The Unequivocal Triumph Of Neuroscience - On Consciousness

But the work of leading neuroscientists like Damasio and the predictive processing group is not consistent with your view of the relationship between affective and cognition, among other things

Evidence? That'll be required here. I see you have a pretty decent assertion, if you can support it. Yo

Garrett, just to make sure we are not talking a cross purposes, what is the concept of consciousness that is operative in your OP?

Do you have a definition of the word? Can you indicate what the neuroscientific theory of consciousness (if there is one single one, which there isn't as far as I know) is a theory of?

Evidence is only intelligible relative to conceptual schemes

"This fallacy is committed when a person makes a claim that knowingly or unknowingly disregards well known science, science that weighs against the claim

I’m not disregarding well known science , I am
wanting to critique it based on its conceptual
foundation, which is different than refuting the evidence in favor of it.

A scientific theory can be absolutely correct in asserting that it conforms with all the available evidence , and still be less useful than an alternative theoretical orientation.

Evidence is only intelligible relative to conceptual schemes
— Joshs

No it isn't

I don’t expect you to agree with me , but I would like for you to be able to tell me where I am getting this idea
from , Have you heard it before?

Tell me what your theory is that opposes the above research, where you got it, and let's see if I can't go track down some stuff from my database that my give it some support. What do you say?

Ok, I really like the research on consciousness that emphasizes levels of awareness, indicating that consciousness is not all or nothing but an integrative
princess that ties together memory, emotion, perception and cognition in amazingly interactive way. Equally important, I think, is emphasizing the role of awareness in predicting and anticipating. events.

That isn't to say it would matter as to what consciousness is if the brain did produce it.

What is consciousness?

How did you prove that your brain 8s an adequate tool for locating it in your brain? Circular logic, much?

It's all just vying for control, but we true lovers of wisdom ain't afraid of neuroscience.

’m not interested in debating evidence. That’s like trying to parse the meaning of bible verses. Evidence is only intelligible relative to conceptual schemes. That’s the level at which I’d like to discuss this.

Odd, innit? The brain does everything, neuroscience does the work to say what the brain is doing when it does everything, then, at the same time, one of the things the brain does, is be sufficient cause for some of us to say.....it makes not the least bit of difference to me, all else being equal, what the HELL my brain is doing. Sure, I got one, but I am never, as Everydayman, conscious of the one I got.

‘Nutha thing. Funny that the human in possession of the brain he investigates, came up with the parameters under which he proves how the brain he possesses works, but the brain never ever presents itself in accordance with the very parameters attributed to its functionality. So really, we didn’t find out how the brain works, but rather, the brain told us how it works.

And then makes it so we can ignore it.

Which is indeed an unequivocal triumph. Just....not of neuroscience.

Basically what the article concludes "a neural network of consciousness in which the paraventricular nucleus formally serves as the control nucleus of arousal, which is closely related to the maintenance of consciousness, and the neurons in the posterior cerebral cortex. It is related to the integration of feelings and the generation of consciousness content. Besides, the claustrum also represents the key channel of the consciousness loop and the transmission of control information."

No, that's not really been established yet.

But, fundamnetally, the wakeful attention that characterizes human cognition.

Global Workspace Theory, Quantum Theory, Integrated Information Theory

What can I say. My brain made me do it.

No you are your brain; you (the brain referred to as Mww) did it. :rofl:

What if the 'folk' models produced by the brain(s) are more adaptively fit than the speculative interpretation of neuroscience which says that we are nothing more than our brains? Should we discard them nonetheless and suffer accordingly?

You betcha. And not only that, but anywhere but right here, the-brain-referred-to-as-Mww......isn’t.

But to have a relationship there must be two, no?

Do you think that is the case with the scientific study of consciousness?

OK, thanks. So you are specifying humans. Are we not considering animals with brains here? If not, why not?

Also you are specifying wakeful attention. What about dreams when asleep? Are we conscious then?

And what about when our attention is very diffuse, almost as if we are not attending to anything in particular, and allowing an unanalysed body of stimuli determine our experience? Does that count as consciousness?

The Global Workspace Theory is interesting as I think it captures something of the phenomenal character of experience, namely that it feels container-like. But what is it exactly?

The trouble with all flavours of functionalism is that they tend to be silent when asked "OK, but why can't all that happen in the dark? What is it about any of that that necessitates phenomenal experience?"

There are several Quantum Consciousness theories I think. Are you thinking of the Penrose one?

These are all very different Garrett. And some don't necessarily involve brains. Are you sure it's all as settled as you think?

That wasn't intended to be an argument; it was a question.

O, the tragedy of a brain that doesn't understand itself...

What do you actually know about the brain and its connection to the body? Explain to me how a memory is formed. What happens when I recognize a face?

I don't know about you, but my brain can't see itself at all

And apparently your brain (or is it your brain's brain?) can't tell the difference between an argument and a question.

Most theories aren't really theories until they can face the crucible of falsification

Nothing to offer but difficulties for your position. You can lead a hoar to culture, but you can't make him think.

What if the theory is true?

No, that's not what happens in memory formation.

Not that you have noticed, it's true.

Yes it is.

But how can a true theory be falsified?

No it isn't. There is no memory formation discussed. Memory formation happens in the whole brain.

At least you're able to admit that much.

Thank you for confirming exactly what I said.

You said nowhere how memory is formed. How then?

Through the integration of sensory data across multiple neural channels before being stored in the hippocampus for retrieval by the neocortex. Left you some research on it up there too.

That's not an answer how it's formed. Only that it's formed. How is it integrated? It's very simple... Like the workings of the whole brain is very simple...

It's my secret. I don't want anyone to know. Found it out thanks to my own brain. Introspection, you know. Dialogue.

There I go again, playing Nostradamus.

Quantum Consciousness is speculative, but has some support.

As I presently comprehend, those are the essentials of quantum consciousness theory, but much of it has not yet been conclusively proven.

And I'll bet that brain will never produce an argument here.

You won’t get an argument from me

be-all-end-all domain is utterly irrelevant to the guy wondering what to do about his neighbor’s dog digging up the carrot patch.

I grant the science, and acknowledge the authority of brain machinations. But I am, at the end of the day, just a regular ol’ human being, and as such, philosophy has much more impact on me, than your science, of which I have no conscious need in my intellectual performance.

You actually might be better off, if you acknowledged the fact that everybody thinks, but not a single human ever, is aware of their phosphorus ion count, activation potentials, nor the span of his synaptic clefts for the color “blue”.

where should the productive emphasis reside?

So if everybody does this, but nobody does that....where should the productive emphasis reside?

O, the tragedy of a brain that doesn't understand itself...

That claim itself is anything but an empirically falsifiable one.

These sorts of claims are made by those of a fundamentalist spirit that fails to realize the importance of perspective and context.

Which would seem pretty hard to explain, methinks.

So if everybody does this, but nobody does that....where should the productive emphasis reside?

Ethics perhaps?

Neuroscience hasn't figured out how a conscious experience is produced. They somehow know...or I shouldn't say they, but sycophants like Garrett know that neuroscience has proven its the product of the amalgamation of the brain.

So, three things they don't understand:

1. The complete function of the brain.
2. Consciousness.
3. The environment in which said consciousness exists.

And yet...they kNoW tHeRe Is nO mystery. Ie. There cannot be ANY surprises.

And no, it's pretty well asserted in neuroscientific community, even if there are still many mysteries to solve.

No, fundamentalists say that the mind and body are separate,

You guys just keep either insulting me, or just saying I'm wrong. Which is weird.

Ya know....and I know you do....it was said many moons ago, that human reason is very good at contradicting itself. So if brain machinations are the be-all-end-all, and human reason is the conscious manifestation of the be-all-end-all of brain machinations, then it is the case that the brain both adheres to the absolute necessity of natural law, and at the same time, ensures the inevitability of contradicting itself. Which would seem pretty hard to explain, methinks.

Just to be clear, I'm not arguing for either side; I am neither atheist nor theist. dualist nor monist; I like to keep an open mind on undecidables. That said I do have my leanings, but they are something I'd not care to argue for, being as how there is no objective measure of mere plausibility.

I've merely thrown you some problems for your position which you've utterly failed to address.

but where you are definitely wrong, in my view, is over-zealously overstepping the bounds of scientific warrant in regard to your claims.

And if you read back over the threads you've participated in with an honest eye, I think you'll find that the move to insult has generally been initiated by you.

Insulting me just makes you look more like someone who doesn't have an argument.

No, I don't think so. Had that been the case, you would have addressed something I've asserted with the data.

You "don't think so" what? I don't need to see the data to know that it cannot support the kind of claim you are making. Yours is a metaphysical or ontological claim. Empirical data has no bearing on those.

What you are claiming is undecidable, pure and simple. If not it could be demonstrated by experiment. Only philosophically uneducated people take scientific results to prove anything about ontology. I've raised questions and you've refused to even attempt to answer them.

For example I asked you whether you thought that conscious awareness was prior or subsequent to its correlated neural process. Libet's experiment seem to show that it is subsequent; which, if true, would mean that the nature of conscious awareness may be completely determined by neural processes,

You want to claim that people are morally responsible, but such a claim would be absurd if we are nothing more than a natural process. From a purely rational perspective our moral status would be the same as any other natural process, notwithstanding the brain/body's much greater complexity.

You have no answer for this objection, apparently, and so try to deflect the question, so as not to show the weakness of your position. At least the Churchlands are consistent in their eliminativism. And so is Dennett for the most part, although he too does not want to admit that there is no free will, and hence moral responsibility, even though everything he writes points to that conclusion. You can believe whatever you like, but at least be intellectually honest enough to be consistent.

If you take pointing out inconsistencies in your position as insult then that's your problem, not mine.

