetical featureless background : the Ground of Being. I suppose even the Buddha must have been forced to assume such an Ideal perfect state, by which to compare the ups & downs of reality. Yet he advised his followers to avoid becoming entangled in metaphysical speculations & derogations, as some of us on this forum do. In order to maintain peace-of-mind though, we must become tough-minded. Can we draw strength from the Universal Mind, or do we just develop mental calluses from butting our individual minds together? :wink:
Quoting Wayfarer
Nor am I. I'm not sure what niche Kastrup puts his own idealistic philosophy in, but my idiosyncratic philosophical position could also be labeled as "bottom-up Panpsychism", or as "PanEnDeism". Which are not necessarily religious in nature. Again though, the "trolls" like to put such mind-centric worldviews into some conventional conceptual box, so they can more easily trash them. :cool:
I'm not sure what the "it" refers to in the quote above, which speaks of "universal Mind" & "PanEnDeism". Neither of which are my "own invention". Maybe you are disingenuously casting aspersions on my personal philosophical thesis : Enformationism. But I doubt that you know anything about it, other than that it sounds vaguely New Agey & manifestly Metaphysical. If you were to look into it though, you'd find that the premise was inspired by leading-edge scientific theories, and not by any far-out philosopher or giggling guru. So, in that sense, it is my "own invention".
Speaking of “inventive” ridicule, your “superscientific postreligious goo” is at least an improvement on 180prove-it's worn-out “woo”. His post-scientism sophistry takes the form of supercilious pseudo-philosophical arguments. As an incitement though, "woo" is not as effective as "n*gger". Moreover, ad hominems are so pre-medieval.
So, I'll share with you a new-to-me term of abuse : “Schizotypy”. It is an unproven psychological label (type) for odd or eccentric behavior or beliefs. But it sounds like "just-plain-crazy". I found that word in a Skeptical Inquirer article about UFO & alien invasions. “Everyday experiences, for those with schizotypal tendencies may cross an ethereal line into an unusual, idiosyncratic universe of occult importance and hidden truth”. Do you think that kind of psychological typing is "complacent about the concept of 'mind' "? Be forewarned, if you sling that schizo-sh*t at me, it will go right over my pointy little head.
The Sci-Inq article admits that “all human cultures possess beliefs in the paranormal”. And “paranormal” could apply to any novel idea that is counter-intuitive or statistically-atypical or paradigmatically unorthodox. So you could use that technical-sounding calumny to belittle anyone whose ideas you don't like, and don't want to seriously engage-with, using Philosophical Methodology . :joke:
Schizotypy : a theoretical concept that posits a continuum of personality characteristics and experiences, ranging from normal dissociative, imaginative states to extreme states of mind related to psychosis
Philosophical Methodology :
[i]The questions in philosophical methodology do not primarily concern which philosophical claims are true, but how to determine which ones are true. . . .
The methods of philosophy differ in various respects from the methods found in the natural sciences. One important difference is that philosophy does not use experimental data obtained through measuring equipment like telescopes or cloud chambers to justify its claims.[[/i]
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_methodology
PS__The same Skeptical Inquirer magazine (mar/apr 2022) has an article on the Scientific Method. Regarding "replicability", it says "the goal of science is to understand Nature". But lest you forget, the goal of Philosophy is to understand Culture, which as you noted, includes the "ambiguity" of the human Mind. Which can blithely string together offbeat arguments such as :"These tour in the path dump chew gather." Comprende?
Buddhism also has the two truths doctrine - the idea of the domain of conventional and absolute truth (although not unique to Buddhism, it is expressed with the clarity characteristic of Buddhism).
As for the 'trolls' - not all your critics are trolling. You yourself refer to your "idiosyncratic philosophical position", so those inclined to the physicalist or 'scientistic' attitude are going to pounce on those perceived idiosyncracies. (Although I agree there is also some trolling.)
The deeper issue is the conflict between scientific materialism and any form of philosophical idealism. As I'm on the idealist side of the ledger, I do understand how my posts rub a lot of people up the wrong way and endeavour, often without success, to maintain an even tone, at least. But there is a real conflict, which is the subject of many of the articles pinned to my profile page (which are nearly all from popular media, not from specialist academic journals. I've never liked that 'Skeptical Enquirer' rag, although I noted with surprise the recent online interview between one of its founders, Michael Shermer, and Bernardo Kastrup, which was surprisingly congenial, I thought, causing me to re-consider a little.)
I have long understood 'it' (your bowl of beep stew) to be inspired by popularizations of science. I see it as spiritualized science fiction or just a work of sculpture really, your latest architectonic erection.
I know people who read about the 'holographic universe' and find it stimulating and 'Spiritual' without knowing what a differential equation is. Of course 'Science' (as in 'the seance of muffle physics') tends to be more exciting than a dreary old science that won't plug up the god shaped hole or give us at least an amusing yarn. (I've suggested elsewhere that we are stains on the diapers of drooling giants.)
Note that you and I are simply rival distilleries. I don't claim to offer more than stuporscientific prosereligious glue myself, or at least not when I wander from the banality of trusting actual science in practical affairs. We are foils for one another. We'll both hopefully end up with sharper claws and thicker manes.
It's hard not to like Kastrup, he is very endearing and he communicates/writes so clearly. I consider myself to be in the naturalist camp but I find idealism very interesting and if I appear critical of it is is just to test it out as best I can, not to ridicule. I think the Western philosophical and religious traditions seem to be built around idealism and its ghostly afterlife haunts most of us. And yes, maybe idealism is coming back into intellectual fashion. I suspect simulation theory and the impact of online living has assisted in proving us with new metaphors for gateway understanding.
Also, in my view, many of those who recoil in horror from idealism really don't understand it. 'You mean, the whole universe is in your mind? What happens to it when you're asleep?' (Stands back, triumphantly folding arms.) The arguments against are usually variations of the 'argumentum ad lapidem'.
(Have a read of The Mental Universe, Richard Conn Henry, Nature.)
I expect this applies in all kinds of cases. As Hegel might stress, philosophies just cannot be summed up into aphorisms. Words in a conversation accumulate meaning historically. You have to put the time in.
That said, your recoiling doof is not entirely without merit, because philosophy's radical theses often just don't have much practical import. If the world don't disappear when the poor doof dies, then that idealism is of course less interesting, 'cause he's still got to pay that life insurance premium. It's like that philosopher's god who don't even give you an afterlife or help you win the lottery or cure mama's lymphoma. He might with some justification accuse us all of getting drunk on yawn-fiction.
On a philosophical forum, I expect rational criticism. That's the whole point of presenting controversial (or idiosyncratic) topics for discussion. Fortunately, only few on this forum are trolls, who engage in passionate bullying instead of dispassionate reasoning. I assume they think they are defending the "revealed truth" of materialistic science (Scientism) from the falsehoods of casuistic Spiritualism. 180proveit likes to refer to non-physical notions as "donut holes without the dough". But I prefer another analogy : the Materialist worldview is like a Zombie : a body without a mind. The trolls also seem to equate "Metaphysics" with Christian Theology, whereas I associate "Meta-Physics" with the "wisdom" of Aristotle's follow-up to The Physics.
I deliberately chose the name Enformationism to indicate an inter-connecting bridge between Spiritualism and Materialism. That consilient notion is based on the recent discoveries indicating that Information (mind-stuff, knowledge, ideas, etc) is essentially the perception of logical Relationships (mathematical Ratios). Shannon himself related Information with Energy in the notion of Entropy. Consequently, some pioneering scientists are touting the concept that Matter, Energy & Information are different forms of the same essential "substance" (in the Aristotelian sense).
What the ancient sages called "spirit" is what we now know as "energy" : invisible forces & causes. And what the early philosophers called "matter" is now known to be merely a different form of Energy. And, in Thermodynamics, Energy is defined in terms of Ratios (relationships), which is also the basis of Reasoning (rational thought). So, I perceive a three-way relationship between causal Energy, substantial Matter, and rational Mind, which is an emergent function of energetic Life. This equation of Causation with Matter and Mind is indeed idiosyncratic and eccentric, in the sense that it is not yet a mainstream "fact" in scientific textbooks.
I came to this BothAnd (matter & mind) worldview late in life. So, I pursue my thesis on internet forums instead of in college classrooms. I don't expect to get any formal recognition for my minor contributions to Science & Philosophy. So, I have to be content with sharing the news with a few open minds on this forum, and on my blog. It's not a religion, but it serves as a sort of philosophical replacement for the religious worldview I was indoctrinated with as a child. Unfortunately, with no Bible to guide me, I'm like a child wandering in the wilderness. This forum provides feedback to help me get my bearings. :brow:
Aristotle’s Metaphysics :
[i]Aristotle himself described his subject matter in a variety of ways: as ‘first philosophy’, or ‘the study of being qua being’, or ‘wisdom’, or ‘theology’. A comment on these descriptions will help to clarify Aristotle’s topic. . . . .
In Metaphysics ?.1, Aristotle says that “everyone takes what is called ‘wisdom’ (sophia) to be concerned with the primary causes (aitia) and the starting-points (or principles, archai)” (981b28), and it is these causes and principles that he proposes to study in this work.[/i]
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/aristotle-metaphysics/
Information, Matter and Energy – a non-linear world-view :
[i]Hence, nature can no longer be interpreted by means of matter and energy alone - a
third component is required: information.[/i]
https://biophysics.sbg.ac.at/paper/biosem-madl-2006.pdf
That's not an argument, and it's spine is 'these two are in the bath tub together.' The bath tub is also a path dump, since language is a system of inherited/discarded token-dealing habits, squirts of the tribal mammary glance. 'Chew gather' emphasizes the materiality orphysically of our signal system. 'I made it out of a mouthful of air.' We chew the air, promise-and-everything-else crammed. 'Gather' stresses semantic holism, for 'a talk links its runes' and a dog licks it wounds, for it's our rational duty and itch for coherence that has us do what we can to assimilate the offensively inscrutable or surprising. 'Tour' emphasizes the time of reading, the way that meaning gathers to erupt at the and of the sentence (the now is not a point but more like a splatter of paint.) This necessarily-incomplete unpacking cannot be canonical, however, for I don't 'own' the effect of my token string, which must function in my absence as a machine or a virus, a suggestive irritant that goads an ungovernable-by-me assimilation within a new context which I cannot anticipate. I can never gnaw just what I'll meme or even what I just mount. (I can't know exactly what I will mean or have meant, for the very tail of the homunculus is slippery when rat.)
