Science, Objectivity and Truth?
This is a topic which I have been thinking about recently, because not just among the philosophy community but, in general, science is seen as being an important aspect of knowledge. This is in the emphasis on evidence based research. I am certainly not against science and try to keep up to date in its findings.
This thread is aimed to look at the nature of how science is often seen. One book, which looks at this is, 'The Myths We Live By', by Mary Midgley. She queries the neutrality of science, saying,
'It struck me as remarkable that people answer questions about science in two opposite ways today.
On the one hand, they often praise science for being value-free: objective, unbiased, neutral, a pure source of facts. Just as, as often, however, they speak of it as being itself a source of values, perhaps the only true source of them.'
This raises questions about the connection between science and values.
Also, I have been reading Rom Harre's, 'Varieties of Realism: A Rationale for the Natural Sciences'. He says, 'Logic and with it the principle of ambivalence migrate from the epistemology of science to the persuasive rhetorics of scientific communities.' He points to the ideas of Feyerband, including the claim about science, including '"Scientific rationality" may be no better, indeed it may be even worse as a general ideology for regulating the relations of people one to another and to the natural world than lay rationality.'
Harre also suggests that, '
the essences of human cognitive processes and structures are semantic networks, webs of meaning held together by ordered sequence of analogies. Metaphor and simile are the characteristic tropes of scientific thought, not formal validity of argument'.
This thread is not aimed to attack and criticize science, but just to look at its role and values from a critical point of view. Also, even though I use the words 'objective' and 'truth' in the title, I realise these words are open to question. My own meaning of objective is as something which lies beyond the individual and can be measured. I am not sure that there absolute 'truths', but that is not to say that everything is relative. The whole point in using such terms is that they are used by some writers and that even questioning such terms is important in critical examination of science. Any thoughts...?
This thread is aimed to look at the nature of how science is often seen. One book, which looks at this is, 'The Myths We Live By', by Mary Midgley. She queries the neutrality of science, saying,
'It struck me as remarkable that people answer questions about science in two opposite ways today.
On the one hand, they often praise science for being value-free: objective, unbiased, neutral, a pure source of facts. Just as, as often, however, they speak of it as being itself a source of values, perhaps the only true source of them.'
This raises questions about the connection between science and values.
Also, I have been reading Rom Harre's, 'Varieties of Realism: A Rationale for the Natural Sciences'. He says, 'Logic and with it the principle of ambivalence migrate from the epistemology of science to the persuasive rhetorics of scientific communities.' He points to the ideas of Feyerband, including the claim about science, including '"Scientific rationality" may be no better, indeed it may be even worse as a general ideology for regulating the relations of people one to another and to the natural world than lay rationality.'
Harre also suggests that, '
the essences of human cognitive processes and structures are semantic networks, webs of meaning held together by ordered sequence of analogies. Metaphor and simile are the characteristic tropes of scientific thought, not formal validity of argument'.
This thread is not aimed to attack and criticize science, but just to look at its role and values from a critical point of view. Also, even though I use the words 'objective' and 'truth' in the title, I realise these words are open to question. My own meaning of objective is as something which lies beyond the individual and can be measured. I am not sure that there absolute 'truths', but that is not to say that everything is relative. The whole point in using such terms is that they are used by some writers and that even questioning such terms is important in critical examination of science. Any thoughts...?
Comments (332)
Philosophy is a valid mode of knowing.
Art is a valid mode of knowing.
Theology is a valid mode of knowing.
The problem is when science is epistemologically privileged over the others as a mode of knowing. Unfortunately we are in an era where the materialist reductionist perspective is dominant.
Yes, these are all valid means of knowledge and it does seem that the materialist reductionist perspective is given prominence. This is especially true within psychology in the debate as to whether psychology is a science. I know a lot of people who have studied psychology as a BSc and quibble over people who have studied it as s BA, as if it less valuable or valid.
Aesthetics is well-known for the subjective-objective debate over beauty. "Beauty," as Shakespeare once wrote, "lies in the eyes of the beholder!" Not necessarily: subjectivity is objectivity undeciphered.
You can lead a person to science, but it doesn't mean they'll accept it. Generally to persuade people, you have to use rationality in combination with addressing their emotional feelings. Many people will often times reject rational arguments in favor of their own personal feelings, but that doesn't mean science is currently one of the most valuable tools we have to accurately assess the world.
So I do agree that science alone will not persuade or motivate most people. It it wants to do so, it must make great efforts at creating the positive emotions in people that will make them open to accepting the rationality that science has to offer.
I tend to think it’s the other way around.
Why not! Relativism.
[quote=Protagoras]Man is the measure of all things.[/quote]
Old ideas deserve more attention than they get.
Which old ideas do you think deserve more attention? Do you think that Western culture has gone too far in embracing relativism and plurality?
Fair enough. We need to draw a distinction between science and scientism. Just we there is a difference between religion and fundamentalism. For my money science still provides the single most reliable pathway to knowledge about what we deign to call reality. It constructs tentative models of reality based on the most reliable information we have. It should not make proclamations about absolute truth.
Quoting Joshs
Objectivity is subjectivity undeciphered. Nice. I guess we might put science into the communities of intersubjective agreement category? Or something like this.
:100: Feyerabend couldn't have said this any better.
