Hypothetical consent
Hypothetical consent is something we often appeal to in trying to arrive at considered judgements about what it is right or wrong to do to someone.
For instance, the philosopher John Rawls famously argued that redistributive taxation is justified because we would all, if rational and ignorant of our natural talents, agree to such a system. And when it comes to making decisions on behalf of those who cannot consent, either because they lack the ability or because they are not here (the dead, for instance) we commonly think the fact 'it is what they would have wanted' counts for something.
But what ethical clout does it actually have and when does it count for something?
First, hypothetical consent is not consent. To quote Nozick, it is not worth the paper it isn't written on. If Jane is in a temporary coma and you want to have sex with her, then the fact that she would have consented to you doing so had you asked, does not mean you're not raping her if you go ahead and do it.
Second, its presence only seems capable of counting for something when a) the hypothetical consent is informed and not a product of ignorance; b) the actual informed consent is not practically possible; c) when the hypothetical consenter would either be harmed, or deprived of a benefit were the act in question not performed; and d) when the hypothetical consent can be considered present prior to the performance of the act. Hypothetical consent is not retrospective, in other words.
To elaborate, the hypothetical consent needs to be informed. That is, when engaging in the thought experiment, one must not assume the person whose hypothetical consent you're inquiring after is ignorant of facts that, were she to know them, would likely alter her decision. So, perhaps prior to the operation Jane would have consented to procedure x given what she had been told about procedure x; but if it subsequently turns out - that is, a paper is published moments after she's put under - that x has side effects that, had Jane known about them, would almost certainly have meant she would not have consented to procedure x, then the fact she 'would' have consented to x given the state of her knowledge prior to being put under does not count for anything.
Re b, you are not justified in doing something that significantly affects me - either for the better or the worse - on the basis of my hypothetical informed consent if you could actually have asked me. Again, sex cases seem to illustrate this most vividly. The fact Jane would have consented to you groping her does not justify you groping her without her consent. Hypothetical consent is no substitute for actual consent, when actual consent is practically possible. (Even when actual consent is not possible, it is not really a 'substitute' for it, but rather serves to inform us about other ethically relevant considerations that now must be what the justification of our action depends on).
Re c, to use an example of Bernard Williams's, if you're about to drink a glass of what you believe to be gin and tonic but which is in fact petrol, and there is no time for me to point this out to you, then I am justified in knocking the glass from your hand. For it seems beyond a reasonable doubt that you would not want to drink the glass of petrol if you knew it was petrol and if I do not knock it from your hand then you would come to a significant harm. So, hypothetical consent only applies when the act for which it is being considered is one that, if it were not performed, would result in the relevant party coming to harm or being deprived of a benefit. That is, there needs to be someone who is harmed by the action's non-performance, or would be deprived of something were the act not performed.
Re d, imagine there is a love drug that, when taken, makes you fall in love with the next person you see. You are in love with Jane, but she is not in love with you. Imagine she is about to move overseas and you can only see her for one last time if she carries through with her plan. There is no time to ask for her actual consent, and so you decide to put the love drug in the coffee you are bringing to her, for you reason that after taking the drug, she will be happy that you did so for now she will be madly in love with you (and she will now happily abandon her plans to move overseas). Well, I take it that it is obvious that this would be a wrong thing to do and the fact she would have given her consent to it after you did it counts for nothing.
Do those sound like plausible restrictions on the use of hypothetical consent to justify actions?
For instance, the philosopher John Rawls famously argued that redistributive taxation is justified because we would all, if rational and ignorant of our natural talents, agree to such a system. And when it comes to making decisions on behalf of those who cannot consent, either because they lack the ability or because they are not here (the dead, for instance) we commonly think the fact 'it is what they would have wanted' counts for something.
But what ethical clout does it actually have and when does it count for something?
First, hypothetical consent is not consent. To quote Nozick, it is not worth the paper it isn't written on. If Jane is in a temporary coma and you want to have sex with her, then the fact that she would have consented to you doing so had you asked, does not mean you're not raping her if you go ahead and do it.
Second, its presence only seems capable of counting for something when a) the hypothetical consent is informed and not a product of ignorance; b) the actual informed consent is not practically possible; c) when the hypothetical consenter would either be harmed, or deprived of a benefit were the act in question not performed; and d) when the hypothetical consent can be considered present prior to the performance of the act. Hypothetical consent is not retrospective, in other words.
To elaborate, the hypothetical consent needs to be informed. That is, when engaging in the thought experiment, one must not assume the person whose hypothetical consent you're inquiring after is ignorant of facts that, were she to know them, would likely alter her decision. So, perhaps prior to the operation Jane would have consented to procedure x given what she had been told about procedure x; but if it subsequently turns out - that is, a paper is published moments after she's put under - that x has side effects that, had Jane known about them, would almost certainly have meant she would not have consented to procedure x, then the fact she 'would' have consented to x given the state of her knowledge prior to being put under does not count for anything.
Re b, you are not justified in doing something that significantly affects me - either for the better or the worse - on the basis of my hypothetical informed consent if you could actually have asked me. Again, sex cases seem to illustrate this most vividly. The fact Jane would have consented to you groping her does not justify you groping her without her consent. Hypothetical consent is no substitute for actual consent, when actual consent is practically possible. (Even when actual consent is not possible, it is not really a 'substitute' for it, but rather serves to inform us about other ethically relevant considerations that now must be what the justification of our action depends on).
Re c, to use an example of Bernard Williams's, if you're about to drink a glass of what you believe to be gin and tonic but which is in fact petrol, and there is no time for me to point this out to you, then I am justified in knocking the glass from your hand. For it seems beyond a reasonable doubt that you would not want to drink the glass of petrol if you knew it was petrol and if I do not knock it from your hand then you would come to a significant harm. So, hypothetical consent only applies when the act for which it is being considered is one that, if it were not performed, would result in the relevant party coming to harm or being deprived of a benefit. That is, there needs to be someone who is harmed by the action's non-performance, or would be deprived of something were the act not performed.
Re d, imagine there is a love drug that, when taken, makes you fall in love with the next person you see. You are in love with Jane, but she is not in love with you. Imagine she is about to move overseas and you can only see her for one last time if she carries through with her plan. There is no time to ask for her actual consent, and so you decide to put the love drug in the coffee you are bringing to her, for you reason that after taking the drug, she will be happy that you did so for now she will be madly in love with you (and she will now happily abandon her plans to move overseas). Well, I take it that it is obvious that this would be a wrong thing to do and the fact she would have given her consent to it after you did it counts for nothing.
Do those sound like plausible restrictions on the use of hypothetical consent to justify actions?
Comments (168)
I hope Nozick would also agree that it's problematic to not save someone/provide a genuine gift just because one cannot ask for it themselves.
A. Hypothetical consent seems to be about considering what a person would have agreed to had they been aware of all the facts at hand. Fortunately, we can consent to amazing things even if they have side effects.
B. Taking unnecessary risks can certainly be problematic, especially since they aren't needed for living a fairly decent life. However, if one would have genuinely found the good to have been worthwhile, then not giving that seems to be more troublesome. I don't see why a person would ever agree to being "groped", since that seems to go against most people's preferences. However, if a person would truly have been fine with the act (which seems absurd to me), I don't think it would wrong to do so. But this could still be changed if the person would not have consented for someone to grope them if they were not able to ask for that act first. I suppose this strange desire would vary from person to person. I agree that actual consent/impositions are what ultimately matter. Also, just because someone might not ask to be helped in a precarious situation when they are awake, it doesn't seem ethical to not do so on the basis of reasonable probabilities when they are incapable for requesting support themselves.
C. It might be good to intervene and prevent a person from being unnecessarily harmed (which is something they themselves would have avoided had they known that what they were drinking was petrol). Thankfully, we don't always have an ignorant person being thrust into sheer harm when they are created. There are innumerable joys which aren't "unnecessary" (assuming the absence of the harms is necessary), and if anything, it can be genuinely ethical to partake in the bestowal of a good that cannot be asked for before the person is capable of cherishing it. If this doesn't make sense, then neither does the idea of "imposing" existence. Hypothetical consent was assumed not just because it prevented a harm (a negative), but also because it allowed for a positive (ensuring one continues to have good health). Therefore, hypothetical consent isn't just about preventing harms; it is also about acts of genuine beneficence that lead to a positive.
D. That could definitely be extremely unethical. Fortuitously, nobody is being misled into radically changing their views against their "real" interests when they are created.
They are plausible, but they don't apply to every situation.
What was your point in respect of gifts? Do gifts constitute a counterexample to one of my conditions?
Regarding c, I don't think it's for you to paternalistically judge what would be petrol or gin for others. It seems "beyond reasonable doubt" to me that one wouldn't be averse to a nectar of ethereal joy. Also, it's probably a good thing that one isn't*ignorantly* brought to a worse state of affairs that they would always have avoided had they known the facts. Additionally, the fact of ineffable happiness also remains pertinent. Not letting the person drink leads to actual benefit (conserving one's health) for those who exist, but that's not the case with people who are yet to be born.
As for d, we can certainly be happy that nobody's being altered/misled into believing something "they" otherwise would have disagreed with when they are being created ;)
So you agree that hypothetical consent counts for nothing when it comes to the morality of procreation? The fact that if we create Tony, Tony will be pleased at us for having done so, is morally irrelevant, yes?
I said that when it comes to hypothetical consent, we are sometimes justified in appealing to it when the act we are considering performing would be one that, were we not to perform it, would either harm someone or deprive someone of a benefit.
That doesn't apply in the procreation case, for if we do not perform the procreative act there is no one who is harmed or deprived of a benefit.
Well, doesn't that apply to impositions too? Something is an imposition on another if, were you to perform the act in question, there would be someone who is imposed upon?
Agreed. Similarly, respecting one's autonomy can certainly be good if it is in a person's interests, which isn't the case with those who are not born.
Neither would it lead to a good or go against their desires (prior or present) by putting them in a state of affairs they did not want to be in.
An action is an imposition if it goes against the actual preferences of a person. Happily, procreating doesn't impose anything onto someone, since there aren't people in some pre-existence antechamber who want to avoid existence.
I don't see how you're responding to my point. In order for something to be an imposition, there needs to be someone who is imposed upon.
There is in the case of procreative acts: the person who is brought into being here. That person is imposed upon. There is no conceptual problem here.
Sometimes we are justified in making impositions on others without their consent. That is where hypothetical consent comes in. But hypothetical consent does not apply to procreative acts.
Procreation creates a person, but it doesn't impose anything upon a person, since there is no person to begin with prior to their existence who is being "brought" (moved from one place to another) here against their will.
I also don't understand why you always miss my point, but I guess we have different intuitions. Hopefully, other people would be able to provide more apposite points.
No form of consent applies in this case.
So you think that in order for something to be an imposition it is not enough that we locate someone who is imposed upon, they must exist prior to the act as well?
So, if I know that were I to have a child, the child's existence would be characterized by utter agony from beginning to end, I would not be harming the child by bringing it into existence?
Creating that person would certainly be unethical, just as it would be ethical to give birth to a person who could have an ineffably positive existence.
My view is consistent: in order to be harmed or disrespected or imposed upon or whatever, one needs to exist. That is, there needs to be someone who is harmed or disrespected or imposed upon.
That person does not need to exist 'prior' to the act. It is enough that they exist at some point.
And this applies to hypothetical consent as well: it only counts for something in respect of acts that, if not performed, would harm someone or deprive someone of a benefit.
Many people argue that existence is worse than nonexistence due the the presence of harms. This is a different claim than the idea that it's a harm due to life being an imposition (which would mean that all acts of procreation were unethical, even if the person had a perfectly happy life). The person could certainly be harmed due to the existence of a state of affairs that's worse than nothingness, yet that isn't the same as it being an imposition, which doesn't seem to make sense when nobody's interests are being violated. And as I said before, if one can consider life to be an imposition, it can also be a gift. A life that could not have been solicited by an individual yet one that would be permeated with joy could definitely be seen as a genuine blessing.
Yes, one needs to exist in order to be imposed upon. Fortunately, the act of creating them is not one that is imposing something onto an existing person.
They do, and I am glad you admitted to that by saying they need to exist ;)
And the lack of impositions only matters if their absence leads to a genuine positive for a person via respecting their interests.
Locate an inconsistency in what I am saying! I am the one being consistent. You are being ad hoc.
We are justified in performing an act, at least in principle, when failure to perform the act would either result in someone being harmed or someone being deprived of a benefit.
That's why it's wrong to bring into existence someone whose life would be characterized by intense suffering. There's someone who is harmed by that act.
And that's also, incidentally, why we do not have an obligation to bring into existence happy lives. If we do not do so there is no one who is deprived of the benefit of them.
The fact that they would have consented to what we did to them if we had created them is irrelevant, as I have shown in my OP (with which you agreed).
Which means that the action would also lead to a benefit. But not creating a person doesn't seem to lead to an actual good for a person. Yet, if the lack of existence can sometimes be preferable, it can also be worse than a good life.
If it can be a harm even though nobody has any needs, it can also a benefit because of the manifestation of numerous positives.
There's nobody who's being provided tangible relief from the lack of harms. However, if it can still be good to prevent their presence, I do think that it's problematic to prevent the birth of all joys. This is why your position is ad hoc, in my view.
I said that the concept of consent is irrelevant, which is a slightly different idea. But if it's "relevant" that harms have been "imposed", it's equally relevant that benefits that one could not have sought prior to existence have been bestowed. My view is that the former should not take universal precedence over the latter. To disregard it altogether seems inconsistent to me.
Thus, we have an obligation to prevent harms when there would be someone who'd be harmed if we did not do so, but we have no obligation to promote benefits unless there would be someone who'd be deprived of them if we did not do so.
Impositions: Unsolicited harms
Blessings: Unsolicited benefits
In my view, both matter.
My point was that consent as a concept doesn't seem applicable to procreation. Your scenarios were not similar to procreation, since they involved manipulation (changing one's existing interests) and acts that one would have hypothetically opposed (such as being groped while they were unconscious). But I would imagine that a person would definitely consent to experiencing a blessing if they could do so. You also said that hypothetical consent only applies when the failure to perform an act could lead to a deprivation of good for a person. If this isn't the case with people who don't exist because they cannot experience deprivation, I hope this doesn't mean that you would be fine with an unconscious person being groped as long as they don't actually experience a harm. But also, one could also suggest that respecting one's consent only matters when it creates/preserves a real good for a person. Finally, if when cannot invoke the concept of hypothetical consent when it comes to procreation due to its absence not leading to a deprivation of benefits, I think we should also accept that we cannot say appeal to a hypothetical dissent (the idea that a person who had no prior interest would still dislike their life) in an effort to deem procreation immoral, since the act of not creating someone by assuming a hypothetical rejection of life doesn't entail a real benefit for an existing person that would lead to relief/fulfillment. If we have to prevent harms whose absence doesn't result in satisfaction for a person, I think we should also seek to create goods irrespective of whether or not they can be asked for before existence. There wouldn't be anybody who would be happy due to an absence of life either.
A hypothetical consent that's premised upon manipulation/misunderstanding of what constitutes consent (such as harming an unconscious person when they probably would not have consented to being interfered with in such a state even if they would have been fine otherwise) or an incomplete scenario that doesn't take into account the fact that not acting due to hypothetical dissent doesn't lead to an actual benefit/relief to a person in that particular case are equally impertinent for me.
This is why I said earlier that we have different intuitions.
Whether or not we have an obligation to do something also depends on our own limits as sentient beings and the ultimate results of an action. Since we have already discussed much of this before, I don't think that there's any point in fruitless repetition.
I hope that you have a great week ahead!
Also, excellent input :ok:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/12026/does-god-have-free-will/p2
"?GraveItty ?SolarWind Don't engage it. Among other ridiculous claims, it believes that life on Earth is hell where the wicked are sentenced for punishment and that whatever happens to you here, you deserve it. It also believes that if you disagree with it its necessarily because you lack expertise, and goes around asking for qualifications without presenting any on its part. It also can't see the irony here:
When reality is at home?
— GraveItty
You can't answer a question with a question, can you?
— Bartricks
Engaging it is reserved for masochists. When you begin to get anywhere it will retreat to "dunning kruger" or "this is how it is present to my reason" but it will take you 70 posts to get to that point.
The only clever things that come out of its mouth are ad homs. Which I have to say are top notch.
— khaled"
This reflects my own opinion on Bartricks. I quoted Khaled because he says what I can't express succinctly and without using expletives.
Hope you have a wonderful day!
Thanks, and likewise, have a nice day yourself.
P.s. All men have limited understanding.
We discussed these issues before, so I would prefer avoiding repeating ourselves.
Indeed. But the limitations are more severe for some than they are for others. For them, limited might be a euphemism for "severely lacking".
I certainly think that I understand far too little. Being here has helped!
:rofl: No offense Bartricks.
You and I never had a discussion back to a month ago inclusive... and the issue I brought up I have mentioned for the first time within a month ago. At least I don't remember any discussion with you, and I did not spot any on your list of posts. Please point me to the time when you and I previously discussed these issues. If it's not you and I who had discussed these issues, then who is the "We" you're referring to? Without clear identification of antecedents, "we" means you and me, and it's not the case.
(This seems to be going in the same direction as any discussion with Bartricks... constant denial of opposition's points, with unclear referencing, vague claims, and extraordinary claims... the only difference is that Bartricks uses insults, whereas you are a nice person, DA671.)
I see you are relatively new to the site, so I wish you good cheer and nice intellectual frolic here. It's a good, fertile ground for fresh thoughts and to develop insights, like you said. Sometimes tempers flare, but that apparently is as old a feature of philosophy as is the practice of debating itself.
On a side note: I am an antecedent-nazi. I can't abide with pronouns that are important to be identified for their antecedents, but are not. I don't always leash out, mostly not, but sometimes I do. I apologize for being perhaps too straightforward with demanding earlier whom you meant with "we", and I am very glad you understood my concern and satisfied my curiosity.
No problem. Glad we sorted this out. I'll continue to excavate the different threads here in order to continue my learning process. Thank you for your reply, and I hope that you have a nice day.
There is a state of affairs where someone actually experiences the collateral damage of harm.
That is procreation.
There is a state of affairs where someone does not actually experiences the collateral damage of not feeling joy. To reformulate this, that is to say: No one actually experiences the collateral damage of not feeling joy.
That is non-procreation.
These are the facts of the case.
This is an asymmetry. If one does not want to cause someone else the collateral damage of harm, one would choose non-procreation.
It is moral not to cause unnecessary collateral damage for someone else, if one can prevent it.
It is not immoral to prevent joys for someone else, if no one was around to be deprived of it in the first place.
These are the outcomes of moral judgements regarding the morality of causing unnecessary harm.
If joy came about without collateral damage, there may be an ethical case, if one was purely a utilitarian. This is not the case with procreation, so it is a moot point.
If harm to a person came about through not experiencing joy, there may be an ethical case, if one was purely a utilitarian. This is not the case with non-procreation, so a moot point.
Have a nice day!
I'm going to stop this here because THIS is where you keep tripping up on my argument.
The asymmetry is about states of affairs. It is the case that no X is happening, is what I am saying.
1. It is the case that no one experiences collateral damage in no procreation.
2. It is the case that on one experiences joy in no procreation.
If one does not believe in causing unnecessary collateral damage for someone else, then one would not procreate.
The rebuttal chimes in (in unison): But joy! But joy!
Then the fact is again: No person actually exists to be deprived of the collateral damage of no joy.
That is an asymmetry buddy. Deal with it. I am not reading the rest until your error in reasoning here is addressed.
I don't think that the lack of harms (or happiness) necessarily means much when someone does not exist, but I granted that for the sake of the discussion.
1. It is also the case that nobody experiences benefits in no procreation.
2. Exactly.
The same response predictably pops up: but nobody is deprived!
Yet, this is an irrelevant objection. It's obvious that people who don't exist aren't derprived, but that lack of deprivation does not lead to an actual good for someone, which isn't the case with existing people who can live happier lives if happiness isn't taken away from them. Furthermore, the lack of harms can be good for an existing person who has an interest in avoiding it, but considering that their prevention satisfies nobody's desires in the void, the absence of harms cannot be good for them either, since nobody is relieved/happy from their absence. Therefore, if the lack of happiness isn't bad, then the lack of harms cannot be universally preferable either as far as potential beings are concerned.
There is no asymmetry, and unless people renounce their arbitrary double standards, this is (mostly) an exercise in futility. Our biases can often trip us up, but we must learn to deal with the truth. Unfortunately, some people will never address the flaws in their ideas that are driven by unchallenged assumptions that ignore one side of the coin.
Have a great day, my friend.
Rubbish statement because it ain't true :wink:.
Quoting DA671
But you didn't. That is most your argument (no one exists to be deprived of the benefit of the non-harms). And you didn't pay attention to the states of affairs themselves, just how you would like it to sound so you can rattle off your point.
As you state, right, here:
Quoting DA671
Quoting DA671
You are being as arsehole dude I can't help this congenital problem.
It's about states of affairs. That's all. In one case you create collateral harm. In the other you are not. It is not about "good for someone", it is about YOU the fuckn perpetrator acting on behalf of someone.
The question is put on the PARENT. Do YOU (the parent) want to create collateral damage or not? That's the fuckn question.
I'm putting a lot of emotive words in here (like fuckn) because I NEED you to get my point and this may be the only way to get through cause calmly repeating isn't working.
I did because I agreed that it can be good to not create a harmful state of affairs. Lack of understanding can lead to erroneous conclusions. One state of affairs was about a harm and joy and one was about neither. The claim was made that it's important to prevent the harms but it was fine to prevent the goods. The argument given in favour of this was the claim that nobody is deprived of happiness when they don't exist. When I pointed out that nobody in the void has the capacity to experience happiness to be deprived of it (which is why the lack of deprivation doesn't seem to have any value), it was decided that this should be ignored whilst still repeating the claims about lack of damage being good (even though there aren't any souls in the void who are relieved/saved from the damage, since there's nobody who experiences this good).
I apologise if I made you feel like that.
In one case, one creates benefits, in the other they don't. I would have loved to point out that there's nobody on whose "behalf" one is unethically acting when they are created, since nobody's interests are being violated. But this has already become too repetitive. Partaking in an act of genuine beneficence might be unethical for some, but in the absence of any logical reason in support of this argument, I find no good reason to accept their position.
The question is also whether the parent is fine with eliminating the possibility of all joy and never creating any ineffably meaningful experience. Having a comprehensive approach can be useful.
There is no "point" for me to "get" here, I am afraid. :P
UGGHHGGHG
I am very frustrated that you are not getting this. See, I would be okay, if you understood my point and then we disagreed from here, but you keep missing it!
Please look at what I am saying. That's all I can say. You are misrepresenting my argument, making a strawman, and then arguing against that.
1. Creating a person leads to "collateral damage" for the person.
2. Creating a person lead to benefits for an individual.
You claim that (2) doesn't matter because nobody is deprived of the benefit (which assumes that the lack of a good matters only when one is deprived of). I argue for a consistent view by pointing out that the lack of damage does not provide relief to an actual person either. Therefore, if the absence of happiness isn't bad because nobody is in a harmful state, it's also not good because nobody is in a preferable state of affairs they had an interest in preserving.
You would say that, being that you keep MISSING THE FUCKN POINT!
I have to go over this in piecemeal I guess and spoon feed this...
Okay,
FIRST and very important!!
We are talking about the actions or non-actions of the parent, and the ethical problem procreation. Presumably that means the parent making this decision. Correct!!??
I like forks more.
Yes, the parent should rationally decide whether or not it's a good idea to ignore one side of reality ;)
Yeah whatever.. So we are on the same page so far..
It is a problem regarding the PARENT's decision.
Good, good... ok, we made it to the first step.
Now, keeping in mind that, this is about the parent.......
We can see outcomes of the parent decisions in regarding to harms and joys...
1. It is the case that no one experiences collateral damage in no procreation.
2. It is the case that no one experiences joy in no procreation.
We are agreed on this?
To be fair.. I should have stated
1. It is the case that no one experiences collateral damager of harm in no procreation
2. It is the case that no one experiences the collateral damage of no joy in no procreation.
1. For existing people, the lack of creation could certainly cause harm. As for those who are yet to exist (interestingly, we have now moved to the beings from the parents in this case), it's true that they don't experience any damage/benefit.
2. Yes.
Harm is a damage, so the clarification isn't that necessary.
Having no joy is a harm. It's true that nobody experiences that when they don't exist.
Um, okay. Don't think your objections mean much here. These are the states of affairs. The parent's are making a decision based on them.. If you need me to connect that for you, just did.
Okay, good so far....
Here is the moral claim: It is unethical/bad/misguided (depends on how you view ethical decisions), to create unnecessary collateral damage for someone else.
Here is where we can start debating a bit because this is the normative claim about the states of affairs.
The parent is causing unnecessary harm. Unnecessary harm is harm that did not need to be created. If for example there was a person who already existing and needed you to cause a minor harm to prevent a greater harm, one can make a case that this may be necessary harm. However, this is never the case in procreation.
You are going to jump in and say: "But joy!" "But joy!"
This is where we really need to focus the argument. Is creating unnecessary collateral damage for someone else ever ethical?
If we agree that this is about the parents.. It is about creating collateral damage versus not creating collateral damage.
Look back at the states of affairs. In one case, the parent WILL be creating collateral damage. That is the qualification for the ethical matter. Someone WILL be affected with collateral damage.
EVEN if you deemed "goods" deprived as bad (which we can argue about whether that's even an ethical matter or supererogatory behavior), it is the state of affairs that NO ONE will be deprived, and thus even IF this was an ethical issue (of depriving someone of joy), the ethical element is moot, since there is no one's interests that are deprived.
What YOU would have to answer for is whether humans are ever indebted to non-existent future beings to ensure "they" experience joy.
In isolation, the damage is obviously unethical. However, when the act can lead to greater happiness for a person, it can be justifiable to do so. I also don't think that one is acting for "someone else" when nobody exists at the time of the act, but I shall ignore that for the sake of the argument.
The harm might be unnecessary, but the happiness isn't. If it's necessary to prevent harms even though preventing them doesn't lead to a good for someone in an alternative state of affairs (in the form of fulfillment or relief), I think that it's also problematic to never create any joy.
If it leads to greater happiness, it is ethical, in my view. It's definitely about the ethical act committed by the parents of creating a good.
Benefits are also ethically relevant, particularly when one is not in an already satisfied state of affairs that they would be mostly happy with as long as serious harms are avoided.
In one case, there won't be any positive. In the other state of affairs, there would a joyous experience for an actual person.
It is indeed bad because it's absence does lead to harm for an actual person (such as the lack of health leading to suffering). One could claim that some goods are supererogatory as far as existing people are concerned because they don't need constant interference for living fairly happy lives as long as they can avoid serious harms. But this isn't applicable to those who don't exist.
If the lack of happiness isn't bad because nobody is deprived of it, then neither is the lack of damage good, since the absence of the negatives does not provide someone with relief/fulfillment resulting from a satisfaction of their interests.
If we are indebted to "them, prevent damages for "them" even though "they" did not express any interest in it and neither does the prevention ever lead to an actually better state of affairs for a person by giving them some sort of benefit/relief, then we definitely have to take the joys into account.
In the end, you consider the damage to be unnecessary (which I also do, but in isolation of other factors) but the creation of joys not necessary. But I disagree with that because my intuitions tell me that they are quite relevant.
Anyway, this has been repeated multiple times. I hope that you have a wonderful day!
Unnecessary to whom? Death is necessary to life. Harm is necessary to life. Life is necessary to life.
Sure, if someone spits out a kid in the mouth of a volcano, and makes the decision that this is okay..it's not making a decision on "behalf" of anything :roll:. Just spit it out into the volcano, right? This whole non-identity thing in relation to procreation is a different debate so moving on...
Quoting DA671
WTF?? You JUST did it again!! We JUST spent all this time going over how this is about the fuckn parent's decision. And now you are reverting to you shitty strawman about "not good for an actual person"... It's about the PARENT NOT CREATING SUFFERING!!!!! DOES THAT COMPUTE??!!
I just slowed this down for you so you can see this is about states of affairs. In one case harm, in the other not. It's nothing to do with the "relief" of the non-existent child!!
Quoting DA671
Right, so same question. Is it ever ethical to create unnecessary collateral damage? No. It would be unethical.
Quoting DA671
Okay, so you are finally just putting your normative claim there. Everything is based on utility for you. I am claiming deontology that creating unnecessary collateral damage is always bad.
Here's an example..
If I made an obstacle course and said that you MUST go through the obstacles or you simply die of starvation.. Am I right to make you go through the obstacle course? No.
What happens if I said, hey, I have some tools and skills that I can provide for you to make the obstacle course a little easier.. Is that justified? No. Even though it was better to provide those, it was never good to create for that person in the first place.
Unnecessary to create it in the first place. You are either creating collateral damage for someone else or you are not. I am saying the moral choice is to not create collateral damage for someone when you didn't need to create it in the first place.
At this point, I think that you have decided that you want close your mind off entirely whenever things become uncomfortable for you. You're the one who keeps talking about nobody being "deprived" of happiness when they don't exist, and this is not about the parents. It's about the parents not creating any happiness. This should not be this hard to grasp.
Yes, it is not ethical. Fortunately, happiness is not unnecessary.
You are a selective deontologist who arbitrarily ignores the value of happiness by resorting to the claim that nobody is "deprived" of it when they don't exist, yet when one points out that if the absence of happiness isn't bad for a person because there isn't any deprivation, the lack of harms cannot be good for that person (and I hope that you don't start talking about "parents" again, because this point about nobody being deprived is about the people) since it does not relieve/fulfill them either.
It's nice then that there isn't anybody in the void who is being put in an obstacle course against their different desires. Of course, some people think that life is nothing more than an obstacle course, but I disagree with that. If one could provide a fun puzzle that could occasionally get tricky at times, I don't think that they should decide that nobody should have it when it's likely that most people would mostly enjoy it immensely despite of the presence of some difficulties.
I never claimed that.. I have said previously (look back!) that if it was always the case people were procreated into paradise, there wouldn't be a moral issue. But that is not the case. This very debate disqualifies that state of affairs :D.
Quoting DA671
Oh boy, no no dude. You have FINALLY made it about the parents.. Congratulations.. Welcome to where you needed to be many posts ago...
So that is the question then.. Are the parents obligated to create "happiness" if they are creating "unnecessary collateral damage". Of course I think it is always wrong to create unnecessary collateral damage for someone else, as this will be the state of affairs if they exist. It is not wrong to not create happiness as this brings about no negative/bad state of affairs for anyone.
Moving on.
I have always made it about the things that matter, even though there have been many attempts to divert the topic and employ unjustifiable standards in one case.
It could lead to a bad outcome for existing people, but I shall ignore that here.
I don't think that one is creating harm "for" someone. But it's quite important to create a genuine benefit for someone when it cannot be solicited by that individual themselves. If we have an obligation to prevent damage, I do think that we need to conserve/create good (though that also depends on practical limitations). If a bad state of affairs is required for happiness to be necessary, then I believe that it's also important to have a good state of affairs (which is what I meant by relief earlier) for the lack of harms/damage to be essential. In the end, our intuitions continue to diverge because one of us only cares about one side of the coin, which ultimately fuels their one sided "deontology" of preventing damage but not being concerned about what could be rationally considered a genuine blessing.
I would say that I do think that mindless procreation is not a good idea in a world that already has so many issues to deal with. We surely need to ensure that people take this action seriously. Thanks for raising awareness regarding this important issue.
As always, have a fantastic day!
It's a dreadful argument. Always wrong to create unnecessary collateral damage? Living and breathing is creating unnecessary collateral damage. Time itself is unnecessary collateral damage, for time is constructed in the Hypothetical. My next banana contributes to an exploitation of third world people. Writing these very lines could give you a heart attack. The future itself does not exist, and each creative act is a hypothetical leap. You can't simply talk about parents bringing children into a dangerous world. That is arbitrarily, for this is only one occasion of hypothetically anticipating affairs.
A non response. Unnecessary to create it in the first place to whom? Life is necessary as the precondition for saying "the first place". Therefore life is the first place. Life is necessary to life. Life is necessary to claiming that life is not necessary.
Life is contingent. Harm is necessary to life. Life is necessary to say that life is contingent.
Answer this right here: Is this a moral OBLIGATION? Not just supererogatory.
Quoting DA671
You state it that one is entailed in the other. That is just not the case. Harm is morally relevant. Creating joy, may not be and is probably supererogatory, especially when there is no actual person's interest that one is trying to alleviate by creating the joy. Mind you, this has nothing to do with "alleviating non-existing pain". either just that one is obligated NOT to CREATE that pain in the first place. That's all.
Quoting DA671
Why is creating joy in the first place obligated? You've never answered this other than "blessing" and non-compelling adjectives.
Ah, so you haven't been paying attention to what I mean by unnecessary suffering.. I should just say to do the work and look back to what I said but I will explain it...
If one is already born, one cannot but help but create suffering (this I deem as necessary suffering). For example, creating a lesser harm to prevent a greater harm.. However, in the case of procreation, none of it is "necessary" to perpetrate onto another. You are not preventing a "person" from a greater harm, as they don't exist, you are simply creating unnecessary harm from the start.
No, creating/preserving joy matters just as removing harms does. There is nobody whose interest is fulfilled by their lack of creation either. But if it's still necessary to prevent harms sans an actual good, it cannot be acceptable to prevent all joy. Creating immensely valuable experiences is important, that's all.
If preventing harms (something that is intrinsically negative and against one's interests) can be good, then creating happiness (something that is positive and is in one's interests) can also be obligatory, particularly if that good cannot be asked by the person themselves.
That is totally fuckn ridiculous. So, if someone is going to be born into horrendous conditions, because the kid is not "existent" yet, none of this matters? Give me a break :roll:. In your attempt to be clever with the non-identity argument you put yourself in a corner. You are better than that.
Haha, are you just doing this to be funny? It's about the parent. The obligation to not create unnecessary collateral damage if you can prevent it. You haven't answered the question. Why is it an obligation to create joy? I don't see an argument except some adjectives.
You know what collateral damage is right? I'm not just saying "harm" in our discussion, and for a reason.
Collateral damage means that, despite creating joy, X suffering is entailed. Thus, we are never talking a paradise situation, or simply "Oh, I am creating joy". Rather, it is always joy entailed with suffering. Is it ever good to do this, and do it without any mitigating need (to alleviate a greater harm for that person)? No, it is not. One is going ahead anyways and creating the harm onto that person. It is irrelevant that the intention was joy.
Look, it's a given that when you have children, they will not have a life free of suffering. This is not heaven. But your argument analytic in that is moves from the concept of suffering to its analysis of that which is inherently to be avoided in actions. This is true, this does follow and you will never get anything else out of the concept of suffering as such, other than the injunction not to do it.
But if you treat the concept of suffering as a maxim for taking action, you will thereby be obliged to kill yourself now in the most merciful way. You will conclude that any suffering whatsoever defeats any possible justification for allowing the existence of something.
I never said that there's just joy. However, it's also true that many people can find their lives to be unfathomably meaningful even in the face of harms. If it can be bad to create a person even if not creating the person doesn't lead to greater good for the person (by fulfilling their need to not exist) either, I don't see any good reason to not create the opportunity for experiencing innumerable positives. One is going ahead and creating a benefit (that they would have probably preferred despite the harms) that could not have been asked for by the person themselves. It is ethical to procreate (but not always).
Why go any further? I'm serious.
Quoting Constance
Why can't circumstances change depending on the situation? This is a ridiculous characterization of how my argument is stated. You have a chance to not create harm onto a future person. I am saying this non-action is the most ethical course. Don't create the harm.
I have also stated that once born, we must mitigate and allow for "necessary harms". Ironically, this is the lesser of the two.. In one case, you can purely prevent all harms. In the other, you must mitigate between lesser and greater harms for various interests involved. To do X, I must do harmful Y.. This sucks, but is the case. And suicide is definitely a major harm, or up until the suicide itself.
Because there is no obligation to create "opportunity", "good", "joy". There is only obligation to prevent unnecessary harm when one can.
But it is never just that!! It is entailed with forcing suffering upon someone. This is smugly paternalistic if harm is ignored for X reason (joy). It is presumptuous and paternalistic to think that, "Someone needs this!". But why? If I force you to work my garden, and you go through various moods and experiences of hating and loving it.. and then turn to me and say, "Why are you forcing me to work this garden?" And I say "Because SOMEONE NEEDS to experience this".. I am just a paternalistic douche who likes to see other people do X for my amusement.
What about joy needs to be had? Intrinsic good doesn't mean anything to me. Joy is good, is just a sort of tautology. What is the argument that joy needs to be created at the cost of harm?
Yeah the "go kill yourself" argument against antinatlism is tiresome and should just be ignored at this point.
No. I refuse you a break.
Quoting schopenhauer1
There is no 'if' about it. Every child suffers, and every child dies. This is an inescapable part of what being alive is. Harm is necessary to life, not unnecessary to life.
Quoting schopenhauer1
I have not made a non-identity argument. My argument is that life is good because without life there would be no antinatalism.
Ah I see you needed to hang your hat on that one...
Quoting unenlightened
Harm is necessary but someone else being born from YOUR decision is not. You know this, yet you phrase it like no decisions are made.. They are all made by default. No a parent MAKES a decision.
Quoting unenlightened
Haha, I see what you did there. Why do you, the parent, have to be the harbinger for other people's experiences? You are almost making the point I am trying to make to @DA671
It's equally paternalistic to proclaim from the tower of doom that bestowing genuine happiness that cannot be solicited doesn't matter because that's what one's own perspective tells them. It's also presumptuous to think "someone needs to avoid this suffering but not gain this positive". Ignoring the good for X reason (harms) isn't justifiable. Not everybody feels that they are being "forced" to do something they don't cherish. If someone would probably want to work in a garden but is not able to ask for going there on their own, it doesn't make sense to not give them the chance to do so because of one's own evaluation that might not be shared by the other person (telling them that their joy was unnecessary and that their harms are what really matter can also be quite paternalistic). Also, I have already said that it's wrong to harm another person unless it leads to a greater good for that person, so this forced to work example isn't germane to the discussion at hand.
Intrinsic bad/damage also doesn't mean much, by the same token. If the argument is that it's wrong to impose/cause an action that is against one's interests (suffering), I believe that it can be good to bestow/cause a good that's in their interest. If we are intuitively averse to one, the preference for the other also matters.
Yeah, I don't like that "kill yourself" argument either.
Stop it.. Born into a volcano is okay because everything prior to the volcano that person didn't exist :roll:. Dumbass notion. Only in the case of NOT having a child would the "forcing" not happen. Because as you point out, no ONE is forced. At X time of existence, there is someone. "They" didn't just come about in that place and time by fiat. The things that led up to that.. that is the force. Look at that!
Quoting DA671
Phew, luckily there was no one who is deprived of the garden experience beforehand. No one who was "forced" into the garden. HERE is where you can make your case about non-identity NOT the one where someone actually is born.
Quoting DA671
But it isn't bestowing on their interests without causing harm, so you are in a conundrum of causing suffering to cause a good.
Counter-intuitive ideas aren't necessarily dumb (semantical legerdemain doesn't change the fact that the act itself doesn't go against the interests of a person), but I didn't assume that position here. It could still be comparatively worse. And even if it is an imposition in some cases, it can also be a genuine blessing. I shall not forsake consistency when I don't have a reason to do so.
Phew, finally one can realise that not working in the garden isn't better/preferable for a person either, since one can logically see that they are neither being deprived nor being relieved/fulfilled from an absence of harm. And yes, nobody is being "forced" into that garden of yours if one would think about this issue thoroughly, but that's a separate matter.
Since it's not the case that an alternative greater good could exist from an absence of that harm, it can be ethical to bestow that good as long as it leads to a mostly valuable life for a person. The same would apply to a life that could have some real goods but ultimately turn out to be bad.
Just because a "blessing" can be created, doesn't mean doing the harm was justified, if it was unnecessary to start.
Don't be stupid. No one "needs" to realize it. Remember, this is about the parents, not "non existent people". The parent is not creating collateral damage for someone else unnecessarily. Didn't we agree on this like many posts ago? Or are we slipping into weasily strawmen again because this line of reasoning (of yorus) is unreasonable to sustain?
Quoting DA671
I am tempted to make the "how would you know either way, and air on the side of caution if you don't" argument, but that would go down another path (though valid too). Staying with the deontological argument that is valid.. It is about the decision to not create for someone else harms. The joy not "had" by a person, while may be sad face to the parent who projects about missed joy, is still being more ethical here despite their sad face projection, because they didn't create harm.
@unenlightened unfortunately makes the wrong assumption that you need to exist so that you have "something" for which you are not harming. He isn't understanding that it's simply the state of affairs of not creating collateral damage that needs to take place for it to be a moral decision. "The parent did NOT create collateral damage unnecessarily". That's all that needs to be met to make the moral decision.
See my above comment because this is just more strawman.
Nobody being deprived of happiness was about people who were yet to exist. The realisation would obviously occur for existing person. Equivocation is futile. Creating harms is unnecessary, but creating benefits is not.
If it can be good to not create harms for "someone" even though nobody is relieved from their absence (a parallel to the nobody is deprived of joy claim), it's also problematic to not create any joy on the basis of one's pessimistic desires. Eliminating the opportunity of all joy and possibly harming countless existing people can never be ethical.
You're the one who keeps missing the point that something cannot be a damage (in the sense of it being worse for a person) if their interests/desires aren't violated by an action. Creating a state of affairs would only be bad if it made things tangibly worse for a person by decreasing their well-being. It's true that nonexistent beings aren't being brought from a preferable state of affairs to a undesirable one (and vice versa). Therefore, creating a person won't be a benefit/harm for the person.
However, I have not assumed that view here, so it isn't pertinent to my position.
Ah, so we are back to you not agreeing to the facts on the ground.. Okay here we go back to the fuckn drawing board.
It's not "problematic" because in one case collateral damage IS taking place. That is a fact.
In the other case, collateral damage IS NOT taking place.
The most important part of this whole thing is collateral damage IS taking place. THAT is the immoral part. We want to NOT do THAT because THAT is immoral.
There is no benefit in one case and there is benefit in another. If the lack of damage is good even though it does not provide relief/satisfaction to an actual person, the absence of happiness can also be bad even if it's absence doesn't cause conscious "collateral damage". Talking past this or mysteriously talking about parents instead of beings (and not doing so when it comes to the deprivation of happiness) whenever it comes to this won't affect the truth.
Another important part of this whole "thing" is that benefits are taking place. That is the moral part.
No no.. I'm going to call you weasel if you keep weasling like this.. Look at what I said again instead of what you would like to see:
The most important part of this is to understand by procreation, collateral damage IS taking place. That is the immoral part. The parent should NOT do that. That is immoral.
It's certainly important. However, it's also important that genuine benefits are taking place. That is the moral part. The parents should do that. That is moral.
Creating suffering for the sake of happiness is, and doing so unnecessarily.. That is moral? So at least you are not weasling here.. You get my point, right. It is the state of affairs where collateral damage is taking place that is where the moral issue comes into play right? The fact that no one exists if one doesn't actual decide to procreate matters not.. You can call that decision "good" or "not good or bad".. but the point is the collateral damage is the "bad" here.. That is the morally relevant state of affairs we are deciding to select or not select for someone else.
I just don't think you understand your own argument. Children to be don't exist, true. Parents can bring these into being; it is a choice. True also. It is an imposition on the possible child of suffering. True. But this future possibility regarding the well being of others (however they may be conceived) is something that applies to all actions we take. Parenting is a future-looking affair, just as buying shoes or making charitable contributions; I mean, in all we do our affairs are like this. Parenting is thus one occasion of forwardlookingness and so the matter turns toward not simply parenting, but to the very structure of experience itself, which is inherently forward-looking.
In other words, conceive of all that you could possibly do. Each that you conceive will be something of consequence and there are no exceptions to this, whether is is deciding about bringing children in t he world or pay8ng your taxes, there will be a "cost" in negative utility. If your argument is right, then we have no right at all to bring into the world any suffering., for suffering is inherently bad and all choices would be inherently bad due to this negative utility.
Your take on parenting is arbitrary, for the logic of it penetrates all that we do.
That's just how it works, old man; the egg is necessary to the chicken, and the chicken is necessary to the egg. Hence the unanswerable question. It is not necessary to me to have children but it is necessary to my children that I had them; and their suffering is necessary to their lives as your suffering is necessary to yours.
You see, when you talk about what an individual has to do - what they find necessary, then you begin to talk sense; you don't have to have children; if you do have children they will suffer. These are bald facts; but there is no life without suffering, so there is no unnecessary suffering {apart from all the unnecessary suffering that we ought to avoid, by not putting ground glass in the bread and not shooting folks in the knee-cap etc.}
Quoting DA671
I reject the calculus of joy - suffering = value of life. A life of suffering is valuable. Fall in love, and be heartbroken; go climbing and break a leg and die of exposure; have children and agonise over their every grazed knee. Live much and suffer and die, and if there is joy sometimes, that is a bonus.
I'm going to stop you right here, because it actually doesn't. There are some things due to the special nature of procreation vs. already existing people that make the decision different.
I'm listening
The damage is bad, but the benefits are good. My position is that it can be ethical to create the person due to the presence of goods (they are also morally relevant), and you solely emphasise the prevention of harms. Ultimately, we have different intuitions as far as this topic is concerned.
Have a brilliant day!
Why is the suffering "necessary" to take place in the first place? As the parent, you decided that their suffering is "necessary". This isn't a weird paternalism of amusement?
Quoting unenlightened
Ah, so you are misunderstanding my point about unnecessary suffering. Unnecessary in the fact that, unlike most of life where you do indeed have to worry about not doing X to prevent Y, and weighing various outcomes of harm.. This is a case where you (the parent) can not create ANY harm for another person..
See here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/657460
Who?
What does "ultimate sense" here mean.. You sound like a god damn messiah trying to spread the word.. You aren't, there isn't.
Quoting DA671
I am saying at the end of the day, unhad goods mean nothing for no one. Rather, harms had is bad for someone and not do that to someone. Good day.
You, the parent, aren't creating (unnecessarily) someone else who is harmed.
I am also ending this here. Unhad goods do lead to harm for existing people (such as loss of health leading to pain). As for those who don't exist, if unhad goods don't matter due to the fact that nobody is experiencing a deprivation in the void, the absence of harms is not preferable either, since there aren't any souls in nihility who are fulfilled/relieved from an absence of suffering. Benefits had is good for a person and we should strive to help and support each other as much as possible. As ever, have an excellent day/night!
You wrote, "Ah, so you are misunderstanding my point about unnecessary suffering. Unnecessary in the fact that, unlike most of life where you do indeed have to worry about not doing X to prevent Y, and weighing various outcomes of harm.. This is a case where you (the parent) can not create ANY harm for another person.".
You assume that the unborn child does not exist, therefore, there can be no harm for the other person because the other person does not exist yet. One cannot have moral regard for nothing. Is This it?
Yes. I have heard your argument. I don't have to procreate, and if I don't procreate I nobody will come into being to be harmed. If I do procreate, necessarily a being will come into being who will suffer.
I think we agree as to the facts. It's the morality that we differ on. you equate harm with evil, and I utterly reject it.
This is like "how many angels fit at the head of a pin". I don't care about the "benefits of unhad alleviation" just that the parent isn't choosing to cause harm where they could have. Stick with the states of affairs and not the strawmen invisible empty set.
Quoting DA671
Unhad goods had by no one, I said.. Not just unhad goods in and of themselves.. I am careful not to fall into the non-identity traps you (and everyone else here apparently) likes to set.
Quoting DA671
Good thing I am not talking about the alleviation of bad then, right? Same reason why I wouldn't care about unhad goods.. It's about the parent not creating harm for others.. So glad we are not repeating that constant reworking of my statements.
Quoting DA671
And this the only thing you said here which is a legitimate normative statement.. That you think parents have an obligation to create benefits, despite the collateral damage that is created. I of course disagree that creating benefits, if it means creating collateral damage, is never good to do unnecessarily.
Reject harm as evil, or reject that we are at all harmed?
Also, I am glad we agree on the facts.. @DA671 keeps going in circles to make it so that we can't agree on them.
I also don't care about nonexistent beings experiencing deprivation. Sticking with consistency and caring about the benefits that the parents can create would be quite useful. Again, pointing out the flaws and forming a consistent view isn't the same as straw manning.
It was a clarification regarding the value of good, not a reference to nonexistent beings, so imaginary traps can be safely discarded. If unhad goods isn't bad, then neither is the absence of harms good.
Yes, finally one can stop talking about nonexistent beings not being deprived of happiness (as if that proves a point) and conveniently changing the topic when it comes to the value of the absence of suffering. This is also about the parents creating benefits for others. Hopefully, not all statements will be disregarded.
Yes, I disagree with you on this. If preventing the harms is necessary, then so is creating the joys.
Unhad goods matters not if no one exists to be deprived.
Alleviation of bad matters not either.. because there was no one to be alleviated.
All that matters is the parent doesn't choose "create collateral damage" onto someone else here. So all your points are moot cause I am not even trying to argue those.
Do you think there is such thing as a mild form of sadism?
If I kidnap you to work my garden and you eventually find some goods and bads with it, and I watch in amusement as you experience these things.. Am I being not just a little sadistic in my paternal amusement?
Your points are also moot because you have deliberately chosen to ignore the fact that damages are not the only thing to consider here. Creating genuine benefits that one never had a prior interest in avoiding and which could lead to amazing experiences that one could not have solicited otherwise will always be ethical. Irrelevant examples, such as one's involving harming existing people for the sake of benefits that are quite unlikely to surpass the goods are not useful. Paternalistically judging that nobody should be able to enjoy a park when they cannot ask for going there themselves merely due to one's own perspective is also problematic.
Yes, and an extreme form.
Quoting schopenhauer1
I don't know. It's your story you tell it. I do love gardening, mind.
I am not saying that.. For the last time. It is simply wrong to create collateral damage unnecessarily unto someone. That is what I am saying. Not the consequence on the non-existent person for not doing that.
Quoting DA671
No, keep up dude. The point is that YOU keep saying that if the parent doesn't procreation, then there are "unhad goods" and this is bad, but it isn't for anyone. All that matters is NO HARM is taking place. I am not saying that the "alleviation is thus good" as you seem to be about unhad goods (being bad).
To want suffering to exist because you want to see people struggle and overcome hardships, can be construed as mildly sadistic. Just because it happens to be people's stance a lot of the times, doesn't mean it still isn't a great stance to have regarding what they want to see from other people.
It's easy to say anything if one has unjustifiable and biased standards that are applied in an ad hoc manner. Merely proclaiming that unhad goods don't matter but unhad suffering matters sans an actual good does not show anything. You should be the one who should try to keep up, since you're the one who is insinuating that the lack of harms is good even though it isn't actually good for a person. And if creating harm can be bad even if not doing so isn't necessarily good for a person, then forming joys can be good even if their absence isn't problematic. If all that matters is the lack of suffering but not an actual good coming from that suffering, then I think one could also say that all that matters is the lack of joys, not an actual deprivation resulting from their absence.
I am saying exactly that actually. You seem to not care what I am saying, which is evident. The only thing that matters here is the parent not creating the harm. That is the moral decision. I am not saying that the non existent person is thus alleviated.
The only thing you said of any normative value is that you think creating collateral damage is not immoral. Okay then, we disagree.. BYYEEE.
I said a lot more, but it can be convenient to look away from things that challenge our cherished beliefs, such as the value of happiness and the nature of forcing something in the absence of an actual violation. If an action leads to a greater good for the person by virtue of the benefits, I do think that the action can be justified. Obviously, we disagree on this. Nevertheless, thanks for taking the time have this discussion.
That is a truly bizarre comment. What I or anyone wants is beside the point isn't it? Any being that lives, dies. Any being that lives, suffers harm. to live is to die, and therefore to live is to suffer harm. To notice this fact is not sadism, mild or bitter. That is an argument unworthy of you, and smacks of desperation. I'm stopping here, because it is clear that we have again reached the nub of our disagreement, and further discussion would be pointless suffering.
Your just arguing to argue now. Piss off if you can't be consructive. I've given you plenty here to loock back at.
You keep wanting to drop my earliest statements on state of affairs.
In on state, there is collateral damage. In the other there is not.
Should you create the state with collateral damage? That is the question. That is all. Anything else you say is straw manning me, and the fact you keep doing it, makes it now a red herring.. So stop.
I am sorry Un, but I don't really get what point you are trying to make.
Are we not in agreement that another life can come about if a parent decides to procreate?
And thus, if life has suffering, which we both agree it does, why, as the parent would you want to procreate and have a person who will suffer, as we both agree they would?
I thought you were trying to say that you think that "Yes, procreation is good despite suffering, because suffering isn't bad".. And I was responding to that. If I am not getting your argument, please explain.
I only want a consistent view regarding state of affairs.
In one state, there is benefit. In the other state, there are no benefits.
If the goods are high enough to allow the person to live a truly happy life, it's indeed justifiable to create the person. As long as you don't attempt to derail the conversation by talking about nobody being deprived due to an absence of suffering and falsely accusing me of straw manning you whenever I point out the fact that nobody is benefitted from the lack of harms either, there's not much left to say. Red herrings regarding straw mans are impertinent here.
As always, have a wonderful day!
Right, so the disagreement is always with whether causing harm is immoral. It is never because of "unhad" anything for the "no one" that exists. And so, characterizing the "not causing suffering" as "not causing benefit" either, is mischaracterizing the states of affairs.. Do you want to cause this or not cause this state of affairs..
You can surely make the same case for benefits.. Do you want to cause "benefits" or not cause "benefits", but that isn't the full story which is why I phrase it all encompassed as "collateral damage". It is the acknowledgement that with one, comes the collateral of the other. Is this right/just to cause on behalf of another unnecessarily? The answer is no.
For me, when one takes into account the innumerable positive experiences that countless people experience throughout their lives that act as a source of inimitable value even in the face of harms, I believe that the creating the benefits can be ethical. Therefore, in my view, the correct answer is, usually, yes. I hope that we can live in a world where this becomes even more likely.
And that was a response to the idea that there was some "loss" to "someone" going on- that there is no "downside" for any "one", only a projection of a downside (just as there would be as you pointed out to the joy of being alleviated from suffering). What matters is not creating a situation of X taking place. Not that X is good for someone.
Quoting DA671
I've stated my case contra this here before:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/643425
I've seen that before. I don't think that the potency of the joys can be ignored either. Many of the happiest people I've met were often those who didn't have a lot. A lot of beings can find great happiness in their lives even in the presence of harms. Resilience cannot be underestimated. However, it's true that suffering is a serious problem, which is why thoughtless procreation must be opposed.
I already said that I don't think that it's unethical to change the initial conditions to a positive one even if it has some harms. Many people also find their lives to be precious yet also resilient.
If anybody is interested, here's my response to that comment:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/643434
I’m not particularly interested in the topic, but I think this is a good inconsistency to have found.
I know and I wonder if you don't keep harping on this (non) point that I am not making as you know I have been careful not to make it. As if to just bug the hell out of me you keep bringing this idea of consistency when this whole time, you know that I have been careful to always say X state of affairs or not X state of affairs. But I'd like to just not talk about it. I just need you not to bring it up as if I am.
Quoting DA671
I said my thoughts in that earlier post so you can look back for reasoning why suffering created is not good to do.
But if it were even my argument. My whole point to him was that he keeps pretending I am talking about the nonexistent nobodies when I am just talking about states of affairs of creating collateral damage or not creating it. You sir, are perpetuating his endless straw man with this.. Encouraging it.
No, I’m just here to pronounce @DA671 the winner of the argument.
Ah, so no reply. Good one.
As for states of affairs, I already said that I don't agree with the idea that benefits should not be created for the sake of preventing damage.
And you can also look at my comments (or the world in general) to see why, though it's not necessarily good to create harm, it's certainly ethical to create joys. I've read through the replied, and I am not convinced by the claim that the truly meaningful experiences of life and the effulgent smiles of billion of sentient beings don't give us adequate reasons for creating a person. Thanks for the discussion and have a good day!
As for hypothetical consent, I think that the whole concept is inapplicable, so the discussion is irrelevant. Yet, if an act can somehow be immoral by virtue of a lack of consent despite of the absence of alternative interests, then appealing to hypothetical consent for something valuable that one cannot ask for at a particular point of time doesn't seem wrong to me. Anyway, this was a good discussion.
Most people believe that the first step is to do a cost-benefit analysis (weigh the pros and cons).
This, prima facie, seems generalizable i.e. it gives one the impression that one could think for someone else and give/withhold consent on their behalf. Unfortunately or fortunately, no, we can't for the simple reason that we all differ in our values, sometimes only in small ways but at other times we could all be thought of as living on separate planets.
That said, there are some core values we all share and these then amount to a strong justification for hypothetical consent,
How is that relevant to the OP?
In the OP I outlined what I took - and still take - to be a set of conditions on when hypothetical consent might count for something. I argued that the fact Rachel would have consented to have X done to her only counts for something, ethically speaking, when:
a) the hypothetical consent is informed and not a product of ignorance;
b) the actual informed consent is not practically possible;
c) when not doing X to Rachel would either result in her being harmed, or deprived of a significant benefit;
and d) when the hypothetical consent can be considered to be present prior to the performance of the act.
I defended each condition. I would only add to it that b should include 'not normatively possible' too, as sometimes getting someone's actual consent may be something we have powerful normative reason not to do. And c should include 'undeserved' harm and 'deprived of a significant benefit that she did not positively deserve not to receive'.
My point is that the method employed in re accepting/rejecting a proposal matters to hypothetical consent. One thing's for sure - it involves an examination of risks & benefits. The catch is these are value-dependent and one man's meat is another man's poison if you catch my drift.
Quoting Bartricks
:ok:
Quoting Bartricks
:ok:
Quoting Bartricks
Problemo! If Rachel has a different set of values, you wouldn't be able to give/withhold consent on her behalf. One man's meat is another man's poison.
Quoting Bartricks
:ok:
What's the problem? Are you saying that there is no fact of the matter about whether doing X to Rachel will harm her or not? Or are you just saying that sometimes it'll be hard to tell?
Either way there is no problem for my condition. If there is no fact of the matter about it - an absurd proposition, for of course there is - then c still applies and so too if you are just saying that it'll sometimes be hard to tell. You haven't done anything to show c to be false by simply pointing out that sometimes it won't be easy to tell if c is satisfied.
:up:
That's the fatal flaw in your argument, oui?
We ought not to hurt another, other things being equal. But sometimes we can't tell whether doing X will hurt another or not. By your wonky lights that's evidence that it is false that we ought not to hurt another.
You're contradicting yourself. First you affirm it isn't (always) possible to know what someone wants and then, second you deny that very position by averring that hypothetical consent is permissible.
I was wrong, a thousand apologies. Hypothetical consent is possible. One simply has to put oneself in the other person's shoes! I recall, 6 or so moons ago, attempting to simulate the long-dead Buddha (his mind); some very well-known thespians are known to become the character they're portraying. So, for instance, Ben Kingsley (becomes)is Gandhi!
I've never done that.
Quoting Agent Smith
How's that any kind of contradiction?
The proposition "Rachel would have consented to have X done to her" can be true. And it is the moral relevance of such truths that I am talking about.
We can be informed of what a person's value set is, the particulars of a given situation, and that's all we need for hypothetical consent.
Implicit in the notion of hypothetical consent is the belief/fact that we're all, like Aristotle thought, rational animals. Are we?
:ok:
Thanks for your willingness to raise awareness regarding the need to alleviate harms. Hope you have a great day/night ahead!