Replies to Steven French’s Eliminativism about Objects and Material Constitution. (Now with TLDR)
I’ve been teaching myself metaphysics, it’s been pretty challenging since I don’t really have anyway to get feedback. I was wondering if you guys have an ideas how to reply to an argument Steven French makes below. It seems like a combination of the grounding problem and overdetermination to me, but I’m not sure if I’m on the right track or how to reply to it. Everything below is an excerpt from his paper.
Articulating a metaphysics for the manner in which the structure of the world yields that which we call ‘atoms’, ‘molecules’, etc. is a tricky business, but the core point remains: that which we call a ‘table’ is nothing but a manifestation of that fundamental structure.
However, leaving this aside, the non-eliminativist might appeal to the distinction between possessing a property derivatively and non-derivatively: if the table is broken up and destroyed, the sum of elementary particles that constituted it still exist, even though they no longer constitute the table; so the table is a table non-derivatively, whereas the “sum of particles is a table only derivatively (see Baker 2007, 2012). Thus, the table and the sum of particles constituting it can share the same properties but not be identical, since they have these properties in different senses.
Again, one might appeal to the relevant physics to flesh out the appropriate notion of ‘constitute’ here and that appeal will run as it did for ‘arrangement’. But note that to call that which is supposed to be a table only derivatively a ‘sum’ of particles hardly does justice to what is involved in this appeal! I suspect that, as with other metaphysical notions, what is lying in the background here is a fairly crude classical picture of billiard ball-like atoms hooking together in some obvious way, forming the sum of the respective parts. However, applying the relevant symmetries and laws does not work like this, and the non-classical nature of the relevant physics famously creates major problems for standard notions of mereology and constitution (see, for example, Paul 2012). Assuming that these problems can be overcome and that, for example, an appropriate notion of ‘part’ can be articulated (where this may be different for different accounts of mereology and constitution), any such constitutive relation will be more than just a mere ‘sum’, to the point where, as already indicated, one would want to turn the argument around and demand of the non-eliminativist, wherein lies the difference between the table, as an everyday object, and the particles-‘arranged’-tablewise?!
Now, the non-eliminativist can insist that that difference lies in different persistence conditions, say, or different causal powers (Baker 2007). Appealing to the first is unconvincing: that an aggregate of particles-arranged-tablewise has different persistence conditions from an aggregate not arranged tablewise is hardly a persuasive argument (and indeed, has a hint of begging the question about it). Obviously, if the relevant bonds are broken, then one no longer has what we ordinarily call in English ‘the table’, but that is no grounds for regarding ‘the table’ as an object. All this points to is the difference between the set of particles, dispersed across the universe say, and the set brought together into an aggregate and subject to the kinds of constraints and principles already indicated so as to form what we call a table. Again, all the work is being done by those constraints and principles and whether those are to be an object qua element of one’s ontology.
TLDR: 1. An object is an object non-deriviatively whereas a mereological sum is an object only derivatively. Objects are constituted out of mereological sums.
2. The primary difference between mere sums and objectslie is in persistence conditions.
3. The arguments against eliminativism assumes an object and begs the question against eliminativism
4. The difference in persistence conditions only points to a set of particles dispersed and those aggregated objectwise and subjected to the principles of physics like the Pauli Exclusion principle.
5. Because all the work is being done by those physical principles and constraints then it follows there is no difference between mere sums and an object.
Articulating a metaphysics for the manner in which the structure of the world yields that which we call ‘atoms’, ‘molecules’, etc. is a tricky business, but the core point remains: that which we call a ‘table’ is nothing but a manifestation of that fundamental structure.
However, leaving this aside, the non-eliminativist might appeal to the distinction between possessing a property derivatively and non-derivatively: if the table is broken up and destroyed, the sum of elementary particles that constituted it still exist, even though they no longer constitute the table; so the table is a table non-derivatively, whereas the “sum of particles is a table only derivatively (see Baker 2007, 2012). Thus, the table and the sum of particles constituting it can share the same properties but not be identical, since they have these properties in different senses.
Again, one might appeal to the relevant physics to flesh out the appropriate notion of ‘constitute’ here and that appeal will run as it did for ‘arrangement’. But note that to call that which is supposed to be a table only derivatively a ‘sum’ of particles hardly does justice to what is involved in this appeal! I suspect that, as with other metaphysical notions, what is lying in the background here is a fairly crude classical picture of billiard ball-like atoms hooking together in some obvious way, forming the sum of the respective parts. However, applying the relevant symmetries and laws does not work like this, and the non-classical nature of the relevant physics famously creates major problems for standard notions of mereology and constitution (see, for example, Paul 2012). Assuming that these problems can be overcome and that, for example, an appropriate notion of ‘part’ can be articulated (where this may be different for different accounts of mereology and constitution), any such constitutive relation will be more than just a mere ‘sum’, to the point where, as already indicated, one would want to turn the argument around and demand of the non-eliminativist, wherein lies the difference between the table, as an everyday object, and the particles-‘arranged’-tablewise?!
Now, the non-eliminativist can insist that that difference lies in different persistence conditions, say, or different causal powers (Baker 2007). Appealing to the first is unconvincing: that an aggregate of particles-arranged-tablewise has different persistence conditions from an aggregate not arranged tablewise is hardly a persuasive argument (and indeed, has a hint of begging the question about it). Obviously, if the relevant bonds are broken, then one no longer has what we ordinarily call in English ‘the table’, but that is no grounds for regarding ‘the table’ as an object. All this points to is the difference between the set of particles, dispersed across the universe say, and the set brought together into an aggregate and subject to the kinds of constraints and principles already indicated so as to form what we call a table. Again, all the work is being done by those constraints and principles and whether those are to be an object qua element of one’s ontology.
TLDR: 1. An object is an object non-deriviatively whereas a mereological sum is an object only derivatively. Objects are constituted out of mereological sums.
2. The primary difference between mere sums and objectslie is in persistence conditions.
3. The arguments against eliminativism assumes an object and begs the question against eliminativism
4. The difference in persistence conditions only points to a set of particles dispersed and those aggregated objectwise and subjected to the principles of physics like the Pauli Exclusion principle.
5. Because all the work is being done by those physical principles and constraints then it follows there is no difference between mere sums and an object.
Comments (91)
Sorry. I tried, but even with your summary I got lost. Why does any of this matter? A table is a table by human convention. An atom is an atom by human convention. Why is there a mystery? A table is made up of atoms held together primarily by electromagnetic forces. My family is made up of my wife and children held together primarily by tradition, duty, and love.
Again, I wanted to respond to your post in the terms you laid out, but I got lost.