[quote=Carl Sagan]Science is not perfect. It's often misused. It's only a tool. But it's the best tool we have.[/quote]
Only a method of inquiry (i.e. testing how I know what I think I know), science is not merely a worldview (i.e. socialized indoctrination/ideology-agnotology). It's the worst one for explaining aspects of the natural world (using other aspects of the natural world) except for all of the other "ways of knowing" tried so far. If you must, blame the prevalence of "reductive materialism" on what Marx critiqued as Capitalism's ubiquitious, or insideous, appeal (driver): "the commodity fetish" (i.e. mass consumerism à la Veblen's "conspicuous consumption"). Most folks, yourself included if I'm not mistaken, Jack, believe in antique ideas (& occult fantasies) which are far outside the scope of "reductive materialism" that are called "spiritual" "religious" "transpersonal" "supersensible" "mystical" "perennialist" "hermetic" "gnostic" etc from which they derive varying degrees of personal (psychological) meaning, and yet, insofar as such "seekers" are our contemporaries, they are also, at least, "lifestyle materialists".
(Btw, by objective I understand propositional claims and their truthmakers (i.e. evidences) as subject / pov / language / guage-invariant. Subjective, on the other hand, denotes to me cognitively biased, prejudiced, evidence (public access)-free, rationalized, experiential, phenomenally self-aware (i.e. me-feeling, mineness)).
I am definitely in favour of science as ' a method of enquiry'. Also, I admit that I have dabbled in reading all sorts of ideas in the last few years, and it has really been during lockdown that I have been reading more actual philosophy. I try to look from various angles and the Madfool often has called me 'truthseeker' because I am inclined to approach philosophy looking for 'answers'.
As far as my own questioning of science, part of this comes from my own experience of academic establishments in England. In particular, it was on a couple of healthcare courses, I found that there was so much emphasis on so-called scientific expertise, which lacked any depth of critical analysis. Also, it does seem that in many aspects of thinking that people sometimes back up ideas with pseudo arguments, which are often made on some general ideas in science and, this sometimes includes media journalism.
Profoundly important point, Jack. What is at issue is precisely the attitude known as 'scientism', which is 'the view that science is the best or only objective means by which society should determine normative and epistemological values.' Amongst its most prominent advocates are Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett, but there are many other secular intellectuals who implicitly or explicitly appeal to science as the 'arbiter of what is real' (Neil De Grasse Tyson, Jacques Monod, Steve Pinker, Francis Crick, Jerry Coyne, and many others.) Mary Midgley's book, Evolution as a Religion: Strange Hopes and Even Stranger Fears is another valuable analysis of this problem.
The word 'scientism'is associated with a lecture given in 1959 by British scientist and novelist C.P. Snow. '"The Two Cultures" is the first part of an influential 1959 Rede Lecture by British scientist and novelist C. P. Snow which were published in book form as The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution the same year. Its thesis was that science and the humanities which represented "the intellectual life of the whole of western society" had become split into "two cultures" and that this division was a major handicap to both in solving the world's problems.'
It remains a strong undercurrent in contemporary thought and culture. The general point to make is to begin to distinguish the roles of quantitative analysis and qualitative judgement (a.k.a. 'value judgement') in human affairs. Science is grounded in quantitative analysis, even if judgement always plays a role in e.g. what to measure, what experiment to pursue, what is worth investigating, and so on. But the philosophical issue of the ground of qualitative judgement is invisible to scientific analysis as it by definition it's not amenable to quantitative analysis. This is actually the issue that underlies the entire debate about facing up to the hard problem of consciousness, which is being flogged to death already in another thread, so I won't recap it here. Suffice to say for this thread that the general consensus is that questions of value are a matter for individuals, meaning, essentially, relativism and subjectivism, or conversely, there are no real (non-subjective) criteria for value judgement outside the individual conscience. Implicitly this states that 'the world' is devoid of any inherent value - which is (paradoxically!) a value judgement. There you have the tension at the heart of 'scientism'.
[quote=Michel Henri, Barbarism]Science is a form of culture in which life denies itself and refuses itself any value. It is a practical negation of life, which develops into a theoretical negation in the form of ideologies that reduces all possible knowledge to that of science, such as the human sciences whose very objectivity deprives them of their object: what value do statistics have faced with suicide, what do they say about the anguish and the despair that produce it? These ideologies have invaded the university, and are precipitating its destruction by eliminating life from research and teaching. Television is the truth of technology; it is the practice par excellence of barbarism: it reduces every event to current affairs, to incoherent and insignificant facts.[/quote]
Quoting Philosophim
I think 'the world' is too big a word, here. 'The world' includes the subject, the experiment, the starting axioms, the observations, and everything else. Scientific analysis starts with a specific question, and generally proceeds by ruling out, or bracketing out, anything deemed not relevant to the specific subject of the analysis. From this it is hoped to arrive at the most general idea possible, an hypothesis, which unites disparate observations into a coherent theory. But it can only ever proceed in terms of what is measurable or quantifiable. So I don't agree that it is the most rational way to evaluate 'the world'. It is the most rational way to evaluate many kinds of specific problems across an enormous range of subjects. But if you use it to evaluate 'the world' then it's subtly morphed into 'the scientific worldview'. The scientific attitude to the world ought to be to suspend such judgements.
See also Six Signs of Scientism, Susan Haack and Science, Materialism and False Consciousness, Bas van Fraasen.
It's interesting that you mentioned Steven Pinker as well as Dennett, because I have been reading some of a book by Pinker, called, 'The Stuff of Thought.' I do find that it is important to read and listen to all points of view and I can usually see some rationality in arguments, even those which I disagree with basically. I am not a materialist, but I did read a book by John Rawles, 'The Matter With Us: A Materialistic Account of the Human Predicament', a couple of months ago. That may explain why I ended up making this thread. I try to read books which challenge my perspective. But, it is interesting that you mention scientism because it may be an outlook which goes beyond the scientific method into an ideology.
I accept that the models created through science end up getting involved with other kinds of narratives beyond what they claim to claim as science per se..
But the notion that such an influence is beyond the realm of effective ways to do things versus not having those means escapes me.
Take the problem of mental illness as an example. We have the means to understand all kinds of suffering to be outside of the means of 'society' to manage. But our politics are far away from dealing with this thing science has put at our feet.
I will become more interested in the problems of 'scientism' as a pattern of thinking when it proves itself unable to meet the challenges it has already given itself.
One main thing is the importance of seeing how science offers models and only that. I come from the perspective of having worked in mental health care and, also at the moment I have a close friend who is an inpatient in a psychiatric hospital. It seems that there are competing ideas within psychiatry, including psychological approaches which recognize the role of trauma as being a factor which can trigger mental illness. However, there is some strong opposition to some holistic models, which recognize the role of social factors and life experiences. There are many thinkers who prefer to see mental illness just as being a matter of genetics and biochemistry. How mental illness is seen affects the treatment regime and support offered in mental health services.
I don't mind Steve Pinker and he has some good things to say about cognitive science, language, and so on. (Strange as it seems, the last Christmas present I ever received from my dear, departed mother, was Pinker's The Blank Slate, probably nearly 20 years ago.) And I think we need unabashed advocates for Enlightenment science and values even if I don't fully go along with them. When I call out scientism it is likewise not to demonise anyone but to draw out unexplored assumptions. You could say that 'scientism' is simply the attempt to assess philosophical problems in terms of scientific criteria, so it's definitely suggested by the title of your OP. (Interesting you mention Rawls, I've come across discussion of him in some of Nagel's books.)
Plurality: Nature (as in life) has to do a fine balancing act between heterogeneity (increase the odds against external threats) & homogeneity (decrease the odds of internal strife).
Your account is interesting, and I have had my own experiences struggling against decisions made by those who make them. I figure all the sides in the arguments are made by scientists doing science. At least as the matters regard outcomes we personally care about.
Thank you for the kind words 180 Proof.
I think the only extent to which that is done rightly is the extent to which it's preferable to base one's values on objective reality rather than fantasy, delusion, ignorance, or error. Just as one wants a consensus around facts to establish a (ever putative) scientific truth, one would like access to and consensus about facts pertaining to, say, whether or not an election was rigged and an insurrection justified. For many, such a standard is not required. To that extent, a scientific-like standard is reasonable, and there's no contradiction as implied by MM: if one's values are based on anything, valueless facts seem a good shout.
That aside, it seems like mere innuendo to me. I don't think science is valueless, objective, or unbiased, nor do our values derive much from it, except in the above conscientiousness _sometimes_ (rarely). Our values are largely derived from nature and nurture, from experience, and if anything the scientific community is apt to manifest values through its constitution than be a credible source of them.
The requirement to simulate an objective picture through agreement about the results of repeatable experiments keeps science mostly in check, relegating theories that attempt to implement bad values, such as racism via phrenology or eugenics, to the lunatic fringe while still making way for other value judgements around emotive areas like stem cell research, abortion safety, and climate action. It's perfectly viable to have a science that observes the facts of climate change but makes no recommendations, or even be in favour of apocalypse. We don't tend to get much of that because the intersect between people dedicating their lives to understanding this stage we briefly step onto and people who would sign humanity's death warrant for an easy billion dollars today, or be fine with others doing so, is almost zero. Personally I don't find quantum theory and the general theory of relativity particularly relevant to my values :rofl:
Time for some self-reflection now. We ourselves are measuring devices (our senses) and if truth and objectivity were the be-all-and-end-all of life and reality, evolution would've ensured the die out of all forms of subjectivity. The rule in evolution: if it's bad for survival then it has to go!
Yet, humans have retained their subjectivity, we disagree on many issues and yes, we can be objective about them but that's not the point; we're subjective creatures too!
From a Darwinian standpoint, one conclusion we can draw is objectivity, and truth (objectively defined) aren't as important - there are other, greater, benefit(s) we accrue from subjectivity and they're crucial to our survival.
The paradox: Science (theory of evolution) is telling us, objectively to boot, that subjectivity is important! The truth is truth ain't as important as we think it is.
We might have to change tack but that's another story.
This isn't my experience.
Of course some people will make all kinds of wild claims but "just as often" seems like hyperbole.
Exactly. Science is concerned with primitive knowledge because it is concerned with matter which is primitive. Science cannot make informed judgements about ontological questions and questions about consciousness and being. These things require a higher language. The problem today is that scientism makes people believe that the language of science is the only valid language.
What is often missed, is that mathematics itself is a value structure, and is therefore dependent on, and based in "value judgement". What has occurred through the history of humanity is that we have achieved significant levels of agreement, convention, concerning these value judgements of mathematics, and this has produced great confidence in the notion that "objective knowledge" is produced by mathematics. In reality this knowledge is better classed as 'inter-subjective'.
Inter-subjective knowledge is dependent on agreement between individuals, concerning the applicable value principles. The trend in modern scientism based metaphysics, is to claim a separation between the value judgements which we have great agreement on (like mathematics, asserted as objective), and the value judgements which we do not have great agreement on (like personal pleasures, asserted as subjective), producing an unwarranted division between mathematical values and personal values. In reality though, there is no such separation, just a matter of the degree of agreement, and the type of things which we can more readily agree on.
I can't see how that can be true. Mathematics is purely quantitative, surely? 2 x 2 = 4 whether I like it or not, whether I think it's appealing or not.