Fair enough. But remember Aristotle's dualism was of matter and form (hyle-morphe), not matter and spirit.
I question this:
Quoting Gnomon
What energy lacks, in either the ancient or modern sense, is intelligence or intentionality. 'Spirit' is a hard word to define, obviously, but 'chi', 'prana', and such like are more like 'vitality' or 'vital energy'.
Likewise, 'information' is impersonal. By itself, the word has no intrinsic meaning - it has to be specific to have any meaning, i.e. what information.
The missing element, I think, is 'being' - which is not necessarily theistic in conception. But you can't crystalise 'being' into a concept, its meaning has to be realised, which is what I explored through Buddhist studies, which provides a 'way of being', not a conceptual schema.
Quoting Gnomon
:clap:
This might explain the success of physicalism. It gets a full treatment in science classes. And while these classes don't get into ontology, the abstract systems of physicalism are generally presented as being "what there is."
Since philosophy isn't generally taught at the pre-collegiate level, and even then normally isn't a prerequisite for most majors, no alternative is laid out. Science and physicalism also get conflated, the ontology for the epistemology, an interpretation of the results for the results themselves.
I have subscribed to Skeptical Inquirer and Skeptic magazine for over 50 years. So, I'm well-informed about Pseudoscience & Paranormal pros & cons. SI is mainly focused on pop-sci UFO & Bigfoot controversies, while Skeptic seems to be more interested in the philosophical angle of Science versus Metaphysics.
Shermer is definitely on the side of physical Science, but he gives counter-paradigm proponents, such as Kastrup, the benefit of the doubt, as long as they don't stray too far from "established facts". He usually seems open to alternative interpretations of non-empirical speculative science, especially Quantum queerness. Which is also how I try to approach such debatable ideas. My own worldview is based on avant-garde scientific concepts, that have not yet made their way into the textbooks. An early deviation from the materialistic model was John A. Wheeler's "it from bit", which called into question the fundamental element or essence of physics. His heretical opinions about Materialist assumptions were tolerated only because his scientific credentials were impeccable ; yet "it from bit" remains a footnote in mainstream textbooks.
Even Einstein was disturbed by some of the metaphysical & idealistic implications of his own paradigm-busting ideas of Relativity & Light Quanta. But, he also insisted, that for him, imagination is more important than knowledge. And in that sense, Enformationism remains imaginary, since verification of nonphysical phenomena is still difficult. However some very smart people are also thinking along the same lines. I can take some comfort in knowing that someone as perceptive as Kastrup, has had his innovative ideas rejected as "voodoo" by prominent scientists.
My own experience with labels of "woo-mongering" have also caused me to reconsider, not the foundations of my worldview, but the way I express concepts that challenge the prevailing paradigm of Materialism, as its presumptions are gradually undermined by bits of quantum information. :nerd:
A Super-Simple, Non-Quantum Theory of Eternal Consciousness "
In “Should Quantum Anomalies Make Us Rethink Reality?”, recently posted by Scientific American, Kastrup contends that quantum mechanics—as well as cognitive science, which suggests that minds construct rather than passively mirroring reality--undermines the assumption that the physical world exists independently of our observations. He calls for a new paradigm that makes mind “the essence—cognitively but also physically—of what we perceive when we look at the world around ourselves.”
___John Horgan, Scientific American magazine
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/a-super-simple-non-quantum-theory-of-eternal-consciousness/
It From Bit :
"It from bit symbolises the idea that every item of the physical world has at bottom — at a very deep bottom, in most instances — an immaterial source and explanation; that what we call reality arises in the last analysis from the posing of yes-no questions and the registering of equipment-evoked responses; in short, that all things physical are information-theoretic in origin and this is a participatory universe." ___John A, Wheeler, physicist
https://mindmatters.ai/2021/05/it-from-bit-what-did-john-archibald-wheeler-get-right-and-wrong/
Yes. But, from the perspective of Information theory, I place Hyle in the modern category of matter (physical substance), and "morphe" or "form" in the class of In-form-ation (mental -- design, pattern, meaning). And my thesis interprets the ancient notion of "spirit" (psyche, anima, atman, elan vital) as various interpretations of Energy as Causation & Trans-form-ation. Ultimately, everything in the space-time world is a unique form of shape-shifting EnFormAction (power + design + causation). Therefore, "spirit" is just one of many ways to characterize the particular expressions of Potential Platonic "Form", and Actual Aristotelian "Form". So, it's all Information/EnFormAction, all the way down. :joke:
EnFormAction :
Unsatisfied with religious myths and scientific paradigms, I have begun to develop my own personal philosophical world-view, based on the hypothesis that immaterial logico-mathematical "Information" (in both noun & verb forms) is more fundamental to our reality than the elements of classical philosophy and the matter & energy of modern Materialism. For technical treatments, I had to make-up a new word to summarize the multilevel and multiform roles of generic Information in the ongoing creative act of Evolution. I call it EnFormAction.
BothAnd Blog, post 60
SAME EN-FORM-ACTION ALL THE WAY DOWN
100%
I teach math to college students, and part of the work is cutting against the grain of an implicit metaphysics. To see the formalism as such is no small accomplishment.
Indeed ! Because perhaps it flatters the physicist to assume so, or there's just no time to' indulge' in such 'useless' chatter. I know a mathematician who hates philosophy. I told him that he can't hate it as much as philosophers do.
The issue is then how do your recover what folk think they mean by meaning, consciousness, mind, intentionality, agency, etc, from an infodynamic perspective?
That is the next trick to close the loop.
Hylomorphic substance does reduce reality to the ur-dichotomy of free material possibility and the imposed constraints of form and purpose. Substantial being is a combination of what folk think of as the material vs the mental causes of existence.
And the modern infodynamic view - as a dichotomy of entropy and information - again reduces all reality to the same idea of radical "material" instability shaped by the Platonic inescapability of global rational structure. And while Aristotelan substance still seems rather material in the end, infodynamics (or dissipative structure theory) emphasises that we are talking about a process philosophy. Reality is a structured process of development where stability and coherence is what the Cosmos achieves by becoming a steady-state dynamical process.
But to be a success, this reduction to "atoms of form" has to incorporate more than just a process metaphysics to take the edge off the hard materialism (that wants to oppose itself to the fluffy idealism).
The one complete theory has to include all four Aristotelean causes. It has to cover off life and mind as more evolved levels of hylomorphism or infodynamics.
Which all, of course, leads us to Peirce, semiotics, codes and epistemic cuts. :grin:
But my general point is that system science has its version of a quantum gravity theory of everything. The theory isn't complete until it is the meaningfulness of signs all the way down, coupled to the meaningless of material contingency all the way up.
Quoting Gnomon
Yes. And that is matched to? And the third thing that is a meaningful balance of the opposing forces of spontaneity and constraint is being explicitly offered in the theory where?
So lovers of wisdom hate loving wisdom?
I think it's better unelaborated, having first given it a try.
===
As Anatole France say in The Garden of Epicurus, we may imagine rubbing and polishing the coins of different countries until all inscriptions on them are erased. In this way, the coins are extracted from space and time, they would have inestimable value and their circulation could continue ad infinitum. This takes us from the world of our senses to the realm of metaphysics: knowing safely what the coins have lost, we do not know what they have gained. Of course, this is a mere dream, but does it have philosophical implications?
...
Wearing out of our words makes us metaphysicians. Metaphysics chooses worn-out words, such as the absolute, infinite, nonexistence, which do not display a trace of original coinage. These concepts have a negative form.
...
What is the relation between metaphorization which covers up itself and the negative form of concepts? The function of these concepts is to sever the links of our thought with the sense of any concrete existence. In Aristotle’s work, metaphysics comes after nature (physis). A metaphysical sentence is always symbolical and mythical. The sentence “The soul owns God to the extent, in which it takes share of the Absolute.” does not contain any signs, only symbols whose colourfulness and evocative power were erased. With some phantasy it can be said instead: “The breath is seated on the shining one” (God) “in the bushel” (to the extent) “of the part it takes” (in which it takes share) “in what is already loosed (the Absolute),” and elaborate it metaphorically even more: “He whose breath is a sign of life, man, that is, will find a place in the divine fire, source and home of life, and this place will be meted out to him according to the virtue that has been given him of sending abroad this warm breath, this little invisible soul, across the free expanse.” Even at this point we would not arrive at the original figures of speech, though our fantasy would read as an old Vedic hymn. From this, says France, follows that metaphysicians rub the colours from the old myths and fables, and are their collectors. They cultivate white (colourless) [clear] mythology.
...
First and foremost, there are no originary concepts. All of them are tropes, starting with the word arch? – origin and principle, that is, governing rule, control. The value of the “basis”, “base”, “ground” corresponds to our wish to stand on a firm ground.
...
The words for comprehending and conceiving (fassen, begreifen), says Hegel, have a totally sensuous contents that is substituted by spiritual meaning. The sensuous words are becoming spiritual in the process of their use.
===
The last fragment addresses the historical accumulation of meaning that seems to make a relatively abstract realm possible (simultaneously providing a relatively concrete realm 'left behind.') This touches again on the impossibility of summarizing a philosophy. The words get their 'meaning' from within the conversation that employs them, via relationships to still other words in that conversation, as if they were characters in a novel who are delineated by how they treat one another.
Since "infodynamics" is based on Shannon's definition of "information" in terms of Entropy & Thermodynamics, I tend to avoid that approach, in favor of a more general & less physical interpretation. Infodynamics may be a useful way to think about Information as a scientific concept. But my interest in Information is as a philosophical notion. Unfortunately, there are a few nagging gnats that view every topic from a reductive/scientific/materialistic perspective. I try to ignore them, but sometimes I have to swat at them, as they buzz in my face. It's OK though. They are a minor nuisance. :cool:
Enformy (analogy to thermodynamics):
In the Enformationism theory, Enformy is a hypothetical, holistic, metaphysical, natural trend, opposite to that of Entropy & Randomness, to produce Complexity & Progress. It is the mysterious tendency for aimless energy to occasionally create the stable, but temporary, patterns we call Matter, Life, and Mind.