Yeah you’re basically saying there’s things are grounded, whereas he just says they don’t exist only the grounding stuff exists, if that.
Would there be? Would there also be cells, and trees, and forests, and ecosystems without people? Would there be hydrogen and oxygen, and water, and runoff, and brooks, and creeks, and tributaries, and rivers, and oceans?
Quoting Ignoredreddituser
I'm not sure what this means.
It means those facts exist because of other facts
C'mon TC. This is a philosophy forum, and it's a perfectly valid philosophical question. It's a lot better thought-out than many of the one-liner OP's that are posted. Not seeing the point of an OP is not a constructive criticism.
Quoting Ignoredreddituser
I can't see exactly what you're getting at, but it seems to be an argument against the idea that 'the whole is more than the sum of its parts'. Or put another way, that what something is, can be explained without residue in terms of it primitive physical constituents and the principles that bind them.
So it seems to me you're trying to argue for a pretty simple form of physical reductionism (sometimes parodied as 'nothing but-ism').
But there's a few things that I don't understand. I understand 'eliminativism' to usually refer to 'eliminative materialism' associated with Dennett and Churchlands, in respect of philosophy of mind. I can't really see how it applies here.
Also, you haven't provided any details the arguments you provide references to in passing (Paul, Baker, etc) so you can't assume that the reader will know anything about them (I certainly don't).
But the basic difficulty I sense with your proposal is that it is essentially physicalist, and so I'm naturally inclined to disagree with it. You want to provide an account of objects purely in terms of their physical constituents without the need to appeal to higher-level concepts such as form. Am I right in saying that?
I think it's a good OP. The addition of the summary was a good move. I read the whole OP, including the summary. As I noted, I tried hard to figure out a way to respond in the terms laid out, and I failed. I don't understand the point being made, but I put effort into it. At least it gave you a chance to kick me in the pants.
Never mind TC, no hard feelings, I just felt it deserved a bit more of a constructive criticism.
Although I will say, @Ignoredreddituser, you've picked an absolute stinker of a Forum name, I believe the forum software allows you to change your handle once (unless I'm mistaken), so I'd urge you to consider that. :wink:
There’s elimintivism in theory of mind, but also metaphysics of objects, usually it’s contrasted with permissivism which entail arbitrary combinations of objects such as Trogs, which tree-dogs.
Yeah, so you something like hylomorphism?
Yeah, it’s clunky name, but it reflects how hard it is to find people who like metaphysics like the OP.
Quoting Wayfarer
I think T Clark's question is also a valid philosophical question, if we read it as a question rather than a rhetorical dismissal of the OP's question. Why does it matter? What is the discussion about? If we want to know about tables, their history and uses, then the discussion will give us nothing new. If we are seeking information about quarks and atoms, then the debate will yield no information beyond what we already know or think we know. If we are uncertain what is a single object as distinct from, for example, a pile of objects stuck together, then we need only play with lego to get the idea. If we want to know whether one thing is 'nothing but' another then we can try substituting the concepts in various contexts and see how we get on. It looks to me as if we cannot even pin down what question we are trying to answer before leaping to the safety of an answer. We cannot say why it matters. We cannot even say clearly what we are talking about.
The Lego example is pretty contentious because you can recover an individual Lego from a block as opposed to say an atom which cannot, in principle, recovered from a molecule.
This objection shows that lego will help me learn the difference between single objects and stuck-together objects but that molecules and atoms will not help me. So one example is helpful for the purpose of learning a distinction. A different example is not helpful. That is what I would expect from examples and learning in general.
Also, what is electrolysis? Now that is worth learning.
Oh, ok. Well, let's suppose that the answer to the underlying question is - "No, nothing that we typically think of as existing does actually exist." So I don't actually exist and neither do you. At least that saves us the bother of worrying about metaphysics......
Perhaps T Clark's question did not go far enough. Not only does the question not matter - it doesn't even make sense. (I'm thinking partly of logical positivism's criticism of metaphysics.)
I agree with your explanation, but I think Wayfarer's criticism was that I wasn't responding in the terms that the OP laid out. I don't disagree with him.
To OP is extremely confused, and responding in the same terms would only add more confusion.
I was confused, but I don't think that means the OP was. After all, it wasn't @Ignoredreddituser's writing, it was Steven French's.
A whole is a particular relation between its parts, in that a table is a particular relation between its atoms. If the whole is more than the sum of its parts, then relations must have their own ontological existence over and above the ontological existence of the parts (putting to one side the question of what exactly is a part).
To argue against Steven French and argue for the non-eliminativist view, one will also need to argue that relations ontologically exist.
As the SEP on "Relations" notes: "Some philosophers are wary of admitting relations because they are difficult to locate. Glasgow is west of Edinburgh. This tells us something about the locations of these two cities. But where is the relation that holds between them in virtue of which Glasgow is west of Edinburgh? The relation can’t be in one city at the expense of the other, nor in each of them taken separately, since then we lose sight of the fact that the relation holds between them (McTaggart 1920: §80)"
I know that Glasgow is west of Edinburgh, but does Glasgow know that it is west of Edinburgh !
IE, the non-eliminativist must also argue for the ontological existence of relations - not an easy task.
Nevertheless, I find the OP quite confused. For instance, Steven French is not presented, nor is his argument FOR eliminativism of tables. Instead the OP goes straight into some putative objections to French's thesis, but how are we to make sense of the objections to a thesis we know next to nothing of?
Indeed, but let's have a go. First, let's distinguish ontological existence from other merely everyday kinds of existence. Now 'ontological' means, roughly, 'pertaining to existence'. So we are looking for a category of existence that is related to existence. Well, perhaps that's not too hard, after all. I guess every category of existence will qualify. If it is a category of existence then it pertains to existence. In the same way, if we go looking for canine dogs, feline cats and primate humans we will not be disappointed. We can tuck them into our metaphorical hunting sack along with the ontological existence.
Next problem. We have to show that relations exist. We already know (from above) that, if relations exist, then they have the special ontological kind of existence required - because everything that exists has that special kind of existence. But we don't yet know whether relations exist.
Let's borrow an example from the opposing camp. Glasgow is west of Edinburgh - so we are told. We are further led to believe that 'being west of' is a 'relation'. Now, what would it mean for such a relation to exist? It could mean that if we turn over the whole universe item by item we will find at least one thing that is to the west of another thing. On the other hand, if we get to the end of all the items in the universe and have not encountered a single thing that is to the west of any other thing then we can say that such a relation does not exist. If 'a relation exists' does not mean that, then I will need to confess I do not know what it does mean. OK so far. That leaves us with the small problem of turning over every item in the universe. But hold on! We just picked an example of the very thing we are looking for. There is a case - at least one case - of something being to the west of something else. From which it follows that there is at least one case of something being in relation to something else. From which if finally follows that relations exist. Putting this conclusion together with our earlier one, we can see that relations have ontological existence.
"But which of the two cities does the relation 'being west of' exist in?" Well, relations do have ontological existence. But they are not objects that we can lug around with us. We can turn over every object in Glasgow and Edinburgh and we will not find any such thing. That's not because it's very small or particularly elusive. It's because it's not a kind of thing. It's because - oh, gosh, see Ryle and anyone who has written about category mistakes for the last 70 years....
Need I go on? (No, Cuthbert. Not only need you not go on. You need not even have started.)
Thanks, that makes the thesis -- at least your interpretation -- a bit clearer.
Still, I am not quite sure why Glasgow should be aware of its geographic position respective to Edinburgh. And I still wonder what's so great about "ontological existence", or if you prefer, why anyone should be worried about a table not existing "ontologically".
As long as I can eat and work on it, and occassionally climb on it, the table is real enough for me. It is a dependable and stable object, a tool ready for use. Note that in this pragmatic perspective a table is NOT JUST a set of atoms arranged tablewise. It is first and foremost a means to an end.
But for the sake of the argument, let us agree that ontological existence is the best thing since sliced bread. So the challenge is to prove that relations do exist "ontologically". That is to say (I guess) that they exist objectively "out there", and not just as ideas in our minds.
A chemist would answer yes to this question. She would say that a molecule of water is not just the sum of one atom of oxygen and two atoms of hydrogen regrouped conceptually in one mental set.
For one, the chemical reaction (at ambient temperature etc) is not O + 2 H --> H2O but precisely O2 + 2 H2 --> 2 H2O, i.e. the combustion of two biatomic molecules of hydrogen with one biatomic molecule of oxygen. The original molecules of hydrogen and oxygen are broken in the reaction but they are the starting point of it, not atomic hydrogen and oxygen. What exist "out there" are the molecules of oxygen and hydrogen and water. The atoms are conceptually constructed (by deconstructing the molecules).
For two, the combustion of hydrogen releases significant energy in the form of heat. This energy is objectively measurable. Therefore the chemical reaction is an objective process, not just some view of the chemist's mind. And what is a chemical reaction, if not a series of relations between ingredients?
A medical doctor would answer positively as well. A living man is very different from her perspective from a dead corpse. And yet what is life if not a series of chemical reactions and ecological relations and interdependencies?
An economist would say that markets exist 'ontologically', or she wouldn't study them. A mechanic would tell you that a functional car is far more than a concept. It takes work and money to put it together or to repair it. Etc. Etc.
It seems like the relations are mind-dependent. Doesn't it require a mind to determine whether something is West of something else?
I did not mention minds. Perhaps I should have. I think if anyone tries to determine something in the sense of 'decide whether something is or is not the case' and that person does not have a mind then they have a bigger task ahead of them than the previous one I tackled. Determining entails thinking and thinking without a mind is perhaps not possible for any person. But such a supposed person's difficulties - struggling, mindless, to position cities in Scotland - will not affect the geography of Scotland. How could it?
It isn't. Ask any city what it's aware of - if you can work out how to ask things of cities - and you will draw a blank. Perhaps I did need to go on about category mistakes. But here's someone who went on about it at greater length and in more detail than I can manage: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/category-mistakes/
I too cuthberts claim about the geopgraphy of Scotland to say that relations were not mind-dependent. Though I think cities aren’t the clearest example because they’re more constructed/abstract than say the moon and the sun which relationship would be there even without a person to perceive it.
Yes.
Thinking about it some more: if relations do not exist, then what can possibly exist? The concept of "the world" or "the universe" implies interconnectivity between the elements of the world. Otherwise, if relations do not exist, then each element of the world is entirely alone; each elementary particle is its own independent world. And thus "the world" does not exist.
For the world to exist, relations must exist.
The use of the word 'table' or 'apple' or 'chair' is invariably a stand-in for objects in general. So the question is about, what are things, really? Are they simply aggregates of material particles, or are they something over and above that? And that matters as one of the fundamental questions of philosophy. So if you're in a philosophy forum, and someone asks that question, I don't think 'yeah so what?' is much of a response.
Quoting Ignoredreddituser
I can see that English syntax is not amongst your strengths, but yes.
Quoting Cuthbert
Actually I believe this is from a Bertrand Russell text:
I think this nails it. These kinds of relations are only meaningful to an observer who can consider the relation between Edinburgh and London; there's nothing in London or Edinburgh which comprises that relationship, but it's the case for any and all observers.
He goes on:
I've underlined a couple of sentences for emphasis, which I think are of high significance. Notice his use of the word 'subsists' for such relations, rather than 'exists'. I think that is signficant also.
I think there might be a thought in this thread that 'If the relation "being west of" isn't in the cities then it must be in our minds'. I don't think that's true, either. I cannot explain compass points by referring to minds. I would need to refer to cities, for example, but not (as explained) to a particular object in a city called 'being west of'. What kind of thing is a relation? Is it a physical object like a building? No. Then is it a mental construct like a perfect circle? No. But it must be one or the other. Why? It may be in a category of its own, separate from physical objects and also separate from mental constructs. The category in question may be 'relation' and it works in a way different from either.
Quoting Wayfarer
True. If someone had written that then I think they would just not have been joining in properly. Thankfully the person who might have said that has not pitched up in the thread yet.
If some X had not been west of some Y on an earth with no minds, then there would not have been a suitable environment for terrestrial mammals with minds to evolve.
True atoms have no mass like a table. On the fundamental level matter is kinetic only. With a will to reach out. The table is an example of satisfied will. Love and hate are almost perfectly balanced in the table. The balance can be disturbed in time. An evil black hole, the great annihalitor of love and hate, can pass, or a thermonuclear disaster befall on it.
The love and hate at fundamental level will all be annihilated in the end, and only vague remembrances will linger into oblivion. And then, bang, a new catharsis. Love and hate reappear in those rare, most turmoilical and vibratical happenings.
Yeah? So what?
It's like this:
(1) Some X was west of some Y at time t
(2) At time t there were no minds
(1) is not logically inconsistent with (2). You can have both without self-contradiction.
I'm not sure exactly what you mean about 'ontological status' - unless you mean whether (1) and (2) are consistent. I think they are. As far as I can see, they are.
Using particle to also mean elementary particle.
Particles ontologically exist in the world
Materialists historically held that everything was matter, but we now know that not everything is matter in this historical sense, for example, forces such as gravity are physical but not material in the traditional sense. As the world exists, at least particles exist.
If relations ontologically existed in the world
If relations ontologically existed in the universe, then between any two particles in the universe there is a relationship that ontologically exists. For example, it follows that between a particular particle in the table in front of me and a particular particle somewhere in the Andromeda Galaxy there is a real ontological relationship.
One could ask if the relationship between two particles is limited by the speed of light or is instantaneous across the universe.
Do relations ontologically exist in the world
Consider two particles A and B. Each particle A and B has an ontological existence.
The question is, does the relation AB between the particles A and B have its own ontological existence in addition to the ontological existence of each particle ?
The problem for an observer is in recognizing the ontological existence of the relation, in that a world with ontological relations between ontological particles would be indistinguishable from a world only consisting of ontological particles. What purpose do ontological relations serve ?
As the human observer uses their mind to add relationships between observed particles, the existence of relations ontologically existing in the world serves no purpose, and if they serve no purpose, by Occam's Razor, it should be assumed that they don't exist.
Quoting Olivier5
I agree that the concept of the world implies interconnectivity between the elements of the world, but concepts exist in the mind, not the world. Elementary particles located in time and space are sufficient for a world to exist. A world with ontological relations between these particles would be indistinguishable from a world without ontological relations between these particles, meaning that ontological relations serve no purpose. And if they serve no purpose, why have them.
I agree there may be forces between particles, there may be forces between oxygen and hydrogen atoms, but forces are not the same thing as relations ontologically existing in the world.
Quoting Cuthbert
Ryle's examples are based on examples whereby relations exist in the mind, not the world.
Ryle gave examples of category mistakes in The Concept of Mind 1949.
A visitor to Oxford upon viewing the colleges and library reportedly inquired "But where is the University".
There is the category 1 of "units of physical infrastructure", and category 2 of "institution"
The visitor made the mistake of presuming that the "University" was part of category 1 rather than category 2.
Category 1 includes those parts that physically exist in the world independent of the visitor - colleges, library, etc. Category 2 includes unseen relations between those physical parts - role in society, laws and regulations, etc
Ryle's examples make use of the fact that relations don't exist in the world but do exist in the mind, supporting the idea that relations don't have an ontological existence in the world.
See below.
Quoting RussellA
Do note that these particles exist in the same universe. Therefore they are already in a relation with one another, a spatial relation: they share the same space. Now you could say that this is a purely conceptual relation, not an ontic one. But if that is the case, then space does not exist ontologically.
For the world to exist, relations need to exist.
That's not what Russell is doing. He's saying that it is a relation. That's why he says it 'subsists', not 'exists'.
Quoting Cuthbert
Correct! That is precisely the point of those passages I quoted from Russell:
They're real, but they can only be discerned by a rational mind.
Quoting RussellA
The problem with that is that all of us must have exactly the same idea in mind when we do arithmetics, and furthermore that the outcome of calculations utilising mathematics have exactly predictable consequences in the world. If you're an engineer building a bridge and you get your weight-bearing calculations wrong, then the bridge will collapse. And that's not something that happens 'in the mind'. So applied mathematics stymies that distinction between mind and world, because it straddles both. This is the subject of Eugene Wigner's famous paper, The Unreasonable Effectiveness of Mathematics in the Natural Sciences.
Quoting Olivier5
So, I'm very interested in what sense they exist. I'm exploring the radical idea that universals are the elements of rational thought. They are only discernable to a rational mind, but they're not the property of any individual mind, being the same for all who think. What do you think? Stacks up?
I see a difference between relations and universals, though.
I don't understand why there couldn't be a space that exists independently of any human observer within which there are particles that are, as you said, "entirely alone" (ignoring for the sake of the argument any forces between the particles).
Using an analogy, if there is a cat in a box, it does not follow that because the cat is entirely alone there is neither a cat nor a box.
Okay, but if there's two cats in your box, they can keep each other company, play or fight one another. Right?
Now, if I were to put two cats in the same box and yet forbid them to have any relation with one another, would you find me logical? Wouldn't you wonder why I didn't put them in two different boxes, if I didn't want them to interact?
Likewise, two particles in the same universe can interact with one another, bounce against one another, attract or repulse one another, etc. etc.
If they cannot do so, in what sense are they in the same universe?
I'm afraid I've never given much thought to the issue of universals. The issue of relations is important to my systemic metaphysics, to the idea that a whole is more than the sum of its parts, etc. But I see no urgency in determining whether Pi is really really real or just a universal concept.
I agree that "two particles in the same universe can interact with one another". But as you said "So the challenge is to prove that relations do exist "ontologically". That is to say (I guess) that they exist objectively "out there", and not just as ideas in our minds."
Steve French argues against non-eliminativism, where non-eliminativism is the position that the whole is more than the sum of its parts, possibly because there are ontologically real relations between the elementary particles making up the whole.
I go back to Bradley's Regress Argument against external relations (SEP - Relations), which concluded that we should eliminate external relations from our ontology.
Either a relation R is nothing to the things a and b it relates, in which case it cannot relate them.
Or, it is something to them, in which case R must be related to them.
But for R to be related to a and b there must be not only R and the things it relates, but also a subsidiary relation R' to relate R to them
Now the same problem arises with regard to R'. It must be something to R and the things it related in order for R' to relate R to them and this requires a further subsidiary relation R'' between R', R, a and b.
This leads into an infinite regress, because the same reasoning applies to R' and to however many other subsidiary relations are subsequently introduced.
IE, particles will still interact even if relations are only spatial and not ontological.
Quoting RussellA
Why then, I'm a non-eliminativist by your definition. I strongly believe in structures.
Come to think of it, I hardly eliminate any philosophical concept, so the label fits. Too bad it's a double negative.
I don't see the advantage of eliminating space, or time, or relations, or matter, or qualia, or minds. The idea sounds self-mutilating to me, almost obscene... I'm much more interested in those things than in their elimination.
Quoting RussellA
Before doing so, are you satisfied that Bradley himself existed ontologically? And if yes, what makes you so sure?
Because Amazon sells his books.
They sell tables too.
We don't know that objects exist either. After all, we describe objects as the relationship of smaller objects, and those smaller objects as relations of even smaller objects. Every time we think we grasp an object we find that we're really grasping relations.
Quoting Ignoredreddituser
Can you "recover" an observer from the reality that it is part of?
What is necessary to answer these questions is a useful description of "observer" and it's relation with the rest of reality that it is part of. What is an observation or an awareness if not a relationship between observer and observed?
If observers are a part of the whole of reality then realism is the case, if not then solipsism is the case (observers are their reality, or observation is reality).
