Ukraine Crisis
The situation in Ukraine is becoming more dire by the minute. NATO is implying Russia is planning to invade Ukraine, whereas Russia denies this. Russia claims it will not allow Ukraine to enter NATO, as this would effectively put a hostile military alliance - NATO - right at the borders of Russia.
There's also political maneuvering going around, with the US never wanting a lack of enemies - soon after the disaster in Afghanistan. And Putin is wanting to shift attention away from pretty bad conditions in Russia do to the COVID pandemic and rising prices.
The situation is quite dire and could escalate into something very, very dangerous.
Here are a few links for those interested:
NATO sends reinforcements to Eastern Europe amid Russia tensions
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/24/nato-sends-reinforcements-to-eastern-europe-amid-russian-anger
Russian naval exercises off Ireland's coast 'not welcome,' says Foreign Minister
https://edition.cnn.com/2022/01/24/europe/russia-naval-exercise-ireland-intl/index.html
Pentagon reveals number of US troops on higher alert over Ukraine
https://www.rt.com/russia/547231-pentagon-troops-europe-ukraine/
Rising costs of Ukraine gamble could force Russia’s hand
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/24/rising-costs-of-ukraine-gamble-could-force-russias-hand
Let's hope things don't escalate too much more. Welcome 2022...
There's also political maneuvering going around, with the US never wanting a lack of enemies - soon after the disaster in Afghanistan. And Putin is wanting to shift attention away from pretty bad conditions in Russia do to the COVID pandemic and rising prices.
The situation is quite dire and could escalate into something very, very dangerous.
Here are a few links for those interested:
NATO sends reinforcements to Eastern Europe amid Russia tensions
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/1/24/nato-sends-reinforcements-to-eastern-europe-amid-russian-anger
Russian naval exercises off Ireland's coast 'not welcome,' says Foreign Minister
https://edition.cnn.com/2022/01/24/europe/russia-naval-exercise-ireland-intl/index.html
Pentagon reveals number of US troops on higher alert over Ukraine
https://www.rt.com/russia/547231-pentagon-troops-europe-ukraine/
Rising costs of Ukraine gamble could force Russia’s hand
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/24/rising-costs-of-ukraine-gamble-could-force-russias-hand
Let's hope things don't escalate too much more. Welcome 2022...
Comments (18084)
Once the war started, Ukraine made lot's of strategic and tactical choices to maximise suffering of it's own people, essentially holding them hostage in war zones for the purpose of garnering international public sympathy.
The worst of such offences is handing out arms to civilians, which makes them legitimate military targets.
A weapon in the hands of a civilian during a war is a false sense of security that will get them killed and hyperdrive gang violence.
The NATO policy of pouring arms into Ukraine, as I mentioned months ago, will undermine European security for decades to come. These weapons are already in Europe. The two traditional barriers to sophisticated weapons coming to Europe: they're being hard to get and so super expensive (therefore only affordable by groups Western intelligence likely knows about, and most well financed groups are mafia's of one form or another that aren't so interested in causing random mayhem) and then the actual transport to Europe giving opportunities of interception, do not exist with these weapons: they are cheap, available to all sorts of random groups that can come into existence literally today and completely dedicated to random mayhem (especially if Ukraine doesn't "win" and the West is obviously to blame for that), with the weapons already in Europe and require little smuggling expertise or expense to transport them anywhere on the continent (maybe why UK has been more enthusiastic for war).
Furthermore, lowering both the cost and the costs and risk of transport, lowers the barrier to completely "rational" organised crime. It makes no sense to spend millions in both capital outlay, transportation, and "levelized cost of crime" considering the risk of capture, on a robbery, assassination, or gang violence of which the benefits are lower.
Lower the costs and risks of acquiring and transporting the weapons and this significantly widens the scope of profitable crime.
To make matters worse, security systems and protocols of yesterday were thought out and designed for the threats of yesterday.
It is only a matter of time before a civilian aircraft is downed by a stinger missile, as well as unbelievably violent robberies take place with advanced weaponry.
There is no doubt as to the extreme lethality and effectiveness of the sophisticated weapons delivered to Ukraine. NATO flooding the black market with its most sophisticated shoulder operated weapons is complete insanity.
When you actually do military service you realise quickly that an automatic assault riffle, as destructive as it is and capable of civilian massacres that we regularly see ... is basically a prop compared to the other weapons systems involved in a modern military engagement.
Your position is very remote from any realism. You have entertained fantasies about nuking Ukraine. You have argued here that rooting for and supporting the Ukrainians was more morally disgusting than bombing the Ukrainians. This evidently implies an anti-Ukrainian and pro-Russian bias. It also shows that realism has little to do with your motivations, because a realist would never bother with such skewed moralism and fantasy of Armageddon, aware as he would be that it won't come across to his audience.
You and your walls of equivocating text are supporting the Russian war effort, even if you won't admit it openly.
Realism has nothing to do with:
Quoting Olivier5
Which I have not argued. I asked: what about the US bombing the Iraqi's (and plenty others) with exactly analogous or then very similar justifications.
However, given the Russian's perception of self-defence (at least as much as the US vis-a-vis Iraq -- and it's simply legitimate to say Russia is genuinely more at risk from Ukraine than US was at risk from Iraq), there is at least this moral component on the Russian's side.
NATO pursuing a policy that essentially maximises destruction in Ukraine, short of nuclear weapons, is not "supporting Ukraine" but rather doing everything to possible to destroy Ukraine. Which, US diplomats and military mouth pieces don't really hesitate to say that's the policy, as that's the policy which also maximises harm to the Russians.
Imagine I am your commanding officer, and I ask you to defend a position to the death. I cannot possibly say this is justified in supporting your own self-defence. Obviously, the only possible justification is fighting to the death holding one position will help the defence of others. US representatives regularly say the justification for "supporting" Ukraine is not that they'll win, or that the outcome is somehow better for Ukraine, but that it is beneficial to avoiding other parties, including themselves, from need to fight the Russians later. A highly debatable presupposition to begin with, but clearly the argument put forward.
Quoting Olivier5
I just explained at length the realistic option to protect Ukraine by "supporting Ukraine" which is to form a formal military alliance inside or outside NATO and send boots on the ground to do, or be prepared to do, actual fighting to protect Ukraine.
I made clear that if there was some "Cuban missile" style standoff where some grand bargain is reached or Russia "bluffs" we're continuously told about are actually successfully called (rather than Russia doing exactly what the West claims Russia is bluffing about), hats off to high-stakes statecraft ... if it works.
It is the in between, neither strong nor conciliatory that I have issue with. "So, because you are lukewarm—neither hot nor cold—I am about to spit you out of my mouth." I remember hearing somewhere ... a long time ago.
You did, right here:
Quoting boethius
----
Quoting boethius
This is not a realist option, rather it's a recipe for WW3. Yet another proof that your position has very little to do with realism.
It is realistic, it's exactly what the Cuban Missile crisis was, which no one really criticises US decisions about.
And, I explain that Ukraine in NATO could be compensated to Russians so they don't even consider WWIII. And, considering the high stakes, everyone would accept pretty much anything given to Russia in such a context, as obviously peace is preferable to war.
You could go in with a "statecraft" plan, even tell it to the Russians over the crisis hotline, see if they signal they agree with the steps about to be taken (or maybe reconsider if they don't).
Anyways, the only thing not realistic in the strategy to protect Ukraine by protecting Ukraine ... is US does not have the statecraft capacity for high-stakes diplomacy, as corrupt plans require the purge of all dissenting voices internally (leaving corrupt and/or morons running things), and the US does not care about Ukraine even if they did have such statecraft capacity left.
Ukraine is tit-for tat for the US disastrous invasion and retreat from Afghanistan. US mouth pieces even kept on saying that before and immediately following the war: "we can give Russia their Afghanistan! We can give Russia their Afghanistan" ... just like the USA gave the USA the USA's Afghanistan ... Russia has become somehow to blame for everything American does to itself.
Take "meddling in elections": even if 200 000 USD on facebook adds was significant somehow and, even assuming it was somehow state sanctioned trolling, why does regulation allow Facebook selling political adds to foreign entities to begin with?
Follow the money.
What are you talking about? Sending NATO troops and planes and warships into this war would literally be WW3. What do you think Putin will do when NATO troops get close to Moscow?
How many realists want to die in a nuclear holocaust?
Strategic (militarily and other):
The geographic strategic advantages of Ukraine being part of Russia should be fairly obvious.
Has come up in the thread here and there.
(Crimea, connecting Russia and Transnistria, etc.)
A Russian Ukraine would extend Russia further into Europe, bordering Hungary and Slovakia, ..., influence, missile ranges, whatever.
Economic:
By now, most should know that Ukrainian agriculture is big on the world stage.
High-tech and minerals are also big.
(By the way, according to rumors, the last Antonov An-225 Mriya was destroyed during the invasion, would'a :heart:'d seeing/flying one.)
What would subsuming Ukraine mean for Russian economy?
[sup](I have little overview on this stuff, heck, GMOs, droughts, climate change could be factors for all I know)[/sup]
Political:
Taking over Ukraine (in part or whole) would be a victory for Putin (or could be construed as such), one that could secure his future.
Losing face over the invasion could be bad for him and team, right down to lethal.
That's domestic; foreign is much more wishy-washy, at least I've come to expect little.
A disadvantage could be Ukrainian resistance (now terrorists) and Russo-haters; hard to tell how such like would figure in Putin's concerns.
Another disadvantage could be international responses and distrust.
Without Ukraine, Russia isn't a Great Power, but just a regional power.
By Denis Kataev and Eric Biegala, Radio France
Published on Tuesday, August 16, 2022 at 8:57 am
There are a few hundred of them, maybe thousands. Russian "refuseniks" who refuse to fight any longer and are imprisoned, even tortured according to the father of one of them. Some would also be sent back into combat.
Recently, the Russian army seems to be struggling in Ukraine: its advances in the Donbass are particularly slow and costly in terms of men and equipment. And obviously it is struggling to recruit fighters, especially since desertions and refusals to fight seem to be multiplying.
"I will solve the problem by my own efforts, I will talk to these soldiers who are responsible. He is my son. I will not leave without him": for several weeks now, Maxime*, in his fifties, has been wandering between the disparate units of the Russian army engaged in Ukraine, in the region of Luhansk where his son Youri*, 26 years old, has disappeared. He did not die in combat, nor was he wounded, he simply refused to continue the offensive started by Moscow on February 24. Since then, he has not been heard from again.
Yuri was an active soldier, a lieutenant assigned to a unit based on the island of Sakhalin in the Pacific, in the Russian Far East. In April, his unit found itself engaged in Ukraine, in the battle of Izium, south of Kharkiv. Izium is a neuralgic point which commands the communication axes towards the Donbass. The battle is hard, the Ukrainians defend themselves with great effort, the Russians finally take Izium, at the price of heavy losses. In June the young lieutenant decides to throw in the towel and refuses to fight any longer. He was immediately arrested, along with other Russian soldiers from his unit who were just as resistant, and incarcerated in Bryanka, a prison in the Luhansk region.
He still managed to reach his father on the phone, who said: "He told me about torture, he said they were tortured. I had already understood this from talking to the parents of other soldiers. According to Yuri, the rebels are regularly beaten and tied up on the floor. There are even mock executions. "Many of those who have been there have told me that they could never have imagined such a thing, that their own country could treat them in this way", Maxime tells us.
The objectors were kept in detention for some time, then transferred: "They were exfiltrated to unknown destinations... Why? I think it's clear, so that they can't say anything about what happened in the prisons. They are not sent back to the units where they used to serve, but to special units, to the areas of the front where the army is suffering the most losses. I think they don't want them to get out alive."
Some Russian units seem to have been condemned as a whole, such as the infamous 64th Motorized Rifle Guards Brigade, probably responsible for the abuses against civilians in Boutcha during the Battle of Kiev. The unit, although decorated by Vladimir Putin, was immediately reintroduced into the battle in Ukraine after its evacuation from the outskirts of Kiev. Its losses have been so great in the Ukrainian Donbass that some are now talking about its probable dissolution.
The losses, in men as well as in equipment, are obviously sufficient for the Russian General Staff to have decided to completely recompose certain units, combining sections with no experience with other more seasoned ones. Yuri, Maxim's son, probably found himself forcibly re-enlisted in one of these units: "He was taken to the prison in Perevalsk, where the men of the Wagner group said they needed him because he was a specialist - Yuri is a sniper - he couldn't refuse, so he went back" to the battle. Maxime traveled all the way to Ukraine, to the province of Luhansk, to try to find his son, who was undoubtedly reengaged in the fighting against his will.
How many are these refractory members of the Russian army? At least several hundred, perhaps even several thousand. In June and July, two units present in the Ukrainian Donbass, the 205th Cossack Motorized Rifle Brigade and the 11th Airborne Assault Brigade, about a thousand men each, reported a total of more than 378 soldiers, non-commissioned officers, and officers who refused to continue fighting in Ukraine.
*First names have been changed
https://www.radiofrance.fr/franceinter/guerre-en-ukraine-les-refuzniks-de-l-armee-russe-plombent-l-offensive-de-moscou-3992522
Gorbachev Feels His Life's Work Being Destroyed by Putin, Close Friend Says (Jul 23, 2022)
At 91 and at poor health, he's probably not going to get killed for his words. Then again...you never know.
Putin Says U.S. Using Ukrainians as 'Cannon Fodder', Trying to Prolong War (Aug 16, 2022)
Yet, Putin could end the war whenever. Blames the entire "west" while bombing Ukrainians. Is his propaganda/diversion working?
Bit ironic when your life's work was actually the dissolution of the Soviet Empire. Think about it, the Soviet Empire was basically the continuation of the Russian Empire, and they got Russia to be against it's own empire.
Quoting jorndoe
To those that think everything bad that happens is because of the actions of the US, yes. They take it all in without any problem.
Similar news and that some Russian troops don't want to serve in Ukraine (see here) or some officers have been even officers have been prosecuted for sending conscripts to the Ukraine war (see Russia Prosecutes 12 Officers Over Conscript Deployments to Ukraine) just point to one obvious issue: low morale among the Russians fighting troops in this war.
Then again, laws-schmoes. At first, commanders were pressuring soldiers to stay, threatening all manner of (fictitious) legal consequences. Then they began detaining refuseniks in unofficial prisons, beating and starving them into submission. Or they just refuse to accept their resignations. According to some soldiers from the infamous 64th infantry brigade, some 700 of their ranks are trying, mostly unsuccessfully, to quit. Even those whose contracts have expired often cannot leave. Those few who manage to obtain a leave of absence and go back to Russia promise to come back, but of course, none do. It's like Catch-22, but even more absurd and tragic.
When you start a large conventional war and don't call it even war, you have this. Putin had the balls to put the Russian Armed Forces to make an all out attack on Ukraine, but he hadn't the balls to put the Russian society into war mode. You reap what you sow.
Meanwhile, NATO is flexing it's muscles.
The 22nd Marine Expeditionary unit with it's Marine force and Airwing (on USS Kearsarge) practiced with the Finnish Navy and it's coastal forces and the exercise just ended this week. What is notable, that either the 22nd MEU or the Finnish Navy didn't know about this exercise in May of this year. So now NATO is basically having ad hoc exercises, not those agreed basically years earlier. The Finnish commander of the Coastal Brigade commented that the ad hoc exercise was the best military exercise in his 33 year military career. Tells something about it.
(What is interesting that American marines and their Finnish counterparts are training in mixed units:)
Just few weeks before in Estonia, on the other side of Gulf of Finland, Exercise Hedgehog was conducted and was the largest military exercises in Estonia since 1991 with 15 000 personnel (in a country with 7500 active personnel). An interesting video about it:
And likely you could go down until the Black Sea with similar NATO exercises taking place.
Yet the actual war seems to have to an artillery duel equivalent of WW2 / WW1 era, that both sides simply cannot continue. This war has dragged on for quite a while:
Speaking of FSB, here is the next installment of WoPo's investigative articles on pre-war intelligence: FSB errors played crucial role in Russia's failed war plans in Ukraine
It would not be "literally WWIII"; I spend some effort to explain how a "tough" standoff could result in a diplomatic solution.
Maybe actually read what I wrote.
However, let's assume this premise is true, then it follows that arming Ukraine "enough" to actually push back the Russians may likewise start WWIII anyways ... so, can't have that, just enough arms to Ukraine to cause damages to Russia but not enough that they escalate to tactical nuclear weapons.
Which is exactly what we see.
However, the truth is that the principle of "can't send NATO troops" or "can't send too many arms", to avoid WWIII, is simply used as a manipulation tool to calibrate the arms and intelligence support to maintain the war by propping up Ukraine, but not nearly enough support for Ukraine to have a chance of winning.
Quoting ssu
Obviously they would make it an "official war" if they wanted to, and they've talked about doing so.
However, paying people to fight is a lot more stable politically and they have increased revenue from fossil fuels sales, so can easily pay.
Quoting ssu
Again, we don't really have any statistically relevant data on Russian troops morale ... and low-morale in armies is pretty common and often goes up and down, total collapse being a pretty big outlier.
Moreover, is Ukrainian morale any better?
For such observations, even if true, to be useful, we'd need to compare both sides. If Russia has lost some number of armoured vehicles, the context of Ukrainian losses are needed to make sense of such a figure.
At least, in terms of evaluating the current military situation. If morale is equally bad on both sides, though neither likely to collapse, then perhaps no difference at all really will result anyways.
If the goal is to damage the Russian military regardless of damages to Ukraine in the process, then the context of Ukrainian losses
Quoting Changeling
Yes, please elaborate on your military and geo-political analysis that killing Putin with a drone attack is both feasible and a good idea.
Or, go to reddit to circle jerk virtue signalling fantasies.
Quoting SophistiCat
As I've repeated many times throughout this thread, we really have zero credible information on the Kremlin's or FSB internal dialogues and aims.
However, it's already been discussed here at length this idea of a Russian intelligence failure. They secure the South and clearly had a plan B to the first plan and methods of attacks (level everything with artillery), successfully prepare for and withstand sanctions, this does not really demonstrate a failed war plan.
I'd be willing to believe a quick Ukrainian capitulation was viewed as more probable (and maybe it was more probable, the current situation being realistically less likely than the counter-factual; as simply because something happens doesn't mean it was the likely outcome), but the Russian's clearly had a plan B.
There's an incredible amount of myth making on the part of Western media about Putin, or the Kremlin, or the FSB, or the Russian generals internal debates and monologues, but we really have basically zero information. We do not really know what they even really trying to achieve.
For example, part of this mythology of "miscalculation" is that Putin didn't expect the West to steal Russia's money held in Western banks. Certainly sounds had having some 350 billion dollars stolen from state assets.
However, maybe demonstrating to the developing world that their assets aren't safe in Western banks is exactly what Putin wanted, and is worth spending 350 billion dollars to undermine confidence in Western institutions.
Indeed, a critical component of resisting Western sanctions over the long haul is getting the non-Western world to implement alternative payment systems with Russia, and seeing 350 billion dollars get stolen without any due process of any kind is a big motivating factor.
What Western mainstream journalists / propagandists consistently forget in their analysis / propaganda is that the rest of the world is far closer to Putin politically than it is to the Western "ideals" (which the West hardly represents anyways). Most powerful people in nearly every country would be more concerned about their own assets and state assets being stolen by the West, for genuine philosophical "differences" or then pretextual bullshit, than they are of Ukrainian sovereignty.
I really don't know why you bother
You bother to posit some factoid as "real truth", or such is the implication, completely ignoring the issue has already been discussed.
I bother to point out your factoid is based on nothing; the whole "someone close to the Kremlin" or "anonymous CIA officials", or "FSB told me so" etc. are a confidence level of information of precisely zero.
What we learn from de-classified intelligence is that things are completely fucked up and almost nothing could have been deduced from public information at the time. What people in the FSB really thought, Putin thought, what they think now; we really don't know.
Reddit believing as a collective whole they can psychoanalyse all these people ... not a substitute for real knowledge.
And you're bothered that I bother to point it out?
As for updating my analysis of the situation:
It seems Russia is slowly taking all of the Donbas region, and the much talked about Ukrainian counter offensive against Kershon did not move the Russian lines much at all.
We've seen some "high value" targets been damaged or destroyed, such as the bridge to Kershon and then the recent ammo depots in Crimea, but these have very little affect on the actual war.
Main purpose of these attacks seems mostly for media diversion purposes, as Russia steadily takes ground in the Donbas.
Once again, the new "shiny" weapons system "finally getting to Ukraine", the HIMARS, had little effect on the actual military situation.
As I mentioned some weeks ago, taking Kershon is essentially a litmus test for the offensive manoeuvre potential of the much hyped "million man army" in combination with the legendary HIMARS.
Without offensive manoeuvre potential, Ukraine can only steadily lose territory.
As @Olivier5 keeps reminding us, no one wants WWIII, so it seems this situation where Ukraine can only lose territory at immense loss of life and cost will continue.
My guess is the Russian plan is to take all of the Donbas, declare their current objectives "achieved", switch to a defensive posture, and then it will be extremely difficult for Western media to keep up the narrative that Russia is somehow losing / has lost.
As far as the map goes, it's extremely slow but Ukraine has not been able to actually hold any fixed lines, so in the current dynamic is only a question of time.
At that point, Europeans maybe too tired of the war and the media narrative will switch to Ukraine needing to accept defeat and compromise with Russia. Or, could just be shelling back and forth for years as a new normal.
Ok, great, but how are we talking if I'm on mute?
I think we'll know the details later even better, but likely the intelligence service painted a rosy picture of this invasion just going so well as the occupation (and annexation) of Crimea. We have to remember that the most successful military operations that the Soviet Union and Russia have pulled off were so successful that they aren't called wars: The occupation of Czechoslovakia 1968 and the occupation of Crimea 2014. Hence the Russia have this urge for these armour attacks going straight to the Capital and simply eliminate the enemy leadership.
Americans call the tactic a "Thunder Run", which the US did successfully during the invasion of Iraq. When the US noticed that the Iraqis weren't putting much a fight, they just rolled the tanks right inside Baghdad into the city center. With a defender that would be willing and capable to fight, this would be a horrible strategy. And so it was in the battle of Kyiv (and earlier in the First Chechen war).
Interesting to look at the American experience in Baghdad to what now happened in Ukraine:
And how the same tactic didn't work near Kyiv. Here a large armoured column is attacked, it stops (basically bunching up dangerously together) and then it retreats:
Again, wild speculations by Western media.
The raid could be that someone sold information to the Americans (they did "know about" the invasion), or were anyways spied on, or then not but how to know without an investigation?
Or, throwing shade on the FSB perhaps suits the Kremlin as a scapegoat for a bloody war that FSB told them was likely, but that's what the Kremlin wants.
Or then simple intelligence failures having nothing to do with a supposed assessment of Ukraine likelihood of fighting.
There can be a long list of reasons on the jump to conclusions mat.
Quoting ssu
Certainly that is the preferred outcome, but we have no knowledge of how likely they thought this outcome would be, but we can be pretty sure they did not think it 100% as otherwise they would have only gone for the capital and not bothered taking Kershon (and the critical waterway to Crimea) and surrounding Mariupol, all in a few days.
A bloody war, with extreme sanctions and nearly total cut with the West may suit Russian and Chinese leadership interests, or then at the least an acceptable outcome and clearly preferred over the pre-2022 status quo.
Obviously just rolling into the capital and the war over in a couple of days, is preference number one for any military (as you point out for the US in Iraq). However, there is zero indications that the invasion was premised on such an eventuality and plenty of indications the Kremlin was committed to intense warfare if need be.
It also simply doesn't seem plausible that the Kremlin would assume taking Kiev in a day or two a slam dunk, as the Ukrainians are already supported by NATO powers and the CIA is advising at various levels, Ukraine has been fighting since 2014, political class as well as many regular people has been very radicalised to want a war with Russia, and therefore there maybe both intelligence and military surprises.
The war is always mythologized as Ukraine "standing alone" against a larger power. But that is obviously untrue, US and NATO made many commitments to Ukraine, already supplying arms and training and intelligence, so there's zero reason to assume the scenario presented itself to the Russians as simply a smaller country totally alone and should be foregone conclusion to just "knock out" with a column of tanks to the capital (which was not their strategy, they also took critical strategic positions in the South).
But they have not. And that's the important issue here.
Quoting boethius
With the information we have, we can at least quite confidently say that Russian morale isn't high and Ukrainian moral isn't on the verge of collapse.
Even if it is anecdotal and perhaps some reporting is biased, there's enough to understand that there are moral (and other) problems in the Russian side. That doesn't mean that all Russian units have low moral. And when it comes to Ukrainians, Russia would be eager to show of large groups of surrendering Ukrainians. We did see videos of these when Mariupol fell.
And naturally we can say that Ukrainian morale is better. They have been attacked, it's pretty simply for them. It's the Russians that can have the debate about if this war was a good idea. Many young people have voted on the issue by leaving Russia. Something that is an indicator that not everyone agrees with Putin.
I'm not so sure about that. We do know something about how Russia works. Don't think it's all speculation. Starting with the US knowing that Russia would invade, there are things that are known. What Putin thinks inside his head we naturally have no idea.
I'm not saying they haven't, I'm just pointing out that there's no reason to assume it's some miscalculation or mistake. There's negative consequences to conscripting people into an offensive war, especially with the economic pressure of the sanctions.
Furthermore, it's part of the Kremlin's narrative to the domestic audience that they are not trying to "conquer" Ukraine, just dealing with neo-Nazis and protecting ethnic Russians.
Quoting ssu
Sure, but there's nothing to indicate Russian morale is on the verge of collapse or affecting the war outcome in any significant way. Battle is still raging and Russia is still taking new territory. Russians are obviously presented with a very different version of the war as well, with major recent victories.
Quoting ssu
There have been reports of Ukrainian units refusing to fight, even posting videos saying so, as well as recent interviews with foreign fighters talking of major corruption, weapons disappearing, pointless suicide missions, etc.
But anecdotes really don't say much about the current war situation.
For sure there will be units with low morale in any military nearly anytime, even in peace time. But there's so far no evidence of Russian morale affecting battle outcomes in any significant way.
Quoting ssu
But that's what speculation is, saying "we know something about how Russia works" and therefore such and such events must be explained by what we already "know".
Evidence, hard evidence, is required to actually know something about anything, and even moreso when it comes to spooks who are constantly trying to deceive each other and certainly us.
I have so far encountered no evidence that Putin, the Kremlin, the FSB, believe the current state of sanctions and the war is a bad thing compared to the pre-2022 status quo (the basis of comparison). Certainly things can always be better, but it seems to me Putin and the Kremlin and FSB committed to this schism with the West by preparing for it for 8 years.
Why that's relevant is that decisions and diplomacy depend on a model of the counter-parties decision making. If the West assumes "sanctions are bad" and Putin and the Kremlin are squirming under them ... when they aren't, even exactly what they want (as kicking the West out unilaterally would not be an easy sell domestically), then it produces bad strategy. Or, likewise, if the West assumes the war is a net-negative (a miscalculation) for the Kremlin but they see it as a net positive, again results in bad strategy.
Of course, could be a giant miscalculation and they are in a panic, sweating bullets, sanctions about to destabilise the entire economy as army morale collapses, and wanting to find a way to end the war, save face and all that. I've just encountered no actual evidence for any of that.
It is speculative what is the current mental state of Russian decision makers. Nothing wrong with speculation of course, but it is dangerous to assume speculations are facts simply because they are convenient to believe, leads to terrible decision making.
By confidence the following was published today in The Guardian:
Quoting Philip Short - has written authoritative biographies including Putin
Quoting Philip Short - has written authoritative biographies including Putin
Quoting Philip Short - has written authoritative biographies including Putin
All just "propaganda" a literal biographer of Putin pointing out we don't know Putin's objectives?
Casually mentioning successful "'madman' theory" a la Nixon:
Quoting Madman Theory - Wikipedia
Though, of note, I like how some experts are "skeptical" about appearing insane and doing so is perhaps counter productive ... sometimes.
[tweet]https://twitter.com/MoscowTimes/status/1560345691825872903[/tweet]
, I don't think people generally think of Putin as mad insane.
At least, outside of the usual (sociopathic) authoritarian strategizing/manipulation.
Anyway, so, what's the simplest coherent explanation? (Or a coherent simpler explanation?)
Attempting to push Russia up the food chain?
"Russians and Ukrainians are one people" signs being put up in Kherson (Aug 18, 2022)
... both echoing and contradicting what Putin has said previously.
Russian-speakers in Latvia told to pick sides in test of patriotism (Aug 19, 2022)
[sup](by the way, I don't think such draconic measures would fly in the places I call home, then again, Latvia borders Russia and has lots of Russian-speakers)[/sup]
LOL. Just watch....
In this extract from former paratrooper Pavel Filatyev’s memoir, he recalls wild looting after soldiers entered Kherson
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/aug/17/they-turned-us-into-savages-russian-soldier-describes-start-of-ukraine-invasion
Again, if this is true, how are we talking.
Furthermore, my last post was simply quoting a literal "authoritative biographer of Putin" explaining basically the same thing.
So, please, explain how this biographer's article in The Guardian is propaganda and demagoguery.
Quoting Olivier5
Watch Ukraine retake all the Donbas and Crimea?
Watch Ukraine march on Moscow?
Watch what?
Insane - no. Isolated, poorly informed, surrounded by a small circle yes-men who tell him only what he wants to hear - much more likely.
Continuing the FSB theme, here are a couple of articles in a Russian investigative publication. The first is an OP by a journalist who has been covering Russian security services for many years, written in May (English version):
How Putin Decided to Go to War
And a follow-up of sorts, published today and not yet translated:
Who controls Russian troops in Ukraine
And why not?
You considered Ukraine vanquished from day one of the invasion. And yet, didn't they repel the attack on Kiev? Didn't they bring the Russian steamroller to a halt in Dombass?
It's not over until it's over. Neither you nor I can tell the future.
Looks like a pretty good source, thanks.
Again the "Putin attacked Ukraine because of NATO-membership" argument?
I think everyone agrees that one single reason doesn't explain a decision to go to war and obviously Russia wouldn't like Ukraine to be a member of NATO. However this idea that this was the most important reason (or only reason) depends on the idea that Ukrainian membership was possible/realistic/imminent.
Let's notice just what actually was said before the war:
(Do note the date: before February 24th.)
What "not being in the alliances agenda" meant for Germany has been now cleared a bit:
If Germany was against the NATO membership of Ukraine (basically openly), I guess there would be other NATO members too, which have disputes with Ukraine and willing to be in good terms with Russia and hence wouldn't want to expand the organization. But of course this hasn't silenced the people who argue that this war happened because of NATO.
We forget just what have been the real military victories of Russia and Soviet Union after World War 2. The really successful large military operation was in 1968 the Occupation of Czechoslovakia. Such large attack that the Czech army didn't raise it's finger and not even the Czech people dared to fight with against the tanks as had the Hungarians in 1956. There wasn't any war, just a surrender, basically protests.
(And then, the tanks were in Prague)
Similarly the occupation of Crimea, when this war actually started, was actually huge military victory. Using overwhelming force and achieving strategic surprise, all the objectives, both military and political, were met. The surprise is best shown in the World media was confused about the who were "Crimean volunteers" or the "little green men".
Yet the similar things as then were present earlier when Soviet Union invaded Finland: A puppet government "so-called Kuusinen government" that portrayed to be Finland asking the help from the Soviet Union, the idea that the Finnish workers would rejoice being liberated and earlier Civil War "reds" joining the ranks of Kuusinen's government. And the Soviet troops were said it would be an easy march and that Finnish workers would welcome them. Now we just have the "People's Republics", which have been far more successful.
Yet same thing happened as now: it hasn't been a victory march into Ukraine as it wasn't into my country.
Yet, before the assault as war is only an option, why wouldn't people under Putin tell him what he wants to hear? That it will be a short quick war and Ukraine will fold when the going gets tough.And hasn't Putin modernized the Russian military and hasn't it shown it can fight well in Syria? Who's going to say to a President that has fought very successful wars that this one will be different?
That's not what I nor Philip short is stating.
The thesis is clear:
Quoting Philip Short - has written authoritative biographies including Putin
We don't really know what the motives are, there is widespread disagreement, and several narratives have come and gone about it in the Western press.
I'm completely open to speculation of essentially any plausible motive.
Quoting ssu
Again, neither I nor the author I cite is claiming this.
However, it's pretty clear that declaring Ukraine and Georgia will join NATO some day is the trigger that set's in motion the violent events that follow starting with the invasion of Georgia. Professor Mearsheimer point about that is that there is simply no evidence of any plan to invade Georgia nor Ukraine before declaring they would join NATO.
It is clearly a main driver of the hostilities and tensions.
The significant escalation in 2014 is again only after a violent coup against a "moderate" (from the point of view of Russian relations) and the rise of anti-Russian neo-Nazi groups who then start a forever war in Donbas against separatists, refuse all settlement proposals.
No one is claiming Russia engineered the coup, and there's literal audio evidence of USA "choosing their man" as president. Russia, Ukraine and EU came to a resolution before things got further out of control, then several peace processes failed, and people were being shelled and dying for 8 years.
Now, what to make of this context is of course up for debate. One can speculate that somehow it was Russia that engineered all these things to get to this point of invading Ukraine. But, it would speculation and there is no evidence for it.
The only prima facie interpretation of the context available is that Russia is reacting to clearly hostile moves. Ok, even if one accepts that, one can argue Russia has no right to react to such hostile moves, they're not "all that hostile" considering it's not realistic Ukraine will join NATO even if NATO is publicly saying that's the goal and Ukraine places it in their constitution.
However, the context is just facts and what the facts have issue with is a narrative of Russia suddenly and without provocation invading a weaker neighbour who then valiantly "stand alone".
There's of course lot's to debate; one can accept declaring Ukraine and Georgia will join NATO is a provocation without accepting that is reasonable or moral basis to invade, or even wise to invade even it if was just and reasonable to want to.
One can argue that somehow "this is what Russia wanted all along!" and has engineered events to go this way, knowing Ukraine would refuse all reasonable proposals for peace they keep proposing reasonable resolutions at every step of the crisis in a sort of bad faith prediction of the counter-party bad faith; it's certainly possible, I don't put anything past the cloak and dagger under world, but there's simply no existing evidence for that.
I think you and me will have to wait about 30 years before we have a reasonable view of what likely happened. It's true that only 50-100 years history usually has come to an overall conclusion and the historians are arguing about the minor details, but likely in 30 years we can see how it was.
Quoting boethius
So your " completely open to speculation of essentially any plausible motive", yet you have decided that NATO expansion "is clearly a main driver of the hostilities and tensions". Well perhaps "a main driver" is better than "the main driver".
Well, if it was just NATO membership, Russia wouldn't be annexing parts of Ukraine. It is as simple as that you cannot deny that. You simply cannot. Regime change yes, annexation no.
Quoting boethius
By annexing territories of other sovereign countries. Right. :roll:
We've had this discussion in this thread of what Crimea meant for Russia, how Crimea is now seen as integral part of Russia and how it is now seen by Putin an illegal act and so on.
And how about Moldova? Has it tried to join NATO? No. Yet there the same strategy was implemented: Russian/Soviet troops presented as "peacekeepers", a separatist force backed by Russia. Just like in Georgia, actually.
And how about Armenia? Has Armenia tried to be a NATO member? In fact it's a member of the CSTO. Yet when Azerbaijan attacked (with the help of Turkey and oil money), Russia didn't help it's ally, because the government had tried to make perhaps better relations to the West. It played the role of a mediator.
If your are blind to the fact that Russia wants to dominate all of it's former states and does want parts of Ukraine, if it can, then there's not much to change your view.
But this is a minor issue as the war is going on.
And before WW2 there were the three Baltic states that USSR occupied without a fight. The disastrous Winter War that preceded this didn't discourage the Soviets - and the gamble payed off. They installed puppet governments, which promptly held "elections," followed by a vote to become new Soviet Socialist Republics (with 90+% voting in favor).
So yeah, they've learned all the wrong lessons from history, if they learned at all.
Over half of Ukraine's children are now refugees or fleeing (some more or less kidnapped), with no light at the end of the Ukrainian tunnel.
As seen before, a generation could be lost, while Putin's machinations bomb away, allegedly to deNazify and/or out of fear of NATO.
The right thing to do in the immediate term would be for Putin to turn the volume down, simple as that.
So far, UNICEF et al arranged for schooling/education for some 600,000 children having fled Ukraine.
Sure, it might be so.
Quoting ssu
Obviously NATO expansion is a plausible motive and clearly a main driver of hostilities and tensions over the decades since the end of the cold war.
It's clearly a main driver of events.
Quoting ssu
Exactly why I say "a" instead of "the", as other plausible ideas of motives still feature NATO expansion as a main driver, and certainly legitimate to some degree, but serving more as pretext for the real main drivers (such as imperialism or Putin's legacy and the like). And even if one were to posit that invasion would occur regardless of NATO expansion in the counter-factual, the fact NATO does expand makes it at least a main driver of the events we actually see.
I would not find it credible a theory that proposed NATO expansion has nothing to do with it and is not a main driver of events. Certainly Russian policy vis-a-vis NATO expansion (or then because they will invade anyways) is also a main driver, but the speculative part we're considering is what's exactly the motive behind the Russian policy.
The point I was making in my last post is that the context is still NATO expansion over decades, these are facts, so any explanation of motive needs to account for this (whether some sort of good faith, bad faith, or even nefarious "Russia engineered NATO expansion" somehow), to contrast with a popular Western framing that presents the invasion as essentially out of the blue (no invasion of Georgia after the NATO announcement, no coup in 2014, no civil war against ethnic Russians since, no advanced Baltic missile bases to protect against Iran and so on).
Quoting ssu
For certain there are other considerations. NATO expansion I mentioned as main driver since the end of the cold war, at least of the particular events as they particularly occur. Of course, the counter factual of no NATO expansion is completely legitimate to argue would be "Russian imperialism unleashed" as much as mundane EU integration.
Regime change has obviously failed. However, Russia did offer to completely withdraw for recognition of Crimea, neutral Ukraine, independent Donbas (within Ukraine) and Russian speaker rights protected.
There are several interpretations of the annexations, ranging from leverage to still try just to achieve above, to Crimea being a completely legitimate critical security issue that then needs water, to the plan was to start annexing more and more of Ukraine whenever the opportunity arises.
Quoting ssu
Definitely you can say the reaction is unjustified, I go to some length to explain that.
For example, I would certainly agree I have provoked more than a few people on this forum from time to time, and if one of them came to my door and shot me, I would not agree that's reasonable or justified, but it is still true I provoked them.
Provocation does not entail some moral fault. Pretty much any protest is provocative vis-a-vis police and whoever's being protested against.
However, the only evidence available is that NATO / Ukraine does something provocative, and then Russia reacts to that provocation. Saying annexing territories is totally "out of line" is of course a legitimate line of argument.
Where provocation is relevant is in terms of evaluating pre-planning which is the narrative I have issue with. If you go to a bar and get provoked and get into a fight, even if totally overreacting and committing crimes where the provocation is legal, it still demonstrates you didn't go to the bar with the intention of getting into a fight. Of course, unless you go to a bar that you know you'll get provoked in so as to have an excuse to punch a guy.
Quoting ssu
I have zero problem with the idea that Russia "wanted" Crimea anyways. The debate (between plausible theories) could be framed as whether Russia is using events as an excuse to overreact and Annex territory or then had no such plan but feels it necessary as events unfold. I.e. is the 2014 coup a genuine surprise and the annexation of Crimea a snap reaction to secure critical defence positions, or was it the plan all along and simply waiting for the reason to do so.
Professor Mearsheimer does not exclude this latter scenario, just that there's actual evidence supporting it. However, even if Russia is reacting, again, doesn't mean Russia is the victim or that the reactions are justified.
Quoting ssu
I have zero problem accepting such a premise.
The question is what to do about it.
I go to some length to develop the feasibility of having implemented (more difficult now but could still be arranged as a "peace keeping" thing) a military standoff with Russia by sending in NATO troops, thus daring Putin to attack NATO. Sending boots on the ground in Ukraine is obviously not directly attacking Russia, it would still be Russia starting a conflict with NATO if it were to attack Ukraine and whatever soldiers are there.
Of course, as a some sort of ballsy Western cowboy move, probably would result directly in WWIII as other posters have mentioned.
However, accompanied by a diplomatic theory more sophisticated than kindergarten name calling, with enticing compensatory offers to Russia (Nord Stream 2 and so on), not only would I expect that to work, but I still, even now, would evaluate it as more stabilising and less risky than the current policy (which, as we've seen, gets us super close to WWIII anyways as well as a chaotic and destructive war, in itself a risky thing).
What I have issue with is the "well, we won't actually take risks ourselves to prevent the war using 'force', the only language Putin understands and respects according to our narrative, so we'll just pour arms into an incredibly unstable and destructive process that affects the entire globe in terms of food and energy prices, triggering the first event we could consider global famine."
If protecting Ukrainian sovereignty is a moral imperative, then y'a gotta do what y'a gotta do and send in troops to do that protecting.
If avoiding WWIII is the moral imperative and a conflict with Russia over Ukraine is a pathway to that ... then gotta compromise and basically let Russia have major concessions concerning Ukraine to avoid war; and indeed, concessions would involve ceding territory, such as Crimea, and accepting the risk Russia may take more land later.
It boils down to simply both principles being in conflict and you can't have both; you can't minimise conflict with Russia to avoid probability of WWIII but then also stop them militarily taking what they want to take.
Pouring in arms is a worst of both worlds in my opinion: widespread destruction, Ukraine loses territory, and still incredibly unstable situation (globally) that can lead to WWIII anyways.
Big WoPo article: Battle for Kyiv: Ukrainian valor, Russian blunders combined to save the capital
According to several Ukrainian officials, on the day of the invasion they were contacted on Russia's behalf with an offer of surrender. (The Minister of Defence says he made a counter-offer to accept Russian surrender.)
I remember when they studied the effects of WW2 on children in Finland, they found that the most traumatic experiences were with those children that were evacuated to Sweden and were separated from their families and parents. No civilians were left to the hands of Russians as the civilian population was evacuated from front. At least now it has been mothers with their children that have been evacuated from Ukraine.
(Not like this...)
(Better like this for the child.)
And with this rate, likely about 100 000 or over will be killed in the first year of the war.
There is a very interesting longue durée in the way Russia works it's imperialistic goals. The methods and tactics are basically same. From Putin's speeches the historical viewpoint is evident, something that rarely Western politicians use, but is very common for example in the Middle East.
Meanwhile, Putin is trying to enlargen the armed forces:
Even in the spring draft the objectives weren't met. So easier said than done.
Why not? Do people just flee to the Eurasian steppes and live with camels to escape the draft?
Or do they dress like Cossacks and get so drunk their hearts stop beating?
I'm very familiar with Russian life, as you can tell.
[sup]• Russia extends its claim to the Arctic Ocean seabed (Apr 4, 2021)
• Satellite images show huge Russian military buildup in the Arctic (Apr 5, 2021)
• Russia wants more of the Arctic seabed — right up to Canada's 200 km offshore zone (Apr 12, 2021)
• What is behind Russia’s interest in a warming Arctic? (Mar 28, 2022)[/sup]
Back further south ...
[sup]• Russia is disappearing vast numbers of Ukrainians (The Economist; Jul 7, 2022)[/sup]
Sinister, but not unheard of :/
:smile:
Well, people just evading authorities and moving into the forest is said to be one reason why Russia didn't have similar feudalism as in Western Europe.
But I guess the reason is that a) you can bribe the officers that are responsible of your draft, b) you can bribe a doctor (like Trump did to avoid military service in Vietnam) that you are unable to serve or c) you just don't show up and the government doesn't have the resources to hunt for every draft dodger there is. Or then work on an important sector (like information technology) where your employer can get you exempted.
That not all of able males do serve has been a problem in Russia for a long time:
(from 2015)
Now it is said that the drop out rate is only 30%, so basically the situation has improved from 2015 I guess.
On a related note, here is a recent opinion piece by Fiona Hill and Angela Stent in Foreign Affairs: The World Putin Wants:
This merc clearly had the right idea:
(don't know the origin, allegedly a protester's sign)
As mentioned before in the thread, this does put a liability/accountability/onus on Putin.
[tweet]https://twitter.com/norwayun/status/1498363232632950792[/tweet]
Igor Mangushev is a psychosociopath or whatever the right term is. I guess they tend to come out of the woodwork when the opportunity arises.
Video Shows Russian Fighter With Ukrainian Skull, Says He'll Make a Goblet (Newsweek; Aug 28, 2022)
Again, no one is actually "standing" with Ukraine, except a few foreign fighters.
If Norwar and other NATO countries were actually standing with Ukraine, then Ukraine could easily be defended.
Which then brings no the retort that that would start WWIII.
Ok, but if "Standing with Ukraine" that way may start WWIII, then doing so in a substitute way has the same risk.
Solution, no matter how "bad" Russia is, arm Ukraine just enough to reduce Russia war aims ... but not enough to actually be any sort of loss.
Currently Russia has nearly all of the Donbas, Crimea, Kershon, and Ukraine has not been able to budge Russian lines West of the Dnieper.
Literally since day one of the war we are told Russian military morale is bad and will collapse any day, sanctions are hitting and Russian state will collapse any day.
Quoting SophistiCat
We see statements like this, but never see any evidence.
People in the West are living in a fantasy world where the war can be won on social media.
Meanwhile tens of thousands of Ukrainians have been killed, many more traumatised and displaced, as a consequence of social media bloodlust.
The narrative doesn't even make any sense, since if the first phase of the war was a disaster for Russia, then easy to negotiate a peace on good terms.
Of course, Russia would never give back Crimea, so if your bloodlust extends to that, then at least have the decency to append "with hundreds of thousands of lives spent doing it".
You can say "Russia's bad" and "Russia could withdraw" all you want, but if there's no political or military plan to do so, what's the point.
And, the only person who has actually proposed a military "tough way" plan to "force" Putin to back down, is myself. Of course, that's not interesting to any pro-Ukrainian interlocutor, because the fantasy of supplying arms as literally "Standing with Ukraine" is so entertaining.
In a situation like this your arms dealer is the same as your drug dealer.
Feels good every hit.
Maybe in a few days.
Still, after all these months, no one has actually answered the question of how many Nazis with power and influence would be too many Nazis with power and influence.
We believe in Russia (Jun 10, 2022; in Russian)
:brow:
That's odd. Sure, there was Sovietphobia in most or many places. After that, things changed, there was optimism, friendships, seeking trust. 2-3 decades ago, something like that, I personally know people that went to Russia, business and otherwise. But now, ironically, Putin and compadres stomped that out good and well. To the extent it's real, Matviyenko's "Russophobia" was/is like a self-fulfilling prophecy. Except, who has been wanting Russia to cease existing...? Will she be able to sell the persecution complex (or fear) to the Russian people (while Putin possibly creates a Ukraine of Russohaters)...?
A bit of irony and a bit of deceit/lying here. (Not going to keep repeating what's been posted.)
Right, the evil westerners are more or less accepting homosexuals, democracy, freedom of press, individual rights, ... And the Russian state must put a stop to that at home. The deNazification thing is a ruse, hypocrisy (be it the call for nationalism, actions taken, not looking in the backyard or at the employees, oppression of other voices, moves toward systematic indoctrination, or whatever), an excuse, a means to "collect the troops", another common enemy.
So, a sketchy justification for an authoritarian Russia, and a call for nationalism.
An exercise in propaganda, and (some) people will lap it up. Nothing new to see here.
Matviyenko did some good things for Saint Petersburg. What happened?
Except giving military and financial aid to Ukraine. Which actually rarely happens.
Quoting boethius
How isn't the ANNEXATION of Ukrainian territory clear evidence of this?
Or the Russification that Russia is doing in the occupied territories?
Or simply just what Vladimir Putin says?
How simply that isn't obvious evidence???
That's not "standing" with someone, it's supplying arms.
Quoting ssu
Because there's an important port in Sevastopol which an anti-Russian government supported by literal Nazi's would threaten, and Crimea was Russian not long ago and is filled with ethnic Russians.
Of course, you can argue Russia should not have annexed all of Crimea to protect a military base, but it's clearly a large and credible motivator and is not related to absorbing all of Ukraine.
Quoting ssu
Again, what's at issue here is that the idea that Putin and the Kremlin's goal is now, and has been all along, to annex all of Ukraine and destroy all of Ukrainian culture. That's the proposition being contested.
I'm pretty sure you've mentioned yourself several times that the preferred outcome of the first phase of the invasion was regime change to a government friendly to Russia, which is what fits the troops committed and the rolling tanks to the capital and soft hands on Ukrainian infrastructure.
A total war of annihilation would have looked very different.
And again, if Russia's goal was total destruction of Ukraine and Ukrainian culture it could easily use nuclear weapons to largely accomplish that.
If you retort that: ok, ok, ok Putin and the Kremlin's priority isn't the total destruction of Ukraine, as it has the tools to do that and has not done so, and there's all these other goals and conditions to consider ... but, but, but they'd still love to own Ukraine if they could by magic.
Ok sure, I'm sure Putin and the Kremlin would like to own the entire world if somehow it was magically feasible. However, in the real world, if you claim someone has an objective, they have the tools to achieve that objective, and they don't ... then that's clearly not their objective and speculating about what people would wish, or rather, or prefer if they could somehow magically have it, isn't very useful.
I'm sure Trump would have preferred to own the whole world too if it was magically feasible, but claiming that was Trump's objective as president is dumb.
Limiting factors include military resistance, domestic politics, resources, international responses, ...
The Feb 24 attempt on Kyiv failed, but Putin has time.
A moving target (likely).
Doubtful there's any explicit or particular goal to destroy Ukrainian culture.
More like the usual propaganda, Russification, doing away with resistance as needed.
Another (likely) moving target.
I'm sure he has Kremlin advisers, spies, strategists, generals, and such sweating, maybe running scenarios + contingencies or whatever.
A cynical chess game, control, incidentally bombing Ukrainians?
Quoting Banno
Wow. The pretense is astounding.
I can't actually think of a single American film or tv series where I could say with certainty that it doesn't ridicule Russia or present Russians as anything other than stupid or hostile. Russophobia is pervasively present in American culture and has been for a long time.
And similar for other Western cultures.
Then US presidents, esp. the Democrats: all Russophobes to the bone.
I can't think of an EU politician who hasn't been a Russophobe. It's part of what counts for "being civilized" around here, and it's been like that for as long as I can remember, at least 30 years.
And to then hear someone claim that the Russians chose this negative image that Westerners have of them!
Except that usually arms are sold. Not given. That's the real difference here.
So I don't understand what your point is with this kind of rhetoric.
Quoting boethius
Poor, poor Russians. Threatened by Nazi's.
I guess that Sevastopol base is the reason to start a war in the Donbas too. By denying the obvious imperialist aspirations of Russia, your position is quite clear.
They haven't ever liked the West and especially they haven't liked the westernizers, the Zapadniks. The divide goes far into history in Russia.
Why should the Western hatred of Russians (and Slavic people in general) be considered morally right?
It might be useful to remind @baker that Ukrainians are Slavs. In fact Ukraine, the region around Kyiv in particular, was historically the cradle of all Slavic nations. That's where the trade route from the Varangians to the Greeks ran. The Varangians were Vikings who came to rule a mix of folks living in those parts circa 8th century if memory serves. The word originally means "war gang" or "war party". They founded the Rurik dynasty, which ruled the Kievan Rus from the 9th to the 13th century. They waged wars against Constantinople and lost, but settled along the Danube and in the Balkans. And then they allied themselves and traded with the Eastern Roman Empire.
Hence the establishment of the highly profitable trade route from the Varangians to the Greeks, running through Kyiv. The Varangians or Rus traded with Byzance in fur, metals, but mostly slaves, as previous traders had done along this ancient route. The etymology of "slave" is "Slav".
Hence also the Slavs being generally Orthodox, because they forged a strong link with Byzance at that time. They even supplied the personal gard to the emperor: the Varangian Gard. The Varangian gard traveled wherever the emperor had to go, and they left runic inscriptions all over the empire.
The Slavs were born in Ukraine.
Why would any hatred of a large people or a country be morally right?
I think you should judge individuals by their actions. Regimes can be totalitarian or undemocratic, but why the hatred, especially of large people, be they American or Russian or anybody else? There's a lot of different people among them.
In wars some people find it easier to really hate the enemy. And of course personal experiences and those to your fellow people makes it totally understandable. Personally I don't have anything against Russians, I know that many of them don't at all support Putin, and some naturally do. I'm just not in that hating game. It's for the racists and xenophobic people.
I don't think they are slaves, and haven't been for a long time. Sometimes you are just in a country where politics doesn't work so well as in other countries and you don't have democracy, rights of the individual and a justice state. Mexicans are nice people, but their government is terrible. I would say the same thing about Russia. We should remember that our countries could also lose our democracy if everything would go to hell in a handbasket. And then we are just awed how insane our society has become and how crazy our fellow citizens are.
Well, I'm not sure just when Russians weren't Russians. Or the time when Ukrainians weren't slavs (Ruthenians were considered slavs too). It's not as we Finns have been Finno-Ugrian and before weren't, but I guess with enough time we all trace back to Africa.
While searching for it, some interesting notes are that messaging has definitely shifted. Russia sent "saboteurs" while the West sent "military consultants".
But really, they were doing the same.
And Fiona Hill seems to have totally changed her tune. Here is her 2014 real politik analysis: https://www.brookings.edu/articles/mr-putin-and-the-art-of-the-offensive-defense-ukraine-and-its-meanings-part-three/
This was a pretty good read as well. https://www.beyondintractability.org/casestudy/grover-minsk-II-accords#_ftn43
Classifed, top secret! You'll need to get security clearance to view these docs. :smile:
Quoting Benkei
And disinformation had its humble origins in Moscow (dezinformatsiya). As per Wikipedia, Joseph Stalin coined the term in a way that sounded French so that the Soviets could say "you started this" to NATO nations.
Genetics confirms your statement.
:up: We're all African apes. If someone discriminates personally prejudicially by shoe size, place of birth, freckle count, melanin pigmentation, or some such, then they're a racist (and that's meant as an insult).
I think that both sides did break the so-called cease fire. Before the February 24th assault, the Russian artillery intensified.
Quoting jorndoe
As a Finn and as an European I just point out to my Mexican (Latin) wife that my skin is darker than hers. That's how stupid the whole race thing is.
Why should hatred be morally right?
This is what this whole Ukraine thing is about: the sanctity of hatred, the sacred right to hate, and the duty of the hated to kneel before the hater.
People just love to hate, and they will not let anyone question that.
Complete the following sentence:
Because Russians have always been slaves, they should ....
In some occasion, people do understand why someone would have this feeling.
If someone kills your family and other loved ones, is it morally wrong to hate a person for this action?
Heck, if you would say that hating Donald Trump is morally wrong, many here would disagree (I presume).
I remember that Morocco offered cavalry to Finland during the Winter War. Yet the Moroccan cavalry didnt come to fight in snowy Finland.
"I don't care to know what happens next."
On the opposing side it's the other way around. Russians have a seemingly endless supply of tanks, guns and ammunition, but nowhere enough men to go with them. They are still losing a lot of armor, but they are not as careless and undisciplined as they were at the beginning of the invasion.
Which basically means that Russia can still fight on for quite some time without it's tank fleet being finished.
The Russian puppets were preparing for a vote, with the usual propaganda etc.
Maybe they'll get interrupted by the counterattack (don't know if they already have).
, an "anti-Russian enclave" that Putin's efforts have made more or less = Ukraine.
Arguably, Putin has created much Ukrainian Russophobia (analogous to a self-fulfilling prophecy).
, that's a lot of scrap metal. :o
I'm guessing that moving 100s of tanks from wherever they are in Russia can be seen by satellites or whatever monitoring.
If so, then the Ukrainian defense might get a warning.
Meanwhile, Trump applauds Putin.
Gotta' wonder what'd happen if Trump had been in The White House.
"Fierce" (using Trump's term):
• Russia warns Moldova over Transnistria troops (Deutsche Welle · Sep 3, 2022)
• DISINFORMATION: Russians in the Diaspora face discrimination (Veridica · Mar 21, 2022)
Ukraine is surely given top satellite information. And don't forget the simply thing as people taking videos and posting them on the net.
This was actually the reason why Russia couldn't gain strategic surprise at the start of the war. Even if Ukraine didn't start the mobilization of it's troops until the Russians were attacking.
:up:
[quote=Louis XV of France]Après moi, le déluge.[/quote]
:grin:
I think that's right. We have enough manpower (for now), but as the Ukrainian counterattacks ramp up, this will start to change. Since the start of the war, on the Kyiv fronts, Ukrainian Territorial Defense Forces made up a sizeable portion of our frontline units. So far it has been mostly OK because Russia has been content with shelling the hell out of us from long range, and when absorbing these attacks, there's not much salient difference between territorial defense units and regular units.
Attacking is another story, and "regular" troops are preferred for a number of reasons not limited to better training, higher morale, better equipment, etc.
In any case I agree Russia's problem is more about maintaining adequate numbers of trained personnel. However, at the rate they are expending ammunition, and putting stress on their big guns, I do not expect them to maintain their current pace of attack for more than 1 to 1.5 years. They will HAVE to slow down.
We just need to be patient, pick our spots, and plan counterattacks carefully. It would be nice to push hard from now until mid-October or thereabouts, before digging into defensive positions before Winter comes. Then Russia can either wait (while we amass more weapons and ordnance) or they can attack and incur catastrophic casualties. Either way, the winters that have historically worked to their advantage against the French and Germans will now work against them in this war, and I foresee Russian morale dropping to all-time lows.
I think that's right. We have to pick our spots and initiate counterattacks only when opportunities present themselves. So far the Russians have been throwing themselves against a brick wall and taking on huge casualties. As we mentioned before, Russia has now lost a bit over 10% of their total tanks in a little over 6 months. That should be a totally unacceptable number for them considering the majority of their remaining tanks are outdated or non-operational.
As the Ukrainian frontline forces consist of a large number of Territorial Defense units, the same is true for the Russian frontline units. The frontline is still majority regular troops, but in many spots they are not. This is problematic for Russia because they cannot mount respectable attacks with non-regulars against moderate-heavily fortified positions.
More or less the usual, "the evil hemisphere" is mad about Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Putin seems to have a bit of sancxiety, ...
A recap of how Europe is now facing an energy crisis:
It is in the east that the Ukrainian forces' counter-offensive is proving the most effective. They regained ground in the region, taking advantage of a weakness in the Russian defensive system.
By Emmanuel Grynszpan, le Monde
Posted today at 5:30 a.m.
https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2022/09/08/guerre-en-ukraine-une-contre-offensive-ukrainienne-bouscule-les-forces-russes-pres-de-kharkiv_6140648_3210.html
It had been expected for months in the south of the country, in the Kherson region. But it is in eastern Ukraine, near Kharkiv, that the Ukrainian forces' counter-offensive is proving most effective. Between Tuesday September 6 and Wednesday September 7, it broke through the Russian defense lines and advanced 15 kilometers. Images filmed by the Ukrainians and testimonies from both sides attest to this movement, which occurred in one of the least publicized areas of the front line which stretches over 2,000 kilometers.
It seems that the Ukrainians had previously identified a weakness in the Russian defensive system there and attacked by surprise. The idea would be to cut Izioum's main supply route. This Ukrainian garrison town, taken in March, is used by the Russians as a rear base to attack northern Donbass.
The influential Russian blogger Starche Eddy (half a million subscribers on Telegram) deplores that the Ukrainian army “has for the moment completely outclassed our command (…) . Izioum prepares for battle. We must now wish good luck to our soldiers, our veterans and our officers. The enemy will strike from the north and from the south (…) , the night will be hot” .
“Exceptional Audacity”
The breakthrough was made near the town of Balaklya, pushing Russian forces to the left bank (north side) of the Siversky Donets and Serednya Balakliika rivers on Tuesday, September 6. Ukrainian forces probably took Verbivka (less than 3 kilometers northwest of Balaklya) on 6 September. Geotagged images published that same day show Ukrainian infantry in the east of this city.
Several Russian sources have acknowledged the Ukrainian gains and report that the Russian army hastily demolished bridges east of Balaklya to halt the Ukrainian advance. The experts of the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), in Washington, believe on the contrary that these destructions testify to the fact that the Russians were preparing for a retreat. The Ukrainian assault troops are now advancing towards Kupyansk, another crucial city for supplying the Russian divisions attacking the Donbass.
"On the Kharkiv front, the enemy launched [Tuesday] an offensive which he had been preparing for a long time, judging by the transfer of reserves, striking his main blow in the sector of the city of Balakliïa" , relates, on his Telegram channel, Igor Girkin (alias "Strelkov"), a retired colonel and former Russian warlord, who led the armed uprising in the Donbass in 2014 during the first months. Ukrainian army, this ultranationalist remarks "the exceptional audacity of the enemy attacks taking positions, penetrating them at high speed directly by means of armour, as a result of which [the] [Russian] artillery lost the ability to hit a enemy too close [its] positions” .
On Wednesday evening, the Russian forces seemed to have lost two additional localities (Baïrak and Nova Husarivka, south of Balakliïa). Moscow has probably cleared this area since the end of August to redeploy soldiers in the Kherson region, where the Ukrainian counter-offensive was clearly preparing.
Strikes on logistical nodes
Based on available obituary data on Russian soldiers, the ISW found that Russia elements of the 147th Artillery Regiment of the 2nd Motorized Rifle Division of the 1st Guards Tank Army deployed in the Kherson region no earlier than the end of August. “This is the first time that the ISW has observed elements of the Russian 1st Guards Elite Tank Army operating in southern Ukraine. Elements of the 147th had previously fought at Buchha and Kiev in March, and elements of the 1st Guards Tank Army were active mostly along the Kharkiv axis after the Russian withdrawal from Kiev. »
Begun ten days ago, the counter-offensive in the Kherson region is progressing more laboriously on a front 200 kilometers long. Here too, the Ukrainian forces have long sought weak points in the Russian system. The preparation was made by continuous strikes on logistics nodes coming from Crimea, means of transport, concentrations of troops and equipment, ammunition depots and command centers in the Kherson region.
Particular effort was made to methodically destroy the only two bridges crossing the wide Dnieper and, subsequently, the ferries used by the Russian army. The objective was to exhaust the isolated Russian army corps north of the Dnieper until, deprived of the necessary supplies, it was no longer able to resist.
“In the area of ??the enemy bridgehead, [south of] the Ingulets River, the enemy continues to slowly but surely push back our units ,” laments Igor Girkin. According to his information, which matches that collected from pro-kyiv sources, the Ukrainian forces have taken four localities: Sukhoi Stavok, Bezimenne, Kostromka, Schastlivoie. “Such a deep advance by the enemy threatens to break through the front towards Tchkalovo, and further towards Berislav, with, as a result, a fragmentation of our units in this area” , he comments again on Telegram.
Clandestine actions
Pentagon Undersecretary for Defense Policy Colin Kahl also confirmed for the first time on Wednesday that Ukraine had launched its counteroffensive in Kherson and "inflicted heavy casualties on Russian forces . " Kherson is also the scene of frequent clandestine actions. On Monday, a vehicle bomb killed a local Ukrainian official collaborating with the Russian invader. This is the twentieth assassination or attempted assassination in six months. On Wednesday evening, the headquarters of Vladimir Putin's United Russia party in the city of Melitopol was blown up, an action claimed by Kyiv.
Moscow regularly postpones the holding of "referendums" intended to legitimize the annexation of Ukrainian territories. A few hours before the Melitopol explosion, the local boss of United Russia, Andrei Tourtchak, had announced that these consultations would be held on November 4. A date which corresponds to the feast of the unity of the people in Russia.
But, while the Ukrainians rejoiced to finally seeing their counter-attacks materialize on two fronts, a few false notes disrupted the day on Wednesday. In the Donbass, Russian forces managed to gain ground on two axes. In Piski (northwestern suburb of Donetsk), they took the "anthill" , nickname of an underground bunker gradually reinforced in 2015. The front in this area had hardly moved for eight years thanks to a line of defense very efficient Ukrainian. Further north, Russian forces captured the also heavily defended hamlet of Kodema, thereby breaking one of the last barriers to the town of Bakhmout.
Russians can be gotten to negotiate for an armstice (if not peace) only with making this option to be the better one for them than just for Putin to stick onto the original plan.
:death: :flower:
Military pro-war bloggers with frontline contacts offer rare insight into Russia’s performance on ground
Pjotr Sauer, the Guardian
Thu 8 Sep 2022 13.35 BST
“The war in Ukraine will continue until the complete defeat of Russia,” Igor Girkin, a far-right nationalist, grumbled in a video address to his 430,000 followers on Telegram on Monday. “We have already lost, the rest is just a matter of time.”
Girkin, a former Russian intelligence colonel who became a commander of the pro-Russian separatist forces in 2014, is arguably the most prominent voice within an increasingly loud and angry group of ultra-nationalist and pro-war bloggers who have taken to berating the Kremlin for its failure to achieve its tactical objectives as the fighting in Ukraine has entered its seventh month.
After Ukraine’s latest counter-offensive in the south and the north-east of the country, these bloggers – who have so far been granted a public platform denied to many – have intensified their criticism of the Kremlin, slamming the army’s inadequate performance in the war and urging Vladimir Putin to declare a full-scale mobilisation.
Never underestimate a country that goes full-time war economy.
Zelensky also appealed to "some bloggers," as he put it, "not to complicate the task for our army with your haste. Please do not report the specific details of the defense operation earlier than the official representatives of our state."
As an avid consumer of information, I heard that as calling for less demand for the last five minutes. Guilty, as charged.
I sort of believe it too. More photos and videos of captured undamaged vehicles and supplies than at any time before. Looks like the Russians were totally unprepared for an attack up north.
Hopefully they don't outrun in their indirect fire support and supplies. I am curious if the aim was always to attack in force up north after trapping so much of Russia's best prepared units down south by blowing the bridges, or if it was just opportunity and the ability to move resources north quickly. Guess we won't know until things settle down.
Russian milbloggers doom posting makes it seem like half the Ukrainian army was somehow secretly teleported to Kharkiv.
It is interesting that Zelensky was not asking the 'bloggers' to shut up but chill with the absolute immediacy element.
The information war includes these bloggers.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
The Russians did move resources south after all the fanfare. As you say, it is hard to know who is fooling who until the deal goes down.
Eerily similar. Guess that's because geography doesn't change much and the same points still make natural boundaries.
Interesting to note that, given the current news blackout from Ukraine, these Russian military bloggers have become our main source of info on what's happening on the front.
They are clearly well tipped by frontline informants.
Every one seems to assume they must have a pro-russian bias but some may still be 'catastrophists'.
One wonders why the Telgram platform isn't shut down or "policed". Maybe Putin too relies on them for info... :smirk:
But times have changed!
We have now learned that the faliure was the fault of rapacious boyars once again. The incompetent scourge of Russia. The true leaders have stepped in. Unfortunately, the word going out to the Russian milbloggers is that the boyars really blew it this time and all that can be done is to abandon the entire front and retrench. Strangely, no mention of how the thousands of men cut off from a retreat will manage this retrenchment or how they will be replaced if they represent a significant proportion of all combat forces.
To be honest though, this probably is the smarter move. When I initially saw that they were going to try to airlift VDV through an area covered by SAMs and crawling with MANPADS, just to put even more men who need supplies into a cut off pocket, I thought I was going to see something as stupid as the continuous unsupported air assaults with no SEAD at the start of the war. The propaganda videos made more sense then the real thing would have.
Would not surprise me. I don't take any "leaks" of Russian casualties that seriously. I doubt anyone knows. There is a tendency to not report bad news up the chain of command and we now know from public trials that many BTGs were extremely understrength in vehicles and men going into the invasion, so extrapolating from the starting components is going to over count loses as well. Seems like a ghost soldier phenomenon similar to what was common in the ANA. Some commanders are being tried for that anyhow, I suppose they could just be scape goats, but lots of evidence suggests understrength BTGs.
You mean, corrupted generals and such? Those getting the ghost soldiers' pay?
On russian milbliggers, it baffles me that they are right now the world's only source on battlefield news.
Meaning what?
All the talk about the counterattack in the Kherson region. Even the civilians were warned about the counteroffensive there, plus a lot of artillery bombardment in the section. Then a counterattack in the East. Hopefully the counterattack continues well.
:100: :up:
What are you talking about?
I stated taking Kherson is the litmus test of Ukrainian counter offensive potential.
It is obviously vulnerable and obviously strategically critical, as holding Kherson West of the Dnieper is a major strategic pain (Russia can constantly threaten counter offensive West of the river, which would be significantly harder if they were stuck on the East side of the river).
Ukraine had a serious offensive there that did not work. It's now said that it was a "faint" to attack around Kharkiv, but that doesn't seem the case to me.
Furthermore, if you could take Kershon you would for the reasons above, there would not be a strategic reason to not take it and hitting the brides is an obvious first step for a serious effort to take it.
The last times Ukraine suffered a strategic defeat, they would take land around Kharkiv, which is not strategically important and the Russians simply tactically retreat to the Russian border, re-advance later, as their war doctrine instructs.
Just a few months ago Ukraine "fought to the border!" and raised a flag, and this seems like
more like a repeat of that .
Kharkiv is simply not a strategically important offensive.
Of course, that they can do any offensive is still meaningful, obviously more than zero; however, armies are tested fighting over strategically important locations and everything else is "tactical retreat" and does not mean so much in itself.
Granted, it's not a good thing to lose territory, so Russia has responded by hitting power plants and taking down half the grid in Ukraine. In terms of pure military analysis, this sort of infrastructure is pretty important for Ukraine's war effort.
Ukraine has not just "won the war" as some parts of the internet seem to think.
Far, far from it.
Could they win?
Yes, with enough NATO support it's possible. But NATO does not give that "enough support".
My position is not "Ukraine can't win", but, as I've made clear many times, my position is US and NATO policy is to support Ukraine just enough to prop it up but not enough to win.
A sign of a "winning" army would be taking Kherson (which I have not said that Ukraine "can't possibly take it", just pointed out that whether they do or not is the best signal of their military potential), and that they couldn't take Kherson so instead attacked land Russia policy is clearly to just retreat from whenever attacked is very much compatible with the hypothesis that US and NATO will not support Ukraine enough to actually win.
Now, the reason the Russians tactically retreat from around Kharkiv whenever there is an offensive there is because it's not strategically important area. The area around Kharkiv only strategically matters in taking Kharkiv, which the Russians have never tried to do
[tweet]https://twitter.com/mbk_center/status/1568174194243915776[/tweet]
Khodarkovsky has connections and resources, and as far as I know, he has not been implicated in disinformation, but I am skeptical. Not only is the figure staggering by itself, it is very close to official Ukrainian military estimates, which one assumes are exaggerated, and much higher than recent US intelligence estimates (70-80k casualties, which probably means about 15-20k dead).
Since the context is compensation payments, this would include only confirmed (and officially admitted) dead, which means that the real number would be higher still. The number would not include those conscripted in the breakaway "republics," but it may include at least some of the dead mercenaries: it is said that the military gets them to sign official contracts to avoid complications.
Quoting Olivier5
They tried to block it a few years ago. Succeeded only in breaking some innocent sites, as Telegram actively evaded blocking. Eventually they gave up.
The new form that escalation seems to be taking now is attacking Ukraine's critical civil infrastructure, especially its energy system. This is something that Russian war hawks have advocated for a long time. With the heating season coming, such attacks could become deadly. Earlier Ukrainian authorities have warned Donbass residents in cities that have been devastated by Russian bombardment that they had to evacuate or else face freezing temperatures with no light and heating. This could become the reality for Kharkiv and other cities even farther from the frontline.
The strikes on power and transformer stations in the recent days put the lie to the notion that the reason that Russia expends most of its "high-precision" munitions on civilian housing, schools and hospitals is because they are just that inaccurate, or else Russian military lacks up-to-date targeting data. That's not entirely false, but clearly, they can "do better" when they make an effort.
Quoting Agent Smith
Who knows how many civilians, children, non-combatants have been killed... Destroying infrastructure doesn't help.
LB in Kyiv reports (not independently confirmed) ...
[sup]Sep 10, 2022 Names of the nameless grave. The story of four people whose bodies were found in a ravine in the Kherson region
Sep 10, 2022 In a de-occupied village of Kharkiv region, they found dead people with traces of torture
Sep 12, 2022 At least a thousand civilians died in Izyum as a result of the armed aggression of the occupiers
Sep 12, 2022 Hostages of geography. How the Russians take revenge on Kharkiv for the counteroffensive
Sep 13, 2022 Not a single local resident remained in the village of Udy in the Kharkiv region, the police said
[/sup]
Also, need to look into long-term consequences of living in war zones - depression, shell-shock, etc. Most statistics on war I've noticed are skewed, mortality (deaths) is given more weightage than morbidity (suffering); antinatalists might need to factor that into their philosophy. Perhaps suffering is hard to measure compared to deaths; after all with the latter all we need to do is count bodies & body parts.
There you are going on against a lot of military analysts, to whom it's their actual job to analyze these.
First of all, a military operation to do such an attack has to be methodically planned and prepared a long time before. It's not just political "spin" of "Oh well, our offensive didn't work there, so let's try somewhere else". Military operations aren't done like that.
Quoting boethius
Really?
I think that when Ukraine is capable of such a counterattack, it tells quite a lot. It doesn't mean that the war is at all over or who will "win". The war can drag on for years still. That Russia has had to withdraw tells a lot of the situation.
Thanks for this background. Still, couldn't they arrest the most negative milbloggers and send them to jail for 15 years?
The same analysts that said Russian troops have low morale and will completely collapse ... like 2 days into the war?
Doesn't take an analyst to see Russia still holds Kherson.
I states that Kherson was the litmus test of Ukrainian military potential, it is still in Russian hands ... so I'm not so impressed.
If Kherson fell, then I'd completely agree things are clearly bad for Russia, but that didn't happen. I see no reason to change my analysis to the idea that Kharkiv region was the real prize all along.
There's nothing really in the Kharkiv region, you just have to cross it to take Kharkiv which the Russians have never tried to do, and it's gone back and forth precisely because the Russians have no reason to defend it fiercely and what they are trained to do is tactically retreat and bombard enemy forces.
It's these back and forth manoeuvres around Kharkiv which is where Russia is doing exactly their military doctrine, so it's difficult to say doing what you say is a good idea is somehow an embarrassment.
The reason Russia trains this way is because Russia is massive, so it's better to retreat, bombard as you go, regroup and then counter attack (hopefully) enemy formations that have overstretched their supply lines (see: Napoleon, Hitler).
Quoting ssu
We're not in disagreement. I agree being able to do any offensive is better than being able to do zero.
However, Kharkiv region itself is not critically strategically, unless you want to take Kharkiv. But anything else you want to do you can easily go around, unlike Kherson that is a critical bridge head for the Russians West of the Dnieper and controls the canal bringing water to Crimea (although I assume you'd need both sides of the river to shut that off again, but obviously taking one side is the first step to taking two sides).
What's critical in the current situation is Kherson for the reasons above, and Donbas for the political reasons that is where Russia declared it wants to liberate.
And I made clear I'm not saying this is a "good development" for Russia in some topsy-turvy reasoning. Any general would prefer not losing any ground and not losing any troops, no denying that.
However, development isn't all that great for Ukraine either.
What's a critically strategic battle is something like taking Mariupol or Donetsk; Russians say they're going to take it, Ukraine says they're going to defend it; the commitment of both armies to the battle is clear and the stakes are clear. That's power: you say you're going to do something, then you do it and no one can stop you. Ukraine said they would take Kherson, started something, were stopped. Now they say that was the pan all along, but that still presupposes they don't have the power to take Kherson.
From the Russian point of view, had they lost Kherson that's a major embarrassment they can't spin, so they commit serious troops there. Places that are less important will just be retreated from, counter attacked later if there was reason to.
That's pretty normal strategy.
But I agree that doing any offensive at all is better than doing nothing.
And it is still clearly bad thing even from Russia's perspective, as they've now escalated to Shock and Awe NATO playbook of destroying the electricity grid.
So, yes, militarily speaking that Ukraine can do any offensive is certainly good for Ukraine, but losing the power grid (potentially permanently) is bad for Ukraine.
Also of note, my prediction that Ukraine could not do any offensives at all was without armour in the "javelin hysteria" phase of the war, but these offensives had heavy use of armoured vehicles.
And this is still an important consideration, as it's unclear to me how much armour Ukraine has and can get. If these offensives heavily attrit their armour and if that can't be replaced, then we are not seeing sustainable gains (even if the attacks on the grid aren't a problem).
Nope. Anyone serious hasn't said that.
Quoting boethius
With every tenth Ukrainian being a refugee, the GDP having crashed and the possibility of hyperinflation would be devastating politically in peacetime. But Ukraine is facing an all out war and the people do understand it. Even if Russia's objective isn't to take of all of Ukraine, basically just the Novorossiya-part, it is an existential fight for the Ukrainians. That Russia has now postponed those referendums to join Russia tells very clearly to Ukrainians what is at stake. And there's still the option that Putin goes for martial law.
For us Europeans, living in our comfortable peacetime, energy shortages can be a huge issue.
Have you followed Western media?
However, if you're simply stating that the "retired generals" and other talking heads in major Western media aren't serious, but propagandists, then of course I agree.
Quoting ssu
I'm not talking about those things, but the electricity grid which is required for things like the train system.
Quoting ssu
So even if Russia's objective is not to threaten the existence of Ukraine ... it's still an existential fight for Ukraine?
Quoting ssu
I'm not sure I understand what you mean here about postponing the elections. I'd interpret that as simply due to practical considerations of the war intensifying or then a diplomatic message that the status of these regions can still be negotiated (if would be more problematic, even perhaps impossible, for Russia to hold elections that declare independence, Russia recognises that independence and then "gives back" the territory; that would no longer make any legal sense).
Quoting ssu
Electricity is not just about comfort. Having all sorts of systems running smoothly throughout the war was of critical strategic benefit to Ukrainians, not only in making military operations far easier but also less civilian problems to deal with.
Yes, generators are easy to run for military systems.
However, standing next to a generator is the "most likely to be killed" spot according to my military training. You can place them farther from your encampment but voltage and just the weight of cables places severe limitations on that.
Generators produce significant and persistent IR signatures.
Being able to conduct a war with access to the civilian grid all over the battle space is a major strategic asset (all sorts of systems either need to be plugged in or require battery recharge). Of course, it was a strategic asset gifted by the Russians that they've now clearly ungifted.
Grids are insanely fragile to explosions.
Point is, we are not seeing the war clearly "swing" in Ukraines favour (such as taking Kherson I would agree Russia would be clearly embarrassed, although that still would be a clear sign Ukraine could continue East of the Dnieper).
There are pros and cons for each side in recent developments.
Even ignoring the grid, to evaluate Ukrainians gains we need to know the losses, which don't. If they lost significant and unsustainable armour and troops to take territory that Russia tactically withdrew from, then that's not a victory.
As usual I think we agree, you are making the case developments are good for Ukraine (but we lack information to really know) and I am criticising that position but recognise things are clearly not "100%" in Russia's favour.
I have always accepted that surprises are possible in any way, just I (personally) could not see how offensives without armour would be possible to do, which the current events support (significant armour was used, so a critical question is whether armour attrition rates are sustainable not only for Ukraine but for NATO as a whole).
You seemed to be of the opinion that Ukraine could not win this war. It can, and it will!
Quoting boethius
Foxes and sour grapes, again. When the Russian are booted out of Ukraine, you will say that Ukraine was not strategically important! :-)
That's obvious.
First, "winning" the war would mean defeating Russia, which is pretty obviously Ukraine is not capable of invading and conquering Russia. That's what "winning a war" means.
For example, allies "won" against Germany by conquering Germany in WWII.
Even if they pushed Russia out of Ukraine that's still not "winning" a war, the war would still be on and Russia could re-invade anytime which is not an end to war in a "winning" state.
There could be military victories followed by a truce that people would consider a win, but there is basically zero chance of that, it would just be a frozen conflict.
Second, retaking Crimea does really seem not feasible from a military point of view, so even Ukraine's "winning light" definition, really does not seem militarily feasible.
Third, Russia could nuke all of Ukraine at anytime, so even if Ukraine did either of the above it's not because Russia "cannot" defeat them military, but because Russia chose not to for political reasons (obviously good political reasons, but not a straightforward military defeat).
Now, what diplomatic resolution to the war would be some sort of "win" is always up for debate, but if we're talking about winning wars in a military sense the conditions are clear: defeat the opposing military, conquer their territory or force surrender in the process of doing that.
The conflict is one between Russia and NATO with Ukraine serving as proxies using NATO weapons, NATO training and NATO intelligence.
And, as I've stated, I believe NATO can defeat Russia in a conventional conflict and can supply Ukraine sufficiently to produce some lighter form of battle field victory, even without Nukes which NATO could provide to even the playing field but obviously chooses not to (for the same entirely good political reasons that Russia doesn't nuke Ukraine).
My position is not that NATO does not have the capacity to push the Russians back to the border using Ukraine as proxy soldiers.
My position is that NATO chooses not to.
By this measure, since Russia is not capable of invading and conquering Ukraine, Russia cannot win either.
I'd rather think this is only what it means for people who want to invade other people's land. But for people not bent on invading other countries, winning a war can mean something else, to be defined in each specific case. That is what people mean when they speak of "war goals": What is the specific objective of this specific war? It's not always about conquering and invading.
We don't actually know what Putin was trying to achieve with his war; he hasn't made his war goals public, afraid as he is to be seen as a loser. We will probably never know for sure. Somehow I doubt it was about invading some hectares of land.
NATO getting directly involved or officially at war with Putin's Russia ups the stakes markedly, be it internationally, with respect to the Kremlin/Putin, loose-cannon'ery, or whatever;
the latest hi-tech equipment/weaponry, or similar, falling into the wrong hands is a tangible risk.
Someone takes this stuff seriously enough. Maybe direct foreign involvement happens some time, don't know, should it?
Regardless, it seems like foreign aid has made a difference this far:
List of foreign aid to Ukraine during the Russo-Ukrainian War
No one's marching on Moscow or has threatened to do so (as far as I know anyway); should someone? (Alternatively, should someone hand Putin further excuses to whip up domestics and/or spread fear?) Ukraine is being invaded attacked bombed by Putin's Russia — ruinage and killing. Basic facts setting up what others have to contend with and decide from through noise and diversion attempts.
Anyway, apart from the ?s perhaps, nothing new.
Quoting boethius
What?
Oh you think that a -40% drop in GDP, a naval blockade and every tenth citizen being a refugee don't have real life implication quite somehow comparable to the electricity grid???
Quoting boethius
To have connection to the sea, or a long coastline as Ukraine has enjoyed, is quite existential.
Quoting boethius
Of course.
Hmmm... has then Israel won any of it's wars against it's neoghbors? It still has them around and never have Israeli soldiers entered Damascus, Amman or Cairo.
Via TASS (Sep 5, 2022): Kherson region postpones referendum due to security considerations — authorities
Via RFERL (Sep 5, 2022): Kherson Referendum On Joining Russia Postponed, Official Says
(incidentally answers earlier question in the affirmative)
What's more significant is that Xi's first foreign trip since the pandemic began will be not to Russia but to Kazakhstan, and the first head of state he will meet in person will be Tokayev, not Putin. This can't be just a matter of convenience: such moves carry symbolism, not least in Chinese politics. He is putting Putin in his place (pardon the pun).
Quoting Olivier5
Good question. I find this puzzling as well. Russian authoritarianism hasn't quite morphed into totalitarianism. I suppose the regime isn't ready to unleash Stalinist purges on its supporters.
Putin's options:
There's obviously a lot of disgruntlement and dissatisfaction how this war is going in Russia. Putin is no Stalin and even if his Russia is totalitarian, it isn't as totalitarian as Stalin's Russia was. Yet people are killed in prominent positions: too many people die in "accidents" to be real accidents.
Quoting Banno
Invade Moldova > ummm...with what? How to supply them? Russia doesn't have total air superiority over Ukraine and the last thing the Russian troops defending Kherson front are capable to do is to push into Transnistria/Moldova. Troops in Transnistria can basically hold ground there.
Send a ‘stabilisation force’ to Kazakhstan > They already handled that. Kazakhstan is OK for now. Perhaps Armenia would be that place. That Russia would actually defend it's allies that it has (and not only look from the side and be a mediator when it's allies are attacked and lose territory).
Full mobilisiation > Oh, that's going to be so popular in St. Petersburgh and Moscow! But a possibility.
Draw NATO in > Great! Let's have WW3! That's the solution...
Arrange a radiological ‘accident’
Use tactical nuclear weapons > If Ukrainians want to take Crimea, perhaps nuke the narrow corridors into the Peninsula could work. Because Crimea is Russia, according to Putin. Just like defending Russia proper: then the established nuclear doctrine can be said to be followed. Perhaps just a nuclear test on Novaja Zemlija would be enough. That would scare enough of WW3 fearmongers to do the trick. Likely China could tolerate that. Simple fact: Ukrainian battlegroups especially on the vast plains of Ukraine are a lousy target for a tactical nuclear weapon. Weapons of Mass Destruction are more political instruments than solutions for the battlefield.
Likely option(?): hope the Ukrainian offensive loses it's momentum and winter comes quickly. And focus on keeping the power in the Kremlin.
It would at least be in line with their earlier propag...err statements, perhaps even be sold as keeping a promise to Donbas Russians.
They'd be taking a defensive position, though, which may not sit well with Putin and team.
And, if foreign support to Ukraine was to keep up, then holding those regions might not be feasible, unless some sort of peace deal was struck, which, in turn, might not be acceptable to Ukraine, after all, they've been subject to the invasion fire and whatnot for some time now.
If possible, then the destruction and killing would cease at least, but I'm guessing it wouldn't fly.
Quoting ssu
Sure you can define "win" in some way that doesn't involve defeating your enemy, why for the context I'm talking about I put "winning" quotations.
The context where "winning" comes up and where I define "winning the war" as meaning defeating Russia, is addressing the idea of Ukraine not requiring a diplomatic resolution to the war but can achieve victory through military force.
For, even Ukraine pushed Russia back to the border ... that wouldn't be an end to the war, the war would still be on.
And Isreal is a good example of this; without defeating their opponents the war isn't actually over. It's only in hindsight that it makes sense to call the 6 days a war over 6 days, and a win for Isreal. Had fighting re-intensified then it would have been just the first engagement in a larger war.
For example:
Quoting Wikipedia - Six day War
Quoting Wikipedia - Six day War
Is the kind of thing that happens when a military battle or campaign is "won" without actually defeating the enemy. States of war continue and the word choice quickly becomes debatable.
6 Days War was initiated by Isreal attacking Egypt pre-emptively ... so according to the definition of repulsing an invasion is a "win", Egypt actually won that war. Obviously, Israelis may argue very differently.
Point is that military conflicts that do not end with one side being defeated are only ultimately ended diplomatically; states of war simply persist even without fighting, and it doesn't make sense to say the war is over ... but a "state of war" persists.
War refers to both military conflict as well as a diplomatic relationship between nations or groups (that may not involve fighting all the time).
Now, in the case of Mauritania's state of war with Isreal that persisted for decades, it doesn't matter all that much because Mauritania did not have practical means to invade and attempt to defeat Isreal any given day. These sorts of state of war is symbolic, but nevertheless there is still technically a war.
However, the Ukraine-Russia situation is very different; pushing back Russia to its borders would not result in a situation such as Isreal and Mauritania where the persisting state of war could be said to be symbolic and there is no real threat. Russia would still be a considerable threat to Ukraine and could re-invade at any moment, the war would not be "over" and Ukraine would not have "won".
To force Russia to accept Ukraine's terms would mean going and defeating Russia, you know: "winning".
The alternative to winning in a military sense to end a war, is a diplomatic resolution (how most wars end); a diplomatic resolution is not a surrender, and so neither side is defeated and neither side "lost the war". Of course, one side will have lost more than the other, but this will always be debatable and each side will point to some evaluation criteria that implies they won, and certainly didn't do as badly as the other side claims.
For example, I have heard Americans mention many times that they sort-of-kind-of won in Vietnam because they killed way more Vietnamese.
In the case of this war, even if Ukraine pushed Russia back to the border and then a diplomatic resolution that ended the war ... at what cost in lives, trauma and infrastructure and economic development? If the West does not rebuild Ukraine as sort-of-kind-of-promised, is that "winning"? We can debate it.
However, this would be fairly hypothetical debate of what clear "winning" would be in a diplomatic resolution after pushing the Russians out of Ukraine, as Ukraine's current stated "war goals" is re-conquering all of Ukrainian territory including Crimea, which really seems completely unfeasible.
Currently Ukraine does not have enough military potential to push Russian's out of their enclave West of the Dnieper which would be a miniature version and far easier task than pushing Russians out of Crimea. And, definitely Ukrainians would push Russians back across the Dnieper if they could; it's a major strategic pain the enemy having a large bridgehead across a water body.
Crimea seems truly completely unfeasible for Ukrainians to ever reconquer, without NATO supplying systems like an entire fleet of ships and hundreds of fighter aircraft.
With enough NATO support (and Ukrainian willingness to fight to the death as NATO proxies) I would guess it would be possible to push Russia out of Donbas.
However, the risk for NATO of even trying to do that is Russia resorts to tactical nuclear weapons.
NATO policy is very clearly to give enough support to Ukraine that they don't outright lose, but not enough that they can "win", even in very limited definitions of achieving some key war goals.
The situation, however, is very unstable.
However, the dream of a long war that bleeds the Russians may not survive Russia finally implementing NATO's Shock and Awe playbook of disabling the electricity infrastructure.
It was not clear to me how long Ukraine can hold out without electricity (both militarily and civilian endurance). True, people have withstood significant hardship without electricity in past wars, as @ssu points out ... but that was before electricity was a critical need to pretty much all modern social and economic activities.
The only goal, in my opinion, that Ukraine has achieved is that it has signalled to the West to still be capable of offensives, in the hopes to garner more aid. An army that cannot conduct offensives is broken and has in essence already lost - an impression that certainly must have crept in with Western leaders after the failed Kherson offensive.
Perhaps a good diction for this sort of analysis, is defining military-diplomatic victory, which I would say Isreal definitely achieved in its various confrontations and negotiations with Arab neighbours, in contrast to purely military victory (such as defeat of Nazi Germany by the allies).
The Isreal example is a good example of what to do when you cannot simply defeat your opponents: win battles and negotiate acceptable resolutions.
Isreal did not continuously declare "we will not negotiate!" throughout all these conflicts with neighbours. Neighbours, useful to keep in mind, that had far more extreme rhetoric and really would have completely annihilated Isreal if they could, than Russia has against Ukraine.
That's called: statecraft.
Isreal did not throw temper tantrums and announce completely unrealistic demands in negotiations it rebuked as cowardly.
Isreal made consistent reasonable demands (such as the right to exist) as well as offers of compromise acceptable to opposing countries (despite anti-Isreal rhetoric 1000x more extreme than anything Putin has said about Ukraine), resulting in negotiated peace with Egypt, for example, that involved withdrawing from the Sinai (only way to make peace with Egypt).
Whether one approves or not of Isreal policies vis-a-vis the Palestinians, through force and diplomacy they have achieved key objectives, but it would be foolhardy to dismiss or minimise Israeli diplomats and statecraft in those achievements.
So, it's when people say Ukraine does not need to negotiate and can "win" militarily, which is when I point out that without diplomacy "winning" means conquering and defeating your enemy; otherwise, the war just continues forever.
Agreed.
Losing Kherson would be both bad militarily (likely thousands, if not tens of thousands, stuck and captured troops) as well as intensely embarrassing.
Retreating from around Kharkiv is certainly some embarrassment, but if it's not important area to hold then Russia can easily reverse the embarrassment with an important victory elsewhere.
Russia has clearly stated its main war objective is conquering the Donbas, which the Kharkiv region is not a part of. So, if Russia goes on to complete conquering all the Donbas then it can declare "winning" this key military objective.
Quoting Tzeentch
I believe this is an excellent summary of both my and @ssu debate and position on this subject. Definitely important to show at least some offensive potential.
However, it's entirely possible the withdrawal from around Kharkiv was pre-determined and also pre-determined it would be followed by attacking Ukrainian's electricity grid as militarily "logical" to both home and diplomatic audience (rather than out of the blue).
This seems to me completely delusional.
And again, I stated my position before these offensives: taking Kherson would be a turning point.
I have not changed my goal posts.
The pro-Ukrainians changed their goal posts as soon as the Kherson offensive failed, but for months were talking about taking Kherson, praising the brilliant Himars attacks on the bridges that would make Russia unable to defend Kherson etc.
If the Ukrainians take Kherson, then I would view that as step one.
There was zero talk of the region around Kharkiv as having any importance before this offensive, the idea it's important is entirely retroactive. Before this re-definition of things what was important was: Kherson, Donbas and also the Nuclear plant, and all talk was on those 3 important things.
Ukraine achieves nothing on those important things ... so goes and does something no one was claiming was important to do and declares a major victory.
And, it's a broken record at this point, just a couple months ago Ukraine "pushed to the border" in Kharkiv region and that was somehow a major victory.
That seems incredibly high for a fixing operation.
But again, to really evaluate things militarily we'd actually need to know KIA, wounded and material losses on both sides (and quality of those losses, such as the KIA in Kherson being the experienced elite, NATO trained units that can do offensives), and we don't know losses on both sides.
Thousands of Ukrainian KIA might be worth the territorial gains if somehow Kharkiv region is some critical strategic thing and the offensive continues from there ... or then simply there are more KIA Russians in these operations.
The war still remains mainly of attrition at this phase, and we'd need to actually know losses to evaluate what's happening militarily.
However, the grid attacks seem more significant to me and we'll see the fallout of this in the weeks and months to come. I honestly don't see how Ukraine could maintain their grid under conditions of continuous attacks and I honestly don't see how Ukraine can deal with simply not having grid based electricity over larger areas.
Putin's failure to invade Ukraine will probably lead to his death and/or replacement by someone else at the helm of Russia. Regime change, IOW. Perhaps the new Russian regime will be less Nazi than the current one.
Again, this has been claimed since basically day 2 of the invasion.
Sure, maybe, but as simply a propaganda statement to keep social media spirits high ... I don't think they could be any higher at any point of this conflict; however, the conflict clearly is not won or lost on social media.
Bottom line: the future is wide open, Ukraine can win and Russia can change. Enough with your pessimism.
Yes, an official breakdown would be politically expensive.
Still, they could 'suicide' one or two of them, like they did to so many oligarchs. But then, Putin would be left with only the official reports, and he knows they lie.
Russian milbloggers must serve a purpose, otherwise they'd be dead.
Sure, yeah, that's possible.
Quoting Olivier5
Also possible.
Quoting Olivier5
I don't disagree.
We've been discussing these recent military developments, but there is still all the political and economic part in which many things are possible too.
Exactly. And such is often neglected by people who think "inside the box".
Agree, but the point of geopolitical analysis is to try to tease out what is more or less likely to happen, rather than be satisfied with the observation that many things are possible.
In the scheme of things, I'm guessing this won't change much with someone like Putin (or worse) at the helm.
The history, measures taken domestically (and foreign for that matter), rolling into Ukraine, ...
[sup]RAND (Jul 11, 2016): The Russian "Firehose of Falsehood" Propaganda Model
CSIS (Jul 20, 2020): Russia Ramps up Global Elections Interference: Lessons for the United States
Reuters (Mar 16, 2021): Putin likely directed 2020 U.S. election meddling, U.S. intelligence finds
Wilson Center (Mar 4, 2022): The Limits of Putin’s Propaganda
Defense One (Mar 11, 2022): Putin’s Propaganda Machine Is What America’s Far-Right Wants (seemed +speculative at first)
National Post (May 13, 2022): Wesley Wark: Russian Victory Day was a powerful propaganda tool for Putin[/sup]
Meddling, subversion attempts, etc, happens all over, sometimes in response to each other.
Systematically suppressing other voices domestically is another ball game.
Sure. All I am saying is don't insult the future. Meaning, when you try and tease what could happen, do not assume that the future will necessarily repeat the past. Expect some surprises.
This is a broader issue than the war in Ukraine but the Ukrainian resistance, as a whole, has been one big surprise.
Someone discussed Russia's options. Russia has pulled out troops from some areas. Why not simply pull out completely, admitting defeat or whatever the need may be? It will save lives, and that can't be bad.
Here's the idea:
https://www.rferl.org/a/scholz-putin-ukraine-ceasefire-russian-withdrawal/32032075.html
Russia should offer an ceasefire and peace treaty. Ukraine ceases all military action, leaves the east alone and Crimea to boot, and gets to rebuild its shattered nation.
Russia could launch another 'special operation' if the ceasefire is broken, but this time I don't think Ukraine will have the will to get into a war again just when it is rebuilding. Russia gets to get on with its life or death or whatever it was doing before 2014.
Covert operations are always an option like for the US. But you knew that.
Hopefully Putin gets a day older each day until he doesn't.
I can't blame anyone for that, because the propaganda has been relentless.
Still, I'd like to know what factual circumstances give rise to this idea.
It would appear that Russia - having abandoned the Kharkiv region without a fight - has no intention of conquering/holding any territory whose population is not predominantly supportive of Russia and also capable of deploying its own troops to defend that territory.
Although, the Ukrainians were successful in reclaiming a large swathe of territory in the Kharkov region - last week - the weight of evidence suggests that the Russians had largely already withdrawn and repositioned their defensive lines behind the Oskil River on the Lugansk border.
A much larger Ukrainian Offensive operation was attempted in Kherson region - last week - but there the Russian and allied forces were prepared to fight and for now have successfully repelled Ukraine advances. Since then, a series of minor further Ukrainian Offensive operations have yielded little if any gains and the war has resumed its normal pattern of the last 2 months: where Russian allied artillery relentlessly pounds fortified Ukrainian positions near Donbas and Donetsk with the occasional minor Russian advances.
The Ukrainian capture of territory in Kharkhov led to jubilant claims throughout western media and Kiev. And in Russia, Putin and his leadership attracted widespread criticism. Senior Ex-military officers and opposition parties began calling for an escalation from this timid Special Military Operation to an all out declaration of war and full mobilisation of the country. However, following a series of high-level meetings in Moscow, where it seems various escalations were considered - including declaring Ukraine a Terrorist State - in the end it has been decided to continue with the Special Military Operation - with some minor tweaking of the rules of engagement but without any declaration or further military mobilisation.
With due respect for the fog of war - if we assume the above synopsis largely depicts events as they actually are - then it would seem that the Kremlin is prepared to play the long game in the Ukraine - or at least to the end of the coming northern winter. Putin's calculus maybe that the economic trade war is working to its favour and that European unity against Russia may begin to crumble, over the coming winter, as pressure on fuel prices, gas shortages and food continues to mount.
On balance, it seems highly unlikely that the Ukraine will recapture its lost territory or that Russia is able or willing to conquer all or most of the Ukraine. In boxing parlance, we are looting at a split decision. And at some point, a settlement will need to be negotiated and signed by NATO, Russia, Ukraine and its neighbours.
Quoting yebiga
sources?
@ssu Also let's talk about this. I have found the decisions to impose sanctions incredibly callous in regard of our own populations, especially when we consider the effects on the poor with regard to their energy bills, combined with the ongoing inflation caused by supply chain issues now further excarbated by those sanctions.
It started with some export restrictions on gas and later diesel.
In the first few weeks of the war we had sanctions on the foreign reserves of Russia with the potential of inflicting a banking crisis in Russia. That didn't happen.
Subsequently, we had further sanctions intended to affect Russian exports.
March: IAE says: Russian exports will crater.
April report: Russia sees output fall by 17%
May report: Russia sees revenues increase
Thank God we're going into the summer and the effects are relatively small but Russia is making a killing.
August report: Russian exports have increased from the March low as well as Russian revenues.
September report: IAE says: Russian exports will crater with new embargo package from EU.
Only donkeys try the same thing twice and expect different results. Meanwhile, bakeries and small businesses are applying for bankruptcy because they cannot afford the increased energy bills. There are 690,000 households in the Netherlands threatened to go into poverty due to the increased costs of living and rising energy prices. That's almost 9%. And once you're in poverty you're pretty much fucked in a system that only concerns itself with what rights you have instead of what you need to get out of poverty.
In the final analysis, this is not our war but we're sacrificing entire families by pushing them into poverty - that includes all the missed opportunities as a result of a lower socio-economic position in society. We're destroying the future of thousands of children in the Netherlands and I doubt it is much different in other European countries.
I think the energy sanctions have been a mistake and should never have been imposed.
Yet Israel never agreed on to stop a military engagement before reaching it's military objectives.
Usually there was a push from especially the Superpowers to cease the military actions. Both in the Six Day war and in Yom Kippur basically the Arab powers were defeated on the battlefield. That is a simple fact. Also was in the case of the Suez crisis with Egypt. Then Operation Musketeer was totally successful reaching it's primary objectives (and I assume Operation Kadesh too), the failure was political, which saved Nasser's ass.
Quoting boethius
I'm not sure what your point is. Ukrainian have tried to negotiate with the Russians and understand that even a ceasefire needs negotiations. Remember the negotiations in Turkey. So I'm confused just what is your point here.
I swore I wouldn't get into this nonsense again, but this one is so simply answered, and could well summarise half the thread in one sentence.
Here's a model negotiation...
"You do/stop X and we'll Y"
So with Ukraine to Russia it would be...
"You stop invading us and we'll Y".
What's the Y you'd be willing to advocate? Because apparently it's not ceding territory and it's not ceding any autonomy and you've just admitted that Ukraine are no threat to Russia. As @Benkei says, the sanctions are somewhat toothless. International condemnation seems irrelevant...
This is what @boethius and others mean by recognising that Ukraine cannot 'win'. They can't reach a point where they don't have to come up with a Y.
The whole argument we've been making here is to try and preempt what this Y is going to have to be as early as possible to avoid the destruction of war.
The counterargument has been that Ukraine ought resist all attempts to limit it's territory or autonomy at all costs (the 'existential fight' we keep hearing about).
But if it's not to cede territory, not to cede autonomy, nor can it threaten Russia itself...
...then what Y can it offer in negotiations?
Sources: Not Mainstream Media
Various Pro-Ukraine and Pro-Russian Telegram Channels
Military Summary Channel - telegram
The Duran
Scot Ritter
moonofalabama
southfront
zerohedge
None that I can think of, which is perhaps why they aren't negotiating, in actual fact.
Your confusion is easily solved: it comes from them losing ground on the battlefield.
This BBC article pushes some of the same facts, but much of it is still speculative due to the paucity of legitimate military sources.
Looking at a map of Ukraine now, why is this significant?
Because it puts things into perspective.
The Ukrainian forces took back some territory, but large parts of Ukraine remain in Russian hands. Further, it shows the offensive halted at the first natural line of defense it encountered - the Oskil river. Why would that be?
Quoting Olivier5
The aforementioned implies the Russians weren't beaten, but their forward troops retreated to the first line of defense.
Anyway, back to your point.
You're implying that because Ukraine has shown the Russians can be beaten (lets put it in military terms - "is capable of offensive operations") Russia is losing the war. Seems like a jump to conclusions to me.
The failed Kherson offensive signaled that Ukraine was, as many had feared, no longer capable of conducting offensive operations - which would mean they had all but lost the war.
This risked to undermine support, especially abroad, at a crucial time. Likely a months-long operational pause is coming during winter, and Ukraine will need this time to rebuild and repair. To do that it needs foreign aid and a lot of it.
Meanwhile, European countries' Ukraine policies are under pressure due to growing energy insecurity. Their support for a war which many fear will be lost cannot be maintained indefinitely.
They needed something they could write off as a victory, and to convince their populations that they would not be sitting in the cold for nothing.
So after the failed Kherson offensive they chose to stage an offensive over dead ground - the Russians would not be defending it so victory was essentially guaranteed.
Then they just needed to let the propaganda machine inflate this to a victory of epic proportions - that notion probably won't be challenged before the onset of winter. Hopefully for the Ukrainians that will safeguard foreign support and buy them time to recover.
Admittedly a bit cynical. I could be totally wrong. But this is my genuine impression.
That all would make sense... if it weren't for the fact that people within Russia risk prison for speaking out about how Russia is losing and the fact that they leave precious hardware behind when they retreat in a situation where they have to grab chips from home appliances in order to keep up with the hardware advantage of Ukraine.
While the offensive seems to take more casualties than Ukraine is being official about, this is more in line with traditional warfare. Keep the war propaganda up to keep the morale up. It's part of how war is conducted and it would be foolish to do anything else.
The problem I see is that the tribalistic nature of the discussion around all of this makes people either deem the offensive a pure failure or pure success. But it just is what it is, Russia is being forced back, faster than they expected and it is a noticable defeat on Russias part, otherwise there wouldn't be that much hardware left behind and negative words in Russian state media. But it's also not a complete success for Ukraine as they've suffered a lot of losses.
In the end, the balance hangs on if the losses were enough to make a huge difference. If Russia has problems pushing back the line and win back territory, then there's a new line bunkered down over the winter, or Ukraine chooses to use the winter as a way to push Russia before they have time bunkering down. Taking advantage of the chaos this has caused.
Larger still are the Ukrainian regions the Russians failed to invade.
Because the Russians blown up the bridges over the Oskil river while leaving, duh...
Nope. I simply said that if Russia can be beaten in this oblast, it can be beaten in other oblasts. Do you understand now?
The number of troops the Russians have deployed indicate they never intended to invade all of Ukraine.
And that's sensible - modern armies have the experience of many failed wars in the Middle-East to know the risks of that.
Quoting Olivier5
Blowing up bridges doesn't stop a modern army. Ukrainian vehicles have amphibious capability, and their engineer corps possesses over bridging equipment like AVLBs.
If your position is they had the Russians in a full on rout, why didn't they take advantage of their breakthrough?
Quoting Olivier5
But not in Kherson, apparently.
No, it does not. That is only your interpretation of it. The war goals of this "special operation" haven't been made public. My interpretation is that they expected a rapid Ukrainian surrender.
Quoting Tzeentch
Too early to tell, but the Ukrainians have made progress there too, in blocking the logistics and regaining terrain.
Sure. All we have are interpretations. But it's supported by figures like Mearsheimer. Mearsheimer makes the same point - the number of deployed troops are far below what would be feasible for a full-scale invasion and occupation of Ukraine.
Quoting Olivier5
I would change that slightly - I would say they gave the Ukrainians (but more specifically the West) a chance to back down when they threatened Kiev.
In my opinion, this was the last point where a neutral Ukraine was still an option. They showed their hand and made it clear they weren't bluffing.
That doesn't mean they expected it to lead to a surrender or a re-negotiation of Ukraine's position, but they must've thought it was a possibility. And they must've also had a plan B, that's no more than standard military practice.
The plan B was evidently to take Kiev and install a puppet regime. Didn't happen either.
I don't think that's evident at all.
For one, with western backing it was obvious from the outset that taking Kiev would not end the conflict. Leadership of the war is not and never has been conducted from Kiev.
Secondly, taking Kiev (or any kind of full-scale invasion of Ukraine) would have made direct western military intervention a lot more likely - Russia is obviously trying to avoid this. Keeping the conflict small(-ish) makes the bar for western powers to intervene military high. It also would have discredited the Russian narrative.
I think plan B was to accept war with the West, occupy the strategic areas in the south, and take it from there. The south is crucial, because it is both the key to Russian strategic interests pertaining to Crimea and Transnistria, and cutting off Ukraine from the sea would greatly hamstring it in the long run.
And yet, they tried to take Kiev and to kill Zelensky. Have you considered that what seems obvious to you may not seem so obvious to someone else? A dictator for instance may find it difficult to fathom that killing Zelensky would not stop the resistance. See what I mean? We are all prisoners of our world view. Putin's world view is hierarchical.
I would turn that around, actually. Putin and his cronies aren't fools, nor is Zelensky, nor is the Pentagon or the EU leadership - they likely know a lot more than us.
It's up to us to make sense of their actions - not to dismiss these people as dummies for acting in ways we can't make sense of at first.
But take whatever approach you will. I will stick with the one I just expressed.
The only way Russia is going to the negotiating table is when it cannot obtain it's objectives through military means. What is so difficult here to understand?
Just to take a historical example: Finland was able to negotiate a separate peace with the Soviet Union in 1944 after it repulsed the Soviet offensive in the summer of 1944 with having one defensive line (the Salpa-line) still far behind the front line. Other German allies couldn't do that, even if the switched sides like Romania.
What Ukraine can do is simply what it is doing right now, quite successfully.
If the Ukrainians would not have defended at all, just why would you think Putin would have stopped? What Putin has said about the "artificiality" of the sovereignty of Ukraine shows clearly what he thinks about Ukraine.
That's a rather big if.
Quoting ssu
The short answer is, occupying large countries with too few troops is asking for trouble. The Russians know this first hand.
If they wanted to invade and occupy all of Ukraine, the troops they'd need to deploy to keep it under control would have to be several times what they've deployed now.
So the why is: they don't want a repeat of another Afghanistan or Vietnam.
[sup](I suppose we could start categorizing meddlery, like rationales-outcomes, material for a thread on its own, heck maybe a book, tedious. Say, do Transnistria and Donbas have "fingerprints" of sorts?)[/sup]
Draconic, domestic oppression-repression is taking things further, as is attempts to take over other nations.
Meddling creepy. People ought to (be left to) make up their own minds by maximum information+ethics and minimal imposition/bias. Takes just one meddler to complicate that.
I've gotten the impression the EU has taken the opportunity to use the war in Ukraine to both excuse its desastrous economic policies and to push its energy ideology.
"Never waste a good crisis," seems to be the motto they go by.
While I do believe we need the EU to effectively combat the various global crises we're facing, they're still shitty neo-Keynesians for the most part, or worse, half-hearted proponents of MMT. Meaning their economic policies are utter shit. It's like looking at a person with one bucket trying to stop a leaking roof.
Any way, we're straying off topic. We tend to agree about the problems but diverge about their causes and therefor solutions. No need to rehash I think.
I see that my previous response was deleted. Oh my...
This has nothing to see with being a fool, and everything to do with being human.
Putin is a human being, not a god. He makes mistakes, and rest assured that there are things he cannot understand. You should not assume that what seems obvious to you necessarily seems obvious to him.
They tried and failed to capture Kiev and to kill Zelensky. Explain these facts, if you think they weren't trying to install a puppet regime.
"Failures indicate that success was never intended."
Of course. But there are dozens if not hundreds of people working in the Kremlin. Analists, advisors, a general staff etc.
Quoting Olivier5
I already explained my view on Russia's initial drive on Kiev.
As for Zelensky - I don't see how an assassination post-invasion would have facilitated the installation of a puppet regime. The goal behind such a move is probably aimed at sowing general chaos in the command structure.
We are long past the stage where regime change would be an option.
All you said was:
Quoting Tzeentch
What was the purpose of sending -- and in effect sacrificing -- all these elites troops in the general direction of Kiev at the onset of the war,then? Their lives were spent in vain?
Quoting Tzeentch
My view is that this initial drive was a last attempt by the Russians to end the conflict quickly, not necessarily by taking Kiev, but by showing they weren't bluffing and their threats of war were real.
This failed, but it also drew a lot of Ukrainian manpower to the north, reducing resistance in the south, which is where the areas are located that are strategically relevant to the Russians.
If they really wanted to take Kiev, I believe they could have. But it would have taken them a lot of time and manpower, and occupying capital cities isn't all that relevant in a conflict where foreign support is the centre of gravity, so there wasn't much of a point.
Not to mention, if Russia manages to destroy Ukraine's C&C (which is generally the goal of occupying a capital city), who is going to take over that role? The West - likely the United States. The centre of gravity would shift even further towards the foreign backers, drawing them in. Russia will likely try to avoid this.
Wierd.
I asked "what is Ukraine's negotiating position?"
You answered...
Quoting ssu
And...
Quoting ssu
I didn't ask what would bring Russia to the negotiating table. I didn't ask what Ukraine could do in general. I asked what negotiating position you'd be prepared to advocate.
Did you have trouble understanding the question? Or do I take your inability to answer it as an indication that your position is exactly as incoherent as it seems.
It's a simple question. Ukraine comes to the negotiating table... what do they offer?
Quoting Tzeentch
I think that's a highly questionable assumption.
The maps do not really put things in perspective.
There is a massive difference between the areas in the North previously occupied by the Russians and the areas in the South, in particular the Donbas, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia (which Kharkiv is not a part of).
The Southern Donbas to Kherson band is of obviously political and strategic importance: Donbas being the pro-Russian separatist region supported by Russia (and at least nominal cause of the whole war), Kherson controlling the canal that supplies water to Crimea and Zaporizhzhia is the region directly in front of Crimea (additional protection and connects to the other regions for supplies).
Russia conquers nearly all this additional territory in the South in about 3 days and then there is prolonged siege of the Azov battalion and other forces in Mariupol.
There is obvious political and strategic value of these regions, Russians conquer nearly all of what they currently have in a matter days, and still hold it and clearly are willing to defend it as we see in Kherson over last few days.
The Northern operation was very different. Russians simply went around towns and tried to surround Kiev.
Analysts kept on telling us it would take at least a million soldier army to occupy all of Ukraine, which the Russians didn't invade with ... well, they invaded with 200 000 soldiers and are now occupying 20% of Ukraine, so maybe the math checks out.
The operation in the North was quite obviously to achieve 3 things:
1. Ideally the capitulation of the Ukrainian regime (accepting the offered peace terms) with the pressure on the capital]\.
2. Failing that, fixing Ukrainian forces in the North to be unable to defend and/or launch counter-offensive in the South (before new fortifications, supply lines setup and towns passified, there is vulnerability to counter-attack).
3. Destroy industrial capacity and various targets around Kiev, which apparently is achieved.
Now, whether doing the above was a good strategy or not is one question, but there was obviously never any even remote attempt to storm Kiev or occupy all the Norther regions the Russians pass through.
How likely the Kremlin believed in Ukrainian capitulation I don't know, but obviously there was plan B which was take in the South the desired lands and strategic locations and destroy Azov Batallion (whether the Kremlin genuinely fears/ despises these neo-Nazi's is one question, but either way it is critical for the home audience to defeat Azov Batallion in particular).
In particular, now that all pro-Ukrainian propaganda is instantly declaring the Kherson operation a fixing attack ... it's just dumb to dismiss off-hand the Kiev offensive as not possibly a fixing attack but failed occupation of the North and storming of Kiev.
As for whether it was a good idea or not, Russian generals have several nightmare scenarios at the start of the war:
A. Being stopped coming out of Crimea and the entire Southern operation falling flat.
B. Even after the South operation succeeds, successful counter attack that (for example) creates a salient to Mariupol and breaks the siege (as well as just counter offensives generally speaking).
Had A or B occurred it would have been a massive embarrassment to the Russians.
Certainly some things have gone well and other things less well for the Russians, but they have not experienced anything like an actual military debacle. Propaganda needs to spin full tilt just to present Ukraine as "in the fight", so imagine if they had just shelled to rubble the bridges out of Crimea and the Russians never got out of there, or valiantly penetrated Russian lines and fought all the way to breaking the Siege of Mariupol.
Keep also in mind, that there is not only these purely strategic elements in the South described above, but that's where Azov battalion, of which defeating is absolutely essential to the entire de-Nazification enterprise. So, failure to take this region would have been completely disastrous in terms of international and domestic image (support for the war etc.).
So, considering the stakes in the South, it is entirely logical to commit forces to threaten the capital which then must be defended at all costs (liquidating Azov battalion maybe a priority for Russia, but keeping Kiev would be the priority for Kiev; so one priority for the other).
Of course, would have been even better for the Russians if Ukraine simply collapsed, accepted peace terms etc. but a military strategy does not take into account political resolution; that for politicians to do or not, military planners will assume there is no political resolution to the conflict in elaborating their plan -- if they are told not to try to take all of Ukraine, they will then simply plan for an eventual frozen never ending conflict a la North-South Korea.
Point is, whether the plan was the best, could have been better, should not have been launched in the first place etc. are all valid criticisms, but the criticism that the plan does not make sense or has already failed is simply not supportable.
Additionally, even for the Russians to withdraw at this time, it would still be less embarrassing than being stuck in Crimea or Azov Battalion being rescued.
Russians have (even if they withdraw now) demonstrated the massive amounts of man power, equipment and money required to deal with (200 000 of) them. From purely international relations perspective its not "so bad" if Ukraine has clearly paid a heavy price for the withdrawal (that no other rational party would want to pay). One cannot draw the conclusion that the Russians are push-overs, certainly neither the Ukrainians, but this doesn't necessarily encourage anyone to seek conflict with Russia anytime soon.
However, I very much doubt the Russians will withdraw and until Kherson West of the Dnieper is reconquered by Ukraine I have a hard time believing they have the offensive capabilities to seriously threaten Russian presence East of the Dnieper.
The regions the Russians are committed to holding have now dense and integrated fortifications, concrete shelters for tanks, bunker networks etc. electronic warfare setup, and is extremely hard to assault, as the recent offensive in Kherson demonstrate.
Quoting Wounded Ukrainian soldiers reveal steep toll of Kherson offensive
Yes, offensive in Kharkiv (not part of Donbas ... no strategic importance to Crimea) did succeed, but none of the above was put in place.
The reason to tactically retreat from a region you are not intent of occupying long term (whatever the reason: political, terrain and/or man-power) is to save as many of your own troops as possible while inflicting significant casualties on the advancing army: artillery, mines, gunships, missiles and bombs in predetermined kill-zones.
I don't see anyone claiming this.
Rather, a good military plan includes what to do if certain missions fail.
Certainly plan A was Kiev accept the offered peace terms at the start of the war, obviously that plan failed.
However, there was clearly a plan B which was take the key Southern regions and liberate Donbas by force, do some denazification and so on.
In the current situation, certainly plan A is defend both Kherson and the Kharkiv region, but plan B is that if defending lines in Kharkiv fails to withdraw.
In chess the "not-best-moves" are categorised into inefficiencies, mistakes and blunders.
The ant-Russian propaganda presents the smallest of Russian setbacks as catastrophical blunders, and when it's explained that's obviously not the case then the retort is "you think the Russians don't make mistakes!"
Fact of the matter is, in purely military terms, Russians have no blundered. Being stuck in Crimea would have been a blunder, a rescue of Mariupol.
The offensive to Kiev obviously had pros and cons. Certainly involved many inefficiencies and mistakes ... but so too the Ukrainians.
When you send soldiers to war some of them are going to fuck up and die, it's just a fact. There's no evidence that Russians do more of this than the Ukrainians. To make a strategic appraisal we need to know if one side is fucking-up and dying more than the other.
And this key information we simply don't have. If the Russians killed a lot more soldiers and destroyed more vehicles, and of higher quality, than the Ukrainians in the Northern operations, then it is successful engagements of attrition, in addition to distracting Ukrainian forces from the South, it they had way higher losses then maybe it was still worth it as a fixing operation (or maybe not).
Likewise with the sanctions; could be a major blunder if the Russian economy collapses as has been predicted since the first week of the war ... but that hasn't happened yet.
It's subconscious, I think.
If you're battling other people's subconscious, shouldn't you do that subconsciously and in silence?
It's not a time honoured tradition to not address what your interlocutors actually say.
If you want to honour this tradition you're talking about, you should first address what's actually said and then carry on your project of speculating what unexamined assumptions there maybe.
For instance, in the Socratic method (indeed, time honoured) the way to do that is: asking questions.
Otherwise, just paraphrasing erroneously people is called: disrespectful and a waste of time.
For example, to take the text in question (and not risk erroneously paraphrasing you myself):
Quoting Olivier5
Nowhere does seem to assume never makes mistakes; the point was it that the idea of a significant Ukrainian victory (as plastered everywhere in the Western media at present) is questionable.
And those are just the facts (so far).
Kherson offensive had very little impact (so far at least).
Around Kharkiv, Russians simply withdrew (avoiding getting trapped or overrun, which could have easily happened had they not retreated, and would have been far worse).
The conclusion of the recent offensives (so far) is nothing really changed in the strategic situation and it appears a high cost in lives for Ukrainians to achieve a largely propaganda victory (which they certainly need to motivate more Western aid ... but wars are not won by propaganda alone, or Ukraine would rule the entire world by now).
In addition, Russia has demonstrated it can disable half the Ukrainian power grid.
This all could be a good setup for a diplomatic resolution, which the Europeans could easily force (if they weren't bitches ... but I think that boat has sailed a long time ago).
The reason you are "struggling to see where this idea comes from that Russia is losing" is simply that you subconsciously assume that whatever happens is a desirable outcome for the Russians. Rid yourself of this assumption, and you may start to read the message on the wall. But if every time something happens, you jump to the interpretation that the Russians must have wanted this to happen all along, you will never be able to understand how Russia is losing.
To caricature your position a little bit, if the Ukrainians ever end up besieging Moscow, you will conclude that the Russian leadership have them Ukrainian hordes exactly where they want them to be!
I don't think this characterizes my position very well. But already said about this what needed to be said (and thank you for that ).
How much troops did they need to annex Crimea? And the way Russia could interfere in Ukrainian politics before makes it easy to underestimate Ukrainian resolve.
Putin made quite easily same kind of mistakes like Hitler after the victories against Poland and France.
LOL! :rofl:
Oh boy, these arm-chair pro-Russians....
Quoting Olivier5
:up: :100:
Follow-up on that:
Putin in Samarkand is not a happy boy. China has "questions and concerns." So does India:
Modi said that "today’s era is not one for war." Xi did not even mention Ukraine in his statement after the talks. I suppose that's as far as he is prepared to go in his support for Russia: not chastising it in public.
On a different topic:
[tweet]https://twitter.com/ChrisO_wiki/status/1570169288849326082?s=20&t=eim_lmy3ppnQMvMaYB2zdA[/tweet]
Sure, demonstrate your fanatical devotion to your preferred propaganda by proudly explaining your closed mindedness on a debate forum.
Quoting ssu
Seems like there's two wild, unsubstantiated claims in here:
1. Russia modelled their invasion of Ukraine on the previous conflict in Crimea.
2. Russia's invasion of Ukraine can from a military-strategic viewpoint be compared to Hitler's invasion of Poland and France.
The podium is all yours friend. Show the world you've got more than clowning, 'pro-Russian' accusations (which are beyond sad, by the way) and parroting western propaganda.
I won't argue those bullet points as theses, but several observations occur to me.
In 2014, Russia succeeded in getting a large number of the 'the self-identified Russian' population to support the changes. There are no similar groups in play during this Special Operation. The attempts to set up a similar scheme in Kherson has collapsed. The conscription methods in Donetsk and Luhansk have the population hiding their males to protect them from the war. So whatever strategic/tactical similarities may exist between the present operation and the first invasion, the previous element of local support is not there in newly attacked territories.
The WW2 comparison most apt for the present situation in the Kherson oblast is the Battle of the Bulge. The Germans were kicking butt until their supply lines were cut and they could not retreat across a big river.
The objective was to capture Kyiv and replace the existing administration and take basically the part of "Novorossiya" into Russia. That the Donetsk and Luhansk Republics were planned to be annexed into Russia is quite evident (starting from the Freudian slip of the intelligence chief, just to give one example). Hence it was basically a strategic strike.
Which then failed the first day.
Quoting Tzeentch
When you don't get it, you really don't get it.
The success of Hitler in Poland and France made not only him, but his generals to believe that the Soviet Union could be beaten in 100 days. Hubris kicked in. If France fell so easily, why wouldn't the Soviet Union too, which couldn't even annex puny Finland?
Similarly Putin's earlier victories and the West's mute response made him confident the Ukrainians wouldn't be much of a match and he could pull off the invasion that he started on the 24th of February this year. That since 2014 when the war started, the Ukrainians basically wouldn't have done anything.
What the hell you are talking about above, I don't know.
There are no winners in war. The survivors get to count their dead.
First it was Crimea, now it is Czechoslovakia.
Invading a diplomatically isolated, unprepared Soviet republic and invading a western-backed, militarily prepared Ukraine? The two couldn't be further apart.
You're now claiming the Russians modelled their invasion of Ukraine after their invasion of Czechoslovakia - a conflict that took place over 50 years ago? Lets see some proof then. Or anything that resembles a reasoned argument.
Quoting ssu
Mhm. Except that there was an eight year period between the invasion of Crimea in 2014 and the invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
The conditions surrounding the invasion of Crimea were completely different from the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Furthermore, the element of surprise the Russians had in 2014 was not present in 2022. The United States has been preparing Ukraine since at least January 2021, and probably earlier.
Everybody and their dog knew it wasn't going to be a repeat of 2014, and that the Ukrainians would be prepared.
So getting back to your earlier response, what your claim boils down to is that Russia's troop deployments aren't a product of meticulous planning as is standard in modern militaries (argued also by experts such as Mearsheimer), but it's because they're a bunch of dummies who underestimated their opponent.
So, let's take stock:
1. The invasion of Ukraine was modelled after the invasion of Crimea? Czechoslovakia? Conflicts that couldn't be more different in nature. Wild claim. Zero substantiation. Lets see some proof then if you want to argue wild!
2. Putin is Hitler in 1941, except everything is completely different. Supposedly the invasion of Crimea eight years prior gave him all the confidence he needed to wing an invasion of a western-backed Ukraine.
You expect me to take your "they're a bunch of dummies" argument seriously, when everything from common sense to military doctrine and expert opinion points towards the Russians having made a carefully weighed decision?
That the Russians did not have enough troops deployed in and around Ukraine for a full invasion was already known in the West before the start of the invasion, with Ukrainian officials going on record stating they were not expecting a full-scale invasion, but were fearing for a more localized conflict.
All I'm seeing from you and is knee-jerk reactions whenever your flimsy ideas of how this war is going are challenged. Accusations of partisanship and "subconscious biases" - have either of you ever looked in a mirror?
Oh I am clearly pro-Ukraine, I haven't been shy about it. Whose side are you on?
No one's. I'm not a part of this conflict.
Learn what a strategic strike means in military terminology first.
The similarity with the occupation of Czechoslovakia and Crimea should be evident: Both were military operations where the opponent didn't fight back. Both achieved strategic surprise. Both events we even don't call wars, they were so successful. When you can achieve your objectives without even a shot fired, the military operation has really achieves it's goals. The tanks just appeared on the streets of Prague, just like the Russia paratroops appeared in Crimea, whom the Western media even didn't call out to be Russian, so totally dumbfounded was back then the Western media. The totally insane lie that these would be "Crimean volunteers" got the media confused and it fell into bothsidesing. The pro-Russian propaganda had a field day.
Quoting Tzeentch
This just shows how ignorant you are.
Czechoslovakia wasn't a Soviet Republic (like Ukraine was during the Soviet Union). And Ukraine in 2014 was totally unprepared for any military attack. There were no shots fired when Russia took over Crimea. The military was able to respond to the Donbas insurgency only far later. Ukraine was militarily prepared by the West.
(Russian troops and Ukrainian troops confined to their barracks in Crimea in 2014)
Quoting Tzeentch
Perhaps not as an easy cake-walk as Crimea, but the view was that it was totally possible for the Russian military to take out Ukraine quickly. Your "and your dog" argument that everybody knew that Ukraine would be prepared is totally false, absolute bullshit.
Proof:
The US offered Zelenskyi to evacuate him. Why would they offer this, if they were certain that there would be a war fought for months? Before the attack the ability for Ukraine to defend itself from a Russian aggression was seen quite futile.
For example, the Atlantic Council openly questioned in December 2021 Ukraine's ability to defend itself in a conventional war and opted to go for an insurgency:
See Guerrilla tactics offer Ukraine’s best deterrent against Putin’s invasion force
Something like fighting a conventional war was obviously out of the question to the author above.
This is what the CSIS think tank thought of the chances of Ukraine in November of 2021, just months before the attack happened:
See CSIS report: Moscows continuing Ukrainian buildup
A well-respected think tank estimating that the capital will fall in hours showed just how little the West believed in Ukraine. The West had just experienced the fall of Afghanistan. The Russian military machine looked smart: modernized and capable.
Quoting Tzeentch
Because you are inventing your own fabricated narrative that you then answer and not that what people actually say, I guess I shouldn't take you seriously either.
Does that mean you are indifferent to the outcome of the war?
This is brilliant. So your 'proof' that Russia intended to take Ukraine is that some analysts thought that Russia could beat Ukraine in a full invasion. The same analysts you now want to claim were wrong? So the analysts who you want to claim got it wrong are the ones you want us to believe got it right?
And talking of...
Quoting ssu
...any intention of actually answering the very simple question I asked? Or just going to stick with fabricating your own narrative and answering that?
Quoting SophistiCat
No-one's seriously falling for that. Of course @boethius's comments are well worth your time, that's why you've just chosen to spend your time painting them as being beneath response. If they really were beneath response you'd just not respond. You respond because there's merit to them which you'd rather weren't seen as meritorious, that's the whole point of the 'your arguments aren't even worth responding to' tactic. It's verbatim from the playbook. If arguing against ideas you don't like isn't your scene then just don't, but let's not insult anyone's intelligence by pretending this is anything other than rhetoric.
Strategic strike isn't a military term used to denominate ground invasions.
I won't hold it against anyone that they're not experts on military terminology, but don't try to fake expertise.
Quoting ssu
Quoting ssu
And what does any of this have to do with the invasion of Ukraine?
I am talking about the troops deployed in the invasion of Ukraine. You replied by asking questions about the Crimea invasion, implying they're in any way comparable - they are not.
Now you went from comparing the invasion of Ukraine to Crimea, to comparing Crimea to Czechoslovakia. Your goalposts move quickly.
Quoting ssu
How is that proof of anything? Zelensky is an obvious target for assassination regardless of what course the war took.
Quoting ssu
There was no certainty at the onset of war. War is a terribly unpredictable thing that has a way of defying all expectations. So why would anyone assume the Russians were singularly expecting an easy repeat of Crimea? Taking into account worst-case scenarios in the monumental decision to invade Ukraine seems no more than common sense, and it's a standard of military planning.
Quoting ssu
The author, T.X. Hammes, doesn't make that claim at all. You're making stuff up.
Secondly, he's speaking on his own behalf - not on behalf of the US government or the Atlantic Council. He simply wrote an article. And I don't find the article to be without merit. However, it doesn't claim or prove what you believe it does.
Quoting ssu
This is not what the CSIS thought - at the bottom of the page it reads:
"Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s)."
I suggest you get your quotes and attributions right.
Further, here's CNN reporting two Ukrainian officials (foreign minister Dmytro Kuleba and Ukrainian ambassador Sergiy Korsunsky) on January 26th 2022 going on record saying Russia does not have a sufficient amount of troops for a full invasion of Ukraine: CNN: Ukrainian Foreign Minister says current Russian troop numbers insufficient for full invasion
Official statements by the Ukrainian government, one month before the invasion.
At this point everyone knew the invasion was coming - the only question was when. Obviously there was plenty of reason for uncertainty. I still see zero evidence of the idea that Russia went in expecting an easy victory.
Quoting Olivier5
I don't see it as my role to be a cheerleader for either side.
As of yet, I am not able to see the full implications of either outcome, so I reserve judgement. I just sit and watch, and try to understand.
Are you refuting that Russia didn't try to attempt a strategic strike? That's brilliant!
Quoting Isaac
No. What I was referring as proof was against the argument from @Tzeentch that:
Quoting Tzeentch
Are you so absolutely clueless that you don't understand that this war started in 2014? That just for some time, it was called a frozen conflict, yet Russian forces where all the time involved in the Donbas?
But now you are asking what does the occupation of Crimea have to do with this war now? :snicker:
What backpedaling?
I have consistently said that Russia attempted first a strategic strike, It's objectives that can be seen is to get basically the part of Ukraine called Novorossiya after it already has annexed Crimea. I've consistently said that even if NATO enlargement is ONE reason for the attack in Ukraine, it is wrong to denounce EVERY OTHER reason clearly stated by Putin for this invasion. And simply that when a country annexes parts of another and declares them part of itself, simply the actions of a third party (NATO and it's expansion) don't explain everything. Likely without NATO expansion, Russia would have regained a lot more of it's territory it lost when the Soviet Union collapsed. The imperialism of the Putin regime should be obvious to anybody.
It is you who are asking what does the annexation of Crimea have to do with the war in Ukraine now. So I try to answer that.
Quoting ssu
And this claim...
Quoting ssu
And this claim...
Quoting ssu
______
And what about your implied claim that Russia was aiming for a full-scale invasion of Ukraine?
Quoting Tzeentch
Quoting ssu
Oh, and when I stated that it was a highly questionable assumption that Russia intended to hold all the territory that it occupied at one point or another, you replied characterstically with:
Quoting ssu
So lets hear you substantiate the claim that Russia intended to hold all territory it occupied as well.
When Nazi-Germany invaded Ukraine in June of 1941, they deployed roughly 800,000 - 1,000,000 troops, fighting against an extremely weak and disorganised Soviet military.
To anyone familiar with military doctrine and strategy, this should be no surprise. Invading and occupying a country isn't just about defeating troops, but also about supply lines and holding the ground that is taken. That requires troops, and a big country like Ukraine would require a lot of troops to fully invade and occupy.
Russia only deployed a fraction of what would be necessary to accomplish this. Mearsheimer makes this point ( The causes and consequences of the Ukraine war, he addresses it during the lecture and answers a specific question about it during the Q&A at 1:55:00 ) . To me that implies a full invasion and occupation was not their objective.
So dodging the substantive question again, then?
Notwithstanding the fact that nothing in the article you cited comes close to refuting @Tzeentch's point. People assessing Russia's full invasion capacity to outmatch Ukraine is not even close to refuting the idea that everyone knew it wouldn't be a repeat of 2014.
Your reply is a performative contradiction.
Quoting SophistiCat
If tagging someone constitutes "jump[ing] up and down trying to catch [someone's] attention", then why are you tagging me when you "don't care" what I think? Seems a little undignified...
Still, he had some interesting things to say and gave the impression of being both knowledgable and relatively unbiased.
Starts getting into the Ukraine war and the Kherson offensive at 18:30.
Also interested to know what the forum thinks of this man. Has he been brought up before?
@Isaac @SophistiCat - neither of you needs to have a contest about who wants to talk to the other person the least. Walk away from each other if you can't be constructive.
Really???
So @Tzeentch says:
Quoting Tzeentch
And then I note that the US was offering to evacuate Zelenskyi and I gave example of how Western think tanks thought that the capital Kyiv would fall in hours and the best option of Ukraine would be to fight with an insurgency? Sorry, but if you would know anything about military issues, advising to fight with an insurgency means that you cannot directly stop any military attack otherwise.
And then you say that doesn't refute the idea that everybody thought Ukraine was prepared and could stage a fight as it has done. :roll:
That's simply laughable. Insane.
Please now, Tzeentch, try yourself to back up your words and say that the battle for Kyiv wasn't a push to try to take the capital. The taking of Antonov Airport and the drive towards Kyiv.
I'm waiting with popcorn for this thing.
Just what is wrong with Meersheimer's idea explained by Alexander Stubb:
And an interview done just as the invasion had started in February, a sober interview with Stephen Kotkin. Even if done in the start of March, it still is worthwile to listen to:
I think I should take some example from you. :up:
The survivors also tend write the history. It'd be interesting to read a history of war written by those who did not survive. I don't think it would dwell so much on the glory.
Quoting ssu
I meant to write 'full-scale invasion of Ukraine' there, but I also find it plausible that the Russians did not intend to take and hold Kiev, even if they could have. I've already presented arguments why I believe that.
In summary:
- The Ukraine's centre of gravity is not in Kiev, because this war isn't conducted from Kiev. It's foreign support that is keeping this war going. Capturing Kiev would be symbolic, but not decisive.
- With the limited amount of troops Russia has deployed, it is unlikely they intended to spend the time and effort it would require to capture Kiev, when they had areas of strategic significance to occupy in the south.
- It is in Russia's primary interest that Ukraine continues to fight this war themselves. The capture of Kiev and it's C&C facilities could bring a western intervention closer.
- My view is that the drive on Kiev was a show of force and Russia's last attempt at finishing the conflict quickly. By showing they were not bluffing, they could conceivably have made the West back off and forced a renegotiation of Ukraine's position. If this were to fail, which it did, it could double as a diversionary attack to allow Russian forces to occupy the south with less resistance.
Quoting ssu
Quoting ssu
Much of the things we are discussing here are speculatory, and not factual. Multiple perspectives are possible, and finding one perspective more convincing than others does not mean that the other perspectives are completely without merit. Time will tell, and it's entirely possible that when they open the archives that all of us were wrong.
But if you're so convinced you're right and find perspectives that conflict with yours "laughable" and "insane", then why are you here? If an echo chamber is what you're looking for you can just turn on the tv.
The duration of elapsed time between the events and the narrative created around them doesn't magically make bias disappear.
Neither you nor I are in the war, even those in it don't have an eagle eye view of the whole theatre.
Everything we hear is a filtered narrative. Without exception. The idea that the news, or literally any other source, provides us with some unbiased 'window on reality' is absurd.
Likewise... :-)
Seems that you aren't a von Clausewitz fan.
Quoting Tzeentch
Hmm...so Capturing the Western border was the objective then? Or what?
Quoting Tzeentch
How? The US won't start WW3 because of Ukraine. That's already established. And what do you mean "by themselves"? The Russian army has had to save many times the Donetsk and Luhansk rebels before when the war was limited to the Donbas.
Quoting Tzeentch
I wonder why you find it so hard to agree that a) Russians did try to take the Capital and b) once the defense was far more stiffer than anticipated, they understood that some Stalingrad/Grozny -type slow methodical overtaking of the capital was immensely costly and likely counterproductive, so they opted to withdraw understanding their limited resources. This withdrawal was easy as Ukrainians wouldn't follow them over to Belarus (and basically start a war with the country).
That simply sounds far more logical than showing something to the West with an attack that somehow isn't anticipated to work...or just be a fake.
Reacting to the announcement, on Friday, of the placement of her husband, the actor Maxim Galkin, who had openly criticized the military campaign in Ukraine, on the infamous list of "foreign agents", Alla Pugacheva wrote that her husband, currently abroad, wishes in Russia "freedom of expression and an end to the death of our boys for illusory objectives which make our country a pariah and weigh on the lives of our citizens ".
Why not? 'Centre of gravity' (Schwerpunkt) is a Clausewitzian term. ;)
Quoting Tzeentch
Quoting ssu
They probably won't start WW3, but the United States is deeply invested in Ukraine, starting with the Bush administration fourteen years ago in 2008, and possibly earlier.
A total defeat of Ukraine would be a major blow to the United States, both in terms of investments lost and reputation. That's something they cannot afford in a time where US hegemony is being overtly challenged.
If under current conditions a total defeat of Ukraine is threatened, the United States won't let that happen quietly, even if it means risking escalation.
Putin isn't the only one capable of brinkmanship.
Quoting ssu
Because I remain unconvinced that they made a serious effort to do so, and the attack was likely a probe, followed by a diversionary attack or feint.
Quoting ssu
I think those things played a role in their decision-making process. Your particular take on it seems to be that the Russians ran into unanticipated resistance.
Again, I keep pointing to the limited troops the Russians have deployed, making it in my view unlikely that their war aims were to take the capital and take and hold a lot of territory in the south. They simply didn't have the manpower to make that happen.
At the onset of war, it was roughly 200,000 Russian troops versus roughly 250,000 Ukrainian troops. Most contemporary military doctrine prescribes at least a 3:1 numerical advantage when on the offensive, and preferably even a 5:1 advantage. The Russians didn't even have a numerical advantage, they were outnumbered!
Sure, they may have believed their troops were qualitatively superior, but no qualitative edge can bridge such a gap. These things were all on the table before the invasion began, so the Russians knew what they were in for.
Was the Ukrainian resistance stiffer than they had anticipated? Maybe. But we need to have a sense of proportion. We don't know the Russian war aims, so we have nothing to compare their current situation with, other than estimating what their war aims might've been, based on the few things we do know.
If one's opinion is that the Russians expected to take Kiev in a few hours and Ukraine in an equally rapid amount of time, they'd obviously not be doing well.
If however one's opinion is that the Russians aimed for a limited war - something which I believe is supported by the available evidence I have discussed - it paints a different picture.
The Guardian (Feb 11, 2022): US warns of ‘distinct possibility’ Russia will invade Ukraine within days
The New Yorker (May 9, 2022): How Ukrainians Saved Their Capital
Washington Post (Aug 16, 2022): Road to war: U.S. struggled to convince allies, and Zelensky, of risk of invasion
? paywalled, ? summarizes
The Brussels Times (Aug 19, 2022): US warned of Russian invasion for months but EU dithered
The Ukrainians had information, though, from there to thinking it would happen, and to further proactively implement a strong defensive posture, is another step (also easily construed as provocation by Putin for that matter). Seems doubtful that Putin would sacrifice military resources like that in an outright fake Kyiv takeover; history tells a different story. What would that say about Putin anyway? Belarus and Transnistria are standing by. A few states have now taken measures, less fumbling, which Putin and team may or may not have anticipated.
One factor pointing toward the status of taking Kyiv being a central goal at the beginning of the invasion is how the failure to do so has greatly diminished the utility of Belarus in the conflict.
One imagines that the situation in that country would be very different if it was now the favored access path to a Kiev ruled by a puppet government.
Are we to believe then, that if the Russian 'probe' had succeeded all the way to Kiev, it would have been a failure of the Russian strategy?
Maybe they would not have taken the city, despite getting it "for free", for the reasons I've already explained. Maybe they would have taken the city, but abandoned it later. Or perhaps they would have taken and held the city for as long as they could, even though it's a massive commitment to occupy a city like Kiev. I find the first two options a lot more likely than the third.
But this is just speculation over a very unlikely hypothetical scenario, about an event that has already taken place.
I have not been following all the interchanges here, but I am curious where the taking of Kiev 'free of cost' idea refers to. Who spoke the quote marks, "for free."?
Quoting Olivier5
A probing attack or a feint are non-committal attacks.
A probe is meant to gauge the degree of enemy resistance in a certain area. A feint is meant to provoke an overreaction.
Had the Russians been able to take Kiev with such an attack, it would imply the Ukrainians let them walk into Kiev basically unopposed.
Honestly, that hypothetical scenario isn't really worth considering.
There are also attacks that some call "probes" after they failed.
@Olivier5 argued that if Ukraine didn't fight back and Russia simply marched into Kiev unopposed that would mean the feint (though I think "fixing" is more appropriate for this context) operation would have failed.
Obviously, if your battle plan goes unopposed that's not a failure, and every manoeuvre simply conquers territory whether it was meant as reconnaissance, feint, fixing or the main battle.
Of course, even if Ukrainians offered no resistance, Russians may not have entered Kiev anyways fearing Guerrilla warfare or simply the administrative burden of a large capital. @Tzeentch has pointed out that obviously that didn't happen so discussing what the Russians would have done in the case of zero resistance is pretty irrelevant.
However, if you haven't been following, what is more interesting is the main debate, which is proponents of Zelensky's policies (whatever they are at the moment), which usually boils down to military victory, versus neutral analysis of the war (in the case of @Tzeentch) and proponents of diplomatic resolution (@Isaac, myself and on occasion @Benkei).
The pro-Zelensky interpret all other points of view as "pro-Russian", so the debate simply goes in unfruitful loops.
Pro-Zelensky want military victory and basically Russian surrender, but there's simply no military way to achieve that.
Whenever Zelensky declares he will not negotiate or then makes unrealistic demands, pro-Zelensky faction will basically yell approbation and that Russian's can't be trusted anyways and shouldn't be negotiated with etc.
Whenever there is rapprochement and diplomatic advancement (which has happened several times) it's failure is squarely on the Russians for not accepting whatever Zelensky wanted. At no point is Zelensky's diplomatic strategy a legitimate subject of criticism.
The whole debate is profoundly confusing to pro-Zelenskyites, because their basic argument is simply moral condemnation of Russia directly justifies any and all fighting against Russia.
Of course, even if their moral condemnation is correct, that does not actually in itself support a fight to the death.
For example, I may invade your home and hold you at gun-point to rob you. Barring some extenuating circumstances (such as being myself a police officer and the robbery legal, or then in a war and I'm an intelligence agent etc.) it's easy to accept the premise I am in the wrong and you are in the right.
However, simply because I am in the moral wrong for holding you at gun point, that does not justify any and all acts of violence against me, such as if they are foolish and will just get your whole family killed.
The circumstances that would justify any and all acts of violence, regardless of probability of success, is if you believe I am going to murder everyone anyways (more precisely, calculate the probability I will do so is higher than the probability my successfully defending your attack, which maybe a very high likelihood but my intention to kill you anyways even higher).
This is why the war is continuously framed as "existential" even though Russia clearly does not threaten, nor ever has, complete occupation of Ukraine, and, even if it did, that's only existential for the Ukrainian state and no necessarily Ukrainians themselves. One would have to believe Russia is intent on murdering the vast majority of Ukrainians in the event of total occupation to justify a fight to the death.
Without the fight to the death justified, the policies so far simply make no sense.
The lives lost, people maimed, children killed and traumatised (my own "side"), damages to Ukrainian economy, damages to the world economy and suffering from energy and food inflation, are not worth the demands Russia made at the outset of the war: recognition of Crimea, autonomy for Donbas region, and neutral Ukraine.
The retort is of course "well that's all Russia's fault" ... even if the offer was rational to accept diplomatically and further fighting is extremely unlikely to ever result in a better deal, and certainly no better deal that is worth the price in blood.
For the war to be "worth it" (from a purely state perspective, ignoring any human value), at this stage, Ukraine would need to resolve the conflict occupying a large areas of Russia.
Of course, the Western policy is not to defend Ukrainian interests, but to defend US interests of bleeding the Russians (which is not really what's happening, but that's a different topic), and more importantly destroying Europe as a geo-political competitor.
Only the Euro could have replaced the USD as a global competing currency, and the war in Ukraine now precludes that from happening.
The strategic options for the US was to either accept multi-polarity in a largely peaceful world where economic and diplomatic clout shifts to Europe as a fair arbiter of world economic affairs, or then break up the world into a new cold war paradigm and destroy European soft power.
US, at this stage in Imperial development, has only hard power as leverage, and Europe is the only soft-power competitor around, and the war in Ukraine guarantees a hard-power brokered world going forward in which US is "top dog" in a greatly diminished Western sphere of influence.
Geopolitically, what we are witnessing is the USA destroying its own allies economies in order to remain dominant over them. Of course, this means the West as a whole is abandoning a world leadership position, but all the problems that result from that are far from America's shores. Only Europe directly pays the cost for America's imperial projects within NATO, which makes those projects easy to carry out from US point of view, and the Ukraine war is the culmination of that process (so far mostly in the middle-East and North Africa) and sacrificing Europe as a piece on the geopolitical chess board, on the off chance is might become an equal partner, which it was close to achieving but its leaders sold Europeans out, basically.
How this happened is basically the anti-Russian propaganda since a solid decade precluded European leaders from saying "we're going to go make peace with the Russians and hammer out a deal, and if the Ukrainians don't accept it then they'll be left militarily alone and we won't even allow US supply to go through our territory". Peace that would have been easily achieved; Russia did not invest in Nord Stream 2 on the premise a war with Ukraine was guaranteed.
Which is why the pro-Zelenskyites basically view the war with Ukraine as a good thing and discard any diplomatic resolution at any point as a bad thing.
But that view point meets with the criticism of "then how will the war end?", which they are unable to answer and likewise unable to answer how tens of thousands of lives (other people's sons and daughter) are worthwhile to sacrifice for no rational plan but merely as a "heroic gesture" to make a moral point.
It's clear they don't even understand their own position, as it rests on a common fallacy that is typical in denial. For, in the situation that you are my hostage and you make some heroic attack that immediately gets you and your family killed, it is not really the case that your actions are immoral. I would still be in the wrong, still doing the killing, just that the result could have been avoided (by you) if I was not intent on killing you anyways. On the individual level, such actions we could categorise as unfortunate, perhaps even amoral (as you are not prepared for the situation), but clearly unwise (if it's clear I only want your television and I'll be on my way, and your attack is so surprising that I kill you and your family by accident).
However, such analogy with a individual in a difficult situation does not directly translate to nation states. A nation state is morally responsible to be prepared for a war and its conduct and making unwise decisions that get people killed is not morally neutral. For, the least we can say in the hostage situation is that you are gambling your own life, it is much different if your actions get immediately others killed, and you are fairly safe and have time to reflect, and, moreover, the decision to have others die increases your power and wealth, whereas wise decisions might save hundreds of thousands (even millions) of lives but end your political career (as a compromise never satisfies everyone).
To which they will respond that it's Russia that's bad at fault for everything and the debate goes around in a circle again.
In the background to all this is a parallel moral-logico propaganda loop that NATO is right to oppose Russia and "stand with Ukraine", but of course that means not taking any actual risk directly to NATO nor actually "standing with Ukraine" in any sense that involves actual standing with Ukrainian soldiers on the front line, and is right to limit arms shipments in a way that guarantees Russian victory on the battlefield -- that last part is easily fixed by just claiming Ukraine is winning somehow (because ... basically, Russia could be winning even harder right now, Ukraine could have capitulated, but they aren't winning as hard as is conceivable ... therefore: Ukraine is winning).
That's still a joke and therefore an exagerration. But both "NATO is a purely defensive organisation" and "NATO is an existential threat" will be considered true depending on who you're talking to. A failure to try to understand either, means parties cannot reach a diplomatic solution and this thread similarly doesn't progress either.
Not only this, but also leads to faulty analysis of the military situation.
For, the premise that Russian soldiers are low morale and will collapse ... any day now and Russians will overthrow Putin ... any day now, which was the only justification of both total war and the sanctions at the start (that this would somehow "defeat" Russia via low morale), is based on the idea that Russians have no alternative perspective to Western propaganda. If Western propaganda announces expansion to Ukraine was not a threat to Russia, then Russians too believe that and therefore don't see any possible legitimate point to any of the fighting in Ukraine, and morale will collapse months ago.
And if you think victory will be delivered through the magical thinking operation of other people you don't know all feeling the same as you, then there is no reason not to fight and there is also no reason to have a rational plan for your fighting ... just keep fighting, Russian morale will deliver ... any day now.
Indeed, training ten's of thousands of Nazi's in Ukraine will directly lead to more literal Nazi government takeovers or "influence" as some people here like to refer to it; the formula worked out in Ukraine is not really useful in "defeating" Russia and as soon as that becomes clear and the conflict is resolved or frozen, the focus of these Nazi organisations will branch out to neighbouring countries to expand said "influence".
Economic hardship has as a consequence both rallying behind "strong men" to "fight the scapegoats" as well as the weakening of neoliberal welfare state parties that require economic prosperity to be able to promise and deliver welfare state policies.
Of course, authoritarians (in today's political context; not some logical necessity) are generally right wing with elite backers who want to lower taxes, anti-environment protections, sell state assets and unwind welfare state policies in parallel to the fighting of scapegoats.
In the "name of the liberal oder" that the EU is conducting warfare in Ukraine, will lead to the direct collapse of liberalism in the EU. And not "in the distance", recent elections in Sweden are the first example of this.
Again, EU society unravelling into a fascism is good for US investors and corporations.
Everything turns up roses from the US Imperial perspective. Of course, without the EU economic stability there is no counter-weight to Chinese and Russian economic policies on the world stage, but they are no real threat to the US and are more freinemies that mutually justify each other's totalitarian war economies.
How many F-35's and other war equipment just got sold again?
Indeed, the whole affair is basically a Christmas miracle for the US military industrial complex, going from losers that fucked up Afghanistan to true heroes and defenders of "freedom" in a few months.
Again, something only EU was advocating for, and US, Chinese and certainly Russian elites sort-of-kind-of-wanting business as usual to continue, certainly don't not-want it to continue.
Its international relations 101 that peace would be required for international collaboration on climate change, European prosperity to bank it, and that obviously peace requires compromise.
How to explain EU leadership policies?
Bitches. Bitches all the way down.
So, European leaders create the conditions for war by immorally doing nothing much about climate change for decades, and the war will now further frustrate any effective action on climate change, which will continue to benefit Russia in relative consequence and power terms (eases energy exports and exploration while increasing food production while those things diminish globally).
European NATO leaders (all of them) do not veto US expansion into Ukraine, tolerate supporting literal Nazi's, despite many calling it a bad idea that can only lead to war.
War comes and European leaders are all Pikachu face and still do absolutely nothing in terms of soft power to try to end the conflict, rather just supply some arms (obviously not enough to win, just cause more bloodshed), and buy into the kindergarten framework of international relations that their decision making and state policies must be deferred to Zelensky ... he was on the cover of vogue and a social media god after all.
They are not morons, they just serve a different master than any EU constituency, even their own domestic elites, for the most part, the others simply begin and end their political analysis based on what's trending on social media today.
The recent hundreds of billions of weapons purchase commitments is only a tiny step in that direction.
What you'd really want to do is a coordinated missile attack on European civilian aircraft.
Which will be super dramatic and super traumatic, as planes are not only blown up but planes in the air will not know where it is safe to land, people crying on TV and everything. So it will be many hours of intense anxiety and as many planes as required can easily be shot down in order to change European policy into whatever one's heart desires.
The weapons to do this are now "out there", already in Europe and it only takes a single covert organisation, of one form or another, somewhere with relatively modest funds to accomplish what will basically be EU's 9/11.
Of course, some will ask "why are our own missiles we sent to protect freedom or whatever being used to down our own planes with the obvious consequences of creating a EU security state?". Fortunately, the great thing about a security state is it doesn't have to answer.
So we'll all be able to rest easy.
The good news, though, is that wiping out most of the human population not only makes sound economic sense now that we have robotics and bespoke 3D printing and computer-controlled precision machining, but it is also the solution to almost all the environmental problems. Hurrah!
If the original plan was a blitzkrieg, as the evidence indicates, then the military utility of Belarus would end with the cessation of hostilities. As it is, although the ground invasion from that direction failed, Belarus still hosts Russian air force, which pounds Ukraine from the safety of its airspace.
The Russian "guests" would not be leaving in any event though. Belarus has effectively ceded its sovereignty to Russia.
You still fail to even get the point.
Even assuming Russia is entirely in the wrong and no one else is responsible for anything, NATO isn't going to go "defeat" Russia and Ukraine can't "defeat" Russia.
So, how does the war end?
How does more fighting improve the negotiating position or then being at war forever is somehow the best outcome for Ukrainians?
What is even the negotiating position that could plausibly bring a resolution to the war?
People don't change perspective, most of times. Cf. any debate on TPF for evidence of that. Let's not aim for the impossible. No pro-russian poster is ever going to change his mind because of what you and I write.
All that doesn't change the point though that if you don't understand why someone believes something, there's no chance of changing that perspective. And even then, people can still disagree. Which should also be fine.
I second @Benkei in his response above, but again, even assuming you are right,
if:
1. Russia isn't going to change it's perspective
2. NATO isn't going to defeat Russia on Ukraine's behalf, following through with their Churchillian rhetoric
3. Ukraine can't defeat Russia
What is the alternative to a compromise that takes into account Russia's unchangeable perspective and that Russia may accept?
Your position so far seems to be:
Step one: everyone on Western social media agree Russia is bad
Step two: everyone on Western social media agree that Ukrainians fighting and dying to kill Russians is good
Step three: ...
Another way to understand the basic criticism you are facing is we're just asking what step 3 would be, even if we did accept step 1 and 2.
Ok, Russians bad and Ukrainians good ... what's the plan even assuming that's true?
If there's no answer to step 3, then it seems to me at least Ukrainian welfare is not a consideration in this position and the moralising of bad faith to begin with (along with no one ever answering how many Nazi's would be too many Nazi's).
That seems unarguable. But it is in general the case that wars are prosecuted on the basis that:
[quote=Churchill] We shall defend our island, whatever the cost may be, we shall fight on the beaches, we shall fight on the landing grounds, we shall fight in the fields and in the streets, we shall fight in the hills; we shall never surrender.[/quote]
War is always 'to the death'. There is no other plan. The welfare plan involves health and safety officers and hospitals, not tanks and bombs.
This is an illusionary objective, in any case. Nobody can change someone else's perspective. Rather, a person can decide to change her perspective, or not. So at best, you can help someone change perspective, if that person wants to do so in the first place.
It's not that complicated to understand. Even you should get the point.
Not really at all.
Most wars are resolved in surrender of one side (or the negotiated resolution to preempt complete surrender while there is still some leverage) ... the exact opposite of "we shall never surrender".
Quoting unenlightened
Again, completely untrue. Most wars throughout history are not fought to the death but one side capitulates.
In hunter gatherer times, when one side clearly lost they would withdraw and go elsewhere (wars being generally over territory).
In Imperial times, the losing side is absorbed into the winning empire administrative system as a vassal state or direct administration.
In nation-state times, the losing side accepts the economic and diplomatic policies of the winning side, with occasional changes in territory.
Indeed, most individual battles are resolved with the surrender of the remaining enemy troops rather than fighting to the death.
Fighting to the death is quite rare in the history of warfare. Very few cultures developed such an ethos (because cultures can survive different administrative changes over centuries, but cannot, by definition, survive even one battle to the death they don't win).
Indeed. but you are not asking about what the truth is, but what the plan is. The plan is to win - the truth is everyone loses.
You might have to tell about your point 3 above to the Ukrainians, because they don't seem to be aware of it... Some 80% of them believe they can beat the Russians.
No qualms from me on this.
Correction, 80% of Ukrainians think NATO can defeat Russia using Ukrainians as proxy soldiers. No one believes "Ukraine", as such, can defeat Russia.
If NATO wanted to "standup" to Russia it would have done so before the war broke out.
NATO doesn't want to, it's quite content selling some arms, creating the new cold war, and not "defeating" Russia, which would just complicate everyone in NATO's life (everyone that matters anyways).
No one with any thoughts on Scott Ritter's interviews?
I linked this interview a few days ago and I'm curious what the forum thinks of this man.
Winning meaning locking up Russian forces in a stalemate which will lead them to eventually accept some type of truce or even peace deal, I think is highly probable. And I'd rather see that sooner than later.
Winning meaning reclaiming Donetsk and Luhansk and the southern occupied territories is already much more difficult. Not impossible but I think that also depends on what of the stories are true. Did the Russians merely tactically retreat form Kharkiv or was it an actual gain? Are the Russians having problems with their supply lines or are these news items exagerrated? Is Western material support sufficient or not? I can't tell and I don't think anyone on this site can accurately gage it. Along with those uncertainties, the question also becomes one of whether the costs are acceptable (eg. Ukrainian deaths first and foremost but also Russian deaths which are mostly men like you and me forced to fight). My personal feeling about that, is that territory is much less important than people. But then I've never been a nationalistic or patriotic type so I might misunderstand the psyche of Ukrainians in that respect.
Then there's winning meaning reclaiming the above and Crimea. That's exceedingly difficult and to me it's pretty obvious that that should not be attempted from a cost-benefit analysis (costs in human lives). At least as things stand now and appear to continue for the foreseeable future.
But then, the sanctions could all of a sudden have an effect, more through an erosion effect, affecting the broader Russian economy, destroying their supply lines and a general decomposition of the Russian state apparatus. This seems highly unlikely to me though due to the fact so many countries in the world have not imposed sanctions on Russia and I don't think regime change was ever affected through sanctions. The closest was South Africa but that had an active and successful anti-apartheid movement even before the sanctions started so seems to dissimilar to the current case to expect such changes from the sanctions.
So, what type of winning are you thinking about?
The NATO thing applies to all of Ukraine;
various statements (propaganda style) like calling Ukraine not a real country, should never have been given self-governance, history this history that (there's a bit of irony here), suppression-oppression-repression (if not assassination) of other voices in Russia along with calls for nationalism, whatever;
Yanukovych was ousted in a bad way, granted, yet the parliament voted to fire him, and democratic elections followed, putting Ukraine on a trajectory of more openness and democratic transparency with international observers, despite all the foreign meddling in different directions - all construed as nothing but a wicked coup d'état by the Putinistas;
officials demanding Ukraine just give up, and that the "special operation" has been expanded;
yep, the initial Feb move on Kyiv, too;
diplomatic "hesitance" and semi-concern, perhaps even pseudo-efforts (apparently being dictated by Kremlin war strategists - albeit conjecture, it's consistent);
too little bona fides indications;
actions taken in Ukraine, the interrupted Kherson pseudo-vote, militarily, against civilians, what-have-you.
As of typing, I can't be bothered to round up more.
Something that stands out is the disregard for, even forgetting, Ukrainian self-governance.
They're the ones being bombed, killed, while flooded (past and present) with propaganda/meddling in different directions.
Crimea is another kettle of fish but it has vulnerabilities, e.g. that bridge linking it to Russia.
Gargalo (Portugal), courtesy of Cartooning for Peace
Not just the president of Kyrgyzstan, but the leaders of Turkey, India and Azerbaijan also made Putin wait for them.
[tweet]https://twitter.com/skazal_on/status/1570824858401116161[/tweet]
And Erdogan has done this to Putin before.
Remember how Putin made everyone wait for him?
How the times have changed!
It may seem a bit childish to gloat like that, but in politics optics matter, and this is an apt illustration of the point made in the article.
The term "paper tiger" has appeared in a number of articles. It seems Putin has screwed up, probably irreversibly.
I think the US has helped China fill the power vacuum, though.
As it stands right now, Kharkiv and several thousand square kilometers to the east of the city have been recaptured. Russia is suffering serious personnel shortages. The Russian soldiers previously stationed in that region were inadequately fortified and entrenched. In the south we have Kherson pinned from the north and west, and Russia’s supply lines into the Kherson and some of the surrounding cities in the oblast have been severely compromised. There are still a LOT of Russian soldiers left in Kherson, so the going is slow. We have to work very carefully.
From my experience fighting the Russian invasion force is like fighting children. Most of their troops are inexperienced, unmotivated, poorly provisioned, and suffering from low morale. The main thing that makes things difficult is the inordinate amount of artillery that Russia possesses (easily the most in the world, more than the United States), and the fact that Russia was able to essentially sneak a large part of its army into Ukraine with very little resistance under the guise of doing military exercises and other things.
Ukraine is going to incur heavy casualties in the coming months, but the difference between Russia and Ukraine is that the former lacked the personnel to adequately defend newly gained territory, whereas the later does not. Also, the motivation of the Ukrainian soldiers cannot be underestimated, and the poor morale of Russian soldiers cannot be dismissed. They are very salient factors in this war, especially now that winter is coming.
Russia will be unable to maintain its current pace of artillery fire for more than one year. This is extremely important because its Russia’s artillery (as well as air support, missiles & rockets) that have been largely keeping Ukrainian armies at bay. Meanwhile Ukraine is picking up steam with more and more long range weaponry.
Most likely Kherson will be taken and we will recapture more territory in the north and east. We are reaching a point where Russian forces are more compacted and dug in, so its best to focus on digging in now to fortify the lands we have recaptured, while more of our forces can “catch up” behind us.
Will Ukraine be armed with enough air defence to protect its civilian power grid? Or does the Russian “trash everything you are claiming to liberate” mentality just proceed to its next logical step?
:chin:
What I'm missing again from your reply: even if all of that is true (which I don't think any of us are in a position to say with certainty one way or the other), should they? Is it worth the deaths and destruction? Surely there's more to morality than beating the Russians at all costs?
Yes, in the context of "we will not negotiate!" then winning is the surrender of the opposing side.
Quoting Benkei
Quoting Benkei
None of these scenarios are "winning the war". This is the key point that Zelenskyites refuse to address.
Take back Donbas, take back Crimea ... the war would still be on.
Not only would the human and material cost be very high to retake all Donbas and even higher Crimea, Russia can re-enter Ukraine at any point along the 2000 km border with Ukraine at any time (and, presumably also the 1000 km border with Belarus).
The "front line" discussed today is only a small part of the actual front line that stretches some 4000-5000 km.
Even if the the above scenarios were to play out, there would still be a state of war with a lot of border to defend.
Quoting Benkei
I also agree that a negotiated peace is the best outcome, but definitely this is not a "win" according to Zelensky standards and it's difficult to say a war was won when 20% of territory is ceded.
There's been a lot of internet debate on "tactical retreat" vs. "just retreat", which I think is worth clarifying to said internet denizens.
The mini controversy seems to take place under the erroneous conception that tactical retreat is synonymous with "brilliant military manoeuvre" and that you "actually wanted to retreat all along".
This is of course not true.
Tactical retreat can refer to a re-positioning, a deceptive pre-planned trap, or just then retreating under pressure as a tactic, and in all cases is not by definition the best move.
It's "tactical" when it is used as a manoeuvre to reposition and inflict casualties on the advancing forces, which may or may not be successful. It's "successful" if the pros outweigh the cons, obviously.
Which definitely, as you note, we cannot easily evaluate. We don't know the cost to Ukraine in pushing the Russians out of Kharkiv and we don't know what Russia plans on doing next.
Quoting Benkei
I think it's safe to assume everything is exaggerated in Western media.
However, NATO could definitely pour far more arms into Ukraine than it currently has. Could have provided Himars and satellite targeting of those from day 1 of the war, likewise flood Ukraine with AA systems, along with NATO tanks and far more artillery.
NATO has not. So what one needs to ask to understand the situation is "what's the evaluation criteria of what to send and not send". Why only 16 Himars trucks when the US has over hundred such systems.
Of course, NATO mostly simply doesn't explain the criteria, Ukraine must be happy with what it gets, but on occasion claims their criteria is they send as much support as they can ... until their own defence is compromised.
Well, that's really not plausibly true at all, as if that was the criteria Ukraine would at least get a bit of everything already. If the current US stockpile of shorter range Himars missiles really was running "dangerously low" then they'd have already supplied some of the longer range missiles that are at full stock.
Other weapons systems that Ukraine doesn't get at all, like F16's (not to mention F-35's), obviously US could spare at least some (especially aircraft that's being phased out of the US air fleet). Would require training ... but Ukrainians have be doing training for months in UK and other NATO nations (and non-NATO nations like Finland too). It can't take that long to train a fighter pilot on a new aircraft, and even if it did the war may go on for years so better to get started.
What can we deduce from NATO arms supply policy is that the criteria is not support Ukraine up until some imaginary standard of compromising own security (which doesn't really hold water in itself ... should everyone be willing to take some risks for this holy war?).
Rather, quite obviously, the policy is to supply arms and training enough to Ukraine to not suffer embarrassing defeat but not risk actually winning on the battlefield either.
US and NATO do not care about the Donbas and whether Ukraine has it or Russia has it.
The policies that actually matter: new cold war and arms sales bonanza and securing a hard-power future where US is top dog in it's little club, while also undermining European security with a flood of advanced weaponry on the black market. These policies are achieved by a prolonged war where Ukraine support is calibrated to neither win nor lose.
Russia may also want exactly the same thing: cutoff from the West, alternative financial system booted up, alternative component supply lines worked out, permanent justification for the war economy, increased arms sales to non-NATO partners, increasing uncertainty and price of everything it sells.
Of course, the key partner to do all that is China, but that maybe why the invasion was launched after a long meeting between Xi and Putin.
And the Western idea that China is unhappy about Russia's "anti-Western-liberal-order" moves in Ukraine, is just stupid.
True, China has economic leverage over Russia, but Russia has commodity leverage over China. and as we've just seen with the EU, it's pretty big leverage. Russia actually has more leverage over China than the EU because the EU is at least food self sufficient whereas China has major problems there and is facing much harsher climate change impacts.
So, true, we cannot evaluate the conditions on the ground, exact casualty statistics, but we can evaluate what is and isn't sent to Ukraine and infer the actual criteria is not-win but not-completely-lose. And if that's the criteria than what we see fits that hypothesis: Ukraine is unable to take Kherson (a strategically vital position for the Russians) but can take a bunch of more-or-less buffer space around Kharkiv. Ukraine asks for more arms and longer range missiles to continue the momentum ... US hums-and-haws and warns Russia about using tactical nuclear weapons (which would provide easy victory in military terms ... some on the internet, like Zeihan, are claiming tactical nukes aren't effective, but that's really dumb).
I do think he's a good faith actor genuinely believing what he says, and has lot's of interesting facts and I think generally is at least discussing the relevant topics, just with extreme US bias (which is good perspective to have for the sake of argument in any case).
However, sometimes his analysis is basically "what the hell are you smoking?"
He feels using tactical nuclear weapons wouldn't be effective (wrong, they are very effective at blowing stuff up) and Russia won't use them (very likely, it's obviously a massive line to cross that Russia would have crossed already if that was the plan).
... but then goes onto casually state Russia may flatten European cities with Nukes?
But also Russia, even Putin, doesn't want to end the human condition and have all out WWIII. I'm honestly unable to follow the reasoning: "tactical Nukes ... nah, but sure let's nuke entire cities?"
And the reason not to use tactical nukes is because that will frustrate the ultimate goal of taking key strategic locations Poland and Romania ... but also Ukraine will defeat Russia.
Obviously Russia hasn't already lost, but still holds most of Donbas, Kherson, Crimea and the space in between.
Before this new offensive, even the Western narrative was shifting towards questions like "can Ukraine win?" and "is supplying arms enough?" and "time to discuss the diplomatic resolution of the war?"
So, Ukraine knows it needs a win to keep its Western backing and Russia knows it too, offensive is for sure coming before the fall and winter. The mud may figuratively freeze Ukrainian offensives (Scott Ritter posted above is quite convinced of this), and then winter may literally freeze Ukrainians on the front line where the supply line is stretched out 1000 km, easily targeted, and likely much easier in winter with IR signatures much more apparent.
It was certainly in the realm of possibility a few weeks ago that Ukraine actually break through and take Kherson, or then anywhere from there to Donbas. For example, an attack East of the Dnieper, if it were to succeed all the way to the coast would isolate the Russians on the West side of the river. These sorts of things would be major strategic blows and major embarrassment, followed by re-damming the canal that supply Crimea.
The retreat from Kharkiv regions is certainly some embarrassment, but no-where near anything the embarrassment and actual strategic problem of the fall of Kherson, or punching through the "land bridge" all the way to the coast at any point.
It's said Russians repositioned significant forces from Kharkiv region to reinforce other places on the front. The logic certainly is that they don't intend to defend Kharkiv if the offensive comes there.
So, the situation is now that Ukraine has certainly a propaganda win, that they critically needed; however, battle field conditions are not clear and momentum of the offensive seems to have stalled back to incremental gains on both sides. There's certainly no collapse of the Russian lines and critical strategic locations are being overrun. The territories exchanged are at the moment highly debatable in military significance.
What's next?
Russian strategy since the withdrawal of Kiev offensive, has been clearly to stop armoured offensives and advance with significant artillery bombardment (basically bombard a place until Ukrainians leave it), minimising casualties, and making "geopolitical moves" until Winter.
Russia has successfully navigated the sanctions and their partnerships with China, India, basically the entire rest of the world outside the West, as well as just closed various deals in the SCO meeting, including Iran. Time will tell what significant this all has, but seems in the positive direction for Russia. There's a theory that sanctions are "eroding" Russia economy, but I find that implausible given the economic links with China and positive revenue flows. This is in no way comparable to North Korea or Venezuela, of which sanctions didn't "work" in those far more favourable conditions. I find it far more plausible that any direct infrastructure problems happened in the initial sanctions shock and alternative components worked out since. True, some Western equipment may simply be impossible to repair, but if you have money you can just purchase an entire substitute from China, maybe a bit less efficient but economies don't entirely collapse due to efficiency drops in various capital equipment. Likewise, for normal people's lives, there been plenty of time now to adjust to new jobs and habits.
Unless Ukraine does succeed in some catastrophic breakthrough, the next phase in the war is slowing either retaliation or then genuine need to slow Ukraine down by hitting infrastructure and then seeing how the gas situation plays out in winter.
If everything on the front line is stabilised again by winter, nothing much happening for the months between now and February, when the gas shortages and prices really start to hit home, talk of negotiated settlement with Russia may build back momentum again.
Moods change, today people cheer on the Ukrainians because they're told they're "winning", and people like winners, but if that narrative flips again, mood can easily change to "time to end the war" and "it's gone on long enough" and "it's better to make peace with Russia", obviously fuelled by gas pains.
Diplomatically, the whole thing could be wrapped up by the EU in about a week, by coming up with a resolution Russia can accept and more-or-less forcing Ukraine to accept it whether the like it or not. EU leaders simply choose not to try to resolve the conflict, but at some point real economic domestic pressures may simply overwhelm any churchillian fantasies or just distaste at losing face to Russia, and the leaders that spearhead peaceful resolution will get the credit for doing "what needs to be done" and being on the side of peace and so on, and putting things behind us; if gas prices go down, it will be a political win.
It's only a (highly debatable) political win today insofar as the full consequences of the war aren't felt by people. At some point Europeans aren't going to care much about some strange idealistic fight that has no clear end point in Ukraine, and will want their leaders to fix economic problems (that are far easier to fix with cheaper gas and oil).
My prediction is the main European leaders will push for a peaceful resolution the moment all the smaller European countries start to essentially capitulate diplomatically for the gas. If there's no prospect to the end of the war with more fighting, and an essentially pro-Russian factions starts to grow bigger within the EU itself, the more powerful European leaders will have no other choice than to attempt to make peace and put things back "to normal".
This my best guess to the basic thoughts of the Kremlin at the moment: everyone comes crawling back for the gas, sooner or later.
Not to say this strategy will succeed, but I think this is in broad strokes what the Russians are trying to accomplish.
I am not 100% certain of much. Let's not pretend that things are impossible to tell in the specific case of Ukraine... There's more info on Ukraine than on many other issues.
And yes, Ukrainians in majority think that it is worthwhile to chase the Russians from Ukraine. You are welcome to disagree, but our opinion is not really important here. We're not fighting this war.
This is obviously untrue in itself and your opinion on @Benkeis opinion or anything Ukraine would likewise be unimportant and you should have just been repeating that from the beginning.
However, if our if our tax dollars are being used to finance Ukraines war effort and supply arms and also government implementing sanctions to harm Russia ... how is that not our direct issue as European citizens?
Sure, if Ukraine was doing its thing entirely alone, under its own power and resources, it would be less relevant to non-Ukrainians.
But that's not remotely the case.
Sure, EU citizens are welcome to demonstrate or argue against what the EU does, ie the EU sanctions or the EU support to Ukraine. But they are not the one deciding to fight or not, and to negotiate or not, or whether it's worthwhile to resist or not.
So by that token your comments about Russian military policy have been out of place. It is carried out by Russians and affects Ukrainians. Nothing to do with you, a matter only for Russians and Ukrainians to comment on.
Your 'point' is as transparent as ever. Parrot Western mainstream media and deflect any criticism by transferring all responsibility to this amorphous group 'the Ukrainians' whom you've neither polled, nor surveyed, nor asked, but in whose hands you're happy to place unprecedented levels of firepower, barely traceable, for them to do with what they will.
I was fighting in Ukraine in spring when Russia had invaded Kyiv Oblast and was attacking Irpin, Bucha, Brovary, and other surrounding cities. The biggest challenge fighting Russia is their massive amounts of artillery, which is invaluable for keeping attacking infantry units at bay. Russian infantry to my apprehension looked like chickens with their heads cut off, and were hesitant to attack, quick to pull back, and not decisive at all. I have personally seen Ukrainian Territorial Defense units (which are volunteer “reserve” units) hold back incursions made by Russian regulars (supported by tanks), using only automatic rifles, grenades, RPGs, & other rocket systems. To be fair, it is easier to dig in and defend than it is to attack, and attackers generally incur much higher casualties; but I was not impressed with Russia’s combat performance. There was also a host of logistical concerns Russian invaders had to contend with — not limited to bad roads, muddy conditions, fuel shortages, etc. It’s bad when a long column of Russian tanks are stalled out and you can engage them from the trees with infantry & rocket systems, then fall back & mount more attacks. To be fair again, Russia has been better with logistics since that time, but their overall performance on all but one of the Ukrainian fronts has been lackluster thus far.
As of earlier this month several key bridges around Kherson proper were destroyed by Ukrainian long range rocket systems. There are other ways for Russia to get supplies into the city, but currently defenders are largely cut off from their supply lines. As it stands right now we have not reached a point where this is affecting Russia’s ability to mount a strong defense of Kherson. They have a LOT of artillery stockpiled in the city, and defenders there are better entrenched than they were in the Kharkiv Oblast. In addition the terrain in the south does not offer attacking Ukrainian forces much cover as they mount an offense (there are plains, soft rolling hills, and irrigation canals). This will lead to high casualties on the Ukrainian side. The question in my mind is whether Ukrainian generals will decide to “wait out” the defenders & focus on stopping their supply lines while the defending force’s morale withers away, or whether we will continue to press the attack full force. The first option is attractive but the more time we wait, the longer Russia has to devise a plan to get more supplies & troops into the city from the east.
IOW, you could take the Ukrainian perspective and agency seriously, rather than minimize their role or deny their agency. And this even applies to the Russian perspective, which also needs to be studied if one wants to understand anything about this war. E.g. since the Russians started this war, it's worthwhile thinking about the conditions under which they could be forced or convinced to stop it.
Yet...
Quoting Olivier5
I thought you were a cop in the USA. :rofl:
I understand from some NATO friends you need about 3 times the manpower to invade, which is why NATO was always convinced the Russians were going to invade because of the huge standing armies when the Warsaw Pact was still existing (after the fall of Berlin, they did find exactly those type of plans). Since Russia only fielded about twice as many soldiers as Ukraine, whatever strategic goals they were considering does not involve occupation of large swathes of Ukraine and should be relatively limited. And if that's the case then what is their real goal?
The "all but one front" that actually mattered.
If you followed this issue before the war broke out, the "limited war goals" military analysts would talk about was "land bridge to Crimea" (and likely the maximum ambition given the forces assembled); this is what military analysts talked about as a difficult goal to achieve.
Russians achieve it in less than a week:
The idea the Russians have poor performance, no plan, irrational, etc. is just completely dumb propaganda.
Now, if the maximum goal with 200 000 troops was land bridge to Crimea, then the best commanders and forces will be committed to conquering and securing said land bridge. Second tier commanders and troops will be committed to a fixing operation to pressure Kiev and their orders will be largely to advance until resistance is met and to then entrench and wait for artillery, which is what we saw. Of course, supply lines are still vulnerable to ambush and less experienced commanders will still "try some shit" that then maybe fails, but if the goal is to fix Ukrainian troops in the North then it doesn't really matter what areas are conquered or not; i.e. there's no actual military objective in terms of a point on a map, just to keep the pressure on.
Furthermore, yes Russians suffered a lot of casualties, but so too Ukrainians, so to judge the North operation even of itself it would only be a failure if casualties were a lot higher for Russians.
Of course, that brings up the question of why not withdraw sooner if it was a fixing operation. The answer is that they withdrew at the logical time for a fixing operation.
Russian generals main fear after the first week would be if the siege of Mariupol was broken, so the fixing operation needs to stay in place until then.
Quoting Siege of Mariupol
Quoting Battle of Kyiv (2022)
Yes, Russians suffer losses in the North but if their strategic priority is Mariupol, it is far better to suffer losses in the North than a offensive in south Ukraine that may relieve the siege of Mariupol. Had Russians not pressured Kiev in the North, the only thing for Ukrainians to do would be try to fight a salient to Mariupol, which would be intensely motivating to save their "Azov heroes" and massive propaganda victory and real, tangible and irreversible embarrassment to Russia that could not be "spun": they had the Azov Nazi's surrounded but their superior "brethren" fought all the way to break the siege; it would be truly a battle worthy for song.
Being pushed back from Kharkiv is, to contrast, not a comparable embarrassment and is reversible by simply regaining that terrain or then victories elsewhere.
And the roughly 2 weeks between the final surrender of Mariupol is not an unusual timing. First, the decision would need to be made that there are no further key objectives which the operation in the North would serve (Russians also want Donbas but do not decide on a major offensive there, but instead withdraw from the North and switch to incrementalist tactics), and second the complete withdrawal would need to be planned and orders delivered to all the key officers and again they may require some days to prepare to withdraw. So, that all that would take about 2 weeks after the Mariupol surrender is entirely reasonable time frame, and without such a hypothesis there's really no alternative to why Russia went to Kiev and why they withdrew when they did (occupation of all of Ukraine was clearly not feasible; the plan was not to conquer all of Ukraine and then they "settled" for South Ukraine, but obviously the plan was the land bridge to Crimea and securing the canal the supplies Crimea with water, and that was achieved).
You have a good memory. I worked for a police department many years ago. I do real estate investment now =]
Russia’s goals are summarized well by boethius — among other things securing the Donbas, defending Crimea and securing recognition of their sovereignty over that territory, establishing an overland route to Crimea from the east, etc. Earlier in the war, Russia’s goals were more ambitious. But where boethius attributes the unfulfilment of those goals (e.g. taking Kyiv) to being a strategic diversion, I disagree, and attribute it to incompetence. Putin thought Kyiv could be taken in days, and his “yes men” mirrored that sentiment. This was not a brilliant tactical stroke, rather an embarrassing failure where Russia incurred catastrophic casualties. The number of casualties that we incurred at Irpin? Less than 60.
The sheer number of tanks, for example, that Russia lost during the incursion into Kyiv Oblast is staggering. Prior to the invasion they had 13,000 tanks (probably lower because they self-report to an extent). They lost over 2,000 in Ukraine in less than 7 months. That’s a minimum of 15% of their total tank force (probably more). Russia had already downsized its tank force because it couldnt keep them serviced properly. One thing to bear in mind is that Russia lost some of their better, modern tanks in Kyiv Oblast, and has been forced to use older tanks to bolster their depleted tank force elsewhere. This is something I have not only seen personally, but you can see in videos of engagements on the other fronts. One question to bear in mind is why would Russia send some of their best to simply “create a distraction”? Some of their best units slaughtered. An unacceptable number of Russian generals and colonels killed. High losses among their mid-level officer ranks that will takes many years to replenish. This was not a diversionary tactic. This was a strategic miscalculation in part caused by corruption and nepotism at the highest ranks, along with overconfidence, inexperience, and failed strategy (which of course is not surprising when such a system doesn’t produce the best, but instead the best connected.
The problem is that boethius is trying to render a post factum analysis of the situation as a whole without taking into account the original mindset of those planning the invasion. This is a salient feature to leave out since it speaks to the issue of [in]competency. It is essentially revisionist history (and moreover, excuse making). This is to be expected when glossing over critical details like some of the ones I provided above.
So the truth is that Putin is doing a good job executing a rational plan. Sounds legit. :lol:
Ziehan's analysis – that the real ambition is to push all Russia's boundaries back to defensible mountain passes before demographic collapse leaves its armies starved of recruits – is always going to be more plausible.
It's what they've been doing for many years in dribs and drabs under Putin. With a politically disengaged US and a Europe dependent on Russian oil, plus a need to keep the Russian population under his spell, now was a time to see just how much he could grab in terms of a Russian annexation of a connecting Crimean land corridor and regime change in Kyiv.
If the special operation achieved these limited aims in weeks, then onwards and upwards. The geopolitical logic was still the old Russian dream of control of the steppes all the way to defensible borders. That means Poland to the edge of Warsaw, the Baltic States, etc.
So where would you argue halting Putin's ambitions? You would let him eat your hand, but not your arm?
It would be lovely if every one could just declare eternal peace and brotherhood around the negotiating table. But again, the geopolitically reality is that Russia has always needed to have its effective borders fixed way beyond even Ukraine or - in its own eyes - perish as an identity. The leadership can also read the future in terms of the demographics. Even if Putin goes, the same logic will guide those who replace him without the complete democratic overhaul that never happened the last time, and still seems utterly improbable unless it is finally de-nuked and carved back up into ethnic regions too small to trouble the world.
Stop excusing Russia's failed adventure. Give us some real analysis here. What is the least cost off-ramp for everyone now given that Russian weakness has been fully revealed and Europe would be foolish to believe the project to integrate politically and economically could be restarted even in 20 years.
You literally cite me right above your sentence, where I use the words "irrational", "no plan" and "poor performance" (discussing the Russian military) and you then paraphrase that as talking about Putin doing a good job. I.e. you literally respond to my comment pointing out propaganda with the propaganda of wildly misrepresenting my statement and throwing Putin in there when I wasn't talking about Putin.
The discussion was about Russian military planning and performance (responding to @Wolfman assertion that Russian infantry run around like headless chickens), which has nothing to do with Putin or civilian leadership in general: a competent military managed by people who can think, can be sent to fight an unjust and foolish war ... cough, cough, Iraq, Afghanistan, cough, Vietnam, cough, cough, cough.
And evaluating Putin's job performance (or the political decisions in general, such as going to war in the first place) is a completely different matter, that will be mostly about value judgements, international relations and economic consequences, and not so much military strategy and tactics. Discussion that would certainly be fruitful.
I'm an anarchist and so don't like authoritarians, but I do not view authoritarianism as irrational and certainly for people that do just want a strong man then Putin's actions are very rational.
If Putin was a peacenik good vibes loving hippy with dreadlocks living in a tent on the Kremlin commune lawn and smoking the herb all day talking about oneness and shit, then suddenly launched this war; ok, sounds irrational. However, Putin isn't a peacenik good vibes loving hippy.
Given Putin's state of beliefs (which are entirely typical for nation-state leaders both now and since thousands of years), the war in Ukraine and broader global economic conflict was and is certainly a big gamble. That it has "worked" so far (Russia hasn't collapsed economically or politically, hasn't been isolated in international relations, and the land bridge to Crimea and Kherson is occupied) should be evidence enough that the plan has been well thought out and, indeed, executed competently by Russian military and civilian leaders.
That does not mean the plan will ultimately work, maybe the Russian government will collapse tomorrow, but the Russian successes so far and things being so "on edge" militarily and politically, is really abundant evidence that it was a rational gamble to make (if you have the kind of goals Putin has).
Quoting apokrisis
This idea seems just completely unsupported. Russia simply doesn't have the military manpower to push all the way into Poland and Romania anytime before these demographic changes happen anyways. Zeihan also doesn't explain how Russia would plan to deal with NATO and why nuclear weapons are not a better deterrent that preserves what younger generation you have ... which killing most of them in a war with NATO would be counter-productive to fixing demographic problems.
Quoting apokrisis
As has been discussed several times, Russia did not assemble a force remotely capable of occupying all of Ukraine and, from even before the war, offered extremely minimal peace terms compared to occupying all of Ukraine. Without occupying all of Ukraine there no way to go "onwards and upwards" in a military conquest of Eastern Europe.
Quoting apokrisis
This is just annoying. You start your post disputing my statement the Russian military has competent performance and planning given its achievements so far, but then seamlessly transition to Russia as the great bogeyman of Geopolitics capable of conquering nearly all of Eastern Europe.
You can't have it both ways, on the one hand ridiculing the Russian military capabilities and Putin's political acumen, but on the other presenting Russia as the doom of mankind that, if not stopped, will devour the whole world (or then at least Eastern Europe) somehow.
Quoting Benkei
This is what's so interesting about Zeihan, is that he brings up all sorts of interesting facts and history ... and somehow manages to weave a tale that reads like fiction.
There's so many assumptions in your post that it is fiction.
What propaganda?
Can you cite a single sentence of mine that is "propaganda" and not either plausible facts and premises or then reasoned argument from those plausible facts and premises.
For example, I stated a Ukrainian offensive or counter-offensive would not be possible with only small arms such as shoulder launched missiles, and these recent offensives utilised many armoured vehicles. A plausible assertion that proved true.
Another example, I've asserted there is no end to the war other than a negotiated peace that will require compromise, as there's no way Ukraine can defeat Russia and force a Russian surrender (Ukraine could win every battle in Ukraine and that is still not winning a war with Russia). No alternative to this view has even been presented.
I've even elaborated how NATO could have, before the war or even during the war, sent in ground troops and created a Cuban missile crisis style standoff and then negotiate a rapid resolution to the conflict (again, would require compromise), and made clear I would support NATO making such a move (if it worked) as that would have prevented the war and could have, and still could, end the war rapidly at any moment preventing further child suffering, death and trauma (my "constituency" in this fight).
That NATO has not provided Ukraine sufficient armament and training to defeat Russia in Ukraine, much less in Russia itself, is just obvious fact, with each weapons system drip-fed and provided only when previous weapons systems prove insufficient (after thousands of Ukrainian KIA and casualties demonstrate that empirically).
One can argue that the US should do this policy to "fight them there rather than here!" but that's obviously not a policy with Ukrainian interest in mind, but is to use Ukrainians to bleed the Russians.
As for the geopolitical realm of things: Russia has not collapsed, has not been abandoned by key allies, and economic hardship from the sanctions are changing governments in Europe and not Russia. These are facts.
Since my position is to support a diplomatic resolution of the war, and I've explained how this is done (minimum understanding of the Russian perspective in order to negotiate in the first place and then minimum compromise to reach a deal), I am not so interested in "just war arguments" (it could be Ukrainian cause is just ... just that they can't defeat Russia so it's relevant in terms of resolving the conflict now). However, I've also made clear I'm willing to debate who has just cause or then "more just cause", and I've asked questions that would start such a debate: such as how many Nazi's would be too many Nazi's (in order to evaluate that Ukraine does not reach this threshold of Naziness) and also a political theory in which US invading Iraq on pretext of bioweapons that weren't there was not-a-war-crime but Russia invading Ukraine and actually finding military bio-labs is a war-crime (or then make clear both are war crimes and doesn't matter if Iraq actually had WMD's or Ukraine actually has bio-weapons labs or not); i.e. is there a theory that US has just cause in its various wars but Russia does not have just cause for the exact same reasons? Of course, neither has just cause is also an acceptable position, but proponents to a moral theory about Russia should demonstrate how it applies to other cases, is the main point.
You're position basically boils down to the idea that pointing out Ukraine cannot defeat Russia (a critical factor in evaluating what to do; only a force destined to win need no diplomacy, such as the Russian defeat of the Nazi's the first time), but if you cannot force a capitulation then the options are diplomatic resolution or then no-end to the conflict ... or being eventually defeated yourself.
Of course, if the only practical option to end the war is diplomacy, and compromise will be needed for that, then every day Ukrainians fight on to support an uncompromising position is lives lost for nothing, for they are, under such conditions, not actually fighting to anywhere but merely "for Western values" -- aka. a symbolic gesture -- as Zelensky himself notes.
I thought this comment I read in a interview recently was very pertinent to @Olivier5's absurdity, he's talking about Paul Mason, but the point is the same...
Our opinions seem to be "important" to the point where they're relevant to their thread. Most discussions don't change the world but we still have them so this is a strange dismissal. We can also dismiss individual Ukrainian opinions because they don't get to decide and we can dismiss all their opinions as not really important because in the grand scheme of things this doesn't even register on the scale of the history of the universe. Doing this, we can make every opinion unimportant.
Either it's interesting to discuss the morality surrounding this war or it isn't. If it is, then my opinion on that matter is as important as yours. So I'd still would appreciate you to engage the earlier question. When is it no longer worth it to fight? (If you're familiar with the just war theory, this is an explicit consideration - does the war ultimately result in a better outcome than not fighting?)
I also love how the assumption is that when someone disagrees with you they are simply uninformed. I could say the same thing about you then. Haven't you read Mearsheimer and Kissinger? But of course I've read some of these exposés since @ssu is a proponent of them as well. I'm simply not convinced by them.
In what world does you coming up with a handful of sources become 'every analysis'?
Quoting Benkei
We live in a terrifying new world where one side has 'the facts' and the other 'disinformation' simply by fiat, and that such fiat happens to align with the interests of some of the most powerful actors in the global economy is apparently a coincidence.
Or instead, the FSB’s expensive network of political stooges were meant to ensure a swift and easy win. But - irony - corruption saw the money going into other pockets, Just as did the funds meant to keep the army’s tanks and trucks in serviceable shape.
Events have shown just how many miscalculations were involved in Putin’s “rational, well planned, limited aims” debacle.
But you can write your own history of the world.
Hyperbole seems the appropriate response for this low grade thread. :blush:
I get it, the rest of Western social media is just repeating whatever Ukrainian "officials" say unquestioningly, asking zero questions that might be critical of NATO or Ukrainian government policies, and taking some unimportant ground around Kharkiv is supposed to be some cathartic moment that means full victory and the war essentially over already, Russian lines disintegrating as we speak, Putin about to be assassinated etc.
It's a comfortable propaganda bubble for Zelenskyites to live in and it's necessary to guard this delusional state to simply repeat the propaganda here and believe that doing so makes it more credible, being posted to a "philosophy" debate forum and all ... rather than actually debate on a debate forum.
You do realise this is a Zelensky and co. complaint, that Russia took over Kherson and South-West Ukraine with hardly any resistance due to Ukrainian traitors taking bribes.
Hyperbole is absolutely the worst possible response in the world, there's literally no worse response, you couldn't think of a worse response if you tried. It's worse than murder.
This is definitely how I imagine things to be. Yes, we agree on this description of the situation.
Quoting apokrisis
Please, prey tell. How does the world really work?
Russia has just announced a partial mobilisation, calling up 300 000 reserves as reported by the BBC:
Quoting What does Putin mean by partial mobilisation?
Of course, Ukraine has been in total war, banning military age males leaving the country, and forcibly conscripting.
Why mobilise now and not before I think has a bunch of explanations. First, had Russia mobilised before the war then Ukraine would have mobilised and this was not necessarily an advantage to start the war. Why not mobilise after can be explained either because the Kremlin believed a negotiated settlement was possible or then for political and economic consequences of mobilisation outweighed the benefits. Definitely, mobilising during the first phase of the sanctions could have been economically disastrous.
Additionally, Russia has been holding off annexing new territories. Again, this could be explained due to a desire to negotiate or then for purely tactical reasons of either first wanting to conquer the territories concerned or then fearing a Ukrainian offensive during the annexation process. The timing now can be interpreted as either retaliation for the recent offensive or then simply it is now safe to conduct the votes if the offensives have stalled and it will take time for Ukraine to organise a new one.
Whatever the reasons, annexing the territories is the pathway of mobilisation to then defend Russian territory.
It is repeated on reddit a lot that Russian reservists and conscripts will be super low quality soldiers. This is debatable (especially in quality comparisons of Ukrainian reservists and conscripts), but likely calling up reservists allows more rotations of the professional army corp for offensive manoeuvres.
Of course, how this plays out politically, economically and militarily is not certain, but mobilisation is certainly a military advantage and the question would be to what extent along with the political and economic costs.
:yawn:
Two responses ... two emoticons.
If you're trying to express how deep and sophisticated your soul is ... I'm not sure this is the way to do it.
Well, a total defeat of Ukraine...which seems quite remote now, would only alarm more the eastern NATO members and put to existential threat a country like Moldova.
But still, losing Ukraine wouldn't start WW3.
Quoting ssu
Quoting Tzeentch
That it wasn't a serious effort?
The size of the attack and the use of paratroops to seize a central airport doesn't logically sound as a diversionary attack or feint. It goes totally against, actually the thing you mentioned, the Schwerpunkt-tactic. And what then was then the effort that was called Kyiv convoy, a 64km long convoy stuck there to do what? It wasn't a feint or diversion as the attacking forces were quite the same as the attacking forces attacking Kharkiv, which also wasn't taken. There the 1st Guards Tank army, the most powerful formation of the Russian army failed to take Kharkiv (and it's commander was sacked). Was that also a feint/diversion?
I think you should give some credible arguments that this operation was a feint or just a diversion.
Quoting Tzeentch
If I use the Occam's razor, that would be the answer. And I would add to that the fact that Russians ran also into unanticipated problems of their own: the armed forces were simply not ready for a giant war like this. There's simply too much anecdotal evidence of this, if we don't take listen to the general consensus that this operation didn't go well for Russia. Just like this brief encounter from the start of the war:
Where the Russians did succeed was in the south attacking from Crimea. I think these formations were from the South and had seen combat in Georgia/Chechnya, so they were also a bit better (and obviously the Ukrainians basically were defending the North and the East.
Quoting Tzeentch
As I quoted earlier a highly regarded Western think tank, they didn't believe that Ukraine could repel an attack towards Kyiv from the Russian armed forces just few months before it was tried. It's quite an apologist take to say that they really didn't try to take Kyiv.
This has been said over and over again, but facts don't win an argument. Yet I think it's important in this kind of thread that someone points out the facts. :up:
They really should try to hold talks. Unless they topple Putin from the inside, it is not wise to cage a tiger with no way out. It's pretty reckless. imo.
For a diversion to work, it must be believable. To tie up large amounts of troops requires real fighting.
The difference is simply that in an actual offensive the orders are to try to push through and get to various objectives, whereas in a diversionary fixing operation the orders are to push until enemy resistance is encountered and then minimise casualties.
Definitely there will still be casualties with a large manoeuvre intended to tie-up whole armies and there will still be commanders trying to do things as efficiently as possible, which may involve taking an airport.
And, no disputing that the idea outcome is Ukraine simply capitulate and accept the offered peace terms.
The debate has been between the idea that the entire operation in the North was some sort of failed attempt to storm Kiev or the first phase of conquering all of Ukraine. I.e. the "facts" you seem to laud against the propaganda of just calling everything Russia does incompetent.
Incompetence would have been not even getting out of Crimea ... and even then not necessarily incompetence but because Ukraine did the logical thing and blowup the bridges and heavily defended the coast.
Quoting ssu
Aka. the operations in the North meant they were unable to defend the South, the obvious military objective of creating a land bridge to Crimea that military analysts pointed out the Kremlin would be very much wanting to accomplish.
You basically lay out in your own words the logic of feinting / diverting / fixing / distracting, whatever you want to call it, operation in the North.
Zelensky has made his position clear that any compromise is rejected (at least right now).
As for running out of options, the current situation is not a military bad one for Russia: they still hold Kherson and the whole land bridge back to Donbas and Russia.
Best report I've seen into actual conditions on the front is this Washington Post article:
Quoting Wounded Ukrainian soldiers reveal steep toll of Kherson offensive - Washington Post
The whole article is insightful, but the above first-hand casualty reports should be concerning to anyone who thinks Ukrainian victory is "in the bag".
I assume that the sham elections will go as well as in Stalin's time, but the partial mobilization might be something more difficult. There simply should be an organization to mobilize the forces.
Quoting Manuel
Now the mobilization shows clearly what kind of failure this war has been to Russia. It's something like the Russo-Japanese war. And I think can easily have similar consequences as that war had.
My worst fear is that if the now held areas are "acquired" to be part of Mother Russia, Putin will use tactical nukes to "Escalate to De-escalate" and then cow the West to urge Ukraine to stop the war immediately however badly it is going for Russia.
Using one or two tactical nukes against Ukrainian field units wouldn't be extremely useful, modern brigades and combat teams are simply quite spread on the battlefield. But the public scare would be phenomenal. Naturally Putin's Russia would be even more of an outcast and China would reject the use of nuclear weapons. But if Putin can sell the illusion that Russia is under threat, he could do it. Otherwise now it's just useful to make threats about the use.
They do, but one cannot deny that Russia is under severe pressure - otherwise Putin would have not made his announcement today. Of course Ukraine has lost plenty in the war, but at the moment they are looking better militarily than a few weeks ago.
Yeah, it's of no use except to scare or cause an accident that will perish us all. But from his perspective, what is he to do? Admitting defeat is never an option for a nuclear power, national pride is worse than religion here.
Certainly pressure is high, no disagreement there. And definitely even partial mobilisation has a economic and political consequence, but my guess is that it's no longer as big a concern as mobilisation even a few months ago. Things that need alternative service and supplies to Western one's will have things worked out by now, and if not they can be foregone.
Quoting Manuel
This is debatable; these sorts of evaluations depend on casualties and material losses. There was certainly a much needed propaganda win, but for the terrain to be "worth it" the offensive needs to then continue into strategically critical locations, which does not seem to be happening.
The area around Kharkiv was a buffer zone on the flank to the strategically vital region of Donbas (what Russia claims the whole point of the war is about). However, Kharkiv itself was not in Donbas and losing the territory has pros and cons (one of which is there need not be a referendum in the Kharkiv region, which would be cynical motivation to abandon the region but politically and militarily convenient).
What or whose logic are you referencing when you say those things aren't logical?
Quoting ssu
A centre of gravity isn't a tactic, and there is no such thing as Schwerpunkt tactics. It's a military concept that describes the thing or a place a military force gains its strength from.
For example, one might claim the centre of gravity of the Ukrainian forces is the central communications and C&C hub in Kiev.
I disagree with that. I don't think at any point in this war the Ukrainian forces depended on Kiev to continue its operations.
Quoting ssu
Sounds like logistical congestion?
Friction (another Clausewitzian concept) is a typical occurence in war, and failures big and small will always occur in massive military operations.
Quoting ssu
Why would the same military force not be able to carry out the same two tasks?
A feint, a diversionary attack, an assault, etc. these are all standard military manoeuvres that units are able to carry out at all levels of command.
Quoting ssu
Quoting ssu
I can't look in your mind to see what you find credible. I've given you plenty of arguments already. If you're looking for simple explanations I can't help you there. War isn't a simple endeavor.
Quoting ssu
Anecdotal evidence is evidence that cannot be verified (and thus is easiliy construed). The video you shared isn't an anecdote - it's actual evidence, of two vehicles breaking down. That literally happens all the time, so I'm not sure why you believe it to be significant.
Quoting ssu
Don't try to make your sources more authoritative than they actually are.
An expert wrote that article, and experts are often wrong. And they were wrong this time. Nothing new under the sun.
You're trying to make it sound like this article constitutes some form of official statement by CSIS. This is clearly not the case. Here's another article from CSIS, written by the same author no less, from January 2022: Russia's Possible Invasion of Ukraine
Suddenly there is no mention of Kiev falling within six hours. In fact, the author states:
And he continues:
Sounds like a few months later your guy, Seth G. Jones - the one you keep pretending represents formal positions of CSIS - is supporting my argument, and not yours.
Do your research, don't be lazy, and don't try to make your sources more authoritative than they actually are. Thanks.
I think we're done here.
Yet, if the ONLY objective would have been to create that land bridge with Crimea and help the Donetsk and Luhansk Republics, you wouldn't have had the 1st Guards Tank Army attacking Kharkiv.
The simple fact is that your most powerful military formation is used where the Schwerpunkt of your assault is (meaning Center-of-Gravity). You don't use it as a diversion. The simple fact is that the Russia Army was (and is) actually small because the National Guard (340 000) and other troops not created for conventional war are so large compared to the Russia army (300 000). Just to look at the total strength of the armed forces simply hides this.
1st guards Tank Army was reformed in 2014. There's a prestigious history (but not so prestigious as to avoid dissolving it in the first place).
And even if it was "super elite" then, again, it can be part of the diversion to commit some elite troops so your counter parties think that's the real objective.
You have to invest for such an operation to work.
And, I would not disagree that the pressure on Kiev did not have as a first objective the capitulation of Kiev and accepting the offered peace terms, but clearly it's secondary objective was to then divert as much Ukrainian military potential to the North as possible in order to secure the land bridge and complete the siege of Mariupol.
Now, as to how probable the Kremlin or Russian generals thought the capitulation of Ukraine would be, I don't know. Likewise, even if the evaluated the probability of Ukrainian capitulation as low (lot's of reasons to believe Ukraine would fight) I have zero clue if they would have therefore not invaded. The war is going on since 2014 as you've recently noted, 2 agreements failed to resolve the conflict, so invasion maybe evaluated as needing to happen at some point or another, as Russia could not sustain the separatists indefinitely without regular troops invading which would mean official war with Russia itself (whatever they want to call it).
That they had a plan B does not mean that they thought plan B was likely, just that their planning obviously wasn't irrational. The thinking maybe "80% likely Ukraine will capitulate with this here plan A, and, if not, that's unfortunate but our best option in that case will be this here plan B". Or maybe they thought Ukraine capitulation was 20% likely but worth a try in case it worked, and if they are in anyways committed to the land bridge and taking the canal at Kherson then the whole plan makes a lot of sense (they did accomplish that); the offensive to establish the land bridge did work, of course winning a battle isn't winning a war.
And that is why I fear this option. I wouldn't underestimate the impact of a genuine "mushroom cloud" in videos and photos somewhere in the Ukrainian countryside. People would simply think that it would mean an escalation to a nuclear holocaust. Which it doesn't: Ukraine has no WMD ability. It gave away it's nuclear deterrent, something that Mearsheimer himself called a huge mistake (and where I agree with Mearsheimer).
Quoting boethius
I don't think we have here much of a disagreement.
Once when the "Race to the Capital" didn't succeed, the Russian commanders understood their weakness and withdrew from Kyiv and tried to reinforce other fronts with these units. It should be said that here Putin did follow what was reasonable in the military terms, but bad in political terms (as obviously the Ukrainians got a huge moral boosting victory). A more pigheaded politicians wouldn't have dared to disengage this way.
You're suggesting the FSB singlehandedly overturned military doctrine which is consistent both in NATO and Russia for decades that an offensive force to be successful needs to be at least 3 times larger than the defensive force to be successful more than half of the time and 5 times as large as a prepared, dug in defensive force. This seems highly unlikely even when it is likely that they misrepresented facts - but counting soldiers and material is the one thing that's basically freely available on the internet nowadays. As a result, I don't believe the goal was getting the entirety of Ukraine, because they didn't commit the manpower to hold it. That doesn't preclude a lot of things going wrong.
A successful blitz to Kiev still wouldn't have implied occupying Ukraine either and there I agree with @ssu, they did try. It probably would've led to a very short war with parts of Ukraine breaking out and joining Russia or some sort of federalist system and temporarily having a "pro-Russia" government in place. It would've been the "easiest" win and they failed at it and lost a lot of material in the process. But again, if you don't have the manpower to occupy the entire pro-Western part of Ukraine then I would sooner assume they didn't intend to occupy it than assume the FSB decides on how Russian forces are to be deployed.
You incorrectly infer that I think Putin is somehow infallible. My point is merely that your recent points are conjecture. That you can point to other people engaging into similar conjecture doesn't validate it and is in any event an appeal to authority.
Yes, as I've said before, if everyone here was pro-Russian I would make the case for the Ukrainians, in hopes of helping a negotiated peace.
Quoting ssu
This is an astute observation.
Ummm....assuming the forces are otherwise similar. Which they many times have not been.
Operation Desert Storm (1991 Gulf War)
US & Allied forces: 956 000
Iraqi forces: 650 000
Operation Iraqi Freedom:
US & Allies: 500 000+
Iraqi forces: 1 300 000 (theoretically), likely 500 000 active.
Russia could argue to itself that Ukrainians would be an inferior force compared to them. Let's not forget the huge military exercises that the Russian armed forces has done (that have been far larger than any NATO exercise). At least many Westerners thought this way when thinking of the superiority in materiel that Russia has enjoyed.
You really think that OIF wasn't an occupation?
May I remind you that US forces, if very few, are still in Iraq.
The thing is if he does drop one, even a so called "mini nuke", I don't see how NATO will not respond. They'd have to. But then that creates a self-feeding loop.
If they fired a nuke in the ocean somewhere close to Europe, that might be doable. But almost any scenario of nuke use will have consequences we can barely imagine.
Prior to the February 24th, the official line was "Finland faces no military threat".
Going from "no threat" to "no immediate threat" it is a bit uncomfortable. :sad:
I'd think the response would to increase the military aid. Have no limits like now.
I think the pressure to stop the fighting would certainly increase. You would see peace marches demanding the conflict to end. And that's basically what the "Escalate to de-escalate" strategy has as it's objective.
Furthermore, after being nuked, who the hell would condemn Zelensky for throwing in the towel if he goes for the immediate cease-fire on the lines that are held?
It could increase bravado from NATO. They can be accused of "cowering to Russia"-type rhetoric, which, don't get me wrong, is incredibly stupid, but exists and has be said a few times by more hawkish figures in the Republican party.
It's best to not see what would happen if such a scenario arose. But, there's not much we can do about it.
This is a lovely piece of spin, it should get some sort of award...
Russia will cow the west into getting Ukraine to stop the war (despite all that famous Ukrainian agency we hear so much about). Holding a strong enough position to force the whole Western world to do their bidding (whilst still incompetently losing, of course!). Whereupon the West (who are obviously still barely involved in this war) will nonetheless stop the war (the one they're barely involved in), in Russia's favour (who will still somehow will have lost though).
Fantastic, just what we've all been waiting for. A Ukrainian victory (negotiated between Russia and NATO, who are barely involved).
I think the prize should go to you by going so well along with the Kremlin line.
NATO isn't fighting in Ukraine, but it is surely (just as is the EU) supporting Ukraine. To put into context, the US has given aid to Ukraine since February until now I guess about 15 billion. The Ukrainian defense budget was last year I guess something like 5 billion dollars. And many NATO and still non-NATO countries (like mine and Sweden) are aiding Ukraine. And why not? Ukraine was an independent country attacked by Russia.
Yet for the US and Russia, this isn't anything new compared to the Cold War:
The fact is that the Soviet Union took part in the Vietnam war far more than NATO does now with Ukraine.
And yet even more, in the Korean war the Soviet Air Force and the US Air Force fought each other with both sides staying silent of it. (Actually the good performance of the MiG-15 and the Soviet pilots against the USAF made the Soviets to be complacent later during the Cold War.)
But feel free to regurgitate the Putin line here word for word: they aren't fighting Ukrainians, they are fighting to defend Russia from NATO aggression.
Perhaps it's best just to quote Putin himself:
See here
People who believe Putin and that Russia has been attacked by Ukraine/NATO, well, are crazy.
The Kremlin take an anti-NATO position. So if following the Kremlin's line is reprehensible, then you're basically saying that no-one can take an anti-NATO position.
The Kremlin are broadly opposed to Western governments. So if following the Kremlin's line is reprehensible, then you're basically saying that no-one can take a position critical of Western governments
It's an absurd position to take that any argument which is also used by the Kremlin must be avoided on pain of accusations of collusion. The Kremlin don't need to deal entirely in lies. Their enemies make sufficient moral and strategic errors to supply a reasonable flow of useful propaganda items. It's ridiculous to place all of that out of bounds just because the Kremlin are using it too.
But sure, if that qualifies as an occupation than Russia's aim was to occupy Ukraine and to then have an insurgency on their hands and unsuccessfully try whatever the Americans were also unsuccessful at.
I’m merely pointing out the widely reported view that FSB corruption saw funds diverted from creating a network of stooges. That was one more proof that Putin runs a rotting kleptocracy rather than anything resembling a competent superpower.
My error here was in not realising there is a whole bunch of you Putin apologists pushing the crackpot idea that all the Russian set-backs have been part of a grand plan to achieve very minimal invasion goals. Every reverse is a feint followed by a tactical regrouping.
You are welcome to your little circle jerk. Faced with crazies, one backs away
I have no trouble of being critical against NATO and the US especially when it came to the war in Afghanistan. That war was in every respect quite disastrous starting from the basic argumentation, which was actually far more insane than the Domino-theory of the Vietnam war: that we had to be in Afghanistan because otherwise it could be a safe haven for terrorists. The sheer stupidity of that line goes beyond my imagination. Then was the ludicrous implementation of the "War on Terror". I'm critical of my own government, when it came to that fiasco.
However in the case of Ukraine, it is different. And if you don't there is any difference, then it's quite useless to have a discussion about it. If you do notice a difference, meaning that a collective defense treaty is to you (as to me) quite different from invasions of Third World countries followed by nation building, then by all means we can continue.
The inability of many of these USA haters to see that former Soviet countries and East European countries were totally justified and rational to seek the protection from an collective Western defense organization from a revanchist Russia is so telling. Yes, my country has made it's application too with a sound majority of my people (including me) favoring this.That people downplay the imperial aspirations of Russia and just view NATO enlargement as the cause for this war is actually telling.
Quoting Benkei
They didn't actually leave. The "War on Terror" is still actually going on in Iraq. It just has been forgotten that some troops are still there.
(US troops in Iraq, 2022)
Quoting Benkei
I think it is beyond discussion(or debate) that Russia has imperial aspirations about Ukrainian territory as it is holding referendums to join more of the occupied territories to Russia. Annexation of territories and saying that they are an integral part of Mother Russia says the obvious to anybody with some understanding about history and the objectives of the people behind such talk.
:clap: :up:
Quoting ssu
Actually now this thread is far longer than the original Coronavirus thread, which started before the epidemic had become a global pandemic with lockdowns. It has now 267 pages and this one is on page 313.
My hopes didn't become reality, which is sad. :sad:
So I can criticise NATO, so long as that criticism agrees with yours. Got it.
Where have I argued this not to be the case?
Quoting apokrisis
That was not your argument. You had a whole shtick about Russian identity that was pure fiction. That's what I took issue with. The above seems accurate to me.
Quoting apokrisis
And where have I argued that? Your error is inferring arguments I'm not making.
Which is not what he's talking about. He's saying the West is pushing Ukraine to move military action into Russia (a bit unclear but I think he means Russia proper, excluding Ukrainian occupied land). Which is a lie. But the point he's making is that if that were to happen (the conflict moves until Russian soil), then he would authorise the use of nukes. It's literally in the text.
The interesting bit about the lie is that it actually opens the door that allows him to "lose" while maintaining face.
I provided sources. If you want to posture on the issue, then provide the sources that argue against these sources. Kindly put up or shut up
Quoting Benkei
Where have I claimed that anything you might have said reached the level of an argument. I’ve said exactly the opposite.
Anyone who claims Putin’s war is going to plan is rather hard of understanding. It makes no sense on any level. The incompetence is plain to see.
I don't need to provide sources when what you bring to the table aren't facts. The onus is in you to show the facts supporting your position. Merely offering up additional opinions that agree with you, aren't facts, and in any case I already pointed you to two other writers who hold different opinions. I've argued why I believe your position is a leap of faith based on the links you've provided. You're just dodging.
Quoting apokrisis
Blah blah. I have offered an argument, you simply choose to ignore it and then pretend I haven't. Whatever floats your boat I guess.
If you said yourself that it's a lie, then isn't believing a lie crazy?
Conquering territory from another country and calling it part of your country isn't the same as being attacked and defending the boundaries of your state that other countries have accepted to be yours. But for Putin, it is the same. Hence the need for those sham referendums in the occupied territories.
Quoting Benkei
You were comparing the US invasion of Iraq to the current events. Perhaps I didn't get your point. But the simple fact is that regime change and annexation of territories is a bit different. Yes, both are actions that Great Powers do (or try to do). However the latter is quite classical imperialism, whereas the former is more of neo-colonialism. As we can see from the case of Iraq, that regime isn't playing so well anymore to the tunes of the US. And in case of for example Serbia (where the US successfully assisted on regime change), it isn't an ally to the US but basically a friend of Russia.
Quoting Benkei
Crimea, Donetsk and Luhans are all occupied territories. Which Putin has said are part of Russia, basically. So that's my worry about him "defending Russian territory" with nukes.
*again, for me this is not at any cost, which never seems a worry for most supporters.
Blah, blah, blah. Wake me up when you have sources to back up your opinions.
What sources could possibly back up the claim that you are presenting opinion as fact? Such a claim only requires a rational analysis of the type of proposition you're making and the nature of the sources you're using. It doesn't require sources itself, it's not that sort of claim.
What's happening here is just lazy partisanship in place of debate and I think it's a social change that needs resisting as it undermines the status of experts and if we no longer trust in experts then all that's left is populism.
I think that's right, but one can, perhaps, speak sanely about those practices which lead to a promulgation of war and those which work to limit it?
Part of the problem I was trying to describe is that the partisan division of all who are not 'with the Ukrainians' as being 'with the Russians' means that such conversations, which I think are important, can't take place. If one cannot criticise the behaviour of one side without being treated as if one must thereby be on the other, then all we have left is the "insanity" of two warring sides.
As I said, I only repeated standard wisdom about Russian national identity and how that stems pretty obviously from the problems of defending a sprawling empire composed of many ethnicities on a vast exposed plain.
And I posted specific sources showing how Putin was invoking this worldview as justification for his series of ever more ambitious military adventures.
If you believe these are fictions, then get busy with the debunking. :up:
Many don't understand the fact that Russia is a colonial power, because it had no oceans to cross when it invaded new territories. Yet the fact is that Central Asia or the Caucasus aren't part of Russia proper, but were linked to it like parts of Africa were linked to European imperial powers. And basically similar meddling is done now by Russia as France still exerts in some of it's former colonies (not all).
Nobody in Austria believes that the Austro-Hungarian Empire can rise again. In the Nordic countries, even if the states are in very good terms with each other, nobody is calling for the restoration of the Kalmar Union. In Russia it's different. The way to "make Russia great again" is through restoring the territory that formerly it held. Not things like improve the industries and education etc.
The idea of Russian is still quite close to what it was as an Empire and this is the real problem. I think the reason is that the Soviet Union collapsed peacefully, hence people like Putin think it was simply a mistake. A mistake that can be repaired. Yet it wasn't an unfortunate mistake. It's like a divorce: you cannot just assume that after having a divorce, in some time things will get back as they were and you will marry again.
The idea of Russia has been captured and dominated by an ugly cabal of jingoist thugs, who are used as a tool by the kleptocracy which rules Russia.
What could possibly debunk them? They are someone's opinion about the intent behind Russian foreign policy, what do you expect me to debunk? That in fact no-one has such an opinion?
There are no facts there to debunk, that's the point. It's someone's opinion about the motivation for events. The events are facts, the theory about what motivates them is opinion. I can't see how you're not getting that distinction.
By Florence Aubenas, Kupyansk, Le Monde
Posted today at 2:00 p.m.
The capture by Kiev's troops of this northeastern Ukrainian city, a railway hub, had initially seemed a foregone conclusion. But it remains close to the front line.
It was a small town in the far east of Ukraine, discreet and charming, with two factories, 27,000 inhabitants and a river. In February, the Russian invasion turned Kupiansk into a strategic point, now marked in red on the staff maps. A railway junction on the border of the two countries, the town had become the gateway for the supply of Russian troops to the northern front of the Donbass, the limits of which begin barely 20 kilometers away.
In the autumn rain, the Ukrainian counter-offensive has just planted its flag in the town's main square. "The Kharkiv region is 94% under our control and the reconquered area is almost completely cleared," says a Ukrainian deputy commander of a base near Izium, nicknamed "Diver". That "almost" makes all the difference. Around Kupiansk, Russian soldiers continue to fight bitterly, while they have quickly retreated elsewhere. The official Ukrainian visits that were supposed to celebrate the victory there are postponed from day to day.
Near the town hall, residents remember that the city fell without a shot at the start of the Russian invasion. “This will avoid destruction,” argued the mayor, elected from a pro-Kremlin party, welcoming the occupants with docility. The strategic position of the city quickly erected it into a Russian administrative and military base in the region. All the signs of a planned annexation seemed in place: propaganda posters, open registrations to obtain a Russian passport, distribution of telephone chips or payment of a bonus to pensioners. Only Russian TV channels were allowed.
Dmytro, a mechanic, regularly took one of the two daily shuttles to the nearby Russian Federation. There, finding work seemed easier to him. Today, in Kupyansk, passersby who see him talking to us walk away from him, faces closed, hostile and frightened at the same time.
On a camping table, Galina sells pasta, shampoo, matches. Both rubles and hrynvia (Russian and Ukrainian currencies) are accepted. "It was calm with the Russians," she said. "No one was against it," Dmytro continues, raising his voice over the noise of the fighting in the vicinity.
Viktor Pripouta, a farmer, intervenes: “That is false. And Mikola? Do you remember Mykola?" A pro-Ukrainian veteran from Donbass, Mykola was loaded into an armored vehicle after organizing a demonstration of 150 people against the occupiers. It was the first and last event of its kind. To avoid discussion, Galina turns her head away. Uncertainty can be read in her eyes: are the Russians really defeated for good? Who knows how the situation will turn out?
“On television, I saw…” begins Dmytro. The farmer cuts him off: “To find out what's going on, I look out the window, not the television."
With the counter-offensive, the city is now on the front line. No water, no electricity, no gasoline, shops looted. An old lady has been dead for four days, the smell is unbearable. There are no more ambulances or firefighters to evacuate the body. In the streets, the noise of the fighting draws closer.
A car has just parked, marked "humanitarian aid". From everywhere, people come running with used plastic bags, even the older ones who are hobbling around. But when the distribution begins, a bomb falls with a bang on a nearby block of houses. A second one crashes even closer. Part of the crowd makes a sudden U-turn to take cover, while the other continues to rush towards the distribution. We collide without a word or a shout, terror and misery thrown against each other in a chilling silence.
Today, Kupiansk is all the more strategically important as the Ukrainian counter-offensive advances towards Donbass. Huge military convoys are driving south, some heading towards Donetsk, others towards Luhansk. Each battalion is displaying its war trophies, Russian machines seized during the last fighting and triumphantly stamped with the arms of the victors. But the proximity of the Russian border, 15 kilometers away, obviously complicates the recapture of the city. "Our enemies can continue to mass troops on their side of the border," explains a Ukrainian officer in a base in the region.
He took part in the battle of Balaklyaya, a city twice as big as Kupiansk, 70 kilometers away. However, it fell almost by itself, like most of the liberated territories in the region. "We have noticed that Russian soldiers retreated easily when left without a command," the officer continued. "In Balaklyaya, we began by locating and decapitating the headquarters." According to him, the Russian soldiers were then surrounded in large groups, and then attacked. "They were caught without fighting," he rejoices.
As if to whip up the ardor in Kupiansk, President Zelensky posted a photo of a bombed-out square in the city on September 19 with the caption "Our Kupiansk," calling for the return of "order and civilization."
Among the soldiers, they discuss Vladimir Putin's speech, who has just announced a partial mobilization in Russia. "It can change very quickly with them, but we are ready," says one. All in the glory of the counter-offensive, the troops compare their enthusiasm with the pessimistic signs of the adversaries. Glib, a 23-year-old fighter, says he saw on social networks that young Russians from Belgorod, on the other side of the border, about 50 kilometers away, are trying to flee to avoid being drafted.
After the liberation of the town, massive numbers of requests for leave for September 1 were discovered in the Russian command post.
Suddenly, the ringing of Glib's telephone stops the triumphant speeches. He silences the others with great gestures. It is the University of Kharkiv calling him for his online entrance exam. The voice, sounding as if from another world, announces an immediate test in Ukrainian grammar. "If the questions are too difficult, you tell them you don't have network," whispers a colleague. And Glib, looking suddenly serious: "Hey, if I don't get a degree, what will I do after the war?"
If you take all the people who have done their military service in the last five years, you are talking roughly about two million men (and some women). Yet just to retrain and arm 300 000 is not at all easy thing for Russia. Russia has not had any kind of system for reservists and for their refresher training. Hence it's going to take some time.
So why are posters here wanting to deny it?
Are you nuts? The fact is that the view is held and shared as justification for the current actions. The fact is Putin actually says it, even if we can debate how much he really believes it.
All national identities are in some sense fictions. But it ain’t a fiction that all nations have some coherent sense of self that arises from their histories and geopolitical realities. How could it be otherwise?
It is odd that you and others seem so flustered that this context might be openly discussed. What’s going on there? :chin:
And he says it while doing fist bumps with the head of the Russian Orthodox church. If the intention was substantially different from what was stated, the erasure of Ukrainian identity is a lot of collateral damage.
I figure Occam can keep his switch blade in the pocket on this one.
Who's denying that the view is held and shared as justification for the current actions? People hold all sorts of views. Hell, I could probably find someone who thinks Putin is the head of the lizard men. So some people think Russia's foreign policy is driven by imperialist expansionism. Others don't.
The question was why you want to paint those that do as prophets and those that don't as lunatics. Both views are held by experts in their field. The discussion is one in academic articles. What's obscene is this modern attempt to weaponise ostracism for your own political gain. We exclude quacks and lunatics from serious discussion because they are unqualified to take part. We don't exclude perfectly qualified academics because we don't like what they've got to say... or at least we didn't used to, but I suppose I'm too old fashioned for the new discourse.
Great. You will have no problem providing expert sources arguing the opposite then. Look forward to it.
Quoting Isaac
Maybe it’s you and Benkie that are emotionally invested here. So you project a lot.
It's far too annoying for many that sometimes the US President and elite can utter something that is totally right and justified. As if that makes somehow the criticism about other issues less valuable.
Just look at what people said on this thread before February 24th. The time when the US was saying that Russia was going to attack Ukraine starting from page 2. Just to take it in the most obvious and clearly stated comment:
Quoting Streetlight
For some, everything bad comes from the US and only this should be said. Period.
Hence talking about Russia, the idea of Russia or what Putin thinks about Russia is meaningless.
Poor SX just seem go off his head eventually.
[i]Max Seddon (Moscow), Polina Ivanova (Berlin), Ben Hall (Kyiv)
Financial Times
Sep 21, 2022[/i]
And as we know, not all Russians support this. Haven't for a time as many have fled to places like Georgia even before this mobilization. That the Russian National Guard has more troops than the Russian Army ground forces tells you something just what Putin is afraid of. (National Guard is for domestic safety, previously been Ministry of Interior troops)
Still, the fact is that enough do support Putin. Even if that might be changing.
Every nation has it's ardent "Trump supporters". If there is a Trump around and in power.
Jesus.
That’s something the Vexler video covers. But of course sound bites win over analysis in your world.
Jesus yourself, Benkei!
How many Belarussians love their leader? Not a lot, but he is still in power. Are there Turks that don't like Erdogan? Sure, but he is in power also. Must there be someone that is OK with their leaders in both countries? Naturally.
There is absolutely no contradiction in that official Russia is, and Putin and his followers are imperialistic and that in the same time there are Russian who are against the war in Ukraine and who don't want to participate in that war.
I don't understand how you can see a contradiction there. I've met enough Russians who aren't for Putin to know that.
Meanwhile back in the real world….
Some arguments are so vacuous a single sentence suffices to waylay them.
Yep, you’ve got nothing, have you. Just a lot of anger and frustration. No rational reply. No sources to back you up.
Your man Putin says it out loud in public and … nothing. Just more insults.
By "cracking down on it" you mean restarting the war against the Chechens? That is totally in line with the imperialist cause. Putin obviously tolerates minorities, as long they don't want to separate from the Empire. That is natural for an Empire.
And making "sweeping claims" "based on a few speeches"?
How about actions and implemented policy, Benkei?
Starting from the annexation of Crimea.
It isn't just rhetoric. I think moves like that (annexation of Crimea and the ongoing war) put the counterarguments to the "sweeping claims" category.
we're not talking about Putin, we're talking about "Russian identity". I'm resisting that idiotic sweeping generalisation.
I've provided plenty of sources throughout my contributions, but on this particular issue (the motivation behind Russian foreign policy) there's academics like Daniel Treisman, experts such as Fyodor Lukyanov, Andrei Tsygankov, Richard Sawka, Marie Mendras...
But I'm not getting into this ridiculous shifting of the burden of proof here. If you're seriously making the claim that all academics believe imperialist ambitions drive Russian foreign policy, then you are making by far the more extraordinary claim for which you've yet to provide a single source.
So, in return. I look forward to hearing your sources to back up your claim...
Well, do notice that I have emphasized, many times now, that I am talking about the identity that official Russia has, and what Putin and his followers cherish. It is an imperial identity, if you think of it for a moment. Fortress Russia. A Zapadnik might hold other views, but Zapadniks are not in power in Russia.
Yes, Putin is a politician. I assume that Ernst Röhm was a devoted Nazi and totally in line with the ideology of the party, yet for 'some reason' Hitler killed him.
Nationalism, or basically jingoism, works for Putin. Yet if the Soviet Union would be still around, I guess KGB officer Vladimir Putin would be devoted still to that cause. Again, there's no contradiction.
Of course there is. If Putin is an opportunistic politician who uses imperialist rhetoric when it suits his ambitions, then all your speeches prove is that at the time of the speech the political landscape was such that imperialist language would help cement Putin's position (or at least, he thought as much). So any analysis of the motivations behind the recent invasion can't be assessed on the basis of past speeches as if they were indicators of a consistent motive, having just established that they were most likely reactionary and Machiavellian.
You can't, on the one had, claim his speeches give us a window into his foundational motives then on the other admit that he just says whatever he thinks is going to work best at the time.
Simply because even when Putin says it himself, you still can’t admit being wrong. :cool:
Putin has been struggling against nationalists for at least ten years. In the Russian context he’s centre-right, and wants to neutralise opposition from the left and the right, either by direct repression or appeasement.
This doesn’t contradict his use of nationalist rhetoric, but note that his variety of nationalism is opposed to the extreme ethnic nationalism that characterises his right-wing opponents. He’s always been careful to prevent anything that risks a breakup along ethnic lines.
But right now, extreme nationalist opposition to Putin is quite vocal in Russia, and is tolerated perhaps partly because it currently serves the aggressive aims of the regime, but maybe also because the regime will seem reasonable and moderate to the bulk of the population, who are not extreme nationalists.
Stating the obvious: Putin’s allergy to extreme nationalism does not imply that he and his regime are not imperialist or do not reject Ukrainian nationhood. Even more obvious: I am not defending Putin. The main point is that Benkei’s quote about nationalism doesn’t contradict apokrisis or ssu.
Ahh, so now Putin's actual words are indicators of motive. Great, then we have our answer. Here's why he chose to invade Ukraine.
Or is it just some of the things he says that matter now. The things you pick.
Quoting apokrisis
…which means that my point was about how Russia is expansionist as a geographic necessity. And that then has become an enduring identity because of the way history keeps repeating. Invasions keep happening.
Russia must form some kind of multiethnic federation of client states all the way across the steppes to have defensible borders and ocean access. That is the perennial geopolitical context and it generates the justifications needed to pursue the goal. It breeds an enduring mindset.
Quoting Jamal
Yes. We would hope Putin is still the calculating spook figuring out some workable arrangement to achieve natural security and economic goals. And that he either bangs on about neonazis or imperial Russia depending on what works best with a particular audience.
But a lot of the commentary is that he seems to actually believe in Eurasianism and suchlike these days. He takes things personally and acts erratically. That makes it much harder to figure out accomodating deals and is making Europe pretty certain Putin will continue in reckless fashion.
Quoting Isaac
Can you cite some actual argument he makes that makes your point explicit? Both you and Beckie are remarkably coy on quoting sources or indeed detailing a counter position in any way.
What article by Treisman do you have in mind?
I’ve found it difficult to tell. Vlad Vexler—who you linked to above and whose videos I think are pretty good—plausibly says no, Putin has no ideological commitment to that stuff; he just wants more territory (that he genuinely believes that acquiring Ukrainian territory is in some sense defensive is beside the point here, incidentally).
National identity is nothing more than propaganda, surely. 'We' 'Brits' are 'very sad' because 'our' 'beloved Queen' has died. For fuck's sake! I've been told this 24/7 for 10 days so it must be true, and has become true because anyone can cry over a sentimental film.
"Still, what’s unlawful is not always impossible"
Can also just be made legal tomorrow.
However, in discussing Russian draft dodgers relevant to the situation, should be kept in mind there are draft dodgers on the Ukrainian side and also USA had plenty draft dodgers last time they drafted people.
There's few historical instances of draft dodging actually affecting a war much.
People leaving Russia is perhaps more relevant economically speaking, but so much intellectual work is done via computer and at a distance these days. Large bulk of Russians are simply unable to leave economically speaking, and many that do may continue the same economic contribution as before, managing their business or app development or engineering consultancy at a distance. Generally speaking, "brain drain" has never actually collapsed an economy.
Apparently, when asked Putin simply said "let them leave" basically, so otherwise-trouble makers leaving could be a net benefit in the circumstances.
Although maybe you have different opinion on the affects of professional class people leaving Russia.
Then add to it "Russian national identity", if it's so puzzling to you what I'm talking about.
Because we aren't talking about Russian cuisine, which I love btw, which also has a part in the Russian Identity.
At the moment seems Ukrainians are trying to make a breakthrough into Luhansk region, where they are currently occupied a small portion around the edge, and, while this is going, on Russians are trying to take Bakhmut and have advanced to the river there.
We will see today and coming days if Bakmut falls and Luhansk line is defended, or then vice versa (or nothing changes much).
Of course, the most significant thing happening today is the referendum votes to join Russia.
This is (presumably) a legal point of no return for the Russians where they must after the votes (assuming the result we're all assuming) be fully committed to not only defend the current territory but also take the rest of these regions.
Up until now the Russians have been threatening to do this if Ukraine refuses the offered peace terms of accepting annexation of Russia, autonomy in some sense of Donbas within Ukraine (they declared some sort of independence, but could still rejoin Ukraine presumably; certainly much easier than if they formally join Russia).
It's difficult to imagine the Russians doing these votes without the military confidence to defend the territory, that the failed attempts to take Kherson may have provided, at least in the short term.
However, NATO can always provide whatever support is needed to win battles (in my opinion) and likely the Russians as well. NATO could provide f-16 (or even f-35 if it wanted to), missiles of all kinds and more HIMARS trucks, western tanks and other armoured vehicles, more artillery etc. Training is always a concern but that's just a matter of time.
Which could explain the conversation immediately transitioning into nuclear weapons.
If Russia is committed to defend this territory then nuclear weapons maybe the only means to do so if NATO provides enough military assistance to Ukraine.
Diplomatic resolution of the conflict seems remote at this point (due to NATO's policy to undermine and scuttle all diplomatic efforts), leaving NATO with the options of frozen conflict (support Ukrainians enough to defend, eventually lose all the regions that have been annexed and then a front stabilises) or then go on the offence.
However, after these votes escalating the conflict with more weapons and more weapons systems really does seem now will be met with nuclear weapons at some point.
It's possible NATO wants that to happen for long term reasons (make the world a more dangerous place and thus US more relevant to the West as top dog), but it's unclear how NATO would be able to respond to the use of nuclear weapons. NATO may see the long term benefit to the arms industry of the use of nuclear weapons, basically a forever wet dream, but an impossible short term situation to navigate militarily or diplomatically. I honestly don't see any other option other than do nothing. Therefore, I find it likely US / NATO will not escalate even if US they would really, really want Russia to use nuclear weapons (other members of the alliance may simply not be willing to go along with it if there's no coherent military or diplomatic plan to deal with the scenario).
If there is no significant escalation now from NATO, it seems likely to me that autumn will slow the front down and Russians will conduct their offensives in the winter. We'd then see in the spring EU's appetite for further escalation.
There is no contradiction, if you read the above. It's not a wavering opportunist speaking, this comment from 2005 (I think) shows clearly the way how Putin has thought all his reign.
Which, of course, is absolute nonsense and should be remarked as it.
I've heard that the voting will be done "online". So no reason even to stage people for this theater. The Crimean elections, and then there was genuine support for the annexation, had to be orchestrated as likely free and fair voting wouldn't have got the results needed (even if there was a substantial amount of yes-votes).
Nonsense?
Obviously these votes will basically exclude the possibility of any negotiated settlement with Ukraine.
Doesn't matter if you think the votes are legitimate, or fraudulent, or whatever; it's the most significant thing happening today (in the war in Ukraine) and, presumably if the votes conclude as basically everyone expects, results in a dramatic shift in Russian policy.
Again you can disagree with this change in Russian policy, or argue it's counter productive, and obviously you can argue you don't accept the annexation, but it's obviously a significant fact that it is (presumably) changing along with partial mobilisation.
Whether you lend these regions any legitimate power of self determination (such as Kiev demands for itself, and "right to join NATO!" was a rallying cry to reject the offered peace terms for weeks) or then you do lend them that but claim the votes are fixed, or then have some nuanced approach to self determination and democracy that mean some votes matter but not others, doesn't change the fact that these votes are currently happening and have a dramatic impact on Russian policy and the military and diplomatic situation.
In the short term at least. NATO would need to essentially abandon entirely Ukraine for there to be a negotiate peace now, barring some super diplomatic surprise no one expects.
However, it's difficult to imagine NATO entirely abandoning Ukraine so the only likely options seems to be frozen conflict or then escalation to nuclear conflict (limited or large scale).
I suppose there's a third option that NATO truly believes Russian state will simply disintegrate and that would be a manageable thing. But this claim is made repeatedly since the very beginning of the conflict and does not seem any more evidence for it now; of course could happen, but seems to me will result in use of nuclear weapons, but if limited and doesn't prevent Russian state disintegrating maybe US / NATO views that as a good process to be welcomed, no matter how many nuclear weapons are used on Ukrainians on the way down.
Naturally, if the hypothesis about Russian "identity" is correct, it seems exceedingly implausible there would be some large scale revolt enough to destabilise the Russian state. Far weaker states have seen far greater disruption and protest and revolt and not collapsed. The only recent examples are caused by direct intervention (like bombing everything in Libya that could potentially support something that could potentially support something that could fly) or then entirely running out of money as with Sri Lanka. Even massive support to proxy forces (without direct bombing) was not enough to collapse the Syrian government. So, this idea of Russian state collapse seems remote to me.
I'm referring to his 2016 Essay in Foreign Affairs on why Putin took Crimea, but that's not relevant. If I make the claim "all men over 50 have grey hair" it's not acceptable proof for me to provide a couple of grey-haired men and say "find me one that doesn't then". That is proof that some men over 50 have grey hair, not proof that all men over 50 have grey hair.
You made a claim about the motivation behind Russia's foreign policy that it was universally held to be imperialist, or motivated by a desire to secure soviet borderlines. You made that claim so boldly as to suggest anyone thinking otherwise was not even to be taken seriously, a lunatic, motivated by deep psychological issues. Such a claim would be supported (short of you providing the works of every academic in the field), by either some kind of statistically significant sample, or by citation from someone expert in the matter making such a claim themselves. You've provided neither, you've just made a wildly unsupported claim about the prevalence among foreign affairs analysts of a particular interpretation with absolutely no support given at all, and then you attempt to shift the burden of proof on anyone who disagrees with you.
If you want to claim that such a position is universal, then provide us with some evidence that such a position is universal.
Oh, and I can't believe I'm having to say this, but given @ssu's latest offerring...the fact that it seems to you that such opinions are universal is not evidence that such opinions are in fact universal.
I've read the above. It sounds like a wavering opportunist speaking. Now what? I'm consigned to the looney bin because I disagree with your interpretation?
I don't know how to break it to you any more gently than this, but the way things seem to you to be is not always the way things actually are.
However, what is getting less attention is nuclear sabre rattling from Western leaders:
This interview is just insanely bizarre.
I paraphrase, but basically:
Question: You've been ordered to annihilate the earth how do you feel? (As framing of the question is she has no other choice than to launch nuclear weapons for some reason, and the result is definitely world annihilation ... caused by her next actions, not some ongoing process that, why not, let's go out with a bang)
Liz Truss: I feel great, I launch, it's an important duty of the Prime Minister (... to annihilate the world when ordered to do so?!?!).
The whole interaction makes zero sense, and the crowd goes wild!
Are you not entertained!!
But props to the British for managing to find someone even more of a loose cannon than Boris.
Well thanks, but it wasn't us, and it wasn't even grassroots Conservatives, who were given the choice of madwoman of no fixed opinion, or millionaire bloody foreigner, and chose the homegrown disaster because they are majority racist.
She doesn't say how she feels about it though.
Oh, I understand, but, still, the leader of the country is certainly in some sense a collective effort over several generations.
It is honestly surprising to me that she's even more extreme in her rhetoric that Boris, but it's often said this is an overcompensating feminine perceived weakness, so we'll see what her policies actually are.
Quoting Benkei
That part I lift from her general demeanour of smiling and upbeat "nuclear-woke", get-things-done, courageous keep-calm-and-carry-on attitude.
She doesn't even say a preamble that the nuclear strategy is a pretty big state secret, very serious, that she'd of course do everything possible to avoid nuclear war, but if for some reason it was the only option available etc. ... and she would feel "something" before killing hundreds of millions of people.
Just so weird.
Why are they doing an emotion inquisition? And why was she given orders to do it? Isn't she the commander in chief?
You tried narcissist - why not upgrade to psychopath?
Unfortunately for Russia, the front has not remained still. There was a large break through across the Oskil, and the flow of liberation announcements and geolocated abandoned vehicles is reminiscent of the recent breakthrough on the other side of the river.
Time will tell how serious it is. Another serious breakthrough and encirclement would suggest the poor morale that lead to the prior rout remains a serious issue, and newly mobilized forces are unlikely to change that (particularly those BTGs made from criminals or those arrested for protesting mobilization). You might see something akin to the disintegration of the Third Corps, who were worse than useless, essentially just handing over hardware to the enemy.
This area needs to hold at some point because further south you run into a series if rail hubs that serve as the main ground lines of communications for the Russian front. If these are severed the war is effectively over.
It is sort of mind boggling that they continue to use their limited resources on an offensive effort that has stalled for months now instead of reallocating combat forces north to avoid disaster. My guess is that this is a consequence of the split command and infighting that has been ruinous for Russian decision-making from the begining.
And things don't seem to be going well in the south either. The increasing volume of Ukrainian air strikes suggests Ukrainian SEAD efforts have been successful in degrading Russian AA capacities. CAS is probably the thing Ukraine would most benefit from given the nature of the fighting there, and they now seem able to provide it. I would have called the prospect of Ukrainian air strikes to support an advance very doubtful just a month ago, but the AGM-88s somehow jerry-rigged to work on MiGs actually seem to be working. I think this just goes to show that in a modern context AA without effective missile defense is not going to cut it.
The combat there is less about some major breakthrough, and more about if Russia can deny Ukraine key firing positions that will totally cripple their already flagging ability to supply forces there. Either the forces around Kherson will hold the critical ground, or I expect it will fall apart all at once. Potentially a Dunkirk type situation since there are not many ways to pull back either.
I'd say poor leadership, poor coordination, and morale is their biggest issue. If I was them I'd be focusing on unifying the command and boosting morale through rotations. Better leadership alone would help morale. If you have bad leadership and this (https://nitter.it/visegrad24/status/1573303078685753344#m) is what your meetings for mobilized men look like, you'll just have larger routs. Also, two weeks training is wholly inadequate.
I literally say this:
Quoting boethius
So I completely agree that:
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
As I also mention, while the Ukrainians are trying to make a major breakthrough into Luhansk, Russians are trying to take Bakhmut, and literally state:
Quoting boethius
So we agree.
Definitely Russia is under military pressure or they would not have withdrawn from Kharkiv, not shutoff the grid for the first time, and not called up 300 000 reserves in a partial mobilisation.
And before anyone interjects, yes, they clearly had a contingency plan in place to withdraw from Kharkiv, shutoff the grid, and also bomb the damn in Kherson river, doesn't mean they "wanted those offensives to happen" just means they clearly had a plan in place as otherwise their response would not be immediate.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I'm not so convinced of the morale argument. There's morale issues in every army and general mood never stays constantly high. There has been serious morale issues on the Ukrainian side as well.
As for the current battle in Luhansk, I don't think it's really possible to tell what's likely to happen at a distance.
Definitely time will tell if the Ukrainians can continue their offensive deeper into Luhansk.
What I can say is that reports seem pretty consistent that Ukrainians are suffering heavy casualties in these offensives, so it could be that Russian operations are in disarray or they are simply letting these offensives exhaust themselves to inflict maximum casualties.
Anyone interested in the military analysis part, an important footnote is that Russian doctrine is literally to tactically retreat as much as possible, hit the advancing army with artillery and other long range munitions, make them go through mine fields, and stretch their supply lines, so this is what they train to do. Russian military trains this way because Russian territory is pretty big so their basic idea is to run around and exhaust any invading force and not risk armies in decisive battles.
So, except for strategic locations where we are sure Russians are committed to defending (such as Kherson, Crimea, Donbas) it's extremely difficult to tell the difference between a tactical retreat and just being straight-up defeated. To evaluate these non-critical changes in the front we'd need to know the statistics of losses. Anecdotes don't tell us very much as we'd need to know the whole circumstances and result of the battle to evaluate things.
And when I point this out it is because I genuinely don't know. I do not know the current state of neither the Ukrainian army nor the Russians. Things could be a lot better or worse than they seem on both sides, or then suffering from exactly the same problems.
Onwards and upwards I guess.
Wheel of progress never stops.
Yeah, I was just referring to the fact that the major breakthrough started hours ago. It appears they are no longer trying for a break through, but have accomplished it and the encirclement of a lone BTG on the other side of the river.
The larger efforts at taking Bakhmut have been ongoing since July, and a significant advance up from the south in that direction hasn't occured since early May. That's why it seems like a poor use of resources given other priorities.
You don't abandon 10+ command vehicles, warehouses full of ammunition, extremely scarce counter battery radars and EW vehicles, and multiple years worth of your prior annual tank production for defense in depth...
Even assuming all this is true and will result in encirclement of a BTG, this is still not what I would call a major strategic victory of penetrating deep into Luhansk. Most of river is still in Kharkiv region.
There were reports of units being encircled but then rescued in Kharkiv.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Who's to say what the priorities are. It could be poor use of resources, or then maybe Russian military is content with trading Bakhmut for some space in Luhansk. A lot of youtube analysis presents Bakhmut as some critical strategic location (though I have no idea if that's true).
Of course, maybe Ukrainians defend Bakhmut and advance into Luhansk, or maybe they trade or maybe something else happens.
However, for certain Russian commitment to defending all of Luhansk is very high, so if advances continue there beyond the edges then that is a strong signal Russian forces have a big problem.
If things stay on the edges, then it could be Russian forces simply implementing their doctrine of tactical retreats to inflict maximum casualties (of course, suffering some losses also in the process).
Russian commanders know too that it's a symbolic victory for Ukrainians to get back some of Luhansk territory, so instead of suffering high casualties to prevent that they could pull back knowing Ukrainians will then poor in troops to get that symbolic victory and then keep advancing for a real strategic victory. It very much depends on the casualties and losses on each side, until there is clear strategic locations taken.
Definitely continuing to advance in Bakhmut could be a false show of confidence, or then good strategy, or misallocation of resources as you say. I have no way to evaluate that from the information available now.
However, as I said weeks ago, taking Kherson would be a litmus test for Ukrainians offensive capabilities.
Now, knowing Russia is committed to Kherson, it's of course possible to develop some higher level thinking strategy of an offensive in Kharkiv and Luhansk instead.
My basic criticism of such a strategy is simply that Kharkiv and Luhansk are very close to the Russian border and don't threaten the land bridge. Cutting the land bridge and then blowing up the bridge to Crimea is what I would be worried about as a Russian general, and that doesn't seem to be threatened in these current offensives. So, maybe unfortunate loss of territory (that certainly no general wants to see) but does not seem pressure on critical military positions (but rather mostly political optics). Kharkiv and Luhansk are also the easiest places to re-conquer as they are so close to the Russian border.
The other data point is that certainly Russian generals were worried during the initial Kharkiv offensive (even if they ordered a withdrawal, things can still get out of hand), and so they ordered the strikes on the electricity grid.
I assume they would do that again if things are indeed falling apart and there's "irreversible momentum" as claimed by the West.
In order to assault a location you need to move forward and are far easier to see. So a small group of even lightly armed defenders can setup in a location and then as soon as they see you fire ATMG's at your vehicles, sniper rounds and mortars at your infantry, and call in artillery and airstrikes. Then they can burry a bunch of anti-tank-mines, just retreat 5 kilometres and repeat the process. Likewise, a camouflaged tank that isn't moving is going to have a lot easier time seeing a tank that is moving, can fire a bunch of shells, pop smoke and then run away.
So, there's a large spectrum when it comes to retreat: from being basically overrun and most of your troops being captured and the rest retreating under fire and suffering high casualties, to a very well ordered staged fallback to inflict maximum casualties with the above methods.
Of course, the disadvantage of the tactical retreat is if you keep doing it, eventually you fallback to your backs against an ocean and it's difficult to continue the tactic underwater (or some similar obstacle).
Russian military doctrine and training puts particular high emphasis on the tactical retreat because they have a particularly large amount of space to work with.
The US military, to contrast, doesn't train so much to defend a land invasion on US soil from Mexico or Canada, so if they deploy it is to capture territory oversees (so there's little use of battalion and division level tactical retreats; US deals with counter offensives by bombing the shit out of everything, which is why their doctrine is to only deploy ground troops when they achieve air superiority).
Of course, two can play this tactical retreat game, and so to deal with their enemy using this particular good idea, the Russians have developed the counter strategy of simply advancing slowly with masses of artillery. If you're a well hidden defender waiting for the enemy forces to advance into your firing line, it stands to reason "enough" artillery will eventually get you.
So, what we will see in the next days and weeks is if this whole doctrine "works" or if a sufficiently determined offensive by a foe willing to suffer high casualties simply pushes on and destabilises your entire defensive system.
It's pretty clear that Russia is losing this war. Exit strategy is what they should be thinking about. This was a disaster for Russia.
Blah, blah, blah. Wake me up when you have sources to back up your opinions.
Quoting boethius
Lol.
Oh really, it doesn't matter if the elections are fraudulent or not to you? Right. :rofl:
Fraudulent elections that are a scam arent in any way important. Only shows that Russia uses similar tactics as Stalin''s Soviet Union did.
Just to think of it, holding elections in a territory that is a battlefield, and not basically defined in any way just what territory and what people are part is taking the referendum. It's absolutely crazy, but if you want to make these attempts from Putin to be somehow credible, then attempt to do it, I don't care.
We already knew this from the gaffe that the Russian intelligence director made as he confused the acknowledgement of the independence of the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics to them joining Russia. (Which Putin was mad about)
How is this in anyway clear?
Quoting ssu
You're the one that contradicted my point that these votes are significant (to the war), saying that's nonsense.
Now your outraged by the idea it doesn't matter if the elections are fraudulent or not. So, seems pretty significant events to you after all.
It does not matter to the point we were discussing, of whether these votes are significant or not.
The significance in terms of these votes, whatever you think of them, is that it is the step to formal annexation of these territories by Russia, and, again, regardless of whether other countries recognise that or not, it will become Russian territory for Russia.
I explicitly say you are free to argue the legitimacy of these votes, that's a different topic as to their significance to the war and how the military and diplomatic situation changes.
Definitely appears to me that annexing these territories makes it exceedingly unlikely Russia would agree to give them back, which makes a diplomatic settlement likewise exceedingly difficult, which is a significant change to the situation.
Well, they're losing previously taken positions, they're running out of troops, they've lost face with their allies. I mean, it looks like they're losing to me. Not to you?
[sup]RadioFreeEurope/RadioLiberty (Apr 30, 2022): Draft Document Gives New Clues To Russian Plans For Occupied Ukrainian Regions
AP News (Sep 22, 2022): EXPLAINER: What’s behind referendums in occupied Ukraine?
Reuters (Sep 23, 2022): Ukraine says residents coerced into Russian annexation vote
NPR (Sep 23, 2022): Russia begins annexation vote, illegal under international law, in occupied Ukraine
NBC News (Sep 23, 2022): Russian-occupied regions in Ukraine begin staged votes as the Kremlin denies reports of men fleeing partial mobilization
France 24 (Sep 23, 2022): Live: Ukraine pushes east into Donbas as Russia holds 'sham' annexation polls
Al Jazeera (Sep 23, 2022): Russia-Ukraine live news: Kremlin planning for quick annexations
The Guardian (Sep 23, 2022): ‘Referendums’ on joining Russia under way in occupied Ukraine[/sup]
Is this rubbish recognized anywhere outside of Russia, or perhaps even outside Putin's Kremlin?
With a(n incremental) land grab, Putin can change his rhetoric from "a special operation" to "an attack on Russia", and continue on, or at least try to. Being so transparent, why aren't more calling him out for it?
Apparently, Russia's neighbors have some busy border controls at the moment.
You've just posted the almost literal wall to wall international condemnation. What more exactly were you expecting?
Looks can be deceiving.
For months Russia was gaining ground, but obviously had not "won", and now Ukraine has gained some ground back. Obviously things can swing back and forth.
Ukraine has taken heavy losses in the recent offensives from everyone I've heard talk about it (including the Washington Post). Russia has just mobilised 300 000 additional troops. Russia could also use tactical nuclear weapons, which some claim would not be effective ... but I honestly doubt anyone walked away from Hiroshima saying "wow, underwhelmed, fail, so ineffective".
What is also critical is that Ukraine is now entirely reliant on NATO, so even making a real attempt to "beat the Russians" would be a NATO decision and not really a Ukrainian one.
It could be NATO is fully committed to pushing back the Russians (using Ukrainians) and calling Russias bluff about nuclear weapons or then actually wants Russia to use nuclear weapons for some reason (there being no other possibility), or it could be that NATO wanted to have a little moral victory before they either wrap things up diplomatically (something they can do anytime) or then guide things into a frozen conflict.
I honestly don't know NATO's intentions but not every NATO member is happy with the war.
Definitely Russias strategy is to hold onto these territories and see how winter plays out, and these are still long distances, 1000km front, so I don't see Ukraine being able to get some decisive victory by winter; and, as far as I can tell, the only "big" victory feasible, perhaps not decisive but big, would be cutting the land bridge to Crimea / Kherson, which there's no reports of the Ukrainians even trying to do. Of course, if you want a moral victory you'd avoid such a critical battle and focus on the areas your opponent is the least focused on.
As for "running out of troops," the Russian population is 144 million and Ukraines population is 44 million, and the Russians could mobilise 25 million conscripts.
Of course, there's political and economic impacts to mobilisation, we're already seeing some.
There is little question that if the Russian population as a whole really wanted to crush Ukraine they could, even with conventional weapons.
The question is one of motivation, why morale always keeps coming up.
Ukraine is in a total war posture and Russia certainly meant to win with a purely professional force (and that certainly failed), but considering Ukraine has fully mobilised everything they could and gone into total war and Russia has only now announced a very partial mobilisation, that's not necessarily a good sign for Ukraine if things are as tight on the front as they seem to be.
Of course, mobilisation could unravel the Russian state somehow, but as dramatic as mobilisation seems, it seems to me less pressure and risk to the Russian state than the start of the war and the sanctions, but of course it's possible. Protests don't seem to ever stop any war the state is committed to, so I don't see why Russia would be an exception to that rule.
I suppose they could engineer some sort of Hundred Years War, but their main ally, quickly becoming their master, is China. It will be Xi's call whether they can wage on indefinitely or not.
Quoting boethius
And that would be Putin's final act as leader of Russia. I'm sure he knows that.
For certain the war is only possible with Xi's blessing.
However, Russia-Chinese relationship is far more equal than Western media presents. Russia has the commodities China needs and Russia also has a large arsenal of nuclear weapons.
Definitely Russia is suffering a lot of losses, but the geopolitical game (that I'm sure few Russian actually care about) is pretty cunning. By waging an essentially war of attrition with the entirety of NATO and creating this madness in Easter Europe that then commits NATO buildup, pressure is taken off all Russia's allies and friends: China, Iran, Syria, Venezuela, and anyone else that has beef, big or small, with the US, which allows the creation of an alternative global payment and economic system to that of the US to be created between all these parties.
The Western media presents the war as Ukraine standing up to the "mighty Russia", while simultaneously calling Russia incompetent and in no way a danger, but geopolitically speaking the war is Russia standing up to the "mighty NATO" and that message is not lost on any leader outside the West.
Quoting Tate
I honestly don't know what would happen, I doubt anyone knows.
Luckily, Putin hasn't wanted to find out yet either.
This honestly "feels" to be changing, but it could all be just posturing to just make NATO hesitate to pour in more arms, or then on the way to a diplomatic resolution (hopefully).
Kremlin plans ‘immediate’ annexation of Ukrainian territories — and mobilization at home. Here’s this new decision’s background.
9:08 pm, September 20, 2022
Source: Meduza
https://meduza.io/en/feature/2022/09/20/the-war-party-has-won
This is not true. China is an economic powerhouse ascending to superpower status. Russia has now lost its status as regional power and its economy is medieval. Any dream of equality with China is gone now.
Quoting boethius
No, it doesn't, at least not the news sources I see. It's just a little conflict in Eastern Europe. You can see parts of it live on reddit. That's about it.
As we've just seen with this gas thing in the EU, your factories don't run without the raw materials.
You cannot dominate a party that you are dependent on, and China depends on Russia for a lot of its raw materials. To free yourself from dependence you can go take these things you need for yourself, but in this particular situation you face the same problem NATO is facing which is nuclear weapons.
Russia also depends on China for components, but there are other potential suppliers of key components, like India.
Quoting Tate
It's been front page news on CNN and BBC et. al. for months at a time ... Putin just said "all weapons systems will be used to defend Russian territory" and then Blinken went and made a speech that this was "bad, bad boy talk" at the UN.
I honestly don't see anyone describing this war as a little conflict in Eastern Europe.
The highest article on reddit front page (for me) is about the Irish PM calling for Russia to be removed from the security council.
Which is honestly one of the dumbest parts of all this, the whole point of the UN was to avoid another world war, which means the big powers can veto military action. Otherwise, the UN would just be "my boyz when WWIII starts"; i.e. the mistake the League of Extraordinary Nations made and the UN was designed not to repeat.
Or as SuperGenius98K informs us:
???
Quoting boethius
A sham referendum is a sham referendum. It's basically propaganda.
Quoting boethius
Oh boy.
Just stop and think what you are saying @boethius: "it is the step to formal annexation of these territories by Russia, and, again, regardless of whether other countries recognise that or not, it will become Russian territory for Russia."
This is all pure 100% Russian propaganda.
Sovereignty over any territory isn't called by the one who declares it, it is given by other sovereign states. So you saying "regardless of whether other countries recognize that or not" doesn't make sense.
Of course not, Isaac. If you don't get it, you don't. That doesn't make you a looney.
The other day they showed Ukrainian soldiers taking a bunch of Russian soldiers as prisoners. I was a little horrified that the Ukrainians were going to execute them on the spot on reddit, but they didn't.
whew!
So Treisman says the seizing of Crimea was either to prevent loss of Black Sea fleet, or part of a more general imperialist agenda, or just an impulsive improvisation of an autocrat turned erratic.
It seems to me that all three are still in play, although with the current miscalculated invasion, there was no immediate prospect of Ukraine joining NATO or Russia being forced out of Crimea. And where once might be seen as impulsive, twice looks more like a pattern.
Again, remember my comment was not that Russians are driven by some kind of nostalgia of lost empire - although that is a sentiment. It is the practicalities of constructing a defensible Russia that drives the imperialism in the first place. Given the actual economic and demographic state of Putin’s Russia, this then explains why Putin’s efforts to Make Russia Great Again look impulsive and opportunistic because, well, he isn’t in a position to be more systematic.
Treisman concludes by rejecting the first two possibilities. But again, this is not the point (unless we're going to go through every single opposing academic one by one). The point is that your comment...
Quoting apokrisis
...was ridiculous, but more importantly, this whole trend (of which you've merely been an example) of painting all voices opposing the mainstream Western narrative as being somehow deficient, has to stop. We've had accusations of psychological disturbance, ideological delusion, collusion... Everything from plain old stupidity to being full-on FSB agents. Everything... except just acknowledging that we simply have a legitimate difference of opinion.
The point is not what Treisman, or any of the other academics I mentioned, said. The point is that this new way of conducting discourse is toxic and erodes trust in the only means we currently have of distinguishing legitimate debate from populist diatribe.
As I said, it was hyperbolic in response to benkies hyperbolic accusation of imperialism being a fiction.
The fact you acknowledged this yet still continue to make a song and dance says you have no interest in a discussion. You are simply caught up in the emotional drama of it all and need someone - anyone - as a foil for your righteous opinions.
Yes, the referendums will be used as propaganda. But that doesn't make them a real democratic referendum. And that's my point.
When it's propaganda, then say it's propaganda. It's not a question of whether or not, because it's not. Or do we think just at an instant, in a war zone that actually isn't properly defined a true democratic referendum would / could take place? Would you really think that the referendum result could be that the majority would say "No, let's not join the Russian Federation"? You really think that would happen, @Jamal? Something that only tries to be a democratic vote shouldn't be treated as a democratic vote.
Was it bizarre to call the Russian VDV paratroops what they were? Then Russia was calling them "Crimean volunteer defence forces" and the puzzled Western Media was calling them "little green men"? Can just taking off your flag sign from your crisp new uniform be so puzzling? The same way, can an invader declaring a referendum in the area it has occupied be also so puzzling for us?
Scary stuff. Russia will continue falling back to the Donbas and Crimea if need be. Putin's decision to mobilize is not a popular one in Russia, but even if half of those troops mobilize, it will help make things more compacted in those regions (almost like an NFL red zone). That's one of the best things Putin could have done strategically. It is possible that the Russian people, and his close advisors and general staff turn on him, but I don't think that is very likely (at least not in the immediate foreseeable future). I see us making moderate gains & reclaiming more land in the east as well as Kherson, possibly, before it starts getting cold in November. Pushing too hard on the Donbas in the winter will lead to high casualties. We will need more long range artillery to pummel Russia throughout the winter.
Another play would be to continue the original Kharkiv push deeper into northern Donetsk and northern/western Luhansk. This would be a gambit because it exposes our flanks and pushes tired (but enthusiastic) troops deeper against more fortified and entrenched positions. It's tempting because the defenders there have seen other Russian soldiers retreating from the west, and their morale is low.
I think the best way to proceed is to continue the push as far as it's allowed and if resistance becomes too strong, pull back, dig in, and wait for the supplies, artillery, and reinforcements to catch up. There are weak points in the defenders' defenses in Donbas, but they are most likely not large enough to exploit to the point we can induce a full-on rout. Sometimes you can remove one straw in the right place and the whole house can come tumbling down. This is what happened in Kharkiv, but then again the Donbas is not Kharkiv.
We know that's your point. It's such an obvious and uninteresting point that I question what you're in this discussion for.
Obviously the referendums are not legitimate.
I saw comment that military law says conscripts have to serve four months before they could get sent to fight in Ukraine. But annexing Donbas, etc, would let them be sent straight to defend the “homeland”.
If this is the reason for the referendums - to dot the i’s of domestic legalities rather than anything to do with international opinion - it is an interesting sidelight in how even autocracies must function as states with legal systems.
So the show is for home consumption - a fiction to stave off law suits from a nation of angry mothers.
You've continued to paint all opposing views here as bafflingly delusional at every opportunity. This was not a one off rhetorical tool.
I've taken part in this discussion for several hundred pages. The main protagonists are interested in nothing but ensuring the world knows how much they think Putin is bad, that's it, so the meta-argument about public discourse, 'disinformation', and the maintenance of hard partisan lines is the only interesting matter left to interrogate. It's not as if anyone's open to actual discussion about the crisis itself is it?
You and Bennie just shoot first and ask questions afterwards.
But go ahead. What is your balanced view of Putin and his little adventure? What paints him in some better light? What makes it anything less than an awful miscalculation and another Russian implosion?
If his rump of the old empire finally crumbles into its parts, why would it be so bad to be a clutter of small ethnic states on the edge of NATO and the EU? Some might be corrupt stans, others might thrive like the Baltic states. But in what way would the West be the bad guys in such a world?
Discuss away.
It's been 'discussed' at great length, if by discussed you mean mentioned, immediately dismissed as delusional Russian propaganda and then rendered beneath further response (your begrudging invitation through gritted teeth notwithstanding).
As to your specific questions, I haven't any idea why anyone would want to discuss who the 'good guys' and the 'bad guys' are in geopolitical events. If virtue signalling your disgust at Putin's actions is your thing, then you crack on, some of us take seriously our duty to hold our governments to account for their actions, so for us what matters here is the justness of the actions of our governments, and for most of us, that isn't Russia.
If you seriously can't think of any way in which The West could possibly be the bad guys in a collapsed Russia then I can only imagine that you've either been reading too much Rand or have been living on a remote island for the last 50 years.
... go on.
Now, from a moral perspective, one could say this is commendable, as it saves human lives.
From a strategic perspective, one could say it is likely to be effective, for many reasons including military ones but also it strengthens national solidarity and troop morale.
However, I'm told by well connected comerades that, from a Russian perspective, it means Ukrainians are little cowards.
Yes, yes, keep the precisions coming. We might be getting somewhere.
By basically talking a lot more about everything else than the actual topic of the thread, the war in Ukraine. Because on a thread about Ukraine, the topic ought to be how bad the US and your government is, not Ukraine or Russia. Right on. :snicker:
It would be more credible, if you came up even once with some actions, any action, of your government that would be justified. But as obviously everything your government does is unjust, the West is evil capitalism, it's great to then you go with the line that the Pro-Russian side pushes. Because it's critical about the West! Because the US is far more worse and hence we shouldn't discuss what Russia does in a thread about the war in Ukraine.
Like just days before this offensive started, you clearly obviously believed Putin won't attack because Joe Biden was saying so (and Putin was denying it):
Quoting Isaac
Quoting Isaac
The offensive then started on the 24th.
And just to give an example, then your idea what options in the war would be better:
Quoting Isaac
Obviously Ukraine surrendering and then Putin putting his puppet oligarch friend Medvedchuk as leader of what's left of Ukraine after the territories of Novorossiya would have been annexed by Russia would have meant fewer dead (and fewer tanks destroyed). Even less would have been killed if Putin wouldn't have attacked Ukraine starting from 2014.
But that Option 2 what you hoped for didn't happen. (At least yet and looks to be unlikely)
(Yet Medvedchuk was released to Russia in a prisoner transfer, so I guess Putin can still use him)
So you continue to strawman me. Post after post and still nothing of substance from you. Find someone else to pester.
I think that the Ukrainians understand that they have to be ready for a long war. After the initial push failed, the Russians have tried to salvage what there is to salvage. But I think they have made a breakthrough in how to fight the Russians. Aerial and US satellite reckon, pinpoint artillery/rocket attacks make are quite successful.
This video tells rather well just why this is so. And why the Russian multiple rocket systems aren't so effective. The video also explains just why Russians have declared so many HIMARS systems being destroyed:
It's interesting to see how much longer the Ukrainian offensive can go.
That's certainly a desirable representation of victory. I love her belly button... :naughty: But note the wings, the running stance and flowing garments, all meant to suggest the swift speed at which the goddess can fly from one side to the other on the battlefield.
Our governments are involved in the war in Ukraine. Their involvement is therefore squarely on the subject of the war in Ukraine.
Quoting ssu
Taking part in negotiations. But this this already been mentioned.
Quoting ssu
Yes.
Quoting ssu
So? Even less would have been killed if airlifted the entire population to Mali too. What possible relevance could that have?
Quoting apokrisis
You literally said...
Quoting apokrisis
It's a direct quote, you asked for a moral judgment on Putin. I don't give a shit what 'paints him' in any kind of light, why would I? What is with this obsession over how bad Putin is? He's a thoroughgoing heartless psychopath. Is anyone still in any doubt about that? What matters is what we do about that.
Whinging about it online is pretty low on the list.
Quoting Isaac
So Ukrainians not deciding to do this, roll over and surrender, would according to you been the best outcome. I think that's enough to know from you and of the contribution you give to this thread.
What strawmen? can you backup your assertion with any citations.
Furthermore, your friend @apokrisis spends several pages defending what he finally admits to be "hyperbole" ... well hyperbole to make what point?
Quoting ssu
Again, if the HIMARS are so effective why doesn't the US send: A. more launchers and B. more missiles and C. different kinds of longer range missiles?
Quoting HIMARS, Lockheed Martin
How am I strawmanning this argument?
My counter arguments on the factual likelihood are simply pointing out NATO's own stated policy is only to allow Ukraine to "defend itself" and not enable Ukraine to attack Russia; whole justification for sending shoulder launched missiles, light arms and no heavy weapons that would have been needed for counter-offensives in the South (before tens of thousands of Ukraines best troops were KIA or casualties), in the first phase of the war was to not threaten Russia, much anyways.
In addition to the obvious policy and its implementation, there is no more evidence for the collapse of the Russian state than backed the chorus of predictions on literally day 2 of the invasion (which obviously didn't happen).
And clearly, by drip-feeding weapons systems to Ukraine NATO this is completely coherent with the "we won't let Russia actually lose" policy.
As for the goal of collapsing the Russian state no matter the cost ... is this really a policy that benefits Ukrainians? Is this even NATO or US policy? Is this even Ukrainian government policy?
Or is it EU-Nazi fantasy?
Seriously? You dismiss entire swathes of analysis as lunacy, pro-Russian, uninformed, beneath response... Do you think those posters would agree you've represented their positions in the most charitable light? Would you even stand by such a claim?
And, so nobody misses it, this statement is simply accepting my main point since the last few dozens pages and the absolute madness of the view held by the extreme Ukrainian right, Ukrainian nationalists, Ukrainians Nazi's as well as left-wing liberals in the West, that continued fighting without diplomatic compromise is justified.
For, indeed, that only makes sense if you manage to collapse the Russian state; i.e. defeat Russia.
However, if that's a delusional fantasy for which there is no evidence then all that is accomplished is tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands by the end, killed and wounded, and extreme damages to Ukraines economy and general welfare.
And for what?
If you can't actually defeat Russia (because NATO doesn't actually give a shit about you and isn't about to use nuclear weapons on your behalf and people employing Churhillian rhetoric ... at a distance, is just stupid), the alternatives to diplomatic compromise are: endless war or losing the war.
How would endless war or losing the war benefit actual Ukrainians that aren't Nazi who declare war their "way of life" and their mission in life to destroy Russia?
Well, if those options can't be explained as benefiting the average Ukrainian, then what would the diplomatic compromise be that Ukrainians are fighting for.
Which was the explicit policy only a few months ago: fighting to a better position at the negotiating table.
What's the plan?
Zelenskyites here seem to interpret an inability to answer basic questions about their position as "strawmanning", which is not what strawmanning is, it's how debate works: asking and answering questions.
If people never explain how continued fighting without diplomatic compromise is a justifiable and feasible plan of action, nor explain what diplomatic compromise they think is feasible and why more fighting (for now) somehow makes sense to achieve that compromise, pointing out that people never answer these questions is not "strawmanning", it is simply underlining their denial and delusions.
And what's that foundational delusion that supports the house of cards of their racist world view (which, so it's clear to everyone, "Some might be corrupt stans, others might thrive like the Baltic states" is a racist statement)? It's that somehow all this chaos and madness is going to lead to the destruction of the Russian state and any and all sacrifice (by Ukrainians) is a worthwhile if there's a one percent chance of achieving that possibility and even if the desired process risks global nuclear war world leaders now discuss completely casually ... like it's just Sunday afternoon tea with Nanna.
A racist statement all the more absurd that even in 2020, before the war, Ukraine ranks below Kazakstan on the Corruption Perception Index and well below several other Persian and/or Muslim and/or "others" filled countries (whatever "ethnicity" is being referred to by "ethnic state").
Well, the glorious armies of the Russian Federation are apparently making a stand at Lyman and Kupiansk, and resisting further Ukrainian advance there, thus showing far better fighting spirit than displayed so far around Kharkiv.
Their enlighten leader in Moscow must have told them to stop running and face the enemy. Let's see how long they can last.
And who's stating "He's [Putin] in trouble and he knows it"?
Jame Clapper.
The very same James clapper who was Director of National Intelligence and also ...
Quoting Jame Clapper - Wikipedia
Why should we take the words of James Clapper at face value, and how does he know what Putin "knows" to begin with?
All he really did in that interview was say that the White house has been telling Putin "not to use nukes" but also maintaining "strategic ambiguity" about what the US would do.
News flash: US is extremely unlikely to strike Russia with nuclear weapons when the US nor any of its actual allies isn't attacked. Why would it?
Foreign war declared for nebulous reasons that is popular with a small, influential nationalist clique, but not with the general public: check.
Major strain placed on the economy by economic isolation: check
Getting himself directly involved in the war so that he will be seen as personally responsible for faliures: check (https://www.nytimes.com/2022/09/23/us/politics/putin-ukraine.html)
Slowly losing support from the right for losing the war while also getting growing ire from the left: check
Sending mature men to fight who have wives and children to get back to and support and who have much higher opportunity costs for serving in the military: check. Historically, drafting older soldiers is not a good move. It's more disruptive to the economy. The guys have experience living on their own and having a high degree of personal autonomy. They don't look up to their officers just by virtue of them being older. To be sure, older fighters are sometimes preferable, particularly for COIN missions where they are less likely to be hot headed and many have law enforcement experience, but they're also more likely to mutiny under poor command. It's a baffling choice.
Sending protestors and opposition leaders to the front: check. This was pivotal during the Russian revolution, as motivated organizers against the ruling elite got sent into groups of armed men functioning in a leadership vacuum.
Send prisoners who are much more likely to mutiny to the front in large numbers: check.
Sending men in after almost no training and with poor equipment: check. Leaked videos show men being told they will receive 15 days of refresher training. Men are being issued the same bolt action rifles used in WWI as service weapons.
Chronic supply issues due to endemic corruption and an inability to rationally organize production: check. The number of Russian fire missions has fallen by an order of magnitude, which suggests a shortage of tubes (likely due to burning through existing ones with high usage) or shells, or both. Allocation of resources seems to be a chronic issue too. MBTs lack ERA, while ERA has been thrown directly on light vehicles with no separation, meaning that if it does activate it'll end up immolating the vehicle, no saving it.
Putin's decision to personally stop a retreat from Kherson could prove particularly damaging if Ukraine is able to move into new firing positions that allow its interdiction campaign to completely limit resupply or escape. The forces there probably represent about 10-15% of Russia's combat forces, and likely a higher share of its total combat power.
The funniest part is the postscript...
No. I asked for a geopolitical account by which he might be understood as a rational actor. Just as my first post stressed that Russian imperialism as a national identity is grounded in geography and history.
So keep on strawmanning.
I was talking about the implosion of Putin’s regime following a failure in Ukraine. Different thing.
If the implosion of Russia follows failure in Ukraine, that's definitely one way to defeat Russia.
If the war is with the Russian state and through war the collapse of the Russian state is caused and is no more, that certainly qualifies as victory over the Russian state.
There's a huge effort to do that. By Putin, actually.
The Russo-Japanese war cannot be viewed as a victory for Russia. That war resulted in the 1905 revolution.
The poor performance of the Soviet Union in the Winter War 1939-1940 and it's inability to conquer a very small nation lead Hitler to think that the Soviet Union would be a pushover.
Both wars ended in humiliation for Russia, yet on both occasions the country faced later a World War and survived, even if in WW1 faced a revolution and a long civil war.
The mobilization effort, with having no earlier plans for anything thing like this, no organization to do the mobilization and the training and equipment being no questionable cold-war era materiel, will end up likely being chaotic. Both Meduza and Novaya Gazeta Europe have reported that the actual number would be 1,2 million. And this can create real friction in the Russian society. Already it's been noted that especially minorities and poor regions are used as naturally angry mothers at Moscow and St. Petersburgh streets could be a problem.
Actually from this war there is a perfect example just how difficult it will be and long a mobilization that hasn't been prepared and been rehearsed will take. That's the mobilization that Ukraine had to do in 2014. Basically it took half a year for Ukraine to mobilize the reserves and for a long time it was the voluntary battalions that were used. So basically when you are talking about this mobilization, it will have an effect perhaps on a Russian spring offensive in 2023. How effective it will be is another matter.
Or then that implosion can come from that 'New Army' that is now created.
I would think the reason is because wars and military operations have been so crucial to his (Putin's) rule, that once confronted by a military endeavor gone bad, he has just ante'd up. Second Chechen war was basically his Presidential campaign, the Russo-Georgian war, even if pretty chaotic for the Russian army, was still a victory. The Crimean occupation went like a dream. The Syrian campaign wasn't a disaster either. Everything looked good until this military adventure.
And I think he likely cannot see what a perilous situation he is creating with this war, which you explained very well. This war seems a lot to me like the Russo-Japanese war.
Quoting Paine
Except this war is bloodier than the Vietnam war was for Americans (for the Vietnamese, it's another issue). The highest death toll for the US was in 1968 with nearly 17 000 killed. Russian losses have pasted that in far less than a year (although believing the official statistics, only 5 000+ have been killed).
This war is also a bigger burden for the Russian economy than the Vietnam war was for the US.
And this war has basically put nearly all Russian ground forces into the fight. During 1969 at the peak the US armed forces had 543 000 troops in Vietnam. Yet even then only 30% of all US troops were deployed into foreign countries, and not all in Vietnam. A quarter million troops were deployed into Europe in 1969. Compared to that, Russia has put it's whole ground forces to fight in Ukraine. It's telling that for the annual exercises in the Far Eastern military district, Russia had withdraw troops from Ukraine to participate in them.
And Putin knows just where he actually needs troops: the National Guard is larger than the ground forces of the Russian army.
I hear what you are saying about actual numbers of deployment. It is pretty scary what the Russians are trying to accomplish.
I was just pointing to what happens when conscription enters the picture. People who could care less start caring more. Putin tried to avoid that element. Now he is deep in the shit of it.
For Ukraine or any country that is defending itself from outside attack, conscription works quite well.
The logic of conscription has always been put forward on the basis of an existential threat, as the expression goes.
The reference to the American experience in Vietnam brings that more into question than explains anything. Mobilizing a population to fight is a sort of referendum. That worked for some groups better than others.
Why would you be asking me for such an account, what makes you think I have one?
A threat to the existence of whom, or what?
You’re hilarious.
War is messy and chaotic, you're going to find pretty much anecdotal evidence for pretty much anything.
Also, keep in mind a large proportion of Ukrainians speak perfect Russian.
The videos you post seem genuine (and mean absolutely nothing in terms of evaluating the war), but it's worth noting that Ukrainians can easily fake pretty much any kind of propaganda material they want and it will just be immediately posted to Western front page news as "Ukrainian intelligence says".
Quoting ssu
Quoting apokrisis
If you think the Russian state is on the brink of collapse because of a few protests and a tiny minority of people leaving the country, you are truly living in fantasy.
Even if it was remotely feasible, it would cost hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian lives, perhaps millions, and for zero benefit to the average Ukrainian accomplish, certainly not to attempt and fail.
And from what I understand from Ukrainian Nazi planning on this issue, the idea is not that Ukrainians themselves would defeat Russia but that NATO would do it for them. From this perspective, Ukrainians being nuked is a good thing because they believe NATO would nuke Russia in turn.
That is extremely low odds of happening. Very high odds now of Russia using nuclear weapons; they've basically said they are going to do this, said they are not bluffing, and are now setting up the laws to make it essentially legally obligatory for them to do. Logic will be exactly the same as the use of nuclear weapons in Japan: that it will save lives on both sides compared to more fighting.
How will NATO respond? Likely, diddly squat.
How can NATO respond? They've been flexing their sanctions and weapon supplier muscle, but if they actually wanted to a nuclear standoff with Russia they would have sent boots into Ukraine before or then anytime during the war and dare Russia to nuke them.
Since that has not happened, nuking Ukrainian military positions is not an attack on US or any NATO member and there is simply no legal mechanism in which to retaliate. Neither the US nor any NATO member is in a legal state of war with Russia; there's really no way to just nuke a country out of the blue that you're not at war with.
What about the Ukrainians? You may ask ... well, what about them? Afghanistan government was a literal ally of the US, just let's not put labels on things and this "non-committed relationship"; what happened to them?
Ohhhh noooo!!! but they're brown muslims Boethius, you may cry out! The literally live in a "corrupt stan"! It's right in their name, at the back, see!! Stan! S. T. A. N. spells Stan!
Sure, that's true, but US military and NATO are pretty woke nowadays and have non-discriminatory and equal opportunity throw your "allies" under the bus policies.
US cares not for Ukrainians, but want cold war 2.0 and a irrelevant EU on the world stage.
Nukes in Ukraine accomplishes that, and both the US and Russia get what they want. Why would they bicker about it?
Dangerously weak
Yes, you can be confident this analysis is legit.
The only retaliation available to the US / NATO for a Russian tactical nuke in Ukraine would be something like striking a Russian base with a tactical nuclear weapon ... which would be followed by Russia striking a NATO base, followed by further tactical nuclear exchanges until it's WWIII and full scale strategic exchange.
Or then NATO strikes a Russian base and Russia strikes a NATO base and ... no response? What does that accomplish?
The only available move is to do nothing. Ukraine is not part of NATO and there exists no legal obligation, national self-interest, much less military reason to strike Russia with nuclear weapons in retaliation for an act in a war ... in which you are not legally at war.
Given this state of things, why wouldn't Russia use tactical nuclear weapons? Spot a tank column: blow up the tank column, is a pretty big military advantage.
The "consequence" of Russia using nuclear weapons last year, for example, would be total sanctions and cutting off the cash cow of selling energy to Europe ... well that lever has already been pulled.
The protests against mobilisation and people leaving the country result in not many people being left willing to protest the use of nuclear weapons.
As has been discussed already, there is a sizeable part of the Russian population that are nationalistic and (just like the Americans) will be happy to see nuclear weapons used for their own national benefit and pride.
I don't speak german, but I'm pretty sure the key word in that phrase is "dangerous".
Dangerous to Ukrainians, and no one is coming.
If US / NATO retaliate.
Provide one argument that they would?
Ergo, what's likely? US / NATO will scale back their support for Ukraine as they have no response to Russian tactical Nukes in Ukraine.
The war has achieved US policy generously informed by US arms manufacturers as @Isaac cites above, so why continue?
Let winter pass and by the spring everyone will be so fed up with energy prices that peace with Russia will just be the normal, competent, level headed thing to do by politicians wanting to be reelected. Russia certainly learned its lesson and are sorry, time to turn over a new leaf.
The alternative is not simply that Russia uses tactical nukes in Ukraine, but likely then keeps using them until Ukraine unconditionally surrenders (since Ukraine maybe able, with time, develop their own nuclear weapons or WMD's of some sort with their nuclear material and remaining biolabs).
The other thing to consider is that even Eastern Europe may get cold feet now that they're faced with the consequences of their fanatical support for more war, such as Volkswagen saying they will leave Eastern Europe if the energy situation there doesn't improve (aka. the war with Russia does not come to an end).
Talk is cheap, but we'll see soon enough who has their money where their mouth is.
Who's saying it?
Zelensky:
So, if you're a supporter of Zelenky's analysis and decision making, and uncompromising devotion to the gods of war, then you should support my message, which is the same (just with the added caveat that Ukraine is not an ally to the US and will be left out in the cold ... or then the fierce heat of the nuclear sun, or why not both!).
With all due respect for Zelensky, I don't believe the nuclear escalation is likely to happen.
Definitely Putin is taking large risks and the whole war is a big gamble and makes lot's of people nervous.
However, what matters in material relations, such as business or international politics, is much more actual leverage than emotion.
The West has become accustomed to focusing on the emotions, but only because the material leverage is taken for granted in Western policy decisions. For example, the decision to support revolution in Lybia and then bomb the place may have been due to the simple reason Gaddafi wanted to make a African bank and needed to be punished and Libya (the most prosperous African state by some metrics at the time) needed to be made a failed state so as not to be an example of how to escape Western debt peonage. Let's assume that's true, well it's far easier to just make some emotional story of people struggling for freedom or whatever, to explain the bombing to the home audience for the show (and just completely ignore the question of why bomb Libya rather than any of the other dictatorships around).
Or maybe it really was from the "goodness of their hearts" of the policy makers.
Either way, the perception that results is that it is emotion that drives international and warmaking policy is only possible because the leverage was there. NATO could bomb Libya, could invade and occupy Afghanistan for 2 decades, US et. al. could invade Iraq, drone strikes can be carried out all over Africa and the Middle east, proxies financed and armed etc.
In other words, the leverage exists to carry out these policies, so the emotions drummed up, whether by propaganda or genuine grassroots sentiment, can match the policies because the policies can be done.
But all this emotional driven policy making is not so possible when you don't have the leverage.
China needs Russian energy and commodities ... that doesn't change regardless of what Xi or anyone in China feels about it. So, the West obsesses over how people may feel here or there, but only because Westerners live in the delusion that emotions matter the most.
It's a pretty typical psychological result of too much power and prestige: the "diva".
The situation in Ukraine is simply that the West doesn't have the leverage to get what it wants, so it cries about it, but that doesn't help.
Russia does have the leverage: energy, food, military, nuclear weapons.
What we feel, what the Chinese feel, what the Indians feel, what the Ukrainians feel, and to a large extent what the Russians feel: doesn't mean a thing.
Only when you have the power, the leverage, can you simply translate your feelings into actions. If you feel like fucking up a country that had nothing do to with 9/11 to express your feelings about 9/11? you definitely can if you have the power and leverage to express your emotions that way. You want your servant to do some humiliating task? You definitely can if you pay them enough or they have no where else to go.
Everyone that doesn't have the power in the situation: learns to bite their tongue and digest their feelings: because that's how the world actually fucking works.
It's been that way for a long time.
The strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must.
Quoting Olivier5
... Well, well, well, if Zelensky is wrong about this, what else maybe he wrong about?
Even in the context of environmental crisis denialism, even Jordan Peterson can see the obvious.
Only delusional propaganda supports the current narrative and policies vis-a-vis Ukraine, and it doesn't matter your politics to see these particular obvious facts if you stop eating lies.
Which ... what does Peterson's observation that totalitarianism involves everyone lying to everyone on every level apply to in the current situation?
Quoting Olivier5
I don't know man, I don't think the devil's a comedian nor a puppet.
... or are you saying satan works for NATO, the money's just that good?
But has the West developed any other way to deal with their problems and "feelings"?
No.
They haven't.
Feel something, bomb something. That's just how we roll baby.
Now, you may say Russia hasn't either; fair, but they have picked a fight with someone they can bomb.
And that my friends, makes all the difference in the World.
I see... But NATO is a tool of the devil, isn't it? So since Zelensky is a puppet of NATO... he's one of the devils in any case. Small devil, or big one, I don't know. I leave that to specialists, better introduced than I am to/by the Lord of the Earth in the East.
I am new to all this line toeing, you see? Can't seem to get it right. It's like... I put one toe on the line, and then the other toes fall on that side of the line or the other! Maybe if I turned my feet inward? How do you guys do it?
Yet what isn't anecdotal is:
a) Since coming into office Putin has tried to push away from a conscription army and veer the armed forces into an volunteer force, which hasn't happened.
b) Even the Soviet Union had huge difficulties of mobilization it's reserves, which basically were just nothing else than a list of names in a vault.
c) Russia doesn't have an organization for the mobilization of such quantities of troops and neither have reservists been trained. It would be different if Russia would have done refresher training to reservists after their military service and trained these as units. It hasn't done that.
You cannot dispute these facts. Yes, any video material is anecdotal, but those arguments above aren't. Those forces mobilized now will likely be able to be used in a spring offensive by the Russians in 2023.
Quoting boethius
A tiny majority? Let's see what that "tiny majority" is like?
IT-sector professionals and millionaires. Quite an irrelevant minority there.
Just here in four days over 27 000 Russians have come over the border. Of course, some go back even here you are talking about thousands fleeing the mobilization. And Georgia and Kazakhstan it's far bigger. Finally Finland is tightening the visas to come here.
Quoting boethius
Spoken like a true Putin believer. Resistence is futile!!!
Quoting boethius
Wow. Sergei Shoigu couldn't say it better. Ukrainian nazis counting that NATO does the fighting for them.
Incredible, Boethius.
I'm not following your theology, but please elaborate.
Quoting Olivier5
It's not following a line: Russia's leverage in the situation is factual. All the US says about it is "strategic ambiguity," you, or anyone else, is free to speculate what that ambiguity involves that's in Ukraine's favour.
This is definitely true, but this plan does make sense. Invading Ukrainian territory with conscripts / reserves is neither legal nor a good political move; especially at the start of the war where you'd have the current disruption and instability of mobilisation in addition to the sanctions in addition to the unknowns of what would happen in the war (they could not know 100% that they'd take South-East Ukraine so easily).
So, invade with the separatist militia's, Chechians (who "like" fighting, especially white people that dip bullets in lard to taunt them), mercenaries, with support of professional soldiers.
Then, once the front stabilises "enough" and effect of sanctions has smoothed out, annex these regions and mobilise to defend this new territory.
Quoting ssu
Russia has 25 million potential reserves and conscripts and nearly 2 million standing army; I think it's far fetched to say they will not be able to mobilise 300 thousand. It's claimed these will be "low quality troops" but A. there's no reason to assume they'd be any less quality than much of Ukraine's conscript force and B. Russia still has professional and mercenary forces to conduct offensive operations and more man-power to support and defend quiet areas of the front can only help.
Quoting ssu
Reservists have been trained. The usefulness of periodic 2 weak refresher training is debatable. A lot of military tasks require only following orders by average people, like just moving shells and boxes around.
Quoting ssu
I definitely say "tiny minority" and not "tiny majority".
Quoting ssu
I'm really just not so sure about how many such people will actually leave, and what the economic impacts are. Presumably they'll mostly still do work for their Russian company or for their contract clients, just at distance and more effectively without the stress and bother of war and all that.
Additionally, pretty much any intellectual work nowadays can be done at distance by Indian's and Chinese firms, and they can easily send their specialists when needed who will not fear mobilisation.
I'm just not convinced this is a big economic problem. Certainly the sanctions was an order of magnitude larger economic problem to deal with.
Russia is also not an IT driven economy, but sells commodities, so IT inefficiencies have few short term impacts. When brain drain matters its generally really top tier stuff of making the next unicorn startups and technological break throughs; silicon valley vs. various other competing tech hubs.
Quoting ssu
This is a tiny amount of people compared to the Russian population, mostly who don't have the option to flee, and, as you say, many who do flee will return as soon as the situation is clarified a bit and risk seems lower to them.
Quoting ssu
The issue was if Ukrainian fighting can lead to the collapse of the Russian state.
Feel free to propose a scenario where that is likely to happen.
Resistance was definitely not futile at the start of the war but could have lead directly to a negotiated peace on the best possible terms for Ukraine.
However, continuing to fight beyond that point to a mythical moment where the Russian state collapses for essentially unexplained reasons, indeed is futile.
Keep in mind that the majority of the Russian population have fresh memories of the last time they overthrew their government to embrace the West. West didn't hug them back, so I find it exceedingly unlikely they would do so again as they all know it would be an even worse repeat of the disastrous mafia state of the 90s and early 2000's.
The West loves laughing at the Russian misfortune after the collapse of the Soviet Union, but Russians themselves do not join in that laughter but, for the most part, would rather avoid repeating it.
The situation is not the same where Soviet citizens started to truly believe Western propaganda and that they'd all be living like Finns in a few years if the wall came down.
It's a "Fool me once, shame on... shame on you. Fool me—you can't get fooled again," kind of situation.
Quoting ssu
That was clearly the plan from the beginning, handing out small arms to civilians, committing to a total war with maximum harm to civilians, and then begging for the no-fly zone.
The Ukrainian Nazi's who really wanted and still want total war certainly believed that NATO would see their righteous plight and come in with their planes and "show the Russians". They would not have been begging for the no-fly zone for so long, even after very clear no's, if they didn't genuinely believe that was possible.
And now, faced with the next disastrous escalation of the war, Ukrainian Nazi's and other "ultra nationalists" and their Western sympathisers, seem to truly believe UN / NATO will nuke Russia in retaliation for Russia starting to use nukes.
The delusions of NATO responding with Nuclear weapons if Russia uses them have been present on this very forum; for example the belief that NATO would give nuclear weapons to Ukraine ... at least a couple to Nuke Moscow and St. Petersburg. How much more delusional can you get?
It's also highly suspected and really little doubt about it, that "ex"-NATO contract soldiers man HIMARS and all the targeting is with NATO intelligence.
How is this not NATO fighting the Ukrainian Nazi's war for them? HIMARS being "the thing" that keeps them in the fight and their proposed path to victory.
There is. Ukrainians are defending their country against a hostile invader. The Russians aren't.
If the Russians now called were sent to defend St. Petersburg or Saratov from an foreign invasion force, I think they really could be fighting to get into the busses to the front. Never underestimate the role of the will to fight.
Yes, let's see...
...oh well, maybe later, eh?
Your point was about training and quality of skills, not motivation.
And, as from many Russian's perspective, once the 4 Oblasts are officially part of Russia then they will be defending their country against a hostile invader. Likewise, it's possible many Russians happen to share Putin's sentiment that NATO is an aggressive force against Russia and a threat to them.
Additionally, Russia has demonstrated it has highly motivated soldiers able to win in urban environments, so, as I already mentioned, the reservists can have a large impact simply supporting the professional forces.
Ukraine has sent fresh conscripts with little to no training into front line combat, but there's no reason to believe Russia will do the same.
Especially if the consequences are as terrible as talking heads in the West claim, why not just rely on the professional contracted forces in that case for the heavy fighting?
On the diplomatic front, as I've said previously it's difficult to analyse as the trial period of "open source diplomacy" of simply reporting every meeting between world leaders in real time seems to have ended.
However, there are some signs of diplomatic advancement. There's this recent prisoner exchange brokered by Saudi Arabia and Turkey, and now India and China are calling for a diplomatic end to the conflict, and also both Putin and now it seems Zelensky have stated they want an end to the conflict.
In particular the prisoner exchange seems super bizarre timing if it was not in the context of steps towards a diplomatic resolution.
Although it seems difficult to imagine what a compromise would be at this stage, it's of course always possible. If Ukraine is simply unable to sustain the current offensive (even regardless of US support) then that hope maybe simply dashed internally and also hardliners who promised some vast victory now sidelined.
For certain the EU has enormous leverage in the situation and can easily use it to broker a peace deal.
A recipe for a resolution could go something like this:
- Ukraine enters the EU on some fast track process.
- Russia gets sanctions dropped and Nord Stream 2.
- Russia pays for rebuilding of Ukraine (which is obviously just recycling some of the massive profits of dropping sanctions).
- The territorial question is of course the tricky part, but that could be resolved by agreeing to have another vote after peace is restored, people return to these regions; something that the world community would accept as legitimate, outside observers etc. If holding onto the territories is an obstacle to a peace deal that Russia actually wants, "giving the territory back" is problematic after annexation, however, the various regions having another vote in x time could be a reasonable compromise for everyone. "Will of the people" At least in principle Ukraine is "fighting" for the right of self determination, and Russia is claiming these regions can leave Ukraine and join Russia based on a vote, and presumably the EU is democratic and maybe even the US, so there's at least no issue in principle. Of course, you'd want to come to this deal before these regions are officially annexed, as Russia wouldn't want the precedent of one of its territories being able to vote to leave.
Of course, a peace deal could be something else entirely, depends on who wants what and what people are willing to give, but my basic point is that there's always creative solutions to negotiation impasses when both parties rather a resolution than continued conflict.
"Strategic ambiguity" may not be a satisfactory response for Zelensky, to name one motivating factor.
And, even if there's nothing much to analyse, although other perspectives on this strange prisoner swap and China and India statements would be welcome, I like to repeat how diplomacy can work as the point of the military analysis is to evaluate the leverage on the table and what is a reasonable deal to take.
If we talk about training, the as I've said multiple of times, this force might be useful in a possible spring offensive for the Russians in 2023. Not in two weeks time. And as I said earlier, a perfect example of this was the Ukrainian mobilization in 2014.
Quoting boethius
Why you think so? With Wagner group searching jails for volunteers, I think this is very typical how Russians have organized these wars: chaotic and unprepared.
Quoting boethius
Really, who would after this trust in the West Putin for one's energy needs?
Uh huh. Whereas this...
https://thegrayzone.com/2022/07/30/zelensky-militants-convicted-child-rape-torture-military/
...is presumably a genius move from a well organised war machine?
Have I said that? Strawmanning as usual Isaac.
As I just said, the Ukrainian mobilization of 2014 is an example how long it takes to mobilize forces when you don't have a plan or organization to do it. Was Ukraine ready for war in 2014? Absolutely not! It took half a year for Ukraine and in 2014 the voluntary battalions were doing the fighting then. The Ukrainian military seems to have developed from that time, I guess.
Quoting Isaac
And this is the Websites @Isaac uses:
Keep it up for Putin, Isaac!!!
You criticise a source by posting an unsourced criticism of that source?
Ha! Thought you'd like that one (of course the news was reported in major British newspapers like the Telegraph too, but the Grayzone version's more punk)
Very partisan. Not like your "well-respected think tank" CSIS, with their...
Quoting https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Center_for_Strategic_and_International_Studies
I found it. It's Wikipedia, for evidence citing a Times article about the BBC pursuit of Tim Hayward (who cited Grayzone). A pursuit for which they later had to offer a full apology after complaints of bias.
It writes itself...
Very compelling resemblances.
All that is needed to complete the picture is the Rasputin in the story.
Putin's nuclear rattling doesn't help.
By Putin's "logic" at least, they'd be justified in direct military action to free Ukraine — direct as in planes in Ukrainian airspace, troops on the ground, whatever — not a mere "special operation".
If Russia was to take over some parts of Ukraine (in whichever way), like Donbas and Crimea, then Putin's rhetoric would still apply to the rest of Ukraine.
Sort of similar to the current occupation, with whatever instability.
If Russia was to leave Ukraine alone, except for acquiring a guarantee that Ukraine won't become a NATO member, then these two scenarios wouldn't be applicable, at least.
For such a guarantee to work, some sort of international observers/inspectors might have to be put in place, not sure, don't know if that could work.
I'm guessing this option is acceptable to the Ukrainians (mentioned earlier), maybe also to many/most Russians, hard to tell.
(By the way, Europe won't become "Western Russia", under Kremlin control, hardly realistic, rattling or not.)
That btw. got things wrong, as was my main point. But of course you don't notice such 'minutiae'. :roll:
Putin has once again overplayed his hand in Ukraine
Source is respected enough, but some details not so easy to verify.
I guess we'll see.
Misc comments via max seddon ...
[tweet]https://twitter.com/maxseddon/status/1573613761453342720[/tweet]
Interesting article. Fairly typical of the western response trying to tie itself in knots. So...
Phew! Incompetent, stupid Russians can just be left to fail embarrassingly, should be good for a laugh. Except, for some reason these manifestly failure-ridden actions...
Struggling to see why on earth NATO would get involved against actions so manifestly destined to fail anyway. Still, moving on...
...which won't happen, of course... what with Putin's stupid plan destined for failure and all. Same with the strategy to...
...not going to actually work, so no cause for alarm yet... Although, myself, I must admit, I'm struggling to see how a country that's being simultaneously destroyed and threatened with nuclear weapons is in the clear. Maybe it's the immanent downfall of Russia internally the author's got in mind?
Nope. Not that then. Ah ha! We finally have the answer, the reason Putins' idiotic plans are all destined for failure. It's those plucky Ukrainians, of course...
The author here is a little shy on details. It's not quite made clear how the heroism of Ukrainian armies are going to fend off...
...nor do anything at all, once...
...but we are, by the end of the article, reassured that we can rest easy in our beds, assured that the bumbling incompetence of the Russian bullying is no match for the plucky heroism of the Ukrainian army. Phew!
Only...
Hang on! I thought we were barely involved. Isn't it those super independent Ukrainians who face the difficult choices? What choices NATO leaders face is left something of a mystery for a war we're barely involved in and couldn't do anything about anyway (what with all the Ukrainian agency and all).
Perhaps it's all in the
Quoting ssu
...?
I think it has already happened in February 24th of this year. Russia achieving it's objectives (Novorossiya + regime change in rump Ukraine) isn't the event when other countries change their views. Even if the war would stop in a frozen conflict (basically a loose armstice and talks going nowhere), Russia would be the looming threat. It actually took a long time to come to this, with the resets, and all that hopeful belief that Russia will change.
Putin is all in.
In fact, I think made a good historical comparison just how "all in" Putin has gone and how this could backfire on him (based on what has happened earlier in Russian history with similar actions). And it doesn't look good for him now.
Not only did the Ukrainians win the battle of Kyiv, a huge moral booster, but the success of their counter attack has also kept the moral up in the Ukrainian camp. And then there's the NATO/US support, which by these levels are totally sustainable for the West. The West hasn't thrown in everything, perhaps the Javelin missiles have to be produced about 1,5 years to regain the levels of missiles that were prior the war. The West isn't bleeding, the defense expenditure isn't excessive. The simple fact is that the West can continue such support it now is giving for a very long time. That the Ukrainians can not only defend, but regain territory and go on the offensive has changed how the Ukrainians are viewed in the West.
After the war in Afghanistan came to it's natural conclusion, in a spectacular catastrophe that was for very long in the works as an impending policy train-wreck, the West likely saw any military engagement as unwinnable, a looming failure. So the up-beat attitude of the Ukrainians actually talking about winning the war surprised them. Now that can become overconfidence, because let's just remember that WW2 was for the Russians a cascade of epic failures until the battle Stalingrad. Russia is those countries can constantly fail and then just continue at it far longer than anybody would anticipate them continuing.
As the saying goes, Russia is never as strong it looks at strength and never so weak as it looks at it's time of weakness.
A second option is Russian "allies" get fed up with the fall out from the war, such as India, NK and China. In guessing they're not too happy about current food prices either. But this would probably force Russia to the table and might mean some territorial gains (eg keeping what they currently occupy) or even a reversal. It's unclear what the West would back and Russia would be expected to swallow.
I guess if neither of these play out by the end of winter, we'll have to assume this is unlikely to happen and sanctions aren't accomplishing what the West wanted.
Worst thing that can happen is that the Russian disgruntlement and logistical problems with the mobilisation are grossly exaggerated in the news and we'll see a huge influx in personnel on their side. That will lead at a minimum to a long protracted war or worse new gains by Russia.
@Jamal do you have any sense about sentiment in the Russian population? Some "resistance" seems quite well organised but no clue how big or small it is.
There's no need for the scares quotes, they are literally anecdotal videos.
Do you think Gabuev is wrong then, when he says...
...?
Firing into the air is pretty normal in some cultures. Certainly would be a "huge deal" in the West, but a good indication that it's not a big deal in Dagestan is that no one in the crowd seems at all alarmed.
There is zero reason to believe small protests are about to take down the entire Russian state.
We had massive protests in the West against the war in Iraq, all sorts of drama ... wars still happened.
There's almost no examples of protests stopping wars that the people in charge are set on.
Furthermore, Western propaganda is starting to be a broken record of protests, Russian lines collapsing, low morale, Putin about to die or be assassinated, logistical problems dooming their operation, incompetence and "miscalculations" at every level, and so on, with a few choice anecdotes.
People are free to argue that "this time is different" but that requires actually arguing that.
Otherwise, these positions are essentially "there's much less evidence for this belief that Russian collapse is imminent as there was 6 months ago ... and I believed it then and I'm believing it now."
Of course, and this is naturally from an Ukrainian media.
Otherwise the mobilization is going absolutely perfectly. :smirk:
Vietnam comes to mind.
It seems strange to try and mobilize a population that has been effectively demobilized for decades, ie told not to get involved in politics.
My geographical location unfortunately gives me no special knowledge. I have a sense that people are increasingly scared (for example, many of my wife's colleagues originally came from distant parts of the country and have young male relatives there who now face the prospect of going to war), but I don't really know how people are thinking because those who openly express their opinions are usually either supporters of the war or critics of the government from an even more bellicose nationalist position. Opponents of the war and the depoliticized bulk of the population are mostly silent, or else they're in another country.
Having said that, there is a strong sense that debates are heating up. The mere fact that pro-Kremlin politicians are voicing their frustration and anger is probably a sign of a roiling mass of resentment and fear (there has been open criticism of the way the mobilization has happened).
But I don't know to what extent the mobilization is actually causing the hitherto indifferent majority to change their minds about the war. That may develop. So far the anger is about the fact that the government has messed up and might be losing control; they've always tolerated Putin because he's strong and stable.
Vietnam is not an example of protesting a war leading directly to the collapse of the US government or ending the war or anything remotely similar to what's being continuously predicted will happen in Russia. US stayed in Vietnam for years even after the majority of the public was clearly against the war, of which large protests is more a manifestation than a cause (good arguments to question why the US was in Vietnam).
And even if you want to particular emphasise the role of protests (compared to other political discourse) then that's still one single example that does not serve as a good analogy: the war was thousands of kilometres away from US shores, North Vietnam was not a threat to the US, domino theory was speculative, and the war went on for years and years, before the US withdrawing under a ceasefire and not surrender conditions ... and, again, the US government did not entirely collapse.
Wars eventually end but there are no examples I know of where protests like we see in Russia somehow lead directly to the end the war.
Of course. A daily normal occurence in Dagestan. :blush:
Quoting boethius
Mere inconvenience. Putin Strong!!!
Quoting Olivier5
According to our Putinists, No Problem! Puny protests and tiny minorities fleeing Russia won't have any effect on the regime. Anytime, in any way. It's just a hoax by the Western media that this would any kind of problem to the strong Putin regime. :razz:
Or that what just some months ago were said:
(See here)
Just like they denied having any ideas of making a large scale attack on Ukraine prior to February this year. (Which btw was believed by the same people here)
I just was talking to an American a few days ago who was complaining about the love of people where she comes from for firing into the air on every holiday, (triggering PTSD of veterans was the gripe about it).
In Turkey the army fired into a crowd with a helicopter ... and that didn't bring down the government.
So again, feel free to argue that this one soldier in some random outpost firing into the air to warn a hundred or so people is some ground shaking political event in Russia that changes everything, or that compared to the protests at the start of the war "this is different" and will lead to full scale revolution.
Otherwise, it's just that "pointing out some true things for propaganda purposes" that you complain Russia does.
The idea that Ukrainians should keep fighting and dying for the strategy that Putin is weak internally and eventually the whole Russian state should collapse, yes, should have more than just virtue signalling as a basis.
Otherwise, the Russian army and reserves are far larger and now on the defensive and have all the benefits Ukrainians had defending Kiev, and the Russian army can disable the entire Ukrainian grid at will, and also has nuclear weapons that it can deploy at any moment. So, without the mechanism to somehow collapse the Russian state, there are not presently favourable battlefield conditions.
If the proposal that there is a mechanism to collapse the Russian state is wrong, then the cost of being wrong is literally hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians and the entire Ukrainian economy: dead.
It's repeated over and over that it's their land and they can fight and die for it if they want. Ok, sure, but if the fighting and dying doesn't accomplish anything, is it still worthwhile as some sort of moral Churchillian gesture? (Churchillian gesture the whole West applauds ... but doesn't put their own soldiers in this noble quest)
Unfortunately, most of this debate is arguing with obvious denial of facts (there are definitely more Nazi's in Ukraine with more power than in the typical Western army and government) or then unsupported hypotheticals presented as likely (such as Russian state on the brink of collapse), and I try to keep my arguments focused one positions I intend to defend.
Furthermore, the purpose of the denialism and unsupported hypotheticals is not to argue them in any sort of good faith way, or that their proponents even believe them despite the lack of supporting evidence and analysis, but rather to tease out a normative agreement for the purposes of tribal-group think.
For example, if I disagree that Putin is literally Hitler, I am supposed to annex my argument with "but of course Putin is super evil and bad" or then if I disagree that the Russian state is on the brink of total collapse I am supposed to preamble that with "of course the Russian state should collapse!".
I don't play into that because I don't like propaganda.
Furthermore, the moral evaluation of Putin should nevertheless have supporting arguments. The "hyperbole", as one poster refers to himself, followed by "of course Putin is still bad" is a way to get agreement on a moral evaluation of Putin without any facts, analysis or values.
If I say "Putin is bad", the standard I set for myself is I have reasons I'm willing to explain for saying that.
My priority in this discussion is a diplomatic resolution, and morally evaluating Putin is not necessary for a diplomatic resolution.
If other's have as their priority the moral evaluation of Putin, they are free to present an argument and if it's convincing then I can just say I agree to it.
My purpose in pointing to the Nazi's in Ukraine is that obviously many Russians are upset about it, which is important to understand their world view which is important in finding a diplomatic resolution.
That there are too many Nazi's in Ukraine and therefore we must invade and destroy them, is, for me, a completely sound argument: the conclusion follows from the premises. Of course, maybe the premise is false, that there aren't enough Nazi's in Ukraine to satisfy the Wests own definition of "appeasement" of Nazi's; that is a complicated journalistic and political question. How many Nazi's with how much power are in Ukraine exactly? And where do we draw the line between "not relevant" and "too many" politically speaking.
Again, people who's priority is merely condemning the Russians in order to justify any and all Ukrainian suffering (and the world for that matter) should present their argument (the sources that plausibly establish "how many Nazis" and the political theory that answers "how many is too many"). It's their priority and not mine, if their arguments are compelling I can simply agree to them.
My priority is a diplomatic resolution and for that solutions must be found that are also reasonable for the Russian perspective, and what the Russian perspective "ought to be" is hardly relevant in that.
To take another example of something taken for granted in the West but no argument is ever presented to support it, the current votes in South Ukraine are simply announced as "a sham".
However, although on the surface it may seem a vote carried out under an occupying force is coercive and illegitimate, or then the "real law" there is Kiev's, these are not so easy positions to argue.
Both positions the West would not support in other contexts. For example, votes in both Iraq and Afghanistan after the US invaded and occupied are completely legitimate according to the West. And, obviously, if conquest was not a valid form of changing legal systems then the entirety of America would be given back to Native Americans and all the borders of the world would radically change overnight.
It would be a complicated task to resolve these sorts of questions without resorting to "it's legitimate when the West does it because we say so!"
If the people of these Southern Oblasts genuinely want to separate from Ukraine and join Russia, then it is indeed liberation according to the Wests own standards (that Iraqi's genuinely didn't want Saddam's form of government, and Afghani's genuinely didn't want the Taliban's).
Of course, how do you establish what people genuinely want (on average) without a vote? But how does an occupying army, such as the US, carry out such a vote if no vote under occupation is valid?
The answer to that is of course the vote is valid because we already know what the population feels about it.
Which sounds circular reasoning, and formally it is, but the world is a lot messier than formal arguments and we can get an idea of what a population thinks by both culture and journalism.
Ok, applying all this to Southern Ukraine, we do know there are a lot of ethnic Russians there that speak Russian and, we can safely conclude, based on "cultural knowledge", that they maybe genuinely upset about the Russian language being banned and other cultural genocidal practices; which the West may support this sort of cultural genocide when "we do it" but maybe the Russians feel differently (again, how people see things and feel about things is critical for finding a diplomatic resolution).
Of course, with the right journalistic evidence we maybe convinced that only a tiny majority support joining Russia and therefore the votes are illegitimate. Point being, things are not so simple as they appear in Western media.
As for Putin's moral character, again it's not so easy to condemn Putin.
If he's as evil as people in the West say ... why hasn't he nuked us yet. It seems incompatible with extreme levels of evil to have nukes and not use them.
Additionally, I try to avoid moral evaluations of people, but when I do my criteria is always comparing to a similar class of people and not some immutable set of actions I deem "moral". In this case, Putin's peers are other authoritarians ... but in Putin's case no one really disputes that he has the support of a majority of Russians; which definitely "sounds like democracy" to me.
Compare that to the US Senate ...
A national leader supported by a majority of their people is difficult to morally condemn. The people can be wrong ... but then it's the people that are condemnable and the leader a mere tool expressing that.
Of course, one may argue that the Russian people only support Putin because of Putin's propaganda ... but good luck trying to convince me there's no propaganda in the West.
We then therefore conclude that all nation-state leaders are morally condemnable, but then we come up against my criteria of comparing people to their peers; there being no reason to single out Putin in particular.
The reason we condemn Hitler, Stalin and Moa, is because their actions go far beyond their peers of national leaders (during the same epoch ... again, if British and other previous genocides are fair game, they become far more banal, just happen to be the last members of the same list: nothing more unusual than that, someone has to called out last in attendance).
Now, my point in explaining all this is not to present my views on these topics, but to point out they have not been debated and they are not my priority so I don't have time to evaluate these topics, take a position, present my arguments and have even more time to defend them.
They would be interesting to debate, but no one is actually debating these issues, but rather engaging in a series of factual denials and unsupported hypotheticals in order to argue against the position that diplomatic resolution involving compromise (sort of necessary for diplomacy to happen) is not the best possible outcome for Ukrainians.
Yes, they're tankies all right. But I'd like to address "far-left". While I'm not denying that it's a far left website in some sense, or even that tankies are far left, I'd like to point out that one can be far left but also against authoritarian regimes like China's or Russia's. It's sad that so many on the left fall for the pro-or-soft-on-Putin crap, but not all do.
Although it's true that people like Isaac do have a serious problem:
[quote=Zbigniew Kowalewski]On the international left, almost nobody knows Russian, and even less Ukrainian; so when the left wants to know what is happening in Ukraine, it finds itself in a catastrophic situation. So as not to depend on the Western media, it is condemned to have recourse to the English-language propaganda of the Putin regime and to that of the so-called “anti-imperialist networks” which are pro-Russian (often “red-brown” or downright brown)[/quote]
This is quoted in an article on anti-Stalinist far left website libcom.org, which traces the history of red-brown alliances (alliances of the far left and far right). I'm not unreservedly endorsing the view that pro-or-soft-on-Putin leftists are necessarily in alliance with fascists, or that there's much of a link between, say, Aleksandr Dugin and Western Leftists, but the article is at least an example of a left-wing history and critique of the authoritarian tendencies on the left. (Though to be honest it's too boring and full of links to read in full)
This seems like a pretty good article on Grayzone and Blumenthal:
Grayzone, Grifters and the Cult of Tank
Being "hard on Putin" NATO could have done by sending NATO troops into Ukraine before the war to defend a dear ally, create a standoff and then negotiate a resolution a la Cuban missile crisis (which would be easy to do).
Otherwise, the available means to be hard on Putin is to nuke him.
If you're not willing to nuke Putin then the only available options are soft options.
As for sanctions, they have never been demonstrated to bring about regime change.
So, what are the hard options available to "deal with Putin"?
The "hard on Putin" position since over a decade is simply incendiary rhetoric which, at the end of the day, only serves to support US imperialistic policies and not harm or deal with Putin in anyway.
So you'd include Gabuev as a Putinist then? Interesting assessment...
...or is it only Putinist when we say it?
There is the rest of Ukraine to negotiate over and avoiding or inviting the use of nuclear weapons.
What a bizarre critique. Does your source go on to say why Centrists know more Russian? Is it just Russian? Do leftists know more Swahili than Centrists? Are the Right Wing mysteriously fluent in Turkish, but haven't a clue what's being said in Hebrew?
We're been out of the loop Isaac, to comment on geopolitics one must know every single living language, as well as all the dead ones for context.
Let's see then how triumphant the victorious Russian forces are then, shall we?
Thank you for that article. :up: Hadn't heard that term tankie before.
From the article:
This sounds so familiar to me. The criticism against the US I can understand, but then being an apologist to totalitarian regimes is at first confusing. Yet of course, it should not be. Especially if someone tries to make a living out of journalism or commentary, then you have to pick a side. It's not only about the hand that feeds you (as depicted well in that article), it's also the polarized readers that demand that. And if you become a persona non grata to one audience, why would you write anything that for them and then inflame also the other side. Those trying to stay out of the ideological camps have simply to tread carefully, I guess.
Exactly, this is the position you're supporting along with the other pro-NATO policy and Zelenskyites:
See if the Russians lose for as of yet unexplained reasons at the cost of tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian lives and the near total destruction of the Ukrainian economy.
And not only that, but lose against a smaller force that now needs to be on the offensive, seen as the Russians have already conquered a large majority of the territory they mean to annex (they clearly still want to conquer the rest, but they don't need to).
In addition to being able to shutdown the Ukrainian grid at any time and have nuclear weapons to deal with problematic situations if they want.
Ha! Yes. Lucky for those fluent Russian speakers we have here that the issue of the day is to do with Russia. I wondered why there was so little talk of what's going on in Afghanistan, Somalia, Iraq, Venezuela, Brazil...
Little did I realise everyone is wisely refraining from comment from not knowing the native language.
Yes, indeed, let's sacrifice every single Ukrainian for a chance to "have some consequences".
As an observation of the legacy of the war, you maybe right, who knows, but how does that benefit Ukrainians in either case?
That wasn't what I asked. I asked about your derogatory use of the term 'Putinists'. Does it apply to Gabuev when he concludes that the protests are too small to be much of a threat, or only to us?
Right on, boethius. No one has ever convincingly explained or made any sound hypothesis that this war might not be a victory for Russia. Because it's all just Western propaganda. Like the talk that Russia would invade Ukraine, in the first place.
The glorious Russian army will be victorious!!! Why can't the Ukrainians understand this and surrender?
https://focus.ua/uk/amp/ukraine/521825-osuzhdennyy-za-pytki-byvshiy-kombat-tornado-onishchenko-vyshel-na-svobodu-eks-nardep
I translated it using a little known facility called Google Translate. Of course I had to infiltrate a Liberal Democrat conference to find out about this obscure tool, but I made it out alive to bring this new magic called 'translation' to us tankies. Vive La Revolution!
God created three great virtues: Honestly, Intelligence and Putinism.
But since nobody is perfect, one who is honest and intelligent is rarely a putinist; if one is putinist and intelligent, one is often dishonest; and if one is an honest putinist, then one is not very intelligent.
What a splendid idea! The West could nuke Moscow and Saint Petersbourg, putting Putin in a stronger position to negotiate peace.
Impossible to make sense of your statement here.
Please cite the hypothesis if it's been made.
And, you've already moved the goal posts as your criteria for "not victory" includes things like technically winning a war but it "has some consequences".
What was under discussion was the idea that if Ukraine fights long enough the Russian state would simply collapse. This was the proposed mechanism of "win".
You state that once the territories are annexed that there's nothing left to negotiate.
There is obviously the rest of Ukraine that can be negotiated as well as the use of nuclear weapons, such as trying to negotiate that not happening.
Something the US is currently doing:
Quoting The Hill
Another word for "private talks" is "negotiation".
Seems to be to try to convince Russia that a conventional military strike on Russian forces would follow the Russian use of a nuclear weapon in Ukraine.
This seems to be grasping at diplomatic straws.
First, if the use of tactical nuclear weapons produces an easy victory in Ukraine then the loss of some military assets elsewhere is simply a "cost of doing business".
Second, the easy retaliation for the US striking Russia (a country the US is not at war with) can just be using more nukes in Ukraine, absolutely destroying every base, command centre, logistics hub etc. absolutely decimating the Ukrainian capacity to wage war.
What would be the US response to that? Just a larger conventional strike? And again, even if Russia didn't retaliate against NATO it is easily a net benefit in military terms.
Or, are these "private talks" just the US seeing they've achieved their policy objectives for their constituents the arms dealers and are now willing to wrap things up?
If people have arguments that conventional weapons are a deterrence to nuclear weapons, people are free to explain that. Likewise, why wouldn't Russia simply retaliate with tactical nuclear weapons against the bases which launched these attacks against its forces?
If they did, why would NATO retaliate for that with nuclear weapons of its own if the whole purpose of the conventional attack was to avoid using nuclear weapons, as a full scale nuclear war over Ukraine makes no sense any everyone in NATO knows that.
Solution: resolve the situation diplomatically which is suddenly US and EU officials are talking about.
[sup]Washington DC, USA; Oct 21, 1967
George Harris demonstrating against the Vietnam war
100,000+ protesters participating
Photo by Bernard N Boston
(Similar protests have been seen elsewhere)[/sup]
Nowadays, such protesters wouldn't really be seen as crazy extremists, except perhaps in Moscow?
Either way, Putin has put a firm lid on other voices.
Obviously I don't trust RT or CNN much in this topic. I still feel that I may be missing out on some very good websites on this topic, which, given recent developments merits getting as much accurate info as is possible at the moment. I'm skeptical of the NYT and the like. Nevertheless, and knowing that a complete bias free reporting is not possible, what sites are you all using?
09:30 AM, 26 September 2022
Novaya Gazeta Europe
Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) has reported that 261,000 men had left Russia after the announcement of “partial” mobilisation in the country, our source in the Presidential Administration tells us.
Discussions on closing the border for men of military age began in the Presidential Administration on Wednesday, 21 September, when law enforcement agents had started reporting the numbers of men leaving the country. According to our source, the last report by FSB from 25 September stated that 261,000 men had left Russia in the period from Wednesday to Saturday evening.
https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2022/09/26/sources-fsb-reports-260000-men-left-russia-wants-to-close-borders-news
Meduza, Al-Jazeera, Reuters, AP, Deutsche Welle, France 24, BBC world news, NPR.
No source is free of bias, but some are more reliable and professional than others.
Yep. Bias is inevitable, accurate presentation of the facts given context, is not.
Thanks for those sources.
It's for real. :(
That the Russian invasion of Ukraine is only Western propaganda? Sure.
(See here)
(See No, Russia will not invade Ukraine)
Except you can find photos like that from years ago already. This is from 2007 and then Putin's elections:
Perhaps Russia now experiences something that the US experienced in 2020 after the death of George Floyd?
What's concerning (among all the concerning stuff) is that Biden doesn't want domestic tranquility in Russia. He wants regime change.
Putin had a somewhat good run for Russia. Until 2014, and especially from February 24th this year it really been a train wreck.
I guess if Biden wanted stability in the region, he would try to help Russia save face right now, instead of humiliating the fuck out of Putin? Maybe that's not even in the cards, though.
Quoting ssu
True. I think he was pretty well respected after Syria. How things change.
By the way, going by ...
Russian Society and Foreign Policy: Mass and Elite Orientations After Crimea (Mar 14, 2019)
... the general Russian population isn't particularly keen on the outward aggressions nor feels particularly threatened by other countries.
Hard to tell, but does make sense (to me anyway).
I can totally believe that. But that's the official line: that foreign countries (the US) are out to get Russia. Many of the Russians that I've met have totally sound and realistic views about the state of their nation. If the US is polarized with democrats and Trump fans, Russia is even more divided with those that believe in Putin and those who are against the regime.
Yet as there isn't a democracy, just how much there is opposition is hard to know. Yet a quarter of a million people leaving the country does tell something.
What are you talking about?
The issue under discussion was how Ukraine would be victorious, or Russia not-victorious, through military means, such as the collapse of the Russian state.
And I was asking for a citation from this thread or an actual argument.
I know people state that Russia will collapse or that Ukraine will "be victorious", what I'm asking for is how?
The closest I've seen to an actual argument is that low morale will simply lead to the complete dissolution of the Russian armed forces. An argument with zero supporting evidence except anecdotal that some Russians aren't happy (which is not surprising).
I'll give it a shot.
The West insists the war is a "mistake" or "miscalculation" as basically Westerners don't approve. I think this sentiment is more-or-less just the emotional praxis of cancel culture applied to Russia and with zero context.
The war is presented as something happening totally out of the blue and unprovoked.
Obviously it's not out of the blue and has been going on since 2014 and teasing Ukraine joining NATO and therefore moving NATO weapon systems into Ukraine, and in the meantime arming and training Ukraine, is obviously a provocation. Of course, one can argue that these conditions do not satisfy a just war hypothesis along US' standard of invading Iraq (or then argue both aren't a just war), but, putting the moral evaluation aside, the context is important to actually understanding the situation.
For, after the civil war broke out there was 2 agreements (agreed by all sides) to end the fighting, the Minsk accords:
Quoting Minsk agreements
Azov sympathisers like to say these agreements aren't "fair", well then Ukraine didn't need to sign them.
Again, regardless of the moral status these agreements obviously failed.
Getting into the geopolitics, the context of the war going on since 2014 (and ethnic Russians dying in it) and Russia signing agreements that would create a ceasefire (and mainly Azov and co. continuing the fighting), doesn't matter for Western media but it does matter to other geopolitical actors that Russia deals with.
The war is not out of the blue, and Russia has essentially since 2015 to make their case to their friends and allies that a larger war is inevitable. Simply because the West just ignored this issue, does not mean Russia did and literally 7 years of being able to point to Russia signing the Minsk agreements and Ukraine and the West not implementing them can go a long way to explain when the sanctions came down, essentially no country outside the West joined in, and the West was all Pikachu face all of a sudden.
Likewise, cutting the water to Crimea was a real headache for the Russians, with Crimean agriculture about to be seriously damaged (without fresh water, not only is agriculture more difficult, but salt water seeps in from the sea, from what I've read). And we can't forget the Nazi's, who nearly any Russian, from Putin to the lowliest peasant, is going to be angry about. From the Russian perspective "D-day" wasn't the cathartic moment that defeated the Nazi's, but 20 000 000 dead Russians, and it wasn't so cathartic. So it does not only stir hatred for Nazi's, but also hatred for the West which Russia views as ungrateful for their sacrifice in dealing with Hitler's war machine (an actual existential war with a genocidal maniac, not just rhetoric).
Now, simply because there's nearly a decade to prepare militarily, economically and diplomatically for the war, doesn't mean it's a good idea, but the context that it's not some random act out of the blue, obviously prepared diplomatically in direct and indirect ways, may indicate there is a thought out geopolitical plan, in addition to things like meeting with Xi before the war was launched.
We don't know what conversations between Putin and Xi are like, but we can make an educated guess.
From the Chinese perspective, US is constantly talking about a pivot to Asia (aka. China) and constantly talking about China as the rival super power and so on. The war in Ukraine essentially opens a second front with the US, they now are "pivoting" back to the Europe.
From the Russian perspective, they are constantly sanctioned and threatened with more sanctions, so economic relations aren't friendly and all economic ties with the West are a double edged sword, as easily a benefit as painful leverage (for the exact same reasons as the West is suddenly lamenting it's economic ties).
Unlike in Soviet times, there is now alternative sources for advanced technology. We're also at the end of Moores law for a single processing core, so advanced technology does not improve as it once did in any case.
What this means is not only is there no strong technology dependence relations, but China and India now compete with the West as technology suppliers. You can say Western technology is still "better" but China and India are trying very hard to catchup. One thing that would allow them a competitive edge across the board: cheaper access to energy.
So, let's say Putin determines that the West's failure to deal with Ukraine and make them implement Minsk and the constant propaganda and sanctions and threat of sanctions, all means that the West just aren't good partners, just a source of constant headaches, and China and India can provide everything the West provides in terms of components and technicians to run a commodity based economy of things both China and India really need (being the world's factory).
Now, I have zero problem accepting that the preferred outcome of the war in Ukraine would have been a negotiated peace in the first week of the war with Ukraine, every day since, and even now. However, the levels of preparation for both the war (taking over the south in less than a week) and also economic sanctions (Ruble didn't collapse, infrastructure didn't stop working) tells me at least that the possibility of a long war and total sanctions was thought through and accepted as a second best scenario.
Why would this be? Well, if Putin's perspective is either the West are good partners or then not-partners, he would be in the position of being unable to implement this policy himself. If Putin just randomly one day kicked out all Western corporations from Russia, no one in Russia would understand the move and he's gone insane and all that.
However, if the West implements sanctions that forces Western corporations to leave Russia ... that's not Putin's doing, Chinese and Indian corporations come in and are super happy. Russia is still a sizeable market ... so imagine doing your best to compete, with lower prices and marketing and bribes and stuff, struggling for market share and ROI, and then your competitors just up and leave. It's a pretty great feeling.
So, geopolitically, the value Russia is providing China and India as an outcome of this war, is not really questionable. In return, India and China purchase the energy and commodities and don't sanction Russia.
Of course, that's not really a payment to do the war, just conditions that allow the war to happen.
So what is Russia getting from the war other than just kicking out unreliable partners (from it's point of view)?
Militarily speaking, the Azov sea is a traditionally very weak spot for Russia and the 2000 km border with Ukraine means Russia can be invaded on a massive front just like it did to Ukraine, goes both ways. How much do these things matter in a nuclear age I honestly don't know, both in terms of the real truth and what the Kremlin actually thinks about these conventional military considerations.
So, even ignoring any real military gains, apparently there's giant gas fields right under the Donbas and around Crimea.
I'll stop the analysis here for now, as I need to go to a meeting, but if a Schism with the West and taking these gas fields are a primary motivating factor, with protecting ethnic Russians (whether genuine concern for Putin or not) easy pretext for the war, then one is left to wonder who is baiting who.
Did the US bait Russia into this "mistake" or did Russia bait the US into massive sanctions and refusing reasonable peace deals to take these gas fields and create Russia-India-China alignment? For, the US' analysis was that this would be Russia's "Afghanistan" and so weaken Russia in conventional military terms, which is certainly true in terms of using up Soviet stockpiles. However, if the Soviet stockpiles had a shelf life anyways ... and short term conventional weakness doesn't mean much when you have 6000 nuclear weapons, and therefore the gas fields, water to Crimea, and creating an alternative global financial system is "worth it".
It used to be called "voting with one's feet", in the good old days of the USSR. They all tell the same story: not interested in committing war crimes, thank you very much. I thought they would say they are saving their skin, but it seems they primarily don't want to take part in what they rightly see as a crime.
Again, any evidence this has a chance to stop the war? Will all these people be signing up to fight to Ukraine?
How many will just return to Russia after they get their first energy bill?
Propaganda victories can be short lived (for example if Ukrainian gains are stopped and reversed the recent euphoria will be a distant memory) ... and obviously no amount of propaganda produces victory, although it is pleasant to hear.
We can just look at Venezuela, Belarus, Iran and Russia itself and notice that widespread dissatisfaction and protests don't topple totalitarian regimes. It's only in functioning democracies were large scale protests can make the administrations to resign.
But I agree, it's at least positive what is happening in Russia.
I really think people here have a tendency to extrapolate all sorts of stories from a minimum of facts.
We have seen an irrational Putin. Which is a variation on the theme whenever leftists proclaim "but why do poor people vote against their interests? whine whine". It's elitist and almost always misplaced. Putin is not an idiot, he's not irrational. He simply thinks other things are important than most "Westerners" fed on a steady diet of neoliberal economic policy, white saviour complex while being blind to the financial and cultural oppression of other countries and sometimes outright wars (based on lies). He doesn't care about the legal order so the whole "it's an illegal war" is not a consideration at all. We know this because Russians bomb the shit out of civilians in every war and those rules are older than the UN charter.
Then there's the "Putin is a mastermind" kind of exposition you just wrote. We see coping and market mechanism developing alternative financial systems, we see increased trade between Russia and countries that didn't join sanctions. These are reactions to circumstances and I don't believe for a second these steps and consequences can be predicted by any type of accuracy because you cannot accurately predict the shape and form of sanctions, the level or type of support by the West and even your own allies. etc.
Then there's the "imperial" Putin because he referenced tsaristic Russia a couple of times (and boy, what a lot of books that invited). I'm sure lizards dream of being dragons too. That doesn't automatically mean they actually try to breathe fire.
I still believe the simplest explanation is NATO expansion or the threat thereof. The BBC in 2008 on Georgia: Quoting BBC
I think the similarities in 2008, 2014 and now in 2022 are obvious. It's the simplest explanation for Putin's actions. A basic realpolitik interpretation of the geopolitical situation where Russia considers NATO an existential threat. The knee-jerk reply that "NATO is a defensive alliance" is neither here nor there - it's not about what we believe, it's what Putin believes that drives his decisions.
Uh, by continuing to do what it has done now. :smirk:
Quoting boethiusYes, we have heard your argument that everything is just anecdotal. The quarter million leaving Russia are just anecdotal also. :snicker:
Quoting boethius
Actually the war has lweakened Russia far more than the war in Afghanistan did the Soviet Union. That Russia is using Soviet stockpiles is already quite telling. Meaning that the modern stock has already gone or very limited.
(T-62 tanks, which were first introduced in 1961 to the Soviet arsenal. Production stopped in 1975.)
Again, it is not meant to stop anything. Boys don't want to be criminals, kudos to them. If you want to commit war crimes instead of just advocating them on TPF, go right ahead and enlist. But that too won't stop anything.
To be fair to @boethius, the question he was answering was a request for...
...not necessarily a wholesale agreement with such an assessment. The point is to show how it's a perfectly plausible theory, and it does indeed has many plausible aspects.
One bit of rhetoric that seems to linger even in critiques is this idea that things like sensible long-term strategies, plans B (or C, or D), feints, bluffs, preparations etc require some kind of strategic mastermind. They don't. They're all quite normal tools in any governments tool-box. It would be a surprise to find them absent from Russian planning, it's not remotely a surprise to find them there.
Putin can be a mediocre autocrat and still have more than one reserve plan, he can be clouded by ambition and still think strategically a few years ahead, these aren't difficult tasks.
It's part of the Western propaganda to paint a prepared Russia as being implausible so as to maintain the 'victory is just around the corner' spin we hear so many here obediently regurgitating. To further that end, this narrative had been spread that anyone suggesting Russia is prepared must think Putin is a genius (and therefore must be a Putin supporter!). It doesn't take a genius to adequately prepare for war. It takes a mid-level bureaucrat with a modicum of facilities at his disposal.
...and then?
Ukraine continues to win back territory as it has been doing, rebutting Russian advances as it has been. Go on with your story...What does Russia do next in your version of 'How Ukraine Wins'?
I've been meaning to ask you as an actual professional of these things what would need to be proven for a judge to consider an actor "irrational". Maybe people would propose some other standard, but I think it's an interesting reference point regardless.
Your summary above is spot on: you need a lot more than some mistakes to consider someone irrational. And ... it's one of those "call me in 300 years" to even really be sure what was a mistake or not. Russia totally collapse with this a contributing factor as @ssu says may happen; sure, big mistake, no dissenting opinion from me on that one ... but people pretend like that has already happened somehow.
It's not often used that way, but in terms of 'capacity' it's largely to do with the retention and repetition of relevant data rather then the outcomes or methods. If someone can be shown to repeatedly fail to recall, or make use of, information that is clearly consequential to the outcome of a decision, then they may be said to lack the capacity to make that decision rationally. They can get it 'wrong' as often as they like, it doesn't really enter into the legal framework.
Mistakes are, as you say, very difficult to judge. This is especially true of an autocrat like Putin. He's not the state, he's a person, which means he'll have his own agenda which may or may not have anything to do with the perpetuation of the Russian state.
Wow. According to my back of the envelope calculations; with a 1% margin of error, to 99% confidence you'd need a sample of 15556 to be able to make such a claim of 250,000 people. You have been busy haven't you!
Of course I wouldn't dream of doing any actual factual analysis about war crimes before the most important matters are dealt with. I'd get straight on to social media without delay and make sure everyone knew just how very much I thought war crimes were bad...
...then I'd get the calculator out...
"Nearly 100,000 Russian citizens have crossed into Kazakhstan alone since last week, the country’s interior ministry said on 27 September."
https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/putin-mobilisation-russians-flee-across-borders-kazakhstan/
Estimates seem to be very variable as to how many Russians are leaving. Has anyone done any sums yet?
The place will be empty by next Thursday. All 145 million of them citing the fact that they suddenly realised that killing innocent people is bad. Most said they had no idea until they read some earnest Westerners clarifying the matter for them on Twitter.
First of all, one should look at net flows. People come also back to Russia.
Here's of statistics of Russian citizens entering Finland (yellow) and leaving (white):
As for Finland (and the EU) Russians need visas, the volumes of people to coming to Finland is small. Yet it's the only Western border open for them (perhaps Norway might be up North). Kazakhstan doesn't have visa requirements and there is a large ethnic Russian population in the country.
From the Border Guards site of the following days of Russian citizens (link here:
Date___Incoming_Outgoing___Net inflow
26.9.___ 7 743_ 3 662_ 4081
25.9.___ 8 314_ 5 068_ 3246
24.9.___ 8 582_ 4 199 _ 4383
23.9.___ 7 667_ 3 545_ 4122
Hence several thousand coming in every day to Finland. And a lot of new cars. So these aren't poor people leaving Russia, but basically people the Russian economy would need. To put this into perspective, last year in Finland there were about 70 000 people that came from the former Soviet states, majority naturally Russians. Of course many go onwards to other Western countries.
Here's the stats by Frontex:
Georgia and Kazakhstan likely have far more. The stats may have difficulties to keep up.
Swedish geological stations notice an explosion: See here (in Swedish)
Reuters picked on it:
Russia has declared it cannot repair the leaks because of the sanctions. So a bit of hybrid warfare?
I haven't listened to it, but will give it a try when I have time.
1 Ukrainian Questions Posed by Russian Invasion
2 The Genesis of Nations
3 Geography and Ancient History
4 Before Europe
5 Vikings, Slavers, Lawgivers: The Kyiv State
6 The Grand Duchy of Lithuania
Kazakhstan will guarantee the safety of Russians fleeing their country as Russia moves to conscript hundreds of thousands of army reserves to fight in Ukraine, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has said.
“A lot of people from Russia have come here over the last few days,” Tokayev said in a speech on Tuesday.
“Most of them are forced to leave because of the hopeless situation. We must take care of them and ensure their safety.”
Not sure what you consider to be "the like" of NYT. It has few peers, in my opinion. (That is, if you are after reporting and analysis. I generally avoid opinion columns.)
I am always wary of people in the West (don't necessarily mean you, Manuel) who proudly declare that they don't get their information from mainstream media (spoken with a sneering contempt). You can rightly criticize mainstream media for a lot of things, but what are the alternatives? More often than not, it is trash like conspiracy blogs, misinformation enterprises like RT, Infowars (or thegrayzone), partisan media that cares more about ideology than accuracy and depth, and generally anything that tells you what you want to hear.
NYT, Guardian (which still has an active live stream for the war news), Washington Post all do professional reporting and analysis. BBC is OK for news updates (their Russian studio does good coverage of the war, but of course you need to know Russian). NPR, like much of US media, has scant international coverage. The most complete and timely news can be found in independent Russian and Ukrainian media.
And this is very interesting.
Has Russia lost Kazakhstan?
Gasprom just issued an ultimatum to Ukraine's gas operator Naftogas. The likely outcome of this is that unless Ukraine consents to deliver Russian gas to Europe at no charge, this pipeline will be cut off as well, reducing the current amount of Russian gas flow to Europe by half.
More precisely, Putin has apparently lost Tokaïev, Kazakhstan strong man.
This is the interesting fact: gas to Europe has flowed through Ukraine by the Brotherhood / Soyuz pipelines. Yeah, all out conventional war going on...but don't that let hinder gas trade.
I think here Putin made an error by cutting the gas (or making threats to cut it) far too earlier in the summer. Yes, it's a natural response to counter with something when the West makes all kinds of embargoes against you. But now West Europe has had time to replenish it's stocks, to look for new resources and above all, get it's people informed that the winter might be filled with electricity rationing and even blackouts. Without doing so, without responding in any way until now, I do assume that Western politicians and especially Germany could have been gotten caught with their pants down.
Germany's Olaf Scholz obtaining a LNG deal with the UAE few days ago.(I bet he's as relieved as he looks in this picture):
Imagine if the question where to get gas now, when Russia is out, would have been asked only so late and people in Berlin would start looking at the World map today?
I think that many leaders are starting to notice that Putin's fragile position.
That some ex-Soviet states are starting to have border troubles shows also that they have noticed that Russia is weak, incapable to intervene. Let's remember that Armenia and Azerbaijan didn't even wait for the Soviet Union to collapse before they started their war with each other.
And Armenia and Azerbaijan are again on the edge:
And then there are other border clashes:
When the cats away, the mice come out to play?
It quickly became evident that there is nothing "partial" about the it. This follows from Putin's decree, the actual practice, and statements from some of the local commissars in charge of the campaign. General mobilization doesn't mean that everyone gets called up all at once - the Russian military couldn't handle even a fraction of all eligible people anyway (even though that's much less than the claimed 25 million). The Soviet military reserve system, whatever its shortcomings, was pretty much dismantled in the 2010s, and there is no evidence that any preparations have been taken even after the war started. The military seems to have been taken as much by surprise as everyone else.
Even with the professional ("contract") army we have had plenty of reports about their poor equipment and inadequate supplies in the field. Some of the looting was simply due to the fact that soldiers didn't have enough food and clothing. A typical story was that of a kontraktnik from a supposedly elite division borrowing money to buy his own gear before deployment. Some described the first aid kit issued to them as consisting of a gauze bandage, a rubber band and a bottle of iodine.
This sorry state of logistics will become much worse with the mobilized troops. There are already videos making the rounds showing mobiks being quartered in abandoned barracks with rickety walls and no beds, and being asked to buy their own sleeping bags and mats, and improvise first aid kits from hydrogen peroxide and women's tampons (apparently they work pretty well for stanching the blood flow). Oh, and training? Forget about it, you are going straight to Kherson!
He looks so anxious! I can't blame him.
They're going to be killed. I don't understand it.
There tends to be very little dissent in the NYT, it tends to go with the government in relation to wars, so it's not the best site for this conflict. I think something like Democracy Now! is better, though I do occasionally go to these "traditional" sources, to see what the US establishment is thinking. It certainly has its uses, but I prefer other sites, like Al Jazeera and a few others.
RT used to be excellent for non-Russia related news. Now it's a parody. As is to be expected during wartime from a state sponsored media.
Dissent isn't their job, though.
That's true. Though it should be. "Check on power" and all that media responsibility.
The US government has built-in checks on power. We just want the newspapers to investigate and report.
Questions: What would be the first target? Would he aim to shock and awe Ukraine into submission with a demonstration population strike like Hiroshima, or hit vital infrastructure, or hit some military concentration?
Then what is the world like after that? The West couldn’t respond in kind. But does it just escalate its current tactics - step up arms supply, sanctions and isolation - or does it have to stop and come up with an entirely new plan? Can it give into Putin’s demands in the short term while having some long term containment strategy? What’s plan B?
There's an analysis here.
If they were used for a tactical advantage, then some units would have to advance through the corridor provided. There is no evidence that the existing forces are equipped to do that. The prevailing winds tend to go from west to east. Not good for Russia.
If it was a strategic strike, then wiping out Kyiv would certainly change the calculus. But that would probably prompt NATO and company to strike all of the other Russian weapons with conventional forces. And if the Russians know that would happen then the strike would have to get in front of all the instruments of Mutually Assured Destruction by a preemptive strike from the mother of preemptive strikes.
Or else the big Hiroshima demonstration of resolve much sooner to see if that cracks Ukrainian and Western will. A more desperate gamble. And who would be the likely target? Odessa as the critical sea port and historical city?
Could US provide the Ukrainians with the antimissile defence or even shift to enforcing a no fly zone if Russian preparations are underway? Is that the countermove?
Quoting Paine
Yes. The analysis I’ve read so far rules out practical use on the battlefront - apart from EMP.
Quoting Paine
But who do you negotiate with? And Belarus might be unhappy about a strike so close.
Odessa docks might be a limited enough starting point. Both a useful military target and one with international name recognition.
Quoting Paine
Yep, the sky’s the limit after the first move. So if the Russian generals are capable of rational choice, does that tilt things to an EMP attack and spring offensive? A more “excusable” crossing of the line?
The problem is that Putin needs to pull a rabbit out of the hat in the next month or so given the way his frontline is crumbling. What do we know of his generals and their ability to prevent that?
I don't know how deep the support may go toward supporting the use of weapons of mass destruction in the Putin regime. But I am pretty sure that there is not any room to try one thing first and then see how others react. The best chance one has, as the aggressor, is to wipe out the opposing response at the same time one attacks. Otherwise, you are toast.
It’s not as if the chemical and biological lines haven’t been crossed often enough now.
Yes, that is why I thought a 'proportional' response would employ 'conventional' weapons. What if that response wiped out strategic use of nuclear weapons by Russia?
MAD only works if you can deliver the destruction on command.
I’m not following. How could lobbing a few tactical nukes in the current war - now framed as a legitimate defence of mother Russian territory - make any difference to the strategic arsenal of subs, missiles and cruise missiles?
That was the irony. Yes, to report on the US they were able to act like investigative journalists. But anything concerning Russia or it's allies is a different matter. And of course, when the Kremlin wants to push something, everything close to journalism goes out the window and it's Goebbels-time. Sad, but they could be OK journalists, if they want.
Quoting Olivier5
I sincerely hope so. There is a small possibility that Putin will follow the "escalate to de-escalate" doctrine especially now when directly from the Stalinist playbook, the sham referendums have been done with North Korean success on the occupied territories. Especially if not otherwise the Ukrainian counter-offensive cannot be stopped.
A tactical nuke wouldn't do much in the battlefield: Ukrainian battlegroups simply aren't packed together that a tactical nuke would do much. It would just create huge panic and likely condemnation to Russia even from it's allies. Naturally the panic, especially in the West, could do wonders. People would genuinely think that nuclear annihilation is the next logical step and will happen the next day. Arguments for immediate cease-fire would be heard a lot.
Likely in that case, if tactical nukes would be used against Ukraine, suddenly the Ukrainian defence forces would start to inflict unseen damage to the Russian forces. The Russian Black Sea fleet would have many ships sunk in rapid secession, Ukraine suddenly would leash this awesome barrage of cruise missiles etc. I think this is the issue that US tries to communicate to Russia. Hopefully they are credible in their threat. (And it's obvious that this isn't said publicly as that would make it just worse)
I do think that neither side wants all out WW3. Putin's game would literally start to be Russian roulette for him.
The fact is that it seems now as things are going good for Ukraine, some Western countries are starting to limit the arms shipments to Ukraine. Germany hasn't been keen to send Leopard 2 main battle tanks to Ukraine and what the Ukrainians are short of is modern Western air defence systems.
See here
The Border Guard wants to build 130 - 260 km fence on our 1300 km border with Russia. The project is estimated to take 3 to 4 years. Now there is no fence or anything physical on the border. Just an narrow corridor in the forests with border stones marking where the border is.
(This isn't reality yet between Finland and Russia)
Ukrainians could also retaliate: not with a real nuclear weapon (at least initially) but with "dirty bombs". Add nuclear waste material to a conventional bomb, and find a way to blow it off on the Red Square.
Lol, yes. It seems that mobilization has succeeded in making people fear the Russian military again, it's just that those people are Russians themselves.
After reports and videos of escalating clashes and riots in Dagestan, officials have stopped mobilization there, at least for now. I can see this having serious follow on effects if other minority populations, who have made up a massively disproportionate amount of front line combat forces, realize they can refuse to fight and their federal leaders refuse to assist with mobilization. After all, what can Putin do if they refuse like Luka in Belarus, send his military to cow them? They increasingly are the military. Quite a predicament.
I mean, it's a dumb question. What is the answer supposed to be: "well, after we've come under nuclear attack, I might start having second thoughts about the doctrine of retaliation?"Or maybe "hmmm, I suppose I be paralyzed by fear and unable to act?" All you can really say about strategic deterrence is "yes, no doubt should exist, we will retaliate." Hell, you'd say that even if you're arsenal didn't actually work.
Western responses proposed range from detonating a nuclear weapon in the Arctic, to a conventional strike on the base that sent the attack, to a no-fly zone over Ukraine and the destruction of what remains of the Russian air force, probably paired with US missile defenses moved in as well so they can't effectively use more weapons as easily, to a nuclear strike on an unpopulated area of Siberia.
Or simply increasing sanctions to a full embargo. China has a treaty saying it will defend Ukraine in the event of a nuclear attack, so it may feel it has to join such an embargo to keep its credibility, which would totally isolate Russia.
I suppose the West could also have already prepared tactical nuclear warheads that can be mounted on Soviet era systems or Ukrainian designs such as a modified version of the Neptune missile. This would allow the West to avoid directly attacking Russia, but let Ukraine deter Russia by answering strikes on military targets with their own low yield nuclear strikes on Russian bases. Obviously the big risk here is that a loose cannon gets control of the weapons and uses them in a first strike.
However this war ends, Ukraine will end up with a large incentive to develop nuclear weapons and missiles capable of reaching strategic targets in Russia in order to avoid future attacks. They also likely have the resources left over from the Soviet era to accomplish this, and the risks associated with them being armed now might carry less weight if you expect them to be armed later.
The parallel in history here is Russian nuclear escalation during the Yom Kippur War. Part of the reason this didn't work as well as it might have was that Israel itself was capable of hitting Moscow and St. Petersburg with its own nuclear weapons, which made Moscow's ability to escalate much more fraught, since it wasn't only the US it has to worry about.
Putin would have annexed the territories anyway :lol: the referendums were just a make up.
Yeah, 99.2% approval in some areas. Truly an unbelievable victory...
In general, the most dangerous part of a radiological attack is the actual explosion. I generally worked on the C and B in CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear but people who had spent their careers in the field were pretty underwhelmed by the threat of the R component. Something like VX or anthrax is much easier to disperse and more deadly, particularly if used in a terrorist attack in an indoor soft target.
Its also unclear how many tactical nuclear weapons Russia can really deploy. The arsenals that exist on paper don't exist in reality. We know the Russian defense budget has been plundered for years, and weapons no one expects to use are a good target for plundering.
We also know the US arsenal was in shambles during the Obama era despite much less theft and a much higher funding level. Even after a modernization surge in spending, Russian funding for its arsenal is just 1.8% of US spending, despite that being spread over 33% more warheads supposedly held in readiness. Delivery vehicles also need constant upkeep and all of Russia's are near or past their retirement date. It's telling that their only functional delivery vehicle since the fall of the USSR is a liquid fueled system (older technology that is much easier to attack before it can be used since you have to fuel it before launch). This is of course aside from ridiculous wunderwaffen like their nuclear torpedo or nuclear powered hypersonic cruise missiles that circle the globe at all times, which are every bit as much science fiction as the idea of satalites firing lasers for ICBM interception.
So, the risks for Putin of ordering a strike aren't just the risks of the responses from the rest of the world, but also the risk that the military will refuse to execute such a command, and that they will fail to implement it, further hitting Russian credibility.
You can't just throw ICBMs and nuclear warheads in a warehouse and expect them to work. Anything using tritium from the Soviet era is very unlikely to detonate. He also has to worry about plans for a strike leaking and Aegis intercepting the strike if it comes from an IRBM (the vehicles they have that are most likely to be reliable for these purposes), as this will cause second thoughts among his military leadership about following him into further escalation. Aegis' ability to hit ICBM targets is new, without a lot of public data, but the ability of the launchers in Poland to shoot down shorter range missiles is a better understood, and larger threat.
I think the US gets a lot of their troops by offering citizenship to Latin Americans for service.
https://news.antiwar.com/2022/09/27/medvedev-says-us-and-nato-wont-intervene-if-russia-uses-nuke-in-ukraine/
I don't think anyone can afford to have much confidence in even further escalation. It is not wise. People always say that no-one would dare use them because of the consequences, if philosophy has any application here, its that we can't be certain of anything. This applies to international affairs doubly so.
I think Putin wants to stop where he is and just defend the (soon to be) annexed territories. If they're part of Russia, attempts to take them back are supposed to be an attack on Russia.
Depends on what you consider "a lot." It's about 30,000 of 1.3 million. It was a relevant source of recruitment when the all volunteer force was under a lot of stress in the mid-late 2000s though.
Minorities in general (if we define that as non-Hispanic White) are actually underrepresented in the military in comparison to the population of service age in the US. If you look at just females, minorities have a much higher representation, but women are a minority in the military. This isn't that surprising historically. African Americans are over represented, as are non-Hispanic Whites. Asians and Hispanics are underrepresented, which tracks with lower levels of military service among immigrants that declines over generations. But again, this is quite different with female members.
Interestingly, this is a pattern that is common with trades too. Minority women are much more likely to go to trade school, get licenses, and join trade unions. When I was working on boosting the number of minority employees working on construction projects we were funding the advice we got from a PhD team was to work on recruiting more women, as this would be key to reaching your other targets.
Right. Best case, Russia is able to keep their gains and becomes a pariah state likely facing near embargo trade restrictions, and possibly even harsh sanctions from China. I can't see a path where using nuclear weapons to conquer new areas doesn't provoke a military response, because at the point what is to stop Putin from doing this anywhere he pleases?
And this will leave Ukraine intact and will likely get the US to go along with deploying Aegis and THAAD there, while Ukraine will have a very high incentive to build their own nuclear arsenal. So now you've created a hostile neighbor who has significantly better missile defense than you and an arsenal that isn't 40+ years old, while your ability to find and get materials for your military as dropped off a cliff. Wasn't the goal to make Russia safe?
It's not that many, then. I I guess it was related to trying to stabilize Syria?
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I wonder what proportion of those are single moms ready to take any path to earning wages.
I mean, that would be my guess too. Then he would hopefully, be forced into a negotiation, which has not happened yet, before considering the use of nukes. Given the inner turmoil in Russia, people fleeing and protesting and so on, the timer is on for Putin, much more than at any stage during this war.
We can hope this doesn't cause him to break and go for broke, or he could be thrown out by the military. Too many variables in the equation.
For a country that freely gave away it's nuclear deterrent, it has already hinted that it would do this. If Ukraine wouldn't be in NATO, this would be the totally logical policy. Hence it's far better for Ukraine to join NATO after this war as developing a nuclear weapon is still quite costly in this World.
Quoting frank
That's what Russia wants the West to think, at least.
Quoting Manuel
As I said earlier, if Putin opts to use tactical nukes, he is playing Russian roulette, and not only in figuratively.
However, let's remember that when Russia annexes the territories of "Novorossiya", then it's the scenario that it has trained for in past exercises: that NATO attacks Russia and they end they conflict with using nuclear weapons. So it's a possibility...if it becomes a full-scale route in Ukraine. So I think it's a possibility, however small.
I think this is a little too much bragging from Hamish de Bretton-Gordon. Is NATO going to attack them when the launchers move out of their garrisons? Hell no! Hence you are talking about a truck-size target that can be stored in any storage facility, garage, cowshed or where ever. It can be anywhere. The idea that NATO could pick up all the tactical nukes is simply ludicrous. In fact, just how elusive the HIMARS launchers have been tells how difficult this really is.
And what if the launchers are now in Belarus. as Putin has said? (See here) Is NATO going attack out of the blue Belarus?
Let's look at history:
1) During the Cuban missile crisis the US was blissfully ignorant about the deployed Russian tactical nukes in Cuba. Hence if US Marines would landed in Cuba as in one plan, the beaches would have been nuked. At least Fidel Castro was very eager to use them if the Americans would attack. The existence of Russian tactical nukes in Cuba was only later found out, which horrified people like former defense secretary McNamara.
2) During Desert Storm Saddam Hussein launched Scud missiles against Israel from the Western Desert of Iraq. The US lead alliance put a lot of airpower to hunt them down and inserted special forces there also, which meant that a lot F-15E and other fighter bombers flew across the desert in vain to find the mobile launchers. To my knowledge, no Scud-launchers were found and destroyed. (If the Special Forces would have done that, you bet there would be the motion picture about it. Now we have the memoir of a SAS soldier in Bravo Two Zero which tells how this didn't happen). And Iraq is a Goddam desert and Iraq's military isn't the sharpest tool in town.
Hence I think this goes a bit to the propaganda side...
In Googol's words, Russia can't give a "why". It just hurtles ... and everyone else ought to get out of the way.
And then Putin hates the West because it has twice now infected Russia with its dangerous ideology. First there was Lenin importing communism. Then it was the US pushing neoliberalism after the Soviet collapse.
So the West has its own familiar worldview. It got swept up in its Enlightenment and Industrial Revolution to become a fossil fuel driven dream of endless growth and social progress. Economics and politics have become fused into machine designed to deliver this destiny. The natural expectation is to become one planet united under free trade liberalism.
But Russia was left off to one side as its own vast Tsarist empire with fuzzy borders, unsure if it was really Western or Eastern, just sure that it was a sacred enterprise, a true fount of culture and humanity. And increasingly aware of the difficulties of maintaining a stable sphere of influence given the fast pace development of Western Europe, with Asia starting to industrialise as well.
So the key, says Velxler, is the West is tied to a destiny predicated on teleological growth, and Russia is tied to a destiny which is just about existing as some kind of impressive imperial spectacle. It doesn't want to be made over in crass imitation of what the West thinks of as the human ideal.
This gives a neat view of why both sides think they are right at a metaphysical level. And hence why both finds the other "unreasonable".
Putin comes in after the West's neoliberal shock treatment proved so disastrous in the 1990s - an experiment in the Western dream of unstoppable growth imposed on Russian soil. And he views the USSR era as likewise the importation of flawed Western metaphysics.
Communism, like neoliberalism, was another theory based on economic determinism – change the economic structure and you change the people.
So the thesis is that Russia's sense of empire and destiny has always been vague by Western standards – as the West has very concrete notions of economic determinism and progressive ambitions.
That is why what Russia really wants in this world seems hazy. It doesn't have an empire plan as such. Even communism as a world revolution, a definite project, was a foreign import. But Vexler says under Putin this inchoate sense of self has turned hard and fascist. Putin has worked on making the state and the people one. And the mission is to push back at the West and its ever-pressuring economic utopianism.
"What good is the world for us, if it is a world without Russia?" Putin says rather nihilistically.
So is the war with Ukraine rational or irrational, competent or incompetent? Vexler paints Putin's Russia as a superpower without any particular teleological plan – something the West could negotiate with – but a huge sense of having been imposed upon for far too long and is now fused into a fascist body politic ready to be reckless about shoving everyone as far away as possible.
Sure, he may overstate. But surveillance and drones have also come a long way since Cuba and Iraq. And Russian logistical incompetence is a thing.
I am not convinced that the line between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons is a thing. Thankfully, we don't have any precedent to guide us in the matter. If the Russians start shelling civilians with small nukes instead of with cluster bombs and the like, suppressing that fire will draw NATO and company to become more directly involved. They have said as much. That has a strategic tang to it.
The reason I related its use to the logic of MAD is that once one introduces nukes into the battlespace, it doesn't make sense to send just a few. You need to use as many as you can before the response comes. It is what Zappa referred to as a One-Shot Deal.
NATO a threat to Russia
Russia a threat to Ukraine
Secondary:
Russia a threat to Moldova, Poland, Romania, Hungary, Slovakia
Putin and team a threat to Russia(ns)
Probably missed some. Feel free to extend/correct.
EDIT: added links
The battle space is Ukraine. If you are in Idaho or wherever, you don’t say let’s go MAD. You say sorry for your loss, guys.
The issue is how to frame Putin’s thinking. A persuasive view is that he sees himself in an existential battle with NATO and the West. Ukraine is just the current focus of a general strategy of constant escalation.
So his game is to ratchet up the pressure however he can. He doesn’t know exactly how much he will actually gain, but shaking the tree hard enough is bound to knock off some of the fruit.
Reading the nuclear talk in that light, his goal would be to put the world in such a state of funk that he gains an advantage. He must gamble with Russia’s only real card - a nuclear arsenal - and promote a climate of genuine fear.
So going nuclear in a delimited tactical fashion wouldn’t be to win in Ukraine and then declare hostilities over. It would be part of the bigger project of destabilising the West by crossing one of its bright lines and raising the question “now what?”.
The danger is that escalating chaos is his goal, not some negotiated face-saving solution to the Ukraine invasion. It is a game of chicken and the West would have to figure out how to play in this updated version of MAD in which a whole new bunch of bright lines would have to be established by the international community.
In short, Putin isn’t trying to find solutions. He is trying to create problems.
Of course some folk believe Putin just wants a fair deal on a Crimean corridor, a chastened NATO, and we can all get back to what we were doing before February. Putin is not a nostalgic imperialist. His demands are kind of reasonable from a certain light. Etc, etc.
I don't know what Putin's ambitions are. But if he thought using tactical nukes would give him Ukraine, I think he would use them.
I hear what you are saying how their use would require a frantic discussion amongst those who oppose Putin. On the other hand, the incremental levels of support of Ukraine from the West do have the strategic benefit of matching emerging threats with emerging counter measures. The US., in particular, is saying they will suppress this fire, in whatever form it takes. The more 'tactical' a method is used by the Russians, the more the suppressing of that fire supports the tactics the Ukrainians are currently employing.
Suddenly, clearing Ukrainian air space would not look so provocative.
I see you like Vexler. I agree with his argument that the whole 'NATO as a threat narrative' is a scam. It boils down to complaining that they won't let Putin be an asshole without consequences.
The question is not dumb and the answer is not "we will retaliate".
Nearly certainly, the question and answer is setup before hand, precisely to just nuclear sabre rattle.
Maybe watch the video before commenting.
The interviewer does not say "will the UK retaliate if it comes under nuclear attack", the question does not even include a scenario, just that the PM is brought down to the bunker to order a nuclear attack (implying it's not even her decision) and the question is actually just how she feels about it.
The prime minister of the UK then does not demonstrate any understanding of what was just said, and (very likely) went with a pre-penned response by (I assume) whoever the interviewer was implying controls her actions in the scenario, and so simply declares she'd do it no hesitation. But that wasn't the question, and then the interviewer reiterates that again and she just delivers her response again.
Likely what happened was the Q and A was setup before hand, but the interviewer took creative license or then what to ask wasn't clear enough, and, in any case, the interviewer would assume the prime minister of the UK would be able to interpret words about the use of nuclear weapons correctly and think 2 seconds for an appropriate response.
My guess would be that the interviewer was asked to frame the question presuming the nukes needed to be launched (so not a policy question) and so that the PM could just affirm her willingness to do so as part of classic MAD protocol. However, the interviewer discovers it's difficult to frame a question that presumes nukes need to be launched (especially to the PM who is presumably the deciding person on this) so the scenario doesn't really make any sense, and to avoid "assuming you're launching nuclear weapons ... would you be launching nuclear weapons?" in order for things to make sense then if you are assuming nukes are being launched then a sensible question in that framing would be something like "how would you feel about that?".
Everyone else in the nuclear chain of command makes sense to ask "you are ordered to carry out a nuclear strike, do you do your duty?" and the journalist mistakingly starts with this framing, but (seems midway through) the journalist realises that makes no sense to ask a PM so he recovers by switching to the question of feeling.
A half-way competent politician would then correct the framing of the journalist (who has no onus of making sense) and then answer a properly framed question and not answer a word salad, especially on the subject of nuclear weapons.
A half-way competent politician would either reframe the question as "if you are asking if all other courses of action have been exhausted and [with the other people involved] it is decided a nuclear launch is the only option remaining, then yes the UK will make use of it's nuclear weapons to defend the United Kingdom and our allies" or then "of course I [and the rest of the people involved] will do everything possible to avoid a nuclear war, but if those terrifying circumstances arise we will not hesitate to defend the United Kingdom and our allies".
However, not correcting the framing of a question as serious as the use of nuclear weapons and then answering the wrong question (the question was about feeling and not duty) simply demonstrates a lack of cognitive competence in terms of interpreting what people are saying, self-awareness (being the PM discussing nuclear weapons), and of course a total and complete lack of emotion and empathy (to not even address the feelings question when it is asked the second time! she simply is unable to process the information as she lacks the emotional capacity to do so, which also explains the tax cuts to the rich in the middle of a energy cost crisis) from someone you'd very much want to be cognitively competent (as they have the power to launch nuclear weapons).
Now, I get it, the political right nowadays has a mental and emotional expectation from the highest offices of governance of literally elementary school, but that reference point is dumb. Demonstrating the prime minister of the UK has as much composure, argumentative sophistication and understanding of social interactions as an 8 year old is not an appropriate standard of high state office.
I am skeptical about grand metaphysical explanations of world events, but speaking of 'NATO as a threat narrative', Foreign Policy reports that Russia’s Stripped Its Western Borders to Feed the Fight in Ukraine:
Yes, until now nuclear deterrence has limited arms shipments to Ukraine and things like:
Quoting Paine
As NATO denied Zelensky's request for a no-fly zone despite being a literal social media deity.
However, what would precede the use of nuclear weapons would be a framing war of who's provoking who, such as the long range missiles.
The US is giving (not selling) arms to Ukraine, providing training and managing strategy and tactics "indirectly" via "advice", and providing the intelligence required for planning and targeting. These are obvious acts of war along with the sanctions.
Of course, as long as NATO maintains it's current policy of not supporting the Ukrainians "too much" there's no reason for Russia to use tactical nuclear weapons, but of course that possibility and the strategic and diplomatic problem it would create has been the deterrence so far for the policy to drip-feed support to Ukraine to ensure Russia cannot actually lose.
Again, if that wasn't the policy, why is US sending more HIMARS to Ukraine now? Obviously they aren't "essential" to US defence, so why not just send them before if you want Ukraine to win?
Also, there's still a bunch of escalation steps available between now and the use of tactical nuclear weapons, of which the Nord Stream attacks are a next step.
Definitely, circumstances would need to be that China and India would not change their current policies (or then that's what the Kremlin believes), which is a high bar.
As @Isaac mentions, the question of "show me one plausible scenario" requires extrapolation to answer.
However, I am at least putting undisputed facts about the past together, rather than telling a story about the future Russian state collapse with neither plausibly sufficient, if any, facts nor any historical precedent that states have any tendency at all to collapse in such situations before.
What are facts:
1. War has been going on since 2014 with Russian language and culture suppression, that, at minimum, is likely to attract the Kremlins attention as a problem to deal with.
2. We know there have been giant gas fields discovered in the Donbas and around Crimea (experts, industry and nations certainly believe it's there in any case).
3. Russia heavily invests in modernising its armed forces since 2014 as well as preparing for sanctions. That the Russian economy and currency survive essentially maximum sanctions is I think good evidence they adequately prepared for the latter, and that one of the first things they do is launch a hypersonic missile is good indication of the former; the war launched, by definition, after accomplishing these pre-conditions.
4. We know Putin went to Xi to get, if not a blessing, a common understanding on the war and what China's policy would be.
5. We know Germany rejected approving Nord Stream 2 and the West has been "punishing" Russia over Crimea and the Donbas war in various ways since 2014.
6. We know energy crisis is hurting the West at China, India et. al. benefit, in at least relative terms.
7. Lastly, we know Putin is a sophisticated enough in his thinking and planning to navigate the halls of power for several decades without any major self-inflicted harms to himself or Russia, and certainly doing better than his predecessor which is the only objective comparison standard. Certainly anyone can lose their grip on reality at any moment, but there is no indication that's true of Putin so far.
8. We know that Russia prepared and successfully carried out rapid occupation of a majority of the 4 regions they are in the process of annexing.
The proposal of the Western media and many sympathisers is that these facts are unrelated by any coherent viewpoint from Putin, the Kremlin or the Russian military. That it's all one big miscalculation at best and irrational at worst (that's the acceptable spectrum of opinion on the issue).
Now, regardless of whether a plan ultimately will works or not, is independent of whether a plan makes sense and certainly if a plan exists in the first place. I can lose pretty badly but still have a reasonable plan of action given my capacities and the circumstances.
Indeed, especially if you believe the West is intrinsically superior, US the super power and Russia a joke, then if the USA is "out to get Russia" (which their propaganda since well over a decade would suggest, framing Russia as the adversary, moving missiles closer to Russia, attacking directly Russian interests such as Syria, supporting a coup in Ukraine etc.), then it's entirely possible we are seeing the best geopolitical plan possible ... yet it may still not work due to intrinsic weaknesses.
For example, if we were to duel in some way on your area of professional expertise, I would assume I would lose but that doesn't mean I can't come up with a good plan, try to surprise you in some way, make things chaotic and create chances of victory by mere happenstance roll of the dice than meticulous planning.
Indeed, the right kind of chaos favours the weaker party ... which is exactly why we maybe seeing chaos right now. But chaos can also favour the equal or even stronger party (a solid structure can more easily withstand chaos that can easily overwhelm an unprepared adversary) ... which is exactly why we maybe seeing chaos right now.
Who is weak geopolitically and who is strong cannot be determined by observing Western media.
A. US has aircraft carriers and a lot of bases and high-tech spying, strategic isolation from conventional attack at home, technology expertise and tech multi-national corporations, world reserve currency but lot's of debt, obviously nuclear weapons, and allies (that the current trajectory will significantly weaken economically and diplomatically speaking)
B. Russia and China together have critical commodities, production capacity of tangible goods, some high tech weapons and large land armies impractical for NATO to attack, no debts and in fact lot's of different reserves, also lot's of spies but more focus on lower-tech humans, and if not allies then many friends who are strengthening economically and diplomatically in the current trajectory (at least in relative terms).
The world currently is more ideologically aligned with Russia and China than the US and NATO. Authoritarianism in all its forms is on the ascendancy (even in NATO).
If you can:
A. Knock out the US' allies as relevant parties to world affairs (i.e. isolate the US).
B. Fracture the world economy so US tech multinationals are less relevant and setup an energy arbitrage situation providing China, India and co. competitive advantage across the board.
C. Create an alternative to the USD as world reserve currency.
D. Create a situation where nations are desperate for real access to goods and commodities rather than debts to purchase them.
E. Counter US military power with some key leverage points (hypersonic missiles) and building a non-sea based Asian trade system.
F. If your lower-tech intelligence can at least mitigate US higher-tech intelligence enough to operate.
Then you will unseat the US as the world's superpower.
The war in Ukraine in combination with real environmental and depletion problems, puts pressure on all the above points.
Of course, for it to be some "plan" you'd have to know things in advance such as the West bringing down massive sanctions.
However, you don't actually have to "know" that, you just have to be sophisticated enough to simply have two ways things can go: detente and peace with the West or then extreme escalation: Simply put the choice on the table by starting a big war. The EU, if not the US, definitely took the blue pill of continuing to live in their illusions. As for the US, certainly a formidable opponent and, at the least, we can certainly suspect Russia and China to at least believe direct confrontation was and still is a worthwhile contest compared to the alternatives.
Did you forget the USSR and the German very very Democratic Republic?
The Nazi state did not collapse in WWII, but they lost the war maintaining the state even under conditions of sending children to fight to keep defending the state and even after Hitler died.
Russia and the West did not roll into a failed state but accepted surrender of an intact state and then oversaw state transition and reorganisation.
If anything, Nazi Germany is a testament to just how resilient states apparatus is, even under the most brutal of conditions of literally fighting to the bitter end far beyond any rational hope or moral theory of any kind whatsoever other than state worship.
As for the Soviet Union, again this involved no state collapse as the USSR was a supranational governance of different states and the collapse of the USSR was an orderly transition to new state reorganisation of state power, as far as legal structures go.
Whole reason the current war is happening is precisely because the fall of the Soviet Union did not involve any state collapse, neither Ukraine nor Russia, but mere reorganisation of the existing state power within the Soviet Union.
An analogy on a small scale would be Brexit, which clearly does happen.
However, even if you want to consider them both state collapse, neither are examples of states collapsing under the conditions of having gained territory in a war and suffering less losses than their opponent.
The original proposed mechanism for state collapse was the sanctions, which are still there, but again there are no examples of state collapse due to sanctions. So, no surprise that didn't work for the first time this time. If anything, sanctions make the state weaker in some ways but stronger internally relative their own population.
The new proposed mechanism is state collapse due simply to an unpopular war ... arguably supported by a majority of Russians, so, again, has never caused state collapse before and there has so far been no argument put forward here nor elsewhere that "this time it's different".
Let's not make things more complicated than they are. This war could be over tomorrow and everything back to normal if the regime had the good sense of offing Mr. Putin. One bullet would be enough.
Who's disputing that Russia could withdraw entirely from Ukraine, whatever definition, tomorrow?
Question was what geopolitical strategy might there be to explain ... Russia obviously not doing the above and in the process of withdrawing.
If you want to say Russia is in the wrong and no amount of Ukrainian KIA is too little to demonstrate that moral conviction (just not you personally), even without any theory of a pathway to victory now or later, and, largely due to that lack of a feasible plan,Russia wins, ok, feel free to argue that's a good moral and political idea.
However, was I commenting on that one way or another?
And what's "One bullet to the head would be enough" other than wishful thinking that A. that is likely to happen and B. that would change Kremlin policy rather than consolidate it?
And yet you say my analysis is off the mark?
Sometimes your side loses a contest, doesn't matter who was right or wrong, just how reality plays out.
Furthermore, the entirety of my last posts is trying answer the simple question of why would Putin and Xi start this contest of geopolitical confrontation.
Certainly they thought it was a good idea at the time, or why would they do it?
People are free to argue they thought it was a good idea for other reasons (that the war would certainly be over in 3 days and the preparation for a longer war and sanctions was coincidence) or then free to argue that perhaps they did have a plan that seemed good to them, perhaps what I propose hits some key points, but they will nevertheless lose before the mighty-might of the USA. Likewise, there's also the theory available that Russia feels cornered and these are moves from a weaker position; that they cannot actually accomplish any of the key points, or then those points don't matter, but it is a "good try" to avoid the much stronger US position and containment strategy.
The question was basically demonstrate any plausible geopolitical sense at all for Putin's actions, so I've proposed one as a starting point for discussion.
There are certainly alternatives available to what I propose in terms of what the Kremlin's real plan was and is, as well as the chances of success, which I do not say it must and will succeed but only that there are reasons to believe it is possible to come out stronger in comparative terms after such a conflict (indeed, even if the conflict is a blunder and bad for everyone, it improves Russia and China's relative position of geopolitical strength anyways; intentions, plans, actions and results are all related but also distinct from each other).
Certainly USA does not risk state collapse anymore than Russia, and arguably less, so it's a question of changing relative geopolitical balance of power and paying a price to try to do so.
And definitely I would agree Putin is taking serious risks to do so, my argument is only that there is facts around that support the idea the risks are calculated and the whole thing is not a miscalculation, essentially by definition, for the simple reason that the West disapproves.
The war does not achieve Western values and ambitions as manifest by Western social media; that is for certain, but that in itself does not make it a mistake from some other point of view. Maybe from Putin's point of view NATO is evil.
You may say you don't care about Putin's point of view. Ok, but then you don't care about diplomacy with Putin, and if you don't care about diplomacy you are essentially committing to the idea that unlimited Ukrainian suffering and dying is justified to demonstrate your (a non-Ukrainian) commitment to rebuking diplomacy with Putin.
Since this isn't really a coherent argument, but rather reactionary ideological emotionalism maintained in a cocoon of tweets and memes and the soothing voices of ex-generals, then it is no surprise, from this point of view, that fantasy is required to support such an emotional state suppressing any and all rational criticism (that can distinguish between wish and responsible action); you know, fantasy of the kind that Putin will be shot tomorrow and it will all end in a sea of flowers in rifles and the rise of the Russian 60s hippy collapsing the Russian state in a red haze of rad techno tunes. Revolution. Fresh.
This was basically totally normal during the Cold War.
That the other side aided his ally/proxy was totally in line. So in line that actually there was far more "military advisors" operating the complex hardware in Third World countries than now. Especially the Soviet Union was good at this... and had it's military forces in civilian clothes.
(The Parade step shows just who these advisors are:)
So you start again...
Quoting boethius
And then continue...
Quoting boethius
Russian language and culture suppression made Putin do it!!! Gentlemen! Here are the facts, not stories,... :snicker:
Quoting boethius
So according to you Russia's commitment to modernizing it's armed forces is proven by a single test firing of an experimental missile? The massive footage of Russia scraping the bottom of the barrel with 50 year-old tanks sent to Ukraine, with the mobilization troops in conditions that show total unpreparedness for them doesn't refute this modernization, because they test whatever exotic missile they have? Incredible pro-Russian propaganda. :rofl:
Quoting boethius
Whow. I really haven't heard such blazing over the top apologism from anyone in this thread for Putin.
Yeah, I think I'll stop as this is pointless.
I don't disagree, they are still acts of war.
And, my position is that basically the policy framework is the same as in the cold war with each side doing as much as they can "get away with" to obstruct or weaken the other.
Of course, there's no objective standard of what acts of war are ok and which aren't, it's somewhat subjective to the other side.
For example, bringing nuclear missiles to Cuba turns out was "too much" for the Americans, and the Soviets therefore backed off to maintain the basic policy framework.
In this situation in Ukraine, what would be "too much" for the Russians I honestly don't know, but what's clear is that (so far) support to Ukraine has been in this policy framework of not harming Russia in any vital way.
On a spectrum that involves giving nuclear weapons access to Fidel ... what US is doing in Ukraine is pretty low-key in comparison.
Of course, as always, MAD policy requires trying to make the other side believe you're willing to use nuclear weapons, so how far is the rhetoric to the actual use of nuclear weapons I honestly have no clue, but obviously closer than before the war.
What we can analyse is that the US does not have any obvious response to Russia using nuclear weapons in Ukraine. It's obviously not an act that would trigger all out nuclear war, nor even that a nuclear response would be reasonable. Of course, US would like Russians to believe they are unreasonable. So, who is deterring who more to not-do-what is the question.
Likewise, we may not know what the US would do, but there are obvious ramifications with Russia's friends and own population and so on, so launching nukes to win a battle is not some sort of casual decision. I'd argue tactical nuclear weapons are a big advantage to have in a war, but there's still plenty of other reasons not to use them, some of which may explain why they have so far not been used.
Fucks sake man. You complain about strawmanning then you go ahead and treat...
Quoting boethius
...as...
Quoting ssu
Come on! Nowhere in the argument laid out is there even the slightest hint that these factors in any way compelled Putin to act. If you guys really can't come up with any more serious objection than this lame attempt to make any Western-critical analysis sound pro-Putin then it really is pointless your taking part in a discussion forum on the topic. If all you want is an echo chamber, try Facebook.
Making mountains from soundbites is a cancer in modern politics. There is a sea of solid, legitimate reasons to dislike Liz Trusts without resorting to that.
Context matters. This is like Tucker Carlson's latest shitty attempt to prove the US attacked the Nord Stream pipeline by playing a soundbite from a response specifically about Nord Stream 2, which never even opened, and was already canceled after the invasion began.
The context here is a hypothetical where the PM of a country with what is essentially a "no first strike" doctrine gets dragged down to a bunker and given the "Letters of Last Resort," which are specifically to be used in the event of a nuclear strike on the UK or a decapitation strike that kills the PM and other senior leadership in an expected attempt to disrupt C&C before a nuclear strike.
Generally, countries don't explicitly rule out first strikes because a rival might think they can destroy another country's arsenal or command and control apparatus in a first strike and thus avoid or severely limit any reprisal. Only China and India have official no first use policies. However, the Letters are specifically for situations where the UK has already been attacked.
On a side note, I find the concept fairly interesting. There are supposedly five letters with the options:
-retaliate with a nuclear strike;
-do not retaliate with nuclear weapons;
-the crew should use their own judgement;
-place the submarine under an allies control, often the US in a NATO context
-if all hope is lost, find Harry Potter
All of this nuclear fear-mongering is based on the assumption that Russia is losing and Putin is desperate. I don't think this is the case at all. Considering the amount of troops they have had deployed it's plausible that their initial war goals have already been reached.
Mearsheimer even considers the possibility that after the initial successes Russia expanded its wargoals.
These are facts. And the point of this fact is simply to establish the obvious that the Kremlin has obviously been thinking about conflict in Ukraine since 2014, if not before. So, maybe they came up with some sort of game plan in that minimum 8 year period.
The subject is what geopolitical overall strategy may the Ukraine war be apart of. That the war in Donbas is a viable or sufficient or even relevant justification for the invasion or not is a different question.
Quoting ssu
Again, this fact simply establishes that the full scale invasion follows successful weapons development.
Perhaps these are connected in some sort of coherent thought about the subject matter.
The relevance of hypersonic missiles is that, even according to Western analysts, they cannot be shot down with any current technology, and so renders moot the multi-decade anti-missile defence investment of the West to protect key military assets such as bases and aircraft carriers.
US only has a butchers dozen of aircraft carriers so you'd only need a similar amount of hypersonic nuclear missiles to take all or most of them out. Do Russians have enough such missiles? Do they actually work reliably? We don't know.
Quoting ssu
Again ... the position I'm arguing against is the idea Putin has no plan whatsoever, nothing connects the dots, it's just one mistake and blunder to the next and the Russian state will collapse months ago.
Definitely I would agree an equally compelling case as to the one I've rebutted could involve Putin thinking of some, if not all, of the factors I listed, but nevertheless thought the war would be over by now, that Ukraine would negotiate and not fight (from Putin's perspective at least) beyond any rational reason to do so, and that Russia simply lacks the capacity to sustain the conflict in Ukraine and Geopolitically.
It's called a debate, I've come up with a proposal that argues against that of my opponent (that Putin has no any plausible geopolitical plan; the bar set is basically even remote plausibility, which is a low threshold); the stage is open for anyone to argue my proposal is not plausible or some other proposal is more plausible (such as Putin did have a plan, but it relied on Ukraine settling and we're not in uncharted territories).
Don't undersell their commitment to historical restorations, they're now using T-62s and T-64s, they're using 60-70 year old tank designs.
Although to be fair, I did see a T-72 hit with several AT4s without being destroyed. Granted, it seemed to have severe mobility issues before getting hit, which is why infantry were teeing off on it so easily, but it did survive. And one guy on the crew has the sense to jump out and run off.
I think Russian tanks might actually be benefiting from the ammunition shortage. They were always cooking off before and throwing their turrets ridiculously far. That obviously wasn't from a Javelin alone. Russia just tends to stock their stuff with too much ammunition. This explains the BMP-2 killing destroying the T-80 with its autocannon as well, since it looks like it starts a cook off. Also why the Moskova went down to a fairly small payload (Iran hit a much smaller Israeli ship with a similar payload and it sailed home under its own power, but of course where the hit occurs matters a lot). The Moskova had a ridiculous amount of ordinance for its size and I suspect this is what killed it. Point being, less can be more, provided you have the trucks to keep supplies nearby.
If Russia has some magical wunderwaffen, there is no evidence of it. You might as well also suppose the US has some magical laser interceptor that counter it.
They have a hypersonic glide vehicle, but right now they have to launch it from planes that are already going quite fast, and which can be spotted and hit with standoff weapons.
The whole hypersonic thing is overblown. There have been all sorts of hypersonic weapons for decades. What would be new is a low flying hypersonic delivery vehicle, ideally one that could also maneuver. Low flying hypersonics are harder to detect, but if you have a clear trajectory on them other countermeasures in development like hypersonic interceptor loads fired from 155mm guns can destroy them. Obviously the Israeli laser interception system for mortars and drones is very exciting because you can't beat the speed of light for intercept timing, but there are huge difficulties using it at any long distance.
Usually yes, but discussing the use of nuclear weapons I think is an exception.
The West has made mountains of every mention of Putin not even mentioning nukes but indirect language of tools and so on.
When it comes to nukes there is very good reason to make mountains of few words.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I would agree this doesn't prove anything, but it is clearly a direct threat, and if you are threatening to stop Nord Stream 2 in some vaguely unspecified and clearly illegal way (the legal way would be "oh, we'll convince Germany with sound economic arguments") it stands to reason you maybe threatening Nord Stream 1 as well, which accomplishes the same thing.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Again, she does not mention she too agrees it's a last resort, nor implies any understanding there is choices that remain, does not hesitates to say she will "do her duty to launch" (which does not make sense, it's not the PM's duty to launch but duty to decide if indeed the circumstances justify it, and would therefore be other people's duty to launch; that the military believes there is only one further course of military action available does not exclude the civilian authority deciding on another course of action, such as capitulation; exactly why the military is subordinate to the civilian authority in a democracy, in that morality and politics is a wider scope of consideration than the exercise of force and the interests of the people are not synonymous with the interests of the government, much less the leadership or military as such).
Of course, the interaction is supposed to be just basics of MAD: "we'll retaliate!" For, if you do not think your opponent would retaliate, even when retaliation would be a net-loss for your people (inviting both another nuclear strike and more nuclear fallout generally speaking) ... then maybe rational to first strike to force a surrender, which maybe entirely rational to do after a first strike. It's called MAD because it's predicated on making your opponent believe you will not act rationally after a first strike.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Again, she basically says she'll do her duty (to launch) and not choose what she believes as PM to be in the interest of the UK among the 5 options. So, maybe she didn't understand the question (in which case you should ask clarification) or then, as I say, the question and answer was predetermined but the interviewer went off script. Again, do you want someone who isn't paying attention to detail when nukes are being discussed ... in charge of launching said nuclear weapons?
However, if your retort would be that the whole thing is more insight into the "professional sportification" of politics than UK nuclear policy, I would agree.
As for the letters themselves, clearly those are most of the basic options available, and also there's no plausible scenario at the moment where the decision to use nuclear weapons by a member of NATO is not a US decision.
In terms of US policy, again involving very few words, but the policy recently changed from no-first use, to "defend vital interests". Analysts have written a lot about that too; again, I think for good reason.
Again, this matters little if Ukraine has does not have better tanks in the situation.
The reason Ukraine is now asking for Western tanks maybe because it is running out of Soviet tanks.
However, Western tanks may not be a practical solution for a lot of reasons.
I agree this is likely.
Quoting Tzeentch
The nuclear fear-mongering has a lot of different reasons.
Even if Putin believes he can't "lose" at this point, he'd still want to deter more weapons shipments to Ukraine.
Even if the US believes Ukraine has already "lost", it would still want to keep sending weapons to Ukraine so that they don't lose even harder or to simply bleed Russia and increase the cost of their victory. Of course, the US would not want Russia to change the dynamic by using nuclear weapons, so would want to deter Russia from crossing that line by presenting escalation pathways, nuclear or then conventional (but then may turn nuclear later if the escalation continues).
The logic right now is that the US is trying to convince Russia it will respond conventionally an impose a cost higher than whatever is gained by the use of nukes in Ukraine. Of course, just as it's not rational for US to nuke Russia for nuking Ukraine, it would not be rational for Russia to nuke the US for a non-nuclear retaliation.
Next step is of course Russia trying to convince the US that Russia's non-nuclear and entirely rational retaliation for a non-nuclear US retaliation wouldn't be worth it for the US.
Of course, in that process of threatening non-nuclear retaliations, at some point one party tries to convince the other "well, ha, if you did that then I would use nuclear weapons, so there, checkmate".
For example, US policy is to view even conventional attack on its carriers as a nuclear attack on US soil. Now, how not-A is viewed as literally A is anyone's ontological guess, but nevertheless that is the stated policy. If you believe the US would carry through on that policy, then you are less likely to attack a carrier (as a state actor at least).
So, even if both parties are still far from any circumstance in which nuclear weapons are likely to be used ... it is still rational to deter the other's current policies with said nuclear weapons.
Then there's also just political rhetoric of the blame game for the home audience as well as setting up the threat of nuclear war as the reason for a resolution of some sort (which does not seem likely but maybe plays a roll if people believe resolution needs to happen at some point).
I don't really disagree with anything you're saying, and I certainly don't have any great desire to defend Truss. It's just that I don't see this particular interaction as a great way to judge why she's (likely) going to be a shit PM.
You have the right reasoning on the Nord Stream comments. US comments about shuttering the second line before it opens imply that it might want to close the other pipeline as well (it hasn't been moving anything anyhow). The problem with Tucker's editing and commentary is that it is meant to strongly imply that Biden was making a statement about wanting to attack the currently damaged pipeline, when in context that is not what he is saying.
Notably, the Western responses to Russian nuclear threats was muted early on. When Putin put his nuclear forces on alert Biden didn't do anything with the US arsenal. The media is always going to pick this stuff up because fear sells, but official statements were fairly muted at the start of the war. There definitely seems to have been a strategy of "if we ignore it and don't rise to the bait, Putin's statement won't have the desired effect of spooking the public and weakening the resolve to publish him for the invasion."
What has changed is that Russia is now losing ground almost everywhere there is fighting and appears to be in danger of losing the war outright. Then Put in gives a speech about annexing territories that he doesn't fully control, where there is active combat, and in the same speech implies that Russia will use nuclear weapons if its territory is threatened, i.e. conquered parts of Ukraine are now parts of Russia that will be defended with the nuclear arsenal is counter attacks continue. He was careful not to make that explicit, but it is still a major escalation from the very vague threats early on, and he has more reason to resort to nuclear weapons as the conventional war gets more unpopular and Russia continues to lose ground. That is the key difference I see from hypotheticals about last resort strikes.
Actually, they did thought about far earlier to get Crimea. Just after the Soviet Union collapsed, the debate started like this:
See here
Perceived very well by the Ukrainian diplomats, actually.
I wouldn't refer to it as "analysis". "Unfettered wishful thinking" is more apt. Or simply "verbal diarrhea"...
Interesting. So, if you know this, and you're not committing treason by openly saying it on the internet, then how is it that Russian generals don't know it too?
What mechanism is in place whereby you can freely talk about this tactical insight on a public internet forum yet the information somehow remains hidden from one of the larger intelligence agencies in the world?
https://twitter.com/Gandom_Sa007/status/1573300331412348930
It seems the Italian antifascist song has fans in Ukraine too. From three months ago:
[sup]• Norway oil safety regulator warns of threats from unidentified drones (Sep 26, 2022)
• Norway raises emergency level, coordinating with armed forces over oil and gas drone threat (Sep 27, 2022)
• Drones seen near offshore platforms, Norwegian regulator says (Sep 28, 2022)
• Nord Stream: Norway and Denmark tighten energy infrastructure security after gas pipeline 'attack' (Sep 28, 2022)
• Sightings of several unidentified drones in Norwegian North Sea (Sep 28, 2022)
• Drone activity observed near Total offshore installation in North Sea (Sep 29, 2022)[/sup]
Nothing whatsoever I should think...
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2022/may/13/oil-gas-producers-first-quarter-2022-profits
Do you see any reason there why anyone in power would want to for anything at all about this situation?
Let's not hope it goes to things like in Saudi-Arabia...
At least now (with the Baltic gas pipeline sabotage) Gazprom can refer to force majeure and not be worried about fines from not holding up gas deals.
Happier times with Nordstream earlier... Angela and Dmitri had fun back then. Now literally the thing ended with bangs.
lol, it isn't hidden, there are tons of videos of tanks hurling their turrets due to cook off. There was also plenty of commentary from before the war that the Moskva, despite an impressive armorments (several S-400 systems essentially), was loaded with more munitions than most comparable ships in other navies, and that this necessarily increases the risk of secondary explosions. Leaked pictures of (if I recall from the Moskova itself in some of them) showing munitions strewn about corridors only added to that conception.
You could also come to this conclusion comparing the damage sustainable by the Stark when hit by an Exocet, versus the damage to a larger ship hit by a Neptune (similar payload), although impact site matters a lot. It's not exactly classified that there is a trade off between how many munitions you pack into any vehicle and how likely it is to suffer catastrophic cook off if it is hit by an explosive.
Cramming things with high explosive makes them more likely to explode. If there is a high incidence of this effect in combat vehicles that are supposed to be able to sustain such attacks, then you appear to have a problem. Although it might just be with armor quality for the tanks. And context matters. Cook off after a top attack weapon strike or big bore mortar strike that would likely be fatal anyhow is less of an issue than having a tank that appears to have survived an indirect 155mm shell explode a few seconds later. In the latter, it is the cook off that is destroying the tank and killing the crew.
That's not your claim though is it? Your claim was that they packed too much, not that they made an informed decision about the trade off between pros and cons. I'm asking why they didn't know it was too much if you, and apparently the rest of the world knew.
Because Russian arms manufacturers are incompetent and tests likely get rigged. There is plenty of other evidence for this. Putin is pounding the table about nuclear war and mobilizing old men, yet the Su-57 and T-14 are nowhere to be seen except parades. This implies they don't actually work. Why would you be using T-62s if you have functional stealth super tanks?
Not to mention an Su-57 just arrived in Russia's experimental aircraft graveyard, which is visible on satalite imagery. This strongly implied they tore the engine out of it (used in other planes) because the Su-57 isn't combat worthy. The fact that they never started major production also suggests this. They could certainly use a stealth fighter right now given they can't do SEAD and are losing fighters to MANPADs because they have to fly so low.
Gazprom already declared force majeure earlier this year, apparently due to its "problems" with turbines. They already turned off Nord Stream 1, with every indication that it would stay off for the foreseeable future. And Nord Stream 2 was under sanctions, although Moscow lobbied hard for it to be turned on, even after it cut off Nord Stream 1. So I find it hard to explain how the catastrophic sabotage of both pipelines (it looks like they are gone for good) could benefit Russia. They have already demonstrated that they could turn the flow of gas on and off at will, using it either as a bargaining chip or a weapon. If they blew it up, they have robbed themselves of this tool, because they no longer have any choice in the matter. Not to mention that they have sunk a very costly investment.
So you're not on board with the idea that Putin is ideologically committed to expanding the Russian empire militarily?
Where exactly do you get the idea from that Russian tanks carry significantly more ammunition than other tanks? What tank types are you comparing to this end?
From what I gather the T-72 carries around 45 rounds of ammunition for its main armament. For comparison, an M1 Abrams carries around 42.
This may vary between variants, but that doesn't look like a very significant difference to me.
It seems more likely that the difference you are trying to describe has to do with the loading systems that Russian tanks use. Russian tanks favor autoloading systems, which do increase the chance of cook-offs since a portion of the ammunition is carried in a ring in or below the turret, as opposed to the ammunition storage.
That is clearly a weighed design feature, though. It allows the tank to be operated by fewer crew.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Even though I don't know what footage you're referring to, that does not sound like a typical cook-off at all. In order for a cook-off to happen, heavily armored compartments of the tank need to be penetrated - something which is unlikely to result from an indirect 155mm artillery hit.
Cook-offs can happen to all tanks, and it matters very little to the crew inside whether one round explodes inside the tank or twenty.
When they happen, the tank has already been penetrated, and with some likelihood knocked out.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
This all depends on range. Tanks are made to fight over long ranges, and their armor protects them in that context. When a tank is said to be able to withstand a frontal impact from another tank's main armament, they might be talking about ranges of 1km+, over which the projectile loses a lot of energy.
If the same tanks would meet in an urban setting, at ranges of a few hundred meters, the armor might be easily beaten. Even side armor can become vulnerable to for example 30mm rounds at close ranges. This is nothing strange.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
I suspect out-of-control fire is what took the Moskva out of action. Perhaps ammunition explosions did contribute to her eventual sinking, though a real ammunition cook-off of a ship of that size and capacity would probably have not lead to a "sinking", but to a complete blow-up.
It's an old ship, likely with somewhat outdated fire-fighting equipment on board. It was also taking on water.
I doubt many commanders would send their crew into a sinking, burning wreck of an old ship when they're only a few miles off the friendly coast. Not to mention they had no idea whether more missiles were being sent their way.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
And in the case of the USS Stark incident, you're comparing a ship and weapons platform of roughly the same time period (OHP-class, been in service since 1977, air-launched Exocet since 1979).
In the case of the Moskva, you're comparing a ship from 1983 to a weapons platform from 2021.
These "problems" were already called out, when Siemens did provide the services. But of course this is just theater, basically.
Quoting Isaac
Everybody agrees with that. The majority also believe that Putin is ideologically committed to expanding the Russian empire. :smirk:
So what, he's going to do so by stealth? Steal Latvia while they're all out?
You'll have to fill in a few blanks for me. The theory is that an almost complete autocrat obsessed with expanding his empire has, nevertheless, knowingly let his army decay to the point of malfunction and lets them use military strategies that even the denizens of an internet philosophy forum know are flawed? He's chosen this strategy above say, using his autocratic power to build up the best military possible for his expansionist plans?
Your theory as to why he's chosen this 'crappy army' approach to imperial expansion...? A cunning bluff, perhaps?
After the Russo-Georgian war in 2008, which Russia won only because Georgia was even more unprepared for the war (basically the field commander was one major) and because Russia had numerical superiority, the need to modernize and dramatically reorganize the armed forces was evident to all and was started by Putin.
Russia modernized it's forces equipment partly, that is true. Partly because it had a huge force to modernize. Planes and tanks couldn't be built in the thousands. Yet Russia could do a very successful military operation with the annexation of Crimea. It used it's most elite troops, the VDV paratroops and military intelligence soldiers (from the GRU) in this operation. Here strategic surprise was achieved and the information warfare of the intelligence services worked extremely well. And this good performance lead to people think that Russia had really modernized itself.
Then it performed well in Syria too, yet with a rather small contingent. Basically it had two squadrons of mixed combat aircraft and air base Air Defence + security troops in Syria. Some mercenaries were used, but in all this was a small force. Yet it helped Assad substantially. Again everything looked good.
Then suddenly this Putin decided to do an all out attack against Ukraine and start a huge conventional war that basically involved the majority of Russia Army ground forces. Not only the elite troops, not only a small limited force that then could be backed up logistically by other troops. Nope, basically everything was involved! Then the attack came as a surpise to many in the forces, as the official line was that Putin wouldn't be invading (which some in this thread believed).
Here the Potemkin village collapsed. Basically it would be stressful to any armed forces that is used to limited operations, then suddenly face an all out conventional war.
And needless to say, the Ukrainians themselves have a lot to do with the poor performance of Russia. They did't collapse as the Afghan National Army. They had been preparing for this from 2014. Not only was the Ukrainian armed forces quite large, it also had the will to defend it's country (unlike some here seem to forget and think it would have been better for them just to surrender).
Hence the theory isn't that Putin chose a crappy army. More like the crappy Russian system couldn't make it any better and the really crappy idea of invading Ukraine cemented the outcome.
Ah, that generalised Russian uselessness we hear so much about. An entire nation just generally a bit crap. A far more plausible explanation for Putin's crappy army than the alternative theory that Putin didn't put much effort into making an empire-conquering land invasion force because he had no major plans for any empire conquering.
Just remind me again why that's the more plausible theory... (assuming, of course, the fact that it just so happens to better enrich one of the most influential industries in the world is just a coincidence).
And just to drag us out of your Wikipedia-polluted mire back to the point...the argument was actually about a strategic decision (too much ammunition in tanks). I was asking why the Russians continued with a tactic that is widely known to be wrong. I suppose that's to do with their genetic uselessness too? Poor Russians.
The M1 is also 25% heavier than the T-72, significantly larger, with more modern armor and counter measures, designed for a 105mm gun until armor and weaponry improvements led to a swap to 120mm. The T-72 always used a 125mm gun and also rounds with significantly more propellant. So yeah, the comparison is like 15-20% more material that might explode in 75% of the space, with less effective measures to make sure it doesn't explode.
And yes, 155mm shouldn't make tanks cook off with indirect hits. This might have something to do with having external fuel tanks on while in range of enemy artillery fire. I suppose this is a training and logistics issue rather than an equipment itself. You can have cook off without penetration anytime there is extremely high heat, or if unstable rounds go off from overpressure (more of an issue a very long time ago before more stable HE existed). Obviously not much can be done about a direct hit from 155 or 152mm on the top of a tank. I have to assume that most cases of that happening were with tanks that were stopped since it would be incredibly lucky otherwise (and even still).
Who knows? The problem with authoritarian systems is that over time the leader often gets very disconnected from reality. I would not be surprised with the Russian command had no real idea how many men they've lost, nor that they lie to Put in about how many they think that figure truly is. The information he receives is going to be fair removed from reality. On top of that, he's an old man who supposedly has cancer and a degenerative brain disease. I'm not going to assume his decision making is entirely rational.
Putin faces the nightmare scenerio for dictators, his interests in winning the war, even at extremely high costs, are rapidly becoming more divergent from Russia's national interests. Other powerful actors will see that removing him might allow them to end the war and Russia's isolation. But Putin has to double down, because he needs to ensure he keeps power, or that his brand is strong enough to ensure someone loyal to him takes power. If someone not loyal to him gets power, trying him and blaming him for ongoing problems would be a way to shift public resentment away from the new leader. That there is substantial evidence that Putin organized a terrorist campaign against Russian apartment buildings to aid his bid for power makes his risk much greater, regardless of if he actually did it or not.
The problem is that, even if he wanted to have a strong military, the political organization he has fostered is not designed to create one. A strong military requires cutting edge technological innovation, which requires an open society and an ability for people to dissent. Developing good strategy and tactics also requires a meritocratic system and an ability for people to dissent. A big problem for authoritarians is that they cannot let leaders of merit and ambition raise through the ranks because they create a rival to the strongman.
Why Nations Fail was pretty much "selecting of the dependant variable - the book," but I do think the point it makes about extractive economic regimes only being able to produce catch-up growth, not innovation, is largely true. As autonomous systems and vehicles, drone screens for tanks and ships, autonomous smart mortars for near instant fire missions and constant indirect fire support, loitering munitions, drone swarm cluster munitions, interceptor systems, HUD systems like IVAS, interconnectivity of air and ground assets from fighters to soda bottle sized zones to infantry into a single battle space intelligence system, etc. all scale up, technologically backwards forces are not going to be successful. I can only imagine the hit to morale if in a hard fought battle the damage you inflict on the enemy is mostly destroying a bunch of automated robots.
It's a catch 22. If Russia modernized and had a per capita GDP more in line with say Spain, it would be able to create a more effective military. But such a system would likely remove Putin from power and destroy the incentives to start such wars in the first place.
On the night of September 29-30, Russian troops had to withdraw from Yampil' , and the defensive lines at Drobysheve were also broken through. The Lyman defensive line had narrowed to the administrative borders of the city.
Yeah, the Russian milblogger sphere seems to suggest that Lyman is essentially encircled. It seems for now that there is a substantial force caught in the pocket. If that's true, whether Ukraine is forced to reduce that encirclement or whether it surrenders will be a litmus test of morale.
It's not a catastrophic loss, but it positioning Ukraine closer to rail lines whose loss would prove catastrophic for Russia.
Would Russia's army have been victorious without Western support for Ukraine?
We should expect Ukraine to fight for these territories back, now Russia will consider it a direct attack on them. Quite a problem.
Those areas are part of Ukraine.
I didn't say they weren't. Russia doesn't consider it though, so it will take any attacks on these territories as an attack on Russia.
Not saying Ukraine shouldn't get them back, but I'd be careful in handling the situation.
Careful how?
But this isn't about Putin, it's about basic military strategy and procurement. Do you seriously think Putin is directly in charge of what tanks to buy and how much ammunition to stick them with? One man can't micromanage an entire country.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
What on earth would his personal interests be here? Putin is going to retire on a fat pile of kleptocratic wealth no matter what. Why would he give a shit about Ukraine?
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Go on... I can't see the mechanism here.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Not at all, that much is unquestionable. Good tactics, in this case, requires only that he read the philosophy forum. Clearly this information is public knowledge, nothing more than an internet connection is required to obtain it.
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
But Russia's military spending is really high isn't it? Why would more GDP be required?
Impossible to say. The collapse of the Kyiv and Sumny axes occured before most heavy equipment arrived and before Ukraine's summer's shortages of Soviet era munitions. Further progress by Russian lines into Ukraine would have just made supply issues more acute, perhaps offsetting the benefit Ukraine got from early arms shipments.
It would all be decided based on the level of Ukrainian resistance. Mariupol is right on the border, and was encircled rapidly. It didn't receive new aid and yet taking degraded Russian forces significantly. Similar levels of resistance in much larger cities where Russia was not able to use its air resources with impunity would likely exhaust the Russian military. But you'd see a much higher civilian death toll for Ukraine and far more destruction of infrastructure.
Even if Russia did eventually take these key cities, their force numbers are wholly inadequate for counter insurgency on this scale. So it would depend largely on if the additional costs Ukrainians faced due to a greater arms mismatch resulted in a large shift in resistance. If it didn't, I don't see Russia being successful in their maximalist aims. But certainly without Western support Ukraine would be hard pressed to retake dug in positions as they are now, so Russia would likely be able to keep some territory as long as they didn't fully exhaust their military.
In how it handles trying to get the territories back. If they go full force, it would be akin to Ukraine "invading" Russia. This might allow Russia to expand its quite horrible hands and create an extremely dangerous situation. In my view, these territories should be part of the negotiations, if we ever get to that point. I think there has to be some kind of minor land swap or a token victory of sorts that allows Putin to delcare this a "victory" - (as happened in the Cuban Missile Crisis).
I don't think total humiliation will be accepted by the Russian regime, meaning, they might go crazy. One needs to give the opponent an off ramp, however distasteful it is.
You just hold your racist hints to yourself.
Corruption makes it Russia what it is. And Putin has created a kleptocracy. It's not the people themselves. Individuals are quite the same. How societies function is different.
And lastly, which likely you might not understand, is that many Russians understand that they attacked Ukraine, a country which didn't threaten them in any way. The reaction from the Russian people and the fighting spirit of the Russian soldier would be different, if their country was attacked and they would defend their country from an aggressor that describes them to be an artificial country. Then it would be Russians military aged men coming from abroad to join the military. (As in the case of...Ukraine)
Russia's military spending is very high compared to the size of its economy (about the same as Spain). It's very low compared to the opponents it says it wants to be the peers of. It was below just the UK's spending in 2021. About a fifth of European NATO spending or Chinese spending, just 7% of US spending.
But the larger point is that this money was clearly largely stolen or misused. Russian expenditures are around 47% higher than the ROK, but the ROK has a more modern air force, arguably given the number of Russian tank losses before they had to pull out T-72s more modern tanks, and can definitely mobilize a larger active component despite a much smaller population. Hell, Israel, with a third of the budget and a population the size of a large city appears to be able to equip their front line infantry better, in similar numbers.
Russia has a large hardware advantage, but this is left over Soviet capital. It's become quite clear that the vast majority of this is not upgraded. Old models aren't necessarily a liability. The F-15 is an old air frame, but Korea isn't fielding the 1970s variant, the platform has seen continual upgrades.
And procurement is another issue. The FA-50 is racking up sales, already passing 1,000 units while the Su-57 has had six production models made, none of which seem fit for use. Aircraft development is incredibly expensive so there are serious issues when you make a supposedly high end air superiority fighter and try to drum up sales and then the project collapses.
Then from whom, with whom and by whose permit was such a catastrophe of a state created. You guys really need to get your Putin story straight. A minute ago the man could barely see two steps ahead now he's singlehandedly running the entire Russian military, and somehow taken control of an entire nation against their will.
Quoting ssu
I don't see what morale has to do with military strategy from years ago, but notwithstanding, are the Russian soldiers ruthless thugs or reluctant pacifists? Half and half? Do any of them just mistakenly believe Putin, or are they all angels or devils?
This is a strawman.
You don't need to assume specific character traits to get insights into morale and discipline. It's an emergent phenomenon, and highly situational.
All militaries in earlier history looted, raped, massacred civilians, and tortured for intelligence. Reductions in this type of behavior are partially due to cultural norms, but are largely a function of professionalization and better leadership. This also depends on the leadership recognizing that "taking the gloves of" and allowing their soldiers to engage in these behaviors isn't a winning strategy, because it has very deleterious effects on discipline.
Poor strategic decision-making can break morale even if well trained forces. US morale hit near rock bottom after MacArthur's arrogance and poor decision-making led to the worst rout in US history when the Chinese entered the Korean War in force. It was restored when Ridgway began to demonstrate that the leadership was making prudent decisions and had a realistic vision of what the situation was like on the ground.
It's a hard thing to measure. It's not just about conditions. Montgomery was able to lead a late-fall/winter offensive into Canada through horrendous terrain with 1770s supply technology. Laying siege to a walled city in a northern Quebec winter, during a blizzard is no mean feat. But after the Montgomery's death and the fall back to Montreal the force lost any sense of purpose and that killed morale. These things are hard to pin down and ephemeral.
So 'empire-building on a budget', that's the narrative you're going with? Putin's prepared to make the entire country an international pariah, run it into the ground for his imperial ambitions, but he's going to do so with a keen eye on the purse strings because...
Quoting Count Timothy von Icarus
Exactly. Largely by the likes of Putin and his cronies (and enemies, of course). It's this notion that Putin is anything other than an opportunistic kleptocrat that I'm finding hard to reconcile with what you're telling me about their military failures.
Again, if you're publishing this information on a free internet forum, then presumably it's in the public domain. Do Russian generals not have internet access?
Another factor on Lyman is whether the Russians can retreat. If not, it won't encourage others to hold fast in precarious conditions.
The problem with being entirely dishonorable and untrustworthy is that you can't get your opponent to accept a cease fire, especially when they're on a roll.
That's bullshit. Were fucking selling weapons to Saudi Arabia. We've dealt with the most ruthless despots when it suits us. And there'd be a de facto Ukrainian ceasefire the very second we cut off the weapon supply. So any notion that the failure of negotiations is somehow all on Russia's unique lack of honour is blatant crap. They're all dishonourable, from Putin to Biden to Zelensky. Our own recent addition to the cabal is a fucking sociopath.
Hell, they don't even have to dig that hard. The British MOD regularly posts conflict updates that point out poor Russian command decisions, as does ISW and other OSINT sources staffed by former military commanders. So do Russian nationalist milbloggers.
For Western officials, the judgement is likely that pointing out obvious incompetence will have a larger negative impact on Russian morale than it will a positive impact on Russian military decision-making. This isn't granular tactical data, it's obvious incompetence that would be corrected if there was an ability to do so. I mean, the recent Kharkiv offensive and the follow up around Lyman are almost exact duplicates of German advances in 1942, it's not like they were unpredictable.
My understanding of this war is that Putin, an opportunistic kleptocrat, saw an opportunity, in the machinations of US imperialism, to consolidate his power (and more importantly his wealth) by taking control over key strategic areas of Ukraine. He did this with an army that are neither saints nor monsters, one that is neither useless nor brilliant, but rather just exactly the kind of army we'd expect an ex-superpower to have left over - big, quite brutish, damaging, but perhaps not as sophisticated as the US military.
I'm told this narrative is not only wrong, but so wrong that believing it makes me some kind of Putin apologist. I'm struggling to see how the information you're providing doesn't just fit that narrative perfectly.
What it doesn't seem to match is a powerful dictator with an imperialist ambition strong enough to drive his army to war, but somehow too weak to get them to look on the internet for tips on how to win.
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/9/30/ukraine-accelerates-bid-to-join-nato-after-russias-annexation
Satalite imagery shows than organizing columns, but the road out is covered by Ukrainian artillery and they may have had time to move forces in for an ambush by now. If that's the case, it'd be a situation similar to The Gauntlet at Kunu-ri, at which point the smart decision would be to sit tight and hope for a better opportunity to break out later. Or surrender.
Such a retreat is a terrible situation. US divisions had a massive firepower advantage on Korea but the Second Division was still shattered by that withdrawal.
If their command gave a crap about force protection, they would have had them retreat while they could do it in order.
It's fine. They made surrender punishable by 10 years in prison and Putin gave a no retreat order, how can they lose?
Plus, the calvary is on its way. Just 90 miles away there are videos of civilian busses unloading fresh middle aged soldiers who are razor sharp from their two day refresher training and ready to go (...well as soon as their families supply them with sleeping bags, tarps, and medical equipment, and armor, optional supplies anyway). They can ride to the rescue like the powerful Third Corps did in Kharkiv!
The 20th Motor Rifle Division and Bars-13 are there, along with some number of LNR militia. It's anyone's guess how under strength they are, or how many might have retreated earlier, but this would be around 8-14,000 if the bulk of each is cut off. That's a pretty substantial figure, although I would think at least some decent proportion withdrew earlier.
I do wonder if deteriorating conditions, particularly as conscripts make up more of the Russian forces, along with a large influx of POWs, might swell the ranks of the Freedom of Russia Legion. The massive outflow of men since conscription was announced could do the same.
If you're a dictator, historically it's never a good thing to have your own citizens gaining combat experience and motivation fighting against you in your attempts to invade a neighbor. They tend to become the core of future partisans trying to remove you.
Belarus has a similar problem. For all the hay the Kremlin has made about Western foreign fighters (actually NATO soldiers in some tellings), it certainly seems like most come from within Russia (Chechens included), or former Soviet countries (the Georgian Legion, Tactical Group Belarus, and to a lesser extent Poles and Fins).
Putin's tactic of recruiting extremely heavily from minority populations while mobilizing a much smaller share of ethnic Russians, particularly those in Moscow and St. Petersburg, could definitely backfire if the sort of unrest going on in Dagistan continues. At a certain point, leaders of the republics might tell the MoD to fuck off entirely. At that point there is nothing but terrible options for Putin. If you try to force the issue, you risk ending up with a home front crisis requiring security forces, if you don't, more republics might do the same thing, or even escalate, demanding more autonomy, etc. To make matters worse, in such a crisis you now have minorities as a very disproportionate amount of your armed forces, and news of trouble back home will invariably reach then and hit morale there too.
IDK, someone should offer to let him flee with a bunch of his wealth to some other oligarch nation with protections against extradition. That might save a lot of lives, although his ego probably wouldn't allow it. I suspect a cease fire could follow that fairly quickly.
In my understanding the forces holding Lyman are mainly East-Ukrainian, pro-Russian territorial defence militia. That's why they are so tough and resisted so long, I guess: they are not actually Russians. But it may also be why they are left hanging there.
The 20th Gaurds Combined Arms Army was there, with an additional battalion group of Russians, so a fairly substantial concentration, but it's unclear if components made it out.
I misspoke on the unit there earlier. The 20th Gaurds Army (not the 20th division) is two divisions plus two artillery brigades, plus attached regiments. But the Russian order of battle is a mess right now, so it's hard to say what the current organization would be at full strength. Probably 22,000-28,000 soldiers under its pre-war organization. However, at current strength it could be far less because units with high casualties are being broken up and consolidated into new ones. They obviously wouldn't be all within Lyman unless they got rolled up in there. Some must have withdrawn though.
Russian "armies" are much smaller than US field armies, more analogous to a corps.
Putin eight years ago (upon the annexation of Crimea): "Don't believe those who are making a boogeyman out of Russia, who say that after Crimea other regions [of Ukraine] will follow. We are not looking to partition Ukraine, we don't need that."
Vexler says 30% of the motivation would be Putin creating domestic crisis so as to take tighter control of a shaky power structure. But that leaves a lot of room for also have a rather personal and inchoate sense of imperial mission.
Sick and at the end of his life, wealthy beyond imagination but a failure in his ambitions, he might have just found himself trapped in a cycle of escalating aggression as a gambler's last chance.
He knows – through a successful cult of personality and a clever policy of information autocracy – that he has the people with him. He has made the fascist connection between leader and the led.
But the consequence of that is the state machinery has become too corrupt and inefficient to execute any war plan. He has a crappy army because he had to squeeze all independent thought out of Russia's power structure.
So as a dictator, you win some, you lose some. And the only way forward becomes escalating to the next step in terms of external aggression and internal suppression. Putin becomes caught in the dynamics of his own machine.
So it is not opportunism vs strategic plans. Things just spin faster as they gurgle down the plughole.
What I would love to know is how Putin rationalises all this to himself. What secret hope does he harbour?
Maybe he acts in the belief that if he can just stir up enough chaos, then the worst that could happen is Europe also becomes brought down by it too. You don't need to roll your tanks into Latvia and Poland. You just need to wreck energy and food supply chains for one winter. Quite likely you will have economic collapse, hard right power grabs, a meltdown that cripples the EU.
If you know you can't win a conventional war or nuclear war, then is infecting your foe with social chaos a rational strategy given that everything must be escalated right now in your own eyes?
That said, it seems Putin did expect to be able to seize territory and topple the regime in Ukraine in weeks if not days. Mobilisation was never intended. Concrete gains were hoped for.
But behind that may be the mindset that if Russia can't succeed, then at least it can pull everyone else down to the same level. If this is the game plan, then it is all about tipping Europe into its own hard right chaos now. That is what Russian imperialism looks like these days. The crappiest version of itself.
Before setting forth upon the special operation, Putin was a popular figure in European ultranationalist circles. At the same time, he courted the EU to set up massive infrastructure deals. It seems safe to say that bit of dual theater is gone.
Or if it is not dead, what does that look like?
I ask it that way because the world has changed, whatever his intentions are.
This interview with Ralph Schoelhammer sets up how things might go as Euro nationalism erupts in the coming sticky winter, especially if the US did blow up Nordstream to ensure Europe can't backslide on Ukraine.
(We still have to discover who actually did blow the pipes, of course. Or what it is that the majority will believe.)
The video is right wing propaganda. Yet there is truth in how the political situation could turn quickly if a new European narrative is adopted. The existential fear is legitimate.
My comment was that Putin would at least be calculating the possibility of Europe being at this very tippable point as a result of his chaos.
Climate change is the real existential threat, not this rerun of Tsarist or Soviet imperialism. And the world having failed to become collectively organised must logically dissolve into it collection of self-interested parts.
Peter Zeihan has then been spelling out northern Europe's problem with green tech for many years. In sum – for Germany in particular – not enough sun for solar, not enough wind for turbines. Plus German industry is all about turning fossil fuels into export goods.
So Germany – as the anchor of stability – is facing crisis. It has to jump in some direction.
These are the two narratives I can't seem to square.
Putin has been in power for a long time. Against the wishes of the population (otherwise there'd be no need for the political suppression). That means either he's a useful puppet, or the military are on his side. In any other case he'd have been ousted.
So the idea of a leader hell bent (or even 70% bent) on imperial expansion, with a compliant military, being nonetheless unable to get it to make fairly simple training and strategic adjustments, stamp out a bit of corruption, and invest in the right kit... Seems absurd.
He can get the army to launch a full scale invasion even despite massive losses, but he can't get then to do some training?
He can pocket billions for himself out of the economy, but can't divert enough to buy the right tanks?
He can stamp out any political opposition, even in other countries, even to the point of murder, but he can't clean up a couple of incompetent generals and corrupt arms manufacturers?
It's not as if he even has a very high target. The US DoD is hardly a meritocracy is it?
All this against the alternative narrative that the Russian army is crap because Putin simply wasn't interested in using it to expanded his empire. And no one has yet given me any reason at all to reject that much simpler explanation.
What I do have, though is a reason to reject the 'hubristic imperialist' narrative. It's precisely the narrative the US arms manufacturers need to peddle to justify their lucrative drip feed of weapons. That alone counts strongly against such a narrative.
Quoting apokrisis
This I can definitely see as being plausible. Like I said, I think he's an opportunist and Europe's twin reliance on Russian gas but also US foreign policy gave him ample opportunity. Let's not pretend the sanctions aren't crippling Europe too, but they have to also be 'all in' on any US venture. Again, none of this takes genius-level strategising, its stuff any half-competent political advisor would suggest.
But, importantly, this hypothesis doesn't have Putin aiming for total control over Ukraine either. It would just be a completely unnecessary headache. Kill Zelensky perhaps, that would sow a good bit of chaos, but take over the whole country...? To what end? He's already got the wealth-generating parts, he's made a big dint in EU stability, made America look more authoritarian than it would like... I can't think what he'd expect to gain additionally from more territory.
But...having said all that, I'm far less interested in the actual theories than I am in the social psychology around the way they're expressed. The in-group censorship, the exclusion of experts by laymen, the maintenance of inconsistent narratives, the suspension of critical thought... All this is going to have consequences, long after Russia finally hobbles home with Crimea and a puppet in Dombas.
Think Achilles, maybe. Think every tragic hero destroyed by hubris. Think Samson, and be afraid. The dark side is always about lies, and the devil is the father of lies. But lies are parasitic on truth, and so the habitual liar destroys the world of communication that they depend on; to the extent that community continues, it establishes communication lines that exclude the liar, who is fed back the lies that he projects.
This means in some ways that there are two worlds ("two narratives", exactly), and two societies, the official vision of order, v the messy reality. The books are always cooked - like the tanks - but the tanks are never cooked in the master's books, and the masterful hero loses touch with reality.
So the US military, DoD, and government are a collection of honest, open individuals working toward collective goals? I don't buy it.
The US has managed to gain one of the most effective militaries in the world and it's done it via a system which is as corrupt, dishonest and individualist as any. It's done it because it wants to win, and anyone who wants to win (hubristic liar or not) will obtain the knowledge and equipment required for that purpose (to the extent they have the means to).
I get what you're saying about hubris and lies. Yes, it will ultimately destroy the system it creates, but the issue here is much more specific. It's a question of the exact mechanism in play - more like choosing which route to collapse.
I'm not saying it's implausible that Putin has this private imperialist agenda which he's somehow unable to adequately prepare for because he's been too hubristic to listen to advice. That makes some sense. But it doesn't make so much sense that all other interpretations are apologist fantasy... that's the point I'm making here.
Nor do I. And I wasn't selling it either. Western democracies are not in a good state either, and human nature is not that different around the world. The world is in a state of collapse due to cognitive dissonance, and Putin is one amongst many.
It’s simple enough. If you set up a top down system with the goal of diverting blame from the leader then that prevents the bottom up feedback that tunes the system to be effective. The system lacks the independent thought and truth telling it needs to function well.
Quoting Isaac
Do you have informed sources that argue this? They would be fascinating to read.
Quoting Isaac
This seems a welcome change of tune. :up:
How the War in Ukraine Might End
In recent years, a small group of scholars has focussed on war-termination theory. They see reason to fear the possible outcomes in Ukraine.
By Keith Gessen, September 29, 2022
https://www.newyorker.com/culture/annals-of-inquiry/how-the-war-in-ukraine-might-end
If peace is signed, Ukraine can join NATO. As long as war continues, Ukraine cannot join NATO. At least not officially, according to the NATO charter. They might make an exception, but then again that would put NATO and Russia officially at war, (Art. 5, and all that) which might also not be what the West wants.
Russia has every incentive to let this war drag on.
Putin isn't desperate either. The situation right now is that Russia has annexed roughly 20% of Ukraine. This "Russia is losing the war / Putin is desperate" rhetoric is just a PsyOp. I'll believe it when it happens.
Your assessment seems corroborated by those from within the military too
William J. Astore - military professor U.S. Air Force Academy says...
Trouble is, he's talking about the US military...
They're conflict habituated, a sign of deep emotional wounds that probably go back to childhood.
Slantchev presents a solid argument for how Putin might respond to further losses. I think the logic of proportional response to such escalation would not be to wipe out the Black Sea fleet but to isolate Russian forces in Ukrainian spaces.
By annexing the contested territories, Russia has collapsed the line previously drawn constraining the use of offensive weapons to defend Ukraine. If there is any chance in keeping the escalation from going straight to the unfolding of MAD, response needs to be very specific.
But who am I kidding? I feel like Mandrake while he was stealing a Coke from the vending machine.
Strategically, we will want to push deeper into the occupied territories as much as possible until resistance becomes too thick to permeate. At this juncture, we will want to dig in, fortify our positions, and effectively establish a new front line while we receive more long range artillery in the meantime. Russia has expended an inordinate amount of artillery during the first 7 months of combat. When I was fighting in Irpin in March, the largest lull in between explosions was counted at only 21 seconds — don’t ask me who determines these figures, but that felt about right. In any case, I believe we can establish superiority of artillery in no more than 1.5 years (provided the incoming stream of NATO-supplied weaponry remains somewhat consistent in number and type). Russia is essentially “blowing its load” and cannot sustain its current pace of artillery bombardments.
Don’t count on Putin being overthrown or the Russian government imploding from the inside. While there are some factors that lend credence to these ideas, there are even more that support the opposite conclusion.
Well, that was a light and refreshing afternoon snack!
Seeing that both the Russians and the European ultra-nationalists are dependent upon the continuance of the integrated economies, the reach for maximum leverage would be a suicide pact rather than a strategy for victory for all involved.
Source: Mapping the occupied Ukraine regions Russia is formally annexing (Sep 30, 2022)
"Liberation" of Donbas from Nazis? Ending a NATO "invasion"? :D As usual, goodwill, ethics, truth has given way to ambition, lying, politics. (Science fiction is more entertaining and incurs less suffering.)
Quoting What Russian annexation means for Ukraine's regions · Paul Kirby · BBC · Sep 30, 2022
That’s right. This kind of open criticism of the political settings - the choice of wars fought, the size of the established force, etc - is what Russia would need as well.
But we were talking about the competence - the military structure, equipment, logistics, training, morale - of the Russian forces. The operational effectiveness of a system where criticism is suppressed.
Sure. Everyone can point to all the unnecessary wars the US has fought because it ain’t sufficiently politically honest with itself. It is set in imperialist mode in terms of ideology. No argument there.
Slightly different, I agree, but not a difference which automatically then constitute a demonstration of the theory.
Astore is describing a military which is not just insulated at a political level, but at an institutional one.
The difference that's being suggested here is an institutional or systematic one sufficient to explain why a moderately motivated US government has a very efficient fighting force, whereas a highly motivated autocrat is frustrated in his efforts. That's a very substantial difference.
What you've suggested is at best a moderate difference in the degree to which errors are reported up. In Russia, there's significant repression of that, in America slightly less so.
At best you've given a mechanism whereby an imperialist Putin might, despite his intentions, have only achieved a substandard army, but you're far from a compelling argument. Plausible, sure, but hardly a coup de grâce.
If the differences between the US and the Russian military were much, much larger, I might be more swayed, but not as things stand.
Ultimately, I've just got no reason at all to start from the assumption that Putin is a fierce imperialist, so I don't need to find ways to explain events through that narrative. If I start from the assumption that Putin is a greedy opportunist, nothing about the current events doesn't fit.
As the Continental once said: "Pour champagne on me once, shame on you. Pour champagne on me twice, shame on me."
The process of application aside, when Zelensky said that Ukraine is now a 'de facto' member of the alliance, he was pointing to the annexations as Russia invoking Article 5 as already underway. The death of the pretense of a Special Operation means it is no longer clear what lines are not to be crossed. So that does not mean there are no longer such lines, but that they need to be rearticulated by those who support Ukraine.
(That pocket in the north of Donetsk Oblast has since been closed.)
No it’s not. But perhaps you are confusing yourself because you want to critique the US as an imperialist superpower rather than engage with the specific point - which is that the incompetence of the Russian force projection is not because Putin never thought he would need an effective army, but because a rotten system could never have delivered an effective army.
Try comparing the Russian situation to democratic states in general. Let’s remove your emotions about the US from the debate so you can see things more clearly.
You seem to be arguing that Putin didn’t feel he needed a modernised army when he said he did, nor that he felt Nato wasn’t actually a threat, despite always acting like it was.
Quoting Isaac
So I’ve won the argument but now you want to bicker about the margin of my victory? :grin:
Quoting Isaac
I’ll just remind you again that my original argument was geopolitical. So it was about the conditions that shaped both Putin’s worldview and Russia’s general historical position on these matters.
The puzzle at the centre of this is then that Putin seems a fierce imperialist and a greedy opportunist in equal measure. Both seem true. And yet the two conflict.
That is my fascination. That is what makes things so unpredictable.
Has he changed? Did he start out wanting to make Russia great again but then get corrupted by the very system of power he was forced to construct? What are the actual war aims of his special military operation? How could they rationally fit either monotonic reading of Putin’s mind.
I agree I started out with the Peter Zeihan type analysis of the need for defendable borders and the pressure of imminent demographic decline. Then Vlad Vexler makes it clearer that Russia always hurtles without clarity and so Putin being trapped into his own escalation game becomes the psychology at work.
It’s like if you are Jeff Bezos, why keep piling up more money? If you are Rupert Murdoch, why keep building up more political sway? If you are Trump, why keep stirring up even more shit?
Escalation becomes its own structural logic. We see it everywhere in the world. Folk are trapped in cages of their own making. They start out being successful in the terms the world has given them, but then get locked into that mode of success long past any apparent true purpose.
Bezos, Murdoch and Trump all spring to mind as stark failures of the values of democratic societies. They are growth stories turned cancerous. And yet one can’t believe they are happy in their achievements. Being trapped in an escalation machine seems a human tragedy. The fairground ride that never stops.
So when it comes to analysing the Ukraine crisis, I don’t claim anything is clear. But it feels like Putin must have built his escalation machine out of the mix of inchoate historical imperialist angst and the more modern turn of the Russian state into a self-perpetuating kleptocracy dependent on its skills in information autocracy.
He had to invade Ukraine just to show forward purpose. He had to throw an incompetent, ill prepared, and underpowered force into this endeavour. Plan B is doubling down and hoping the general chaos means that at least everyone loses.
It is all very irrational even if it begins as something rational. Just as in the same way that cancer is biology escaping the constraints of its own immune system.
The Russian army went on the offensive against a (roughly) peer adversary while numerically disadvantaged - that's a military feat in and of itself. It managed to defeat the Ukrainian army in the first part of the war (a blow from which the Ukrainians have since recovered) and take substantial parts of Ukraine, which, based on the troops deployed, likely coincided with their initial wargoals.
Obviously this came at a cost, but war is a messy business. The Russians went up against a properly trained and equipped Ukrainian military. Things go wrong as they are inherent to in war, but militaries don't blunder their way into occupying 20% of a large country like Ukraine.
The only real blunder I have seen from the Russian military is the sinking of the Moskva. That seems like an intelligence failure to me.
Also, the idea that the matter of Ukraine is some personal project of Putin's I believe is outright rejected due to the fact that Ukraine has been a hot topic since the collapse of the USSR. Ukraine is of incredible strategic importance for the Russians, and they have consistently made clear the sensitivity of this region over the past decades. Ukraine is by far the most important region to Russia, outside of Russia proper.
Are you the first person here to legitimately have some insight into the Ukraine crisis?
Meanwhile back on planet Earth….
Etc, etc.
The fact is that, for the time being, they're occupying 20% of Ukraine, and they did so while at a numerical disadvantage against a well-trained adversary.
I guess the US-trained Ukrainian military must be pretty poor aswell, letting a foreign military blunder their way into occupying their country, then?
Is a psychological analysis of the factors clouding our judgments really a route you want to go down? Happy to, but it cuts both ways.
Quoting apokrisis
You seem to be arguing that the Ukraine invasion wasn't just a 'special operation' when he said it was. Come on! Since when have the things politicians say in their propaganda been indicators of anything other than what their advisors think the populace would want to hear?
Quoting apokrisis
You know the difference between plausible and compelling, right? I've never argued that the opposing view to mine is not plausible, I'm not even interested in convincing you otherwise. I'm exploring the extent to which all other narratives are framed (as you have just done) as being ideologically motivated, or apologist, or just plain stupid... To justify those framings, your argument must be compelling (and pretty strongly so), merely plausible is not enough.
Quoting apokrisis
This is the part I've found no reason yet to believe. What is it about events you find difficult to view through the frame of a greedy opportunist? What of Putin's actions to date have not fitted that narrative (assuming the man is not infallible and so capable of mistakes)?
Quoting apokrisis
Now this is good, far closer to the sort of psychology I would assign to him (to almost anyone, in fact). We play out roles in stories rather than take well-planned steps logically directed toward rational goals. But the debate is around the extent to which 'fierce imperialist' is even part of Putin's story. I see him much more as a Bezos or a Murdoch, than a Kaiser or Tzar.
Sure could. Can you link to even one that argues the opposite in convincing fashion?
No, neither am I, but I don't have any trustworthy expert views either way, so the only way forward, it seems is to argue the hypothetical - if Russia's armies were in poor conditions, how would that fit the narrative of a powerful leader bent on imperial expansion?
Quoting Tzeentch
Exactly. I find the idea that we need some jingoistic explanation for why Russia invaded one of the most economically and strategically important areas in the region, frankly ridiculous. The question of whether Putin has some nationalistic (as opposed to self-centred) ideology is moot, but the idea that events can't rationally be explained without it is crazy. A mid-level bureaucrat in the foreign office would point to the four or five contested regions of Ukraine as strategic targets, it doesn't require a passion for the glory of Russia.
https://ibb.co/jG1p33G
https://ibb.co/Z1dVsbW
https://ibb.co/tLpzRM6
https://ibb.co/VT0cDpm
“Young man.” I’m 36. Ha.
Why would I want to? Attempts at making such assessments properly are foolish at this point, and I wouldn't take them seriously unless they're backed up by serious research. None of your articles are, probably because such research does not exist. They're based on anecdotes, small snippets of information, etc. that are framed to fit a certain narrative - propaganda, in other words.
Furthermore, facts that can be checked by anyone speak to the contrary.
- 20% of Ukraine is occupied by Russian forces.
- The Ukrainian military was properly trained and equipped by the United States.
- The Ukrainian military outnumbered the Russian military at the start of the invasion (even though most military doctrine prescribes at least a 3:1 numerical advantage to the attacker for offensive operations).
- etc.
Do your articles mention any of this?
Go back in time a little; see what western authors thought about Russia's prospects in a war against Ukraine prior to the invasion. Many thought Ukraine would stand no chance. Another poster in this thread linked an article that claimed Kiev would fall in a matter of hours!
So what these authors are really criticizing here is not the Russian military, but their own false conceptions of the Russian military. They're just trying to write it off as a Russian blunder, instead of their own.
Again, fierce imperialist was your terminology and not mine. I entered the debate disputing some dumb comments about Putin only making a feint at Kyiv, having goals limited to a chunk of ethniic borderland, and having no desire to continue on if it had won quick success in Ukraine.
And then apart from the geopolitical logic of wanting defensible borders - the driver of territorial expansion - there is Putin’s more general existential driver of a war against US ideological hegemony. It is a battle for psychological Lebensraum. Letting Russia be Russia - even if that now means his greedy and opportunistic, corrupt and incompetent, kleptocracy I guess.
There again is the puzzle. Sure one can understand how oppressed he feels by US hegemony. But to push things as far as a war with a real chance of turning nuclear and creating Europe-wide disaster?
And does it make any more sense seen the other way as a domestic necessity to prop up his own regime and expand his wealth? If Putin had sat tight and continued his low grade trouble making, would anyone have tried to topple him or sanction him? The US had already pivoted to China. Ukraine could have been undermined in the usual sly ways without crystallising sides with an overt war.
If you then listen to Putin’s speeches, what comes through is the sense of humiliation and resentment. Something China also shares. Empires that feel it is their historical right to be empires, and also with bitter memories of how those empires kept getting formed and then broken up by outsiders.
So is Putin just touchy? And believe he is indeed the embodiment of Russia and carries that responsibility? So all this is an emotional reaction seeking its reasons?
That is why I like the idea that Putin is a psychological phenomenon just like a Trump or any other leader who concocts a cult of self that becomes the state’s organisational principle with its own ever escalating logic.
What starts off as private calculation harnessing public emotions becomes the structure of power itself. Putin’s choices are constrained by the logic of his own propaganda. He ends up the puppet of his own reality framing.
To risk so much for so little is ridiculous. Putin’s apologists must pretend he had limited goals, his regime is competent, the West is far more invidious than people realise.
But here we are anyway. And there is still a need for an accurate assessment to predict how this continues of unfold.
To show that you could?
Quoting Tzeentch
This is also true.
But on the surprising incompetence side, we have systemic corruption, a historic undervaluing of logistics, a lack of NCO structure, no routine cross force training, a lack of communication gear, a lack of training hours, low morale and lack of mission preparation, plus umpteen other inadequacies that became apparent as your “small but perfectly formed fighting force” breezed through already half occupied Donbas and started to encounter headwinds.
Plan B became liberate Ukraine by levelling it with artillery. Plan C is truck in the raw conscripts and perhaps start setting nuclear power plants on fire or lobbing a few tactical nukes.
If all this is your definition of competence then … OK.
A lot of claims, but what verifiable data are they based on?
The nature of war is messy - Clausewitz called it friction. In giant operations like these things go wrong, and they go wrong all the time. Logistical congestion is the norm rather than the exception - in a situation where both sides are trying to kill and hamper each other there is never enough ammunition, fuel, troops, fire support, etc. You can't predict an enemy whose primary concern is to be unpredictable, etc.
The question is, when you say incompetence what are you comparing it to?
Quoting apokrisis
"My" perfectly formed fighting force?
This seems the go-to response whenever someone in this thread is faced with a conflicting view - start framing them as partisan.
The Russian forces are not "my" forces, nor do I view them as perfect - far from it. I suggest you stick to my actual words and stay away from this type of copium.
Not the failed attempt of quickly reaching the capital?
Or not the "special military operation" having to resort mobilization of reservists after a successful Ukrainian counter attack? If I recall, Putin was first saying that conscripts wouldn't be used in the operation. :smirk:
Putin annexes territory, from where he is retreating from...
We've already been over that, and we've also established that the author you put forward ended up supporting my argument and not yours.
But it seems a quick reminder of what your author wrote is in order:
Source: Russia's Possible Invasion of Ukraine
In summary, Seth G. Jones, an author whose opinions you purport to value greatly, believes the taking of a city like Kiev would be a costly, time-consuming venture, and holds symbolic (and not actual) value.
However quickly they noticed the mistake, to assume in the first place such an attack was a real blunder. It's quite clear that this quick strike into the heart of Ukraine was attempted. The heliborne landings in Hostomel Airport just next to Kyiv show the intent what Russians had.
It seems to me taking out airports would be a key strategic goal regardless of their intentions.
Do notice the location of Hostomel airport:
Sure they can. Airports are a classic target for airborne assaults.
With the assumption that the airborne force can be then quite quickly be relieved by a ground force. Nobody thinks of making a landing deep in enemy territory and then just assume that they can be evacuated by air from the area if faced by a heavy counterattack.
Once an airborne detachment has occupied an area, it can basically hold on to that area until relieved. And that's basically it. Operation Mercury was the first, and the last, time when an air assault was planned to do basically everything.
Also, the purpose of taking the airport is to use it. Failure to secure it through combined forces is part and parcel to the failure of the whole operation as detailed in this comparison of Hostomel with the failure of Market Garden in WW2: An Airfield Too Far: Failures at Market Garden and Antonov Airfield
Why dumb? What events are so incompatible with that narrative as to render it dumb. Your alternative might be equally plausible. You might even render an argument that it's slightly more probable, in a limited sense. But absolutely nothing you've presented so far has been any where near the level of confidence to render alternative narratives "dumb".
Quoting apokrisis
I think this aspect can be understood as a game of "chicken" (if you're familiar with the game). The first person to back down loses. To play the game successfully one has to be willing to go too far. Anything less won't win. If one only goes as far as a rational actor would then one will only ever match, but not beat, one's opponent.
Quoting apokrisis
Many thought so, yes. The 'westernisation' of Ukraine and the colour revolutions we're considered a potential threat to Putin's regime.
Quoting apokrisis
Yes, I agree with this aspect. Putin comes across as being frustrated at his being left out from the big boys table. A dangerous game for the US and Europe to have played.
Quoting apokrisis
Don't assume much is risked, nor little gained. Putin's wealth is intact, he will be remembered by many as a daring hero of Russia even if he loses (including losing his presidency). The guillotines of the past are gathering dust. A lucrative chairmanship and probably a stunning book deal await the defeated Putin.
As to gains, Europe's a mess. The right wing are gaining ground in the chaos. Ukraine is bankrupt and he still has the most lucrative regions.
Quoting apokrisis
Well yes, but that's best left in the hands of the strategists. What's up to us is who we lend our mandate to and how much we're willing to let them get away with unquestioned.
I see. So the proof that Russia made a massive tactical error is that they wouldn't be so stupid as to make a massive tactical error.
And they were relieved, weren't they?
Quoting ssu
That just so happens to be part of the job description of airborne troops.
But I fail to see your point. This airport was somehow the critical point in taking Kiev, proving the Russians intended to take Kiev by force?
I guess when you're a defending freedomfighter, the cost is sort of secondary.
Apparently there are skirmishes outside of Pavlivka (Donetsk Oblast). Russian supply route?
Didn't know the freedomfighters were that far south.
What's their strategy...? Or maybe just some locals with guided anti-tank missiles?
Hah. It really is just that simple. :lol:
Keep hitting him with the facts. Watch it make no difference to the propaganda.
Because I cannot take you seriously. You give me no reason to.
If that is the case, doesn't that condition apply to your assessment that the attack on Kiev was only a feint?
As a piece of military strategy, a feint draws forces from the true target. But the attack was sprung before movement of that kind changed the conditions on the ground. If you are going to deliver a sucker punch, you better make it work the first time. Do you have a vision of how things would have been different without this 'feint'? An historical parallel, perhaps?
Lucrative the land he currently holds may be but what’s the point of mining gold if the value of it is determined by the market? Furthermore, the current client base of this is what China ? India? … he has started to in fact Alienate more oil rich former soviet states. His incompetence on display for all to see, not all former Soviet’s have the same level of brainwashing going as Russia.
The other thing if the land you hold is lucrative but you can’t comercially exploit it because the machinery to do so is western means you’re essentially sitting on goldmine but eating gold is not what keeps your biology alive but real nourishment like the basics.
He can drink his oil once his inability to produce milk because he detonated a nuke is not only self/damaging and stupid but …a death wish indeed.
He will have signed his own death warrant then…and though guillotines are rusting novichok has a certain shelf life and like wine gets better with age
This account of what US intelligence knew and what the allies could believe about the looming invasion is fascinating.
It is clear that the US had detailed inside information. But it was hard to credit Putin would risk such an ambitious plan with such sketchy forces.
So Kyiv feint? Putin’s limited ambitions? Time to put the sourceless disinformation to bed.
Talking of Goebbels...
It's fascinating how native the suite of propaganda techniques have become... Dehumanise your opposition, choose to repeat your position rather than engage counterarguments....
Whether or not the various alternative narratives here have been sourced is easily checked, but I wonder how few will do so, or rather just assume your assertion is true because it's repeated.
Mine is not an assessment. It's a speculation, and I've never pretended otherwise. The issue is several here do not seem to realize that all they have is speculations also, and pretend to have some authoritative sources on their side, which they do not.
But in a sense, yes, the same condition applies. Which is why I supported my views with arguments based the type of data and common military logic that anyone can verify. When I asked the opponents of my position to share what data their views are based on, I was met with silence.
Quoting Paine
In my view, the attack on Kiev likely served a different primary purpose - to show the West the Russians were serious about war in Ukraine, and give them a last chance to veer towards the Russians in regards to Ukraine's position in EU/NATO.
Of course, the Russians had no certainty this would work, and in the case the West did not back down, this attack could serve as the feint I mentioned.
Had the Russians made their intentions clear to march on the south without threatening Kiev, it stands to reason that resistance in the south would have been much higher.
Consider that the number of forces at the start of the invasion were roughly 200,000 Russians versus 250,000 Ukrainians - the Russians did not have anywhere near the 3:1 numerical advantage that is often considered a requirement for offensive military operations.
It was therefore vital that the Ukrainians were kept off balance.
I've also given several reasons why it is unlikely the Russians intended to occupy Kiev, the most important of which is that it would require an incredible investment of time and manpower, while Kiev is not of great strategic significance in the war.
The extent to which the attack on Kiev contributed to the relatively speedy advance in the south and the acquisition of the strategic territories that likely made up the Russians' initial wargoals is unknown. That would be a nice subject for research.
As for historical examples; the ground campaign of Desert Storm featured a feint on Kuwait as its primary tactical idea. The US forces pretended their intentions were to strike directly through the oil fields towards Kuwait, and the Iraqis concentrated their forces accordingly along the Kuwait-Saudi border.
Meanwhile, the US main force, VII Corps, crossed the Iraq-Saudi border instead, and wrapped up their entire flank.
What an odd response to being asked what data one's views are based on.
I guess I'd be pretty reluctant to share my sources too, if all I had were newspaper articles and confirmation bias.
You are indeed very coy on your sources. Like others pushing the same talking points on this forum. :chin:
I have indeed googled to see where your talking points might be sourced. Strangely nothing respectable is turning up. So I can only continue to say either pony up or expect to be treated dismissively.
Quoting apokrisis
You think the idea of sourcing things is a talking point?
Looking at this map, one might conclude that the Russians tried to encircle and take or destroy Kiev. We can only speculate of course, but for me, nothing could be further from the truth. What if the Russians only wanted to send a message?
Okay, they could have sent an email instead, but they were not sure it would be read. So they sent their best troops around Kiev to send their message.
The message was: Sergei, where did you put the 12 mm spanner?
We don't know what the Ukrainians answered, but it must have been something good, because the Russians then left the area.
I commented on the odd reluctance of apologists to source their talking points. I might also remark on what seems to be a tactic of confusing the discussion with non sequiturs.
But here is a source that supports you guys. Marvel at the quality and credentials.
Yeah. Likewise, I also checked Google to see where your talking points might be sourced, but nothing respectable turned up either.
Funny how when one searches Google one always seems to find what one is expecting to find.
More disinformation. You only have to check my posts to see the sources. :smile:
Uhuh. Likewise, you only have to check my posts to see the sources.
You clearly don't understand what sources are about.
Sources are about facts, not analysis or opinion and certainly not questions to other parties to a debate.
@Isaac has already explained this to you, but I'll explain it again with some examples.
First of all, even having a source when the other side does not, doesn't "win" an argument in any case. If someone on a corner of the internet is making wild claims about a situation no one else witnessed ... by definition there would be no contradictory source.
However, is it reasonable to accept any wild claim about events no one else witnessed? Obviously not, the first followup question to a sourced claim is "well, how credible is this source."
To make a long story short, in a war there are few credible sources. Every source of information could be propaganda or part of some deceptive campaign.
Indeed, one baseline of reliability commentators like to rely on is when both Ukraine and Russia are saying the same thing, seems bullet proof, but even then we must reserve skepticism as one side maybe simply saying what the other side wants to believe for the purpose of deception.
And pointing out that pretty much anything could be deceptive is not "apologetics" it's simply obvious.
Which is why the narrative of Russian incompetence is so essential to Western propaganda, as the only way to take everything Ukrainian Intelligence says, retired US generals, and the Western media at face value with zero criticism, or followup questions is to first believe Russia is irrational (as even taking the Western narrative at face value is replete with contradictions that are only resolvable if Putin, the Kremlin and the Russian military are irrational actors).
Or, as @Tzeentch has accurately described:
Quoting Tzeentch
In other words, there is very little reliable information about any statistically relevant information. Pointing out some anecdotes of failure, morale problems, mistakes, logistical problem, etc. doesn't establish as much or more of the same problems on the Ukrainian side.
All that is established is that "shit happens".
Any honest analysis progresses in several stages, first considering the "undisputed facts" that all parties to the discussion do actually agree on and what to make of them.
For example, undisputed facts are:
1. Russia currently occupies nearly 20% of Ukraine and has successfully pacified these regions.
2. Russia has secured what Western analysts before the war pointed out would be a big strategic victory of creating a land bridge to Crimea and securing the water supply to Crimea.
3. Russian lines are not currently "in collapse" due to morale, logistics, mutiny, etc. as is claimed essentially everyday on my news feeds.
4. Ukraine recently launched a major offensive that recaptured area in the least relevant strategic location, that is now making very slow progress, while Russia also makes progress in other areas of the front.
So, whatever the "absolute competence" of the Russian military it is not so great to have lost all of their land gains since the start of the war, nor lose the strategically vital land-bridge to Crimea canal and Kherson. Indeed, this strategic heart of the whole operation is not currently even under threat.
There is also no reason that all your arguments that the Russian military is not a good meritocracy etc. do not also apply to Ukraine, or the US for that matter. Certainly the US has a lot more technology and equipment and bases around the world and spends much more money than Russia, doesn't make them more competent and less financially wasteful and corrupt ... and ... the war is actually with Ukraine and not the US.
Ukraine was actually ranked as more corrupt than Russia by some metrics before the war. Why wouldn't your analysis not also apply to Ukraine? Not to speak of all the authoritarians of one flavour or another throughout history that fought successful wars, and there being zero evidence that democracy, even "true democracy" without reproach or blemish, is some sort of magical super weapon on the battlefield.
So show me a post where you gave a source after I requested it. Otherwise disinformation.
I know they are more than some random dude on the internet. Even if it is opinion, I prefer it from someone with a name and credible credentials.
...
Quoting Isaac
What counts as 'credible' for the purposes of the points you're trying to make...
US intelligence? Are we seriously surprised that information from US intelligence supports the US government position?
Newspaper editors? I mean....seriously.
Bloggers? Of which there are thousands (and as many opinions)
What is this measure of credibility you're wanting to apply, because the only relevant one I can think of would possibly be experience or expertise in military strategy or foreign affairs. That would rule in people like Mearsheimer (whom you've dismissed), Treisman (whom you've also dismissed), Scholsberg (whom you also dismissed) and so on...
That makes absolutely zero sense on a debate forum.
Point here is to present analysis and then defend or reformulate it in light of critique and rebuttal.
Making a bold claim, then trying to switch the burden of proof is a a common fallacy.
Simply because the Western media repeats again and again bold claims without justification, does not make it the default position that any dissenters must overcome a high burden of proof to critique, just makes it propaganda.
Exactly.
Yeah. And I'd add to that the fact that the claims here are asymmetric. One side is merely claiming a position to be plausible, the other is claiming that no other position than theirs is plausible.
The threshold of evidence required to demonstrate a position is plausible is quite low.
The threshold of evidence required to demonstrate that all other positions are implausible is enormous.
Simply because some random internet dude repeats un-evidenced claims, full of obvious holes, over and over again, doesn’t mean I am going to take them seriously.
No, no. I asked for actual articles or clips that present the case you want to make. But I have been reading Treisman on interesting issues like Russia’s information autocracy.
And I also wasn’t surprised that Treisman dismisses your talking point that Putin has no imperialist ambitions. So you see why I ask, where are the credible sources that support what you claim?
You mean one side claims Kyiv was a feint, Russian forces have proved competent, Putin has strictly limited war aims. And the other side is meant to believe these implausible interpretations by unknown posters who can’t provide credible professional analysis to back up what they say. :up:
Ah, so now he's a credible source. The moment he starts saying something you already agree with. And the others...?
Quoting apokrisis
I'm not making a case. I'm criticising your claim that alternative narratives are "dumb" or "irrational", or uniquely "ideological". All I need to do to defeat such a claim is point to the fact that you've failed to meet the threshold of evidence required for such a claim (showing that there are literally no credible experts who oppose it). You can't seriously expect to get away with a claim of the form "all Xs are Y unless you prove otherwise".
I've given sources who disagree with your assessment, but even that is unnecessary since it is you who are making the claim that the alternative narrative is unsupported, so it's you who needs to present evidence to support that claim.
No.
No one here has claimed that. People have suggested it is plausible.
And no one has given any indication that you ought to believe it either. In fact, I've specifically said the exact opposite.
It is you who are making the claim of implausibility. You have yet to provide a shred of evidence to support such a claim.
And I really shouldn't have to point out to someone of your calibre that showing people agree with your claim does not constitute evidence that the counter claim is implausible. Nor does reversing the burden of proof.
Quoting Isaac
Many shreds have been provided. Might I dare suggest that is at least a plausible suggestion and thus join you in evading all calls for credible support for anything I might happen to say at any point in these proceedings, m’lud? :lol:
Yes.
I have no issue at all with you claiming your preferred narrative is plausible. I completely agree.
As for evidence, the threshold to prove a narrative is plausible is very low and has already been amply met by the sources you've provided.
Now we can talk about the far more interesting question...
Given multiple plausible narratives which are under determined by the evidence, why have you chosen the one you have?
Which one do you think I have chosen? The options have been narrowed by batting away some of crazier views however.
I'm not playing 'get to know you in 20 questions', there's no need for me to guess. I've got a pretty clear idea of the narrative you prefer, but if that's wrong you can just say so.
I know it involves an imperialist Putin, I know it involves a weak Russian military (mistakes and poor morale/equipment). I know both those just happen to serve the US's agenda (the imperialist Putin to support the 'no negotiation' policy and the weak Russian army to support the 'just one more arms shipment ought to do it' policy), but whether supporting the US agenda is part of your narrative or not is unclear.
Quoting apokrisis
If you're including in that any notion of Putin being opportunistic rather than imperialist, or any notion of the Russian army being capable of occupying large parts of Ukraine for long periods of time, then you've failed to provide sufficient evidence that such views are 'crazy'. All you've provided is evidence that your views are not. Evidence that your views are not crazy does not constitute evidence that alternative views are.
Videos from the pull out of Lyman suggest very high losses during the retreat/breakout. I'm a bit surprised they didn't have them sit tight and either force Ukraine to reduce the encirclement, inflicting attrition until the situation became totally untenable, or wait for an organized relief/breakout effort. That might just be because conditions in the pocket were already untenable, or it could be because resources for a relief effort would take significant time to mobilize.
Meanwhile, in the south Ukraine had the first major breakthrough in a long time, moving up over 15 miles over the weekend and seizing a major road that would allow it to carry out a large encirclement.
In terms of the information issues we've discussed, I think this suggests poor communications between field commanders and Putin himself. The decision to annex territories where you are set to lose substantial ground right after the annexation obviously isn't what Putin likely had in mind politically.
Also never a good thing to have your military leadership openly trash talking each other on social media, which came up this weekend.
Deploying those tactical nukes (in this day and age) would probably end the war…but then again would he then redeploy his forces to take more land knowing the advantage he has and resume the barbaric land grabbing Witt renewed impetus ?
I say bring it on.
I figured they've been doing this continuously.
The problem is nuclear weapons existing at all, not a suicidal madman. North Korea has one, even crazier and he hasn't used them.
But I ask you, what country with nukes, would willingly accept humiliation in the battlefield? I think none. I pray he doesn't go for the last option, but he's not been given situations in which he could save face, which is what he needs to get out of this disaster.
I see only Hawkishness on all sides here, escalation after escalation. There needs to be dialogue. But how can dialogue be had when conditions are this dire?
It's a big problem.
There was dialogue during the cold war (thank god). There was dialogue with Hezbollah, the Taliban... The problem is we're having politics by fucking Facebook, I just hope there's someone sane in each of the warring administrations who are actually talking to each other before we blow the entire fucking human race to kingdom come because it gives us more 'likes' than negotiating.
Just spitballing:
Lots of Russian oligarchs see the war is going poorly; they just want to pull back the troops and reopen for business so they can start making money again. Putin blowing up the NS2 pipeline could be his way of telling these oligarchs that he is committed to this war and that there's no going back now.
Another reason it might have been sabotaged by Russia is to garner support for the general mobilization, which is also unpopular. An attack on a key Russian economic asset by NATO could be used to persuade the Russian people that this war is needed.
A good deal of LNG reserves are held outside of Russian territory. If Russia defaults, they lose these reserves.
Out of the European leaders, I think Macron has done the best, he did have relatively frequent meetings with Putin. But the other ones are an utter shame, and this includes the US.
This whole affair is akin to a d**k measuring contest, and to what end? I hope you are right too, there has to be at least one or two people IN NATO and the Pentagon who actually understands that more escalation can only lead to total disaster...
This exacerbates having partial control of regions where success now requires complete control. Before the annexation, the standard of victory was whatever Putin said it was.
He was actually trying to exert political influence on Macron before the war begun. He was offering Europe security to which macron rightly rejected.
I think our main saviour at the moment is that nuclear war would be bad economics. Whilst it behoves the American administration to whip up a social media frenzy to support their arms sales, it does them no good to go so far as to follow on when that mob starts baying for nuclear annihilation.
Whether Putin can be baited into doing it on the other side though remains open. I think he's unpredictable enough to do it if he's got nothing left. No one thought he'd invade the way he did in the first place. He's obviously got no scruples as far as humanity goes. So its a weigh up between his foreseeable economic losses vs his narcissism.
Ironic, given the recent focus on climate change that our obsession with oil/gas-fuelled materialism brought us much earlier to the brink of catastrophe because cheap gas was more important than a stable ex-superpower.
What he said to Macron was that he needed assurances that Ukraine would not be militarized. He did not get this, hence the invasion.
I do not think Europe has been wise here at all. This whole situation is because of NATO expansion - despite what some here are saying - which was promised to not be moved "an inch to the East" back in 1992.
This could have been prevented had they taken these negotiations seriously. They were not. And here we are. I see no wisdom in this. Nor is there wisdom in the invasion either.
I see ample lack of it.
The guy was obviously paranoid. Not only this but he wanted to return to the glory days of USSR where they had bigger territory.
This is where his real idiocy lies. Imagine the BRITISH empire going… fuck I miss the good old days let me take back those darn colonies.
You see he wanted to make Russia great again and now he’s fucked it up.
Stupid little man
I mean, so far the US and EU are being oh-so-confident that he won't do anything with nukes. I wonder how they can be so confident given what's happened.
I think your guess is as good as any. My intuition is that national pride trumps everything else. I'm unclear on something: You mean bad economics inside the US or in Russia?
Russia seems to be surviving somehow.
Yeah, his actions were stupid beyond belief, it made everything he wanted to avoid happen: NATO got bigger, large swaths of the world sanctioned Russia, etc.
But it's not speculation, NATO is the cause of the war, and should be recognized.
Disagree on your last sentence at best both parties are to blame with NATO not really taking into account the little man’s insecurities.
It's easy to blame a complex geo-political situation on "little mens insecurities". But fine, we can leave it at that, or, if you want a final response, go for it. Not point in arguing this further if we have settled opinions on the matter.
That’s ok. Thank you for your stance in all this. At the very least I have been educated on the thoughts of various philosophers on your profile wall as I glanced at it and even absorbing pink floyds brief philosophical point
Thank you.
How do facts bear this out?
Ukraine offered neutrality multiple times before and during the conflict, Putin was unmoved.
NATO offers no conceivable threat to Russia. Russian military doctrine permits a nuclear first strike in the case of an incursion into Russia's borders. This constitutes an ironclad security guarantee for Russia. AFAICT even Russian apologists don't take seriously the idea that NATO could ever launch a conventional war into Russia's borders.
Far more likely, Russia considers Ukraine at best a proper satellite of imperial Russia. Even the suggestion that Ukraine join NATO challenges this status and is intolerable.
Once the conflict started it was too late. Zelensky says different things depending on which camera is on him: Western, Russian, etc.
As far back as late 2021 there were gestures at NATO membership. If the Russians weren't serious about this being the main factor of the war, they wouldn't have been mentioning it for 20 years, it was a red line.
As for NATO launching a conventional war, this came out yesterday: https://www.yahoo.com/news/petraeus-predicts-us-lead-nato-190325472.html
Yeah, Ukraine in NATO is a great idea for having a nuclear war any random day, if a mistake is committed by either side.
As an aside, Putin asked Clinton if Russia could join NATO back in 2000, I believe. It was considered by Clinton and rejected by his advisors. Why? That's a question worth exploring.
In any case, nothing of what I've said justifies the war, it should be clear. But the provocations did happen.
If Russia did ask to join nato back in 2000 what was their intention and long game.
There is no precedent in history of two superpowers forming such an explicit alliance. But perhaps western influence would have been useful to their leadership.
Oh Lordy. At least we know your agenda then. I’m just interested in the whys and wherefores.
Yes, Putin was afraid the store would close before he could rush in to steal the item.
In bid for new long-range rockets, Ukraine offers U.S targeting oversight
I hate to say it, but I'm actually glad at this stage that the US, and I suspect Russia, are run by klepocratic opportunists. Their greed may be the only thing actually preventing this ridiculous Hollywood fantasy roleplay that seems so popular from escalating further.
Quoting Manuel
Both. Russia are more self sufficient than many of the larger economies, but those invested in the big industries (oil, fertilisers, wheat) still would rather their markets were viable - and, of course, let's not pretend any of the big players have been remotely effected by sanctions. Most wealthy Russians have a broad enough range of investments to benefit from whatever crisis is stoked as the latest excuse for profiteering.
"Too late"? What a blase dismissal of what is purportedly the war aim of Russia. Russia could certainly have saved itself a lot of grief.
Quoting Manuel
So I guess negotiation with such a proven serial liar is impossible?
Quoting Manuel
This hypothetical is in response to a Russian nuclear strike. By that point, the calculus changes dramatically.
America has been humiliated on the battlefield without resorting to nukes. We've lost entire wars without nuking anyone.
I hope so. I mean, it looks to me as if these people watch too many action films. They've reaped plenty of profits and have set back Russia for some considerable time. What more do they want by now?
The billionaires are fine, you're correct, the rest of the country less so, and who knows what longer term impacts will happen with these sanctions.
Quoting hypericin
You really expect that, prior to the invasion, the negotiations were rejected, and then as soon as it was launched, they would've stopped and retreated? Really? Would any other great power do that?
Now is a different story (and even months before, not a week or two after invasion), much life has been lost and is only getting more dangerous every day for everybody.
Quoting hypericin
Oh, you prefer the virtually non-existent honest politicians? Politicians, by definition, are liars, so of course proven liars must negotiate.
Quoting RogueAI
Where? Vietnam? Killing 1,000,000 civilians and destroying the ruling government is humiliation? Iraq? They got rid of Saddam.
Afghanistan, maybe. But everyone who has tried if Afghanistan has failed. But then nuking Afghanistan would not have changed much by way of war aims, I don't think.
MacArthur wanted to use nukes in Korea. Thank God he got cashiered. It must have been tempting though, at Chosin.
Ahhh. Yeah. What a nutjob, that would have been insane.
But - now we have the Taiwan issue, so, history repeating.
Fantastic.
Obviously. They would have been negotiating from a position of power, and gotten what they wanted. But what they wanted is nothing less than Ukraine.
Quoting Manuel
Yet you are holding Zelensky to this unrealistic standard while he negotiates with one of the greatest liars in politics.
If they retreated as soon as they invaded, that would convey weakness, not power. By now, as you said, the situation is very different.
More of a liar than Trump, Obama, Bush? I highly doubt that. Not because he's less bad, but because he doesn't have the same amount of power.
Whatever you think of Putin, it's with him you must negotiate, cause he's the one in power. That's a much lower standard than risking a nuclear Armageddon.
Exactly. There's two options. 1) Negotiate a peace deal. 2) Defeat Russia so utterly they have no bargaining position.
For the first Ukraine needs a position - what they're prepared to give up. For the second there needs to be a plausible strategy whereby it might happen. Choosing the second over the first is only reasonable if fewer lives are going to be destroyed that way. I've yet to be given even a vague notion of how the second option, especially with the nuclear risk, could possibly involve less risk to human life.
Anything not directly addressing that decision is just theatrics.
Yes, the later waves coming by cargo aircraft couldn't land as the fighting continued. Basically the Hostomel Airport (or Antonov Airport) I guess was the furthest Russian forces came.
Quoting Tzeentch
And withdrew later.
There's actually two reasons for not using nukes in Korea.
One was the political ramifications, which are obvious and more-or-less the same as today.
But the other reason was the fear that the mountainous terrain would render the nukes not so effective, and that the world would actually fear them less and not more after their use.
Same argument has been presented here that nukes wouldn't be effective.
However, apart from the situation not being the same, Ukraine being quite flat, it's also not the same situation technology wise with the kinds of nukes and speed at which they could be fabricated.
US policy back in Korea days was to build 600 nukes (it was reckoned the magic number) and to then simply destroy the Soviet Union. Anything less and you have protracted war, but 600 was reasoned to be "enough" to destroy the Soviet Union as a going concern.
Of course, it's anyone's guess if the US would have gone through with it, but the soviets developing nukes put an end to that plan.
The danger today is of course escalation does go out of hand and leads to full on nuclear war.
It definitely seems now the general mood, a sort of ethereal nihilism that civilisation has wandered into and launching nukes maybe just the next tic toc meme: felt cute, might delete the planet in 20 minutes.
It is frightening, and even if low probability, something to be worried about. A small risk of nuclear war is still unacceptable morally speaking.
However, even if nukes are used and there is no escalation to nuclear exchange (which I would put my money on, and not simply because it's the scenario I can spend money), the use of a nuke usher in crazy nuclear proliferation and that would get out of hand later.
If the great powers cannot manage world affairs responsibly, everyone is going to want nukes and the great powers will also go back to having even more.
It's not a good thing to throw into the mix of climate change and resource depletion of various kinds.
Bold claims without justification like prior 24th of February that Russia was posed to attack Ukraine. :smirk:
Bold claims without justification like Ukraine has regained territory. :snicker:
Quoting RogueAI
After 1945 usually victorious countries in war aren't having a public (or private) debate of using nukes. It usually is brought up when things don't look so good. I think there was some debate/discussion to use nukes with Dien Bien Phu, but that naturally didn't go anywhere.
Quoting Isaac
Wait a minute! Didn't Joe Biden talk about it a lot? You remember? The thing you didn't believe was true / was just US propaganda?
Anyway....
Lyman has fallen. Although Russians did manage to withdraw. And some advances seem to be made by Ukraine in the south too.
I think the response to Putin using nuclear weapons wouldn't be a nuclear escalation. And naturally the West is trying to make a sincere warning that it would be a bad thing to do.
We can agree then that Mearsheimer was correct in that Ukraine giving up it's nuclear weapons was a very bad idea: with them it could have deterred Russian imperialism.
Not worth the paper it was written on then.
Yes. And the end of the day, these are - at bottom - the two choices available to us. The answer for any rational agent, should be obvious.
That was the time when people where genuinely thinking that Russia might someday join NATO. And the Cold War was over. An NATO was interested in "new threats" like fighting terrorism.
I think it's quite obvious what the objectives have been for Russia. First Crimea, then Novorossiya. Pretty hard to deny it. Same old line since Catherine the Great.
This is basically the theory that Branislav Slantchev has proposed: Putin is like the commander who orders the bridge to be blown up so that his troops are not tempted to retreat.
Quoting Branislav Slantchev
I agree, the danger of larger scale nuclear is more in the cycle of retaliation continuing at some point going haywire.
"Asymmetric moves" such as blowing up the Nord Steam pipe (whoever it was) may have unintended consequences and be a lot worse than even the perpetrators thought it would, soliciting a retaliation in turn much stronger than expected.
Quoting ssu
That this is the main conclusion people are drawing from this conflict, a new cycle of nuclear proliferation has certainly already started. The actual use of nuclear weapon would simply super charge that in my opinion.
Of course, the "next Ukraine" could easily be some poor country that the US wanted to bomb.
So there is at least some skin in the game for the US as well to diffuse the situation. Of course, the net present bombing value is pretty low of nations you don't even know you hate yet, but, still, it is there, it is something.
Yeah, right. Putin would've cancelled the invasion that he had been planning for at least a year if only he got the right assurances at the last moment.
Quoting Manuel
Despite, well, pretty much everything.
Quoting boethius
Then we will wake up in World where two nations have used nuclear weapons against their non-nuclear armed opponents. But the interesting question is: would we actually panic?
Some will likely panic. Go immediately for playbook response Putin (or the Russian doctrine) wants with escelate to de-escelate: immediate cessation of all military operations, an immediate cease-fire on the lines now. I think the Pope would call for it, I guess. Or people of that status.
But what if the response wouldn't be that? Ok, they used a 5 kt tactical nuke. And the war goes on... Then what? The US and the West has had a long time to think about this.
Nice way to cherry pick arguments.
Making NATO larger was a massive mistake, as was recognized by the last ambassador to the USSR, he predicted this would happen. Pardon for looking at the conflict from all sides, and not calling Putin the worse thing since Hitler in every post made here.
I think it's very easy and convenient to do this - after all, if the leader of your enemy is a lunatic with imperial ambitions, we need not bother with the actual history.
But I harbor no illusions of changing minds - and it's too late now to do anything about the past.
And likewisen, he takes Putin's nuclear threats seriously enough - I don't know where @Manuel gets the idea that he is the lone voice in the wilderness while everyone else remains oblivious to the danger when this is being discussed and debated at all levels, everywhere.
You can't change minds by repeating for the umpteenth time these weak and tired arguments.
And the grinding reluctance of the Biden Administration to give the weapons to Ukraine that would fold the Russian invasion in a fortnight is a part of that discussion.
From the way you talk you are already aware that NATO has nothing to do with Russia's aim. If it was, and they got what they wanted by military force, it would have been a brutal show of raw strength. Only if their actual aim was Ukraine itself would their leaving be a "retreat" and a show of weakness.
Quoting Manuel
Total non sequitor.
I think the root of the debate is a profound difference in attitude toward conflict. Where there's a bully, you'll say it's the responsibility of the rest of the population to bow for the sake of peace.
The opposing view is that you have to smash the bully in the nose if you want peace.
Opposing strategies, same goal.
That's brilliant.
Now extrapolate that to a world full of bullies and explain how one bully smashing the other bully in the nose brings about peace.
Because bullies learning to talk instead of fight certainly does.
Now do you see why the record of the US matters to the debate? Your whole theory only works if one side isn't a bully themselves.
If you have a point, please make it more explicit.
Russian warfare can look like an epic fail to observers. But the key is that where everybody else would simply quit, they can keep failing until the other side is totally exhausted even if it has been victorious. Just look at what Russian fighting looked like from summer 1941 to Stalingrad.
Quoting frank
Isaac is very angry that we would forget what kind of a bully the US has been. We might forget this because it's obvious that Russia is the aggressor here, Ukraine is the victim and the US is aiding Ukraine. Isaac would be extremely angry if now the US would look good as a "white knight in shining armour" coming to help a victim. Because the US is bad. Remember all the children that died in Iraq thanks to the sanctions etc. Even if this is a thread about the war in Ukraine, that doesn't matter.
I see.
To incorporate parts of Ukraine, or even the whole of it to Russia would surely prevent Ukraine from being part of NATO, that much is a truism.
I don't understand your last sentence. If you launch a major military war, of course you are going to do propaganda, that's always been the case. If China were in same situation as Russia is, or India or
any other nuclear power, if they left almost as soon as they invaded, would be an embarrassment.
I'd be interested to see cases in which this actually happens. In must be very rare.
They miscalculated badly and thought that parts of Ukraine would want to willingly go to Russia. They never did destroy Kiev, which they could have - it would go against their propaganda.
But if you're saying NATO is not a major part of the calculation, then we really are living in different worlds. Ukraine would have been in a far, far worse state if it weren't from NATO's aid, another truism.
What do you mean they could have destroyed Kiev? Bomb it out of existence? And what propaganda would that go against?
As for the gap between what they thought the Russians could achieve against facts on the ground, how does one separate the rhetoric justifying the operation from the level of resistance encountered?
The Russians clearly underestimated the response. That mistake is not clearly connected to an expectation of a more favorable reception.
Like the US did in Baghdad, or NATO in Libya, bomb it to pieces. Basically, tear the country apart, as those states are today.
Quoting Paine
I think this is easy. Russia presents a grossly distorted picture to the domestic population, and call the whole thing a "military operation" instead of a war. As I understand it, until very recently, most Russians did not know too well how the war was going because of the propaganda.
Outside Russia the situation is very different. As you say, they expected this to be a cake walk. They probably thought this would be a Crimea 2.0 for them, which was, all things considered, not bad for Russia.
Quoting Paine
I agree they severely underestimated the response. But if they did destroy Kiev, I assume they would have no good propaganda to justify it internally. Or maybe they suspect that if they did that, things would go even worse for them.
But the internal conditions for the Russian population and the reality on the ground can be explained.
That's changed now, ever since the so called "partial draft". Now people are waking up inside.
I guess this is precisely what I question. Russians were cool with the Chechen wars and the tactics used in Syria. If Kiev was a smoking heap, how is that different from the other stuff?
They called the Chechnyan "terrorists", so a large portion of Russia probably didn't care about that. Syria was a disaster from everybody, Russia included, as well as Assad. But again, I think the average Russian cares as much about Syria as does the average American or European, which is to say, sadly, not much.
They view Ukranians as belonging to the same people, same heritage, bla bla. I would suppose something similar would be the case if the US invaded Canada. It's harder to justify killing your immediate neighbors, who are similar to you, than some "foreigner" with a strange culture and a different language. All that nasty stuff comes into play in these other wars.
Sure. But the propaganda in play here is saying that Nazis have taken control of Ukraine and must be rooted out. Could get rough.
U.S. citizens did fight Canadians in 1812. We both burned down real estate on both sides.
But clever historical references aside, the Putin regime does not recognize any form of Ukrainian identity.
Frankly I’m surprised the “Kyiv feint” guys aren’t pushing this more. Kyiv is considered the mother city of Russian culture. So levelling it would be a no-no. This would be why the battle plan would have been to deliver such a shock encirclement that Zelensky would flee/get assassinated and a puppet regime installed. No real damage done.
I’m not sure but it seems similar to how Israelis would view Jerusalem. A bit too holy to bomb. However I’ve seen no one saying that so I need to go check.
It could also be one reason for falling back when plan A didn’t work. Unlike the fate of all the border cities and villages where bringing in the artillery was the way to liberate their Russian citizens from Nazi oppression.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kievan_Rus%27
Sure. This war has many ugly aspects, no disagreements from me here.
So, as one who promotes dialogue, how does the denial of Ukrainian identity play a part?
Doesn't one have to stop doing that to have a conversation?
I mean, as I see it, it's a question of priorities. For the people involved, I think this would mean no further escalations on either side. Any military action at all must be defensive, if any. Of course, as things are right now, this would put Ukraine at a disadvantage. Further escalation puts the whole world in serious, serious trouble, way beyond Ukraine.
Listen, I think Putin is a thug and a war criminal, but then, I think this is true of most leaders of nuclear armed countries - it comes with the job. Maybe some think he is specifically worse because of his rhetoric or his ramblings. I don't think this should distract from dialogue.
Once the military situation is more-or-less stable, meaning, no more offensives, then we can proceed to list all the concerns for all involved - which covers a lot of ground.
I think if I were Ukranian, I really wouldn't care what Putin thought of my people, I just want the war to end. Let's work on that, the rest can follow.
Each day what is shown is the opposite of this- from everybody. Russia, Ukraine, NATO, etc. And if Putin, again, however much one hates him, is not offered a way to save face, then this does not paint a good picture for the world. This is pretty serious stuff here. That's just my perspective, could be wrong in several aspects.
I don't understand this idea of withdrawing from dialogue. There are many people desperately trying to talk to a recluse with a special button.
He is no more of a recluse than Kim in Korea, and dialogue with Kim went OK. Putin can be talked to, I'm sure of it. The aim if The Pentagon has been, not to help Ukraine, but to weaken Russia.
If people start to think Putin cannot be talked to, because he is crazy, then this will become a self-fulfilling prophecy. It should be noted that, after several attempts, citizen evacuations were successful in cities under siege, so positive outcomes can happen, it has been shown.
He is open to talk, as he has done with Macron, or Xi and others. But not Biden, nor many others in Europe. So, we cannot blame failure to talk here solely on Putin, I think that would be dishonest.
You have opened up too many wounds to talk about this with equanimity.
I spare you from any curses.
"Retreat" is only weakness if the aggressor did not obtain what they want. If they achieved everything, "retreat" is not even the right word.
If forcing Ukraine from NATO was truly the aim, Russia could have had that easily, early in the war or before. And if they gained that, their withdrawal would not be a "retreat", and it would not be a show of weakness, they would have gotten what they through raw force.
Only by acknowledging that NATO is not their true aim, that all of Ukraine is their goal, does Russia's withdrawal in this scenario turn into a "retreat".
It's not rocket science. I just want you to explain your analogy to me. How does one bully punching the other bully in the nose create a more peaceful world? We just exchange bullies.
I'm just asking the simple question. If, in your scenario, the world were made up of bullies, how would your theory (punch the bully on the nose) bring about peace. It's your theory so it doesn't seem too much to ask you to explain it.
Quoting ssu
Yeah, the US are only providing the weapons, the intelligence, the strategy, the training, the finances and the global propaganda...I see now they're barely involved, how foolish of me to even mention them.
Let's leave them out of it then.
Prior to the invasion Ukraine were one of the most corrupt nations in the regions, the continent's top black market arms dealers and a hotbed of Neo-nazi extreme right violence. Likewise Russia.
So explain to me how @frank's analogy works. how does the world become more peaceful if Ukraine 'beat' Russia as opposed to Russia 'beat' Ukraine? What magic pill stops Ukraine from thinking "now Russia's weak and we've got all these weapons, we could have Valuyki or Belgorod"?
Is it because they're all just really, really nice?
You could change your own mind though, by recognizing the asymmetry of this war: Zelensky is far better than Putin, and Ukraine has just cause.
Reminds me of MalcolmX accusing Martin Luther king of being an Uncle Tom.
Nonviolent resistance is not non-resistance.
No.
The "bridge-burning" theory is plausible, but highly speculative. Still, the alternatives are even more problematic. The players who more obviously stand to gain from the destruction of Nord Stream are Ukraine and the US. Both benefit from burning the bridge that would tempt Europe to backslide and make a deal with Russia. US LNG producers and exporters have a better incentive for long-term investment now that they know that they won't be priced out of the market by cheap Russian gas any time soon. And Ukraine now controls one of the main remaining transits for Russian gas into Europe.
But I don't see the US doing something so desperate for a modest commercial gain. Even for Ukraine this would be a very perilous move. If they were caught, this would seriously undermine their vital relationship with Europe, because Europe would see an attack on their infrastructure as a hostile and treacherous act. Besides, it is doubtful that Ukraine actually had the capability to pull off such an attack.
Russia has the capability, and it has nothing to lose reputation-wise. Of all the players it is the only one reckless and desperate enough to do something like this - if they wanted to.
Another detail making it more likely to be Russia is the ease of access. It’s being said they could just wheel explosive down the pipe using the inspection pig.
But who knows.
https://www.wermac.org/nordstream/html_img86.html
That's just theory. In practice, how would you suggest Ukraine to resist Putin's fascist regime and invading armies in a non-violent manner?
I am not sufficiently at peace myself to recommend anything. but the methods are well developed by Gandhi, King and others. It isn't an easy option, for sure.
I don't think those who advocated Ukraine's surrender to Russia had any kind of resistance in mind. I think @Tzeentch, for instance, was concerned with casualties of an on going war. @Manuel was worried about escalation.
If I understand correctly, they're saying the cost of standing up to aggression isn't worth any gains from it. Surrender assures peace and save lives.
Those methods have not proved to work against a ruthless, amoral enemy. In 1940 Gandhi appealed to GB to stop fighting Germany. Good thing they didn't listen.
That the pipes were blown up from inside would be very obvious to even a casual inspection, I would think. Unless they want everyone to know and don't care even for a modicum of deniability, that would be extremely stupid. But we'll know soon enough.
Well that's obviously not always true. But clearly no one involved is much considering the possibility of peaceful resistance.
Quoting Olivier5
Are you seriously suggesting that the British Empire was anything other than ruthless and amoral?
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/culture/article/mahatma-gandhi-changed-political-protest
From six months ago...
Quoting Isaac
...but don't let what's actually been written get in the way of your little vignette of strawmen.
Except, of course, it does neither, as we can see in front of our own eyes. What it does though is relieve the West from the cost and the responsibility for the war. (Especially in the eyes of those who believe that the [s]white man[/s] the West automatically assumes all of the agency and the responsibility wherever it so much as casts a sideways glance.)
I never advocated any course of action for Ukraine - that would be highly presumptuous.
I was trying to articulate the sides of the debate. It looks like I failed.
But speaking of the cost of the war, what do you think accounts for the continuing support of the West? Fear for their own safety? Or what?
I see. Then what was your perspective on the situation?
Good question, what could it possibly be...?
https://www.businessinsider.com/congress-war-profiteers-stock-lockheed-martin-raytheon-investment-2022-3?op=1&r=US&IR=T
Indeed, comparatively speaking.
On what part of the situation?
What are you comparing? The concentration camps in S.Africa and those of the Nazis? the holocaust of the slave trade with the holocaust of the Jews? The argument is too odious to continue.
Obviously Putin wouldn't stop at Ukraine. Perhaps the territorial annexations might end there, yet the fact is that Russia would want to enlarge it's sphere-of-influence to the West. Finlandization: my country knows the game extremely well.
From Putin's view he is restoring things after the greatest tragedy in history, the fall of the Soviet Union, with a re-emerging Russia taking it's place where it deserves to be against the decadent, failing West.
Yet the war seems to be going well for the Ukrainians... :up:
Well, give it a rest then. Non-violence would likely not work against Putin.
You need to have an option for Russia to get out of this mess by saving face. If not, the worst possible outcome becomes more likely, not less.
Kennedy and Khrushchev would be much better than these mediocre leaders we have.
[tweet]https://twitter.com/RussianEmbassy/status/1576893231278981121[/tweet]
World war 2 Hiroshima-Nagasaki 77 years ago? Bit of a reach. But some will lap it up.
If we're speculating far out ideas anyway, how's this out for Putin?
Set up real democracy in Russia. Prepare a real election, including international observers, independent verification, all that. Oust dangerous people that would stop this move, slowly, incrementally perhaps. Just in case a genuinely elected new government was to chase him, wanting to prosecute him, he can always say that it was he that set up the (real) election at least, that resulted in him being chased, and, worst case, get a house in Chile or something, stash enough money to secure a life. Don't run for the next election, retire, claim family reasons, sickness, whatever, make something up, doesn't matter. Leave the crap to the next government.
Unlikely. :)
Slavery in the 2010s, and the environments that condone them:
The Slaves of St Petersburg (Mar 28, 2017)
Human trafficking in North Korea » North Korean workers sent abroad (Wikipedia)
Please note, this is only peripherally related to Russia :fire: Ukraine, but just gives a glimpse into the environment in Putin's Russia (Medvedev is also mentioned). Poland was accused of something similar in the 2000s.
In many of our sectors, let's say, fatigue has set in after a long offensive period, during which large territories were liberated. But there is no longer any strength left to hold them.
Why is that? Because there are not enough people. Although, for sure, among the top brass everything looked different. These slaps in the face were necessart so that everyone would understand how it really is. After that, they announced a partial mobilization.
The enemy, on the other hand, brings prepared reserves into battle, realizing an advantage in both manpower and morale. The time they spent retreating and on the defensive, they used to prepare new combat-ready formations.
You can sprinkle ashes on your head and tear your chest hair with a cry of “Everything is lost!” But now we need to do the same thing - to prepare people to dilute the bloodless units with them (?). Solve interaction and communication problems. Set up rears.
We drove just now from Kreminna to Svatove. I don’t see panic, hatred either. The men are preparing for heavy battles for the territory of the Russian Federation. Which we have to win back when the operational crisis of the SMO is overcome.
https://t.me/s/sashakots
Well, you can think of it in terms of "surrender". But you can also think of it as "saving lives", and potentially the planet.
Or instead of "surrender", we can call it a "stop" in violence. But sadly, this isn't the route being followed.
Yep. They say about 60,000 Russian soldiers have died. That's how many Americans died in the whole Vietnam war.
So would you argue that Ukraine should have surrendered in order to save lives? I don't think you can escape the use of that word. It's just what it's called when you bow to your aggressor.
Why can't it end with Russia being driven from Ukraine? Do you think it's a foregone conclusion they'll use nukes?
Nuclear Weapons Convoy Spotted in Russia (Ground News; Oct 4, 2022)
[tweet]https://twitter.com/i/events/1577028721239900161[/tweet]
Unclear what to make of them.
It's a matter of priority: do you think saving many, many lives is worth stopping the war, or are you confident that escalation will defeat Russia? If you think the latter is the case, then of course you wouldn't want to surrender. My intuitions don't lead to that conclusion. But in geopolitical affairs, people differ and are often wrong about what ends up happening.
They don't have many options left. They have few allies that support this war (which is a good thing) and they are a pariah. What I am relatively confident about, is that if the only way out for Russia is total humiliation, they can go crazy.
If they are not offered a way out, which can let them say "we achieved our objectives" - even if it is a total fabrication - I don't like the options remaining. It's a real worry.
I'm having trouble following your thinking, which is all I was trying to do.
Your intuitions say that Russia won't be defeated, so Ukraine should have surrendered in order to save lives? I'm just asking.
You insist on using the word "surrender". If you say "compromise", then I agree with the last statement.
Ukraine has exceeded expectations by far. But stopping now as opposed to later, would be better for everybody.
Again- I could be wrong.
When there's a compromise, both parties walk away with something they wanted. What sort of compromise could there have been during this war?
Quoting Manuel
I think in large part that's Zelensky.
Ukraine gets rid of the invaders. Russia keeps Crimea.
Ukraine declares victory against a nuclear power, Russia declares "denazification" successful.
What's negotiated are the cities, which Russia gives back and maybe gets a token piece of territory.
Not unlike the Cuban Missile Crisis. The missiles the US removed from Turkey were technologically obsolete and due for replacement. Of course, the Soviet Union does not mention this bit of news.
Something like that I think could be doable.
Quoting Manuel
Manuel, you're not being serious.
Well frank, if you insist that "defeating" Russia is the only commendable and desirable outcome, then we have different notions of seriousness.
I'll let you have the last word here, if you so desire.
Do you mean something like this? (happened in Iran today):
No strong violence per se, but they did have to physically push him out and throw things
The problem is that this is completely unacceptable to the Russians.
Their issue is Ukraine joining NATO, turning it into a military bulwark on their borders and making Russian access to Crimea a matter of US goodwill.
This has been in the line of expectations since the early 2010's, and nothing short of war would have stopped it.
Any future-proof solution to this conflict has to recognize that the Russians will go to full-scale war, and even nuclear war, over their access to Crimea.
We shouldn't forget how many Ukrainians have died too. This is a huge conventional war and likely it will cost over 100 000 killed in less than a year, which just tells about the ferocity of the fighting.
Quoting Manuel
An outcome where Putin can declare victory, having achieved a land bridge to Kyiv and have gotten more territories annexed so that he can declare "Novorossiya" to part of Russia again seems hardly a great outcome.
You can then wait a decade, rebuild your army and attack again.
No, the real problem is that Soviet Union created a continuum for a Russian Empire that should have ended just like Austro-Hungary or any historical multiethnic Empires, which had their roots in Medieval Times. Putin's idea of Russia is imperial. It is a Russia spread across many nations with Russians being on top. It's obvious in the grandeur of the backdrop that Putin uses, with retro-19th Century uniforms worn by the soldiers at the moment when the new territories "joined" Russia.
Since the Soviet Union collapsed peacefully, people like Putin think it was just an accident. Hence the way to redefine the "official" idea of Russia has to come through a similar path as Serbia had with Yugoslavia. And just like the present day Serbia, Russia will likely be cautious of the West even in the future, but will hopefully shed it's imperial ambitions. And that will likely happen with a military defeat.
Well, my last word is that I was earnestly trying to understand your point of view because you have a history of being remarkably reasonable.
And then I witnessed that times had changed.
Unbelievable. The region won't recover in our lifetime, huh?
I don't disagree with the analysis here. I'm throwing out some ideas of what a negotiation could look like. But something has to be exchanged, I think.
I have trouble seeing a military defeat as being an option for Russia. I really do think they'll risk a nuclear war before being defeated. I hope I am wrong, I really do.
Well - I had my streak, alas, all things come to an end, even being reasonable I guess.
But thanks for the past compliments.
Yes. If you decide to ignore all counterarguments, that tends to be the outcome.
It's tough.
A neutral Ukraine is and has been the long-term solution to tensions between NATO and Russia, but the trust that makes such a thing feasible has been shattered. The United States and Ukraine will not trust Russia to respect Ukraine's neutrality and vice versa, and in both cases I would argue the distrust is well-founded.
Russia holding on to the areas it has currently occupied (creating a safe corridor to Crimea) is probably the bare minimum of what they will accept unless they are militarily completely defeated, but given the rhetoric from the United States and Ukraine, it is unlikely this will be accepted.
That's the issue - what is acceptable to one side is completely unacceptable to the other and vice versa.
@Manuel's question was about the solution, not the problem. It's lazy virtue signaling to just whinge on about the extent to which Russia's attitude is the problem. The question is what course of action we should endorse as a solution to it.
Ummm...depends on just how old you are. :wink:
Quoting Manuel
I don't. Russia has seen it's share of defeats (just like the US with Vietnam and Afghanistan), which have brought political instability.
The sane nuclear escalation would be an underground nuclear test in Novaja Zemlya test site or somewhere else.
The insane escalation would be to try to hit Ukrainian formations with tactical nuclear weapons. This is harder than it sounds as Ukrainian battlegroups don't move in tight confined formations to create great targets. And hitting an airbase or military command center near a town or city would simply make some Ukrainian place name have the similar creepy vibe as Hiroshima and Nagasaki. They already have Chernobyl, you know.
Quoting Isaac
If you want the aggressor to have a face saving victory, I guess now would be the perfect time to have an immediate cease-fire and set Russian territorial gains to start where the no-mans land is now. A time-out is what the Russian army needs now.
Yes. One cannot have negotiations if neither side offers an inch. This is not sustainable, particularly to Russia, I think they will get even more desperate. I don't know if there any "doves" in the Pentagon, but surely they must have at least one person thinking about de-escalation, instead of the obsessions of "defeating Russia", which sounds like suicide to me.
You're correct, it is extremely tough.
It seems obvious to you and me. But what I'm seeing from the people who disagree on the general thrust of our arguments (not every detail, as is normal) is that Putin is like Hitler or so, so evil.
This is a cartoonization of the real world. Reminds me quite a bit of the propaganda used in WWI. Very dangerous thinking, in my opinion.
I'll grant you Afghanistan, no doubt.
Back then Russia (The USSR) was not the target of the most severe sanctions a country has seen. Maybe North Korea faces sanctions at these levels.
Russia still needs to sell a PR "win" for this to end. What, are they going to say "we lost" and go home? That would be remarkable.
This is far, far bigger than Afghanistan, as it includes NATO and the rest of the world, with the whole food production issue plus the energy crisis. In short, many more elements are in play now.
I was trying to put the arguments into words. We ran into a ditch somewhere around expecting Ukraine to accept a compromise that Putin has not offered.
I didn't ask for your assessment. I think you know why.
Yes, it's frightening how quickly these sorts of narratives can take hold, as if the past weren't written in black and white for everyone to see.
Go back a few years and read literally any foreign affairs strategist writing about the region, the topics will be the far right in Ukraine, black market arms, Russian oil and gas, and talk of Putin's internal power politics. Now everyone's pretending like Ukraine is some sort of doe-eyed Disney hero, and Putin's the devil and we've always known it. But the writing is still online, no one was talking that way before the invasion. It's scary-level denial.
Quoting ssu
They went well didn't they. Good job Russia were defeated in Afghanistan otherwise the place might be absolute hell...oh, wait, it is.
Quoting frank
Yes, because it's easier to ignore my questions than it is to answer them.
The other one, which I had in mind (and apparently many in Russia have thought about also), is the Russo-Japanese War. That was a war started by Russia with high hopes of a victorious war and with severe contempt and underestimation of the Asian foe. And the under performance of the Russian armed forces came as a surprise to everybody, which just showed the underlying problems of the Empire.
Russia made a peace which was quite unfavorable for it, but the reality at the war's end dictated this.
Yes, that was a defeat for them too, but remember they were going through quite significant internal turmoil. These days, in which everything is televised, seen on the internet, Twitter and so on, it is much more humiliating. But the crucial difference here, is the extent of the people in play NATO vs. Russia, not Ukraine vs. Russia.
These are "mortal enemies" so to speak. If they can avoid humiliation on such a scale, they have the option. Losing in Afghanistan is peanuts compared to this, for historical reasons and tensions going beyond Ukraine, such as establishing Russia's place in the world. I'm sure such things are in the minds of, not only Putin, but the people around him too.
Now, if you have a situation in which the military gets tired and get rid of Putin, OK. Maybe that ends the war. But I wouldn't put all my eggs in that basket, we don't know if that would work well.
I don't think anyone is now eager to jump into Putin's place.
As it's just now speculated that the north of the Kherson front might be collapsing (or retreating), the thing with Russia and Russians is the severe beating that they can endure and still persist. Just remember how it was after one and a half years of fighting in 1941-1942? Or how successful Napoleon was until he finished in Moscow?
Yet the fact is that the battlefield here is limited: Ukrainian troops will stop at the Russian border. The West can keep up such aid as it's giving now for quite a while. And now the mobilized troops can basically be formed into meaningful units for a spring offensive. Putin can likely continue the war longer than anticipated. Still, a collapse is also possible, although rather unlikely.
I wouldn't worry about that. The current regime have some of the best crafters of PR ever; a chekist runs it, he's an astute PR professional himself.
The summary.
Yeah no, you can't, unless you are living under a rock or you are Russia's useful idiot. This is what surrender looks like:
Those who dismiss Russia's talk about the "denazification of Ukraine" as nothing but propaganda rhetoric are not paying attention. They are very, very serious about it, in their own perverse way. As serious as the actual historical Nazis were about their "final solution."
Quoting Manuel
Or, you know, the propaganda used in WWII. Which reasonable people like yourself would not believe.
* Note - X indicates where Japan landed.
One picture that cuts through a lot of the BS. :up:
I have no doubt Russia is committing war crimes, as those pictures indicate. I mean, it is evident that it is, as is covered 24/7 in most news media. That is not new information, nor is it useful in seeking a way to STOP the conflict.
If you really believe that by posting pictures of that kind and saying "this is what surrender means" is any kind of coherent argument, then I'm afraid the useful idiot is elsewhere. Because a nuclear war will make that picture look pleasant in comparison.
Either a compromise is made, or we perish. Or you may take your gamble with an inside coup, see if that works.
Yes, Putin is a war criminal, has committed AWFUL crimes in a war - to which I add, who has not? No one here is mentioning the mass starvation in Afghanistan, we don't care about that - but if "defeating" him means throw ourselves to the flames, then I can think of no more irrational attitude imaginable.
Quoting Taha Yassin Ramadan
[sub]? NPR; CNN; BBC[/sub]
[sup](Musk trolled Putin. :grin:)[/sup]
Getting Rid of Nukes: The Trilateral Statement at 20 Years (, Brookings · Jan 13, 2014)
Putin Challenges the West (Again) (Carnegie · Jan 27, 2022)
Quoting Putin Wants Revenge Not Just on Ukraine But on the U.S. and Its Allies (Time · Feb 24, 2022)
Quoting West wants to defeat Russia on battlefield? ‘Let them try’: Putin (Al Jazeera · Jul 7, 2022)
[sub]? RFE/RL[/sub]
There are more statements, speeches, whatever, to that end. Thus spoke (and did) Putin. The Ukrainians look elsewhere, their choice to make. Compromise could be no nuclear weapons in Ukraine (above), or no Ukraine NATO membership, say. EU affiliation/membership is a different matter.
[sub](If someone steals my bike, then giving half of it back isn't compromise, but, hey, I won't be riding in their garden. :death:)[/sub]
Your observations upon the reluctance to level Kiev make sense. On the other hand, the distance of supply lines for that sort of thing is much greater than the beating Kharkiv received for example.
In the future, more will be known about the planning in this regard. Coming from Belarus had a lot of limitations in terms of transportation. I wonder who was scheduled to land at Antonov airport if it had been secured.
Crate of gold teeth left behind by fleeing Russian torturers…
https://worldnationnews.com/gold-teeth-the-terrifying-discovery-that-shows-the-horrors-of-the-russian-occupation-in-ukraine/
But then what about this, and that and the other….always what about…
Debrief article says…
Article is all about the riot police who also got sent as part of the Kyiv “feint”. What a cock up (unless you believe the interpretation that Moscow planned for the crowd control that would be needed as regime change was under way).
https://thedebrief.org/know-no-mercy-the-russian-cops-who-tried-to-storm-kyiv-by-themselves/
Airlifting entire battalions by cargo plane under the Ukrainian AA umbrella?
The fact that you wouldn't dispose of such a notion outright is quite telling.
Now the question is, since you seem to lack military expertise, why do you choose to base your opinions on this specific article and this specific author? (or any of the other articles you have shared)
Newspaper articles are all fine and good, but what it seems we're ending up with is the blind leading the blind.
You have committed war crimes, Manuel? ??
[tweet]https://twitter.com/olliecarroll/status/1577274892751290368[/tweet]
Incidentally, google maps says "Light traffic in this area". :smile:
And...?
How does the scale of the atrocity have any bearing whatsoever on the most effective method for stopping it?
The Yugoslav wars were the scene of some of the worst war crimes since WWII. None of which prevented several peace talks, UN interventions, negotiations, agreements over territory and a final division of the disputed territories. None of which, incidentally, even prevented the perpetrators of those war crimes being brought to justice.
There's nothing whatsoever about peace talks, concessions and territorial agreements which either perpetuates war crimes, nor prevents justice being done to those who committed them.
So if you want to have a serious conversation instead of just virtue signalling, then link your atrocities to a solution of some kind. Join the dots. How does the fact that the Russian army are behaving so atrociously mean that prolonged war is better than negotiated peace (even with concessions). What's the link?
It’s nice to know we have someone here with such obvious military expertise as yourself to guide us. Now back to what sources have said and not what some random internet dude wants to claim as an excuse for Russian military incompetence.
So your 'sources' are the CIA, and the arms-industry-funded Atlantic Council? Phew, thank goodness we've finally found some unbiased sources without any ulterior motives to worry about.
I'm presently serving and have a degree in military strategy.
No, you are quite right. This is indeed how one wages a war to liberate and denazify a country. What was I thinking!
Quoting Isaac
Do I have to join every dot for you apologists? If Ukraine AA would have made an airbridge impossible, then someone might have mentioned it. Military expertise would not have been lacking in the reported discussions.
I look forward to evidence that you can source your views in response to the published reports then. It should be really easy.
Not "would have made" - Ukrainian AA makes it impossible. You're suggesting to fly in cargo planes carrying entire battalions a few kilometers from the frontline, where even helicopters and combat aircraft cannot operate safely.
I already have.
Intersting outburst. Anything in response to what I actually wrote...?
The sources that claim to know the Russian intentions are usually western journalists or military analysts - the same types of analysts who in the winter of 2021 claimed Kiev would fall in a matter of hours.
As I've hinted at before, it seems many western analysts are now having to correct their image of the Russian war machine that they themselves inflated beyond proportion. However, they are not yet at the stage where they're able to stop projecting that flawed image onto the Kremlin's military planning.
They seem convinced that the Kremlin shared their inflated view of the Russian military - something for which not a speck of evidence has been presented.
And yet 30 helicopters made the initial assault. How was that possible? Were they supersonic or stealth or something?
The Russians also fired off 160 missiles to try and suppress the air defences.
But Ukrainian troop had recaptured enough of the airport to put the runway out action within 12 hours.
So you haven’t really made a slam dunk case as yet. :smile:
You make it sound like this hasn’t been the universal response of all informed military experts watching events unfold.
Now the whole of the West may be pretending to be surprised by Russian ineptitude. Is this what you are wanting us to believe?
What would be the motive for this massive disinformation campaign that is apparently backed by endless factual evidence of incompetence and miscalculation by a regime eroded from the inside by its gangster economics?
Oh, well maybe an answer this time then.
What is the link between the scale of the atrocities and the efficacy of continued war as a strategy to limit them? It's a simple enough question.
A simple enough answer: a peace deal now entrenching Russia's position in Dombass and Crimea would ensure that they can continue their vast crimes unabated. The only way to stop them, is to take hold of them Russian criminals and bring them to justice, and kick the rest out of the country.
On what evidence? What evidence do you have that war crimes continue in occupied territories after the peace deals have been signed to a greater extent than they do during the war. Do we see similar atrocities being carried out in current Russia on ethnic Ukrainians? Are there still such crimes being committed on a regular basis on the former Yugoslavia more so than during the war?
And prior to the invasion are you saying that no such crimes were committed by Ukrainian forces in Donbas during the insurgencies - because the UN war crime tribunal would beg to differ with you on that front.
You've still not joined the dots. What links the scale of atrocities during the war with the notion that only further war can prevent them?
Quoting apokrisis
What argument? The argument that peace negotiations and territorial concessions are often a good strategy to avoid loss of life? Then yes, that would definitely have been true of 1930's Europe too.
Helicopters fly low, and the type of air defense that can tackle low-flying helicopters have a significantly lower range.
Quoting apokrisis
Does that sound like the kind of environment you'd be airlifting in battalions worth of troops with cargo planes?
Quoting apokrisis
Your sources have been largely non-expert journalists. Among military experts there isn't any kind of consensus at all. Mearsheimer makes the exact opposite case that you're making.
Quoting apokrisis
My point is that they are not pretending. They completely miscalculated the balance of power between Russia and Ukraine (Ukrainian forces would crumble in days, Kiev would fall in hours, etc.). Now they're having to swallow their own words, but they're not yet capable of conceiving that the Kremlin may not have made that same miscalculation.
This is why it is so hard for some to accept that Russia probably went into this war with limited war goals.
Quoting apokrisis
You're asking what the point is of framing? Propaganda, of course. Western backing of Ukraine is hanging by a thread. The only parties that truly want it to continue are the Washington and Brussels elite. Both in terms of political willingness and domestic support it depends entirely on the idea that Ukraine can win this war.
What evidence do you have that they won't continue after a peace deal? And how would you bring the guilty to justice, after a peace deal?
I can't think of a single precedent. In no circumstances at all, that I'm aware of, throughout history, have war crimes continued on the same scale after peace negotiations as they were at before them. I would think the complete absence of such a situation from the annals of human history would count as fairly substantial evidence.
There are no such war crimes in Russia nowadays.
The scale of war crimes in Russia-occupied Crimea and Donbas before the war were on a par with those committed by the Ukrainian forces.
So we have no historical precedent, no reason to think Russia treats its own citizens that way, and no evidence from 8 years of Russia-occupied territory in Ukraine of similar scales of war crime.
Quoting Olivier5
Same way they were brought to justice after the Yugoslav conflict. Why would you think the methods would be any different?
IDK, it seems impossible to sell that as a war aim now. What is Putin going to say? "We had to do this to stop Ukraine from joining NATO. So this is a success. Ukraine is now only on fast track application status for NATO, something they lacked before, and two of our wealthy neighbors joined NATO, but sometimes you need to break a few eggs to make an omelet, right? Oh, and we annexed new areas into Russia but then lost them. And I guess 60-80,000 Russians died and we totally drained down our military stockpiles and got economically isolated from the world and lost our main trading partners. But all in all it worked out because Ukraine isn't in NATO, even though they are closer to joining now than before, and now have a well supplied military of a million men with service experience."
I mean, I wish Putin would just resign and flee with his billions, but I can see why, from his perspective, he can't withdraw, because the entire thing is a humiliating disaster.
They routinely murder and torture folks there.
So your theory is Russia helicoptered its crack troops to secure a cargo airfield that was a top priority despite being well aware it would be impossible to land their cargo planes there.
Does that sound sane to you? Wasn’t there anything else they could have used those limited resources for in pursuit of their limited war aims?
Is it normal military tactics to stuff around taking hold of an enemy transport hub that you never intend to use?
Even if you - as the military strategist here - were asked to construct a feint on Kyiv with this exact force available to you, would this have been your cunning plan? It this the top option?
Come on, be honest. What’s the bleeding point of ringing an unwanted airfield with precious paratroopers when you have a whole country of other more intelligent choices?
So? Are you completely incapable of following an argument. The question is about which strategy is most likely to quickly reduce the scale of war crimes. It is not about whether Russia do anything bad.
Ukrainian armed forces routinely murder and torture folks in Ukraine too. So how does this fact link to your assertion that peace negotiations will not lessen the scale of war crimes?
What seems to be completely escaping the counterargument here is the notion that anything can be judged comparatively. It is not sufficient to point out that things might be horrific under Russian occupation, to make an argument you have to show that they would be more horrific than continued war, either by scale or duration.
Soddin war crime apologists...
So no actual counterargument then. Thought not.
If in doubt resort to accusations of apologism and return to shitposting random articles without comment.
Pathetic.
I haven't posited any theory about what those troops were doing there.
I'm just challenging your view that it somehow proves the Russians were deeply committed in their push for Kiev.
Quoting apokrisis
Certainly. Denying that capability is just as important as being able to use it yourself. And who said they never intended to use it? Maybe they did. That doesn't prove the intentions towards Kiev you claim they must've had.
Quoting apokrisis
I have but a fraction of the information required to give a serious answer to that. If any here profess that "they could have done it better" I would find that very cute. The point of education is generally also to make one aware of the many things one doesn't know.
Quoting apokrisis
What makes you believe the airport is unwanted? Airports are important military targets, either for own use or denying them to the enemy. If a military force occupies an area of land, I would expect them to secure every single airport, regardless of their immediate intentions or use by the enemy.