BothAnd Blog, post 28
Note -- In thermodynamics, what I call "Enformy" (philosophical concept) is known as "Negentropy" (physical term).
Quoting apokrisis
Yes. When John A. Wheeler spoke of "bits" of Information, he was metaphorically imagining them as "atoms of form". Yet, "bits" by themselves have little-to-no influence on the real world. It's only in the corporate form of Systems or Wholes, and their related Processes, that atoms of information add-up to the dynamic physical swarms that we call physical objects.
It will take someone better informed on Semiology to interpret the various meanings of bits of information all-the-way-down and back-up again. As an amateur, I have to avoid getting bogged-down in philosophical technicalities that are over my head. Would you like to volunteer for the job of Information Semilologist? :smile:
Quoting apokrisis
Good question. I may get into the details of that dynamic "balance" in a later post. But it's all about creative Enformy counter-balancing destructive Entropy. :smile:
So more intuitive than mathematical? What is gained by sacrificing full rigour here?
Quoting Gnomon
Energy is a scientific notion justified by Noether's theorem and the conservation symmetries of a closed system. So energy doesn't even "exist" outside of there being a potential difference to be dissipated.
Talk of "mysterious tendencies" need to be replaced by talk of entropic gradients, and then even about self-bounding systems - such as Big Bang universes that are their own cooling~spreading heat sinks.
Quoting Gnomon
Yep. But negentropy doesn't just float about as an aimless tendency either. It can only be rigorously defined when counterfactually opposed to entropy as part of the one system - that has the finality dynamical persistence rather than the contingency of "temporary stability".
Quoting Gnomon
I am simply arguing that this job is being done. It is the systems science tradition, starting with Anaximander and Aristotle, proceeding though Hegel, Kant and Peirce, becoming a general view in modern science - at least as evidenced by dissipative structure theory, condensed matter physics, biosemiotics, hierarchy theory, enactive psychology, infodynamics, etc.
Of course telling your own tale in your own words is fair enough if you just want to arrive at your own synthesis of where modern science has got to. :up:
Why? How would replacing "mysterious tendencies" with "entropic gradients" improve one's understanding? I think this would be a step backward, because "mysterious tendencies" is the more general, and "entropic gradients" is the more specific. Real understanding assigns logical priority to the more general. So for instance, we understand "human being" through an understanding of "animal", and we understand "animal" through reference to "mammal", etc..
So, we should start by defining "mysterious tendencies" as aspects of reality which are not properly understood, or something like that, instead of proceeding to talk about "entropic gradients" in the pretense of understanding.
I always find it interesting to think of what happens if you flip the process.
Thermodynamics is the ground for time. Without the thermodynamic arrow of time pointing towards entropy, we don't have a clear direction for time. The laws of physics work as well backwards as forwards. When we talk of relativity and time slowing down or speeding up, we're really just talking about the relative durations of certain oscillations under the varying effects of gravity, at least as far as the measurement of this effect is concerned.
So, if we flip the direction of entropy, we have a universe tending towards order. Life and other complex self-organizing systems emerge and begin increasing local entropy. Life forms slowly devolve into less and less complex organisms, sucking up entropy and breaking down complexity. Genomes act as one way membranes purging information about the enviornment. Ecosystems are broken down bit by bit. Vertebrates are replaced by single celled bacteria. Eventually, life is driven to extinction by the unending trend towards order.
The takeaway for me is that complexity only exists in the gap between order and chaos, on the fringes. It's very dialectical that way. Being and nothing stand in contradiction, so we have becoming, the continuous transition of being into the nothingness of the past. According to Penrose, when your reach either end of the entropy scale, the heat death of the universe, or the pre-Big Bang singularity state, the formal mathematical descriptions becomes increasingly identical. So then, we also have order and chaos standing in contradiction, undefinable in their absolute states, and so we get complexity within becoming as a secondary synthesis.
“....To coin new words is a pretension to legislation in language which is seldom successful; for this reason, when it happens that there exists only a single word to express a certain conception, and this word, in its usual acceptation, is thoroughly adequate to the conception, the accurate distinction of which from related conceptions is of great importance, we ought not to employ the expression improvidently, or, for the sake of variety and elegance of style, use it as a synonym for other cognate words. It is our duty, on the contrary, carefully to preserve its peculiar signification, as otherwise it easily happens that when the attention of the reader is no longer particularly attracted to the expression, and it is lost amid the multitude of other words of very different import, the thought which it conveyed, and which it alone conveyed, is lost with it....”
Seems to me that there being anything at all is plenty mysterious. It's the central question of philosophy and science, and answers have not been forthcoming.
But if being itself is a mysterious tendency, how are you going to possibly define the term? You can't define "all that is" in opposition to anything else that is that is not simply a component part of being. You can also define being against the idea of nothing, zero, etc. but this is about as far as you can go.
Definition requires difference. If you start at the very highest level of generality, you have no differences to use in definition and your project is doomed. Logically, it would make more sense to start down at the very smallest differences that can be discriminated. If you wanted to define visible colors, you work your way around something analogous to a digital color wheel, and tweak the various shades in small increments until you've laid out a map of all the discernable colors.
Now, a whole is not always defined by its parts. We have emergence as a concept. However, a thing's parts are always, necissarily, part of the definition of the whole.
Pragmatically, you can start wherever you can make meaningful distinctions since some differences are more relevant than others, and concepts from higher level definitions work for understanding lower level ones due to self similarity and fractal reoccurence.
If you look at theories of parts and wholes in metaphysics, generally it is proposed that things are just the sum of their traits, and so traits are the logical unit of analysis. The primary opposing theories to this view hold that objects possess an essential haeccity, a substratum of "thisness." This substratum of bare being/identity makes a thing different from just its traits, and so neatly solves many problems of identity that come up when you posit that a thing is just the tropes/universals it possesses/instantiates. However, the substratum is unanalyzable, an ontic primitive, and so it can't be where your analysis starts, and is arguably a vaccuous concept entirely.
Arguably, something along the line of Aristotlean substance is a third option, but I'm not convinced that this isn't just blending the two other theories, while still leaving the problem of haeccity unresolved. Aristotle claimed the identities of numerically distinct entities with the same substance are self explanatory. I am not sure it is.
What-is-gained is, as you say, a notion that is "more intuitive than mathematical". I am not a mathematician. So, as an amateur philosopher, with no formal training, if I tried to present my Information thesis in mathematical terms, I would be out of my depth. That's why I have to depend on links to specialists, for those who desire a more rigorous treatment. Please click on some of my links for "full rigour". :nerd:
Quoting apokrisis
Yes. I'm not pretending to be an expert in the science of Information. So, I merely use the speculations & conclusions of scientific professionals as evidence to support my own amateur philosophical conjectures. For example, the link below agrees with my contention that "information is the fundamental building block of the universe". If you have any technical questions, please contact the author. :smile:
New experiment could confirm the fifth state of matter in the universe :
[i]Dr. Vopson's previous research suggests that information is the fundamental building block of the universe and has physical mass. . . .
He even claims that information could be the elusive dark matter that makes up almost a third of the universe.[/i] ___Physicist Dr. Melvin Vopson
https://phys.org/news/2022-03-state-universe.html
IS THIS RIGOROUS ENOUGH FOR YOU?
Note : Shermer is the founder of Skeptic magazine, not SI. Coincidentally, I just read a Skeptical Inquirer article this morning, that mentioned the Plato & Aristotle concepts of "forms", "universals", and "essence". It's a review of Life is Simple, by geneticist Johnjoe McFadden, about "how Occam's Razor set science free". "William's heresy was to challenge the Church's view that theology was a real science . . ." We now understand that "theology" is philosophy, bound by an official mandate to support an authorized creed.
Referring to radical scholastic theologian, William of Occam, "He attacked the idea proposed by Plato that things we experience in our world are only faint shadows of the real objects that existed . . . somewhere." My own mildly-radical thesis is that our modern notion of "Information" can shed some light into the shadows of that ancient conjecture. The article continues : "Plato termed these 'real' objects Forms, and 'St. Augustine had already imported Plato's Forms into the early medieval Church where they became ideas in the mind of God." Those universal definitions (ideals) of real things were not just vaguely "somewhere", but specifically located in a the "mind" of the creator of the universe. Hence they became universal principles, governing particular things. McFadden goes-on to note that "Later, Aristotle modified the Forms into 'universals', which were thought to be the 'essence' of an object or concept". And that's how I came to connect the philosophical notions of "Forms" & "universals" & "essences" with our scientific concept of Information as abstract knowledge.
But, Occam concluded that "there was no need for any sort of vague, abstract, entity . . ." Ironically, Claude Shannon's definition of "information" sounds very much like a "vague, abstract, entity" symbolized by 1s & 0s. His "information" was quantified in terms of degrees of Entropy, which is itself a reference to the abstract concept of disorganization (the absence of order). But then, McFadden quotes a biologist that, "life is too complex, even irreducibly complex . . . for Occam's Razor to be of any use". However, If we envision "Information" (the creative power to enform) as both universal and essential, all that apparent complexity can be reduced to myriad forms of a single principle, which I call "EnFormAction".
The article even mentions some conjectures of theoretical physicist Lee Smolin, whose mildly-radical ideas I have discussed in the blog. One of those speculations is the notion of "genetic information", which I refer to as "generic information" to indicate that all the manifold things of reality can be traced back to a single simple principle of Essential Form. Anyway, my thesis agrees that "life is simple" when viewed from the perspective of a universal tendency to self-organize into more complex systems with unique properties, such as Life & Mind, from inorganic & mindless matter. The Skeptical Inquirer might not agree with my interpretation of the article, but I appreciate its consideration of creative simplicity, as a natural principle. :nerd:
EnFormAction :
Ententional Causation. A proposed metaphysical law of the universe that causes random interactions between forces and particles to produce novel & stable arrangements of matter & energy.
BothAnd Blog Glossary
Note -- EFA is the simple singular natural principle of organization, that causes the matter of the world to self-organize. It also produces the natural tendency that I call Enformy, which counteracts Entropy & Randomness, to produce complexity & progress.
Statistical tendencies would be the more generic, mathematically speaking. Mysterious tendencies don’t lend themselves to formal treatment, just frantic hand waving.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
You’re leaving out phenomenology, Wittgenstein , poststructuralism , deconstruction and various and sundry other recent positions that unravel the notion of objects having intrinsic presence or substance or being.
But it is the higher complexity life that transacts more entropy. The earth’s surface is measurably cooler where it is covered by a richer ecosystem. Breaking down the rainforests means less work gets done to break down the intensity of the solar flux.
So organic complexity can only exist in the positive direction because, overall, it works to break down barriers in the generation of entropy. It makes more mess than it makes order.
Yes. That's exactly what my coinage of Enformy proposes. Without some countervailing "force" to thwart destructive dis-organizing Entropy, randomness & disorder would prevail, and Evolution would become Devolution. Some scientists have made a weak acknowledgment of that downward-directional problem with the awkward term "Negentropy". Calling it negative though, permits them to treat the on-going progression of evolution as a quirky accident. However, giving that organizing principle a positive connotation allows us to interpret the singular direction of Time, and of Evolution, as-if it is working toward some teleological destination.
Not surprisingly, that may be why most scientists are uncomfortable with any hint of plan, purpose or positive direction in the natural world. Yet, if the universe is not, in any sense, directional, how could human intentions, and organized human Culture, emerge from purely random collisions of atoms? My assumption is that there is nothing in the actual Effect (Evolution ; Time) that was not potentially in the Cause (Big Bang). Although, mathematically, time should be reversible, in practice that's never observed in reality.
So, we shouldn't read too much into the news that "Scientists Have Reversed Time in a Quantum Computer". In abstract math, anything is possible. But in concrete reality, change is always uni-directional, toward the "heat death" of the universe. However, what if some future cyborg-culture learns how to permanently reverse Entropy? I'll leave you to work-out that Sci-Fi story. :nerd:
Negentropy is reverse entropy. It means things becoming more in order. By 'order' is meant organisation, structure and function: the opposite of randomness ...
https://simple.wikipedia.org/wiki/Negentropy
Intention : purpose, aim, plan, design, impulsion, intent, end, motive, ambition, ultimate-aim, obligation and more.
Entropy vs Enformy :
[i]* Entropy is a property of the universe modeled as a thermodynamic system. Energy always flows from Hot (high energy density) to Cold (low density) -- except when it doesn't. On rare occasions, energy lingers in a moderate state that we know as Matter, and sometimes even reveals new qualities and states of material stuff .
* The Second Law of Thermo-dynamics states that, in a closed system, Entropy always increases until it reaches equilibrium at a temperature of absolute zero. But some glitch in that system allows stable forms to emerge that can recycle energy in the form of qualities we call Life & Mind. That feedback-loop "glitch" is what I call Enformy.[/i]
BothAnd Blog Glossary
Culture vs Nature :
Nature and culture are often seen as opposite ideas—what belongs to nature cannot be the result of human intervention and, on the other hand, cultural development is achieved against nature
https://www.thoughtco.com/nature-culture-divide-2670633
Note -- Human Culture is anti-entropic in that it opposes the disorganizing effects of natural processes. That's why we have to do regular maintenance on our un-natural technology.
A major digression, but I don't believe the nominalists ever properly understood the idea of the forms. A form is not a 'vague abstract entity' or an entity of any kind, if an entity is considered to be a thing. A form is more like a principle or defining characteristic, intelligible only to the 'eye of reason', and the loss of this understanding represents a watershed in the history of ideas.
[quote=John Millbank; https://luminousdarkcloud.wordpress.com/2012/02/28/radical-orthodoxy-a-theological-vision/]Now this [late medieval nominalist] philosophy was itself the legatee of the greatest of all disruptions carried out in the history of European thought, namely that of Duns Scotus who for the first time established a radical separation of philosophy from theology by declaring that it was possible to consider being in abstraction from the question of whether one is considering created or creating being. Eventually this generated the notion of ontology and an epistemology unconstrained by, and transcendentally prior to, theology itself.[/quote]
For an in-depth analysis there's also an essay (used to be online, now avialable via Academia) called What's Wrong with Ockham: Reassessing the Role of Nominalism in the Dissolution of the West, Joshua Hothschild.
[quote=Joshua Hothschild]Thomists and other critics of Ockham have tended to present traditional realism, with its forms or natures, as the solution to the modern problem of knowledge. It seems to me that it does not quite get to the heart of the matter. A genuine realist should see “forms” not merely as a solution to a distinctly modern problem of knowledge, but as part of an alternative conception of knowledge, a conception that is not so much desired and awaiting defense, as forgotten and so no longer desired. Characterized by forms, reality had an intrinsic intelligibility, not just in each of its parts but as a whole. With forms as causes, there are interconnections between different parts of an intelligible world, indeed there are overlapping matrices of intelligibility in the world, making possible an ascent from the more particular, posterior, and mundane to the more universal, primary, and noble.
In short, the appeal to forms or natures does not just help account for the possibility of trustworthy access to facts, it makes possible a notion of wisdom, traditionally conceived as an ordering grasp of reality. Preoccupied with overcoming Cartesian skepticism, it often seems as if philosophy’s highest aspiration is merely to secure some veridical cognitive events. Rarely sought is a more robust goal: an authoritative and life-altering wisdom. Notice: even if contemporary philosophers came to a consensus about how to overcome Cartesian doubt and secure certainty, it is not clear that this would do anything to repair the fragmentation and democratization of the disciplines, or to make it more plausible that there could be an ordered hierarchy of sciences, with a highest science, acknowledged as queen of the rest—whether we call it first philosophy, or metaphysics, or wisdom.[/quote]
Of course, all of this is far, far distant from information theory, entropy, thermodynamics, engineering, and the other preoccupations of technological culture.
Your comment on "entities" may be a digression only in the sense of supplementary information. As I superficially understand the position of Nominalists, they were opposed to Realists, who didn't believe in anything non-physical anyway. For a non-physical abstract "entity", giving it a name doesn't make it a real thing.
So, their name-vs-entity argument seems to be a "how many angels can dance on a pin" debate. Below is the philosophical definition of "entity" I prefer. From that perspective, an Ideal entity, such as a Platonic Form, exists Abstractly & Potentially until Actualized physically. Of course, how that abstract-to-concrete transformation could occur, probably requires some notion of creation of Something (actual) from Nothing (potential). I suspect that concept of Potential existence does not compute in the worldview of Realists, Materialists, and Physicalists. For them, ideas & ideals, or principles & fundamental truths, are merely religious propaganda.
But, for me, a "Potential Entity" is a legitimate topic of philosophical discussion. If we can't talk about abstract ideas & ideals, what's the point of Philosophy? Unfortunately, we could debate endlessly about how that transformation occurs. But the Enformationism thesis proposes a possible answer : it's all metaphysical Information all the way down, only the material container (outward form) changes due to phase transitions or physical transformations. But, lets not digress on an abstruse mathematical or scientific description of phase states & transitions. Those ghostly apparitions might begin to sound like mathematical magic. Is a "phase state" a real or ideal entity? :cool:
PS__I would ask for more information on the "watershed event" stemming from the "eye of reason" notion. But that might be merely a digression from a digression. :wink:
Entity :
An entity is something that exists as itself, as a subject or as an object, actually or potentially, concretely or abstractly, physically or not.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Entity
systems theory phase transition :
A phase space of a dynamical system is the collection of all possible states of the system in question. A phase transition occurs as a result of some external condition, such as temperature, pressure, etc.
https://content.csbs.utah.edu/~butner/systems/DynamicalSystemsIntro.html
Note -- "possible states" sounds like unactualized Potential Entities.
I'm inclined to agree. Where this started for me was with the realisation of the reality of numbers. This realisation was that while all phenomenal things are composed of parts and come into and go out of existence, numbers are not composed of parts (although strictly speaking that only applies to primes) nor do they come into or go out of existence. At the time I felt it was a minor epiphany - I thought, aha! this is why the ancient philosophers held mathematical entities in such esteem, as they're nearer to the unconditioned i.e. not subject to change and decay [sup] 1[/sup]. That was an intuitive leap, but it's held up. But the question it leads to, if numbers (etc) don't exist in the same way as phenomenal objects (or particulars) then in what sense do they exist?
The popular answer is that they exist in the minds of humans only, that they're a mental construction. But the problem with that view is, it doesn't allow for the unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics in the natural sciences, nor for the fact that mathematics is governed by rules. So I'm firmly part of the 'mathematics is discovered' camp. That's what lead to my interest in universals, generally. So I formed the view that there are different levels or modes of existence - whereas for modern thought generally, there is only one mode, i.e. the verb 'to exist' is univocal. Things either exist or they don't. But in the traditionalist view (if we can call it that) there are degrees of reality, with numbers and the 'intelligible forms' being of a higher order (i.e. possessing a higher degree of reality) than phenomenal objects (although they're not at the very top). But this way of thinking is literally unintelligible to most people nowadays - because, in my view, and as that passage I quoted says, the way of understanding associated with that has been forgotten. We're encultured to a nominalist-empiricist-materialist culture, for whom only things are real.
This is actually starting to seep through in various aspects of culture and philosophy. You recall that article I pointed to about Heisenberg and potentia. The experimental discoveries of physics have more or less forced metaphysics back onto the table. (Heisenberg was a more-than-competent philosopher by the way and a lifelong student of Plato.)
Quoting Gnomon
This book was an eye-opener for me. Read it in around 2010-11 when I first started posting on forums.
It's like forensic science - trying to work out what happened to philosophy through the examination of a badly-decomposed corpse. :wink:
----------------
1. 'Neoplatonic mathematics is governed by a fundamental distinction which is indeed, inherent in Greek science in general, but is here most strongly formulated. According to this distinction, one branch of mathematics participates in the contemplation of what which is in no way subject to change, or to becoming and passing away.' ~ Jacob Klein, Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra.
What are those? I don't have an encyclopedic knowledge of metaphysics articles, those are the big ones I was aware of. How do they get around it?
I'm lost here. Doesn't this imply that life forms running in rewind would be increasing local entropy, and thus running against the grain of the now contracting universe that is headed towards ever decreasing entropy? That's what I was thinking of anyhow.
On a side note, if you were an extra dimensional traveler watching our universe run in reverse, I wonder what the opposite of the Big Bang would be? "The Incredibly Slow Warm Up?"
That has the unfortunate tendency to leave out almost everything that is of importance to human beings, once we introduce much higher levels of complexity than things seen in physics. It's also important to remember that what physics says now, will not be what physics says in a few years, if the field continues growing that is.
In any case, I don't see why "physicalism" has to be associated with physics. It can be a monist claim which states that EVERYTHING is physical, including consciousness. This doesn't force physicalism to physics, it merely points out how baffling physical stuff can be.
But that's not sticking here. So whatever the debate is supposed to be about, is not of much substance, in my opinion, unless one considers eliminitavism seriously, which is hard to take as being plausible or even coherent.
No. The sun’s radiation hits the earth at about 5900 degrees K and is then re-radiated into outer space as some cooler frequency. The energy is scattered into a much greater number of infrared photons, hence it has more entropy.
Bare rock re-radiates it at about 330 K, while rainforest re-radiates it at about 290 K. So life contributes greater entropy than bare rock can.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
The whole story had got more complicated since they found the universe is being accelerated by dark energy or the cosmological constant. There is an extra push that is adding to the conventional thermal arrow of entropy unwinding. So a gravitational collapse or contraction couldn’t now recover the Big Bang’s original low entropy condition in the way that folk used to imagine as a reversal of time.
Ironically perhaps, this does now guarantee an actual Heat Death as the opposite, or rather inverse, of the Big Bang. But that’s another story to do with anti-de Sitter holographic horizons and the effective end of time. :razz:
This is not really true. Time is a constraint in thermodynamics, but thermodynamics is clearly not the ground for time, because time is an unknown feature. We cannot even adequately determine whether time is variable or constant. I think it's important to understand that the principles of thermodynamics are applicable to systems, and systems are human constructs. Attempts to apply thermodynamic principles to assumed natural systems are fraught with problems involving the definition of "system", along with attributes like "open", "closed", etc..
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
This is a mistaken notion which I commonly see on this forum. Definition really does not require difference. Definition is a form of description, and description is based in similarity, difference is not a requirement, but a detriment because it puts uncertainty into the comparison. So claiming that definition requires difference, only enforces my argument that this is proceeding in the wrong direction, putting emphasis on the uncertainty of difference rather than the certainty of sameness. A definition which is based solely in opposition (difference), like negative is opposed to positive for example, would be completely inapplicable without qualification. But then the qualification is what is really defining the thing that the definition is being applied to.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Notice what you say, you look for something "analogous". Analogy informs us through similarity, not through the differences. The differences are what we must work to exclude, to make the analogy work.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
This is not true at all. It is generally proposed in metaphysics, and supported by evidence, that a whole is greater than the sum of its parts. There is a logical fallacy, the composition fallacy, which results from what you propose.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
And this is nothing but nonsense. What could a "substratum of 'thisness'" possibly refer to? "Thisness" is what we assign in predication. It is a feature of human description. It is impossible that the human description is the substratum of the thing itself. This is the same sort of problem which you demonstrate with thermodynamics and "system" above. You attempt to make the description, or the model, into the thing itself. But then all the various problems with the description, or model, where the model has inadequacies, are seen as issues within the thing itself, rather than issue with the description.
Quoting apokrisis
Nothing in the real world submits itself to "formal treatment". Formal systems are pure theory. And, there is a very real divide between theory and practice, which produces the necessity for standards of application. The standards for applying formal systems in practice, cannot themselves be formal systems. So those who dismiss such standards as "frantic hand waving", choosing to apply formal systems willy-nilly, produce nothing but fictious nonsense.
Quoting Wayfarer
This problem goes both ways. There is the "unreasonable effectiveness" to deal with, but also there is mistaken axioms to deal with. How do you account for the reality of mistaken discoveries? What is it that is discovered, when the discovery is a mistake?
Yes. I'm not a mathematician, but I think of Math as the Logic of the universe. It's the non-physical "structure" of the physical world. That invisible framework of reality consists of stable consistent patterns of inter-relationships upon which are hung the physical "furniture" of the real world. We can't perceive those intangible links, but we can conceive them via rational inference. So, we "discover" the logical scaffolding of physics, not by empirical probing, but by imaginary conception. We seem to fill-in-the-blanks between things by mentally constructing a pattern of links to fit the pattern of nodes. When a particular pattern is found to be consistent & essential, we call them Rules or Laws that metaphorically "govern" that particular category (set) of nodes.
The stability & necessity of those invisible-but-knowable patterns make them effective for predicting missing nodes or links (components). They serve as a mental map that shows most-but-not-all roads & cities, so we can find our way around the world, even though we are half-blind to that intangible structure. Pardon my woolly description of a topic that is above my pay grade. As an architect, I used to design future concrete physical structures, by first creating an imaginary abstract pattern of relationships between imposed loads (forces) and columns & beams (links). When the math balanced-out, I could be assured that the "logic" of the structure was "sound". Only then, could I be sure that the Potential mental construct would -- when Actualized into material reality -- hold-up under the physical forces of the natural world. That's what I would call "reasonable effectiveness". :nerd:
PS__The mathematical & logical scaffolding of Nature forms the patterns-of-meaning that we call "Information".
Structure :
[i]1. (noun) the arrangement of and relations between the parts or elements of something complex.
2. (verb) construct or arrange according to a plan; give a pattern or organization to[/i]
Let me list some of those who unravel the notion of objects having intrinsic presence or substance or being.
Hillary Putnam, Dan Zahavi, Husserl, Heidegger, Derrida , Merleau-Ponty, Matthew Ratcliffe , Michel Bitbol, Foucault, Deleuze, Nietzsche, Wittgenstein, Evan Thompson, Richard Rorty, Francisco Varela, Eugene Gendlin, Paul Ricouer.
To get around the idea, that is, to deconstruct it, is to place contextually pragmatic relations prior to the intrinsic being of objects ( or semiotic codes or informational structures) . In other words, difference before identity.
Formal systems can be supported by acts of measurement. That makes them useful as models of the world.
Right. To me that suggests an intrinsic connection between maths and the world. I'm interested in the idea that scientific laws exist where logical necessity meets physical causation.
Quoting Gnomon
The word 'matter' is etymologically related to 'mother':
Matter: Origin
Middle English: via Old French from Latin materia ‘timber, substance’, also ‘subject of discourse’, from mater ‘mother’.
'Form' denotes the 'active principle', whereas matter is the recipient, that which is formed, it is passive. The form is the active causitive principle, that which causes the particular to be.
'In Proclus' Elements of Theology, propositions 7–13 begin to formalize and systematize causes and culminate in linking the First Cause to the One, the Final Cause to the Good, and finally identifying the One to be identical to the Good. Proposition 7 is fundamental to the entire structure of Neoplatonic theology and asserts: a cause is superior to its effect, etc. 1'
Whereas the tendency of materialism is to declare that matter is self-organising, that it contains its own organising principle.
Sure, but the point is that the standards as to what constitutes "support" for a formal system cannot itself be a formal system. So it's wrong to characterize something which is not understood as a formal system as "frantic hand waving", or else formal systems would just be totally useless fictions or fantasies.
Quoting Wayfarer
That's right, Plato's description of "matter" as the female receptacle, in the Timaeus is very sexual in nature. Plato plays with word meanings like that a lot. You'll see Socrates described as a midwife when "conception" is discussed, in the Theatetus for example.
That point is made by Robert Rosen’s modelling relations theory, Measurements are the informal part of the formal process. The system, as a whole, is thus a complementary pairing of models and measurements. We have to figure out what counts as sufficient support as something that is pragmatic and contingent on circumstance.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Hand-waving refers to the waving of empty hands - hands which ought to be full of supporting specifics. So it is indeed pointing to what is lacking and thus leaving a “theory as a useless fiction or fantasy.
Can’t, actually. That is a metaphor that must fail, as you then say.
A Guardian article just popped up in my newsfeed:
So - question - before this ‘homing in’, did anyone ‘understand consciousness’. How about the Buddha? Might he have? Even without magnetic resonance imaging and the knowledge of neurotransmitters?
Why not? I can lay you on that table, tickle your feet, and perform some measurements, look into your brain and body.
I think you have actually laid consciousness on the table. Don't you feel the tickle in your feet? It resides inside you.
Rock and a hard place: you won’t find consciousness, insofar as to so claim is reification of an abstract conception, but to say that of which the body is conscious is not to still be contained in the body, is a logical contradiction.
Physics and metaphysics share an Uber. One sits in the front, one sits in the back, they don’t talk, and they pay their own way. All they have in common is the ride.
That's actually very close to my conception! I think we're a body between the physical world (the outer side of matter) and the inside brain world (the mental aspect).
I’d agree there’s an inside and an outside, but not that “we’re a body between” them. Problem is, as always, that the physical must be responsible for the mental.....somehow. Or maybe it’s just the more parsimonious to suppose it is, otherwise, what we take for knowledge is even more suspect than it already is.
The mental resides in matter. Like charge in an electron.
It would seem that way, yes, as an analogy. Or some quantification of the same sort. But if charge per se, because all matter contains electrons, you must also say the mental is a property of matter generally, as charge is a property of electrons generally, which gets you into all kindsa philosophical trouble.
The body is between the inside and the outside, just like the present is between the future and the past. We can claim directions "toward the inside", "toward the outside", just like we claim "toward the future" and "toward the past". But we cannot produce a dividing line, because there is a massive body where we think there should be a divisor.
The problem with physicalism is that it cannot account for function. However exhaustive my physical explanation is for a hammer there is no explanation as to the function of a hammer. Within physical systems, parts may have their functions although this cannot be known until one considers the system as a whole. In the case of human behaviours such as banging in nails with a hammer, physicalist explanations are invariably insufficient.
Agreed; there is a body between. I was objecting to “we’re a body”, which I take to be a misconception. A categorical error of equating the mere representation of a metaphysical object of pure reason, with a concrete spacetime reality.
————-
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The explanatory gap?