If solipsism is the case, then what is the point of this discussion? If realism is the case then observers stand in relation to the other objects/relations in reality. Observations would be the relationship between observer and objects. Observations would then would be about the observer and the observed, not just the observed.
Now consider how any brain processes sensory information compared to the other processes of the world. The brain takes time to process information, and the time it takes to process that info is relative to the process of change everywhere else. So how the brain perceives the world can be relative to how fast or slow everything else changes. Stable, slow changing processes would appear as fixed, unchanging objects, while faster processes would appear as processes, or relations of the objects themselves.
Think of how we perceive the three states of matter. Solid objects are composed of slow-moving, stable molecular interactions. Liquids are composed of faster and less stable molecular interactions, and gases even more so. Could it be that the quantified three states of matter are really more to do with how we perceive other processes relative to the frequency of how our brains process the information? This isn't to say that the interaction between molecules doesn't change, only that our compartmentalized view of these changes is a projection, kind of like digitizing an analog signal.
This would mean that the objects that we perceive are the result of our own subjective frequency of processing information relative to these frequency of change in the other processes that we are perceiving. This would mean that brains as objects don't really exist. Everything is process. This could explain why what we perceive appears differently to how we perceive (objects vs process).
Quoting RogueAI
It exists as a spatial relation. Because brains are part of the reality they observe they exist in spatial and temporal relations to everything else like X and Y. Observations take time and exist in space relative to everything else. The amount of time and it's location in space is relative to everything else, so the way everything else appears would be skewed based on these relative aspects, as I described above. Observations is a stretching of those spatial-temporal relationships into the lengths of time and space that we observe.
:smile: Very true, tables must exist if Amazon sells them. Forget the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
perhaps Amazon is where we will discover the answers to our deepest philosophical questions.
If relations do not exist, how could books exist?
Books are in first analysis physical objects like tables. If tables do not exist, how come physical books do?
Now if by "book" you mean the text, irrespective of its material support -- a text that you could download or find in various prints but it would still be the same text -- then I would point out that any text is made of sentences, themselves made of words, themselves made of letters. And yet, a text is more than an alphabet soup. A text is structured by spatial and other relations between its elements, and only the interaction between these elements conveys meaning.
Therefore if relations do not exist, texts do not exist either.
If texts and books do not exist, what is philosophy? Who is Bradley?
Thanks for that SEP article BTW. There's a quote in it, saying that one could accept relations in one's ontology "if the price is right". The point I am making is that the cost of NOT admitting relations as real far outstretches the cost of admitting them as real.
When I, as an observer, look at the page, I agree that the symbol "i" physically exists on the page and the symbol "f" physically exists on the page to the right of the symbol "i", in that they are spatially located.
Along the lines of Bradley, there is no information within the symbol "i" that there is a symbol "f" to the right of it. Similarly, there is no information within the symbol "f" that there is a symbol "i" to the left of it, and there is no information in the space between the "i" and the "f" that there is a "i" at one end and a "f" at the other end.
It follows that the meaning of the shape "if" does not exist in the world.
The shape "if" only has meaning in the mind of an observer, as only an observer can turn the relationship between the "i" and the "f" into a meaning.
IE, relations do exist, but in the mind, not the world.
And yet it can be mechanically reproduced and even read by a computer and translated by it into the French 'si'.
Information technology is all about writing "IF" and "THEN" out there in the world, as any coder will tell you. And it makes the computer or device on which you write function.
That the letter f is positioned to the right of the letter i in "if" on the line (unless one is reading upside down of course) is an objective sine qua non to the word's functioning as "if". Otherwise it would be pronounced FI and it would mean nothing in English that I know of.
Quoting RussellA
So we already know that this reasoning must be faulty, since there would be no possibility of any reasoning if it was true. It's a thesis that denies its own possibility. But where is the logical error?
My guess is that it's hiding in the phrase: "Either a relation R is nothing to the things a and b it relates, ...
Or, it is something to them..."
Now what does it mean "to be something to them"? Is there any clear meaning to this phrase in this context?
Like, if an apple is under an apple tree, is it something to the apple and the tree, that the apple is under the tree? What does that even mean? "To be something to someone" makes sense as in "to be among his preoccupations". But it doesn't makes sense when applied to a mindless thing.
The tree or the apple are obviously not expected to know something about their respective position, or to do something about it. So what is it to them? Nothing of course.
Still, their respective position remains an objective fact. And an important one too, especially if one is looking for apples. Like a monkey for instance, or a bird who likes apples. Do birds have minds? Yes, probably small ones. Do they eat fruits? Some of them do. That'd be why the position of various fruits respective to various tree species "is something to them." Birds care. Apples don't.
So there's some very suspect language game at the start of Bradley's argument. It looks to me that either he is projecting intentionality on mindless things, or he is just using sloppy language.
The idea that objects are merely collections or aggregates arranged from other objects (particles, atoms, etc) hasn't born itself out, in my opinion. Arrangement assumes a creative force that at sometime or somewhere formed an object from other disparate and unconnected objects (like particles). But tables are built from pieces of other objects (trees, for example), and do not form, particle-by-particle, like Voltron.
We need to know what this creative force is in order to know that a table was arranged in such a manner.
Is not the mind part of the world?
That'd be the last nail in the coffin of eliminativism, a most bizarre fancy... :-) Well done!
Yes, I should have written: "relations do exist, but in the mind, not in the external world". I agree that the mind is part of the world, having evolved in synergy with the world, possibly over a period of 800 million years.
Steve French is misusing the term eliminativism (it seems to me).
Steve French relates eliminativism to objects in the world, such as tables. However, in philosophy, eliminativism is a theory about the nature of the mind, not about the nature of the external world.
IE, within his article he should have used the term reductionism when referring to tables.
Where do relations exist, if they do exist.
For me, there is a mysterious difference between the mind and "external world", in that, although I believe that relations don't have an ontological existence in the external world, I do believe that relations have an ontological existence in the mind.
As regards the mind of the observer, I know that I am conscious. I know that I have a unity of consciousness, in that what I perceive is a single experience. John Raymond Smythies described the binding problem as "How is the representation of information built up in the neural networks that there is one single object 'out there' and not a mere collection of separate shapes, colours and movements? I can only conclude, from my personal experience, that relations do have an ontological existence in my mind, such that when I perceive an apple, I perceive the whole apple and not just a set of disparate parts.
IE, relations do exist, but in the mind, not in the external world.
Reductionism and eliminativism
Slightly back-tracking, I am reductionist as regards the "external world" and non-eliminativist as regards the mind. I feel that I can justify my belief in being a reductionist as regards the external world, but the binding problem is my only justification for my belief in non-eliminativism as regards the mind. My understanding of the unity of consciousness is as much as a goldfish's understanding of the allegories in The Old Man and The Sea.