You guys just keep (....) saying I'm wrong

Ethics perhaps?

I mean....how can “we hypothesize....” be argued?

How will science know what it is like to be something?

How will science objectively know a subjective experience?

Or is this what science is even hoping for?

The neuroscientific community doesn't even dispute that the brain is the source of consciousness.

Bowser's theory of consciousness is that it is entirely digital,

I find it interesting that if photons (EM radiation) superposition with electrons (atomic orbitals)

Paves a way from physiology to the subjective experience of consciousness with which it has seemed so incompatible.

It's a complicated world, and I do not think it can be adequately addressed with one kind of thinking.

I don't think photons are superpositioned with electrons in orbitals. How do you envision this?

I'm under the impression that the role these particle interactions play are supplementary to the global structure of the brain. Have you discovered data that would suggest otherwise?

Yep, nice concundrum!

It's new science, methods such as perhaps spectroscopy etc. have not yet been adapted for it.

What do you think would happen to your consciousness if your brain was gradually replaced while you were awake?

The human brain is a fascinating contraption, even so.

Problem is, the collective parallel ion pulse currents in the brain don't constitute information referring to something else like in digital computers. The connection strengths between neurons can be changed due to synaps widening.

The game artifacts and avatars are not distinguishable from within. So by analogy, that there is not necessarily any detectable 'soul input', does not entail that it is all quarks and probability waves.

The emergent properties of consciousness...

Firstly, Blah-blah-blah neural networks.

So by analogy, that there is not necessarily any detectable 'soul input', does not entail that it is all quarks and probability waves.

Do you distinguish between consciousness and its contents?

not poor ol’ Rene.

Machine ghosts being one more in a long list of conceptualizations the brain foists on the unsuspecting and unprepared human?

I'm inclined to with modern views on consciousness pervading the topic, but when I think about it, when I say something like "my song" when referring to a piece that I have composed, I am talking about the same emergent consciousness as I would be if I said "my thoughts." See where I'm going? It is more likely that consciousness is itself emergent in whatever capacity it is so emergent.

Whether consciousness emerges or intrudes is rather the question of the thread, and your claim that neuroscience has answered the question whilst still unclear as to what it means to be conscious has not found much favour.

But My inclination would be to say that to be conscious is not merely to see, but to be aware of the seeing, and not merely to think but to be aware of thinking, not merely to act but to be aware of acting

And further, to be aware equally of not seeing and not thinking and not acting. This marks a clear distinction between consciousness and content of consciousness, which might be useful to the investigator, and answer some of those awkward questions about dreams and so on.

Yes, I think that conclusion is useful. I would only want to play devil's advocate a little, and offer that this respect for evidence has a tendency (or so I perceive) to (sometimes) produce unimaginative and robotic thinking that has so much regard for rational thought that it excessively de-emphasizes the day to day human, more intuitive experience.

I think that our emotions and irrational tenancies can sneak their way into even the most diligent and professional scientific and rational pursuits, so an inability to reflexively question rational thought and hold it as sacred is also dangerous in my opinion.

That you say that something that is not in accord with science is anti-philosophical, for example, is a little bit extreme, in my view.

It assumes that to be philosophical is inherently good, which is a claim that I do not take for granted. Once empirical data reveal something, as human beings we automatically interpret, and therefore project ourselves onto it, even if its on a very sophisticated level.

I do not think it is likely that we are capable of disinterestedly absorbing empirical evidence and using it with pure epistemologicaly defensible accuracy.

I still think it is important to take empirical investigation seriously. Just that we should still be humble in doing so.

The thing about the Matrix (and computer consciousness) is that, essentially, who I am (and my subjective experiences) would be reducible to CPU(s). Which is to say that who I am (and my subjective experiences) is essentially a series of switching operations- switching operations abc is the pain of stubbing my toe, switching operations xyz is the experience of seeing a beautiful sunrise, cde is the taste of a peach, etc. That, to me, is an absurdity.

That you say that something that is not in accord with science is anti-philosophical, for example, is a little bit extreme, in my view.
— SatmBopd

No, it's basic logic. It's called a disregard for known science fallacy, it's part of basic intro philosophy training in academia.

when people aren't informed by what the empirical observations have to reveal on the subject.

the science that is present needs to be assessed by philosophers.

Philosophical/ inquisitive thinking created logic and science, as well as morality, monotheism, and untold numbers of other ideas and frameworks of understanding.

To then say that disregarding science is anti-philosophical, as I understand it, is to assert that of the creations of philosophical/ inquisitive thinking, science and logic are not only the most important, but that the others just aren't important at all, at least unless they consult logic and science first.

I just think that this is a very substantial claim.

I don't really know what it would have been like to live before then, but I cannot just take it for granted that the human condition was just categorically more disconnected from "knowledge" or whatever else important is to be gained from science, at least not without a rigorous historical investigation, and even then I can't be 100% sure without having lived there.

Do decide on a victor, or champion among the children of philosophical investigation is to end it in my opinion. I think it would be best for humanity to keep our minds open to new possibilities, better than science, better than knowledge and truth. Science basically gives us inventions, and new trivia, which wile solving some problems also opens up untold new questions. I just think we should stay on our toes, and not get overly comfortable or reliant upon a specific framework of understanding, even if it is as useful as logic or science.

You know how that would go, even if they were informed of such reveals: they would still want to know what the observations alone can’t tell them. Which is.....how exactly does that work? I see this stimulus, then I see this display corresponding to it. What happened in between?

Wonder what the scientists think about that. Is the philosopher qualified to assess the reveals of empirical science, or merely the credibility of the logic presupposed by them?

all of you are absolutely entitled to your own personal opinions

what I cannot permit to pass, intellectually, is the wholesale disregard of the entire corpus of neuroscientific research that has provided us ...

"Frontiers in Cellular Neuroscience, 2019 meta-analysis"

The human brain is a fascinating contraption, even so.
— Mww

It's only the coolest thing since Cartesian machine ghosts.

I think that our emotions and irrational tenancies can sneak their way into even the most diligent and professional scientific and rational pursuits, so an inability to reflexively question rational thought and hold it as sacred is also dangerous in my opinion.
— SatmBopd

100%, but this is overwhelmingly supported across hundreds of experiments.

Thank you for granting us this right! :grin:

Well, this sounds a little too stern ...
But ... whom are you referring to? Who is disregarding neuroscience "wholesale"? That would be quite absurd.

How can there be a research on something that it is so difficult that one cannot even present any definition? In other words, how can a whole research be based on something that cannot be defined?

How can one talk about "levels" of something that they cannot even define?

What? Network? Do they talk about Neural Networks in the field of Artificial Intelligence? And this, again, about something that they cannot even define?

But as you can see from the above, these guys are not even able to present a decent paper, i.e., one that is coherent and makes sense. Concepts! Science dealing with concepts, and particularly, with things that it cannot define? This is quite absurd.

That is why I say that Science should only deal with things that it knows and handles well: physical things. It should not enter and get involved in fields that are of a non-physical nature. It is out of its jurisdiction. The tools and methods it uses do not apply there. Simple as that. The above case is a good example.

Garret, I suggest that you leave the subject of "consciousness" to philosophy. Which, anyway, is what TPF is all about! :smile:

In the past you have characterized emotions as though they were the opposite of rationality. I’m wondering whether you would agree with the predictive coding model of emotion, considered by many psychologists to be the among the most promising neuroscientific theories of emotion.

You all need to catch up,

I don't. I actually know how the brain functions. And let me tell you, it's more than matter in motion.

You must shed the blinkers and prejudices though. If you value empricism and evidence you would see material is an emergent property. Your prejudicial blinkers prevent you though from seeing the evidence.

Considering your 1300 posts in one month you seem to be in a manic mind state, like euphoric missionaries were when bringing the gospel truth to the ignorant pagans in the new world. Transforming reality into a scientific materialistic view, devoid of that which it tries to explain in the first place is means that this approach is incapable of explaining consciousness. It can only describe consciousness, meaning it can tell if it's present in a system of particles interacting with the world around it.

And you all appear as Pharisees condemning wlhat you don't like to hear,

Who says I don't like to hear it? I'm very interested in the physical worldview. I got a nice theory about elementary particles, cosmological genesis, creatures arising in it, and about the brain. It misses a thing though. I have proof and evidence of what is missing but you don't accept that as proof or call it an epiphenomenon or emergent property.

I don't know what you are talking about.

The divine magic inside of matter. The constant divinity running around in our brains like millions parallel mini lightings on the neuron pathways on paths of least resistence.

Physical charge!

Cut out the heart and the brain dies. Therefore, we're just hearts.

Yeah, neuroscience and sociopathy have got to be closely linked. It amounts to emotional slavery.

"just"

You can't just explain the empirical nature of a body, though. The brain included, of course, but it seems less obvious that it's abstract.

The brain controls the heart.

Their charges. All massive particles comes from massless particles. They posses two or three kinds of charge, which couple them to intermediate virtual condensates to interact with other massless basics. I will not go deeper into this (it's not a physics site), but the true nature of charge is unknown. Our brain gives us, as the bodies we are, a means to consciously exist in the world, which is constantly projected into our inner world by the senses of our body.

when I was a Christian devotee

The beating of the heart is autonomous.

Ah, that explains it.

It wasn't an insult. Your being a fervent believer in Christianity explains your current status as fervent believer in what you think neuroscience has to show us. Proselytizing mindsets don't seem to change, but at most shift from one crusade to another: I've seen this phenomenon so many times.

I accept everything you write and all the links you gave. I mean, those things are going on. But I don't think it's the whole story.

You should have led with that.

I did. I wrote many times that it's what inside the material you refer to that counts. We are not our brain but our body, in between what's outside of us and inside of us.

