If there is no free will, does it make sense to hold people accountable for their actions?
I hate discussions of free will. The same old arguments over and over and over with no resolution ever. Once, I counted seven FW threads active in the previous three days. So, I decided to start a FW discussion, even though there are currently two FW threads on the front page. I think this one is different enough to make it worthwhile. If we come to a satisfactory conclusion, it may be possible to dispense with any future such discussions. Ha.
For the purposes of this thread, I don’t care if there is or isn’t free will. I have my own answer and I’m not interested in discussing that right now. What I want to discuss is whether or not it matters if we have free will. What difference does it make? There was a similar thread about two years ago that only got a few responses. I’m hoping for better here.
From a practical perspective, which is one I am partial to, I see several important questions - Should I hold myself accountable for my actions? Or maybe - Should I be held accountable for my actions? To turn that around - Should I hold other people accountable for their actions? To the first question, I answer a firm “yes.” To the other two I answer “yes…but.” Yes, but that accountability should be tempered with a recognition that people are affected by factors that are out of their control.
I guess the question is whether or not that makes sense, given that we’ve assumed there is no free will. One answer - We no more have a choice about whether to hold people accountable than we do for any other decision. Another possible answer, although it’s a lot vaguer - People holding others accountable is one of the mechanisms by which their actions are determined.
So, what’s the answer? Does it make sense to hold people accountable for their actions given that there is no free will?
For the purposes of this thread, I don’t care if there is or isn’t free will. I have my own answer and I’m not interested in discussing that right now. What I want to discuss is whether or not it matters if we have free will. What difference does it make? There was a similar thread about two years ago that only got a few responses. I’m hoping for better here.
From a practical perspective, which is one I am partial to, I see several important questions - Should I hold myself accountable for my actions? Or maybe - Should I be held accountable for my actions? To turn that around - Should I hold other people accountable for their actions? To the first question, I answer a firm “yes.” To the other two I answer “yes…but.” Yes, but that accountability should be tempered with a recognition that people are affected by factors that are out of their control.
I guess the question is whether or not that makes sense, given that we’ve assumed there is no free will. One answer - We no more have a choice about whether to hold people accountable than we do for any other decision. Another possible answer, although it’s a lot vaguer - People holding others accountable is one of the mechanisms by which their actions are determined.
So, what’s the answer? Does it make sense to hold people accountable for their actions given that there is no free will?
Comments (122)
Not sure how there is anything else to be said by a non-determined agent about a determined agent. Arguments feel much like they presuppose an agent to argue with that has some ability to agree or disagree on the basis of something other than the causal chain. If we have a choice in the matter, there is free will, and we can be “accountable”, if not, it seems we are determined to hold people accountable anyway.
Perhaps what I'm looking for is a more personal statement from someone who believes there is not free will. An answer to the question - Do you hold other people accountable for their actions? Does it make sense that you do that? Is the only answer that you have no choice?
I guess my answer to the question is that it makes no difference whether or not we have free will in any aspect of our lives. It certainly makes no practical difference.
I suspect that despite your comments to the contrary, the existence of free will, will (no pun) arise.
But, putting that aside, and assuming there isn't, there's no answer. For you could argue that, given no free will, I as judge, have no choice but to hold you accountable for your actions, given the risks involved in letting you go.
On the other hand, given that you are not responsible for what you did, then it makes no sense to me as a judge to punish you, because what happened could not be avoided, and locking you up wouldn't would be unnecessary punishment for an unavoidable outcome, so I'll be gracious and let you go.
But these options don't really make sense, so the assumption of no free will has to be modified or admitted.
Once that word pops up in a offices (government/private), everyone takes a moment to (re)assess their work/performance. I've seen remarkable changes in attitude and performance in response to these ideas (the other word being "responsibility"). Granted that it has zero effect on some folks, it still triggers neural rewiring in most. Free will or is it a deterministic causal loop? God knows.
If there is no free will, then this question is equally non answerable because what sense does it make to decide whether to hold someone accountable or not, if there is no free will?
Wouldn't answering that question imply free will?
The question as to whether or not the individual ought to conform to the code willingly, is irrelevant, when the only interest he has in it, relates to the mere desire for its benefits. There is no need to will himself to comply, when a want suffices for the same end.
Public accountability can be given without any consideration of will. Or....will has nothing whatsoever to do with public accountability.
You know why that is? Because people who take part in these discussions fail to do the most basic philosopher's due diligence, like asking themselves what free will is, why it is that and not something else, and how it is relevant to whatever they really want to talk about, because, as in your case, what they really want to talk about is something else.
Quoting T Clark
Nope. See above.
If a criminal can not avoid committing criminal acts (say, arson, rape, and/or bloody murder), would that not be an excellent reason to lock him or her up? Call it punishment or prevention--some people should not be at large.
I think so too.
Why accept reasons though? There's no reason a person was killed, there's no reason to judge, it just happens.
If you remove free will for everyone, then there's not even a point in going to trial. Either get locked up immediately or not.
If there's no freedom, then it's kind of "involuntary manslaughter", there was no choice. And the judge and jury have no choice either. They do or do not put them in jail, for no reason.
I think such views make the law redundant.
Which is sort of what I'm trying to get at. Hardly anyone has any real commitment to a "no free will" position. Not to the extent that it changes their attitudes or behavior significantly. So it's purely a philosophical, "rational" position.
I have heard of philosopher types who committed suicide after convincing themselves they have no free will. Ironic, I guess.
Yes. I guess what I want to examine is the contradiction between what a lack of free will implies and people's actions and behavior. Does anyone actually believe there is no free will?
This is a very small part of what constitutes holding someone accountable. It applies in all sorts of situations where there may be no specific rules - in employment, in personal relationships, in business relationships, basically in every aspect of human interaction.
Quoting Mww
This raises a question I hadn't thought of - Does acting on desire require free will? I would have thought the obvious answer is "yes." Perhaps not. I'll think about it.
I agree. And those who deny it assume we do have some form of it.
Otherwise, why argue to make a point? There's no reason to, there are only causes.
If they do argue, they assume I'm willing to change my views. But if I'm willing to change my views, I have to judge and choose each reason accordingly.
I don't disagree. I do think that what I am trying to do in this discussion is just the kind of due diligence you are talking about.
I agree.
Quoting Bitter Crank
The asnwer whether or not we have free will does have implications for criminal law. I would contend that in criminal law the absolute presupposition (in the sense of Collingwood) is made that we have free will. That it is such an assumption of criminal law is not uncontroversial, but I contend that it is, so will accept it for the purpose of this thread. If anyone would disagree we can discuss of course. Anyway, criminal law knows a number of justifications for punishment. One is prevention, but the second is retalliation. Prevention of course, as Bitter Crank noted, is still a perfectly justifiable reason for 'punishment'. However, the rationale for punishment shifts. It is not really 'punishment', but a policy measure. Out of policy concerns we would lock up criminals and apply the criminal law to them.
The second one though, retalliation, seems pointless without free will. Why would we reproach someone if he is not in control of his actions and free choice is illusory? It seems to be adding insult to injury because the perpetrator has not asked to have a crime prone character. Possibly that causes more harm than good and then we also reproach him for being who he is and doing what he does without a choice.