What is it we know from theology and what counts as theology? Asking for a friend...
The symbols "2" and "4" signify numbers, and numbers are quantitative values. In its simplest form, a number is the value assigned to a group of things. Mathematicians work with values. And the reason why 2x2=4 is that the values associated with the symbols, is fixed by convention.
A more interesting way of stating your question might be to ask whether there are values which are independent of human minds, i.e. objective values, which either correspond, or do not correspond with the conventional assignment of values. For example, is there an independent, objective value which corresponds with what is symbolized by 2?
The problem with your perspective being that we have no clear dividing line between conventional mathematics (where we all agree), and non-conventional mathematics (where there is some disagreement). The degree of agreement varies depending on the axioms employed.
I picked at random a few ways that man makes sense of existence and called them modes of knowing. The actual list would be very long. Those that are theologically inclined find much meaning in pursuing theology, and they are valid in this. The poet is equally valid in his perspective. As is the scientist. As is the phenomenologist. As is the advaita Vedantist. Etc.
But you're equivocating the meaning of 'value'. In maths,'value' is a number signifying the result of a calculation or function. In ethics and philosophy, values are basic and fundamental beliefs that guide or motivate attitudes or actions. So the meaning of 'value' is different according to the context.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Assuredly. That A=A is not dependent on your or my mind, or on your or my assent. But it can nevertheless only be grasped by a rational intelligence. That is why I favour the form of objective idealism which says there are real ideas that are not dependent on our minds, but which can only be grasped by a mind.
Quoting Tom Storm
Hope you don't mind my chipping in here. There are domains of discourse within which meanings are fixed. Those classical domains, such as classical theology or Advaita Vedanta, have deep roots, i.e. their basic terms are defined in terms of fundamental values. The fact that they are so defined doesn't guarantee their veracity, although I think their longevity and adaptability provide support for that. Within those domains, there is what amounts to 'peer review', in that successive generations of adherents of those traditions authenticate the various texts and ideas of the domains. That is also the basis of the idea of lineage. In fact arguably those practices were the origins of peer review in science itself.
I suppose the marvel universe is very effective at providing meaning within its particular domain (let's call that the realm of the imaginary). Like natural science is effective at providing meaning in its own domain (let's call that the physical). There doesn't need to be any criteria distinguishing validity or invalidity in this case because they each have their own respective, and different, domains. Choosing the valid/invalid modes would only be needed if science and the marvel universe covered the same domain. Obviously they do not, and no one seriously claims that they do.
Is that a Kantian notion? Isnt A=A the concept of ideal self-identity, the infinite repeatability of the same? If so, isn’t the category of temporality intrinsic to it?
I think it's fundamental to philosophy generally. It's the law of identity. I can't see how temporarility is intrinsic to it or even connected with it (although will acknowledge that my own attitude has been deeply influenced by my understanding of Kant).
[quote=Lloyd Gerson Platonism v Naturalism]Aristotle, in De Anima, argued that that... in thinking, the intelligible object or form is present in the intellect, and thinking itself is the identification of the intellect with this intelligible. Among other things, this means that you could not think if materialism is true… . Thinking is not something that is, in principle, like sensing or perceiving; this is because thinking* is a universalising activity. This is what this means: when you think, you see - mentally see - a form which could not, in principle, be identical with a particular - including a particular neurological element, a circuit, or a state of a circuit, or a synapse, and so on. This is so because the object of thinking is universal, or the mind is operating universally.[/quote]
*I would think this means 'rational inference'.
Don't want to go too deeply into this here but am researching the subject of the identity of knower and known.
Always welcome, W. Heading towards the intersubjective communities of phenomenology. I should point out that I often ask questions even if I have answers (well, mine anyway) I am interested to hear how others make sense of things - especially when the worldview is not one I necessarily subscribe to. I am always trying to break out of my own perspective. The chances that I have stumbled onto 'truth' being highly unlikely.
Quoting emancipate
I think it's more than imaginary. It's metaphor and allegory used to provide comfort and guidance. At least that's what I've seen. And yes, imaginative power can guide or temper behavior in real life.
Quoting emancipate
I agree, but it is tricky. I know of a young man who is guided by Spiderman (as metaphor) when psychology might be more useful. I think it can sometimes be hard to determine which mode to apply to which domain. What are the rules (or practice principles) for determining where science should be and where religion should be for instance?
Quoting Wayfarer
216. "A thing is identical with itself."—There is no finer example of a useless proposition, which yet is connected with a certain play of the imagination. It is as if in imagination we put a thing into its own shape and saw that it fitted.( Wittgenstein, PI)
We see particulars ( objective aspect) under accounts (formal aspect) , but are not these accounts subjective rather than objective? And are the accounts not themselves contingent and changeable?
I think Gerson misses an important circumstance that Aristotle observes in De Anima. For whatever reason it might be possible, we come into the presence of beings who actually exist. Something about how we are constituted allows this to happen through means that retreat from the attention in order to permit the arrival of such beings.
That is different than stating that our means of perception and intellectual processes amount to something equal to what exists beyond those means.
Another aspect of equality in the Aristotelian view is how it suspends the comparisons of 'greater' and 'smaller.' To that extent, the condition is not a step toward 'identity' It points to something that works but we don't know why it works.
Wittgenstein didn't understand the point. He boasted he'd never read Aristotle. But I've never read Wittgenstein, so I'd better shut up.
Quoting Joshs
There's a good discussion of universals in Russell, 'World of Universals'. The salient point:
which is precisely the sense in which I understand it.
Quoting Paine
In fairness, mine was a paragraph quoted from a long essay (which you can find here or even watch Gerson deliver it as a lecture here, bookmarked to the relevant section.)
The broader point is that whilst Aristotle departed from Plato's depiction of the existence of universals, they are still present in his philosophy as the intelligible forms of things, which becomes the basis of matter-form dualism (hylomorphism). This holds that the idea of the thing is grasped by the intellect, while its material form is the object of the senses.
Probably logging out for Christmas, so Happy Christmas to all.
I respect Gerson, especially as someone who wrestled with the texts of Plotinus.
But I am not convinced that Aristotle is arguing for the neat division you or he suggests.
A discussion for another time, perhaps.
Wittgenstein, AC Grayling tells us, read almost no philosophy at all. Perhaps like J Krishnamurti he was a kind of seer.
I agree.
Quoting Tom Storm
Yep it's tricky. Anyway, forget it. I was talking shit last night. I don't know anything.
Sorry for dropping in on a thread I haven't read but...
Where does AC Grayling say this ?
He is wrong but that doesn't surprise me.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PmckTveYNI8
Thanks but couldn't find it in the limited time I have for this guy.
No great loss.
Can you give an example of how mathematics is a value judgement. I suppose they are very few.
Quoting Amity
From Ray Monk’s biography of Wittgenstein:
“…what Ryle says about Wittgenstein's attitude towards reading the great works of the past is perfectly true. 'As little philosophy as I have read', Wittgenstein wrote, 'I have certainly not read too little, rather too much. I see that whenever I read a philosophical book: it doesn't improve my thoughts at all, it makes them worse.' This attitude would never have been tolerated at Oxford, where respect for things past is in general much stronger than at Cambridge, and where a training in philosophy is inseparable from a reading of the great works in the subject. It is almost inconceivable that a man who claimed proudly never to have read a word of Aristotle would have been given any tutorial responsibilities at all at Oxford, let alone be allowed to preside over the affairs of the department.”
Heidegger read plenty of Aristotle, but came to conclusions remarkably similar to Wittgenstein.
“ The principle of contradiction and the principle of identity are presupposed to be self-evident, with no questions asked about whether they are actually ultimate.”
Quoting Wayfarer
The proposition A=A only makes sense as a reflection. The second A is being compared to the first in one’s mind and determined to be identical. Reflection is a temporal process, and Heidegger’s argument is that reflection changes what it turns back to by changing the context.
No equivocation. A value is the estimated worth of a thing, whether the principle of estimation is numerical (providing the basis for quantity), or the principle is moral (providing the basis for ethics). Yes, a numerical value is a distinct type of value from a moral value, like a dog is a distinct type of animal from a human being, here I am talking about the more general "value". And just like dogs and human beings are both examples of the more general "animal", numerical values and moral values are examples of the more general "values".
As I explained, it is the claim that there is a fundamental separation between these types of value, which gives scientism its traction. This proposed separation provides for the appearance that somehow mathematical values are more "objective" than other types of values. This produces the illusion that science creates a higher form of certainty than ethics. In reality though both of these forms of certainty are supported merely by the extent of agreement, or convention, afforded by each. So the idea that science through the means of its mathematical applications, gives us a higher form of certainty than ethics, is just an expression of "mob rules". More people agree therefore it more objective.
Quoting Wayfarer
Your expression "A=A" is just a rule, which states that each time the symbol "A" is employed, it must represent the same thing as the last. The reality of equivocation demonstrates that the rule is often not followed. Now, your statement "A=A" is nothing more than an ethical principle, 'what we ought to do' if we do not want to deceive others, and desire to give them a clear understanding of what we're thinking.
So if we want an "objective idealism" we need to start with an objective ethics, because logical proceedings are dependent on people doing what they ought to do in their activities of thinking. When there is no clearly defined rules as to what people ought to do in their logical proceedings, they'll rationalize all sorts of illogical things and try to pass them off as acceptable logic. If there is such a thing as "real ideas that are not dependent on our minds", these ideas must exist as the result of following the appropriate rules of action ("action" includes thinking); as ideas, is how such activity is present to our minds.
Quoting EnPassant
The symbols used in mathematics represent values, as I described, "2" represents a value. Each time that mathematics is employed in application, there is a judgement as to where to assign which values, just like ethical judgements are judgements as to where to assign moral values. So all applied mathematics involves such value judgements, just like applied ethics involves moral judgements. In the case of theoretical mathematics, what some call pure mathematics, rules are introduced which define the values and describe how to apply them, as moral philosophy does the same with moral values. So all forms of mathematics involve value judgements, always.
It appears as if some people here have kind of (conveniently) forgotten that mathematics deals with values. Influenced by this ignorance, mathematics is distanced from "value", and given the appearance of objectivity.
I stand corrected. I respect Ray Monk :sparkle:
I don't see it that way. Numbers are sets that arise out of iteration and partition.
Start with /
Iterate //
Reiterate ///
etc /////////////////////////////...
Partition each step into {/} {//} {///} {////} {/////}...These are sets. Numbers are sets.
In familiar symbols these are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5,...
This is how set theory defines numbers. There are no values ascribed here.
I really don't believe that is the point. I think the point is that the expression '=' or 'is', strictly speaking is only completely accurate in the case of A=A. In other arithmetical expressions, the "=" sign denotes an exactness which is never the case for empirical objects. Mathematical statements have an exactitude which is never truly characteristic of the sense-able realm. Statements about the empirical world are always approximations, because the objects of empirical analysis always consist of an admixture of being and becoming. The reason that 'the law of identity' is being dismissed as a trivial tautology is because this is not seen. It goes back to Parmenides' discussion of the 'nature of what is'.
[quote=Wikipedia entry on Afrikan Spir]For Spir the principle of identity is not only the fundamental law of knowledge, it is also an ontological principle, expression of the unconditioned essence of reality (Realität=Identität mit sich), which is opposed to the empirical reality (Wirklichkeit), which in turn is evolution (Geschehen). The principle of identity displays the essence of reality: only that which is identical to itself is real, the empirical world is ever-changing, therefore it is not real. Thus the empirical world has an illusory character, because phenomena are ever-changing, and empirical reality is unknowable.[/quote]
I think the fundamentally unknowable nature of empirical reality is hinted at by the conundrums of modern physics. (There's a very well edited PDF of Spir's book Thought and Reality available on archive.org, which I've downloaded for further study. He is a little-known neo-Kantian of Russian origin.)
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Not buying, sorry. I think this obliterates a distinction of the first order.
What you are demonstrating is that the set {///} has the value signified by 3. Do you not accept the fact that mathematics works with values? If "{///}" means the same as "3", and "3" means the same as "{///}" then you have a vicious circle of definition. But clearly this is not the case in set theory. Sets have all sorts of different values like cardinality, extensionality, etc.. To say "there are no values ascribed here" is rather ridiculous.
Quoting Wayfarer
This is a good point. When A=A is meant to express the law of identity, i.e. "a thing is the same as itself", then the "=" sign represents a very special sort of exactness, the relationship which a thing has with itself. And this goes beyond the capacity of a human being to judge. Human beings do not really know, nor are they capable of judging the relationship which a thing has with itself. It is simply asserted, as the law of identity, that such a special, and exact relationship exists, and is something real.
But when the "=" sign is used to express equality, as is the case with mathematical equations, then the relationship between the two things related by the sign is a matter of a value judgement, and this does not obtain that degree of exactness which is expressed by the law of identity. It is less exact because it is always a judgement of some value, therefore some specified property. So two groups of two things for example, are "equal" in the sense that they both have the quantitative value of two, and so they are the same in that respect. But they might be different in every other respect, yet still equal, being each a group of two.
Quoting Wayfarer
What's this "distinction of the first order" you are talking about? I've never seen "first order" used in this way.
Clearly they are both "values", under the same general definition of "value", meaning "a thing's estimated worth". When we see a group of objects and assign the value "10", this is the group's "estimated worth", within the quantitative value system we use when we apply a number to the group. Likewise, when we judge the morality of a human act, we are assigning an "estimated worth" to that action. Why deny this basic fact concerning human judgements? All such "value judgements" are related to each other in this way.
I already gave the two different definitions of value, numerical and qualitative. Numerical values originate with counting, 'how many'. Qualitative values originate with judgement. 'Assigning an estimated worth' is simply a judgement of one in terms of the other. The results of quantitative counts are invariant, but value judgements can vary wildly. Imagine a scenario where you have a re-discovered Picasso painting evaluated. If it's found to be genuine then it's worth a hundred millions bucks. If it's a fake it's worth nothing. But it's still exactly the same thing.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
An insurance company can put an estimated value on a human life for the purposes of paying out a policy, but to say a life is worth some monetary amount in absolute terms is a mercenary attitude.
You're deeply muddled here, MU, but as it's Christmas, Happy Christmas :party:
Counting, "how many", is a judgement. How could you think it is not?
It is not a value judgement.
:clap: :roll:
:up: :sparkle:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
One thinks not because "counting" is a practice; "judgment", however, consists in participating or not participating in a practice.
But you are talking about subjective value: something that can be open to disagreement. How can there be disagreement about the cardinality of a finite set? And if there was disagreement about the cardinality of infinite sets it would not be because of subjective opinion it would be highly technical and concerned with Godel's undecidable issues - such as the cardinal in the continuum hypothesis which was shown, by Cohen, to be undecidable.
At the moment, one book which I am reading is 'Freedom: The End of the Human Condition', by Jeremy Griffith and he points to the problem of reductionism in science. He says, 'Science has necessarily been 'reductionist' and 'mechanistic'. It has avoided the overarching whole view of life that required having to confront the issue of the human condition and instead reduced its focus to only looking down on the details of the mechanisms of our world...'.
He goes on to suggest that 'this strategy, the very dangerous trap inherent in this mechanistic, resigned-to-living-in-denial-of-the-human-condition, fundamental dishonest approach is that it could become so entrenched that those practising it could resist the human-condition-confronting, truthful explanation of the human condition when it was finally found and continue to persevere with the dishonest strategy to the point of taking humanity to terminal alienation and extinction.'
One particular writer Griffith seems particularly wary of is the sociobiologist, Edward O Wilson, whom he quoted, 'There is no grail more elusive or precious in the life of the mind than the key to understanding the human condition'. It is hard, I feel, to know to what extent science should be criticised in itself, but the problem may be where it ends up making people feel that their lives and those of other humans and other lifeforms don't matter and are without value, as insignificant.
It only seems that way to those who ignore the fact that numerals signify values. You think that numerals signify some type of Platonic object, called a number, so you have complete disrespect for the fact that numbers are really quantitative values, which are assigned by human beings in practice, rather than some type of eternal object. Such disrespect for reality is rampant in modern philosophy of mathematics.