IE, I would still argue that being a reductionist as regards the external world is a justified true belief.
How can the mind be part of the world
The question is how to equate being reductionist about the external world and non-eliminativist about the mind. My answer is panprotopsychism, in that a proto-consciousness is fundamental and ubiquitous in the world. This allows the mind to be part of the world, as well as allowing monism whilst avoiding the problems of dualism. Using an analogy (not an explanation), as the property of movement cannot be observed in a single permanent magnet, but only in a system of permanent magnets alongside each other, the property of consciousness cannot be observed in the physicalism of the external world, but only in a system of neurons having a particular arrangement within the brain.
IE, still keeping within physicalism and monism, the mind as a system has properties, such as consciousness, not observable in its individual parts, analogous to the property of movement in a system of permanent magnets not being observable in an individual permanent magnet, one of several examples of the weak emergence of new properties.
If Bradley is correct, and relations exist in the mind and not the external world, an observer of the apple and the tree will be aware of many relationships, such as - the apple is below the tree - the apple is smaller than the tree - the apple is more red than the tree - etc.
Given knowledge of these relationships, the observer will be able to exercise their powers of reasoning, for example - the apple is likely to have fallen from the tree - the apple has probably grown from the tree - the chemical composition of the apple as far as one can tell is different to that of the tree - etc.
Quoting Olivier5
It means that relation R relates a to b
Quoting Olivier5
Of course, as trees and apples have no minds. But what is the case is that there is no information within the tree that relates it to the apple, and vice versa.
Quoting Olivier5
"Respective" is defined as "belonging or relating separately to each of two or more people or things". You are starting off with the premise that relationships in the external world are objective facts. Bradley is giving a justification as to why relationships in the external world are not objective facts.
Quoting Olivier5
Bradley refers to things, not minds
If relations exist in the mind and not the external world, is the mind a miracle?
A miracle may be defined as "an extraordinary and welcome event that is not explicable by natural or scientific laws and is therefore attributed to a divine agency"
For me, not a miracle, as I am sure that the mind is explicable by natural or scientific laws.
However, even if there was someone to explain it to me, my understanding would probably be no more than that of a penguin trying to understand the foreign exchange market.
Well then, Bradley must be wrong. Because it would be a miracle if the human mind had relations and nothing else did.
Quoting RussellA
I figured that is what you would respond with but other minds are just as external to mine as tables and and trees are. I don't like using terms like "external" and "internal" because it seems to divide the world into two (dualism) unnecessarily. We all know that the world has an effect on the mind and the mind affects the world.
Quoting RussellA
Not neccessarily.
"In principle, anyone denying the existence of some type of thing is an eliminativist with regard to that type of thing. Thus, there have been a number of eliminativists about different aspects of human nature in the history of philosophy. For example, hard determinists like Holbach (1770) are eliminativists with regard to free will because they claim there is no dimension of human psychology that corresponds to our commonsense notion of freedom. Similarly, by denying that there is an ego or persisting subject of experience, Hume (1739) was arguably an eliminativist about the self. Reductive materialists can be viewed as eliminativists with respect to an immaterial soul."
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/materialism-eliminative/#BriHis
Quoting RussellA
Then it seems that if the relations in our mind don't represent the world as it is then our understanding of the world is radically wrong.
If current conditions are not related to past conditions or to future conditions then causation (a type of relation) is false so all of our reasons for believing things would be wrong. There would be no justification for anything and the basis for ethics and politics would be false. There would be no ontological existence to perception as a relation between perceiver and perceived. In denying that relations have an ontological existence then you are implying that solipsism is the case.
Mind is a relationship that apprehends other relationships. In rejecting dualistic notions of reality, I believe that minds and everything else are the same type of thing, which I identify as relationships, processes, or information. I'm a kind of process philosopher.
How is the "internal" contents of ypur mind different than the internal contents of say, your stomach?
Quoting RussellA
Visually, you only perceive one side of the apple. In visual perception, the world appears located relative to the eyes, but we know the world is not located relative to the eyes. The 'single object' of experience, as you put it, is an information model of the world relative to the body that incorporates data from all senses at once. This produces a kind of fault-tolerance where the data from one sense is used to confirm the data reported by another sense. Your friend that you are next to and talking to, visually, audibly, and tactilely appear in the same location. You can perceive the whole apple tactilely, but not visually. The shape of the apple tactilely (you can feel all sides of the apple even though you can't see all sides of the apple) coincides with the shape of the apple visually in rotating the apple around to view all the sides.
Quoting RussellA
This is a problem because other minds are external to yours.
Quoting RussellA
Thinking of consciousness as a type of working memory where the dynamic states of the world can be represented. Without working memory, the world would appear as static images, like photographs vs. videos.
I don't know what a proto-consciousness would be like. I prefer to use the terms, "information" or "relations" as identifying the fundamental nature of reality. In asserting that proto-consciousness is fundamental in the world, and that relations only exist in the mind, are you not admitting that relations exist in the external world?
What is the paper? If you want to discuss it, please cite it for the benefit of everyone else, because it is difficult to comment on an out-of-context excerpt. And to make it clear that you citing someone, use the quote function. Select the text and click the talk bubble icon on top of the post box or put quote tags around it:
Steven French's eliminativism is about material objects. They can't ontologically exist for reasons which remain essentially unclear, as you (and I) pointed out.
@RussellA later clarified that:
Quoting RussellA
( Note that in this context, a "non-eliminativist" is someone -- like most of us -- who thinks that tables and other objects actually exist. )
@Cuthbert said a lot of very funny and insightful things about ontological existence, and how it was akin to canine dogs...
I said that if relations do not exist, the world as we know it cannot exist. And gave a few arguments for that.
@RussellA called upon some paradox by a certain Bradley, as per which relations cannot exist. In my view his paradox is based on a rather suspect use of language.
Bradley was an idealist, who did not believe matter exists. So again, this is not your usual "let's eliminate the mind" jamboree. It's about eliminating matter for a change.
Fair enough, usually my iPhone attaches the citation at the bottom, I suppose i must have overlooked it by mistake.
@Olivier5 No need for shade, just bare with me. I’ve had a surprisingly very busy week, I haven’t had the time to give this the attention it deserves and i own that.
Is your table real enough for anyone else who does not eat off it?
Someone in Australia could see a picture of my table, and ascertain that it seems to be the picture of a real table. If he's not convinced, he's welcome to a Roman dinner at my table.