I have no argument with the results of neuroscience, as far as they go.

That'd be an appropriate comment if I had insulted you.

Well, your speculation failed to be in accord with the facts. If you felt insulted that would be a different thing, but that would not be a matter of speculation.

You've lost me then: what were you not speculating about?

The IIT's two major proponents, Koch and Tononi have both come out as panpsychists of a kind. They think that inanimate systems are conscious, for example simple molecules, atoms and thermostats.

Where do you stand on multiple realisability? That gets you out of the brain doesn't it?

But you cited the IIT as one of your respectable theories that shows consciousness only occurs in brains. But the IIT is expressly an panpsychic theory. It attributed consciousness to any system at all that integrates information. Have you blundered here? Or have I misunderstood you?

Functionalism of any kind suggests that any system that can replicate the function of a system we know (or believe) is conscious, is also conscious. So a faithful brain-simulator would be conscious like a brain, no?

One topic that denizens of TPF seem to be under the impression that empirical research has left the door open for the discussion of philosophers to "speculate" about.

One example of that division of labor is Albert Einstein

Instead, the role of Philosophy is not to reveal the structure of Reality, but to dissect our subjective beliefs-about and mental-models-of Reality. Mind-excavating Philosophers ask the hard questions -- e.g. about unknown-unknowns -- then speculate on possible answers, but ultimately leave the pragmatic spade-work to lab-laborers.

Moreover, I would caution anyone cognizant of the history of science from making "unequivocal" assertions. When scientists resort to exasperated use of such absolute categorical declarations, it's usually in cases of harsh political backlash, as in Global Warming. But, this is not a political forum, so the hyperbole is unnecessary. You won't convince anyone here by shouting "you're a pseudo-scientist, if you don't agree with my unequivocal worldview".

The brain controls the heart; the heart controls the brain. Funny, the anus is the first thing to develop, so in a chicken or egg scenario. Sorry dude, our entire bodies are one codependent organism. We're not "just" brains.

One topic that denizens of TPF seem to be under the impression that empirical research has left the door open for the discussion of philosophers to "speculate" about. This would be the topic of consciousness, and the nature of its presence here on Earth, and in the human race.

No. It's actually that you have completely ignored the very nature of empiricism and how the way things are observed influences how we think about brains and their accompanying conscious.

In the other thread I mentioned that neuroscience an QM need work together to provide a better explanation of consciousness, but you called that unscientific and woo mysticism, and then continued to berate others, so excuse me if I don't think you're intellectually honest enough to engage in this type of conversation.

IIT is a functional theory, but is having some issues with falsification at the moment. Apart from that, it's very sound.

I read Christof Koch's book about IIT, and in my judgement it is a complete non-starter!

Brains don't work by processing information, they work by ion exchanges at synapses and that sort of thing.

Information is observer-dependent, in the sense that money and marriage are observer-dependent. Something is only money, marriage or information because we say so.

Ion exchanges and that sort of thing are observer-independent, in the sense that mountains, metals and molecules are observer-independent.

So, from what I can gather, the actual theoretical description of how the conscious process works is, in fact, sound, and accepted as a genuine theory in the field.

Information processing is not something that is disputed by researchers.

Ion exchanges and that sort of thing are observer-independent, in the sense that mountains, metals and molecules are observer-independent. — Daemon


Yes, but it is the "observer" part that is important here. An observe has to have something to observe that can be computed in the mind in a manner that is both interpretable, as well as accurate in its representation. It wouldn't make sense to be seeing a mountain, when such is actually a table, right?

Which field? And what does "accepted as a genuine theory" amount to? Is it still a "genuine theory" if it's demonstrably false?

Similarly, a brain works through electrochemical processes, and suchlike, and when you've described the brain in those terms, again, there isn't anything for "information" to do.

Your response here is not relevant to my point.

Cognitive Neuroscience? And, it isn't demonstrably false, it's one of the leading theories.

Do you think that the leading theories can't be false?

Similarly, a brain works through electrochemical processes, and suchlike, and when you've described the brain in those terms, again, there isn't anything for "information" to do. — Daemon


Right, and that's really the direction they're going in now, especially in the branch of computational neuroscience, specifically.

I don't see how that can be. For the same reason the brain doesn't work through "information", it doesn't work through "computation" either. And neither does a computer.

That was my point about the observer-dependence of computation and the observer-independence of brain processes and consciousness.

Consciousness can't be produced by something that only exists because we say so.

You see, I've discussed this issue with numerous people on this sight, and nobody has been able to clearly articulate to me what they think consciousness is

I've said a few times that it are not the physical processes situated in the interest me "brainy" world, un-untieably connected with us and the physical world, that explain consciousness, but, rather, the contents of those processes that lay at base of consciousness.

Consciousness can't be produced by something that only exists because we say so.

the brain doesn't work through "information"

Consciousness can't be produced by something that only exists because we say so. — Daemon


This assertion is going to need some support.

the brain doesn't work through "information" — Daemon


This assertion is going to need some support.

"The optic nerve carries sensory nerve impulses from the more than one million ganglion cells of the retina toward the visual centres in the brain. The vast majority of optic nerve fibres convey information regarding central vision. Encyclopedia Britannica"

Other animals, such as chimpanzees, were conscious before there was anybody around capable of saying anything at all.

As a concrete example, take the optic nerve. "The optic nerve carries sensory nerve impulses from the more than one million ganglion cells of the retina toward the visual centres in the brain. The vast majority of optic nerve fibres convey information regarding central vision. Encyclopedia Britannica"

Now suppose you're a scientist looking at the optic nerve. You are able to identify those nerve impulses. But you can't identify "information" in addition to the impulses.

But I don't think "We Are Our Brain" (book). I think the brain helps us.

But still... The experience is not explained.

It's just, the data that has been gathered is currently indicating the opposite

I get that, but gaps in knowledge are not arguments against what the data currently indicate, nor is it an argument for the position that you are trying to argue. That's an argument from ignorance, and it is merely an attempt to negate an assertion through a lack of knowledge that the evidence implies, but cannot verify as if yet

It's not about gaps, it's about lack.

Point is, the data you refer to can't indicate what I conjecture to exist. You can call that a dark tower lord fantasy, but the conjectured internal is very real, though non-explicable. Well... a scream explains what I mean.

That's a problem with your argument, not mine.

Again, I accept your position, I just need to figure out how it can be empirically validated for my to adopt it. That's it.

Acknowledge, not granting.

for years people have been trying to pin down what structure(s) actually produces consciousness

They do define it. Just not in terms that align with traditional views on the subject.

What? Network? Do they talk about Neural Networks in the field of Artificial Intelligence? And this, again, about something that they cannot even define?
— Alkis Piskas
Qualify these questions, they don't make sense to me.

This is exactly what I was talking about: How can one be concerned about the structure, etc. of something if one cannot define this something or even know what this something is? One can talk about the structure of DNA because one knows what DNA is. If one had no idea what DNA is, could one talk about how it functions? It's totally absurd.

OK, but where? One shouldn't have to read and read and read down the article to find out how these guys define "consciousness", what does it mean to them, etc. Because maybe they talk about a (totally) different thing than what "consciousness" traditionally and generally means. In fact, in such a case they should better used another term. Same or different term, a disciplined mind --esp. a scientific one-- defines that term before starting to talk about it so that the reader know what he is talking about!

The title of the paper is "Consciousness: New Concepts and Neural Networks". If you look the term "Neural Network" in tthe Web, you will see that it is a very known AI (Artifical Intelligence) term: "Artificial neural networks (ANNs)". And they apply that to "the network of consciousness". And again, I ask, how can they talk about a network of consciousness if they cannot --or do not-- define what conciousness is. My reasoning is clear, simple and straight down the line.

Well, I will not annoy you anymore with my remarks on your topic. Maybe some day you realize what's going on with science and consciousmness. I might as well do the same, and get a new perspective on the subject., Let's see! :smile:

you will see that it is a very known AI (Artifical Intelligence) term: "Artificial neural networks (ANNs)

Considering the attempt to empirically validate it, it will be advantageous to neuroscience. For example, in the field of trying to understand the conscious aspect of vision or hearing, and the associated neurological processes, it can offer valuable knowledge which might even be a priori to experimental verification (or falsification, naturally). But such is the case in most empirical or theoretical sciences.

Again, I accept your position, I just need to figure out how it can be empirically validated for my to adopt it.

Thank you for accepting my position. That's all you needed to do. You don't have to adopt it!

Now that looks an interesting article. Thanks for the link. How did you find that? Just Googling? (Goggling?)

A weird experience, involving many processes. What happens, and does that explain the experience?

No, the brain has to keep computing whatever it computes as data to build coherent networks of correspondence.

I don't think the brain computes like a computer. It "resonates" with the physical world and can do so in virtual all circumstances (and independently in dreams, thinking, or fantasies). The circumstances leave traces and memories. Learning. Strengthened connections are made. Or present at birth already (a blank mind is an illusion). From birth to death new structures arise, backfiring and shaping reality. While being conscious.

Even if consciousness reduces to neuroscience, what has that proved? All you have done is reduce one complex phenomenon to another one. That doesn't prove one is more fundamental than the other. If anything, the opposite.

You are implying that neuroscience is productive of consciousness. The reverse may very well be true. It's a question of what perspective you choose. I think that form has the more compelling argument.

Why should it be more fundamental than the biochemical level that facilitated it?

It's an arbitrary dividing line in the direction between reduction and complexification.

There are social phenomena which are as real as consciousness, but those cannot be derived from neuroscience.

Wakefulness and alertness are what fundamentally characterize basic conscious operation, according to modern science.