The question than becomes whether it matters whether you are locked up as a policy concern, or because society reproaches you for doing something wrong, which you should have avoided doing. I would reckon yes, for two reasons. The first one is practical: If punishing becomes a policy concern it means we should only look at effectivenes. Punishment should be tailored to the perpetrator solely an maybe to the obtaining the best results for society. Concerns of fairness, which are germane in criminal law, become less of an issue, because it is not out of fairness that we punish. We merely look at the perpetrator and what is a most effective means of stopping his criminal activity. Secondly we might also entertain social concerns. there might be outrage whe we do not punish a murderer because we know he does not kill again. So we should mediate social concerns with individual ones and find a tailor made pnushment in this specific case. Punishment becomes a utilitarian calculus.
The second reason is that punishment out of policy concerns relegates the perpetrator as an object of policy. The interesting thing about punishment is that it is also a kind of redemption. Yes, we rebuke what you have done but take you sseriously as a perpetrator. Contast that with peretrators that plead an insanity defense. They contend that at that point they were not being themselves, they did not have control of their actions. An insanity defense is nothing else than a request to be treated as policy concern and to be absolved from moral blameworthiness. When we judge that someone is culpable, then we also at the same time say 'we take you seriously' we accept that you are a person who is rational, who is capable of making right and wrong choices. I do think it is more humane to punish out of resentment. The perpetrator may lose his freedom but not his right to be viewed as a human being who is in control if his action. It is actually for this reason that mass murderer Aders Breivik from Norway resisted heavily to be declared insane and Ithink he is right. Calling him insane would amount to an extra punishment, above the life sentence he got.
So yes, I think it matters whether one rejects free will in criminal law. Maybe it this not totally answer your question, whether, given there is no free will, does it make sense to hold people accountable. The short answer based on the view above would be yes, it still makes sense, but only out of policy concerns. Criminal law in this case should be reformed to reflect only utilitarian concerns in dealing with perpetrators.
I think you might treat someone who has no choice in what they do differently than one who does. Perhaps more kindly. If we got rid of punishment and just performed social control, criminal justice might be much more humane.
The law and any moral or ethical consideration at all.
Nonsense?
The thing called "free will" is as deterministic as the cartoon safe plunging to the sidewalk. The source of our free will, whatever it is or is not, are the intricate and immensely complicated transactions of physics and chemistry within our brain cells--which are deterministic.
Accepting the dry determinism of the universe (freely or not) doesn't change anything. We still have to choose all sorts of things during the day: brown socks or black socks; broccoli or asparagus; robbery or burglary; put fake data in the report or let the facts show that one is a lazy bureaucrat; have sex with a stranger or not; read the New York Times or the Boston Globe; stop at Aldi's or Trader Joe's; watch another episode of the Sopranos or not.
We might want to say squirrels are subject to crude determinism. Still, squirrel X has to decide whether squirrel Y has watched X bury a walnut. The transactions in the squirrel's neurons are pretty much the same as ours. Evolution has seen to that. But evolution is merciful and the squirrels can not decide to read boring, difficult existentialist texts. We can, so there are limits to evolution's mercy.
The law not necessarily. If it works to keep people from committing behaviour we consider unwanted it can still be there. also here only utilitarian concerns will count.
Law would dish out punishment or reward, but the reasons given wouldn't make sense. Because even if you say you're doing it for societal purposes, one is assuming that people have a choice in obeying the law.
If they have no choice in obeying or rejecting the law, then it's as if the law did not exist.
Good post.
Quoting Tobias
I was thinking of this when I started this discussion - I've read about jurisdictions where mitigating factors; e.g. childhood abuse, poverty, hardship; can not be be brought up during the trial, but they can be considered during the penalty phase when punishment is determined. This would be especially applicable for cases where the death penalty is under consideration.
Quoting Tobias
I think there are situations when people clearly are not in control of their actions, e.g. schizophrenia with delusions and hallucinations.
Certainly and in those cases we cannot hold people account at all. This means we may take 'measures' against them, expedient actions out of social concerns such as forced care in a mental institution. We may not punish them in the proper sense, i.e. cause them harm because we resent the choices they made. (Dutch legal theory makesa difference between 'measures' and 'punishment', which is helpoful here. It does not mean measures are necessarily milder. Being locked up potentially indefinately in a mental health institution is of course onerous to the perpetrator, the rationale is different though.
Quoting T Clark
Many jurisdictions take the circumstances of the perpetrator into account when meeting out punishment. Gradually in criminal law attention has shifted from purely reagrding the act to regarding the actor. Many people recognise that in some situations we are so pyschologically strained that we cannot think clearly. The problem is that it is not very consistent. It recognises that some circumstances influence your choice, but that that choice is then 'compromised' to some degree. It does not entertain the idea that people have no chocie at all to begin with, because they have no free will.
Well, this was the question I was avoiding by stipulating at the beginning that there is no free will. I don't mind you bringing it up, but I would rather this discussion not be side-tracked too far.
Quoting Bitter Crank
So, you are proposing free will as applicable at a day to day level, even if not absolutely. Kind of a pseudo-free will or free will as result of statistical mechanics. I was going to say I don't think it's relevant to the question at hand, but I'm not sure that's true. What forces control us; gravity, the strong force, the weak force, and electromagnetism; evolutionary drives such as aggression and sex; medical factors such as brain damage or congenital defects; social forces such as childhood abuse; or some other types of forces. Which ones matter? Which ones count? A really interesting question that I don't remember being discussed before. Maybe I missed it - I often avoid FW discussions.
If we get into that here, I think it will distract from the discussion I'm trying to have.
Yes, that brings us back to the question I considered in my response to BitterCrank previously:
Quoting T Clark
Which of these do we take into account? The ones you and I are talking about are the medical and social forces I discussed. On the other hand, some people understand our lack of free will to be dependent on a materialistic interpretation of basic ontology.
I don't see any evidence of that in your OP, nor in most of the discussion.The thread follows the dismal pattern of all such free will discussions, where the subject is obscure and people talk past each other. (@Tobias at least has a definite idea of the sense of "free will" that he is talking about, but is this what you had in mind? I don't know, and I get a sense that you don't know either.)
Alas.
But why make it so difficult? Freedom is the ability to do so and so. It's situation-dependent and rarely as radical as someone ignoring all morality and killing people for fun.
Either we can do so and so in X circumstance, or we choose not to. We can be prevented from doing something by force or by moral reasoning.
Freedom is about being (as Descartes and Leibniz phrase it) "inclined and suggested" to act appropriately given a situation, but not forced to do so. I could speak about the colour of my shirt at length, but it's not relevant to the discussion. And so on.
I agree with them. Phenomenonologically, or maybe less controversially, experentially we do experience freedom of choice. We only do not experience it when under certain meical and social influences. The question is whether this first person experience of free will is illusory, or somehow contrary to the metaphyscial assumptions we accept. Criminal law takes the first person perspective, I experience free will, so assume you do too. Neurology for instance, takes a third person perspective, and accepting basic materialist metaphysics, tells us it does not exist. Criminal law though takes the circumstances that we also accept in our every day eistence into account. It will tell you it does not go into metaphysical assumptions about the nature of free will. I argue though it tacitly accepts the existence of free will as an absolute presupposition.
@SophistiCat I took a very straightforward interpretation of free will as my point of departure. There are others of course. The most sophisticated I have seen is the compatibiism of P.F. Strawson. I do feel they dodge the existential question though: do 'I' influence my life, or is all my choice in fact an illusion.
Are you asking whether, assuming there is no free will, no real choice, it makes sense to hold people accountable from a pragmatic or a moral standpoint? I'd say from a pragmatic standpoint, any society must hold its members accountable for their actions; that's the pragmatic perspective. On the other hand from the point of view of moral judgement, if people could never have done otherwise than what they have done, then I can't see how they could be morally accountable anymore than animals, lightning or volcanoes are.
If it is such a small part, how then does it concern all those things you listed?
The subject matter has to do with accountability, which is to say, in this case, the way in which people account for the activities of others. The subject wished to be held in abeyance, has to do with the account one person takes for himself.
The difference is in the kinds of judgement related to the two different accounts. The one I speak about, and the one with which the topic concerns itself, is judicial judgement alone, whereas the judgement concerned with the will of the individual in relation to himself, is aesthetic. The two cannot mix, and still maintain the differences in accounts, for the interests of the individual determine the judgement under which he is to subsume himself.
From a Guardian discussion of this question:
The issue of free will is really one of agency - whether persons are responsible agents, or they are acting on the basis of causes into which they have no insight and so no control.
I think the rejection of the idea of free will is a consequence of the abandonment of the (Christian) principle that humans are free agents able to choose good or evil and reap the consequences. In a purported 'clockwork universe' driven by mechanistic principles, humans are essentially automata who merely act out programs such as those embedded in the 'selfish gene' to ensure propogation and survival. Any perception of freedom is really an artifact of those programs that are executed in the background of consciousness without any oversight by human agency.
My meta-philosophical analysis is that the world-view associated with this outlook is actually driven by the fear of freedom. That fear, according to Eric Fromm, arises from the historical process of becoming freed from authority which is associated with the development of liberal individualism. This leaves feelings of hopelessness or anomie that will not abate until we develop a form of replacement of the superseded social order. However, a common substitute for exercising "freedom to" or authenticity is to submit to an authoritarian system that purportedly replaces the old order with another of different external appearance but identical function for the individual: to eliminate uncertainty by prescribing what to think and how to act. This is exactly what the thinkers quoted above are proposing: that we submit to the 'scientific' judgement that free will (or agency) is an illusion, that we are simply cogs in a system which only science has knowledge of. This poses as 'freedom' but really it is an abandonment of the possibility of freedom by making the very idea of freedom meaningless. It is precisely a manifestation of the fear of freedom, which provides a kind of illusory freedom as the promise of technological mastery. So it's really the bleeding edge of a new form of tyranny, posing as liberation.
Now, here are my thoughts about why the question of FW still matters. This question highlights the contradiction between the following observations:
1. The universe has laws that it abides. It seems to be deterministic.
2. The human beings have the ability to make choices and control their behaviour. At least that's how we experience our existence.
So the question is how can free will exist in a seemingly deterministic universe. Although we can argue that the universe must not be deterministic or that free will must not exist, I tend to think that there is an answer which allows both statements to hold true. Knowing the answer would help us better understand how the nature of human existence connects to the nature of the universe.
Perhaps that's not the discussion you were trying to have. The discussion about accountability seems boring because you're right: it doesn't matter, practically speaking.
I brought up the question of determinism vs FW because I think it partially addresses the premise of the OP. The OP asks us to assume that there is no free will. I take it as we should assume that the universe is fully deterministic. But here is a thought: what if free will can still exist in a deterministic universe? This would make the whole premise contradictory, as long as it's talking about our universe and not a different, imaginary universe.
Finally, I've read about some criminal cases. With some of the worst criminals, it does seem like they don't have free will: they choose to commit crimes again and again, oftentimes against common sense. The criminal system works well with the absence of will: this person is a criminal, they don't seem to control their own actions and therefore we need to send them into prison for the benefit of society.
Another example: this person has committed a crime. We see their regret and perhaps if they could go back in time they would not commit it again. But it doesn't matter, because the crime has been committed, and we have no choice by to put them in jail. In other words, it doesn't matter how this person will exercise their free will in the future, we will still hold them accountable now.
Great linked article. Clear and thorough in discussing the basics of the question along with its history and implications.
I don't think I buy your "meta-philosophical analysis."
Agreed.
I don't understand.
I find pure materialist physics very unconvincing, worse than unconvincing - meaningless. But this is not the place to go into that.
Conversely, the smell of hot cinnamon rolls was hard-wired into your brain by the many times you enjoyed the delicious spicy bread. The fragrance of cinnamon rolls (or just cinnamon) will always make you feel a twinge of happiness. More determinism.
Do people choose their favorite sexual fetish? No, they do not. It emerges. Do people become Engineers or English teachers on the basis of freely made choices? They do not. Social factors, personal idiosyncrasies, brain build, earlier experiences (of which we were recipients, not designers), and so on. NEXT POST
Outside of the context of the compulsion to comply, the practice of holding other people accountable is closely bound by how much responsibility is accepted by said individuals. Such acceptance may be necessary from a point of view of causes we do not understand. But as a matter of practical decisions about people, agents who bind themselves to obligation are the only one's worth arranging anything with. That is the mark of voluntary action well beyond the apportionment of blame. Are such willing agents free?
A little Spinoza might help here. He noted that we select what draws us closer to what is desired or takes us further away from what is feared. But the degree of our knowledge and understanding is an influence of outcomes, despite the role of necessity. Consider Proposition 6 of Ethics 5:
Another aspect to consider is that being compelled to do what you were designed to do is much different than becoming bound to others or dire circumstance.
That’s ok. If you understand why you agree with then you’ll be closer to understanding me.
This is close to my take on the matter, although I can't speak for Aristotle as you seemingly can.
Quoting Bitter Crank
No, no. It was the fact that my mother, true to her New York upper crust upbringing, always served hollandaise sauce on asparagus. How could you not love anything that has hollandaise sauce on it.
In a better world, we would strive to intervene in the lives of those for whom numerous factors (beyond their control) have made life difficult (for themselves or others). Benign intervention requires acceptance of determinism--otherwise it is likely to be more punitive than corrective.
The concept of FW is the result of determinism being too complex for us to countenance. We big-brained apes can grasp and understand only so much--and a full understanding of determinism is more than we can manage.
Therefore, we do hold ourselves and others accountable. There is no conceivable way to track all the factors that led Joan to murder Sam, so we are forced to settle for personal guilt and prison. The opposite is true too. "I am a successful businessman because I am very smart, and I chose to do everything just exactly right." The fact that your grandparents started the business and trained your parents and later you in its intricacies might have had some deterministic influence, no? Or, the fact that an earthquake and category 5 hurricane created a tremendous need for new and repaired housing was a windfall your business when it would other wise have been a period of no growth?
My guess is that a significant share of drug addicts and alcoholics are gifted with a genetic heritage which facilitates addiction. Compulsive gamblers, compulsively promiscuous dicks, compulsive eaters, and so forth probably have genetic or circumstantial predispositions. Self-intervention in unhealthy behaviors will not occur to many of the addicts, alcoholics, gamblers, dicks, over-eaters, etc.
It isn't sterling virtue that keeps most of us out of the gutter. It's the innate (not virtuous) ability to engage in self-monitoring and self-intervention which prevents disaster. Successful people are born being better at operating in this world. We tend to attribute our successes to our own virtues, and others' failures to their personal degeneracy and degradation.
There is an inevitable cognitive disjuncture or dissonance between acceptance that our behavior is entirely determined by forces and conditions over which we have no control, and the idea of moral responsibility.
There are several things I wanted to accomplish but I found that I did not have agency to carry them out. Put in the vernacular, "I just couldn't get my head around the problem."
In other instances I found I had agency to spare to complete tasks. Whether or not I was going to have agency or not was determined.
There sure as hell is. I felt heavy static in my brain while posting above.
Does it make sense to hold a virus accountable for infecting our bodies? Perhaps not, but it still makes sense to take action against it.
What if the virus had free will? Perhaps we would take a different set actions to influence how it executes its free will. But if it executes its free will in a way that doesn't please us, that's when we can hold it accountable. Lesson: accountability starts after will is executed, but we don't call it accountability if we don't presuppose free will.
I don't understand. Are you saying that only people who agree to be judged should be held accountable? I'm pretty sure you're not saying that.
Quoting Paine
I really don't understand the point of the Spinoza quote or it's relevance to this discussion. When he says all things are necessary, does he mean that they are determined?
I am very aware that my actions "pop into consciousness from hidden areas of the brain." Do you think that means they are somehow not as much part of us as our conscious decisions are? I think a distinction between my unconscious decisions and actions and conscious ones is artificial and pointless.
I agree.
Quoting pfirefry
Ok. Or maybe neither statement is true. I think they are metaphysical statements. You're new here, so you haven't heard my never-ending refrain - metaphysical positions are neither true nor false. They have no truth value. They are more or less useful in a particular situation at a particular time.
Quoting pfirefry
As I've noted in a previous post, wouldn't we treat someone who has done something wrong but does not have free will differently that one who does have free will.
Clearly, people's actions are controlled by factors outside their control to some extent. People who are abused as children tend to abuse others. People of very low intelligence may not be able to understand right from wrong. That seems different to me than a lack of free will associated with metaphysical materialistic understanding of reality.
Quoting Bitter Crank
There is a way of understanding that denies the need or validity of taking credit or accepting blame for our actions. The Tao Te Ching discusses it. That doesn't mean that you don't expect to have to face the consequences of your actions and decisions.
Are our actions different if we assume no free will is involved than if we assume there is?
Starting with the latter, Spinoza argued against free will on the basis that everything that happens is caused to happen and that we don't understand these causes hardly at all. But he also strongly suggested that being less ignorant about why events happened improves our lives.
Quoting T Clark
There are all kinds of reasons to hold people accountable, whether they agree or not. But the only people worthy of trust hold themselves accountable to something. The quality is not without its own uncertainties. But extending trust is more about this assumption of obligation than assuming the quality is 'free.'
Since everyone then would be good, the question of accountability & responsibility would become moot: why hold anyone accountable/responsible when nothing bad's happened? Even free will becomes a non-issue if you factor in those who believe that good/peace/harmony takes precedence over freedom.
This leads to the question: Why did God give us free will if He knew it meant so much suffering, suffering we inflict on each other?
Well, isn't it awesome that we can choose to breed only good people just as we do with animals? It's a choice after all, no? God has given us an option and I, for one, am grateful for it. What we do next is an altogether different story.
Speaking for myself, my family line isn't exactly pedigree material, if you know what I mean.
Perhaps a conscious decision is one where we logically weigh all factors and do some sort of analytics to determine a course of action, whereas most decisions just seem to come to us after pondering. I see a difference.
Once you have the list of traits to select for, remember that 20 generations takes around 600 years. That is a VERY long time for people to pay attention to anything, and it will probably take more like 100 generations to start weeding out annoying human traits.
I take it you want to be on the candidate selection committee--yes?
The devil, as they say, is in the details. It's not going to be easy working out the specifics but if we put our hearts and souls into it, I'm sure we can come up with something doable.
Quoting Bitter Crank
No, I wouldn't. I'm not the type who makes good decisions. However, I will give my opinion on the matter, if asked.
As for determinism, my understanding is people are fed up with freedom (free will) - it's one of those things that's more trouble than it's worth. We could have heaven on earth and surrendering our free will for that seems to be a very small price to pay for it, no? Dirt cheap actually.
I was agreeing with them on this point: Quoting T Clark
The lack of free will follows from a materialistic interpretation of basic ontology. If one ascribes to a purely materistic ontology than accepting the lack of free will should follow from that premise. This type of metaphysics though relegates human experience to the realm of the 'unreal', only the third person perspective decides what is really really real. It is a metaphysical position. I am not saying I also ascribe to it. I do not think we are very far apart, if at all on this point.
It doesn't matter a split end. What matters is that we have a will.
Quoting T Clark
That's why it is better to get rid of accountability, responsibility, guilt, a moral consciousness, or similar nonsense all together. Aren't they just instruments to constrain, forbid, or limit thoughts and actions to fit the expectations of the ones applying them? Isn't this feature imposed on people? To get rid of unwanted behavior and thinking by holding them accountable and making them feel guilty if thinking certain thoughts or performing certain actions?
Holding someone accountable or responsible for their actions is as silly as claiming their will is constrained or even determined by physical laws. The will is simply there, and it can be impaired by brain damage or sickness. The actions flowing from the will can be constrained by the will not to execute these actions, because one knows the consequences or by the will of other people with other thoughts. But the notion of holding a will accountable or claiming it to be free or not is just an artificial notion. It gives rise to the saying that actions taken are
not somebody's fault, which is just the opposite of saying it is somebody's fault. It's invented to steer unwanted will, thoughts, and actions by reference to some god-given notion of what are the right thoughts and actions.
So if there is a will only, without it being free or not, and no such thing as accountability, the question doesn't make sense. Accountability hasn't been proven to exist scientifically, and any claim to its existence is speculative.
It is assumed to exist, as are a free or a chained will. The claim that our will is governed by natural laws is just as silly as the claim for accountability. Both notions don't exist in reality.
Which isn't to say the actions flowing from thoughts, emotions, and the will to perform them, shouldn't be constrained. But to base the constraint on accountability, free will or not, will constrain the will more than desirable. And it's the will for power that mainly drives these silly notions.
On what base then should actions be constrained? I don't know. It depends on the situation and the people involved. But again, using accountability to achieve the goal to get rid of unwanted action or behavior is using a false notion.
I was probably unclear - I meant that the difference doesn't matter from the point of view of whether free will is involved, i.e. a decision made subconsciously can be a reflection of free will. Does that make a difference?
I might have some quibbles with some of this, but I think you and I mostly agree.
No. I don't agree, although this may be outside the specified scope of this discussion. Accountability is one mechanism by which people face the consequences of their actions.
Quoting Raymond
I'm not sure I understand the distinction you are making between will and free will. It sounds interesting, but it's outside the scope of this discussion.
Quoting Raymond
Here's one definition of "accountability" from the web:
The state of being accountable or answerable; responsibility for the fulfilment of obligations; liability to account for conduct, meet or suffer consequences, etc.: as, to hold a trustee to his accountability; the accountability of parents toward their children, or of men toward God.
There may be doubt as to whether accountability is an effective way of ensuring someone's behavior, but it's existence is not in doubt. I've held people accountable. I've been held accountable. It's not a scientific concept.
I guess we have no choice but to ask what decision should we make in a world where we can not make decisions.
If we're content in treating the matter as a deliberately unresolvable philosophical soccer ball, then perhaps. Best I can tell is that free will is rejected solely because at some point it was understood to be a product of a creator God. Post enlightenment rejection of religion seems to be more appealing than dismissing the hollow argument that free will implies random action, so the game goes on.
Quoting T Clark
This is a surprising statement for someone who has started a discussion about good will!! :grin:
And it would be also surprising for me if I were involved in it, because I also hate discussions about free will! :grin:
I know what being accountable or responsible means. But it's nonsense. The quote defines accountability by using accountability: "Accountability: the state of being accountable." Further it gives examples how it is used. Liability, accountability, responsibility guilt, etc. are just inventions to give people the false impression that they are in charge of their thoughts and actions, to not make them think thoughts or do things unwanted by the people who project it on them. If the accountability is installed in people, then they have the false idea that it's them who are in charge of what they do or think, and are accountable for what they think or do, while it are in fact the imposers of the accountability who are in charge of the thoughts and actions they want to control by introducing accountability.
:up:
Quoting T Clark
My two pennies worth: in short answer to the question: yes, it does.
In terms of practical accountability, the ontic (un)reality of free will doesn’t make a bit of difference: If free will, then ontically valid accountability for that which is (freely) chosen (among available alternatives). If causal determinism, then – I think echoing your own views – by the fact that we’re not omniscient, we are ontically predetermined to not know everything about the past, present, or future; i.e., we’re predetermined to be ignorant of the fully predetermined causal system, or the block universe, as a whole; thereby making us ontically predetermined to epistemically live as though we freely choose at least some future outcomes, this on account of our ignorance regarding an otherwise fully fixed causal reality. In other words, in the latter, we are ontically predetermined to hold a strictly epistemic – but not ontic - freedom of choice … and, thereby, epistemic, but not ontic, responsibility for our actions.
I’m not saying the latter doesn’t have issues, but it can be argued, to my mind in a cogent enough manner.
The ontic reality, or unreality, of free will does, however, make a world of difference in the type of universe we inhabit. For instance, is the universe accurately described by physicalism, and are the innumerable consequences in respect to ourselves of the universe’s so being (or not being) thereby true (or untrue)? As a common example among mankind: if physicalism, as its currently known, then all conceivable possibilities of spirituality, such as that of an afterlife, are bogus. If free will is ontically real, then physicalism, as its currently known, is bogus. To me, all this irrespective of there being, or not being, a Creator Deity. But these are the types of differences that make a difference in relation to free will.
From where I stand, this cuts through the muck and gets to the core issue in respect to free will’s reality.
While true, a good Bayesian analysis would consider factors such as the history of cultural myths or religions and how they might inform (or be informed by) common conceptions of things such as free will.
Sure, I agree. Not all cultural myths or religions subscribe to a Creator Deity, though.
Free will means that thought and action can express themselves freely, without any notion of accountability constraining them.
Which isn't the same as saying that every action should be allowed. Actions that try to keep down non-standard thoughts and actions and try to impose the standard ones by means of standardized institutions in a standardized state should be avoided.
In a truly free state, every form of thought and action should be allowed and the institutions should be standard free, i.e. objective.
So, does it make sense to hold people accountable for their actions given that there is no free will?
Yes it does. If the will is not free, i.e. if actions flowing from thought and thought itself are constrained or imposed by a principle of standardized accountability, the people representing the constraining or imposing power should be held accountable.
Couldn't the same be said of causal determinism, a block universe, and physicalism? (For what it's worth, from what I recall, materialism was addressed in the history of Eastern thought.)
The western world has nowadays had global influences, yes, but I don't find that this necessitates all different cultures of the world then center their existential questions - such as those regarding free will - around whether a Creator Deity is real.
For clarity, are you intending to say that belief in free will's reality entails belief in a Creator Deity?
I'm not a theist, but I don't reject free will.
All language is just an invention to give people the impression that they are in charge of their thoughts and actions.
Quoting Raymond
If I lend you $100 with the understanding you will pay it back in a month, am I trying to impose my control when I ask for payment 30 days later?
It makes sense to me. I would have to hold them accountable for any action they perform by the simple fact that it is them and only them that perform it.
If the will is not free in this academic sense, then people are not accountable anymore for their thoughts and actions. It are the laws of nature that are made accountable for them, thereby taking their freedom away which is even more ridiculous than holding people themselves responsible.
You can still apply personal accountability though, as no one knows where the determined processes lead. In the second world war there were two kinds of people belonging to a religious group who preached predestination. One kind became fearless fighters against the nazis, as they saw themselves to be determined so, and another kind who couldn't care less as they thought the course of history was determined regardless their actions.
I'm not. I am saying that the way that a culturally prevalent and deeply rooted force like religion effects language, the history of thought and therefore the current status quo beliefs and consensus understandings is an important piece of context when considering a question like the existence of free will. In a culture with a long history of religion whose central point is the immateriality and immortality of the soul, if free will didn't exist, it would be more likely to arise and be supported as a concept. That doesn't lead to any necessary conclusions, but it is a factor that should be added to a Bayesian analysis. Make sense?
Yup. Thanks for the reply. No doubting what you say. At the same time, I'm one to believe that we ought not allow cultural prejudices to cloud our judgments. Its inevitable that they sometimes do to some extent, but its a good ideal to work toward: the ideal of objectivity. This to say, the issue of free will's reality ought to be judged independently of cultural biases and preconceptions: such as that of its association with a Creator Deity, or such as that of an emotive rejection of anything that can be associated with religion.
I can't follow. Isn't language an invention to express what you think? Only the accountability idea, and the expression of this idea by language, is meant to give the idea that you are in charge. Or not, in the case of holding the laws of nature accountable.
Quoting T Clark
No, of course not. But that kind of accountability is not what I mean. I will (probably) pay you back. You can count on that. I have lend so many things to people, without them giving it back. I don't hold them accountable though. They just are...how to put it nicely...dunno.
I should clarify the point. The belief that free will is historically an affirmative indication of a theist world. Not simply that one implies the other. Suggesting the existence of a historical bias, rather than a logical implication. Si?
It is finally agreed the robot is to be destroyed. :meh:
Yes.
Defendant: Your honor, the universe made me do it, so please don’t sentence me.
Judge: Yes, true, it did, but we still have to lock you up until the universe doesn’t make you do it anymore, for we have to protect society, plus learning may happen, if you are able.
…
‘Free will’ is reduced to indicating that the will is able to operate, which is no great shake, or that one’s actions are not being coerced, whether by another person or by the weather or whatnot, which position is known as compatibilism, but this, too, grants us no real revelation or insight. Besides, the coercion was going to happen, too, as an effect from the causes that it had. The will is just the will—a neural network that votes according to what it has become up to that moment.
The judicial courts differentiate between ‘responsible’ versus ‘coerced’ (by another or via metal ills), this axis being orthogonal to the main axis of ‘free will’ versus ‘fixed will’ or ‘undetermined versus determined’, which the judges hardly get into, although there are cases in which defendants plead their bad nurture or nature, or, as of late, that addicts need help rather than being incarcerated as criminals.
Makes sense. Like axioms.
Quoting T Clark
Quoting T Clark
We would treat them differently if we could observe different patterns of behaviour from them, or if we could reasonably expect different responses to our actions, either form them or from the society. We would focus not on the past, but on how our actions would impact the future.
What considerations would we apply to distinguish between someone with free will and someone without?
If the difference was impossible to detect, we would probably treat them equally. Even if we had a device that would tell us who has free will and who doesn't, as long as they their behaviours are indistinguishable we should treat them as equal.
In practice, such a device would probably create inequality in the society, but only because the human nature is flawed.
Although I may have just missed it, I think that most of this discussion has been centered around free will vs determinism and the implications of the world being deterministic with respect to accountability. However, hopefully, hereforth, I can provide a different perspective. Although I understand that you are not interested, within the scope of this discussion, about whether the world actually is determined or not, I would like to state that my position is that the world is determined, but we still have free will.
The way I see it, determinism does not, in itself, necessitate that all the forms of free will are incompatible, it's thereafter that another discussion can arise between what are typically called hard determinists (also called incompatibilists) and soft determinists (also called compatibilists), where the former argues for the eradication of all forms of free will and the latter argues against some forms of free will while still holding at least one form to be true. I am a compatibilist. I think that, although everything is determined, there are meaningful distinctions that hard determinists cannot account for. The most notable of these distinctions is the difference in where the individual's action was derived within the causal chain: the distinction between an "inner will" heavily coerced by external factors (basically anything not directly of the "inner will") and an "inner will" acting of its own accord (which has no dependency on it be a libertarian choice, where one could have decided to do otherwise). For example, the scenario in which I "decide" to eat vanilla ice cream and the scenario in which I eat vanilla ice cream because someone is holding a gun up to my head are both determined but, nevertheless, are meaningfully distinguishable in the sense that the latter is obviously the external factors heavily coercing the inner will whereas the former is it acting of its own accord. Now, we can get into what "inner will" and "external factors" really mean, and the fact that no one is ever completely acting in a way that is at least somewhat influenced by external factors, but I will save that for a later post if you are interested: for now, I am simply giving you the jist. Personally, this is where my frustration came from with respect to hard determinism (and, subsequently, the eradication of all forms of free will): it necessarily leaves obviously meaningful distinctions unaccounted for. On the contrary, more libertarian (not in terms of politics, but in terms of libertarian free will) minded individuals will incessantly advocate that we can do otherwise, which is, in my opinion, thoroughly refuted. This is, in my opinion, where a vast majority of the "free will vs determinism" arguments and dilemmas lie: in the false assumption that you have to pick a side, it's an either/or fallacy. Libertarian free will can be successfully negated by determinism and determinism can still, at the same time, allow for other definitions, or forms, of free will--such as one that is based off of the relation of external vs internal wills (or factors) instead of choices (in a "you could have done otherwise" sense of the term), which can, consequently, be utterly determined.
With that in mind, when you ask if we should hold each other accountable, I would ask for further clarification on what you mean. You see, I wouldn't say, technically speaking, that "punishment" is the right term but, rather, "prevention". However, I would also so that "justice", or "retaliation", is perfectly justifiable under a deterministic worldview. First of all, I think that "prevention" instead of "punishment" rightly shifts the individual's thinking process away from the incessant presumption that the individual could have done otherwise, which, in my opinion, is nonsense and, more importantly, produces an unnecessary level of apathy. However, with that being said, I can most definitely still blame someone for their actions, but, in doing so, I am not implicitly declaring that they should have done otherwise: I'm declaring that I do not approve of what they did, albeit my disapproval is just as much determined as their action, and I am rightly deriving the source of the action towards them because they did it primarily in alliance with their "inner will". On the contrary, if I know that the person was, in one way or another, not in their normal state of mind (and their normal state of mind I completely agree with--in the sense that they don't normally do things I would characterize as "bad") when they committed the act, then I would only blame them in a very strict sense that the action can be traced back to their body, but with the meaningful distinction that they normally do not act in this way (albeit that both are necessarily determined)(and it is much more complicated than this, as their tendency to be under the influence is also a factor here). Furthermore, if I know that the person did something "bad" but it was heavily coerced by another external factor (or factors), then I would not necessarily blame them at all. Most importantly, even with the fact that everything is determined, all of the aforementioned is still distinguishable in a meaningful sense that cannot be stripped down to merely "we can't judge anyone because its all a causal chain".
To keep this brief, I will conclude with one final note: I find retaliation and justice perfectly justifiable within the idea of determinism. If I witness a lion gruesomely devour my mother, I am surely going to be angry at that lion, however, more importantly, my anger won't be as directed at it as say a human if I consider humans to have the ability to do otherwise. This is what I mean by stating that libertarian free will can cause unnecessary amounts of apathy (or decreased amounts of empathy, however you want to think about it) because the individual, in my opinion, is holding a completely unjustified belief that holds humans to a much higher status than all other animals (and objects in general). Don't get me wrong, the spectrum of consciousness definitely elevates humans to have higher capacities which, thereby, can rightly determine humans to be held to a higher standard than other animals. But, most importantly, this higher standard, I would say, is only insofar as we make a meaningful distinction between the capacities of organisms in our world. This is why my lion analogy isn't completely analogous afterall: the lion doesn't have the same capacity, neural and thereby "causal potential" (so to speak), as a human; therefore, we can't, in a complete sense, erode a human to the level of a lion because human's have a higher capacity, but that capacity is still determined!
Bob
Quoting Tobias
That is more-or-less the ordinary language meaning of free will, and it is how P. F. Strawson, A. J. Ayer and some of the other compatibilists interpret free will as well.
Yes. R.G. Collingwood calls them "absolute presuppositions."
Quoting pfirefry
My stated assumption is that there is no free will. In that case, we would assume that all actions are determined. I guess my question is, would be treat offenders more leniently in such a case. We're not punishing them, we're trying to stop them from offending again.
As you note, a lot of what you write makes sense, but is beyond the intended scope of this discussion.
Quoting Bob Ross
Definition of "retaliation" - The return of like for like; the doing of that to another which he has done to us; especially (now usually), requital of evil; reprisal; revenge. That's from the web.
Why does that make sense if it doesn't prevent the offender from offending again? How is revenge justifiable if there is no free will?
That sounds very similar to our existing criminal justice system. Its goal is not to punish people, but to prevent future offences in the society. What's important is to establish law—the likelihood of being punished—in the society, but not punishments themselves.
Quoting T Clark
I'd call this metaphysical position less useful, because I think the existence of free will is not relevant for justice. Even if all actions are determined, the justice system still needs to deal with a lot of uncertainty. I.e. we know things have happened the way they were supposed to happen, but we just don't know the details. We still need to spend a lot of time to deconstruct the events, create different narratives and decide on which narrative is the most plausible. I think this works really well with the assumption of determinism.
Only in a lab the so called laws of nature are articulated by putting processes in the same experimental set up time after time and observing a behavior that's the same every time. The behavior is described by a law, and then we say that the process is determined by that law. Which is nonsense, because it's the law that is determined by the process. There is no such thing as a natural law existing in nature. Only in the human mind such laws exist. The law is a human invention projected onto nature, thereby giving it an apparent objective existence. The natural things observed don't care. They just show an aspect of them that's the same every time. The law of nature is not what accounts for them.
Likewise, in modern society, laws are introduced. They differ from natural laws in the sense that they are used to direct behavior before it shows unwanted forms. Which is also done in a lab to study natural processes, the difference being that the objects in a lab conform to the laws from the start (after enough repetitions to achieve stability). The processes are isolated from unwanted influences thereby creating processes that are the same everytme.
This can't be done with people. So laws are a priori introduced to steer their behavior, in favor of the powers that rule. Be it determined or not. Accountability is introduced because it relieves the power from the burden to control each and every one. Holding the individual itself accountable, mposing feelings of guilt, and promises of punishment is very effective to keep the individual within the lines of wanted behavior. And behold. The individual behaves determined by laws.
I'd say yes.
Reminds me of the Epicurus paradox. Free will is worthy of worship, to us, due to its positive practicality.
The premise (the given) is false, when it's interpreted and measured along the lines and standard of the academia. So the question becomes:
"So, what’s the answer? Does it make sense to hold people accountable for their actions given that there is a free will?"
For those trying to delimit unwanted action flowing from the will, it's a welcome instrument for realizing their vision of a world free from the eschewed action. With guilt and punishment it forms a powerful trinity for keeping the world free from unwanted thoughts and actions, thereby inevitably preventing the will, thoughts, and actions to be free.
The will, in that case, is submitted to the powers that reign. A power that uses accountability as an instrument to relief itself from the burden of responsibility by shoveling it into the unwilling mind of unwilling slaves it tries to control, giving them a false feeling of responsibility, because in fact it's an attempt to install the desired thoughts and actions without too much effort.
Thus the bank robber asked why he robbed banks: "Because that's where the money is." One can say that he is determined by his will to become instantly rich, to rob banks, just as I am determined by my will to save my hurty feet, to catch the bus.
Thus will ends freedom, because the decision acts. I decide to take the bus, and my future is determined thereby.
So to ask if there is "free will" is to be caught between asking if one can be free from the determinations of one's will, and asking whether one can determine one's determinations before one has determined them. Neither make sense, and so there can be no resolution, and we are, alas, bound forever to revisit the topic in a vain attempt to understand nonsense, until a fuller understanding liberates us.
Quoting pfirefry
There's a difference between justice and social control; retribution and coercion.
I take that to be a bit of a strawman. I haven’t read of anyone upholding free will that endorses the things you mention.
Why not try to find a common understanding of what “free will” minimally denotes? Here’s my take:
First, let “to be determinate” be understood as “to have set limits or boundaries”.
P1: I am the cause of that which I decide whenever I deliberate between alternative outcomes. (If I don’t deliberate between alternative outcomes, I’m not consciously making decisions.)
P2: As the cause of the decision, a) I might be fully determined in all conceivable respects such that I do not hold the ontic ability to generate different effects given an identical situation; b) I might be partly determined and, thereby, partly not determined, in what I decide such that I do hold the ontic ability to generate different effects given an identical situation; or c) I might be utterly not determined by anything in the effects I generate (e.g., the limits or boundaries of my decision would in no way be set by anything I might perceive, desire, intend, etc.).
P3: “P2c” is an absurdity in part due to being contradictory to our experiences; what remains as viable options are “P2a” and “P2b”.
C: If free will occurs, it is defined by “P2b” in that it would be a semi-determinate process of generating the effect of a decision … and it would be necessarily semi-determined in part by the intents (goals) momentarily held. If free will does not occur, our sensations of our deliberative decisions being accordant to “P2b” is illusory, instead ontically being accordant to “P2a”.
Basically, I venture that the “free will” upheld by the people which endorse it is to be minimally understood as a semi-determinate process of effecting decisions wherein different outcomes / effects can be generated in identical situations – hence nether as a pan-determinate process nor as an utterly non-determinate process.
Edit: In case this comes up, free will thus conceived would then be a non-stochastic process in part due to being semi-determined by one's intents.
Yes. A great definition since there are no identical situations. for example, I have coffee in the morning every day. My wife always has tea. The crucial situational difference is that we are different people with different preferences.
So F.W.Java notices this and says, " I challenge you, unenlightened, to show your free will by having tea tomorrow." So I have tea. the next day.
"That's no proof," says D.Javra, "because you have been determined by my brother's challenge to drink tea, and without it you would have had coffee again."
Stalemate.
So define freedom, such that it encompasses the available choices, tea and coffee, and will as the choice one makes...
... and see from there, what the definition of free will might be. I would like to feel that I don't have to be drinking tea so that my choice of coffee is free - if you see what I mean.
As far as I can tell, I've already done so. Remember, free will, as with any notion of causation or determinacy, is a metaphysical one. So, the "freedom" in "free will" only entails the ontic ability to generate different effects in an identical situation (this, it might go without saying, in non-stochastic manners). Now, each an every unique situation is self-identical - this as per the law of identity. So, the position of free will affirms that in every instantiation wherein you've made a decision between a set of alternative outcomes, each such instantiation being a self-identical situation, you could have decided on a different outcome than that which you did. Otherwise expressed, "freedom" here is strictly defined as the metaphysically valid, or else ontic, freedom of consciously choosing any one of the two or more alternatives one consciously deliberates on (quite arguably, two or more alternatives whose presence to oneself during a conscious deliberation one does not consciously choose in any given self-identical situation ... but as cause only chooses amongst, thereby effecting one's choice).
As is obvious, this offered ontic ability is contradictory to the notion of causal determinism. And it is in this contradiction that free will becomes such as big deal to some.
Quoting unenlightened
Yup. That was my current intended point. This in opposition to the position of free will being nonsensical to begin with.
Out of curiosity, come to think of it:
Other than by positing the metaphysical position of causal determinism as true without first evidencing its soundness—which, by the way, as a metaphysical position can apply just as readily to those monotheistic metaphysics that posit an omnipotent deity as it does to the atheistic metaphysics of physicalism—on what rational or else empirical grounds can one deny the validity of free will as I’ve just described it?
----------
p.s. Regarding the Libet experiment: That certain actions of mind or body we willfully, voluntarily, hence intentionally, engage in will be determined by our subconscious mind seems to me to go without saying. It’s a natural outcome of how our minds operate. As one example, just because I, as a conscious self, voluntarily look at this monitor in front of me while typing out my post doesn’t necessitate that perceiving it is a conscious choice on my part. If free will can be ontic for our conscious selves in certain situations, namely those in which we deliberate, I see no reason to deny that free will can likewise be an ontic reality for our sub/unconscious selves as well. In other words, to deny that freely willed decisions can be made by our unconscious … which would cogently explain the Libet experiment in terms that, at the very least, validate the possibility of free will. Again, it seems obvious that not all of the intentions we consciously engage in are consciously chosen by us via deliberation between alternative outcomes … and a valid inference that those intentions not consciously chosen by us are/were freely chosen by our sub/unconscious selves.
At any rate, of sole concern to the question of free will I’ve here placed, again, is only the process of making conscious deliberations between those alternative outcomes we are consciously aware of.
My point was that your definition is already contradictory. One more time...
A chess player on her turn is free to make any legal move. Her will is to make the best move she can.
The only sense I can make of her 'free will' is not that she can make a poor move, but that she can stop playing chess.
The following is a simplification:-
Freedom is 'you can have what you want'
Free will is 'you can want what you don't want', or, 'you can not want what you want'. This contradiction is built in to your definition as... Quoting javra
This contradiction gives rise to curious unproductive ways of (mis)understanding addiction. One is addicted to nicotine, and it is hard to stop smoking. It requires a huge effort of will. One tries, and fails, and tries again, one tries to smoke less, or to change to patches or vaping. One finds one is weak-willed. This is a familiar story to many.
But now retell the story with the contradiction exposed.
There is nothing easier than not doing something that one does not want to do. Therefore, one smokes because one wants to smoke, and although one wants to not want to smoke, that is not an available choice; the choice is to smoke or not smoke, and one wants to smoke. This is the difficulty, that freedom for the will is to want what one wants, and also to not want what one wants. The latter amounts to wanting to be other. It come to the fore in all forms of self-improvement and self-control where the condition for even expressing the situation is that there is an internal conflict in which one's weak will is fighting one's strong will or some such. To be in this conflict is not to be free at all. It is the state of addiction itself.
We seem to have so far been speaking past each other.
To my best understanding, the issue is with your use of “will”, which in what I've quoted and like instances in your post is not common standard English use: You are conflating “choice” (common standard English synonym for “will”) with “desire” (archaic synonym for “will”).
In: “Her desire (or want) is to make the best move she can” one here is addressing "will" as the goal toward which she aspires. And, in this sense and context, it makes no sense to state that her desire, else goal, is something she can freely alter in the given situation - this on account of it being preestablished that that in fact is her desire/goal in the situation.
In: “Her choice is to make the best move she can” one here is addressing “will” as a conscious deliberation between two or more alternatives. And, in this sense and context, it does make sense to state that her choice is not fully predetermined in all conceivable manners. If her choice/decision is to make the best move she can, this then was one of two or more outcomes during a previous deliberation: the other potential outcome maybe having been that of intentionally allowing the other to claim a checkmate. Here, she chose to play the best she can rather than let the other win.
As to the smoking addiction example, it’s a good example for the issue of free will; but again, not when will is taken to be synonymous with desire. Rather it would make for a good example when addressed in terms of choice - which requires deliberation between alternative outcomes. But here we’d be addressing the more complex issue of willpower: the ability to adhere to one’s formerly made choice come what may; hence, in the example of addiction, irrespective of the passions (wants as you’ve termed them) and other dolors which goad you toward not realizing what you’ve chosen.
If you insist that “will” is not equivalent to “choice” in the context of (philosophical) free will, on what grounds do you do so?
Yes, that is the simplification I mentioned. But the distinction I want to make clear is between if you like, choice as the number of items on the menu, and choice as the act of deciding what meal to order. I am saying one has freedom to the extent that is more than one item on the menu, and one exercises will in choosing what to order from the menu. That is the conflation that 'free will' makes, in the philosophical context. of course in ordinary parlance, one distinguishes what is done of ones free will with what is done under coercion, rather than with determinism.
Choice-making and desiring are not one and the same process, and so can’t be simplified into the same given. Other than that, I don’t see any significant disagreement between your latest post and what I’ve stated in regard to free will. But please clarify if you do.
I’m mainly replying because I don’t yet understand how you find my definition of free will contradictory, this given a modern standard English use of the term “will”. For ease of reference, I’ll succinctly summarize my tentative definition of free will here: Free will is the partly-determinate ontic ability to actualize different outcomes in those self-identical situations wherein one deliberates between two or more possible outcomes – this such that the decision one makes between said alternatives will be partly determined by, at the very minimum, one’s momentarily held goal (i.e., long term intent; long term desired outcome).
To be clear, I’m not here interested in whether free will thus defined occurs. Only in addressing other possible misunderstanding of semantics via which this general definition can be found, as you’ve previously said, contradictory (needless to add, when it is considered in whole).
Quoting javra
On the menu is tea or coffee (2 different possible outcomes). My momentary long term desired outcome is coffee. The decision is coffee.
Where is the ability to actualise a different outcome, viz. tea? My fixed desire is for coffee. Does that make mean I do not have free will? Some choose variety, I choose consistency. This " ability to actualize different outcomes" is where all the difficulty hides.
Well, going by what I previously said: If it is a fixed desire, then in this instance there would thereby be no deliberation between the alternatives of tea or coffee - no degree of psychological uncertainty between which to choose, which is requisite for deliberation - hence no consciously made choice/decision is being made and, hence, no conscious utilization of free will ... volitional thought the activity of you saying "I want coffee" to the waiter is (this on grounds of it nevertheless yet being in accord with some other longer-term goal you might have ... just guessing at hypotheses, such as that of quenching your thirst in manners that don't displease you).
One can argue that potential alternatives to what we do are rampant everywhere at all times: "choices" as you call them. But its only when we consciously deliberate between alternatives that we in any way engage in conscious choice-making.
And, in case this comes up: Yes, not each and every activity we engage in is freely willed/chosen by us as conscious beings at each and every instant. Or, at least, so I argue. Most of what we do is decided by out sub/unconscious - sub/unconscious decisions often enough guided by our previously made conscious choices. E.g., I chose to drink coffee after a bit of conscious deliberation between coffee and tea, so I then move the cup to my mouth without in any way deciding on how to best do so.
Quoting unenlightened
Full agreement here.
"My biggest problem is what to do about all the things I can't do anything about"—Ashleigh Brilliant
Problem is that you can never know. Is there any point entertaining a question, the answer to which could never be determined (beyond entertaining it just once in order to realize what alternative possibilities are imaginable)?
Not with infallible certainty, no, but I at least believe that one can justify the universe not being accurately described by physicalism to a sufficient extent.
Quoting Janus
With what I just said in mind, imo, sure there are substantial points to entertaining non-physicalist systems of ontology. As one example I find noteworthy, if non-physicalism, then the possibility opens up of there ontically being such a thing as an objective good superseding any psyche (to be clear corporeal or, if such occur, incorporeal). This objective good in contrast to physicalism’s requisite moral relativism, which, for instance, at the end of the day maintains that the Nazis were good folks relative to their own social way of being. Concentration camps and all. This no more and no less in any objective sense then those who were/are antagonistic to them.
A decent analogy is a computer game. Within the game, everything is fully determined by the programmed flow of information, and every move of every game entity is fully determined, except those of the players, whose decisions moves and interventions come from outside the game world in meat-space. The question becomes, are we pre-programmed game characters or players of the game? If we are players, then we have an existence outside the physical universe, and there is an aspect of spirituality to our being. Religion is concerned with players, and science with the game.
There is no point looking in the 0s and 1s of the game for evidence of players; only 0s and 1s will be found. The avatar of a player and the avatar of a programmed game character are made of the same stuff. But in relation to my previous argument, I would suggest that while consciousness might be put forward as the unique attribute of a player, thought is very much a mechanical process of 0s and 1s.
http://accountability.qwriting.qc.cuny.edu/files/2016/08/Philosophy-of-Education-Chapter-2_-Pedagogy-of-the-Oppressed.pdf
Quoting unenlightened
One issue that can be raised: Might not an individual consciousness ontically create some of the mechanical process of its own thought? In so thinking, the issue becomes one of whether there is any degree of mind over matter involved in our existence. If we are to any small degree masters of our fate. If free will, then the answer becomes "yes" - with many details remaining to be worked out. If no free will, then there is a resounding "no" to these questions.
Quoting unenlightened
Skimmed through the chapter. I find myself in agreement with what I've read. Such as (taken from the concluding paragraph):
In which ways do you find this relevant to the topics of this thread?
Yes indeed. The player creates input data to the machine; the spiritual being provokes human thought and human action that would not happen otherwise.
Quoting javra
In the odd suggestion that the individual is not the locus of freedom after all, but the communication in dialogue. In the idea from Fromm, that the authoritarian is necrophilic, the enemy of 'life', which in context can be seen as equivalent to freedom. But Maybe one day I'll start a Friere thread if I'm feeling bold.