Language, Consciousness and Human Culture?
I am partly writing this thread in response to a comment on the thread on science, objectivity and truth by @Agent Smith, querying what does Daniel Dennett mean by the idea that consciousness is an illusion? I think that is a good question because while I am not sure that I agree with Dennett' s outlook, it is important to consider what he means exactly. In understanding what he means by the idea of consciousness as an illusion, the following statement is useful as a means of clarification of his perspective:
'When we evolved into an us, a communicating community of organisms that can compare notes, we became the beneficiaries of a system of user-illusions that rendered versions of our cognitive processes...'
Dennett argues that 'consciousness is an evolved user- illusion in, 'From Bacteria to Bach and Back: The Illusion of Minds' (2017). His argument seems to go as follows, 'consciousness is not a physical and free will is not a phenomenon isolated from causation'. He connects the evolution of language with the emergence of human consciousness and culture, suggesting that words are memes or tokens. He says, 'Words have, in addition to the visible or audible parts of their tokens, a host of informational parts(making them nouns and verbs, comparative and plurals, etc,) Words are autonomous in some regards; they can migrate from language to language and occur in many different roles, public and private'. He also argues that, ' The evolutionary origin of language is an unsolved, but not insoluble, problem, and both experimental and theoretical work has made progress in formulating testable about a gradual, incremental evolutionary process, both cultural and genetic, that could transform the verbal dexterity and prolixity of modern language users'
It appears that Dennett's understanding of consciousness is connected with language. About 6 months ago there was a thread on this forum about the understanding of the term consciousness, in which it became apparent that people use the term differently with some sering it as being based on the medical definition of being alive while others have seen it in much more specific ways. In this thread,
I am thinking about the nature of human consciousness. I am wondering how others understand Dennett's outlook and also about the connection between human consciousness and language in culture. In many ways this does go into the field of anthropological consideration. I am also rereading Julian Jaynes' ideas about the connection between language emerging from images in the development of consciousness. However, I will end this here, and I am interested to know your understanding of the relationship between language, consciousness and culture.
'When we evolved into an us, a communicating community of organisms that can compare notes, we became the beneficiaries of a system of user-illusions that rendered versions of our cognitive processes...'
Dennett argues that 'consciousness is an evolved user- illusion in, 'From Bacteria to Bach and Back: The Illusion of Minds' (2017). His argument seems to go as follows, 'consciousness is not a physical and free will is not a phenomenon isolated from causation'. He connects the evolution of language with the emergence of human consciousness and culture, suggesting that words are memes or tokens. He says, 'Words have, in addition to the visible or audible parts of their tokens, a host of informational parts(making them nouns and verbs, comparative and plurals, etc,) Words are autonomous in some regards; they can migrate from language to language and occur in many different roles, public and private'. He also argues that, ' The evolutionary origin of language is an unsolved, but not insoluble, problem, and both experimental and theoretical work has made progress in formulating testable about a gradual, incremental evolutionary process, both cultural and genetic, that could transform the verbal dexterity and prolixity of modern language users'
It appears that Dennett's understanding of consciousness is connected with language. About 6 months ago there was a thread on this forum about the understanding of the term consciousness, in which it became apparent that people use the term differently with some sering it as being based on the medical definition of being alive while others have seen it in much more specific ways. In this thread,
I am thinking about the nature of human consciousness. I am wondering how others understand Dennett's outlook and also about the connection between human consciousness and language in culture. In many ways this does go into the field of anthropological consideration. I am also rereading Julian Jaynes' ideas about the connection between language emerging from images in the development of consciousness. However, I will end this here, and I am interested to know your understanding of the relationship between language, consciousness and culture.
Comments (77)
We pride ourselves as conscious but we can't hold a candle to the (brainless) universe. In that sense, the consciousness/intelligence we ascribe to ourselves is (relatively) nonexistent: comparing our consciousness to the universe's is like comparing human life to a stone's "life" and that's putting it mildly. Consciousness is an illusion! We might as well be dead.
An interesting line of reasoning follows: compared to God, we're borderline with respect to life, just as viruses are to us. Problem of evil? Does a virus suffer? (Alert! Off-topic!)
The universe, if a man, is a principled man. It's laws are just what you'd expect of something well-designed (watchmaker analogy). Nothing in the universe is ever wasted (recycling). Against the formidable foe of pure chance and luck, it deploys its own powerful version of randomness (DNA mutations)...it seems to be saying "two can play at that game." I don't know about you but, to me, this is the very definition of intelligence.
I was really thinking about this question with reference to Dennett's outlook, but it does include wider questions about the underlying processes of life, possibly the idea of the will to life as an underlying aspect of the world, as suggested by Schopenhauer. It may be about going beyond the apparent aspects of 'metaphysics' and thinking about origins of culture, consciousness and what is distinct about human beings from other lifeforms. It is likely that that human beings have elevated themselves to the top of the hierarchy of the design.
Nevertheless, as human beings it is easier to understand human consciousness than any forms of consciousness. So, I am still asking about the relevance of language for understanding how human consciousness emerged? That is because from my reading of Dennett and other writers, language and consciousness seem linked clearly.
I have always "answered" Dennett in my mind to the effect that he must have a completely different experience of what it means to be conscious than me. If Dennett chooses to argue that he isn't conscious in any strong sense of the word, I would question, for example, who or what is aware of the illusion? If there is nothing to be aware of an illusion, the entire concept of "illusion" loses its force. You end up with an empty semantics, devoid of any real meaning.
I have sometimes wondered about Dennett' understanding of what it means to be conscious. I have thought about his ideas in relation to the reductive aspects of the ideas within behaviorism, especially that of B F Skinner. In some ways, I do wonder if the idea of consciousness being an illusion is bound up with the question of the value of consciousness and its significance. In thinking about consciousness, especially that the human individual it may be that the inner experience of the individual can be elevated beyond all proportion or diminished as of insignificance. So, when thinking of Dennett' point of view I am left wondering how much is about descriptive knowledge and how much is about the value of the meaning of inner aspects of human consciousness.
It's a descriptive knowledge that allows no force or value to descriptions of subjective experience.
As I see it, the issue for Dennett is that people typically don't know what they are talking about. One gets instead indignant hand-waving, the kind that he himself mischievously instigates by phrasing this situation so aggressively.
To me this is connected to Wittgenstein's comments on sensation.
We can also question the leap from us having the word 'consciousness' to the taken-for-granted 'fact' of there being some grand Entity that corresponds to that word.
It is by no means a simple matter to consider the nature of consciousness and its origins. One interesting remark which may lead many of us to feel less alone in thinking about the nature of consciousness, especially in relation to where it stands in relation to physicality is Dennett's remark, ' I was the one who's terminally confused, and of course it's possible that our bold community of enthusiasts are deluding each other.'
It may be that in attempt to form a cohesive understanding that some thinkers try to cut corners and simplify. There is so much uncertainty and I am not suggesting that people should give up trying. That would throw philosophy out of the window and be about giving up trying to understand. One idea of Wittgenstein's which may be of importance is that language limits our understanding of the world. This applies to consciousness and it may be that through understanding of the evolution of language that some light can be thrown on consciousness itself, as a way of going beyond what Searle describes as 'the mystery of consciousness'. Language may be an extremely important link in what is often seen to be the difficulty of explaining consciousness, especially that of human beings.
I don't know the context of that quote, but I like Dennett suggesting that he is confused. To me that's the point. It's an important to first step to realize and confess that we don't know what we are talking about. This doesn't just apply to 'consciousness' but also to its supposed opposite the 'physical.' I guess I'm gesturing toward the mystery of the mystery. To ask the hard question earnestly is (hyperbolically) like asking why the integers are made of whipped cream. For context, I think that it's not about denying or defending the existence of consciousness but rather of emphasizing how realizing how murky the issue is in the first place. (What exactly is being defended or denied?)
It may be worth noting the humility of an esteemed philosopher expressing some confusion, but at the same time, he is seeking to demystify the nature of consciousness, and look for the connection between consciousness, language and understanding.
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Perhaps that's why some find him offensive, because 'consciousness' tends to be perceived as a last hideout for the sacred from something like critical rationality.
The idea of consciousness as ' a last hideout for the sacred' is an interesting idea, because it may be that many would prefer a perspective in which the individual human being has little value, the person being a mere number and of insignificance. This was the idea which I was thinking of when I wrote the thread on science and objectivity. Even though this thread was inspired by @Agent Smith's query about what did Dennett mean by the idea of consciousness as an illusion, it has ended up back to the philosophy of materialism and its implications for values. Some may find ways of constructing meaning against the void of illusions which may become apparent in the face of materialism.
So, it may come down to the authenticity of meaning and about whether materialism captures the truth. What is really real and how much is about fabrications as fantasy? Perhaps, those who can live with their fantasy constructs are those who are valued in society, because this may be about validation and going beyond some kind of illusion. It does also come down to myth as an idea beyond material reality and it may be that there are social and political issues here, in the way that language and metanarratives of human meaning are communicated.
:up:
I agree that bias can point in many directions (including against the sacred in any of its traditional forms.)
Is it so obvious that a consciousness and value are connected? Do consciousness-eschewing behaviorists think that individuals have less value?
As I see it, a Wittgenstein-adjacent view (and he was by no means the only thinker one could mention here) does dissolve the individual into the community, making language prior to sensation, making the community prior to the Cartesian ghost that dreams itself. (I [s]think[/s] participate in language therefore I'm not an 'I' but (primarily) a 'we.')
I like all of these themes. Can self-deception be advantageous? Is there some truth of the matter in the first place that makes self-deception possible? If there is such a truth of the matter, does it depend on or exist as a mediated substrate? (Is the truth of the matter the truth of some obscure Matter?) Is the game of philosophy a kind of veil-penetration contest? Who can strip the goddess nakedest? Is calling the goddess an onion with no center one more move in the game?
Philosophy may lead more to the rejection of a popular set of pseudo-answers than to an answer.
And yet, for Wittgenstein the personalistic perspective doesn’t simply disappear into the communal whole. His approach is person relative, occasion sensitive and context dependent.
I will agree that personhood is significant. What needs to be corrected is the tendency to take personhood as fundamental rather than emergent. How can 'consciousness' have a meaning? (Well, a family of meanings.) (I think it does have such a meaning, that it plays a role or family of roles as a token within a community.)
As you can probably tell, Dennett is pretty divisive. Personally, I don't think he makes sense. So I'll skip commenting on him, don't want to ad-hominem just because I don't like that type of thought.
I think the interesting fact about consciousness and language is that we don't have a good way to talk about ideas absent language. I think it's clear to many of us (if not most), that ideas are one thing, language is another, but as soon as we'd like to speak of ideas, we use language.
There's plenty of stuff we can't talk about, language fails to capture many experiences accurately. Other times, we can express subtle experiences through language use.
As for culture, who knows? It's what we're in all the time, but the only thing I can say about it, is that it's whatever is peculiar to us as about another group of people. Otherwise, it's the same.
Phenomenology doesn’t take community to be primary, but rather subjective perceptive on community. Community is experienced differently by each participant in it , and taking community as primary is incoherent.
I haven't been a big fan of Dennett really but in the last few weeks of reading him I do think that his writings are extremely important, if for nothing else other than capturing a major way of thinking in the twentieth first century.
It may be that there are inadequacies in language for talking about consciousness. Therefore, it is rather ironic that some philosophers, ranging from the logical positivists to Wittgenstein, see the philosophy as being restricted to the limitations of language. It seems like some kind of double knot.
I have been reading Julian Jaynes recently and he sees language as arising from metaphors, especially those of poetry and song. He also maintains that subjectivity of self arose in connection with this. In the early stages of culture, there was less of a clear distinction between inner and outer reality. He refers to the way in which the Mesopotamians and writers of the Indian 'Upanishads' involved projection of thoughts as 'voices' from the gods.
Also, I am inclined to think that anthropology may throw some light upon the evolution of language and that some dialogue between philosophy and anthropology may be important in thinking about language, which is a central aspect of philosophy. Language is about shared meanings in communication and it may be that in construction of the idea of 'self' others play an important role in mirroring. No person can exist as an entirely separate entity, even in cultures which value individualism.
Some may see consciousness as an illusion, as Dennett does, and others, including some Buddhists see the self as illusionary. However, in some ways, while each person exists as a unique entity, in some ways each person exists as part of the web of culture and its consciousness, with language being the main point of reference. I do also wonder to what extent does individuals consciousness exist, and how dependent is it upon the physical aspects of reality?
In previous times, in the context of dualism, many believed in the journey of the individual 'soul' beyond life on earth. Some people still adhere to that, which has a certain understanding of consciousness. However, many do not hold that view, and it may be that the individual lives on in cultural memory through artefacts. In that sense, information is the basis for continuity of the person. But, so much of the understanding of consciousness, human identity and its continuity comes down to language, but the origins of language itself may be important in considering this too.
We know a little about language, not much. I think it's "primary" use, so to speak, is to articulate thought to oneself.
Communication is done by all animals, and they don't have language, if by language we have in mind what people do. So, language can't be about communication, it would be superfluous.
Consciousness is a process of the brain, which we don't understand much at all. One can call it "physical" or "ideal", doesn't matter much what it's called. Our views about experience need not commit us to an ontology.
Yes, I agree, Dennett does appear to articulate a strain of thinking which is misleading, imo, but, influential nonetheless.
One aspect which is interesting is the way that languages vary unlike mathematical ones, like numbers and the basic principles of mathematics. Of course, there are underlying concepts which seem to coexist although expressed differently in words. I do wonder how the basic ideas seem to have a certain universality but with different expression in the many languages.
There were signs and symbols developed in culture, including hieroglyphs and alphabets. There are some shared alphabets and some which are completely different. It could be asked how such similarities and differences come about. In some ways, it is about naming of objects in the physical world, but it is also about abstract concepts. Ideas may be understood a bit differently from one culture to culture, and this may be where the evolution of language is connected to philosophy, because this involves the naming and framing of basic ideas about life and the human condition.
Strictly speaking, mathematics is not a language. You can say "mathematics is the language of the universe" in a poetic sense, and that's perfectly fine and legitimate. But it's not to be confused with an actual language with syntax, phonemes and all the other technicalities belonging to linguistics.
Quoting Jack Cummins
That's an excellent question. I think Chomsky is right here, the different languages human beings use are rather superficially different, though to us the differences seem immense, but we have many of the same basic concepts, RIVER, MOUNTAIN, LOVE, TRIBE, FRIEND, ANIMAL, etc.
It's quite mysterious, related to innate ideas in some manner.
Quoting Jack Cummins
Yep. It is curious, why so many different ways of talking about essentially the same things. When it comes to abstract concepts, almost nothing is known, it's very sophisticated and complex.
The area of abstract concepts is where it gets so complex. As you say river, mountain and friend are more straightforward than ideas, although friend is connected to value attachments, so is less straightforward than mere objects. The nature of concepts in general may be why metaphysics may exist beyond language. This may have been thre basis for Plato's theory of Forms. Although it is hard to point to them in a concrete way, it may be that some basis of ideas exists independently of the human mind.
Quoting Jack Cummins
all of which is waved away as wishful thinking and obscurantism by Dennett and his ilk. '“We are survival machines – robot vehicles blindly programmed to preserve the selfish molecules known as genes. This is a truth which still fills me with astonishment', says Richard Dawkins, although the irony is the astonishment he speaks of is also an illusory projection of the selfish gene.
I like the term anti-philosophy and it may be that he has not helped the art of philosophy. However, what may be worse is when people take the idea of consciousness as an illusion in an extremely shallow way to dismiss the importance of mind and consciousness. I do believe that he is at least wishing to understand the complexities of the nature of consciousness. It may be that the conclusion which he comes to is more one which represents the underlying view of many thinkers, based on cognitive psychology, more than from the angle of the historical development of ideas. This is bound up with a picture of reality which emphasises empirical observations above all other ways of understanding.
His agenda is not to understand but to deny; not to explain, but to explain away. (Did you know that his first book, Consciousness Explained, was parodied by many philosophers as 'Consciousness Ignored' or 'Consciousness Explained Away'?)
Such as anonymous posts on online philosophy forums.
Yes, it may be that it is a reflection of materialism and scientific thinking, but the issue is that the people who adhere to ideas such as consciousness is an illusion don't seem to even question beyond the ideas. It may be that so many people have grown up in a climate influenced by Dennett and similar thinkers that to look beyond for other alternative perspectives can almost be seen as antiscience.
Of course, it is up to each individual to come to their own conclusions but some ideas are represented more prominently in culture generally. Different individuals may come across specific ideas according to their family and educational background, and it is likely that some people are not that aware of the full diversity of ideas, especially historically.
You don't seem to agree that consciousness is an illusion, do you? What alternative perspectives do you have in mind?
Personally, the idea of consciousness as an illusion makes sense to me. If it's not an illusion, then it's something that exists in physical world. Something that we can point to in time and space and maybe even touch it. But that doesn't seem to be the case to me.
Maybe I need an example. Let's say we have a film strip with a movie on it. We can use a movie projector to show that movie. One could argue that the film strip is a physical thing that exists in the physical world, but the movie is an illusion created by projecting that film strip. The movie exists and it carries some meaning, but it's not a physical thing. That's why we can call it an illusion.
We could think of consciousness as a movie. The brain cells act as a hardware to project consciousness. I think Dennett bases a lot of his ideas on studying the inner workings of the brain, and how those ideas are used to create functioning AIs. It's not easy to see consciousness in individual brain cells, but all cells combined seem to project consciousness. Is this consistent with your world view?
- an instance of a wrong or misinterpreted perception of a sensory experience
- a deceptive appearance or impression
- a false idea or belief
Notice that all of these definitions assume consciousness to exist, as illusions comprise something erroneously interpreted or misunderstood. So even if a theory about consciousness is wrong, no theory can plausibly argue that consciousness is an illusion, because illusions are conscious phenomena.
Quoting pfirefry
The movie is the reason the film strip has any signficance. Otherwise it would simply be celluloid with chemicals on it.
I see! I didn’t use the word illusion in a negative sense, just neutral. Hope you can see what I mean. For example, this comment is not me, but an illusion of me talking to you. Does it mean that any one of us is deceived in a negative sense? I don’t think so. Is there a better word than “illusion” that we could use to avoid negative connotation?
If you mean a more accurate synonym, then no. We can definitely be fooled by illusions or be trapped by delusions, but again it's only possible because we're conscious beings to begin with. The fact of our conscious experience can't be an illusion - just as Descartes said. Even if we're wrong about everything, there can be no doubt that there is a subject who is wrong.
Dennett does indeed say that what we normally understand the mind to be is a consequence of the combined actions of millions of cellular processes which individually are unconscious. This gives rise to what he calls 'unconscious competence' or 'competence without comprehension'. It is this kind of view which reviewer David Bentley Hart describes as 'so preposterous as to verge on the deranged'.
I loathe it when people say we're just here to spread our genes. People are and aren't their genomes, and it's completely ignorant of the fact of personhood, that life is overwhelmingly regarded as worth it.
Genes may be predisposed to valuing the human experience, but why?
Is Dennett claiming not that consciousness is an illusion, but the human experience is?
That's how it would seem to me, but I regard the human experience as the most indivisible thing we can know. And, if it's not eternal, that doesn't mean it's an illusion.
So I think we must parse this word "consciousness" from "the human experience," which we all know to be real and more profound than words spoken.
I suppose Dennett would argue it's less profound, but that's really juvenile, to me. Even if this all ended tomorrow, the story would be just as incredible. Imagine all the strokes of luck that have gotten us to this point.
But I digress: to explain consciousness requires a comprehensive explanation of both the brain and the environment in which it exists. The whole universe, in other words, including Time.
Anything less sophisticated than that is truly milquetoast: a placeholder for a lack of a much grander perspective.
The alternative is like saying "clouds produce water"; i.e. it's true, but isn't a description of water.
And, furthermore, to be human is an authentic mode of behavior. So, I think what Dennett says is that it's based on a lack of perspective, which is utterly true, but, in my view, that makes it no less real or authentic. Surely not a complete illusion, incomplete as our perspective is.
If genes hold this all together they're as loaded a word as "love" at least. If you're going to reduce everything, why not to the formal expression of its results?
What if the subject that you're talking about is not an atomic thing? What if it can be divided into multiple parts? Some studies suggest that if we split the two halves of the brain, each half will act independently from another. Do we end up with two subjects, or still one subject, or perhaps no subject at all? If we start removing brain cells one at a time, undoubtably we will begin with a subject but end up with none. If the subject is not an illusion, then what would happen to it once we disconnect all the brain cells?
The subjective unity of perception is a topic in its own right. It is true there have been studies on patients with split-brain operations, but firstly they're extremely rare cases, and secondly they're hardly typical of human experience.
The bottom line here is that Dennett, in particular, wants to account for everything about human nature in objective, third-person terms. He generates these massive (and highly repetitive) books about it, but that's really all it is, and I've said all I'm going to say about it.
Consciousness - as in that conscious awareness of our own selves we’re inimitably acquainted with via memories, beliefs, values, intentions, and so forth - is neither atomic nor indivisible. As to its being non-atomic, it wouldn’t dismantle/diffuse upon descent into sleep if it were atomic. As to its being divisible, another rather complex exemplification of its fragmentation is that of multiple personality disorder. That the conscious us which we know ourselves to be via direct acquaintance with our multiple memories, beliefs, values, intentions, etc. is atomic and indivisible can well be expressed as a delusion maintained for the pragmatic purposes of going about life as best we can. And, in this respect, this understanding of our own conscious self’s nature as being permanent is an illusion.
But whether addressing split-brain patients, patients with multiple personality disorder, patients with schizophrenia, or other examples, the question remains: can there be anything experienced without there being a first-person point of view that experiences – irrespective of how diffused or acute this point of view might be? Experientially for you and me, the answer, I presume, is a resounding no. Split-brain patients will in many a way exhibit different personalities pertaining to the same body, very differently so from patients of multiple personality disorder. I can’t definitively answer for whether split-brain patients have two first-person points of view that simultaneously operate; I can find this conceivable but, so far, noncredible. I find it more likely that the condition is more akin to multiple personality disorder with two personalities which, as condition, comes about via physical damage to the brain - rather then via what can be at least presumed to be resultant of psychological coping mechanisms in response to severe stressors during onset in people with certain innate mental predispositions, this as can be argued to be the case for multiple personality disorder.
In all these cases, however, the same issue remains: Can the occurrence of a first-person point of view be an illusion to the very first-person point of view in question? The question isn’t if it’s atomic or indivisible but, instead, whether a first-person point of view can be wrong about its own ontic being as such while it occurs. Thereby resulting in the conclusion that the very occurrence of a first-person point of view is illusory; i.e., that no first-person point of view in fact occurs.
Don’t know about Dennett, I haven’t read him, but when I hear that “consciousness is an illusion” I interpret the statement to affirm that “an occurring first-person point of view holds the illusion of its own occurrence and, thereby, in fact does not occur”. An absurdity to me, rationally if not also experientially. If all that Dennett intends to affirm is that “a permanent conscious self is an illusion”, Buddhist for example had beaten him to the punch many ages ago: nothing new and nothing shocking.
Edit: Come to think of it, yes, atomic means indivisible. My bad for that. I'll leave the post as is, though.
Insofar as it is of the essence of the image to be taken for reality, it is reciprocally characteristic of reality that it can mimic the image....If illusion can appear as true as perception, perception in its turn can become the visible, unchallengeable truth of illusion. (Madness & Civilization)
Illusions are real only insofar as they are perceived. An atmospheric condition in the desert only becomes a mirage when it is seen. So if consciousness is in some sense illusory, it is also the reality which substantiates the illusion.
That's a well-articulated post, thank you! Your terminology is much sharper than mine, and agree with everything that you said.
In a humble enough way, thanks. Interesting for me is that if our consciousness can dismantle/diffuse itself upon falling asleep, then by the same token our consciousness can reassemble itself into a unified whole upon awakening. Its clear that a person as body can hold different first-person points of view as the culminating awareness of the body: multiple personality disorder as example. It's also relatively clear that we all deem a singular unified, hence unitary, awareness (re: a culminating awareness of the body) to be indicative of psychological health. Also evident is that our total, relatively healthy minds are constituted of a plurality of first-person points of view: that of ourselves as a conscious self and those pertaining to our unconscious. Our conscience as one example of such sub/unconscious first-person point of view: it holds the same awareness of facts as we consciously do despite holding different perspectives and intentions in relation to said facts - and we in some ways interact with it at times when it occurs. The background noise of the mind that some people attest to as another example of different agencies co-operating within the same, relatively healthy mind - for the conscious self doesn't will the background noise to be nor its intricate details of manifesting. At our best, when we’re “in the zone”, all these unconscious first-person points of view are fully unified with that of our conscious self. We become one in relation to our total being as persons. To me this is in many a way reminiscent of the Latin saying, “e pluribus unum” - and I find it an interesting interpretation of consciousness's etymology "together knowing" (however inaccurate this interpretation might be historically).
All this to propose that if consciousness holds the capacity to divide into lesser parts, it can also the hold the capacity unify from lesser parts. For instance, in a split-brain scenario, supposing the knowhow to re-bridge the two hemispheres and the implementation of this, one then would obtain two conscious parts (be they multiple personalities that operate the body at different times or, else, two first-person points of view that operate the body simultaneously) that become unified into one conscious whole.
Phenomenology sounds like quite a fellow. What assures him, if anything, that he's not just writing poetry? Is it interaction? Confirmation?
Quoting Joshs
Perhaps. And perhaps babies are made of applesauce. What grounds the intelligibility of this sign 'experience' in the first place?
Quoting Joshs
I don't think so. Recall that we're talking about Language, Consciousness, and Human Culture. It's only 'consciousness', a largely incoherent hideout (given its function), that isn't explicitly social.
To be clear, I'm not denying that people have different experiences, but that kind of statement is hopelessly fuzzy. If we aren't just writing poetry in our journals, we have to ask how we could know that our experience varies and how 'experience varying' can gather utility as a sign. If you spin a top, it'll go be itself for awhile. And if you spin up a culture in a child, that child can surprise you with a poem you wouldn't have wrote yourself. Granted. But we're all (the interesting bits) mostly inherited patterns, both DNA and culture. The 'time-binding animal' is made of second-hand information, second-hand habit.
[quote= Dennett]
Scientists are just as vulnerable to wishful thinking, just as likely to be tempted by base motives, just as venal and gullible and forgetful as the rest of humankind. Scientists don't consider themselves to be saints; they don't even pretend to be priests (who according to tradition are supposed to do a better job than the rest of us at fighting off human temptation and frailty). Scientists take themselves to be just as weak and fallible as anybody else, but recognizing those very sources of error in themselves and in the groups to which they belong, they have devised elaborate systems to tie their own hands, forcibly preventing their frailties and prejudices from infecting their results.
[/quote]
Critical thinking is social. If a hundred fools and mediocrities are properly organized, they can function together as if a genius.
The way I see it Dennett's position is what we experience as consciousness is processed data: for instance, light data is picked up by the eyes, relayed to the visual cortex of the brain, processed, and finally displayed...as consciousness. It's kinda like mental models of the real world - the models don't exist per se, they're just there to make life simpler/easier. Consciousness is an illusion.
It comes down to how reality is viewed and what one means by illusion' in viewing consciousness in that way. Illusion is generally taken to mean that something which is only imaginary and not real. However, the question is whether one gives any significant to the imagination, or whether it is seen as having no importance because it is not physical. Is only that which is physical real?
That is where Dennett' s statement is that of materialism. The implications is that physical reality is all there is or all that is important. Okay, physical matter is observable, although particles are not clearly visible and are in constant movement. It may be that the self and consciousness are processes, but are processes not real? As human beings our meaning is connected to experience, and we experience life as subjects and the basis of our meanings are bound up with our subjective experiences in relation to other beings and objects. To say that consciousness is an illusion is stating that the experiences of consciousness is insignificant simply because it cannot be grasped in the same way as the physical world, which may be the basis for physical reality.
But are you and your experience, whether as Agent Smith or the Madfool? It may be about naming of identity, to describe experience, or does the experience in itself have more to say about the nature of consciousness? Each of us is an individual aspect of consciousness, and what does this mean?
Yes, consciousness is something that can be known only through first-hand experience; it can't be taught to you from a book (re Mary's room, re Wittgenstein). This is what David Chalmers refers to in his hard problem of consciousness (subjective nature of consciousness, the first-person perspective).
Does this (vide supra) warrant a nonphysical interpretation (of consciousness)? Taste is subjective, so is art, but nobody claims these are nonphysical.
Does a verb exist in the same sense as a noun? Can I say walking exists? If I can, does it exist in the same sense as legs do? To the extent nouns and verbs have been mixed up, consciousness is an illusion.
I don't think that taste, such as art taste is purely physical. The pieces of art are physical objects but this is interconnected with representation or the mental states of those who created them. I see mind as real, even if relies on physical structures as a basis.
I've engaged you and others with the intent of discovering what Daniel Dennett actually means when he claims that consciousness is an illusion. It hasn't been easy.
Here I am, in a room, I'm awake, reading/typing, I see my cell phone's screen - this awake state, this state of awareness (of my self, and the not-self, my cell phone) is what consciousness is to me.
I'll be hitting the sack in the coming few hours - blackout i.e. I'll lose consciousness (sleep).
There's a differnce between awake and asleep which is consciousness. I wonder what Dennett has to say about this.
Perhaps, for Dennett, consciousness is what we consider to be superconsciousness (God-level awareness; it's no secret that we aren't fully aware of everything that's going on outside of us and inside of our bodies). In other words, compared to God, relatively speaking, we're less than even the stone in a garden somewhere.
I hope that you sleep well. I do struggle to get to sleep frequently. I will look up what Dennett thinks about sleep and get back to you. My own thinking is that it does seem that identity continues in sleep to a large extent because in dreams we are usually the same person as in waking consciousness. I once dreamt that I climbed out of my body and into that of the body of a drummer playing in a rock band. But, I never went on to learn to play the drums, so maybe that was my long lost vocation...
To,
Daniel Dennett,
Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Philosophy,
Tufts University
Dear Sir,
There's no difference between me, asleep, and me, awake!
Thanking you (for this marvelous insight),
Yours faithfully,
Agent Smith
(Member, The Philosophy Forum)
You are still you and exist as consciousness, and not an illusion, while asleep, even if part of you goes into the astral dimension.
Yours faithfully,
Mr Jack Cummins
This seems to be one of the most persistent misunderstandings, seemingly almost impossible to correct in those who hold it. Dennett does not see consciousness as an illusion; he sees the common notion of consciousness, the "folk" conception of consciousness, as being an illusion.
Of course there is a difference; when you are awake, you are awake, and when you are asleep you are asleep. This is basic.
Tautology.
Not merely a tautology; two different states of being.
This is precisely what Dennett's saying is the illusion of consciousness.
I don't know how to say this, but a quote from Zen Buddhism and one Zhuangzi should do the trick. [math]\downarrow[/math]
[quote=D?gen]Before one studies Zen, mountains are mountains and waters are waters; after a first glimpse into the truth of Zen, mountains are no longer mountains and waters are no longer waters; after enlightenment, mountains are once again mountains and waters once again waters.[/quote]
[quote=Zhuangzi]Now I do not know whether I was then a man dreaming I was a butterfly, or whether I am now a butterfly, dreaming I am a man.[/quote]
So that whenever he's challenged, that's what he says - ducks behind a wall of academic jargonese and hand-waving and baffles the punters. 'Oh I don't mean that consciousness is an illusion'. But that is exactly what he believes. He believes he explained it in a book called Consciousness Explained. Why else have a title like that? Why did his critics call it 'Consciousness Explained Away'? Galen Strawson said he should be sued for misleading advertising! I don't know why you keep saying this about Dennett, it's completely mistaken. He’s a lumpen materialist, he believes that everything you think is just the snap crackle and pop of neurons being driven by the selfish gene.
[quote=NY Times; https://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/30/books/daniel-dennett-author-of-intuition-pumps-and-other-tools-for-thinking.html] The elusive subjective conscious experience — the redness of red, the painfulness of pain — that philosophers call qualia? Sheer illusion.
Human beings, Mr. Dennett said, quoting a favorite pop philosopher, Dilbert, are “moist robots.”
“I’m a robot, and you’re a robot, but that doesn’t make us any less dignified or wonderful or lovable or responsible for our actions,” he said. “Why does our dignity depend on our being scientifically inexplicable?”[/quote]
I’ve asked you before - do you see the answer to that rhetorical question? Because I can see it as clear as day. The idea that through scientific analysis, you can arrive at a complete understanding of the human - of any human - is a practical definition of ‘scientism’, because humans are subjects of experience, not objects of scientific analysis. Dennett’s scientism can’t explain anything that can’t be accommodated by his idea of the objective sciences, so it has to be eliminated. It’s as simple as that. He spells it out, says it in no uncertain terms, with no room for ambiguity.
I know I keep saying this, but it’s exasperating that a well-read intelligent thoughtful philosophical person can’t see it.
:up:
Consciousness/mind, just like walking, is an activity. To think that consciousness/mind is an object, like legs are, is a mistake; this error gives warrant to Dennett's claim that consciousness is an illusion.
Do you really believe Dennett doesn't enjoy his life, doesn't enjoy music, nature, poetry and whatever? If he does enjoy life, then what is he missing? When he says that the redness of red, and the painfulness of pain are illusions he is not saying that red is an illusion or pain is an illusion. There is a nuance there which I think you fail to see, probably because you haven't read the man himself. Perhaps you simply can't bring yourself to read Dennett; it might be a waste of time for you; but no more, and probably ;less, of a waste of time than leveling inapt criticisms at him. I think you just have a polemical antagonism to Dennett "and his ilk" and can't see beyond it. I think it is good, and very useful, to read those we find ourselves disagreeing with, more than it is to read those we find confirmation of our own beloved ideas in.
That said, there is no problem with disagreeing with Dennett. I don't share all of his conclusions myself. But the issue is not one of 'the good guys on one side and the bad guys on the other' as you seem to be framing it. The disagreement is over possible ways of interpreting the human situation, ways none of which can be definitively tested; so it comes down to being more of a matter of taste than anything else in my view. When it comes to that, to matters of taste, surely you are not going to demonize someone because they don't think much of Bob Dylan as a poet, are you?
That's one I've quoted myself on these forums more than a few times. I'm a fan of Dogen, even though I don;t agree with everything he says. That one I do agree with and I have used it as an analogy with the transition from naive realism, to idealism and back to a sound critical realism.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia
[quote=CS Peirce]
There are recognizable qualitative characters of the given, which may be repeated in different experiences, and are thus a sort of universals; I call these "qualia." But although such qualia are universals, in the sense of being recognized from one to another experience, they must be distinguished from the properties of objects. Confusion of these two is characteristic of many historical conceptions, as well as of current essence-theories. The quale is directly intuited, given, and is not the subject of any possible error because it is purely subjective.
[/quote]
"The quale is directly intuited, given, and is not the subject of any possible error because it is purely subjective."
If it's impossible to be wrong, it's impossible or just meaningless to be right also.
Along these lines, 'being-in-the-world' and 'being-with-others-in-language' seem to be 'equiprimordial.' Wittgenstein spoke of an urge to thrust against the limits of language. Can we hope for more than an objective correlative?
[quote= TS Eliot]
The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an “objective correlative”; in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion; such that when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked.
[/quote]
There's no way for Eliot to know that he's getting 'the' emotion he wanted, not if emotion is (misleadingly) understood to point to an inaccessible inwardness as opposed to a cluster of related practical significations.
Yet I think I know what people want to say with 'qualia.' It's part of that urge.
Finally, the wiki page on qualia features a red square, as if that could successully point to the quale of red. Does that sound right? Or does it not assume a singular quale for red? Not only without any evidence but in a context of the impossibility of evidence that's guaranteed by the concept/grammar of the word 'qualia.'
If minds are brains, then minds are nouns.
I have no doubt, but it has nothing whatsover to do with his philosophy (so called.) That is one of the many blatant contradictions about the man - affable, genial, concerned, friendly, but according to his philosophy, none of these qualities have any basis in reality, they're convenient fictions only. You're attributing nuance to him only because, for some reason, you seem to think he has something important to say, when, if he's important, it's as a warning, like, 'DON'T GO THERE'.
What's happening is that Western culture is still living off the remnants of its decaying Christian ethos. It's that which underwrites Dennett's genial liberalism, even while he has spent most of his career attacking its foundations. If he really lived out of what he believes is the case, he would be nothing like the genial bearded fellow of his persona. And he even acknowledges that!
So please stop telling me there's 'something I don't understand' or 'something I'm not seeing' here. I see it as clear as day.
Quoting Janus
It's exactly that. Scientific materialism is a corrosive philosophy, it degrades civilization and human culture everywhere it comes into contact. As Dennett himself says it's a 'universal acid' that eats through everything it touches (including, emphatically, philosophy). So somehow, we're expected to entertain it as a possible theoretical outlook. 'Oh, good ol' Dan, he's just like Santa Claus. Mischeivous twinkle in the eye.'
If you are simply not interested in it, then fine, don't read his work or comment on it (which, respectively, you haven't and therefore shouldn't anyway). If you want to critique it then study it and attempt to refute it, point by point.
Your characterizations are not philosophical critique, but childish expressions of your strawman thinking and unfounded distaste in my view. Your personal feelings of distaste are not philosophically interesting.
Here's an example:
Quoting Wayfarer
For fuck's sake! He acknowledges it? The quoted passage is not Dennett speaking. You are making yourself look like a joke, Wayfarer.
Exactly as he explains in Darwin's Dangerous Idea.
Quoting Janus
There's only one point at issue - the insistence that matter has intrinsic reality. When that's seen through, the rest collapses.
Quoting Janus
You're talking to yourself man.
Oh, have you read the actual work? Can you cite some text from it to support your contention?
Quoting Wayfarer
What does "intrinsic" mean there? Does it make the question different than asking whether matter is real? If so how? Please explain.
On the other hand, if I accept for the sake of the argument that the question is meaningful, and is different than merely asking if matter is real, and has an answer that is true or false, then please explain how we would go about finding out whether matter has intrinsic reality.
If it cannot be demonstrated whether matter has intrinsic reality or not, then it becomes a matter of opinion. In that case some will believe it does and others that it doesn't. Why would it be corrosive if those who believe it does do not seek to force or require others to share their view? Or vice versa? You seem to require that others must share your view or else "they just don't get it". So I think your attitude is divisive in that you don't believe a rational person could hold an opinion different to yours; if so, does it not then follow that it is (socially) corrosive in that would seek not to allow for diversity of opinion?
Quoting Wayfarer
No, I'm talking to you. The question is whether you will take heed or not. Past experience tells me you will not.
[quote= Daniel Dennett, Darwin’s Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 202-3.]Love it or hate it, phenomena like this [organic molecules] exhibit the heart of the power of the Darwinian idea. An impersonal, unreflective, robotic, mindless little scrap of molecular machinery is the ultimate basis of all the agency, and hence meaning, and hence consciousness, in the universe.[/quote]
Everything Dennett writes is an elaboration of that theme.
Quoting Janus
Intrinsic: 'belonging naturally; essential.
"access to the arts is intrinsic to a high quality of life"
Materialism claims that matter is intrinsically real and that all else is derived from it.
Idealism claims that matter is not intrinsically real but that (for example) reality is imputed to it by an observing mind (although the specifics depending on the school of idealism).
Quoting Janus
It depends on whether I judge an objection to be meaningful.
Quoting Janus
Only in respect of whether Dennett's philosophy is valid.
Quoting Janus
So it's a matter of subjective opinion, once again. We've been there a hundred times already.
That would be correct, except mind is brain activity. It (the mind) isn't an object like a mouth is; instead, like talking is to mouth, mind is to brain.
But so what? He's not saying humans are mindless or without meaning. If humans are mindful and meangful what would it matter if matter were not?
Quoting Wayfarer
I know what 'intrinsic' means. I want you to tell me what 'intrinsically real' means. Materialists say that matter existed prior to humans, that is that matter is not dependent on us or our perceptions. Is that what you mean?
Quoting Wayfarer
His philosophy is valid if it is consistent with its premises. I haven't noticed any glaring inconsistencies in Dennett's works. This is the criterion of validity for any philosophy. Dennett's premise is that matter exists independently of humans; matter either exists independently of us and our perceptions or it doesn't. No one really knows the answer, and I don't think there is any way to demonstrate the truth regarding that question. So people's opinions fall on one side or the other. What would you expect? That everyone should agree? Do you want to claim that people who beleive one thing or the other are therefore morally better and happier people?
Quoting Wayfarer
What more could it be? Or if there is an objective metaphysical truth how could it be demonstrated to be so? This is the question you can never answer despite your wishful assertions.
Despite them having been pointed out in clear English.