According to certain scientists working in certain fields, perhaps. Others would regard experience as the starting point of consciousness. Feeling something like heat or a pinprick, or seeing or hearing something.

Can you tell us what the Global Workspace Model has to say about that?

Or are social phenomena responsible for the evolution of the physical structures? There is no way you can decisively prove the direction of influence, because the actions of organisms decidedly do influence their subsequent evolution.

Are subatomic particles (whose behaviour is much more stochastic) more real than atoms? Most people would think not. Baryonic matter is the prototype of substantial reality.

This isn't relevant to complex systems characterized by numerous permutations of matter all operating to generate consciousness and conceptuaization. Unless we're willing to discuss it from its appropriate level, I'm afraid I'm going to have to dismiss your line of inquiry

I agree. Your level of analysis is arbitrary, relative to the scope of your claims

I think the neuroscience field uses terms like "data," and "computes," to describe the process in ways that we can linguistically understand.

So, no that's just not what's going on. I mean, you might have some scientists that say such things, but that's not what most scientists say at all about the subject.

I have never encountered so many narcissists.

Yes, of course, it is a Category Error because this is a philosophy forum. As if philosophical training isn't science intensive and focused. Unreal.

Complete nonsense. Albert Einstein was an open point of skepticism within the scientific strata until.... guess when.... Empirical assessment validated his claims.

Disregarding Known Science

Maybe. I was going for pure rational thought, as that which everybody does, or the manifest appearance of a purely rational thinking subject, as that which everybody seems to be, and that having ethical decision-making subsumed under it, so.....

Now that neurologists know what consciousness is, where it is, and how it is, I guess it won’t be long before they go into into a lab and create one.

Let’s see: One part living tissue, two parts electricity, and a dash of physical elements. Heat it up for a couple billion years and let it cool to 98 degrees. Yup that should do it.

Let’s see: One part living tissue, two parts electricity, and a dash of physical elements. Heat it up for a couple billion years and let it cool to 98 degrees. Yup that should do it

There you go again, slandering your fellow "denizens". Is that your idea of a philosophical argument?

So, you place Scientists & Philosophers into the same professional category? Do you make no distinction? Do you hold philosophers to the same standards of evidence as scientists? Is Psychology a scientific endeavor, even though it produces no empirical results of its own? Do you think we are supposed to be doing Science on this forum? Do you have formal training as a Scientist or Philosopher?

As usual, you missed the point. Did Einstein "validate" his own "claims". How do you define the job of a philosopher? Are we doing science on this forum? Like Einstein, I am skeptical of those who make knowledge claims of Incontrovertible Truth. Unlike wise old Albert, I am not skeptical of Quantum Entanglement . . . are you?

You make such broad general allegations as-if Science is a canonical Bible, but you don't cite book, chapter & verse. Can you be more specific about a particular "unequivocal" Fact of Science that I've "disregarded". What evidence has been "Suppressed". Do you think the general consensus of science is Final canonical Truth. Where is it written . . . . . . ?

The conclusion is that there are not absolute final truths,

I think some in the neuroscience field use terms like data and computation because they mistakenly believe that's how the brain works. It's the same conceptual error as with the term "information".

Others are aware that the terms are being used metaphorically, heuristically.

Gosh! I recently read a fascinating book, The Idea of the Brain, The Past and Future of Neuroscience, by Matthew Cobb. The modern scientists Cobb discusses seemed to be talking about many different aspects of consciousness, not just the wakefulness and attention you are focused on.

I'm afraid Cobb isn't too impressed by Global Workspace Theory or Integrated Information Theory though. He says neither is widely accepted!

He quotes French neuroscientist Stanislas Dehaene, who has followed on from the ideas of Bernard Baars in developing global neuronal workspace theory: "consciousness is nothing but the flexible circulation of information within a dense switchboard of cortical neurons."

As Cobb comments, '"nothing but" is doing a lot of work in that sentence, and the theory does not explain why flexible and dense circulation of information causes consciousness to pop up.'

On ITT Cobb says "Again, the link between consciousness and the chosen focus of the theory - in this case integration of information - is unclear.

I actually wouldn't find this to be suprising to found out is quite literally the case

I'm afraid Cobb isn't too impressed by Global Workspace Theory or Integrated Information Theory though. He says neither is widely accepted!
— Daemon

This is simply not the case. Did you read the paper I sent you? It's the leading theory.

Do you have an example of integrated information in the brain?

If you know how the brain works you see that there is no computation at all in the brain. Even when you mentally perform a calculation. Computation and processing data is a human invention. Evidence on my side here.

No

And there is no explanation what it actually is.

Never.

But such a process is not an explanation for the smell, in the sense that it tells what a smell is. Only the smell experience can tell you that. And there is no explanation what it actually is.

:up:

Such a claim is necessarily unfalsifiable and hence is not a scientific claim at all (pace Popper).

What's between you and falsifiability?

However, that does not negate the falsifiable science that has been done, which has revealed the important elements of consciousness I have expounded upon here.

then we should be prepared to drop the notion of moral responsibility and deserved punishment, as opposed to necessary restraint, altogether.

This is still something that doesn't makes. Moral culpability comes from the fact that we can conceptualize the nature of our actions, inhibit or initiate behavior, refine behavior, and make choices. It does not matter if it is natural. All is not permitted if we are naturally created.

What I have found missing form your account and the papers you've linked any coherent and convincing account of how to make a principled distinction between an inexorably unfolding neural process and any other causal process.

Also, I have never encountered a coherent and convincing account of how our normal notion (the one our legal system and the common moral judgements of people are based upon) of moral responsibility could be compatible with the idea that we cannot in any sense really be causa sui moral agents.

Now maybe we cannot help thinking in terms of moral responsibility and deserved punishment because that is way the brain (mind) has co-evolved with culture, and the needs of communities, but if determinism is the case then it would seem to follow that thinking that way is a kind of necessary illusion.

Of course all is not permitted in any case just because societies cannot permit any and all behavior.

I’m all for neuroscience, but any thing that can be described as conscious are invariably more than brains and nervous systems. One can point to a conscious man’s toe and still be pointing to the source of “consciousness”, which is the conscious being itself.

Cheers. I may well have misunderstood you to be claiming more than you were.

Is there any evidence that other organs contribute to the totality of consciousness, like the heart for instance? This seems to be an accepted idea in certain eastern schools of thought.

Consciousness is distinguished by wakefulness and attention. That's specifically how they define it in neuroscience

The brain is no digital computer. It reflects or recreates analogous. Like a planetarium representing the solar system.

I just need some more support from you guys, that's all.

However, in recent times, many different opinions have been proposed. For example, some researchers believe that consciousness is aroused in the frontal region of the brain, including the prefrontal and central anterior cortex. Others believe that consciousness is created in areas of the hindbrain, including the occipital/parietal and central posterior regions of the brain (Koch et al., 2016; Seth, 2018). Questions that should be asked include: where is the material basis of consciousness? The physical basis of consciousness is the most important internal factor of consciousness.

Important Component of Consciousness: Wakefulness

The physical basis of consciousness is the most important internal factor of consciousness.

What I have found missing from your account and from the papers you've linked is any coherent and convincing account of how to make a principled ontological distinction between an inexorably unfolding neural process and any other causal process.

So, the toe, and not the brain, produces consciousness?

Important Component of Consciousness: Wakefulness

"The important internal factor" and (as?) "the physical basis". That's exactly what it isn't.

Painting has to do with paint and colors (physical) , but the art of painting cannot be defined or studied based on them. The elements that mainly define and constitute the art of painting are not physical in nature.

Philosophy that dismisses science is not philosophy, it is casuistry.

Brains are not conscious, are not in a state of being conscious, and therefore do not produce consciousness.

Neuroscience --and Science in general-- tries to describe consciousness as if Otology were trying to describe music (art) in terms of sounds (vibrations).

I do agree with your point that brains don't operate in isolation, but the brain is particularly significant where consciousness is concerned. Do you think, for the present discussion, it matters whether we talk about the brain producing consciousness (leaving out the mention of the rest of the body, the appropriate living environment, etc.)?

Which isn't to say neuroscience is completely useless.

Well if they're happy with that....

I would agree with "let them be happy", only that Science pervades today the world --at least the Western one-- and is spreading a totally materialistic view of life and Man, at the expense of the spiritual part of the human beings, with disastrous effects for the human mind and soul, something I think we are all witnessing today. One has only to look at the growing statistics of violence, crime, suicide, etc.

I see neuroscience as attempting to describe the biological mechanisms that produce and govern aspects of consciousness.

I think you should be targeting philosophical materialists, cognitive scientists and computationalists.

I would agree with "let them be happy", only that Science pervades today the world --at least the Western one-- and scientists --esp. hardcore ones-- are spreading a totally materialistic view of life and Man, at the expense of the spiritual part of the human beings, with disastrous effects for the human mind and soul, something I think we are all witnessing today. One has only to look at the growing statistics of violence, crime, suicide, etc

Pronouncing that you have certitude that consciousness has been solved because you read the proof on the Internet is only you telling everyone that your reading skills are infallible and your judgment of evidence is infallible.

Your unconditional faith in an infallible entity (science + sophistry = sciphistry) is touching. But it turns a philosophical forum into a mudslinging contest. Not surprisingly, your churlish clods memetically miss their mark. (that's a philosophical speculation, not a scientific fact)

You've made your point though : Sciphistry can lick Philosophy in a childish power struggle. So, if there's any dominance-dissing in this thread, its the subordination of Philosophy under the jackboot heel of Sciphistry (allegations without evidence). This thread is a silly cyberspace analogue to the Ukraine invasion. (again, a top-of-the-head conjecture, not a validated truth-claim)

It's been fun trading insults with you, But I prefer to waste my time actually engaging in intellectual philosophical dialogue, instead of below-the-belt who-hit-who harangues. Have a nice day

hen in the second part of the paper they talk about GWT, IIT and quantum theories of consciousness, in a completely unscientific way (there isn't any evidence to support those theories).

