Is Dishbrain Conscious?

Quoting RogueAI

Question for materialists/physicalists: is Dishbrain conscious and what evidence do you have for your answer?

No, great question, but I'd wager to say more retains-certain-functionality than anything even remotely approximating something as complex as consciousness. Consciousness arises as the result the symphony of operations between the neural structures of the brain. Simple neurons aren't going to have that faculty, any more than they have the faculty to induce eye movement when certain structures are damaged. Awesome to see that I'm getting you to explore this though, man. It is the future of philosophy, a huge chunk of at least.

Quoting RogueAI

conscious

Define please.

Reply to 180 Proof

I don't think we can define consciousness, other than we each have a private definition of it, which we assume everyone else has a similar definition (are you a P-zombie, 180???). I think the lack of a rigorous definition of consciousness is a knock on science. Shouldn't we have a working definition of it by now? The fact that we don't suggests that modern science might not be the best tool to tackle the job.

Reply to RogueAI It's the best tool we have; besides, just because the problem isn't solved yet by science in no way entails that science cannot solve the problem (re: hasty generalization fallacy by "mysterians"). Also, there are quite a few "working definitions" depending on which research paradigm cognitive / brain the scientists are using. Anyway, your OP question is incoherent without you defining "conscious" (i.e. it's a scientific problem, after all, and not a philosophical question, IMO).

Interesting story, OP!

This rather disturbing experiment goes to show that neurons are like wires and synapses like logic gates in a circuit board. In other words, the electronic/electrical nature of our brains has been demonstrated (effectively?). That's exactly the opposite of what AI engineers have been trying to do all this time - prove the neural nature of electronic circuitry. I guess it's the same thing.

Reply to RogueAI After reading the article it seems more like the dishbrain was programmed to do do something which was a simulation of playing the game pong.

Quoting 180 Proof

Anyway, your OP question is incoherent without you defining "conscious"

He did define it

Quoting bert1

He did define it

Where? (Link, please.)

Reply to 180 Proof

I don't think we can define consciousness, other than we each have a private definition of it, which we assume everyone else has a similar definition (are you a P-zombie, 180???).

That. From this I know exactly what RogueAI is talking about, so for me it's a successful definition. It accurately picks it the bit of the world we want to talk about. But it's not much good for someone who doesn't share this reflexive perception.

Reply to bert1 I don't read a definition in that quote.

Ok. I do.

You have what is called "ostensive definition", definition by pointing. You might point at a patch of green and say "that is green". You can define consciousness ostensively, that's what RogueAI was implying, I think.

There's surprisingly little detail in that article about the specific set up of the neuron/computer interface. My initial feeling is that the neurons aren't doing anything that a digital computer couldn't do, and that it has nothing to do with consciousness. But I'm going to read more about it.

Lots more detail here: https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2021.12.02.471005v2.full

Quoting Daemon

You can define consciousness ostensively, that's what RogueAI was implying, I think.

Yes, I agree. Do you understand what RogueAI means? Has this definition worked for you the way it worked for me, as far as you can tell?

Reply to bert1 Reply to Daemon Light sensors, for example, "point to green" (or other EM frequencies); the capability "to point" does not itself indicate (define) "consciousness".

Quoting Daemon

You have what is called "ostensive definition", definition by pointing. You might point at a patch of green and say "that is green". You can define consciousness ostensively, that's what RogueAI was implying, I think.

That's correct.

Reply to RogueAI Clarify: what's "correct" about @Daemon's statement?

Reply to 180 Proof That we can only define consciousness by reference to our own consciousness, which is inaccessible to anyone else. I assume your conscious and subjective experiences are similar to mine (I also assume that you even have them), but I have no way of knowing.

Quoting RogueAI

That we can only define consciousness by reference to our own consciousness, which is inaccessible to anyone else.

And therefore that is not a definition in any discursive sense. On the contrary, however, "consciousness" is defined both by philosophy (for example Reply to 180 Proof) and by various sciences in countless ways; what has yet to be achieved, Rogue, is a scientific model which explains "consciousness" (and/or the human brain) in a testable way.

180 Proof:.?bert1 ?Daemon Light sensors, for example, "point to green" (or other EM frequencies); the capability "to point" does not itself indicate (define) "consciousness".

This is informative. It shows you haven't grasped the concept. RogueAI was not saying that the capacity to point indicates consciousness. You haven't performed the reflexive act which would furnish you with the referent of the word.

RogueAI's definition is both philosophical and discursive. It's is clear enough that we are speaking about the same thing, we understand each other as far as I can tell. And it is this definition that is employed by many philosophers, and that is operative in discussions of the hard problem. And rejection of this definition is what puts so many discussions about consciousness at cross purposes.

There is another way you can define it, but that is not very satisfactory. And that is by synonym, and that definition you can find in a dictionary. Usually listed as the very first sense of the word.

