Against Benatar's axiological asymmetry
I am an antinatalist. There are lots of arguments for the thesis. But I think a very prominent argument for it - the most discussed in the literature - is bad: Benatar's argument.
In his book "Better Never to Have Been", David Benatar defends a supposed asymmetry between harm and benefit and appeals to this asymmetry in making his case for antinatalism (the view that we ought not procreate). But I think it's really bad - I think there are at least three problems with it: the asymmetry he posits has no explanatory value; the asymmetry he posits is incoherent; and finally the asymmetry implies procreation is bad if we do not pre-exist, but not bad if we do, whereas intuitively it should make no difference either way (that is, whether antinatalism is true or false, it should not turn crucially on whether we pre-exist or not - yet Benatar's argument makes it so).
Benatar's asymmetry
Benatar argues that absent harm is good, even when there is no one for whom it is good. By contrast, absent benefit, thinks Benatar, is not bad unless there is someone for whom it is a deprivation.
So, the asymmetry is that the goodness of absent pain does not need a subject - there does not need to be anyone for whom it is good. By contrast, the badness of absent benefit does require there to be a subject - a someone for whom its absence is an deprivation. Thus, absent pain is good, but absent pleasure is not bad.
That asymmetry is not self-evident to reason. That is, it is not intuitive in the way that, say, 2 + 3 = 5 is. As such it needs to be motivated in some way - we need some justification for thinking it is real.
Benatar recognizes this and motivates it by arguing that its reality is the best explanation of our rational intuitions about certain cases. For instance, imagine it is true that if Sue and Dave procreate, their offspring will have lives of total agony and then die. Well, it seems self-evident to reason that they ought not procreate. By contrast, imagine that if Mr and Mrs Bartricks breed, any child they have will be very happy. Well, it seems self-evident to reason that Mr and Mrs Batricks do no wrong if they refrain from procreating. So, it seems that we have a positive obligation not to create miserable lives, yet no positive obligation to create happy ones. Benatar takes this to be obvious - and i agree, it is - and says the asymmetry between benefit and harm explains it. For the absent suffering is good (and thus Sue and Dave do good by not procreating), whereas the absent happiness that Mr and Mrs Bartricks' decision not to procreate creates is not bad.
First problem
Our intuitions about the miserable life and happy life cases are asymmetrical and this is why they cry out for explanation. However, all Benatar does by way of explanation is appeal to a supposedly more general asymmetry which these intuitions reflect. How's that any kind of explanation? The asymmetry that Benatar is appealing to also cries out for explanation. Indeed, it is not really a distinct asymmetry - it is, by hypothesis, the same asymmetry, as our intuitions about the happy and miserable life cases are supposed simply to be reflective of it. So it doesn't really begin to be an explanation. It's akin to me asking "how does this watch work?" and receiving the answer "well, it is a particular instance of a watch from a company that makes working watches. Its watches work - it is known as the working-watch-company for a reason - and this is a watch". So, the first problem is that it is no explanation at all. You can't explain an asymmetry by just supposing it to be an instance of a more general asymmetry that itself requires explanation. (And Benatar can't deny that the asymmetry needs explaining - for if it didn't need explaining in the miserable and happy life cases, then his asymmetry is wholly unmotivated).
Second problem
The asymmetry he is proposing is incoherent. This is because absent harm cannot be good if there is no one for whom it is good. If a state of affairs is good, then it is morally valuable - that's true by definition. But something cannot be morally valuable if it is not valued. Where there is value, there needs to be a valuer. The idea that there can be moral value without any valuers seems every bit as confused as thinking that there can exist suffering without any sufferers. Thus, for anything to be morally valuable, there needs to be at least one person who is valuing its being as it is. And whatever it is, that state of affairs will then be good 'for' that person. Thus, there is no such asymmetry. Absent pain is indeed good, but it is always good for someone, just as pleasure is good when it is good for someone. In a world devoid of subjects, nothing would be good or bad. To put it another way, Benatar's asymmetry assumes the truth of some kind of moral objectivism about moral value, a view that is incoherent.
Third problem
If we pre-exist, then the asymmetry does not apply to procreative acts. So, Benatar's case for antinatalism only applies if procreative acts literally summon a person into existence. If instead procreative acts transfer an already existent person from elsewhere to here - which for all we know, they may well do - then it does not apply. Yet intuitively that should surely make no difference? Granted, if we had some reason to think that, 'if' people pre-exist, then they exist in a state of agony, or a state of great pleasure, then plausibly this would make a great difference to the morality of procreation. But in the absence of any reason to think that pre-existent life is better than, worse than, or the same as life here, then our pre-existence should make no difference to the morality of procreation - yet Benatar's argument implies otherwise. So much the worse for his argument, then.
In his book "Better Never to Have Been", David Benatar defends a supposed asymmetry between harm and benefit and appeals to this asymmetry in making his case for antinatalism (the view that we ought not procreate). But I think it's really bad - I think there are at least three problems with it: the asymmetry he posits has no explanatory value; the asymmetry he posits is incoherent; and finally the asymmetry implies procreation is bad if we do not pre-exist, but not bad if we do, whereas intuitively it should make no difference either way (that is, whether antinatalism is true or false, it should not turn crucially on whether we pre-exist or not - yet Benatar's argument makes it so).
Benatar's asymmetry
Benatar argues that absent harm is good, even when there is no one for whom it is good. By contrast, absent benefit, thinks Benatar, is not bad unless there is someone for whom it is a deprivation.
So, the asymmetry is that the goodness of absent pain does not need a subject - there does not need to be anyone for whom it is good. By contrast, the badness of absent benefit does require there to be a subject - a someone for whom its absence is an deprivation. Thus, absent pain is good, but absent pleasure is not bad.
That asymmetry is not self-evident to reason. That is, it is not intuitive in the way that, say, 2 + 3 = 5 is. As such it needs to be motivated in some way - we need some justification for thinking it is real.
Benatar recognizes this and motivates it by arguing that its reality is the best explanation of our rational intuitions about certain cases. For instance, imagine it is true that if Sue and Dave procreate, their offspring will have lives of total agony and then die. Well, it seems self-evident to reason that they ought not procreate. By contrast, imagine that if Mr and Mrs Bartricks breed, any child they have will be very happy. Well, it seems self-evident to reason that Mr and Mrs Batricks do no wrong if they refrain from procreating. So, it seems that we have a positive obligation not to create miserable lives, yet no positive obligation to create happy ones. Benatar takes this to be obvious - and i agree, it is - and says the asymmetry between benefit and harm explains it. For the absent suffering is good (and thus Sue and Dave do good by not procreating), whereas the absent happiness that Mr and Mrs Bartricks' decision not to procreate creates is not bad.
First problem
Our intuitions about the miserable life and happy life cases are asymmetrical and this is why they cry out for explanation. However, all Benatar does by way of explanation is appeal to a supposedly more general asymmetry which these intuitions reflect. How's that any kind of explanation? The asymmetry that Benatar is appealing to also cries out for explanation. Indeed, it is not really a distinct asymmetry - it is, by hypothesis, the same asymmetry, as our intuitions about the happy and miserable life cases are supposed simply to be reflective of it. So it doesn't really begin to be an explanation. It's akin to me asking "how does this watch work?" and receiving the answer "well, it is a particular instance of a watch from a company that makes working watches. Its watches work - it is known as the working-watch-company for a reason - and this is a watch". So, the first problem is that it is no explanation at all. You can't explain an asymmetry by just supposing it to be an instance of a more general asymmetry that itself requires explanation. (And Benatar can't deny that the asymmetry needs explaining - for if it didn't need explaining in the miserable and happy life cases, then his asymmetry is wholly unmotivated).
Second problem
The asymmetry he is proposing is incoherent. This is because absent harm cannot be good if there is no one for whom it is good. If a state of affairs is good, then it is morally valuable - that's true by definition. But something cannot be morally valuable if it is not valued. Where there is value, there needs to be a valuer. The idea that there can be moral value without any valuers seems every bit as confused as thinking that there can exist suffering without any sufferers. Thus, for anything to be morally valuable, there needs to be at least one person who is valuing its being as it is. And whatever it is, that state of affairs will then be good 'for' that person. Thus, there is no such asymmetry. Absent pain is indeed good, but it is always good for someone, just as pleasure is good when it is good for someone. In a world devoid of subjects, nothing would be good or bad. To put it another way, Benatar's asymmetry assumes the truth of some kind of moral objectivism about moral value, a view that is incoherent.
Third problem
If we pre-exist, then the asymmetry does not apply to procreative acts. So, Benatar's case for antinatalism only applies if procreative acts literally summon a person into existence. If instead procreative acts transfer an already existent person from elsewhere to here - which for all we know, they may well do - then it does not apply. Yet intuitively that should surely make no difference? Granted, if we had some reason to think that, 'if' people pre-exist, then they exist in a state of agony, or a state of great pleasure, then plausibly this would make a great difference to the morality of procreation. But in the absence of any reason to think that pre-existent life is better than, worse than, or the same as life here, then our pre-existence should make no difference to the morality of procreation - yet Benatar's argument implies otherwise. So much the worse for his argument, then.
Comments (55)
Quoting Bartricks
You could say "it is good there is no one experiencing the pain"?
Or are you asking if absence of pain would be good even if no one exists? In that case, no - for the reasons given in the OP.
Quoting Bartricks
It feels right to say that non-existence is neither good or bad; it is neutral. However, if everyone stopped reproducing, it feels acceptable to say "it is good there will be no more people to experience pain".
Benatar is assuming that there can be moral value in the absence of any and all valuers. And that makes no sense.
Perhaps it is open to Benatar to concede that there does indeed need to be someone for whom a good state of affairs is good in order for it to be good. Yet he could argue that this person - the source of moral value - values a universe in which there is no suffering, but is indifferent to the absence of pleasure when there is no one from whom it is absent.
1. Nonexistence means the absence of both pleasure & pain.
2. The absence of pain is good even if there's no one to experience it.
3. The absence of pleasure is not bad unless there's someone who experiences it.
I reckon Benatar's asymmetry is true :point: suicide!
Suicide suggests/indicates that people believe 1, 2 & 3 (above).
"Where there is value, there needs to be a valuer."
In which case one cannot claim that the absence of pain that helps nobody in the void is good but the lack of happiness isn't because someone isn't crying out for the joys.
Regarding suicide and the "truth" of asymmetry, I think that people can believe many false things and many right things for the wrong reasons. If the fact that most people believe life is good and the joys are worth creating even if nobody needs them does not justify the idea that life can be worth it, then I don't think that the notion that the absence of pain is good but the lack of joy isn't bad can be logically defended, even though this might be an intuition we have (along with a whole bunch ofnotjer the intuitions that include the goodness of reproduction and life itself). The reality is that:
1. Cessation could be rational if one considers the fact that it would prevent more harm than good.
2. Alternatively, it could reduce one's pain, a relief which would certainly be desirable if no other way can be found.
Benatar's asymmetry is false and the biggest argument for that is life itself ;)
Quoting Bartricks
Agreed. As you've said, moral rights and wrongs only exist in minds.
Quoting Bartricks
Is he not just proposing an argument and stimulating people's intuitions to gain support for it, just as we would? It is not clear that he is saying the AAA is objectively true.
Another problem is a ramification of the argument. If it's sound and it applies to Benatar then it applies to me and to everyone. So to maximise benefit and minimise suffering we shouldn't breed. So the race will die out gradually as we age and die. There will be zero suffering. Nobody will be losing because nobody will exist who can lose. The result is nihilism. A stronger conclusion than the one intended, but I don't see how we can avoid it, having accepted Benatar's conclusion.
The strongest argument against antinatalism is the declaration "Darling, I'm pregnant."
As for pregnancy, I do think that we really need to take procreation far more seriously and ensure that we don't engage in mindless reproduction that could create mostly bad lives and exacerbate harms.
Benatar's argument is subtle and doesn't depend on the idea that life may be generally crap. Even if a life is 99.9% full of joy there will be some suffering. And by not having children we can avoid creating any suffering at all for them. They will not be 'missing out' on any pleasure because they will never exist. His argument works regardless of the balance of pain and pleasure for the child.
Nonexistence is to be released from suffering. That the suicider ceases to exist upon death doesn't concern him/her (the absence of pain even when there's no one to experience that absence is good).
What about the pleasure that a person forfeits upon death/choosing nonexistence? The absence of pleasure, if you really look at it, is, in essence, pain and we've already demonstrated (vide supra) that "the absence of pain even when there's no one to experience that absence is good" (as per suiciders).
That's basically Benatar's asymmetry.
However, the asymmetry ignores the contributions a would-be person could make to the overall alleviation/elimination of suffering. Imagine that you refuse to start a family and it's the case that your children would've discovered the cure for cancer, solved world poverty, brought world peace, and so on. To illustrate, the Bernoulli family, father and two sons, were instrumental to the advancement of mathematics; if genius/goodness runs in the family, is hereditary, it would be a capital mistake not to...er...breed a good stock! :smile:
Anyway, I made criticisms of the argument that you are simply ignoring.
I agree. It's hard to see how morality exists in a personless universe.
Why? Do my criticisms of it fail - in what way?
Note, this thread is not about the credibility of antinatalism, but about a particular asymmetry that Benatar appeals to in arguing for antinatalism. So if you say "the asymmetry is correct, but it does not imply antinatalism" then you're not focussing on what this thread is about - which is the credibility of the asymmetry, not the credibility of antinatalism.
When it comes to benefits and harms we can distinguish between the undeserved and the non-deserved.
When a harm or benefit is undeserved, it is bad. And any action that promotes undeserved harm or benefit is an action that we have some moral reason not to perform by virtue of this fact about it. (Note, an undeserved harm could also be construed as harm you deserve not to suffer).
When a harm or benefit is non-deserved, then though it is good if it is a benefit and bad if it is a harm, we do not have any moral reason to perform the action that generates it.
So far, so self evident.
Intuitively, if you have done nothing and nothing has been done to you, then any harm you subsequently suffer is undeserved.
However, equally intuitively, any benefit that subsequently accrues to you is non-deserved. That is, if you have done nothing at all, and some benefit accrues to you, that is good, not bad (if it was undeserved, it would be bad, not good).
So, harms that befall someone who has done nothing or had nothing done to them are undeserved harms that we have reason to prevent. But benefits that befall someone who has done nothing or had nothing done to them are non-deserved and thus are benefits we have no moral reason to create.
This explains why we have moral reason not to create a miserable life - the misery is undeserved harm and thus is harm we have reason not to create - and it explains why we have no positive moral reason to create the happy life - the happiness is non-deserved and is thus happiness we have no reason to create.
It is an asymmetry, but unlike Benatar's it is intuitive and thus explanatory. And it does not generate the problems that Benatar's does. For it makes no difference whether a person pre-exists or not, other things being equal.
Incidentally, it also implies antinatalism. For the benefits contained in a potential life turn out to be non-deserved and thus benefits we have no positive reason to generate. By contrast, the harms contained in a potential life are undeserved and are thus harms we have positive reason not to create.
I already said I don't agree with it. I don't think I ignored your argument.
It's true that only the existent can experience goods and bads. They might also prevent potential benefits/harms.
Your claims about harms/benefits and who "deserves them are problematic, in my view. If it's bad for people to experience harms they did not "deserve" to experience, I don't see why it wouldn't be good for innocent potential people to experience joys they never deserved to not experience. Once again, there's no real asymmetry here, so universal antinatalism cannot be justifiable.
That's not what I said. I said that in order for something to be good, there has to be someone for whom it is good, for moral value requires a valuer. That's not at all the same as what you just said. Lots of goods and bads are not experiential, but they can still exist. It is just that the goodness of them, or the badness of them, would be 'for' someone insofar as there would be someone valuing or disvaluing that non-experiential state.
Anyway, you have focussed on antinatalism, not the asymmetry I was criticizing. Focus.
Regarding the "asymmetry", it doesn't make sense to suggest that people who haven't done any good/bad don't "deserve" to suffer (which is why it would be good to prevent harm, which in turn would imply that they "deserve" to not suffer), but they somehow don't deserve to be happy (since they haven't done anything that justifies not creating that good). We do have a positive reason to create good (though that might be mitigated by other factors) just as we might have reasons to not create harm. Your argument implies that one needs to have done something good in order to deserve happiness, but if that's the case, then one could also say that they need to have done something worthwhile in order to deserve the prevention of harm (and the people who would have valuable lives need to have done something harmful if they apparently deserve to not experience potential joy). And if we cannot refer to nonexistence and only have existing people to work with, then we could also consider the fact that we do try to alleviate suffering for those who exist, which (rightly) suggests that we believe that everybody deserves to not suffer and be happy as long as they haven't harmed anybody. But if one needs to have done something moral to deserve happiness, then one could apply the same criteria to the prevention of harm and claim that we don't need to prevent suffering for people who just began to exist since they never did something that made them "deserve" the prevention of suffering. In other words, the bar of good as a necessity for joy but not for the prevention of harms seems arbitrary. I would also say that when we usually talk about what someone does not deserve, we also talk about what they do. So, if I say that someone does not deserve to be in prison, then I am also implying that they deserve to be free. Applying this framework to your argument would lead us to the absurd conclusion that people who begin to exist deserve to not experience joy (since they don't deserve to experience them).
In short, if the creation of suffering that nobody deserved to experience is bad (which would imply that "they" deserved to not suffer even though they did not exist prior to their birth), then the formation of joys that we did not deserve to not experience can be good. If one needs to have done some good in order to justify the bestowal of joy onto them, then the only consistent view would be that one needs to have done a good if they don't deserve to suffer. I think that you are equivocating. By saying that suffering is undeserving, you are essentially implying that there is a reason to prevent harms for someone who has not done anything moral. In other words, people always "deserve" to not suffer. However, one could just as easily point out the fact nonexistent beings have not done something immoral either, which is why they don't deserve to not experience potential joy. I don't see any valid reason to accept the claim that doing something good is required for one who never existed to deserve happiness (which is a bizarre criteria, since we don't have a reason to assume that people who were created by us and haven't done any harm and weren't capable of doing a good before existing don't deserve to be happy), but it isn't necessary for them to have done something moral in order for them to deserve the elimination of suffering. Whenever we say that something was undeserving, we also mean that something else was preferable, such as freedom instead of imprisonment. Therefore, if you believe that the harms were undeserving, your position also entails that nonexistent beings "deserve" to not suffer. And this is where the unjustified double standards in your asymmetry become clear, for if it is important to have done a good for one to deserve joy, then I don't see why the same criteria should not apply in order for us to become undeserving of suffering. As always, focus does remain important. Have a wonderful day!
I don't follow you. Which claim of mine are you denying?
The claim that seems to imply that we do not deserve happiness because we haven't done anything moral, but we somehow deserve the prevention of suffering even though we haven't done anything good to justify that either.
Question begging. Harms can be deserved or non-deserved. If a harm is deserved, then we have reason - or can have raeson to - to create it.
I could benefit you right now by sending you some money. Do I have a positive reason to do that? No, right? I could if I wanted - it is not immoral of me to do it. But I don't have a positive obligation to give you some money. That benefit - the benefit I could create by sending you some money - is non-deserved.
Quoting DA671
I am appealing to self-evident truths. One can say that 2 + 1 = 90, but it has no self-evidence to it at all. Whereas that 2 + 1 = 3 does.
Now, it is self-evident that any harm that befalls an innocent is undeserved.
It is also self-evident that any benefit that befalls an innocent is non-deserved.
Again, I am going to assume that you are innocent. Well, if I just punch you, then I have visited an undeserved harm on you - I have done something wrong, something I had positive reason not to do. But if I send you some money, then I have visited non-deserved benefit on you. I have done something good, but not something I had positive reason to do. Yes?
It's not the case that you deserve not to be punched and deserve to be sent some money. No, you deserve not to be punched, but you are non-deserving of being sent some money.
We all recognize this at some level - rights language can be used to express it. You have a 'right' not to be punched by me, but you have no right to be sent some of my money.
On what basis are you disputing it? Do you have the same right to have me visit a benefit on you as you do not to have me visit a harm upon you?
Note too the ambiguity of the view you attribute to me. To say that we 'do not deserve' happiness is ambiguous between being non-deserving of it and being positively undeserving of it.
I would say that we are 'non-deserving' of happiness when we are innocent. So, not undeserving of it, but non-deserving of it.
We could be deserving of things without it being necessary for you to provide it to me if I don't have an extreme need for that thing in order to be happy. As for the benefit, I don't think that one needs to constantly benefit others when they don't need external help to such a great degree. However, this is because of the linked nature of harms and benefits. If one would suffer terribly if they don't get the money due to the absence of the joy of getting it, then it would definitely be important to give the money. However, since the lack of money is not likely to cause terrible harm to my ability to be happy, it doesn't make sense for you to sacrifice precious resources for trying to help me. But it's evident that nonexistent beings aren't in a state of affairs they prefer/don't prefer, which is why we would have to take future goods/harms into account.
I don't think that your claim is intuitive at all. One could claim that 2+2 is 4 but 1×4 is 8. But this would not make this true.
It's indeed self-evident that the harms are undeserved.
But it's also self-evident that the benefits are deserved. This is because we assume the innocence of people. We believe that innocent human beings deserve to not suffer, and they deserve to be happy. Your argument hasn't truly addressed that.
If you punch me, it would certainly be wrong (I think), since I don't believe that I deserve to be punched (I hope). However, this also implies that I deserve to be healthy (which is good for me). Deserving things seems to be about our innocence, not on the intensity of our needs to prevent being punched vs gaining money. For instance, even if someone is perfectly happy, it wouldn't be the case that they don't deserve more happiness unless they committed an immoral deed.
On the basis of consistency. Benefits and harms are interrelated. Since existing beings don't require incessant intervention in order to live sufficiently valuable lives, I do think that preventing extreme harms is more important. However, nonexistent beings aren't in a fulfilled state of affairs, which is why it becomes important to treat harms/benefits as far as they are concerned.
I don't think that there is any ambiguity. In my view, when we say that we don't deserve something, we necessarily mean that we deserve something else. This can be seen when we talk about people not deserving to be in prison, which is precisely because we believe that they deserve to be free. Therefore, it's the term "non-deserving" which is ambiguous and somewhat peculiar.
So, just to be clear - you think you have as much right to have others benefit you as you do to have them not harm you? Because, you know, that's absurd and you don't really think it and no-one else does either.
It is intuitively obvious that, other things being equal, you deserve not to be harmed by me. And it is equally intuitively obvious that you are not entitled to have me visit a benefit on you.
Here's the definition of "deserve" according to the Cambridge dictionary:
"to have earned or to be given something because of the way you have behaved or the qualities you have"
This means that deserving things has to do with our actions (which is why if one can say that we don't deserve to be happy because we haven't done anything moral before existing, we could also say that we don't deserve to not suffer since we haven't done anything to be "worthy" of that) and not with whether or not I would suffer from an absence of something. I could still deserve to receive a gift even if I am already happy as long as I don't commit an evil deed. Now, whether it's obligatory for you to give me a gift is a different matter, and this depends upon the degree of sacrifice involved for you, the long-term consequences of actions that could be universalised, as well as the amount of happiness that would be lost if I don't get the money. However, nonexistent beings aren't in a satisfied state of affairs, which is why we do not need to treat the benefits and harms in an asymmetrical manner.
If you say that people don't deserve to suffer (undeserved harm), then you are presuming their innocence. I would argue that innocent people deserve to be happy, just as they don't deserve to suffer. However, the way we create happiness has to be seen under a broader context that includes our own well-being and limitations as well as the outcome of any action (such as incessantly forcing others to increase happiness).
Do I have as much reason to benefit you as harm you?
The answer is 'no', right?
So, you don't positively deserve any benefit from me - it'd be nice if I benefitted you, but it is not obligatory.
By contrast, I do have an obligation not to visit a harm on you.
This is intuitively obvious. It is asymmetrical. But it is intuitively obvious.
So, other things being equal, an innocent person does not positively deserve benefit - they are 'non' deserving of benefit (not 'undeserving' but 'non-deserving'). But they do deserve not to be harmed.
And note, this 'explains' why we have no positive obligation to procreate even if we know that the life we create will be a happy one, and explains why we do have a positive obligation not to procreate if we know the life we create will be an unhappy one.
I could still deserve happiness, but this doesn't mean that I need it or you have to give it to me. Again, deserving things is about our innocence.
Again, preventing harms might be more important for those who already exist because most people do not require external interference for being adequately happy as long as they aren't harmed. This doesn't mean that one does not have a reason to benefit others, but this reason can be affected by our own personal limitations and the fact that the good isn't that pertinent for a sufficiently valuable life. But this doesn't apply to those who don't exist.
It's not asymmetrical, since both the joys and the harms do matter. It's only the case that there isn't a need to constantly try to benefit others when they do have fairly decent lives since they would probably not lose much happiness from the lack of intervention as long as there isn't severe harm. However, this framework would not apply when there is no fulfilled state of affairs in the first place.
Again, we do deserve happiness (because that has more to do with moral and immoral actions) just as much as we don't deserve suffering. But this doesn't mean that one would always need that happiness or there wouldn't be other factors to consider (such as the harm you could incur in trying to benefit me).
If it can be good to prevent harm, I do think that it can be bad to not create valuable lives. However, this has to be seen in the larger context of practical limitations and the impact of any universalisation of any idea.
I explicitly said that it would be good!! To receive a non-deserved benefit is 'good'. Not bad. Good.
To receive an undeserved benefit is 'bad'.
To receive a non-deserved benefit is 'good'.
But some goods generate positive reason to perform the acts that will create them, whereas others do not.
And the point is that non-deserved goods do not generate positive reason to perform the acts that will create them.
So, I have a positive obligation not to hit you. I have no positive obligation to give you $1,000.
Now, on your view, according to which there is no asymmetry and we have as much obligation to benefit as not to harm, I have as much obligation to benefit you as to not harm you. And on your view, I have an obligation to procreate. I could create happy children - so I ought to. That's what your view says. I ought not to create miserable children. But if I know that any child I have will be happy, I have a positive obligation to create that child. Yet by hypothesis I do not. I mean, that's precisely the kind of case that Benatar is appealing to and that I am saying his asymmetry does nothing to explain. So it is not up for grabs - it is a fixed point in this debate that we do not have a positive obligation to create happy children, but we do have a positive obligation 'not' to create miserable ones. The question is how best to explain this, not 'whether' it is true.
That view is not supported by our intuitions. That is, it is not self-evident. It's just a view. But a view that cannot call on support from self-evident truths of reason is just that: a view. We have no reason to think it is true and it explains nothing at all.
Receiving an undeserved benefit could still be good for a person (in the sense that it would give them joy), but it obviously won't be moral, so I agree with that.
I think that all goods do give us reason to help others, but the point is that those reasons don't have the same power and can be countered by other reasons, such as the issues the creation of that relatively minor good could cause for you. Since most people don't need constant interference for joy other than a lack of harm, it wouldn't make sense to make others try to benefit people at a higher cost for themselves, since this is likely to lead to more harm than good. However, nonexistent beings are not in any preferable/undesirable state of affairs, which is why we have to view that situation differently.
If you could give my $1000 dollars at a nonexistent cost to yourself (no loss for you, no concerns about trust) and if making this an obligation wouldn't cause more harm for others, I believe that one would indeed have a duty of beneficence. However, as things stand, it simply doesn't make sense to try to cause a small benefit that isn't indispensable for a sufficiently valuable life but could cause more harm for the person trying to give the benefit. However, since nonexistent beings are not in a preferable state, the potential joys matter as much as the potential suffering.
I have said multiple times that just because we have a reason to help someone, it doesn't mean that we have to do it. As I have said before, existing people don't require a flurry of benefits for them to be adequately happy as long as they aren't harmed, which is why it can certainly make sense to focus more on reducing harms for existing beings instead of trying to bring about benefits that would eventually cause more harm for you or society as a whole. However, nonexistent beings are not in a fulfilled situation, which is why we don't have a reason to treat the harms and benefits in an asymmetrical manner.
Just because we believe something, it doesn't mean it's true. If this were the case, then I suppose one could summarily dismiss antinatalism on the basis that most people do believe that having children is good and so is the preservation of the positive aspects of life. As for the "obligation to procreate", I believe that we do have a reason to create positive lives just as we have reasons to not do so. This doesn't mean that it's always possible, and it could be the case that implementing such a view could lead to more harm than good, which would be counterproductive. The idea that no positive lives should be created is as much of a "repugnant conclusion" for many as is the idea that we do need to create too many people (which isn't necessarily required). Intuitions are bound to differ. Still, it's great to see people like you who do want to alleviate suffering and care about others. I hope more people could become compassionate like you.
Since my view does not entail that we must keep benefitting others at great cost to oneself, it is indeed self-evident. On the other hand, a position that suggests that it's acceptable to prevent all deeply meaningful experiences for the sake of averting harms is neither intuitive nor self-evident. We definitely don't have good reasons for accepting such as position ;)
Your view is that there is no self-evident asymmetry between what an innocent person deserves, other things being equal. So, your view - for which you have provided not a scintilla of evidence - is that an innocent person is as deserving of benefit from others as they are deserving not to be harmed by others. That is, if act a creates a benefit for another person, and act b creates a harm for another person, I have as much reason to do a as not to do b. That is highly counter-intuitive. That view has the upshot that, other things being equal, I have an obligation to bring into existence a happy person if I know that by procreating I can do so. I have as much obligation to do that as I do not to create a miserable person if I know that by procreating I will do so. That's absurd - that's the very result we're trying 'not' to generate. You're just happily generating it.
Don't - don't - point to other considerations, such as how much sacrifice I would have to make to do one rather than the other. There is an 'other things being equal' clause in there! Stop ignoring those. THey mean something. It means that all those other things - such as the amount of cost it will incur for me or not - are being held 'equal'. So, if the costs to the actor are the same, we have positive reason not to visit harm on others, but no positive reason to provide positive benefit to others. The latter would be 'supererogatory' not 'obligatory'.
Anyway, again: the issue here is how best to explain the asymmetry between our intuitions about these cases. Intuitively, I have no positive obligation to create a happy life, but I do have an obligation not to create a miserable one. Other. Things. Being. Equal. That's in the bank. That's not up for dispute. What's up for dispute is how best to account for it - Benatar's way or another way? You have proffered a view - supported by no intuitions - that implies there is no asymmetry in our obligations in respect of the miserable and happy lives. Thus, your view is false. We need to account for the asymmetry, not deny it.
I have explained why I think Benatar's way of 'explaining' the asymmetry is not a good way (see OP). I have then offered an alternative way of explaining the asymmetry that appeals to apparently self-evident truths and so is intuitive in a way that his way is not.
If other things are equal - don't ignore that clause - an innocent person who has done nothing and had nothing done to them (so again, don't change that and decide they're good or they're bad or whatever) does not positively 'deserve' benefit. They are non-deserving of it. By contrast they are positively deserving of not being harmed. That's an intuitive asymmetry. And it explains why - other things being equal - we have no obligation to create happy lives, yet we do have an obligation not to create miserable ones. And it does so in a way that does not generate the problems I have identified with Benatar's account.
Quoting DA671
If other things are equal, then it does. Other things are equal in these thought experiments.
Quoting DA671
Why are you saying that? Where have I said otherwise? I am appealing to rational intuitions - taht is, representations of our reason. That, as I have said before, is what all of philosophy appeals to.
Quoting DA671
That's why a case for antinatalism needs to be made. I accept that most people have the rational intuition that antinatalism is false. And that, I think, is the best - and I think only - apparent evidence that it is false. But it is not cast iron, for the rational intuition that procreation is morally ok is hardly powerfully self-evident in the way that, say, 1+ 1 = 2 is. And furthermore, there is good reason to think it is false, given that it would be selected for by evolutionary forces.
Your 1[sup]st[/sup] point: No explanation for Benatar's asymmetry. Suffering has more weightage than joy; people want to get rid of pain more than they want to acquire joy. Put simply the priority, first objective, is to end pain (at all costs); only after that can we discuss pleasure.
This makes sense, oui? How can we think of happiness when we're suffering? First, clear our debts (end suffering) and then and then only are profits (gain happiness) possible.
Your 2[sup]nd[/sup] point: I mentioned suicide as evidence. People don't mind/even prefer nonexistence to pain and this basically proves Benatar's asymmetry: absence of pain is good even when there's no one to experience it + the absence of pleasure is bad only when there's someone who exists and experiences that absence.
Your 3[sup]rd[/sup] point: Preexistence nullifies the asymmetery. I'm afraid that isn't correct. Benatar's asymmetry applies to all existence involving suffering and the ability to opt out (suicide).
As I said before, just because we have a reason to create positive lives doesn't mean we do not have other considerations which do matter when making the decision. The fact that people would have to sacrifice a lot (for now) and aren't comfortable with the idea of constantly creating new lives certainly plays an important role, and so does the fact that such as society is unlikely to benefit for long.
You've also not provided an iota of evidence that we "deserve" to not be harmed but we don't deserve to benefit. Once again, deserving something has nothing to do with whether or not one needs something to happen, especially when there are other elements to consider. You have continued to ignore this point. We are trying to generate a reasonable position that is comprehensive and nuanced enough to account for the diversity of the sentient experience and our epistemic limitations. Your framework miserably fails to do that, I am afraid.
If there is no significant harm, then I do believe that we should increase happiness for others. Perhaps a way of doing that would not be to live in a world where everybody is obliged to help others and instead focus on not harming others (which usually proves to be sufficient for a valuable life). Once again, this hypothetical world where (all else is equal) is not the one we live in, so it doesn't make sense to refer to it and try to claim that my view is absurd. It's a lot more strange to suggest that preventing all potential happiness for the sake of averting harms is acceptable.
My view does account for this so-called asymmetry by mentioning the fact that this intuition is based upon our lived experiences, wherein there usually is a cost involved in doing too much to make others happy. If one is willing to posit a hypothetical which is divorced from our current reality, they should also understand that the nature of our intuitions could vary in such a situation. Personally, my intuitions do not tell me that it's necessary for me to not create a bad life but it isn't problematic to not do so if all else is truly equal. We need to account for our intuitions in a reasonable manner lest we fall prey to delusions.
Well, I completely disagree with you. You have merely asserted that suffering is undeserving but happiness is non-deserving without truly explaining why. Again, one could deserve something without needing it (if they are already content) or one being required to act (if there is too little good for too much harm involved). Deserving something has to do with whether a good should be given to someone, not with one needing that good or the creation of that good being necessary at a particular point of time. If you say that the suffering that is created is "undeserving", you're presupposing that it's something bad that's happening to innocent people who deserved to not suffer. But if that's the case, then I don't see how one could logically deny the fact that innocent people do deserve to be happy (which is what one is indirectly saying when we claim that they don't deserve to suffer). Your intuition is not shared by most people and it cannot serve as a basis for the alleged asymmetry.
If they truly are, then it certainly would be. But this hypothetical world is clearly so disconnected from our reality that many people are probably not going to even understand how different our intuitions would be in such a situation. The truth, however, transcends personal biases.
Simply resupposing that an intuition is rational is not rational. As I said in the other thread, not all intuitions are equally plausible. Believing that thunder is a punishment from the heavens might have seemed intuitive once upon a time, but later discoveries have shifted our understanding and consequently our intuitions. And as far as the rationality of intuitions is concerned, we should try to pay more heed to the universally shared intuition that the preservation of life and joy can be quite good.
You have not provided any justification for your claim that happiness is "non-deserving" other than resorting to alleged "intuitions" regarding the necessity to prevent harm but not increase happiness. However, you do not grasp the fact that deserving something does not entail that one needs a thing. Most people do intuitively believe that innocent sentient beings deserve to be happy and do not deserve to suffer. But a person could deserve good health even though one does not have an obligation to donate their organs to them if they do not have a need for them in the first place. The point is that connecting what we deserve (which is about our status as a moral sentient being) with an obligation to give something (which involves an actual need for something) is a line of spurious reasoning. I have already addressed the supposed asymmetry regarding our intuitions to avoid causing negatives but not creating positives. Firstly, it would be pertinent to mention that not all intuitions are correct, which is presumably what you would have to acknowledge if you want to defend a position that goes against the intuitions of most people (that reproduction is good). Secondly, this intuition can be explained by the fact that people who already exist do not need constant external interference for the sake of living a pretty decent life as long as serious harm is avoided. But this principle of giving precedence to the avoidance of harms as far as existing beings are concerned does not apply to nonexistent beings, since they are not in a satisfied state of affairs that would be maintained merely by the prevention of harms. Furthermore, actively doing good for others all the time can involve great personal cost and perhaps even a wider degree of harm for others. In light of this, it is quite natural that people would want to focus on mitigating harms. Yet this does not diminish the fact that the positives of life do matter for people and the fear of losing them (in the case of trying to create too much joy) and the joy of having them (in the case of not requiring interminable active effort from others) is what seems to play a major role in forming this so-called "asymmetry" that we possess no reason to apply to procreation. The arguments for universal antinatalism remain unjustified.
It's interesting how people can so flawlessly point out the alleged problems with other worldviews but fail to apply the same level of rudimentary critical thinking when it comes to their own belief. Antinatalism remains indefensible, but the arguments that you use to suggest that we should not trust our intuitions regarding the goodness of life (which are self-evident to many people, even if it isn't for you or some others) could also be used against your other claims regarding the inherent badness of death (after all, we do have a strong survival instinct which could help in the propagation of the species, which would be "desirable" in a metaphorical sense for evolution) or the creation of happiness not being necessary, neither of which are anywhere close to being as self-evident as 1+1 = 2. Something being "selected for" doesn't have to make it true or false, but it's certainly good to investigate our intuitions in a thorough manner to ensure that we don't hold flawed views regarding a nonexistent hellish void that we are condemned to post existence ;)
I think that happiness does matter a lot, but for all practical purposes, I believe that we should indeed focus on removing extreme harms before chasing minor pleasures.
It's certainly not a good idea to allow for too many existing resources to be wasted away and fall prey to debt. Fortunately, I don't think that the losses have to outweigh the profits. Hopefully, we can continue to mitigate the former. Stopping thoughtless procreation would definitely go a long way in helping this endeavour.
Suicide is about as much evidence as the love people feel for life is evidence for the claim that the absence of happiness is bad even if nobody needs it (since many people want to keep living for as long as possible) but the absence of pain isn't (since many people don't seem to care about the fact that potential harm would also be averted, which might be the reason why many people want to preserve life even in instances of severe harm). In reality, I don't think that suicide gives us any evidence to believe that the absence of pain is bad but the lack of joy isn't. That same person could still think intuitively that the absence of joy would indeed be bad, but since they don't have it in the first place and the bads outweigh the good in their life, so ending one's life doesn't matter. I hope that fewer and fewer people would have to make this choice in a state of total misery. The right to a dignified exit could be useful as far as this is concerned.
I think that @Batricks is right in saying that a possible pre-existence could change the nature of procreation significantly. If it were the case that there were souls floating around in the void who were being tortured horribly and who were desperate to exist in order to find relief, procreation could become a lot more important. However, since there's no evidence that pre-existence is some sort of heaven/hell, I don't think we need to give too much thought to this possibility. In the end, I believe that the prevention of harms should not come at the cost of the prevention of all joy. We've discussed this before so I won't keep repeating myself. Hope you have a great day!
Indeed! However, there's little doubt that in the case of life on earth, it's the former (taking into account the givens).
Quoting DA671
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Quoting DA671
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Quoting DA671
The self-preservation instinct is strong, yes, but doesn't help the case for natalism. After all, to not want to die is (a kind of) suffering. This particular strain of suffering could be avoided simply by not being born: no life, no fear of death; no fear of death; no suffering.
Too, the drive to continue to live is not because people are happy, but because people don't want to experience dying (many accounts indicate that it's painful). Back to square one which is the pressing/urgent matter that life and suffering can't seem to be told apart.
It is a desire that exists despite suffering due to the existence of things we may not always pay attention to (but which matter a lot for us), and while it could cause a form of suffering, I do not believe it is a form of suffering in and of itself. It does help the case for natalism because it gives us a reason to think that there is some good that is left that is worth continuing on for numerous people (even if cessation would be painless). The suffering could be avoided (although it is debatable whether that avoidance is exactly "good"), but the prevention of all cherished moments of life would certainly not be desirable. No life-no love for life; no love for life-no joy. I will not be myopic enough to claim that reducing the harms significantly must not be our priority, but I simply think that doing so should not come at the cost of all good.
Anyhow, I hope that you have an awesome day/night!
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Antinatalism is not to be taken lightly or glossed over. At the very least it indicates that all is not well with our world. If one is part of a group and a few members want to leave, it should prompt a serious and thorough evaluation of the circumstances of the group, oui?
I'm not advocating for mass antinatalism as such because I can't ignore the fact that there's joy in life and the world. However there's also suffering, to some an inordinate amount of it which is the proverbial fly in the ointment of happy folks. It's a double whammy of sorts: the suffering are suffering, the happiness is tainted (guilty pleasure)
And neither will I ignore the fact that there is immense suffering in the world that has to be alleviated through monumental effort. What does give me hope is the existence of people who, in spite of having seen innumerable tragedies, still continue to see the light of meaning in seemingly insignificant things, such as the company of a loved one. There is humungous power there, and there are also people who gain happiness by helping others (a win-win of sorts) along with individuals like you who are deeply compassionate and often bring attention to that which needs to be done. We must not forget that there can be joy even amidst suffering, and as far as "guilty pleasures" are concerned, I believe that true joy comes through contentment, love, and beauty-none of which, if seen in a balanced way, can solicit guilt as long as one is also trying to help those around them and make the world a better place. Greater goods are a necessity, so that is a separate matter. I hope things will work out for the best.
I think the asymmetry is this:
Scenario A. Person exists: Presence of benefit = good, Presence of harm = bad
Scenario B. Person does not exist: Absence of harm = good. Absence of benefit = not bad
By not procreating we can prevent suffering without depriving anyone of good. So there is net benefit.
"The asymmetry cannot be properly explained and it is a special case of a more general asymmetry." Yes, quite possibly. But if he can establish that the asymmetry also exists in the special case then that is enough for the argument to work. The asymmetry does not depend upon an assumption of whether a child will have an over-all happy or miserable life. Any suffering at all - and there will be some - and the asymmetry holds so far.
"Absence of harm is good but it is always good for someone, in the same way as benefit." I think your second problem hits hardest. Benatar would have to show that we have a duty to prevent harm and no duty to promote good. [quote=Benatar]“While we have a duty to avoid bringing into existence people who would lead miserable lives, we have no duty to bring into existence those who would lead happy lives” [/quote] He might have this wrong but I'd be prepared to grant it for the sake of argument.
"We might pre-exist and suffer harm from not being brought into existence." True, we might, but it's a big assumption and we have no way of telling whether it's true or false or how happy or unhappy pre-existent persons may be. So it should not figure in our calculus of happiness.
Quoting Bartricks
I gave a reason why the asymmetry, despite being valid in consideration of people as consumers of pain and pleasure, fails when we add their role as producers. The pain of a childless couple can be mitigated in one way only.
My second argument was attacking the asymmetry indirectly. If asymmetry is sound, then nihilism follows. We already reject nihilism. So we can reject the asymmetry without even knowing in detail what might be wrong with it.
You can accuse me of lots of things but being off topic?? Ooh, that hurts.... :broken:
I think whether you accept the axiological asymmetry depends on whether you judge the morality of an action by its consequences.
If you judge non-existence by its consequences, it is neutral - no good or bad experienced. If not, your intuition could tell you that the absence of harm is a good, but the absence of benefit is not bad.
Quoting DA671
This makes sense to me. If we use "good" to mean better than the alternative, and "bad" to mean worse than the alternative, the axiological asymmetry must fail.
I am not disputing what it is. I am arguing that it lacks justification.
Quoting Cuthbert
That's not a quote from me!! Where did I say that? If you put quote marks around something you're saying it is a quote - but you wrote that sentence, not me!
Quoting Cuthbert
No, he is positing his asymmetry as a 'best explanation' of our intuitions about particular cases - the happy life and miserable life cases. So, it is not in dispute that we have a positive obligation not to create the miserable life, other things being equal, and that we have no positive obligation to create the happy life, other things being equal. What he's saying is that the 'best' explanation of those intuitions is the asymmetry he appeals to.
But that asymmetry is 'not' the best explanation. Why? Because a) it isn't an explanation at all, as all he's doing is saying "let's suppose it is an instance of a more general asymmetry" - how's that an explanation of the asymmetry? It is, as I said, like me asking "how is this watch working?" and being told "well, it is just an instance of a working watch".
And b) because Benatar's asymmetry makes it central whether we pre-exist or not - yet whether procreation is moral or immoral should, intuitively, be unaffected by such matters.
And c) because we can explain the asymmetry by appeal to self-evident truths of reason about desert.. The explanation of why we have no positive obligation to create the happy life is that the happiness in question is non-deserved and thus we have no positive reason to perform an action that generates it. By contrast, we have positive obligation not to create the miserable life because the misery is undeserved and we have positive reason not to perform acts that create undeserved harm.
Quoting Cuthbert
Where did I say that? If you quote someone, you have to use their actual words (obviously!).
Quoting Cuthbert
That's the point! So, whether we pre-exist or not should have no bearing on the morality of procreation. It would if we knew what pre-existence-here life was like, but we don't. So, given we don't, it should make no difference to the morality of procreation. Benatar's asymmetry makes it matter though. Thus, Benatar's asymmetry is unreal. That's one of my arguments.
1. If Benatar's asymmetry is real, then it makes crucial difference to the morality of procreation whether we exist prior to coming into existence here or not, other things being equal
2. If other things are equal, it makes no difference to the morality of procreation whether we exist prior to coming into existence here.
3. Therefore, Benatar's asymmetry is unreal
Quoting Cuthbert
Irrelevant. That's not a criticism of the asymmetry.
Quoting Cuthbert
First, you're misusing words. 'True' or 'real', not 'sound' (soundness is a property of arguments).
And 'nihilism' is the view that there are no norms of reason - that is, that we have no reason to do or believe anything and thus no moral reason to do or believe anything.
An antinatalist thinks we ought not to procreate. Thus an antinatalist thinks it is more important, morally speaking, not to procreate than it is to maintain the species. So all you're doing is saying that the asymmetry must be false becasue it implies the truth of antinatalism.
I am saying that Benatar's asymmetry is no explanation of the asymmetry between the happy life and miserable life cases, for Benatar's asymmetry has no self-evidence to it.
Quoting Agent Smith
That's not Benatar's asymmetry. Benatar says that absent harm is good even when there is no one for whom it is good, whereas absent benefit is not bad unless there is someone for whom it is a deprivation.
He's not saying 'eradicating pain is more important than promoting pleasure'.
I am saying something similar to that (though not quite that). I am saying that it is intuitively obvious that we have reason not to create undeserved harm, but no positive reason to create non-deserved benefit. And, when someone is innocent and has not yet had anything happen to them, then any harm visited upon them will be undeserved, whereas any benefit that befalls them will be non-deserved. I take these things to be self-evident and thus explanatory. And these self-evident truths 'explain' why we have no positive obligation to create happy lives, yet we do have positive obligation not to create miserable lives.
So, Benatar does not 'explain' the asymmetry between our intuitions about creating happy lives versus creating miserable ones. All he does is posit an asymmetry! That's no explanation at all. By contrast, I have 'explained' the asymmetry, because I have shown how our intuitions reflect some more self-evident truths. To use my watch example, the question is 'why does this watch work?'. Benatar's answer is 'it is a working watch'. My answer is 'look - if we take the back off we can see how the hands' movement is a function of the movement of these cogs'.
Quoting Agent Smith
Benatar's asymmetry does not imply that suicide is rational. Indeed, he himself emphasizes this. If it did, that would be a highly counter-intuitive implication.
Because the antinatalist conclusion is itself counter-intuitive, it is important that the case for antinatalism should not have other counter-intuitive implications. A case for antinatalism that implied suicide was rational under most circumstances would be a weak case. I am an antinatalist, but I would argue that suicide is irrational under most circumstances and that nothing in my case for antinatalism implies otherwise.
Quoting Agent Smith
No, that's simply incorrect. Benatar's whole point is that non-existence is better than existence! (Unless you already exist, that is) That's precisely why he thinks that procreation is wrong. So, if procreation does not create us but simply transfers us from elsewhere - as well it might - then Benatar's case would be beside the point: it would not apply to our situation. Now, I would say that's implausible.
I don't think Benatar is/has to explaining/explain the asymmetry. He's only making an observation that people don't mind nonexistence if it means liberation from pain and that the deprivation of joy only matters if there exists someone who is so deprived (Benatar's asymmetry).
That said, good point! Why is there this asymmetry in the first place?
My hunch is that suicide holds the answer, can explain the asymmetry (vide farmers neck-deep in debt commit suicide in India). A debt is, in a sense, settled once the person in debt ceases to exist. What about the profits this now dead person would've made had he lived? No matter since, again, he no longer exists.
Preexistence doesn't affect Benatar's asymmetry. The same argument applies to all instances of existence.
Sorry - the quote marks meant it was a summary of the point I was addressing. The lack of your name afterwards meant that they were not your words. If it was an innacurate summary, then I must try harder.
Quoting Bartricks
In my defence, it's a reductio. If the asymmetry entails antinatalism and antinatalism entails nihilism, and not-nihilism, then not-asymmetry. The 'nihilism' I mean is the view that the world would be a better place if the human race did not exist. The 'soundess' I referred to is the argument that the asymmetry entails antinatalism.
Quoting Bartricks
That is interesting particularly because Benatar makes the same (I think) point:
He makes the point to support his view and justify the asymmetry that underpins it. You make the point to attack the asymmetry. It seems to be quite tricky.
People do mind cessation if it leads to (what we perceive to be) an eternal loss of a valuable life. Also, if a deprivation only matters for one who exists to be deprived, then a prevention/liberation from harm also only matters for one who actually benefits from it, not the void. Benatar's pseudo-asymmetry does not seem logical to me.
A basic understanding can lead to erroneous conclusions ;)
And my hunch is that the widespread rejection of suicide (or dying as a whole, even though it remains an inevitability) points to the fact that the asymmetry is fundamentally flawed (though I have many other reasons as well, such as the fact that absence of the positives being significant if the lack of the harms matters). Vide the farmers in India spending hundreds of days to protest against oppressive laws even in the face of a lack of resources. There are some gains that can be subtle to spot and which are ineffably stronger than material wealth. If a debt is "settled" once a person ceases to exist, the profit of joy is also lost when it happens. And yet if the profits do not matter since the person does not exist, then neither does the absence of debts since their absence would not give them a positive balance and the opportunity to gain something truly valuable.
If pre-existence is a worse state of affairs than existence, it wouldn't make sense to not bring relief to people.
I hope more people can find real fulfillment in their lives and avoid deserts of misery and irrationality. May you and everybody else here have a wonderful day!
He is - his justification for the asymmetry he is positing is that it is the best explanation of our asymmetrical intuitions about the happy life and miserable life case (and some other similar cases) (see p. 31 of Better Never to Have Been).
It is no explanation of why my watch works to say "it is an instance of a working watch". And it is no explanation of the asymmetry in our moral intuitions about the happy life and miserable life cases to say "this is an instance of an asymmetry between benefit and harm". Yet that is precisely what Benatar is doing.
An explanation has to show how that which we want explained - the explanandum - is an implication of something self-evidently true. Otherwise we have not really gotten anywhere.
That's what my explanation does. It is self-evident that undeserved harm is harm we have positive moral reason not to create. And it is self-evident that non-deserved benefit is benefit we have no positive moral reason to create. I have moral reason not to hurt you, other things being equal. But I do not have moral reason to benefit you - it would be generous, kind, nice, supererogatory of me to benefit you, but the mere fact that I can benefit you, does not generate positive moral reason for me to do so, other things being equal. And even if someone disputes this and insists that we have 'some' moral reason to benefit others if we can, it is clear that we have much, much, stronger moral reason 'not' to create undeserved harm. If, for instance, I can only benefit you by doing some undeserved harm, then it is more important that I not create the undeserved harm than that I promote the non-deserved benefit.
Futhermore, it is also self-evident that someone who has done nothing and has had nothing done to them, would be suffering undeserved harm if they suffered any harm. And if they received benefit, the benefit would be non-deserved.
That explains why we have positive obligation not to bring into existence the suffering life, but no positive obligation to create the happy life. That's a real explanation. Benatar's is a pseudo explanation. He posits an asymmetry that has no self-evidence to it - that really is like saying "the watch is working because watches work" or some such.
Quoting Agent Smith
I do not follow you. If we pre-exist, then procreative acts do not create us. Benatar reaches his antinatalist conclusion from the asymmetry he posits because in assessing the morality of procreation we should compare existence with non-existence. But if we pre-exist then we would have to assess it by comparing how much benefit and harm it would be reasonable to suppose the pre-existence life to contain versus life here. Suppose that the reasonable supposition is that pre-existence lives contain none of either, we would not get to the antinatalist conclusion if lives here contain more benefit than harm - for then it would be better to exist here than not.
So it makes a world of difference if we pre-exist or not (implausibly). It shouldn't, of course - it is immoral to procreate regardless of whether we pre-exist or not, other things being equal.
I know! As I said in the OP, Benatar seeks to justify his asymmetry as the best explanation of our intuitions about the happy life and miserable life cases.
I then argued that he fails. For his asymmetry is no explanation of the asymmetry - as his asymmetry (unlike the one it is supposed to explain) has no independent intuitive appeal and so explains nothing. And it gets worse: Benatar's asymmetry has positively counter-intutive implications, such as making the ethics of procreation turn crucially on whether we pre-exist or not. Finally, we can explain the asymmetry between the happy life and miserable life by appeal to some self-evident truths.
It's self-evident that:
A. Innocent sentient beings deserve happiness and deserve to not suffer.
B. To deserve something is not the same as one having an obligation to help an individual. This is not self-evident at all, and neither does this have any reasonable basis.
What appears to be self-evident is the fact that people (who deserve happiness) do not have to be incessantly helped if that isn't required for them to have a sufficiently valuable life, particularly if that support includes great personal cost to oneself. All things are not equal as of now, so it's obvious that our intuitions would differ. But it's certainly "self-evident" to the majority of people that life can be worth it. As I have explained before, nonexistent beings are not in any preferable state of affairs, so this intuition that harms have greater significance becomes irrelevant. And, once again, if suffering is "undeserved", then the joys are definitely deserved. Generally, what we don't deserve leads us to what we do. Those who don't deserve slavery deserve freedom. Considering that happiness is the opposite of joys, it's obvious that innocent sentient beings who don't deserve to suffer deserve to be happy. The term "non-deserving" is a strange and arbitrary one which isn't applicable to reality. The allegedly asymmetrical nature of our intuitions regarding harms/benefits can be explained by conditions relevant to existence (greater harm, interference being unnecessary) that don't completely apply to nonexistence, so the asymmetry, and consequently universal antinatalism, remain flawed.