I believe the statistics show a general downward trend in violence, and a general improvement in the human condition over recent history brought about by reason, science and humanism.

Nothing called “consciousness” comes from the brain.

Just wanted to chime in and say "Well done". I believe people who still think consciousness does not come from the brain are like flat earthers. People need to understand this is not up for rational debate anymore.

The conscious being itself produces “consciousness”.

So Garrett, you asked for support for my assertion that the brain doesn't work through "information", and I provided it. Dehaene, defending Global Workspace Theory, says that "consciousness is nothing but the flexible circulation of information within a dense switchboard of cortical neurons".

And as Cobb observes, Global Workspace Theory does not explain why flexible circulation of information causes consciousness to pop up.

Now me, I think it's stuff like electrochemical impulses and wavelike interactions between populations of neurons that cause and modify consciousness. And not "information". I don't think GWT explains anything.

Do you have any response?

I really don't undestand ... Why do you defend neuroscience so persistently in the matter of consiousness ... What it's for you? And esp. why are you doing that in here? Are you here to promote Science or Philosophy?

Not sure there can ever be a convincing account, when the disparity between what the brain is doing (physics) is on one hand, and what the brain has done (metaphysics), is on the other.

They even consider it as a subject matter of --or belonging to-- Neuroscience! And it's not only them: the whole scientific community (except a few cases) shares the same view.

Nothing called “consciousness” comes from the brain.

have a claim of where consciousness comes from, and have the entirety of neuroscience to back me up. What's your alternative?

Of course it comes from the brain. Ever seen a person get knocked out by hitting their head? How do you think that happens? Barring all the massive evidence at this point in scientific discovery, where does it come from then? I have a claim of where consciousness comes from, and have the entirety of neuroscience to back me up. What's your alternative?

First, you did pronounce that consciousness is solved, which was truly comical.

You answered my long reply in seconds.

You’re a bigmouth who acts like a drunk.

is like a radio receiver; that it in some sense receives consciousness, doesn't produce it. Who's right? Who knows and how could the 'fact of the matter' ever be demonstrated?

Translation: You have never heard of a physical seat of an immaterial power before, and you can’t get yourself to admit it in public.

Have another beer and get even more pissed off. That’s the measure of your worth.

There's no evidence of this kind of assumption, and all the evidence that does exist suggest mine, and philosophim's position.

I don't have the time to read all those. As I said you really should produce the argument yourself, or at least point to the passages in those papers which make the argument. Or tell me just how we should expect the experimental findings to differ if consciousness was received by, rather than produced in, the brain.

What evidence actually suggests that the brain produces rather than receives consciousness?

GT is right on this account : wild speculation does not supersede testable science. You gotta bring more than "here there be monsters".

The knee-jerk horror that philosophy majors harbor for any argument connecting consciousness and the brain needs explaining. One possibility is that it is taught at university, and to pass their courses, the suggestible young students drink the Kool-aid without question. Meanwhile, the rest of the world goes on blissfully believing in : using medicine to help with depression and ADHD, wearing bike helmets to prevent concussions, brain-death being true death, and the like.

I know you philosophy majors hate science, but come on. Receives from where? And why can't any of us remember our thoughts before the brain received them?

GT is right on this account : wild speculation does not supersede testable science. You gotta bring more than "here there be monsters".

Meanwhile, the rest of the world goes on blissfully believing in : using medicine to help with depression and ADHD, wearing bike helmets to prevent concussions, brain-death being true death, and the like.

This view is "hammered" into people from early age on

Science is nice, but it's only knowledge. About the external side of material reality.

it [technology] will never, if sophisticated enough, be indistinguishable from magic, for the magic lies within

I believe the statistics show a general downward trend in violence, and a general improvement in the human condition over recent history

I wonder if you could tell me what it is that your soul or spirit actually does?

I don't see that in the paper you refer to AP

They aren't talking about art or music appreciation, they are talking about "wakefulness"

What does "AP" stand for?

Ethics, unequivocally.

I've got a body that can do things like pushing the keys on the piano

I don't see that in the paper you refer to AP

Alkis Piskas.

Do you mean that your body plays piano automatically, like a robot? :smile:
What is that directs it, not just to play (i.e. tap on the keys), but also what to play and how to play it, how to express a melody, how to compose a music piece ... ?

My mind, as I mentioned.

I have asked and received no answer to the question as to how the experimental results would be expected to look any different if the brain was a receiver of consciousness rather than a producer of consciousness.

As to your other question "And why can't any of us remember our thoughts before the brain received them?", why would we remember thoughts which we had not received, and thus had not had yet?

Physicalism is equally speculative, even if it might seem more plausible due to our inbuilt modernist biases, and I am sure there are very good neuroscientists out there who are devout Christians, or Buddhists, or Muslims and so on; and I am sure their work is not compromised by their metaphysical beliefs.

I think you may be falling into the trap of adopting the Cartesian categorisation of elements of existence.

But how does that account for your soul?

Do you have an example of integrated information in the brain?
— EugeneW

No.

Yep, that's exactly my point. And it is the brain doing so, as far the evidence is concerned. You have something that suggest otherwise, present it. I'm not here to discuss opinions.

So is it brains that produce consciousness or consciousness that produce brains?

I have asked and received no answer to the question as to how the experimental results would be expected to look any different if the brain was a receiver of consciousness rather than a producer of consciousness.
— Janus

And how, exactly, does the brain "receive" consciousness? Is there any indication of an antenna?

I think that all accounts, all kinds of accounts, are reliant for their coherence on their contexts and the grounding presuppositions.....

Of course not. No one on this forum has.

I think that we do get accurate information about the world via consciousness

Of course it comes from the brain. Ever seen a person get knocked out by hitting their head? How do you think that happens? Barring all the massive evidence at this point in scientific discovery, where does it come from then? I have a claim of where consciousness comes from, and have the entirety of neuroscience to back me up. What's your alternative?

This is some 19th century made-up mystical mumbo-jumbo (he mentions souls :roll: )

I would even go so far as to declare, saying that philosophy, and he who merely poses as a philosopher, rejects empirically grounded cognitive science with respect to brain operation and demonstrable functionality, is a case of pathological stupidity.

.....speculatively projected metaphysical or ontological implications of empirically grounded cognitive science are another matter altogether.....

As a partial answer to one of my questions, you admitted that no thoughts occur until "picked up" by the brain. So doesn't that make consciousness a product of brain?

Ahhhh....I see. What you meant by grounding presupposition? I was going there myself, with “the philosophical admissions of the cognitive scientist himself”.

Call it....close enough?

Still, it's not a valid alternative and easily dismissed. No antenna, no reason for evolution to produce receiver-brains

By the way, do you have a position to claim? Or are you just a skeptic?

Then you have overlooked me.

Fuck off. Come back when you want to produce an argument.

My point was only that a scientist could start either from the presupposition that the brain produces consciousness, or that it receives consciousness, and perform exactly all the same experiments as are being done in neuroscience.

I’ve seen people knocked out, but never a brain knocked out. People are far more than brains.

“Consciousness” is a silly concept, anyways. Nothing called “consciousness” moves from one area to another, so saying that it “comes from” the brain is nonsensical. Neither is it “produced” by the brain, as if the brain was a qualia factory.

As I see it, phenomenology brackets the external world for methodological reasons and science brackets the internal world for methodological reasons. Neither are justified in making ontological claims that are beyond the ambit of their methodologies.

It's fascinating how so many of you want to escape from the world. I suggested to GT in an earlier post that it is probably due to egotism. One thinks, "My mind is so special, so important. How can it be limited to a hunk of meat?"

Unequivocally? I cant't even think about how ethics get involved here ...
Do you want to give justice to Neuroscience in general?

So is it brains that produce consciousness or consciousness that produce brains? And that is only part of the question. The other part of the question is how does one "produce" the other? What exactly is meant by "produce" in this context?

Phenomenology is not an idealism or subjectivism , a privileging of mind over matter. It rejects both sides of this dualism in favor of a radical interaction.

Does it actually 'reject' them as false, or is it the case that the phenomenological project explores other avenues?

Even if I'm totally certain that my brain cells have absolutely nothing to do with ethics, I can see your point.

The discussion in the Reductionism and the Hierarchy of Scale thread makes it clear why the premise of this thread and reductionism in general is baloney.

No, it hsn't so far. Again, you're going to have to contend with the scientific research before you get to make that kind of claim, which you haven't done.

I suggest other participants in this discussion take a look and decide for themselves.

How?" is still a mystery, but the leading theory is that all structures of the brain operate in a complex network of unparralleled sophistiction. By produce, I mean emit, generate, or otherwise enable. Much like eyesight is produced by the brain, so too is consciousness

No one knows how, but God forbid anyone disagree that it's been proven to.

Yeah, but how do you explain the difference between someone being knocked out and someone being awake? Where is the difference? You might point the person's behavior, but I can act like I'm knocked out so how do you tell the difference between someone acting like they are knocked out and someone who is actually knocked out? And how would the person that goes from being awake, to knocked out to awake again describe the difference, and would there be a discrepancy between the two descriptions (yours and theirs), and if so why? If we can act, or lie with our actions, then there must be some difference between our behaviors and what we are presently aware (conscious) of.

I agree with everything except the notion that consciousness is a silly concept. How do you explain dreams, or the fact that I can act in some way that is contrary to my present knowledge?

Descriptive terms serve to describe things, but they aren’t themselves things, substances, or forces, and they shouldn’t be treated as such in any careful language.