I'll have to take your word for it, won't I? So will everyone else. But is that necessary? Is that existentially more evidential than having at a football stadium successive columns of people stand up and raise their arms to create the illusion of a wave? What if some people don't stand up, is there still a wave?
You don't. You can come to my place and check the reality of my table.
Everyone will. Or they can accept your absolute credibility as an eyewitness. And that would be true for every other alleged table in the world. Unfortunately not all people are as credible as you are, or they might mistake a footstool or divan for what they take to be a table. Who can tell?
Tables are tables by convention. We verbally agree that instances of table exist, then I'll accept your word unconditionally about your table. But there are no tea cosies or tables anywhere else in the universe because we are not there to say so.
If we can rest assured that ONE object exists, then it follows that Steve French's thesis is wrong.
The question being: what is (or is there) a recognized procedure to ascertain the reality of things? I contend that if a thing or another can be perceived by several people independently, and if it maintains its properties over some time, it is real enough. It is dependable, usable, trackable. Empirical, hence real.
Not unless there is truth in panprotopsychism.
In that event, there would be a world with proto-consciousness and without ontological relations, and a mind with consciousness and with ontological relations.
In the conscious mind, distinct objects are united by the relationship between them into a single experience (the binding problem).
Well, maybe, but I see no reason to believe that my table does not exist, nor any reason to attribute any protopsychism to it.
It’s from “There’s are No Such Things as Ordinary Objects” in the bookThe Nature of Ordinary Objects
In any discussion of the mind the concept of dualism is unavoidable, as you say yourself: "We all know that the world has an effect on the mind and the mind affects the world", instantly setting up a dualism between the world and the mind.
Quoting Harry Hindu
I agree that in principle, anyone denying the existence of some type of thing is an eliminativist.
However, in practice, within philosophy, eliminativism always refers to eliminative materialism, which is a theory about the nature of the mind. Even within your own text - Holbach (1770) are eliminativists with regard to free will - Hume (1739) was arguably an eliminativist about the self. The SEP article concludes with the line: "While it is true that eliminative materialism depends upon the development of a radical scientific theory of the mind, radical theorizing about the mind may itself rest upon our taking seriously the possibility that our common sense perspective may be profoundly mistaken"
Quoting Harry Hindu
As you later say about observing an apple: "Visually, you only perceive one side of the apple" and "You can perceive the whole apple tactilely, but not visually".
When observing an apple, our mental representation of the apple must always be incomplete, in that we may only be looking at one or two sides, we may not be looking inside the apple, we may not be smelling the apple, etc. As our representation must inevitable always be incomplete, we can never represent the apple as you say "as it is".
The fact that any representation can never be complete does not mean that such representation is radically wrong, all we need is that such a representation is "good enough" for our present purposes.
Quoting Harry Hindu
I agree that causation is a type of relation.
Between two objects in the world A and B we observe a spatial relationship - object A is to the right of object B. Because we observe a spatial relationship between A and B, it does not follow that in the world there is a something that exists between objects A and B independent of and in addition to the space between them, a thing called a "spatial relation" which exists as much as objects A and B.
Similarly, between two objects in the world A and B we observe a causal relationship - object A hits a stationary object B and object B moves. Because we observe a causal relationship between A and B, it does not follow that in the world there is a something that exists between objects A and B independent of and in addition to the interaction between them, a thing called a "causal relation" which exists as much as objects A and B.
For us to apply our reasoning and judgements, it is sufficient that spatial and causal relationships exist in our mind
Quoting Harry Hindu
Solipsism may be defined as the philosophical idea that only one's mind is sure to exist. As an epistemological position, solipsism holds that knowledge of anything outside one's own mind is unsure; the external world and other minds cannot be known and might not exist outside the mind.
Being an Indirect Realist, I believe the external world exists, but I don't know for certain. Isn't everyone a solipsist to some degree ?
To deny that relations have an ontological existence in the external world is not to deny that time, space, matter and forces don't exist. Why should the existence of an object in the external world depend on its being in an ontological relationship with something else ?
Quoting Harry Hindu
If the mind and everything else, such as a table, are the same type of thing, are tables conscious ?
Quoting Harry Hindu
I assume because my mind is conscious, but my stomach isn't.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Yes, as you say, "you can feel all sides of the apple even though you can't see all sides of the apple".
Because you cannot see the relationships on all sides of the apple, yet can feel the relationships on all sides of the apple, these missing relations must have originated in the mind, not the world.
Quoting Harry Hindu
It comes down to belief. As I believe that tables are not conscious, I believe that other minds are conscious. I may be wrong. I will never know for certain. It is just a working hypothesis.
Quoting Harry Hindu
I don't know for certain that proto-consciousness is fundamental in the world, and even if it is, it is still beyond my understanding, but it is the least implausible explanation that I have come across.
Yes, it would follow that if I believed in panpsychism this would lead me to concluding that relations ontologically exist in the external world, which is why I tend to protopanpsychism which doesn't require such a conclusion.
1) I agree that the elementary particles that make up what we call a table exist in the external world, and where each elementary particle is located at a particular time and space. I agree that the table exists as a concept in our minds. The information that this particular set of elementary particles each located at a particular time and space is in the form of a table exists in our mind.
The question is, where in the external world is the information that this particular set of elementary particles each located at a particular time and space is in the form of a table ?
2) The Universe has been around for about 14 billion years. It is estimated that the first neurons appeared on Earth about 600 million years ago.
If consciousness did not come from a pre-existing proto-consciousness, then where did consciousness in the mind come from ?
Thanks!
For those who don't have the book, which is probably most of us, this article may help: Defending eliminative structuralism and a whole lot more (or less).
Yeah that’s an excellent article as well but it’s a bit different from his other paper in certain respects, the paper you cited is more about structural realism and the OP is more in the analytic metaphysical tradition. They’re somewhat dissimilar, but there is some overlap though the two are still distinct works.
My point was that the mind is no different than everything else in that everything is both the effect of causes and the cause of subsequent effects. The mind is not special or unique in this regard. What you described wouldn't be dualism as every thing (not just minds) has a causal relationship between it and the world (natural selection). So no, what I said is not dualism and you misinterpreted what I said.
Quoting RussellA
I can't disagree here. It's not my position to deny the existence of mind or world. I just think that the way we understand the relationship between them is "profoundly mistaken".
Quoting RussellA
That's the thing though - is skepticism about what something is as opposed to how useful it is for our purposes warranted? Since we have different senses informing us of the same thing (the smell, taste and color of the apple informs us that it is ripe), is there anything else to an apple other than its ripeness? Why wouldn't our different senses inform us of other aspects of the apple if there were any? It seems to me that perceiving things more as how they actually are would provide an evolutionary advantage.
Quoting RussellA
If these relations did not exist ontologically, then what reason would there be for us perceiving them?
I think that you are confusing the spatial relation as it is in the world with how it is perceived. If I were standing on the other side of A and B I would say that A is to the left of B. We wouldn't be disagreeing if we both understood that what we are talking about is our observation of the spatial relation, not just the spatial relation. Parallax is a concept in science that seems to account for the existence of observers and their locations in space in relation to the objects being observed. We are able to pinpoint the location of objects by incorporating different viewpoints in space, and in accounting for the location of the viewpoints and then canceling them out, we are able to more accurately measure the distance between one object and another.
Why would we observe a causal relation if it isn't there ontologically in some form? I think that you may be confusing the map with the territory here.
Quoting RussellAWhat is the relation between other minds if they are separate?
Quoting RussellA
Time, space, matter and forces are the quantified mental representations of the analog relations that exist ontologically. What something is is a relationship between prior causes and what it effects. That's what your mind is, too - an accumulation of long-term memories and a working memory model of the world as it was a fraction of a second ago.
Quoting RussellA
Not me. Why would a solipsist have experiences of an "external" world if one didn't exist? How could that happen?
Quoting RussellA
No, they are relations.
Quoting RussellA
What does that mean - "conscious"?
Quoting RussellA
No, it's because you're using different sensory organs to apprehend the relationship. This is confusing the map (the way something is apprehended) with the territory (what is apprehended). Both senses are informing you of the same thing - the shape of the apple, not different things. How they are apprehended is different, but they refer to the same thing as both confirm what the other is showing to be the case.
Quoting RussellA
None of this explains what "consciousness" or "proto-consciousness" is.
It's in the form of the table, I suppose. This form is objective.
Quoting RussellA
That's a different issue from the reality of tables, though. And if neurons do not exist, how come minds exist?
Agree, the mind is part of the world, having evolved in synergy with the world, possibly over a period of 800 million years.
Quoting Harry Hindu
Agree, the nature of consciousness is mysterious. Panprotopsychism is just establishing the map, not explaining the territory.
Quoting Harry Hindu
The original Steve French article is arguing for an Ontic Structural Realism, the view that structure is ontologically fundamental, and where objects at at both the fundamental and "everyday" levels should be eliminated.
FH Bradley used a regress argument against the ontological existence of relations.
Question One
If relations only existed in the external world and not the mind, how are we able to perceive things that don't exist in the external world, such as Sherlock Holmes, ghosts and unicorns ?
Question Two
When looking at an object in the external world, our knowledge of it must necessarily be incomplete. Yet when looking at something in the world that is incomplete, the mind will fill in the blanks and make a complete image. When thinking about an object about which we have limited knowledge we still think of it as a complete whole.
If relations only existed in the external world and not the mind, how to explain the principle of closure ?
Question Three
If relations exist in the external world, then a table, which is a particular set of elementary particles, exists as an object. It follows that every possible set of elementary particles in the external world will also exist as an object. For example, a single elementary particle in the apple and a single elementary particle in the table will exist as an object, the set of elementary particles in the table and a single elementary particle in the apple will also exist as an object, etc. It follows that the number of objects in the external world will be more than the number of elementary particles in the world.
How can there be more things existing in the external world than there are elementary particles ?
Question Four
If the apple exists as an object in the external world, then every pair of elementary particles in the external world would also exist as an object. It logically follows that a single elementary particle in the table in front of me and a single elementary particle 90 billion light years away must also exist as an object.
The question is, does this object exist instantaneously, or is its existence dependent of information passing between the two elementary particles at the speed of light ?
Question Five
If relations only existed in the external world, the apple as one set of elementary particles will be an object, the table as another set of elementary particles will be another object, but also the combined set of elementary particles in the apple and table will be another object again.
Where is the information in the external world that the apple as an object exists independently of the table as an object ?
Question Six
We know that we perceive relationships that don't exist in the external world, such as Sherlock Holmes, ghosts and unicorns. Therefore, relationships don't need to exist in the external world in order for us to be able to perceive relationships, meaning that there are some relationships that exist only in the mind.
When we observe the external world and perceive a particular relationship, such as a table, as we are able to perceive relationships that don't exist in the external world, how do we know that the relationship we are perceiving exists in the mind or in the external world ?
Summary
It seems to me that FH Bradley's regress argument makes more sense than relations having an ontological existence in the external world.
If we eat the apple and the table is still there, then we're done.
Suppose someone (it might be G E Moore) chanced upon me writing this post. What explanation can I give? "Well, look, it's like this. We don't know if an apple and a table exist independently. We don't know how we might, outside of our own imaginations, pick up some clue as to whether they do or don't exist independently. We are pretty stuck on the topic. I'm suggesting we eat the apple and check if the table is still there." G E Moore might reply - "Yes, all right so far, but I would put it as a modus tollens for rhetorical effect. If the world offers no information regarding the independent existence of apples and tables, then I cannot discover whether I just ate an apple or a table." I can see Wittgenstein getting agitated at this apparently sensible reply from G E Moore but I'm not going to hang about to find out what he thinks.
If everything that's true of apples is true of elementary particles, then that is indeed so. If you can pick up apples for sixty pence a pound in Tesco, then you can pick up a pair of elementary particles for the same low price. Every little helps.
I saw this offer, didn't know what to take. I ended up picking a pair of neutrinos... They're nice but a bit small. :-/
It's even a better deal than that, in that for the low price of 60 pence, one can get from Tesco's 5 * 10 to the power of 29 elementary particles. Though Asda are slightly cheaper. And Waitrose definitely more expensive.
Because there is no information in the Eiffel Tower that the Andromeda Galaxy exists, it does not follow that we have not been able to discover the existence of either the Eiffel Tower or Andromeda Galaxy.
Depends what one means by exist.
We seem to agree that the Eiffel Tower does not exist in Platonic Form, in that it seems a strange idea that prior to 1889 the Eiffel Tower existed below the ground in Algeria in the form of iron.
But your previous comment "As long as I can eat and work on it, and occasionally climb on it, the table is real enough for me" suggests that we agree the Eiffel Tower exists in Aristotelian form, in that we can both eat in the Jules Verne Restaurant and visit the Observation Platform.
I was evidently kidding, but indeed you are right: my forms are Aristotelian. No matter without form, no form without matter.
Your questions about "where in the world is this or that relational information?" can be answered within this framework: the shape that things take is part of reality, it is objective and ontic. The shape of my table is ontic, and so is the shape of the Eiffel Tower, or the shape of Scotland, with Glasgow ontically situated where it is, i.e. west of Edinburgh...