Quoting 180 Proof
That's nonsense. A "practice" consists of a conglomeration of many activities, and judgements are required at many points along the way throughout any practice. To practice something is to exercise your capacity to make such judgements, it does not remove the need to make the judgements. Suppose you have a pile of apples, and you want to count how many are ripe, leaving the underripe. Each apple must be judged as to whether it qualifies or not. And if you are simply counting, not counting any specific objects, just expressing an order of numerals, you need to make the judgement at each step, as to which numeral comes next.
Perhaps, when one gets really good at some practice, counting from one to ten for example, they simply ignore the fact that they are making these judgements, as the decision making process becomes very rapid and habitual. Then the person might insist that the practice doesn't involve any sort of judgement. This type of ignorance seems to be the prevalent attitude toward mathematics. But ignorance makes poor philosophy. And it is clearly indicated by legal principles that habit does not absolve one from the responsibility of habitual judgements. So your implication that practice is somehow independent from judgement is just ridiculous.
This is exactly the problem with the "mechanistic" reduction refers to. It is a fundamental, basic denial of the reality of the very significant and important role of "free will" in the process of conceptualization. To remove the element of free will from the essence of the concept, portraying the concept as an eternal Platonic object, is a self-deceptive denial of the reality of the "human condition".
Quoting EnPassant
What I am saying is that all opinion is subjective (of the subject). Agreement produces a sort of "intersubjectivity", whereby we say one's opinion is the same as another's. But intersubjectivity is still dependent on subjects, so it cannot support a definition of "objective" (of the object) which extends beyond the existence of subjects.
Quoting EnPassant
This is an example of a difference in opinion. These issues are related to a difference in opinion concerning the definition of "infinite" which existed when set theory was younger. As time passed, and new hypotheses were proposed, mathematicians obtained a higher degree of consensus. That something is "undecidable" is an opinion.
What then about proofs that are independent of the subject? Proofs in Number Theory that are demonstrably true? For example [math]\phi(n), \tau(n), d(n) etc[/math] are indisputable values. They are what they are beyond any subject's opinion of them.
Godel's theorem demonstrates the reality of undecidables.
Quoting Wayfarer
The law of identity is being critiqued because of a change in the way certain approaches to philosophy think of ‘being’ thanks to the work of Nietzsche , Wittgenstein and the phenomenologists.
Their claim is that rather than a dualism between being and becoming, becoming is prior to being. Put differently, the idea of being as encapsulated in its most ideal and exact form in A=A is an abstraction derived from a pragmatic act of reflective comparison. Use is prior to , and makes possible all thought of being as self-identity. Empiricism is no longer seen as representation , approximation or adequation but instead as production. Exactitude is measured by relevance rather than by the pure stasis of identity.
“ the ontological presuppositions of historiographical knowledge transcend in principle the idea of rigor of the most exact sciences. Mathematics is not more exact than historiographical, but only narrower with regard to the scope of the existential foundations relevant to it.”(Being and Time)
Such proofs are dependent on the axioms. And the axioms are not independent of the subjects.
Quoting Joshs
This is the position put forward by Hegel's dialectics. Being and its negation, not-being, are subsumed within becoming as the process known as becoming. It is a position which allows for violation of the law of non-contradiction by dialectical materialists, because this means that a thing both has and has not, the specified property, when it is becoming. But it is distinct from Aristotle's position which held being and becoming as distinctly incompatible, allowing becoming to violate the law of excluded middle, because the thing neither has nor has not the property, when it is becoming.
Suppose the law of identity intends to specify that that which appears, or stands out, or else is, cannot at that very juncture be anything else but itself. In so conceiving, there is no comparison involved in any instantiation of the law of identity—because there is no multiplicity involved in givens addressed. The tree I see (A) is the tree I see (A)—this without any multiplicity in the “tree that I see” that then facilitates comparison. Reflection, then, would only occur in thoughts intending to formulate this universal principle of thought—if not also ontology—into something communicable, such as “A=A”.
Also, becoming to me connotates teleology: This becomes that, such that “that into which this becomes” is the Aristotelian final cause of the becoming; the process of becoming moves toward its end. Within such perspective, “that into which this becomes” will not of itself be a becoming—such as can be claimed of that which is becoming—but will instead ontically be (here entailing being, which is self-identical at any given juncture) on account of its either relative or absolute finality. So—while I agree that being and becoming are not mutually exclusive—because the notion of “becoming” sans the notion of “that into which a given becomes” to me tends to ring hollow; and because I infer that “that into which a process becomes” is not itself a becoming on account of its finality (be it perceptual or ontic) but, instead, is something that is (being); I tend to believe that becoming sans being—at minimum, in the form of the finality toward which the becoming progresses—is not metaphysically feasible. Moreover, if the final cause (as being) is requisite for the becoming, then it will not be the case that becoming is prior to being.
p.s. I’m not intending to pester. Posting this on account of respecting many of your views. If I’m too far out in left field, no worries.
You see how that subjectivizes and relativises the idea of reason. Reason becomes a product of an evolved brain, with no inherent reality beyond adaptive utility.
My interest in the reality of universals goes back to an epiphany I had into the reality of number. I suddenly saw that the reasons that ancient philosophers esteemed number, was because unlike phenomenal objects, it did not arise and perish, and was not composed of parts. Yet it are the same for any intelligence capable of counting.
Quoting Greek Mathematical Thought and the Origin of Algebra
That realisation got me interested in mathematical platonism, from a recent essay on which we read:
[quote=What is Math?;https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/what-math-180975882/]“I believe that the only way to make sense of mathematics is to believe that there are objective mathematical facts, and that they are discovered by mathematicians,” says James Robert Brown, a philosopher of science recently retired from the University of Toronto. “Working mathematicians overwhelmingly are Platonists. They don't always call themselves Platonists, but if you ask them relevant questions, it’s always the Platonistic answer that they give you.”