It's true that the ostensive definition is private. But that's ok, because the way we go on to talk then indicates if we have both performed the same ostensive definition. We can't be 100% sure, but we can be 99% sure, the more we talk. RogueAI and I, if we continue our discourse, are likely to say similar enough things about consciousness, and use it in the same places, that we will gradually become more sure that we share a concept.

@180 Proof I know you don't share the concept, but do you accept that RigueAI and I do share a concept?

If you don't have the concept, how is it possible for you to say something relevant to our discourse?

I think on a philosophy forum, on this issue particularly, it should be socially acceptable to deny another's experience. In a way that would less acceptable to deny a person's experience of, say, disability discrimination or racial discrimination.

Quoting 180 Proof

And therefore that is not a definition in any discursive sense. On the contrary, however, "consciousness" is defined both by philosophy (for example ?180 Proof
)

'Consciousness is secondary – much more veto than volo – and confabulatory', perhaps selected for as a beneficial social-coordination adaptation which functions as the 'phenomenal complement' to natural language usage. — 180 Proof

awareness of self-awareness = consciousness — 180 Proof

I don't think this is what we are asking about when we ask whether Dishbrain is conscious. I think we are asking if Dishbrain can feel anything. Whether it has experiences.

Quoting Daemon

I don't think this is what we are asking about when we ask whether Dishbrain is conscious. I think we are asking if Dishbrain can feel anything. Whether it has experiences.

Indeed. That is definition by synonym (more or less).

If the firing neurons in the dish resemble a part of the neurons involved in the brain when ýou feel pain it might be that pain ho(o)vers around in the dish.

The question is if we can cut the pain out. If we have a drawing of the brain, we can cut the region, involved in feeling pain, out with scissors.

You can remove working structures from a functional brain-body-surrounding, and it will still be functioning. If what you remove will still be functioning, say the neurons responsible for smell, the dish will not possess the smell of rotten eggs. That can only be experienced by the creature experiencing.

Reply to bert1 I have no idea what RogueAI or you are talking about when you talk about "consciousness" and therefore I've also no way of telling if you are talking about the same (notion of) "consciousness".

Reply to 180 Proof Sure, fair enough.

Quoting Daemon

I think we are asking if Dishbrain can feel anything. Whether it has experiences.

Yes!

Reply to 180 Proof Is dishbrain conscious according to your definition of conscious?

If you know already what Dishbrain actually does @RogueAI could you explain it like I'm five? Otherwise, we are going to have to read the paper I linked to above.

I've found this description: [i]The mass, which the researchers call a cyborg, was created by placing human stem cells on top of a micro-electric array, where they grew into brain cells. In their configuration, the cells can both stimulate other cells and read the activity of others around them. Electrical signals are sent to the array to tell them where the ball is located. If electrodes to the right of a cluster fire, for example, the brain cells know that the ball is to their left. The distance of the signal gives the cells information regarding frequency. As with real Pong, the paddle can only move left and right. And also like the real game, the goal is to move the paddle into the path of the ball.

The cyborg was taught to play the game in the same way as are humans—by playing the game repeatedly to learn how to move the paddle in ways that result in success. In this case, it was feedback in the form of electrical signals in the electrodes.[/i]

But I still don't know how it works. Too vague.

Reply to Daemon

The paddle moves analogous in the collection of neurons. You could use more complicated motions. In 3d for example. Though this will require more neurons. The ball and peddle just have to meet. A strange attractor pulls them together and this can be measured.

Reply to EugeneW I'm afraid that doesn't explain the process.

Reply to Daemon I'm not exactly sure either. My understanding is they got a bunch of neurons to act as logic gates and coupled it to some software/hardware and taught it to play Pong.

Somehow the paddle shape and ball shape have to coincide. The motion of the ball is represented analogue in the bunch (not digital). The bunch is repeatedly been exposed to the procedure of paddle and ball meeting. It remembers. Then when offering a motion of the ball the analogues will again try to meet, follow the memory trail, so to speak. Without a consciousness. A kind of longing though. For the memory trail.

Reply to RogueAI

In that case the set-up has absolutely no connection with consciousness. Logic gates can be represented by a diverse range of items, for example some time ago Japanese researchers used crabs to act as logic gates. We interpret these items as logic gates, we ascribe that status to them.

The same is not true of the mechanisms of consciousness: their status, their function, is intrinsic to them, it doesn't depend on our say-so.

But I want to be fair to the Dishbrain people, so I am going to continue to plough through their paper and maybe ask them to explain it.

Dishbrain's whole awareness is pain. It is all Dishbrain has ever known.

Reply to RogueAI I'm not aware of any evidence of anything about "dishbrain" that suggests it's "conscious" in any recognizable sense.

I've written to the lead author of the paper asking if he can provide a simplified explanation of the role of the neurons in the set-up. Watch this space.

Consciousness

1. Other-awareness: Dishbrain is conscious (it reacts to the environment, plays a simple game)

2. Self-awareness: Dishbrain is not (?) conscious. Is it capable of metacognition?

:chin: