Kolakowski’s criticism of the Categorical Imperative

Well OP? What's your response?

yeah come on OP Agent Smith has been waiting for 5 minutes already. :roll:

Only if you ignore/forget that it's an ethics that is under consideration.

Kolakowski's argument as presented seems similar to a claim that an illegal chess move can be somehow a legal chess move.

We don't have access to K's understanding of what ethics is. Generally, though, ethics concerns regard for others. Any argument that turns that upside down is no longer within ethics but is something else.

Kolakowski's argument, if it even is one, would require as a premise a proposition that clearly states the difference between you and others. Everyone is unique of course, but then...everyone else is too :chin:

Those who argue: “the influence of a group of many people cannot be achieved if each person belonging to that group thinks their individual actions change nothing, therefore it's not true that an individual's actions change nothing” could be accused of committing the fallacy of division, trying to infer that because the actions of a group composed of many people has a significant influence in the course of many events, a single person belonging to that group also has a significant influence with their actions.

An analogy which illustrates this is given by Russell:
Granted that football could not exist without football-players, it could perfectly well exist without this or that football-player

It can be argued that if many people become convinced that what Kolakowski says is true, this would have very bad consequences: no one would vote, making democracy useless. No one would stop purchasing animal products, increasing the amount of suffering of sentient animals, etc.

But that is not — strictly speaking — an objection to Kolakowski's argument, which seems to me to have no logical flaws, it is rather an observation of possible bad consequences of publicly stating and defending the argument, and its possibly convincing many people.

That would no doubt be true if it came from someone who is quite famous and influential. But what about the average person? I honestly doubt they could have much of an influence in other people's decisions with regards voting or meat purchasing, even if they posted their opinions here. I don't know how many people visit this site, but I doubt it's that many, and as I said before many of them won't even bother reading threads about those subjects. Furthermore, one would have to prove that those people who do change their mind about these subjects, wouldn't have changed their mind if they hadn't read person X's post about a certain subject.

Not sure I quite get what you mean by this, but your concern has, I think, already been addressed in the OP:

The Categorical Imperative (CI): Adopt only those maxims that you would will to be a universal law.

You may not like done unto you, what you do to others. It appears Kant's CI is simply a variation on the Golden Rule. So, the question is, what's wrong with the Golden Rule?

Kolakowski has pulled a fast one on us. There are dragons.

..what?

The golden rule doesn't apply to actions like voting (those actions which you don't do to someone) though and sometimes people want to be told a lie rather than the truth, which is not compatible with Kant's criterion, so I don't think you can equate the two.

I don't either. But whoever said it had to? And certainly, wrt logic, the denial does not itself entail anything. K. has (it seems) provided a specious argument. I wonder why.

To the question: What if everyone did the same? One can answer: that hypothetical scenario is irrelevant, in the real world it's almost certain that not everybody will do the same things I do, and most likely won't change their actions or decisions due to finding out about my individual actions or decisions.

At the end I'm unsure, is Kolakowski's objection valid after all?

• 1 - Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.
• 2 - Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end.
• 3 - Thus the third practical principle follows [from the first two] as the ultimate condition of their harmony with practical reason: the idea of the will of every rational being as a universally legislating will.

Kant's universalization rule implies the Golden rule (role reversal).

I think you're right, but I'm not sure. Are the CI and Golden rule logically or morally equivalent?

“From now on I'm thinking only of me."

Major Danby replied indulgently with a superior smile: "But, Yossarian, suppose everyone felt that way."

"Then," said Yossarian, "I'd certainly be a damned fool to feel any other way, wouldn't I?”

Kant included three formulations for the categorical imperative:

1 - Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law.
2 - Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never merely as a means to an end, but always at the same time as an end.
3 - Thus the third practical principle follows [from the first two] as the ultimate condition of their harmony with practical reason: the idea of the will of every rational being as a universally legislating will.

But chess is a reasonable analogy. There's nothing in logic that says you have to play chess.

You do not have to be ethical, but you cannot be unethically ethical.

but this phrase of Kant's – that in writing meant was only as a guide to a more complex analysis – seems to ask, given the opportunity to influence what we perceive as the right thing, what would we select?

To ask this you must first affirm the possibility of an ethics. That done, then off to the races!

Nor will I argue Kant with anyone who has, apparently, neither read not understood him.

And, to be sure, that you do not have to be ethical by any standard, or ethical at all, but that once you claim to be, then like the chess player, bound by the rules you have yourself adopted to be under.

But we can start small. Do you have any problems with reason or the golden rule or good intentions?

Didn't Kant say that the consequences of an action are not morally relevant to virtue?

And you will find that he is comprehensive in presentation to a degree that does not lend itself to short, easy summary-as-argument.

Kolakowski:Kant's theory of practical reason has been perhaps the most audacious attempt to find an independent and unquestionable source of moral certainty

I'm not saying your interpretation of Kant is wrong and I admit that I'm not sure where you got this line, is it a direct quote?

In Kant, the source for moral certainty is the transcendental idea of freedom, not once mentioned in the essay. Or, at least the part of the essay posted here. I couldn’t find it to see if there was more to it.

The OP's quote comes from the book

he never says anything about the transcendental idea of freedom.

Subject to correction, I think Kant's argument might run thus: if your intentions are good, then your virtue is intact, consequences notwithstanding. On the other hand, if consequences are your measure and you do not achieve them, then you got nothing.

It is formulations 1 and 3 that I had in mind, and I think Kolakowski probably had them in mind as well.

I think 2 is different. If, for instance, I decide not to vote, am I “using other people as a means to an end”? I don't think so. I wouldn't mind, in the case of veganism, to include sentient non-human animals as moral agents in 2 to be honest, but that doesn't change the fact that, in a sense, a single person's choice to buy meat probably won't change the future production.

I think Kant's argument might run thus: if your intentions are good, then your virtue intact consequences notwithstanding. On the other hand, if consequences are your measure and you do not achieve them, then you got nothing. And this would seem supported in the admonition to "do the right thing," and not some variation like, "be sure to get yours," or "it's ok it comes out ok..." or "the ends justifies the means." In the latter case, of course, the ends perhaps justifying some means, but not all.

Kant doesn't tell us what to do. He merely provides some tests. But they're pretty good tests, and he bases them in logic. Which consequentialism/utilitarianism do not do

Kolakowski has to tell us how, but he doesn't; at least the excerpt in the OP doesn't contain any argument that demonstrates the consistency in a person like x's position/actions.

For what it's worth - This, from the "Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy" article on Kant's Moral Philosophy:

Kant claimed that all of these CI formulas were equivalent. Unfortunately, he does not say in what sense. What he says is that these “are basically only so many formulations of precisely the same law, each one of them by itself uniting the other two within it,” and that the differences between them are “more subjectively than objectively practical” in the sense that each aims “to bring an Idea of reason closer to intuition (by means of a certain analogy) and thus nearer to feeling”. He also says that one formula “follows from” another, and that the concept foundational to one formula “leads to a closely connected” concept at the basis of another formula. Thus, his claim that the formulations are equivalent could be interpreted in a number of ways

categorical imperative [stated in the form: “you should act only according to a maxim that you can... (and so on)”] is true.

If Kant really didn't mean that we ought to do as the categorical imperative says.....

The c.i., because it is a command, is a “shall”, not a “should”. Should, or ought, denotes a hypothetical imperative.

The c.i., because it is a command, is a “shall”, not a “should”. Should, or ought, denotes a hypothetical imperative.

He didn’t mean we should; he means we must (in order to demonstrate the worthiness of calling ourselves good moral agents).

Are you a liar? If not, why not?

And btw, who cares for arithmetic: that's circular too.

Or are you just an opportunist who would do any of these things and more if you thought you could get away with it?

[quote="tim wood;642326"]Or would you massacre women and children if you thought some benefit would come? Are you in favor of Guantanamo bay, and do you admire the US for its so-called black-site practices of illegal detention and torture? I think you wouldn't and don't, and the absurdity of these questions indication that all of us - most, anyway - are deontologists and just don't know it.