That's a new idea to me. But, in view of our discussion of the "logic of reality", I would imagine that Mathematical Logic (bonding relationships ; valence) is the structure of reality, and Mathematical Energy (ratios ; differences) is the cause of structural changes. That concept seems to be compatible with the Enformationism worldview, in which Generic Information (ratios, relationships, connections, differences) is the universal "substance" (per Spinoza) of the world.
Just riffing on a metaphorical theme here : perhaps, the holistic Potential of the pre-BigBang Singularity (egg : zygote), after fertilization (by whom??), contained two Actual aspects : material structure (female ; mother) and dynamic causation (male : sperm). Hence, by analogy with biological development, that initial binary scenario has evolved over the intervening eons into the multiplex world of Matter & Energy we know as Reality. The role of Matter, in this myth, is the stable (Necessity) structure, and Energy is the dynamic (Chance) force of transformation, which explores all options within Possibility Space.
But, who or what defines the limits on possibility? In my myth, the original Egg was programmed by a pre-existing Planner or Lawmaker. However, Materialists might imagine that pre-BB "substance" as a fecund Multiverse (the eternal Mother ; mater). And Spiritualists would picture the dynamic virility as a powerful Elan Vital (eternal Father ; pater). However, my metaphorical myth combines the dual aspects of Reality into a singular Source of Being (cosmic creative principle : Brahman). Of course, anything prior to our local space-time is inherently unknowable. But its causal & substantial (formal) role is still inferrable, by analogy with the substance & laws of the known world. Some might even like to call it the "Great Mathematician". :nerd:
How mathematics reveals the nature of the cosmos :
Mathematics is the language of the universe, and in learning this language, you are opening yourself up the core mechanisms by which the cosmos operates.
https://phys.org/news/2015-06-mathematics-reveals-nature-cosmos.html
Generic Information :
Information is Generic in the sense of generating all forms from a formless pool of possibility : the Platonic Forms.
BothAnd Blog. post 33
The temporal analogy holds quite well for this idea of "we're a body", or more precisely "I'm a body" ("we're a body" contains a further problem of unity). If the body, in its existence, is like the present in time, we still have to account for the reality of the future and the past. Future and past are somehow external to the present, outside it, but are still a very real part of it as defining features. Likewise, there are very real parts (defining features) of a living being, which are somehow outside the living body.
Quoting Mww
I believe it's a failing in our understanding of what constitutes a "boundary". Peirce had some interesting ideas on this issue, but I do not agree with his proposed resolution. Suppose there are two distinct substances in contiguity. What keeps them separate? Either we propose a third substance which acts as the boundary to separate the two, or we assume a zone of mixing. If I remember correctly, Peirce chooses the latter, a mixing, and the boundary becomes vague, because that's how such situations appear empirically, through our senses. However, I believe that removing the need for a third substance introduces an unwarranted principle of unintelligibility into the explanation. Now we have no reason why the two are separated in the first place, they are simply not completely mixed. So I think, that to provide a true explanation we must always appeal to a "third substance" as the boundary, because it is only by understanding a third thing, that the reason why the two are separated will be grasped.
This is very evident in the nature of time. as well as the human experience of internal/external. If we propose that the human experience is just a mixing of internal/external, or that the present in time is just a mixing of future and past, without assuming a third thing which is the actual reason why the two sides of these apparently dichotomous divisions exist, then these two (human experience, and the present in time) become unintelligible. Therefore we must apprehend the reality that these are not true dichotomies, because in each case there is a third thing, which acts as the boundary separating the two which only appear to our senses to be dichotomous.
I was speaking to identity in that post. The words "parts and wholes" is misleading there. When we say an object has the trait of being a triangle, or that it instantiates the universal of a triangle, we aren't referring to any one of its angles, right?
The concept of emergence and the composition fallacy doesn't apply to bundle theories of identity. A "trait" is not a stand in for a part of an object. For example, traits aren't parts in the sense that a liver is a part of a human body or a retina is part of an eye.
A trait - that is a trope (nominalism) or the instantiation of a universal (realism) - applies to the emergent whole of an object. They have to do so to serve their purpose in propositions. For example, the emergent triangularity of a triangle is a trait. The slopes of the lines that compose it are not traits, they are parts (they interact with traits only insomuch as they effect the traits of the whole). The way I wrote that was misleading, but the context is the identity of indiscernibles.
Traits are what allow propositions like "the bus is red," or "the ball is round" to have truth values. The sum total of an object's traits is not the sum total of its parts. It is the sum of all the predicates that can be attached to it. So an object that is "complex" but which is composed of "simple" parts still has the trait of being complex.
So to rephrase it better, the question is "is a thing defined by the sum of all the true propositions that can be made about it, or does it have an essential thisness of being unique to it?"
[Quote]
And this is nothing but nonsense. What could a "substratum of 'thisness'" possibly refer to? "[/Quote]
Yes, that is the common rebuttal I mentioned. It sounds like absurd gobbledygook. Now, its supporters claim that all ontologies assert ontologically basic brute facts, and so this assertion is no different, but it seems mighty ad hoc to me. That this theory still has legs is more evidence of the problems competitors face than its explicit merits.
[Quote]
You attempt to make the description, or the model, into the thing itself. But then all the various problems with the description, or model, where the model has inadequacies, are seen as issues within the thing itself, rather than issue with the description. [/Quote]
This sort of "maps versus territory" question begging accusation is incredibly common on this forum. It's ironic because in the context it is normally delivered, re: mental models of real noumena versus the real noumena in itself, it is itself begging the question by assuming realism.
As a realist, I still take the objection seriously, but I'm not totally sure how it applies here.
The "thermodynamic arrow of time," refers to entropy vis-á-vis the universe as a whole. Wouldn't this be a non-arbitrary system.
I agree with the point on systems otherwise. I don't think I understand what "time is an unknown feature," means here. Is this like the "unknown features" of machine learning?
The difference/similarity distinction is two heads of the same coin. I start with difference only because Hegel did and that's where my thinking was going.
If you start with the idea of absolute, undifferentiated being, then difference is the key to definition. If you start with the idea of pure indefinite being, a chaotic pleroma of difference, then yes, similarity is the key principal.
Hegel used both. In the illustration from sense certainty, we face a chaotic avalanche of difference in sensations. The present is marching ever forward so that any sensation connected to the "now" of the present is gone before it can be analyzed. This pure unanalyzable difference is meaningless. The similarities between the specific moments of conciousness help give birth to the analyzable world, a world of schemas, categories, and traits. However, these universals (in the generic, not realist sense) in turn shape our perception (something you see borne out in neuroscience). So the process of meaning is a circular process between specifics and universals, difference and similarity.
You cannot make definitions if all you have access too is absolute difference or absolute similarity. Similarity alone cannot make up a definition. As Sausser said, "a one word language is impossible." If one term applies to everything equally, with no distinction, it carries no meaning. In the framework of Shannon Entropy, this would be a channel of nothing but infinite ones or infinite zeros. There is zero surprise in the message.
For instance, you can define green things for a child by pointing to green things because they also see all sorts of things that aren't green. If, in some sort of insane experiment, you implant a green filter in their eyes so that all things appear to them only in shades of green, they aren't going to have a good understanding of what green is. Green for them has become synonymous with light, it has lost definition due to lack of differentiation.
The interesting thing is that this doesn't just show up in thought experiments. Denying developing mammals access to certain types of stimuli (diagonal lines for instance) will profoundly retard their ability to discriminate between basic stimuli when they are removed from the controlled environment in adulthood.
Can you explain how these folks get around the issues mentioned above though? The ones I am familiar with in this list have extremely varied views on the subject.
Nietzsche's anti-platonist passages are spread out, and I'm not sure they represent a completed system, but he would appear to fall under the more austere versions of nominalism I talked about. Like I said, these avoid the problem of the identity of indiscernibles, but at the cost of potentially jettisoning truth values for propositions.
Rorty is a prime example of the linguistic theories I mentioned. The complaint here is again about propositions. Analytical philosophers don't want to make propositions just about the truth values of verbal statements. Plus, many non-analytical philosophers still buy into realism, at least at the level of mathematics (the Quine–Putnam indispensability argument re: abstract mathematical entites have ontic status).
On a side note, I honestly find it puzzling that eliminativists tend to like Rorty. Sure, it helps their claims about how lost we are in assuming conciousness has the depth we "think," we experience, but it also makes their work just statements about linguistic statements.
I am familiar with Deleuze and to a lesser extent Heidegger on this subject. I have never seen how moving from ontological identity to ontological difference independent of a concept of identity fixes the problem of the identity of indiscernibles. It seems to me that it "solves" the problem by denying it exists.
However, it does so in a way that makes me suspicious of begging the question. Sure, difference being ontologically more primitive than identity gets you out of the jam mentioned above by allowing you to point to the numerical difference of identical objects as ontologically basic, but it's always been unclear to me how this doesn't make prepositions about the traits of an object into mere brute facts. So in this sense, it's similar to the austere nominalism I was talking about before.
Now I think Putnam might have something very different to say here vis-á-vis the multiple realizability of mental states, and what this says about the traits of objects as experienced, verses their ontological properties, but this doesn't really answer the proposition problem one way or the other. It does seem though, like it might deliver a similar blow to propositions as the linguistic models (e.g., Rorty). Propositions' truth values are now about people's experiences, which I suppose is still a step up from being just about people's words or fictions, and indeed should be fine for an idealist.
I haven't read the previous posts in your dialog, but the "similarity vs difference" and "absolute undifferentiated being" rang a bell. In my personal worldview, the pre-BigBang source of our real world was what I call "BEING". I borrowed Plato's notion that real organized Cosmos emerged from ideal disorganized Chaos. But I have to distinguish the ideal concept of monolithic omnipotential Chaos -- no actual things, just potential for all things -- from the modern notion of irrational confusion & disorder. Another term for the unitary fullness of all possible things is a perfect Pleroma. But that has some specific religious references, that are not necessary for philosophical purposes.
In my usage, Chaos is "irrational" only in the sense that it is unitary & atomic, with no separate parts to rationalize or organize, and no pattern to disarray. So, BEING is "absolute & undifferentiated". It's also a Mathematical Singularity, in the sense of having no parts to define it, just pure Potential (creative power) from which all the components of our Reality are derived. Metaphorically, Chaos is like an ovum, which can split into two halves, which continue to divide & differentiate into Darwin's "endless forms most beautiful". However, since the Chaos egg is assumed to be omni-potent, our universe is just a tiny fragment of the infinite possibilities that remain undifferentiated.
Realists & Physicalists typically envision those possible un-known pre-cosmoses as a physical Multiverse, or a real array of Many Worlds. But, I prefer to avoid speculating beyond the only differentiation that we know is necessary for our temporary & contingent home world to exist. Like idealistic Plato, and using Ockham's Razor, I simplify the Beginning of Being (space-time) down to just "pure indefinite BEING" (AKA : Chaos) and alloyed differentiated things (AKA : Cosmos). So, our physical world is characterized by both Difference & Similarity, whereas BEING is Indifferent & Unitary. Hence I must agree that "If you start with the idea of pure indefinite being", then "similarity is the key principal" for defining the multiplicity of created beings & things in our world. :nerd:
BEING :
[i]In my own theorizing there is one universal principle that subsumes all others, including Consciousness : essential Existence. Among those philosophical musings, I refer to the "unit of existence" with the absolute singular term "BEING" as contrasted with the plurality of contingent "beings" and things and properties. By BEING I mean the ultimate “ground of being”, which is simply the power to exist, and the power to create beings.
Note : Real & Ideal are modes of being. BEING, the power to exist, is the source & cause of Reality and Ideality. BEING is eternal, undivided and static, but once divided into Real/Ideal, it becomes our dynamic Reality.[/i]
BothAnd Blog Glossary
Mathematical Singularity :
In mathematics, a singularity is a point at which a given mathematical object is not defined, . . . .
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singularity_(mathematics)
Note -- the BigBang "Singularity" is a mathematical expression of the Unitary source of our differentiated reality : the ground of our being.
MANY WORLDS OR MULTIVERSE , WHAT'S THE DIFFERENCE ?
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
The numerical difference of identical objects is very far removed from the notion of difference that drives the work of authors like Derrida, Deleuze and Heidegger.
They don’t begin from identity and then add difference onto it. What is an identity? What is self-identicality? What is a logical proposition such as A=A? The concern of these writers is to show that what is assumed as an identity with attributes, traits and properties is o my so as an idealization.
Husserl wrote a book , Formal and Transcendental Logic, in which the starting point for writers like Frege and Russell , S is P, is the end product of a long and complex process of constitution. From their vantage, all that Husserl contributes was a pointless psychologistic analysis. But what he actually accomplished was the exposition of the hidden assumptions and conditions of possibility for the abstractions that Frege took as primordial . In other words , in order to have an adequate grasp of the nature of truth as it is asserted in propositions, one must recognize that the form of the proposition is a derived abstraction that takes for granted what is really at stake in determining the basis of assertions of truth.
To briefly answer your original question, I think that most people nowadays default to materialism (physicalism). But since this discussion forum has seemingly naturally segued into an actual debate between more idealist minded individuals vs more materialistic minded individuals, let me give you my two cents (for whatever they are worth) on the topic. I think that a vast majority of what we know is empirical, but necessarily never solely such: some things are presupposed in any empirical investigation. To be clear and concise, let me provide one example: connectives (as the components of a conclusion which act as the connections, whether that be synthetic or analytic) is always necessarily presupposed in any empirical evaluation. To keep it brief, I think that reason is always met with a recursive potential infinite of connectives when attempting to empirically explain any given connective. For example, if A is connected (in any fashion or form) to B, we then can very well ask why that connective is valid. But when, let's say, explanations for the connective(s) involved in connecting A to B are derived (such as C and D or what have you), we can always ask the very same of those connectives utilized to derive such, and we can perform this for a potential infinite of times, thereby we never get any closer to explaining connectives (i.e. the actual connective's validity, for any further explanation necessarily utilizes connectives itself which are presupposed as valid in explaining the original connective); Only as we trudge along the path of the recursive potential infinite of explanations of connectives do (I think) we realize that the most cogent solution is that of connectivity being transcendental (as in not completely separate from reason--aka not transcendent--but proposed as necessarily an unconditional absolute grounding of reason itself as derived from reason), whereby we still freely concede that this was also a connection and, consequently, the connective(s) involved in that conclusion reveal connectives, as a whole, as truly something of a potential infinite prerequisite of reason itself. So, in relation to reason, it is reasoned that connectives can only be proficiently explained in reference to its potential infinite nature, which necessitates that it be conceptualized as transcendental of reason. Furthermore, this entire investigation into connectives was obtained empirically by analysis of reason on itself to determine that, actually, this entire process of empirical investigation always (for a potential infinite) presupposes the validity of all connectives. So, that which is transcendental (in this case, connectivity) is necessarily obtained empirically, but reveals that which is necessarily presupposed for empiricism in the first place (that which is not empirical). So, I hold, even if we could hypothetically explain (which involves connections) the mind as reduced to the brain, we would not have gotten any closer to explaining the connectives utilized in that empirical investigation: therefore, at best (hypothetically), the mind holistically being derived of the material brain (holistically in the sense that seemingly every manifestation of reason is properly explained by science--i.e. we could tell when you think of a car vs a cat, decide to do something, make you angry, etc) would only be in relation to reason and the connectives presupposed as valid in the first place and, consequently, only ever pertaining to what is manifested by reason and not what is transcendentally true of all manifestations of reason itself--therefore not truly holistically (as in completely) explanatory (there's always an aspect that will never to be explained).
Bob
I don't agree with this. Concepts are composed of parts, and the parts are "traits", only in a slightly different way from the way that physical objects are composed of parts. This is because the parts which are said to make up a physical object are understood as concepts anyway. So an object has different formations of molecules, which might be referred to to separate one part of the eye from another, but this is a conceptual description. And we see this more clearly when we say a molecule consists of atoms, and atom of other parts. It's all theory. conceptual. Unless you take an object, and start physically breaking it apart, there is no basis for your claim of difference. But when you do this, the object doesn't necessarily break at the points indicated. If you cut up the eyeball the retina does not necessarily separate itself out, because this is a theoretical distinction you have made.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
So these assumptions are not true at all. The lines and angles are traits. The line and the angle are concepts which are traits of the concept of triangle, and they are also the parts of the triangle.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Each particular thing is unique, in itself, having a thisness all to itself, but it is defined by the true propositions made about it. There is a gap between these two due to the deficiencies of the human capacities.
Yeah, that's sort of where I was headed at first thinking about these things. The problem of parts being traits though is that it seems like objects reduce to fundemental particles, as in your example.
Interestingly, there are forms of realism people have proposed where the only universals/forms are the fundemental particles. I've never seen nominalism of this sort before, but I could see how it would work. Fundemental particles would be the only tropes, and tropes would really just be names for the excitations of quantum fields we observe.
These are pretty neat. The problem they might have for your stand point comes up here:
Each particular thing is unique, in itself, having a thisness all to itself,
Physicists generally claim that fundemental particles do lack haeccity. Lately though, there has been some debate as to how indiscernible particles really are. In some cases, they may not be fully indiscernible, the jury is out.
For the most part though, we are told not to assume that an electron we trapped in a box will remain the same electron when we open the box. Or, another proposed way to look at it is to say there is only one electron. The electron is not affected by time, and so it can be everywhere at once.
For a bit more detail:
The original paper.
An easier write up .
Now, keep this lack of haecceity in mind and think of how different particles might be seen to function very much like the way letters function in a text (a "T" is always a T; the specific T is meaningless, only its role in a word matters). Words are made up of letters, but words can have properties like "adjective" or "noun." Their traits don't come from their parts. Then, their role as subject or predicate in a sentence is further not derived from their letters, but by their relationship to other words.
But then which letter/concept in a word holds the trait "noun?" Which parts can be summed up into the concept "noun?" This property can't just be attributed to the rules of spelling, the way the rules of geometry denote "triangle" from the slope of a triangle's three lines, because random mixes of letters can be proper nouns in fiction novels and we create new words all the time. Additionally, words have a meaning when spoken as well as written, and illiterate people can understand words without the letters that make them up.
Same holds for the trait of "predicate." It seems the traits a word posseses can't just be coming from the parts, no? In this case, a part of a sentence gets its trait from a whole that it is a part of, in the same way eyes have the trait of being organs due to being parts of whole bodies. Even if the components of words are actually "ideas," I don't know how this gets you to nouns being subjects of sentences, as in the property of the word "Jamie" in a sentence like "Jamie is a dog," which features two nouns.
And here is the other big problem with these fundemental systems: fundemental particles can't be triangles, they don't have a color, they can't be circles, they can't be lighter or darker than each other, they can't be translucent, etc. All these properties are emergent.
So, if traits are actually just parts, I'm not sure I see a way for propositions such as "the block Thomas picked up is triangular," can have truth values. Because the block is actually made up of atoms that aren't triangular, and if you say that the triangularity comes from the block's parts, then you are admitting that objects can have traits that their parts lack, and of course "being made of atoms" isn't necissary or sufficient as a cause of being triangular.
Arguably, the block isn't triangular. It's like Mandelbrot's map of the British coastline, which actually has infinite length because you can always measure at finer and finer detail, which will reveal ever smaller irregularities in the coast line that add to its length. So, the edge of the block is actually a roiling landscape of microscopic bumps, not a straight line.
However, this seems like a pretty big blow to propositions. You can get around this problem with Mandelbrot's insight that the same shape has a different number of dimensions when viewed from different perspectives. His example was a ball of string. From very far away, it is a one dimensional point. As you get closer, it becomes a two dimensional line of string. Get closer still, and it is a three dimensional cylindrical entity. Get closer still, to the scale of fundemental particles, and it is now a group of one dimensional points. (The insightful kicker here is that the strong has fractional dimensions at different points along this analysis).
But if you do this, you're back to looking at the traits of the object as a whole, not the parts.
This is Platonic realism. "Fundamental particles" are nothing but mathematical equations made to represent observations. When we claim that these mathematical representations constitute the reality of what is observed, this is Platonism. I don't think this qualifies as nominalism, because nominalism would say that these equations are just our way of describing what is observed.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
The problem I see is with this assumption: that the observation of a particle, at one time, then a particle at another time, is the same particle. So for instance, a photon is emitted, and an equal photon is absorbed at another place, in a way which corresponds. It is assumed that these are the same particle but that is where the problem is. The continuous existence of the particle between t1 and t2 cannot be accounted for, so the claim that the two instances are instances of the same particle, is not really a valid claim.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
The "role" of a thing, like its function, is an attribute of its context, which presumes a larger whole. The problem though is that we cannot entirely remove meaning from the thing by negating or ignoring the context. So meaning is not completely determined by context, resulting in some form of intrinsic meaning inherent within the thing, as the thing which it is according to its form (law of identity). So we might say the meaning of a word is dependent on the context of usage, but this is not entirely true, or absolute, because there must be something intrinsic within the word, or else any combination of words could have any meaning, and we couldn't figure out any meaning. So the word has some built in limitations which restrict the scope of its usage. Likewise, in you example of letters, the symbol "T" has built in limitations as to acceptable usage, as a letter for example, and we cannot accurately say that the generic "T" "is meaningless", and "only its role in a word matters".
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
In general, the narrower, more restrictive concept, holds within it, the broader, less restrictive, as explained by Aristotle. So the concept "man" holds within it, as a defining feature, the concept of "animal", which holds within it, "living", etc.. In this way, "living" is an essential part of "animal", which is an essential part of "man". So "sentence" has "noun" within it, as a defining feature, "sentence being the narrower or stricter, while "noun" is the broader concept. Therefore "noun" is a trait of "sentence", like "animal" is a trait of "man".
When we get to the very particular, the individual, what Aristotle calls primary substance, we see that it is not within anything. So "animal" is within "man", and "man" is within "Socrates", but "Socrates" being a name (proper noun) referring to an individual, is not within any further concept. This allows that the proper noun has no restrictions, not being within anything, so a name could be a random mix of letters, or whatever, and the name is valid or true, substantiated, by the individual which it refers to. The individual has an identity, or existence according to the law of identity.
If the individual named is fictitious, and it is claimed that this individual is supposed to be a real individual, then we have a form of sophistry because the named thing is really a specific concept within a conceptual structure. So the named fictitious thing, Santa Clause for example, is really within, and dependent on a conceptual structure, whereas Socrates names a thing outside and independent of conceptual structure. When it comes to "photon" and other fundamental particles, the named thing is within a conceptual structure supported by observation. So it's halfway between fiction and nonfiction, the conceptual structure is supported by some sort of observational data, but the substantial existence of the thing named as "photon X" cannot be validated through temporal continuity, so it is not really a thing with identity, as primary substance is supposed to be.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I don't see the problem. The block is an object, and is therefore primary substance. We can name it, and the name becomes the subject, and we predicate. The block is shaped like a pyramid. If we say that the block is really atoms, then we have made the atoms into the objects, or named subjects, and the block is something made from the relations of those atoms. But the atoms are now supposed to be the individual objects we are talking about, the primary substances, not the block. If real substantial existence cannot be given to the atoms, as is the case with photons, then we are back to talking about the block as the objects, and the atoms only exist within the conceptual structure, not referring to any real particles with substantial existence.
It could be that fundamental particles are structures of space. If you consider an elementary an object in a 6d space of which 3 are curled up to tiny Planck-sized dimensions they appear pointlike and can be on top of each other without becoming a singularity as in a black hole. Lots of problems would be solved, like a Lorentz-invsriant invariant Planck length and the already mentioned avoidance of the singularity.
From my experience in TPF, I can't say that physicalism as a subject is at the focus. Rather the opposite. It's quite scarce. But this is of no surprise, since, based on a poll I carried out about 7 months ago and also discussions I have had, about 80% of the people in here are "materialists", well, labels aside, they believe that everything that exists is matter or ibased on matter". So, indeed what's the purpose of making physicalism or materialism a central subject?
Nevertheless. I fully undestand your saying that "it does not strike me to have such importance of a philosophical topic". You can see more about this in my topic "The problem with "Materialism" at https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12480/the-problem-with-materialism/p1.
That is a prescient observation. Both "Consciousness" and "Charge" seem to be intrinsic to matter. But to this day nobody knows what "Charge" is. The etymology literally refers to the "load" that a cart carries. But a wheeled cart could carry a variety of things as its "charge". So, the word is a place-keeper for a more specific definition. Like "Consciousness", empirical science takes its existence -- as an intrinsic property -- for granted -- because of what it does -- but cannot say exactly what it is. My philosophical guess is that Consciousness & Charge & Mass are various forms of Energy : the ability to cause change, to transform. But, what then is Energy or Force made of?
All of these mysterious "properties" are essences, not substances. Which is why empirical Science has to accept them for their functions, even though they can't say what their substance is. As suggested by the "intrinsic property" definition below, what all of these essences have in common is that they are relationships-between-points, not physical objects. The things related can be Physical objects, but the relationships are more like Mathematical ratios (relative values). Hence, a "Charge" can be imagined as the monetary value of a load of potatoes, or sheep, or bread-loaves. But a "monetary value" is simply an idea in a mind. So round & round we go.
Relationships are immaterial links, which can't be seen or touched, so they must be inferred by human "Reason", which "sees" the logical connections between things (see graphic below). And "Logic" is the essence of Semantics : the personal metaphorical or symbolic meanings we attribute to things, as-if their meaning was intrinsic, instead of extrinsic. Likewise, we can say that "Mind" is the function of a brain that sees (imagines) non-physical connections, or relative values, or logical conjunctions between concepts. But what then is "Mind" made of : some abstract ability to bind parts together into whole systems, or to analyze systems into component parts? That mental power itself has no known components -- it just is (Qualia, not Quanta). :cool:
Charge :
Middle English (in the general senses ‘to load’ and ‘a load’), from Old French charger (verb), charge (noun), from late Latin carricare, carcare ‘to load’, from Latin carrus ‘wheeled vehicle’.
___Oxford Dictionary
Intrinsic property :
An intrinsic property is a property that an object or a thing has of itself, including its context. An extrinsic (or relational) property is a property that depends on a thing's relationship with other things.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intrinsic_and_extrinsic_properties_(philosophy)
Essence : the intrinsic nature or indispensable quality of something, especially something abstract, that determines its character.
Q. What’s the nature of a charge or what gives a particle a negative charge or a positive one?
[i]A. Simple answer is: we don't know.
It is simply an observation of reality that some elementary particles have an intrinsic property that we attribute to a charge. . . . Just as matter particles have an intrinsic mass property, so do charged particles have a charge.[/i]
https://www.quora.com/I-m-looking-for-a-philosophical-POV-on-what-exactly-a-charge-as-in-a-charged-particle-e-g-electron-really-means-How-and-what-really-is-a-charge
And I think we'll never know, as it's inside the particle. We can't know what the inside of a particle exactly is. Which implies that we can't explain consciousness. Of course we eat loads of charges each day. They become part of our total charge, so to speak. And we know how that feels like. Kind of you are what you eat. You can have 1001 explanations of charge, vibrational string modes, or coupling strength to fields, the true nature will stay a mystery. A longing maybe?
Yes. Empirical evidence for the inner being of an electron may never be available. That's primarily because electrons are currently assumed to have no internal physical structure for dissecting scientists to analyze. However, that minor obstacle has never stopped theoretical scientists & philosophers from using their X-ray vision (imagination) to speculate on those opaque innards. For example, even a Neutron, with no charge, still contains Energy. So, we could assume that, like Mass, an Electron is made of Energy, which is not a material substance, but merely the potential for change.
Therefore, turning their attention to energy-in-general, some theorists have concluded that "Energy is Information". Moreover since, before Shannon, "information" was the common name for the intangible contents of a Mind (ideas ; thoughts ; memories ; intentions), we can guess that both Energy & Information are somehow related to Conscious Knowing. So, it seems that shape-shifting Energy takes on many different forms, from electron "Charge", to the "Mass" of matter, and even to the "Mind" of a brain. Consequently, some theoretical scientists have deduced that Energy/Information (my term : EnFormAction) is the fundamental substance of the universe. If so, what does that equation of Matter & Mind mean for the "metaphysical theory" of Physicalism? :gasp:
What is an electron made of? :
Electrons are fundamental particles so they cannot be decomposed into constituents. They are therefore not made or composed. An electron acts as a point charge and a point mass.
https://www.quora.com/What-are-electrons-made-up-of-Are-all-electrons-made-of-the-same-material
How is information related to energy in physics? :
Energy is the relationship between information regimes. That is, energy is manifested, at any level, between structures, processes and systems of information in all of its forms, and all entities in this universe is composed of information.
https://physics.stackexchange.com/questions/22084/how-is-information-related-to-energy-in-physics
Is ‘Information’ Fundamental for a Scientific Theory of Consciousness?
After a brief primer on Shannon’s information, we are led to the exciting proposition of David Chalmers’ ‘double-aspect information’ as a bridge between physical and phenomenal aspects of reality.
https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-981-10-5777-9_21
In philosophy, physicalism is the metaphysical thesis that "everything is physical", that there is "nothing over and above" the physical, or that everything supervenes on the physical.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physicalism
Currently the observations are such that the pointlike structure of electrons isn't challenged. One can dive into the electron by the power of imagination. I think all empirical data can be explained by considering electrons, like all quarks and other leptons, composite. Triplets of massless preons (linking pure kinetic particle energy with mass!) explain a lot of hitherherto unexplained phenomena in physics (particle/antiparticle asymmetry, particle families, force unification, etc.) but even proposing this or questioning on philosophy forums why this model is impopular gets you banned. It's an attack on the standard of pointlike standards and the basis of string theory would be endangered. The politics of power are employed to protect the sancta casa. The muon g2 experiment can be interpreted though in the light of compositeness. But this approach is not even considered. I don't understand why and no one was able to give convincing arguments against it. A ban was all they had eventually. The preons themselves can even be considered structures of space in which charges can be enclosed. So mass is a derivative of pure kinetic energy in massless particles. The content, charges, of particles is the unexplainable "mental" component.
I don't see the connection between information and mind. What's the connection between structure and mind? Of course, the structure of particles having a global shape, invisible at the small scale, is not physical. Particles in the shape of, say, a simple circle don't have necessarily a physical connection with diametrically opposite particles. Still they share a commodity. Otherwise the circle could not have its shape. But to say the shape is the mental? Dunno...