When speaking about and analyzing things that exist, the human organism exists. This human organism is what we study and analyze to better understand his activity. “Consciousness”, however, doesn’t exist, and we should abandon the term.

Yes, you not knowing how the brain produces consciousness yet insisting everyone believe it does is a strawman.

I suggest other participants in this discussion take a look and decide for themselves

I would argue that phenomenology brackets both the external and the internal world as understood according to scientific naturalism, and it does so for ontological reasons, which are used to justify it’s methodology. The notion of phenomenology as introspection is a common but mistaken assumption.

Actually.....having thought about it overnight......if consciousness is external, then it affects the brain. If consciousness is internal, the brain is its cause but at the same time, only affects itself........

......which makes the brain affected either way, and affects being that upon which experiments are presupposed.....

(Enter silly little lightbulb thingy here)

He is pointing to the way in which even pinning down aspects of the mind to a physical body and brain rests on how the body itself is seen, with the underlying question of what is body and mind exactly?

Right, so if consciousness is thought as fundamental then the brain and its sensual body is a structure of consciousness, designed by consciousness to focus itself in order to experience otherness. Something like that, anyhow...

It's assumption all the way down, when it comes to (traditional) metaphysics, that is any absolutized claim about the nature of reality. Physicalism and idealism are two such claims.

so if consciousness is thought as fundamental then the brain and its sensual body is a structure of consciousness, designed by consciousness to focus itself in order to experience otherness.

It's assumption all the way down, when it comes to (traditional) metaphysics, that is any absolutized claim about the nature of reality.

Physicalism and idealism are two such claims.

Depending on the chronology of “traditional”. Some metaphysics doesn’t make absolutized claims about the nature of reality, i.e., that there is one necessarily, isn’t a claim about its nature.

Plain ol’ idealism. Idealism in and of itself, re: Berkeley. Ok, sure. Surely not though.....er....you-know-who.

The only scientifically supported assertion (mine) on this thread is not the strawman. Your attempt to claim that I have asserted that I know how consciousness is produced without question is the strawman, and it is pathetic that you keep going with it, even though I have addressed it numerous times in this thread. You're basically just a creepy little troll with no argument, and too much emotion.

The findings of neuroscience are important in science but may not contain all that is known about consciousness because it can describe consciousness but is not consciousness itself.

I saying no more than "it is what it is" (...) seems unimpeachable.

I know you believe that you wrote a reasoned unbiased unemotional post, but you didn’t come close to one.

Anyone with physicalist presuppositions will say that of course it comes from the brain: where else? On the other side those who think consciousness or mind is ontologically fundamental will say that the brain is like a radio receiver; that it in some sense receives consciousness, doesn't produce it. Who's right? Who knows and how could the 'fact of the matter' ever be demonstrated?

I’ve seen people knocked out, but never a brain knocked out. People are far more than brains.

When speaking of qualities or states of a human being, such as consciousness, happiness, sleepiness, etc. we are discussing qualities and states of the organism in its entirety, such as it exists. Since disembodied brains can neither function nor exist on their own—without blood, oxygen, the skeleton, flesh—it’s silly to say a brain can produce a quality that only an entire organism can display.

Describing consciousness is the function of phenomenology.

In fact neuroscience cannot describe consciousness, but only brain function. Describing consciousness is the function of phenomenology.

So, the idea is that science generally brackets (leaves out of consideration) subjective experience and focuses on the objective, while phenomenology generally brackets the objective world and focuses on how we, subjectively, experience ourselves and it, ourselves in it.

If you, as Heidegger does, count phenomenology as ontology then obviously ontology is part of phenomenology. But that is a non-traditional conception of ontology.

From the perspective (and I maintain it is just a perspective) of phenomenology consciousness is prior, just because of its focus on subjective experience. From the perspective of science (and it is also just a perspective) consciousness is not prior, since it never what is being studied, because the subject of study here is simply the objects as they are encountered.

Science is not an ontology either, it is a methodology, as it makes no necessary assumptions about the independent existence of its objects.

But where does phenomenology connect with causality in accounting for consciousness as the phenomena it decides is its subject of study?

"How?" is still a mystery, but the leading theory is that all structures of the brain operate in a complex network of unparralleled sophistiction. By produce, I mean emit, generate, or otherwise enable. Much like eyesight is produced by the brain, so too is consciousness.

Phenomenology doesn’t begin from objective causality, it deconstructs it by grounding it in structures of intentionality, which is is neither objective nor subjective in a traditional sense.

If you unite the eyes and the brain, in this way, you cannot say that it is the brain which produces eyesight, because it cannot be done without the eyes. And if you separate eyes from the brain, then you need to account for how an eye can see without a brain: https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/02/130227183311.htm#:~:text=2-,Eyes%20work%20without%20connection%20to%20brain%3A%20Ectopic%20eyes,without%20natural%20connection%20to%20brain&text=Summary%3A,neural%20connection%20to%20the%20brain.

Either way, you are wrong to say that eyesight is produced by the brain.

The eye is the tool that the brain uses to generate sight. It has no function without the brain.

You speak of 'biological function' and, I am not dismissing biology. However, it is one model and way of seeing reality. To what extent can everything be reduced to this model, which is materialism. I am not advocating idealism as the opposite instead of materialism, but would suggest that reality may be larger than either model.

That is because, ultimately, all these views are models, including neuroscience, and none of these can be viewed as 'absolute reality.' I am not opposed to neuroscience because it is important but to see it as 'the Unequivocal Triumph' may be to put it on a pedestal and see it concretely, in the way 'religious' perspectives were once seen. The findings of neuroscience are important in science but may not contain all that is known about consciousness because it can describe consciousness but is not consciousness itself.

Did you read the article, and see how the experiments showed the tool to function without the brain?

"Eyes and other sensory organs probably evolved before the brain: There is no need for an information-processing organ (brain) before there is information to process.[19] A living example are cubozoan jellyfish that possess eyes comparable to vertebrate and cephalopod camera eyes despite lacking a brain."

those who do not accept his Scientism-based bible-thumping as philosophical arguments.

And all of my proffered "evidence" came from credentialed practitioners of various fields of science

He continued to insist "show me the evidence", yet ignored my many links to quotes by professional scientists supporting my modest comments. He didn't seem to be interested in the opinions of individual scientists. Instead, his absolute authority is capital "S" science -- as-if modern science is a monolithic institution like the Catholic Church, with canonical scriptures.

So, I began to reflect his bullying tactics back at him. And he didn't like it at all, e.g. being treated as a naive idiot, ignorant of holy Science. Yet, he made no attempt to justify his own bragging boast of "Unequivocal Triumph" of Science over Philosophy.

Your not paying attention Garrett. The eye does not need the brain, and most likely evolved into existence prior to the brain. Therefore it does not exist as a tool of the brain.

And semiotic on both the biological and sociological levels.

What do you think it means when it clearly states, overtly, "There is no need for an information-processing organ (brain) before there is information to process?"

That's so ludicrous -- the idea that the rest of our bodies are all in service of the brain. How ridiculous.

We are our whole bodies, including, but not limited to, our brain. If, when you refer to yourself as "me" you're referring strictly to your brain, you're a cartoon villain.

The brain and body are ONE, not separate:

It means, that there is no need for an information processing organ (brain), in order for there to be an organ which receives the information (eye). Therefore we can conclude that the organ which receives the information (eye) does not exist as a tool of the organ which processes the information (brain).

Now you're really not making sense. Are my feet a part of my brain?

You seem to have conveniently forgotten how to read now.

We are more than brains. To see just how much more than a brain you are you could subtract the average weight of a human brain from your total weight.

I know enough biology. The body is the “source of consciousness”. The brain is only one of many integral parts to a conscious or unconscious organism.

Now, it's time for you to address even the first topic of the research I've posted, or scram.

Sorry Travers, just like you are uninterested in the truth about the relationship between the eye and the brain, I'm not interested in the research you posted.

And do some research on that eye thing, you're completely clueless about it.

Of course the brain and the body are one: the brain is a part of the body. The body, even the brain, is not located "in the brain", though, and yet, we actually are our entire bodies -- not just our brains.

The research has been done, and referenced above. You are in denial of the facts, because they are incompatible with what you believe. So be it.

not just our brains.

Who's insulting who? I don't even take this conversation seriously -- you've insulted half the people in it!

...the brain controls EVERY aspect of the body...

No, your research agreed with me, not you.

No, your research agreed with me, not you. And I pointed that out to you by quoting it. Did you miss that part? Here, I'll do it again:

"This has never been shown before," says Levin. "No one would have guessed that eyes on the flank of a tadpole could see, especially when wired only to the spinal cord and not the brain." The findings suggest a remarkable plasticity in the brain's ability to incorporate signals from various body regions into behavioral programs that had evolved with a specific and different body plan."

You completely misunderstood your research.

Frontiers in Cellular Neuroscience, 2019 meta-analysis:
https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fncel.2019.00302/full

Research on consciousness has always been difficult. For example, the definition of consciousness is very vague and includes many aspects, such as the disciplines of psychology and philosophy. Thus, there is no definitive conclusion.

At present, consciousness is a very vague concept that lacks a specific and accurate definition

Thousands of years of reflection on the human mind has left us hard-wired with concepts that are intuitive, descriptive, and wildly unscientific. Understanding the mechanisms of the human brain will require much greater definitional precision. But in the end, better definitions will allow us to develop the theoretical constructs—like the periodic table for chemistry or the theory of evolution for biology—that can move neuroscience forward and help us understand how our brains work.

The easy problems of consciousness include those of explaining the following phenomena:
* the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli;
* the integration of information by a cognitive system;
* the reportability of mental states;
* the ability of a system to access its own internal states;
* the focus of attention;
* the deliberate control of behavior;
* the difference between wakefulness and sleep.