As to the liar, he depends on his lies being taken as true. If everyone were to lie, where would he be then?

Do you agree with tim's claim that Kant doesn't tell us what to do?

why, according to Kant, do we have to act as the categorical imperative says, instead of basing our actions on consequentialist/utilitarian principles?

Kant claims that the categorical imperative is known a priori, in which case it could be deduced through logic alone, and as Kolakowski suggests, this would imply that we can have “independent and unquestionable moral certainty”

But how does Kant know that the way of being good moral agents is to follow the imperative

Is “being a good moral agent” defined as “following the categorical imperative”? If so, that's a mere tautology, isn't it?

A strange equivocation. I doubt you're a liar, but in fact you're telling us you are.

Yes, absolutely. No one can tell anyone else what to do, except in cases of instructions for, or in the pursuit of, a skill.

There are no knowledge claims in pure speculative moral philosophy, so all this is not something Kant claims to know. Morality is based on feelings alone, from which follows that if one feels he has acted in accordance with the goodness of his own will, he can claim entitlement to being happy. There are, nonetheless, knowledge claims a priori in a subject, in that he knows either how he ought to act, or, he is acting, according to his will. He also knows when he does not, for he can feel it, in aesthetic judgements he makes on himself. The most familiar common knowledge a priori being.....”I’m sorry”.

It is known a priori, But perhaps not so much through logic alone per se, but through pure practical reason, by which is deduced on its own accord, those “commands of reason”.

The logic that grounds the deduction, in the form of cause and effect, has been argued incessantly, insofar as the causality here can never be proved, which logic requires, even while the effect is obvious in the actions that follow from it. Kant was chastised for his inability to prove the reality of transcendental freedom as a causality with the same necessity as empirical causality naturally, but based his entire moral philosophy on the impossibility of morality itself without it, whether or not it could be proved. Hence, the ground for the birth of consequentialism proper, post-Kant.

The independent merely indicates without empirical influences, which are wants or desires, and the unquestionable merely indicates the impossibility of disregarding that of which our own reason informs. Both of those are given, which makes Kolakowski’s implication correct.

This came to mind. From Joseph Heller's "Catch 22," which I loved when I read it 45 years ago but which I'm afraid to read again in case it isn't as good as I remember:

“From now on I'm thinking only of me."

Major Danby replied indulgently with a superior smile: "But, Yossarian, suppose everyone felt that way."

"Then," said Yossarian, "I'd certainly be a damned fool to feel any other way, wouldn't I?

Here Yossarian is of course totally right and what he does is exposing a weakness in the Kantian argument, (or maybe the argument of Kantians).

I can of course will all kind of things. I can live by the principle: "T lie through my teeth and I hope everyone speaks the truth". However, one immediately recognizes that if everyone lived by that principle it would not turn out to be a correct description of the world for anyone. What I recognize is that I give myself a 'status aparte' that is dependent on the behavior of others to make sense. That I think Kant would consider building your kingdom on shaky foundations, because you are not acting autonomously, but you become dependent on the actions of others.

One recognizes that such a maxim might be a way to live, but not a way to live ethically. It is the inversion of treating each other as a means to an end. If you hold this maxim you can only become an end in itself if everyone does as you hope they will do. It is also the inversion of being a legislator in the kingdom of ends, because you write a rule 'ad personam', yourself. You are therefore not legislating, i.e. providing general rules. You can do everything you want, but you will recognize it as not ethical. I think that is Kant's point. His claim is we can recognize ethical from unethical behaviour, so knowledge of ethics is possible.

Once, walking in the field, I saw a weary fox, on the verge of total exhaustion, but still struggling to keep running. A few minutes later I saw the hunters. They asked me if I had seen the fox and I said yes. They asked me where it had gone and I lied to them. I don't think I would have been a better person if I had told them the truth.

Thus, it seems to me, it's not about their felling better, or you feeling good, but about preserving both of yours participation in a moral world.

As corollary, he adds that the lie places on the liar a responsibility that the truth does not impose.

The burden of proof is in those who claim that a liar who wants others to be honest is somehow logically inconsistent with his goals by acting like that.

Yeah, but who said you were a) correct, or b) had a right to make that decision? In effect, you're giving me permission to decide what you can know, what is best for you to know

As corollary, he adds that the lie places on the liar a responsibility that the truth does not impose

Yeah, but who said you were a) correct, or b) had a right to make that decision?

In effect, you're giving me permission to decide what you can know, what is best for you to know.

And, if it is my decision and it's acceptable to lie, then I have no responsibility for any consequence of the lie.

Kolakowski denies there's any such inconsistency. Ok, but what's his argument? The OP is silent in that regard.

This (Kant's) argument is not convincing and may be circular. Even on the assumption that some principles — it doesn't matter whether they are explicitly admitted or not — necessarily ground my behavior, that is, whatever I do, I always believe, however vaguely it may be, that there is a normative "principle" that justifies my behavior (and the assumption is far from obvious), there is no reason why those principles must necessarily have universal validity or why I have, as it were, to impose my rules on all humanity (not only Kant had this opinion; Sartre had it too, for reasons he did not explain). I am not at all inconsistent if I prefer other people to follow rules that I do not want to follow. If, to continue with the example given above, I lie whenever I feel like it but I want everyone else to be invariably frank, I am perfectly consistent. I can always, without contradicting myself, reject the arguments of those who try to convert me or push me to change my way of acting by telling me: "What if everyone did the same?" Since I can coherently maintain that other people's actions do not concern me, or that I positively want them to obey the rules that I refuse to follow.

In other words, an imperative that demands that I be guided by norms that I wish were universal has, in itself, no logical or psychological foundation; I can reject it without falling into contradictions, and I can admit it as a supreme guideline only by virtue of an arbitrary decision.

I was under the impression that Kant held some form of moral cognitivism.......

re-read the Critique of Practical Reason.

That makes you an immoral person.

And you want proof you should be a Kantian in ethics? That proof is all around you at all times. For reasons peculiar to you, you're not able to see it. It might help if you were to consider just how much of your life depends on truth.

And to be sure, I do not see where K., above, argues against Kant's conclusion, but only against the argument.

(Actually, due to blood loss to the brain, I’m in a perfectly euphoric state, reliving my fondest memories from a long, illustrious life....and that clown ended it all because of something that completely escaped his judgmental criteria.)

Immoral indeed.

This might exemplify Kolakowski’s inconsistency: a consequential moralist makes judgements on others predicated on his criteria; a deontological moralist makes makes judgements on himself using his own criteria.

To witness the behavior of the sufferer says nothing of the suffering.

The deontologist also makes judgements on others, since he thinks they are acting wrong when the lie, or borrow money.

Insofar as it is a claim that you make, we can ask you to prove that you know best.

That you should be a moral person?

Of course, were this you, you could not be trusted with anything arithmetical, nor any of your judgments about such. Agree?

There is dialectical argument, concerned with what is and is not, and rhetoric, concerned with and considering both sides of contradictories

Kant arithmetized it, accomplishing a goal attributed at least to Socrates. The price of arithmetization being the limitation to general and not particular rules, his categorical imperative, in its various forms. And these do not tell us what to do, but instead how to test and evaluate our possible actions according to criteria of non-contradiction.

These all tied in with his ideas of freedom, right, will, and good. And these all you can deny, ignore, be ignorant of, at the cost of your exclusion from the society of people concerned with freedom, right, will, and good.

An example: you purchase for yourself and family expensive and hard-to-get tickets to a major athletic event. At added expense you all prepare yourself for the day but on arriving discover your tickets are forgeries, no good. Question: do you celebrate the skill and cleverness of the forger? Or were you wronged?

A deontologist makes a discursive judgement on a behavior not his own by his cognitive criteria, which is an experience. That experience informs by means of a aesthetic judgement as to whether he would or would not behave in similar fashion under the same conditions, measured exclusively by how such behavior would make him feel about himself.

When you think something is for the best, you think a good as it is for yourself.

If you use the thinking for what is good for yourself, but apply it to another, as would a typical consequentialist, you are in effect using that other as an end for your own good. To use others for your own good can never be justified as a universal law.

What does the categorical imperative say here? Should the deontologist truthfully answer that question, or is he allowed to stay silent?

If the imperative says to tell the truth he should answer that you tell the truth to the poor man. He can also remain silent. He doesn't lie then.

if I ask a deontologist if he thinks it was wrong for me to lie to the man on his deathbed about his son’s condition, would he answer with a “yes” or a “no”?

That's after I have already lied.

If the imperative says to always tell the truth, shouldn't he obey?

if I ask a deontologist if he thinks it was wrong for me to lie to the man on his deathbed about his son’s condition, would he answer with a “yes” or a “no”?

What does the categorical imperative say here? Should the deontologist truthfully answer that question, or is he allowed to stay silent?

When you think something is for the best, you think a good as it is for yourself.
— Mww

In a sense yes, in so far as another person’s suffering would also make me suffer more, and their happiness make me happier.

Is that “using another as an end for my own good”? Maybe, but why is that bad?

I wouldn’t want psychopaths who feel nothing when they watch or contemplate the sufferings of others to adopt a consequentialist criterion

That's called murder.

But the forger had his own criteria - as do you - what do you have to say to him?

As a consequentialist he may assure you that his happiness was both greater and more worthwhile than your suffering which in any case the existence of which he could only speculate on.

I would think that what he did to me is wrong, because he has caused other people to suffer just so he could get money. But I freely admit that he might not be persuaded If I confronted him about it, since he might be one of those people who, unlike me, feel or care little or nothing for the sufferings of others, in which case it’d be a waste of time to try and convince him that what he did to me is wrong, there’s nothing to say to those people. Just as I’d be wasting my time if I tried to persuade Jack the Ripper or another serial killer that his gruesome murders are abominable.

And by the way, I wouldn’t want such wicked people to follow my consequentialist criterion if they didn’t feel bad when contemplating or watching other people’s suffering, since that would probably lead them to cause more suffering just so they can gain more pleasure. I disagree with Bentham’s doctrine of “enlightened self-interest”, interpreted as meaning that if one acts only for one’s own interest, in the long run that will also benefit the others, since that’s only true in some cases. I state it only for those who share my values about empathy as well as an ethical criterion similar to mine, hoping they agree with my views:

I cannot, therefore, prove that my view of the good life is right; I can only state my view, and hope that as many (of those who care deeply about other people’s suffering and happiness) as possible will agree.
— Russell (I added the part in black font)

If the imperative says to always tell the truth, shouldn't he obey?
— Raymond

If that's the case, he would be making a judgement on me. But Mww says deontologists don't make such judgements on others, but only on themselves. So what exactly does he mean by “judgement”?

I would not have lied.

To stay silent is not to lie.

The imperative is merely a formula, determined by principles held by the subject. Only the subject knows what the imperative commands.

The former is mere inclination, the latter is lawful obligation.

And how would you ever make that preventable? You cannot, so what matters what you want?

And certainly if you contribute in order to feel good, then while there may be considerable benefit, you don't get virtue points.

Bill Gates, for example, gives huge amounts of money to charity. I do not think he does it to feel good or even cares about that. He has so much money that I'm pretty sure he can afford to contribute as he does because it is categorically right to do so. And a further guess, that what he cares about is if his money is well used and helps to accomplish the goals of the charity

Kant would simply observe that your criteria are deficient

Which is to say you don't like it that he hurt you, but in terms of merit, apparently it's all his, right?

And what's wrong with “depending on their actions” in that sense? Again, is it likely that everybody, or at least a majority of people will suddenly all start lying any time soon? No, that's probably never going to happen. So why should that hypothetical world in which everybody lies matter in the least? I'm not trying to justify liars, I just don't think lying always or very often is wrong for the reasons Kant thinks it is.

I don't think it follows that if you reject Kant's criterion for living what he considers an ethical live, then you can do anything you want. It just means you move on to some consequentialist criterion for determining how you should act.

And why should the person provide general rules for others, why can't he just have a personal and private ethic? Even if he did provide general rules about how he thinks everybody ought to act, it's not likely that others will change the way they act by what some random person tells them, the reality is that most people simply won't give a damn about it, unless it's someone close to them, someone famous or someone influential.

Also Kant concludes — if I'm not mistaken — that lying is wrong no matter what the circumstances are. And I think that's just wrong, as is shown in the example I gave of a man on his death bed asking if his son is ok, when the other person knows that their son is dead.

Here's another example: suppose someone's son is terminally ill, and the doctors tell the man that his son will almost certainly die soon. A few days later he goes to visit his son in the hospital, and the boy fearfully asks him if he's going to die. Would the father be doing something wrong or unethical if he lied to his son, telling him that he is ok and that he will recover soon, so that he wasn't terrified and would suffer less? I don't think so.

Once, walking in the field, I saw a weary fox, on the verge of total exhaustion, but still struggling to keep running. A few minutes later I saw the hunters. They asked me if I had seen the fox and I said yes. They asked me where it had gone and I lied to them. I don't think I would have been a better person if I had told them the truth.

The hypothetical world does not matter as an actual possible world, but as a purely logical possibility.

He takes away the boy's dignity as a rationally thinking being.

His duty is to be there for the boy in his dying moments as an acceptance of that fate.

The point is you cannot refute Kant's idealist ethics with consequntialism or by appealing to majority opinion.

If it becomes common knowledge that is such a situation we would lie to the dying father, then dying fathers cannot ask that question anymore because he will never know if he gets an honest answer. So we 'sacrifice' the feelings of the dying father in order to keep our framework, that we answer truthfully, intact. So other dying relatives may ask that question and not face the perennial anxiety of not knowing.

I would not have lied.
— Mww

But I didn't ask him what he would have done, I asked him if he thinks what I did is wrong. So that doesn't answer the question.

To stay silent is not to lie.
— Mww

I didn't mean to imply that it was, I was just wandering if the deontologist was forced to tell the truth about how he feels according to the imperative, or if he could stay silent.

do you think most such people spend a significant amount of time pondering about their actions and philosophizing? I don't.

The question of whether I think another’s acts are right or wrong is irrelevant,

The problem with this consequentialist approach is, I am judging the effect of my deceit on another subject, in which such effect can never be properly understood, for if it was I could claim to know his thoughts, which is impossible.

Also, for the sake of consistency, “to tell the truth about how he feels according to the imperative” has the proverbial cart before the horse.

Spellchecker: can’t live with it, can’t kill it. (Sigh)

The question of whether I think another’s acts are right or wrong is irrelevant,
— Mww

Maybe to you it is, but not to me.

I should have said: Is it his duty to tell the truth about how he thinks I should have acted, according to the imperative?

What I don't understand is why this mere logical possibility in some hypothetical world has any relevance to how we should act in the actual world, where that almost certainly won't happen in any near future. The criterion of “universalization” as a way to distinguish good acts from bad ones just seems arbitrary to me.

Why is it that if an action can be universalized without contradiction, then the action is morally/ethically justified, and morally/ethically reprehensible otherwise? Without circular reasoning, I mean.

I prefer that over making him terrified and sad/depressed.

Why does he have to learn about his fate in the first place? If he doesn't, he won't be terrified by his imminent death. It is more likely that he will suffer less if he doesn't learn about his fate, so I think it's better to lie to him.

And yes, I know deontologists don't care about the probable effects of actions, but I still find that unreasonable. They themselves use probabilistic criterions all the time: when they get out of their house, they don't give serious consideration to the idea that it might be better to stay home because a meteor might fall on their head if they get out, or that suddenly it'll start to rain heavily leading to them being struck by lightning when they get out — although they can't be certain those things won't happen — because such events are very unlikely to happen. And the same is true for almost all of their beliefs in daily life.

Yet when it comes to ethical considerations about the effects of each action, they suddenly seem to stop caring about the probable consequences of each action, and just care about following the categorical imperative, only because we can't be completely certain about the consequences of each of our actions, and because some elaborate and unlikely scenarios in which the actions lead to bad consequences are possible (not always though, sometimes they do mention possibilities which aren't that unlikely, and should be taken into account).

I'm not trying to refute Kantian ethics, I just think its core criterion is arbitrary. Nor do I think that an act is good because most people think it is (“ad populum”), the examples where intended to make people question whether a criterion that leads them to act in that way is really the best one at their disposal, in accordance with their basic moral intuitions.

the examples where intended to make people question whether a criterion that leads them to act in that way is really the best one at their disposal, in accordance with their basic moral intuitions.

Supposing it became common knowledge (which is not likely, so long as there are deontologists suggesting a different course of action) I think the suffering they would feel after finding out about their son's dead outweighs the suffering caused by the anxiety they may feel for not being able to get an answer to that question.

Kant's reverence for the principle of autonomy.

If it becomes common knowledge that is such a situation we would lie to the dying father, then dying fathers cannot ask that question anymore because he will never know if he gets an honest answer. So we 'sacrifice' the feelings of the dying father in order to keep our framework, that we answer truthfully, intact.

Not answering means ignoring and also means not taking the dying father seriously as an autonomous agent.

One doesn't owe the man any answers, respect or one's attention. The fact that the man is dying doesn't create a special situation where that would be the case.

Why would ignoring someone be a good act?

Why would I not answer?

The claim was made (or at least the impression was given) that answering the man truthfully or not answering the question was bad.

I disagreed.

Not to answer is to choose non-interference, and such is one's right.

The man will suffer his anxiety until the bitter end and will not even know, whereas he did ask.... You have decided he should suffer that fate.

No, he decided that fate for himself, however tragic that may be.

There's no reason the cause of his worries and emotions should be projected on some innocent bystander.

No, he asked the question, so he wanted to know.

You deliberately did not help him and thereby violated an imperfect duty.

Nor is there if you just told the man the truth. He asked for it, you gave it, what can be wrong. Instead you chose to make yourself the owner of the problem by not telling him.

Isn't the crux of the dilemma that telling the truth would cause the man significant emotional harm, and thus it was not a question he truly wanted answered?

If that's not the case, then what are we even here for? If the man wants to know the painful truth, then it certainly isn't bad to tell it to him, and lying would be even more clearly wrong.

What duty?

Well, if one no longer takes the position that telling the truth causing significant harm, disproportionate to the harm of telling a lie, then there is no dilemma.

But even then, I don't see how non-interference makes one the owner of the problem, as though whoever asks questions may lay some moral claim on the bystander's attention.

What if an imperfect duty, say taking care of the moral well being of others conflicts with the perfect duty not to lie, as in Amalac's case.

If you decide he really does not want it answered, you violate his autonomy.

The imperfect duty to help.

In another thread you argued that context does not matter.

You are an inconsistent Kantian.

But even then, I don't see how non-interference makes one the owner of the problem, as though whoever asks questions may lay some moral claim on the bystander's attention.

Because you were asked a question. Not answering a question is an act too. You make it seem like it is not an act. That is a wrong assumption. If I ask you in the street "may I ask you a question?" and you are basically ignoring me, you are being rude, or you did not hear it, or you were in a hurry, but at least I am going to think about why you plainly ignored me.

That's not a violation of someone's autonomy. Whether one decides to answer or not isn't a matter of someone else's autonomy, but of one's own!

And that duty is one you have taken upon yourself, or do you also impose it on others?

I am not a Kantian at all.

They're two entirely different discussions.

One is not entitled to my response, my time, attention or even basic politeness, just because they asked a question. What gives one the right to impose any of these things?

Further, inaction is not an act. Not giving a response is not an action - it is inaction, and thereby fundamentally different.

The relative texts in Kant’s corpus make clear to lie is always an affront to a good will, from which is derived to lie is never a moral practical objective. From that, it is just as clear the perfect duty is always more compelling.

I would rather be responsible for a guy’s possible torment that may not even manifest seriously, or that torment which subsides over time, than to jeopardize my moral character by lying in order to not cause it.

This makes him in my perception a somewhat harder and less soft man than I supposed

And feelings as pleasure and pain?! Perhaps the jewel bearing in this watchwork

But unbeknownst to you, the victim went out your back door and went home, and you have in effect killed him! Kant argues that with your lie, you make yourself part of the problem, and thus take on a share of responsibility and liability that the truth or silence would not have imposed.

Kant is concerned with the pure formulations of duty, understanding that between the rule and its application could be considerable slip twixt cup and lip.

As to what to do in the case of conflict, in his Metaphysics of Morals he is explicit. If CIs conflict, then the better rules and the lesser falls away - there being then no conflict. From Mww again,
The law holds only for the maxims, not for definite actions.
— Mww
Wisdom that "might be engraven on a Queen Anne's farthing.., which necessitates a vast volume of commentaries to expound it" (Melville).

Cite? The ideas of one right answer is naive. In some cases there might well be one right answer, but certainly not always.

Yes but you decide by assuming he does not want to have the answer. That is the violation of autonomy ...

It is imposed on others via the categorical imperative (at least according to Kant).

Well either ethics is context dependent and then it matters that there are different discussions, or it is not and then it really does not matter what the case at hand is. In the other thread you answered it was not, lying was always wrong.

Whether you like it or not we live in a world with others and with social expectations.

I gave you an argument, namely that the situation is different when you walk past someone who asked you a question or whether you walked past someone without him asking a question.

Luckily you are not a lawyer because you would have a damn hard time wrapping your head around crimes of omission.

Everyone is in the process of dying.

Having a thought is a violation of someone else's autonomy?

Well, I am interested in your opinion. If I wanted to know Kant's, I'd read Kant.

Apparently Kant views himself as the all-benevolent person who ought to go about assigning people their moral duties. What do you think of this? I think it is profoundly silly.

That last thread was not about lying. It was about violence. We may have discussed Kant's ideas of lying, but only insofar as it was relevant to violence.

Other people's expectations do not change the nature of things,

I don't see how they're all that different for the person who walks past.

Should I go about having expectations and desires towards other people, and then derive all sorts of moral rights to have those things reciprocated? Or is this the moment we need to start appointing people with opinions on "what is reasonable", and we are back in the mud?

I don't credit lawmakers with having a particularly solid grasp on the nature of things, and morality by extention.

What's your point? What is the inconsistency or claim you find in Kant that disqualifies him as an ethicist? What mistake has he made? That is, that can be presented in something less than 29 pages of tying complicated knots. He des not tell people what to do; he tells them what they ought to do and why within the limits of his arguments. And how often have I read some citation that claims to undermine or throw over Kant, only to find the writer very likely has not even read his Kant, or not understood him on the points in question, or the one citing has in some way failed.

Having a thought is a violation of someone else's autonomy?

No, your decision not to answr is. Not answering is not a thought it is an act.

Apparently Kant views himself as the all-benevolent person who ought to go about assigning people their moral duties. What do you think of this? I think it is profoundly silly.

No, you do actually, ...

... you think that ethics is independent from the expectations of others, ...

dependent on the social good in the case of lying, but independent of the social good in case of violence...

... apparently there is some Tzeentch who determines the nature of ethic, ...

Kant thought we could rationally understand our duties or at least the grounds from which they sprang. He called that 'the moral law within'. It is not Kant that tells you, it is reason, at least according to Kant.

So in case of violence we have a context independent ethical ethical system and in case of lying we do not. Thank you, much more consistent now.

Other people's expectations do not change the nature of things,

Well, that rather depend on the ' thing' under discussion doesn't it?

the situation is different because in the situation you have been asked a question you have ignored someone whereas in the situation you have not been asked a question you have not ignored someone. Indeed also ignoring or not ignoring are socially determined behaviors / situations.

However I see now that the mere existence of social world has been so far a mystery to you.

The only point I am making is that not answering is an act as well and so does not absolve you from the dilemma of whether you have to tell the truth or not. You are just trying to wiggle out of that question by shifting the subject.

Well, this assertion merely proves your utter disregard for decades of learning.

Your phrase ' the nature of things' is unintelligible.