(Bennett and Hacker) argue that for some neuroscientists, the brain does all manner of things: it believes (Crick); interprets (Edelman); knows (Blakemore); poses questions to itself (Young); makes decisions (Damasio); contains symbols (Gregory) and represents information (Marr). Implicit in these assertions is a philosophical mistake, insofar as it unreasonably inflates the conception of the 'brain' by assigning to it powers and activities that are normally reserved for sentient beings. It is the degree to which these assertions depart from the norms of linguistic practice that sends up a red flag. The reason for objection is this: it is one thing to suggest on empirical grounds correlations between a subjective, complex whole (say, the activity of deciding and some particular physical part of that capacity, say, neural firings) but there is considerable objection to concluding that the part just is the whole. These claims are not false; rather, they are devoid of sense.

Wittgenstein remarked that it is only of a human being that it makes sense to say “it has sensations; it sees, is blind; hears, is deaf; is conscious or unconscious.” (Philosophical Investigations, § 281). The question whether brains think “is a philosophical question, not a scientific one” (p. 71). To attribute such capacities to brains is to commit what Bennett and Hacker identify as “the mereological fallacy”, that is, the fallacy of attributing to parts of an animal attributes that are properties of the whole being.

Any and All assertions made about the nature of consciousness herein must be supported by some sort of evidence, or they will be dismissed.

Frontiers in Cellular Neuroscience, 2019 meta-analysis:
https://www.frontiersin.org/articles/10.3389/fncel.2019.00302/full
— Garrett Travers

From which:

Research on consciousness has always been difficult. For example, the definition of consciousness is very vague and includes many aspects, such as the disciplines of psychology and philosophy. Thus, there is no definitive conclusion.

From the conclusion of the article:

At present, consciousness is a very vague concept that lacks a specific and accurate definition

From the second source:

Thousands of years of reflection on the human mind has left us hard-wired with concepts that are intuitive, descriptive, and wildly unscientific. Understanding the mechanisms of the human brain will require much greater definitional precision. But in the end, better definitions will allow us to develop the theoretical constructs—like the periodic table for chemistry or the theory of evolution for biology—that can move neuroscience forward and help us understand how our brains work.

So, both the first articles acknowledge that the nature of consciousness is elusive, and in no way claim that it has been found or accounted for. And in any case, they are only addressing what David Chalmers describes as the easy problems, which he gives as:

The easy problems of consciousness include those of explaining the following phenomena:
* the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli;
* the integration of information by a cognitive system;
* the reportability of mental states;
* the ability of a system to access its own internal states;
* the focus of attention;
* the deliberate control of behavior;
* the difference between wakefulness and sleep.


But as for the hard problem, the problem which physicalist accounts can't explain, he says:

The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (What is it like to be a Bat,1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience.
— Chalmers

Plainly neuroscience is an objective discipline. Neuroscience can help remediate those in need of neuroscientific therapy, or help to understand the relationship between functional aspects of conciousness and perfomative acts - in that sense, how the brain operates. But that is cognitive science, and neuroscience, not philosophy as such.

One canonical text on the subject remains the Bennett and Hacker book, The Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, which is staunchly critical of the kind of lumpen reductionism that the OP is advocating. I'll probably never read it in full but the Notre Dame Review provides a useful primer. The main point of their critique centres around the 'mereological fallacy', i.e. the idea that the brain does things. The brain is not itself an agent, and does not, in that sense, do anything, although obviously you need one to act (although not always, it seems.)

(Bennett and Hacker) argue that for some neuroscientists, the brain does all manner of things: it believes (Crick); interprets (Edelman); knows (Blakemore); poses questions to itself (Young); makes decisions (Damasio); contains symbols (Gregory) and represents information (Marr). Implicit in these assertions is a philosophical mistake, insofar as it unreasonably inflates the conception of the 'brain' by assigning to it powers and activities that are normally reserved for sentient beings. It is the degree to which these assertions depart from the norms of linguistic practice that sends up a red flag. The reason for objection is this: it is one thing to suggest on empirical grounds correlations between a subjective, complex whole (say, the activity of deciding and some particular physical part of that capacity, say, neural firings) but there is considerable objection to concluding that the part just is the whole. These claims are not false; rather, they are devoid of sense.

Wittgenstein remarked that it is only of a human being that it makes sense to say “it has sensations; it sees, is blind; hears, is deaf; is conscious or unconscious.” (Philosophical Investigations, § 281). The question whether brains think “is a philosophical question, not a scientific one” (p. 71). To attribute such capacities to brains is to commit what Bennett and Hacker identify as “the mereological fallacy”, that is, the fallacy of attributing to parts of an animal attributes that are properties of the whole being.

I would add to that, that every assertion about 'what is' or 'what is not', relies on judgements which in themselves can never be validated by or found in neuroscientific data. It's one thing to look for the neural correlates of 'attention' or 'wakefulness' - but what could possibly be the meaning of the neural correlate of a judgement? How would you even look for that? You can't stand outside judgement, as every attempt to identify it, is itself a judgement. Judgement is in fact internal to thought, it is part of the operations of the intellect, and is in the province of logic, not that of neuroscience, which nevertheless must assume the validity of judgement in order to even begin.

Any and All assertions made about the nature of consciousness herein must be supported by some sort of evidence, or they will be dismissed.
— Garrett Travers

Yours is the shell-game of dogmatic empiricism - to declare that only evidence of a certain kind, namely, the kind that supports empiricism, is valid! So you're demanding empirical proof of the limitations of empiricism. But none of the sources you quote claim to understand the nature of consciousness in any philosophical sense - in fact they generally will sorround any such ideas with disclaimers and qualifications, or promissory notes of how much progress has been made, or will be made.

So, both the first articles acknowledge that the nature of consciousness is elusive, and in no way claim that it has been found or accounted for. And in any case, they are only addressing what David Chalmers describes as the easy problems, which he gives as:

Plainly neuroscience is an objective discipline. Neuroscience can help remediate those in need of neuroscientific therapy, or help to understand the relationship between functional aspects of conciousness and perfomative acts - in that sense, how the brain operates. But that is cognitive science, and neuroscience, not philosophy as such.

One canonical text on the subject remains the Bennett and Hacker book, The Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience, which is staunchly critical of the kind of lumpen reductionism that the OP is advocating. I'll probably never read it in full but the Notre Dame Review provides a useful primer. The main point of their critique centres around the 'mereological fallacy', i.e. the idea that the brain does things. The brain is not itself an agent, and does not, in that sense, do anything, although obviously you need one to act (although not always, it seems.)

I would add to that, that every assertion about 'what is' or 'what is not', relies on judgements which in themselves can never be validated by or found in neuroscientific data.

Yours is the shell-game of dogmatic empiricism - to declare that only evidence of a certain kind, namely, the kind that supports empiricism, is valid! So you're demanding empirical proof of the limitations of empiricism. But none of the sources you quote claim to understand the nature of consciousness in any philosophical sense - in fact they generally will sorround any such ideas with disclaimers and qualifications, or promissory notes of how much progress has been made, or will be made.

However, what you are overlooking in this articles, although I'm quite pleased you actually addressed them, is the fact that what is NOT a mystery, is that the brain is what is producing what it is that we call consciousness.

You'll need to address the above arguments before we move on.

Except that neither you nor anyone can pronounce what the meaning of 'produced' is here.

I'll leave it at that.

Don't mistake the fact that I can't be bothered arguing with you, means that I think you've made anything like a 'valid point' - only that you will never understand my criticisms, so any further wrangling will be a simple waste of time.

You'll need to address the above arguments before we move on.

every assertion about 'what is' or 'what is not', relies on judgements which in themselves can never be validated by or found in neuroscientific data.

However, there are other regions of the brain that play essential roles in making decisions, but their exact mechanisms of action still are unknown.

We will now address the deepest and most interesting variant of the NBP, the phenomenal unity of perception. There are intractable problems in all branches of science; for Neuroscience a major one is the mystery of subjective personal experience. This is one instance of the famous mind–body problem (Chalmers 1996) concerning the relation of our subjective experience (aka qualia) to neural function. Different visual features (color, size, shape, motion, etc.) are computed by largely distinct neural circuits, but we experience an integrated whole. This is closely related to the problem known as the illusion of a stable visual world (Martinez-Conde et al. 2008).

We normally make about three saccades per second and detailed vision is possible only for about 1 degree at the fovea (cf. Figure 1). These facts will be important when we consider the version of the Visual Feature-Binding NBP in next section. There is now overwhelming biological and behavioral evidence that the brain contains no stable, high-resolution, full field representation of a visual scene, even though that is what we subjectively experience (Martinez-Conde et al. 2008). The structure of the primate visual system has been mapped in detail (Kaas and Collins 2003) and there is no area that could encode this detailed information. The subjective experience is thus inconsistent with the neural circuitry. Closely related problems include change- (Simons and Rensink 2005) and inattentional-blindness (Mack 2003), and the subjective unity of perception arising from activity in many separate brain areas (Fries 2009; Engel and Singer 2001).

Traditionally, the NBP concerns instantaneous perception and does not consider integration over saccades. But in both cases the hard problem is explaining why we experience the world the way we do. As is well known, current science has nothing to say about subjective (phenomenal) experience and this discrepancy between science and experience is also called the “explanatory gap” and “the hard problem” (Chalmers 1996). There is continuing effort to elucidate the neural correlates of conscious experience; these often invoke some version of temporal synchrony as discussed above.

There is a plausible functional story for the stable world illusion. First of all, we do have a (top-down) sense of the space around us that we cannot currently see, based on memory and other sense data—primarily hearing, touch, and smell. Also, since we are heavily visual, it is adaptive to use vision as broadly as possible. Our illusion of a full field, high resolution image depends on peripheral vision—to see this, just block part of your peripheral field with one hand. Immediately, you lose the illusion that you are seeing the blocked sector. When we also consider change blindness, a simple and plausible story emerges. Our visual system (somehow) relies on the fact that the periphery is very sensitive to change. As long as no change is detected it is safe to assume that nothing is significantly altered in the parts of the visual field not currently attended.

But this functional story tells nothing about the neural mechanisms that support this magic. What we do know is that there is no place in the brain where there could be a direct neural encoding of the illusory detailed scene (Kaas and Collins 2003). That is, enough is known about the structure and function of the visual system to rule out any detailed neural representation that embodies the subjective experience. So, this version of the NBP really is a scientific mystery at this time.

The very source you referred to in reply actually says this

You have to be able to make judgements about what such data means, to even speculate about those kinds of connections. So those kinds of explanations are fundamentally question-begging - they have to assume the thing they need to demonstrate.

And as you're quoting NCBI papers, you might be interested in this one about the neural binding problem. It actually acknowledges the hard problem by showing that it has a very real correlate in neuroscience itself:

The quoted paper is a domain of intrigue within neuroscience, I won't deny that. However, I will say that there is more up-to-date info on this particular topic.

Like mathematics, the functional architecture of Life can be expected to form a Platonic realm. It is structured not by external intelligence but by the system-immanent constraint of consistency, which discerns between viable and non-viable structures. This, then, is the true meaning of intelligent design, that material structures and processes, once they come near to consistent architectural structure, are fully drawn into it as if by magical force, like a dangling chain into the form of a perfect catenoid or like a potatoid soap bubble into a perfect sphere.

For one thing, we are certainly not born as a tabula rasa (as Locke claimed), being endowed at birth with the behavioral architecture just mentioned and with the infrastructure to take in and administer experiences, as pointed out by Kant.

Gaps in knowledge do not constitute an argument against my original claims.

What, then, is the relation between the standard ‘third-person’ objective methodologies for studying meteors or magnets (or human metabolism or bone density), and the methodologies for studying human consciousness? Can the standard methods be extended in such a way as to do justice to the phenomena of human consciousness? Or do we have to find some quite radical or revolutionary alternative sci- ence? I have defended the hypothesis that there is a straightforward, conservative extension of objective science that handsomely covers the ground — all the ground — of human consciousness, doing justice to all the data without ever having to abandon the rules and constraints of the experimental method that have worked so well in the rest of science.

And as you're quoting NCBI papers, you might be interested in this one about the neural binding problem. It actually acknowledges the hard problem by showing that it has a very real correlate in neuroscience itself:
— Wayfarer

The quoted paper is a domain of intrigue within neuroscience, I won't deny that. However, I will say that there is more up-to-date info on this particular topic.

The main point of their critique centres around the 'mereological fallacy', i.e. the idea that the brain does things. The brain is not itself an agent, and does not, in that sense, do anything, although obviously you need one to act (although not always, it seems.)

Galen Strawson said he should be sued by Fair Trading for calling his book Consciousness Explained, when he does no such thing.

Dennett I regard as a blustering charlatan

Why is the binding problem a problem?

The existence of binding is not a problem, it's a good thing. Accounting for it, explaining how it happens is the problem.

For example, the shape of the flower is engraved by connection strengths between neurons, which is physically accomplished by widening the synapses.

We feel what our brains are doing because we are the fields that constitute and unify it.
2h

I'll look at the global workspace theory more as that is what Garrett seems to be drawn to, and I like the idea of a space, as consciouness seems somewhat space-like to me, and space might be a candidate for that which unifies brain processes.

Why is the binding problem a problem? Wouldn't it be a problem if there wasn't binding?

Neurons fire around the brain, but there is no obvious spot where they all meet. But, phenomenologically, experiences are unified, we don't experience photon1 signal followed by photon2 signal etc. We see a car, a whole. All experiences involve some kind of many-in-one event. How this unification is achieved is the issue. My thought is that fields are extended throughout the brain, and indeed everything, and consciousness is perhaps best understood as a fundamental field-property. We feel what our brains are doing because we are the fields that constitute and unify it.

It isn't a problem. As I explained, it's just a gap in knowledge, most of which is accounted for in 2022. But, I can't literally explain the same thing over and over again to someone.

it's just a gap in knowledge

And as Cobb observes, Global Workspace Theory does not explain why flexible circulation of information causes consciousness to pop up.

What gap? There is no gap. Well, a gap being crossed easier. Between neurons, enhancing their connectivity.

The brain doesn't process information, nor compute on it. The only thing that happens is resonating with incoming structures. Or vibrating on its own. I can see a real ball and I can imagine one.

I suggest you give a small, supported argument to back up your assertion, because the metaphysics taking place on your thread are in no way contradictory to anything stated here that has been supported with research. Perhaps the opposite.

You keep asking for scientific evidence. There isn't any. There can't be any.

The "metaphysics taking place on [my] thread" does contradict your position.

The only thing happening in the brain is ion currents running parallel on the network, from birth to dead (the brain can't be turned off). Connection strengths involved in learning and memory (which are actually the same) direct the patterns. The 10exp(10exp20) possible pathways are actualized by these strengths. They are already there at birth, as a result of, for example retina induced stimulations of the network (concentric circle patterns moving over the retina structure, stimulating the embryonic network, so the newly born sees and recognizes round shapes).

So, it would have to be brains that produce consciousness, as there are no structures of consciousness that can be tested for brain production, but the opposite is tested daily, as I have demonstrated with the research I have posted.

"How?" is still a mystery, but the leading theory is that all structures of the brain operate in a complex network of unparralleled sophistiction. By produce, I mean emit, generate, or otherwise enable. Much like eyesight is produced by the brain, so too is consciousness.

So neurologists are not conscious of the brains they are testing? When neurologists provide explanations of brains and how they function, are they talking about their conscious experience of brains, or how brains function independent of their conscious experience (observation, empirical evidence)?

I don't see how complex networks of neurons can produce experiences of things that are not neurons. If brains emit consciousness, where is consciousness - once emitted, relative to the brain?

One can tell if someone is unconscious if they are unresponsive. The man acting unconscious is still conscious. He wouldn’t be able to act if he was unconscious, though he may deceive us.

I don’t think the fact of being conscious is silly, but the notion of “consciousness” is. By adding the suffix “ness” to the adjective “conscious” we fashion a thing out of a descriptive term, which in my mind is an error in philosophical discussions. This is true of terms such as “awareness”, “happiness”, “whiteness”. Descriptive terms serve to describe things, but they aren’t themselves things, substances, or forces, and they shouldn’t be treated as such in any careful language.

When speaking about and analyzing things that exist, the human organism exists. This human organism is what we study and analyze to better understand his activity. “Consciousness”, however, doesn’t exist, and we should abandon the term.

Consciousness is the brain operating to allow for wakefulness and awareness. There is no "where." It's a made up idea. There is just the brain and its functions. Consciousness is itself a made-up term used to describe something people had no clue about before the past few decades.

So neurologists are not conscious of the brains they are testing? When neurologists provide explanations of brains and how they function, are they talking about their conscious experience of brains, or how brains function independent of their conscious experience (observation, empirical evidence)?
— Harry Hindu

...?

Then consciousness isn't emitted by the brain, but is the brain operating in certain ways. You aren't being consistent.

Well? Are neurologists conscious or not?

The only thing happening in the brain is ion currents running parallel on the network, from birth to dead (the brain can't be turned off).

"How?" is still a mystery, but the leading theory is that all structures of the brain operate in a complex network of unparralleled sophistiction.

The brain is not a digital computer

How this unification is achieved is the issue. My thought is that fields are extended throughout the brain, and indeed everything, and consciousness is perhaps best understood as a fundamental field-property.

The connections between neurons" doesn't explain how we have unified subjective experience

But that doesn't explain how consciousness arises, any more than saying "it's all particles"

I could learn to see the "illusion" behind my naive phenomenology ... and start to worry about mind~body dualism when I went off to philosophy class.

So sure. Phenomenology is fine if it begins a process of reverse engineering the causes.

And sure, it is neither objective or subjective in the traditional sense. I'm always saying that it is not that, but instead, semiotic. And semiotic on both the biological and sociological levels.

The image of the food and me taking it runs around on the neurons, which makes me say not to do it.Empathy. Dunno how this can be seen or translated in ion currents

Maybe that's because we don't know the nature of particles. They contain charges by means of which the interact, by coupling to the glue fields between them.

My ‘naive’ perception of a mysterious figure in the distance center that turns out on closer inspection to be nothing but a shadow is no different than the ‘naive’ perception of mach bands.

I don't see why consciousness couldn't be explained.

One is an easy mistake to make - a high level act of interpretation. The other is found to be constitutive of interpretations themselves.

You can unsee the mysterious figure. But you can't unsee the Mach bands. And having noted this interesting difference in your qualitative experience, you would then look to its separate causes.

What answer does Husserlian intentionality give us here?

Why is the binding problem a problem?

I'm still waiting on an argument against my OP.

Do you understand why they think the mereological fallacy is important?

One does not unsee the mysterious figure.

One has now constituted a different phenomenon, but idealizes the changes by dubbing this process of perceptual transformation as my seeing the ‘ same’ object correctly now but incorrectly before.

As realists, our belief in persisting real objects makes our conformity to the ‘ facts’ of the real external thing the arbiter of correctness. But from a phenomenological vantage , the difference between illusion and correctness is a function of the inferential compatibility between one moment of perception and the next, which is relatively stable over time but never self -identical.

I simply ask what specifically does Husserlian intentionality add here that we don't already know?