Other scholars—especially those working in other branches of science—view Platonism with skepticism. Scientists tend to be empiricists; they imagine the universe to be made up of things we can touch and taste and so on; things we can learn about through observation and experiment. The idea of something existing “outside of space and time” makes empiricists nervous: It sounds embarrassingly like the way religious believers talk about God, and God was banished from respectable scientific discourse a long time ago.
Platonism, as mathematician Brian Davies has put it, “has more in common with mystical religions than it does with modern science.” The fear is that if mathematicians give Plato an inch, he’ll take a mile. If the truth of mathematical statements can be confirmed just by thinking about them, then why not ethical problems, or even religious questions? Why bother with empiricism at all?[/quote]
(I've tracked down the book by that philosopher. Difficult read but a good book.)
The underlying issue, as I see it, is that if intelligible objects are real in any sense, then this undermines philosophical materialism - that the only real things are the objects of the physical sciences. That is what ie behind the palpable fear expressed in that rhetorical question. There's a deep issue here which hardly anyone I know of seems aware of. I'm working through Gerson's three recent books on Platonism v. Naturalism
Quoting Jack Cummins
You won't find a more persistent critic of reductionism on this forum than me. See again the quote in this post about the barbarism of reductionism.
I encountered Griffith's book decades ago, I even corresponded with him once, but couldn't understand him, although I had a sneaking suspicion he might be a crank.
Quoting javra
As I understand it, which is not well, Aristotle's ideas were developed in response to the conundrums posed by Parmenides and Zeno, which attempted to show that change must be illusory.
Only if one is a Darwinian naturalist , which neither I, Wittgenstein, Husserl nor Heidegger are. Relevance and pragmatic use for us mean something quite different from the instrumentality of adaptive utility, which is defined relative to pre-existing objective structures. For Husserl, ‘relevance’ has a platonic foundation in the synthetic associative structure of temporal acts of consciousness. Unity, identity and number all arise out of syntheses of sense based on likenesses and similarities.
Quoting Wayfarer
I applaud your desire to locate a platonic ground of reason. That’s why I’m attracted to phenomenology. But instead of tracing the basis of reason to mathematical logic and then stopping there , they dig deeper. Husserl shows us how grasping the concept of number requires a constructive genesis.
In Philosophy of Arithmetic(1891), Husserl described a method for understanding the constitution of a multiplicity or plurality composed of independent parts, which he dubbed ‘collective combination'.
“Collective combination plays a highly significant role in our mental life as a whole. Every complex phenomenon which presupposes parts that are separately and specifically noticed, every higher mental and emotional activity, requires, in order to be able to arise at all, collective combinations of partial phenomena. There could never even be a representation of one of the more simple relations (e.g., identity, similarity, etc.) if a unitary interest and, simultaneously with it, an act of noticing did not pick out the terms of the relation and hold them together as unified. This 'psychical' relation is, thus, an indispensable psychological precondition of every relation and combination whatsoever.”(p.78)
In any such whole the parts are united in a specific manner. Fundamental to the genesis of almost all totalities is that its parts initially appear as a temporal succession.
“Succession in time constitutes an insuppressible psychological precondition for the formation of by far the most number concepts and concrete multiplicities - and practically all of the more complicated concepts in general.”(Phil of Arithmetic, p.29) “Almost all representations of multiplicities - and, in any case, all representations of numbers - are results of processes, are wholes originated gradually out of their elements. Insofar as this is so, each element bears in itself a different temporal determination.”(p.33) “Temporal succession forms the only common element in all cases of multiplicity, which therefore must constitute the foundation for the abstraction of that concept.”(p.30)
While the first step of constitution of a multiplicity is the awareness of the temporal succession of parts, each of which we are made aware of as elements “separately and specifically noticed” , the collective combination itself only emerges from a secondary act of consciousness. This higher order constituting sense changes what was originally a temporal succession into a simultaneity by ‘bringing' back ‘ the previous parts via reflecting on them in memory. Husserl says that a combination of objects is similar to the continuity of a tone. In both cases, a temporal succession is perceived through reflection as a simultaneity.
“For the apprehension of each one of the colligated contents there is required a distinct psychical act. Grasping them together then requires a new act, which obviously includes those distinct acts, and thus forms a psychical act of second order.”(p.77) “It is essential that the partial representations united in the representation of the multiplicity or number be present in our consciousness simultaneously [in an act of reflection].”(p.33)
This series of constructive acts forms the basis out of which the concept of number is constituted.
It is not the mathematical itself which is platonically original, but the intentional structure of associative synthesis.
As usual, what's "nonsense", MU, is taking issue with something I've not claimed or implied.
Can such a principle even be communicated from myself to myself without reflection? And if not, then before reflection do we have a principle or law, or just a contingent experience of momentary sense? In other words, think about the difference between experiencing an event right now and thinking of this event as a law or principle. These are two different kinds of experiences. Making the first into the second (specifying it as a principle or law) requires a secondary act of thought. If the law or principle isnt in the actual experience of an object, it has a different purpose or use.
Quoting javra
“That into which this becomes”. If the ‘this’ and the ‘that’
are conceived as separate beings, moments or states, then we have a split between beings and becoming. But for Husserl and Heidegger there is no such split. The ‘this’ and the ‘that’ are the subject and objective poles of a single occurrence of becoming, not two separate moments or states.
Quoting javra
The objective pole of the occurrence of becoming isnt a cause, because it is as much determined by the subjective pole as the subjective pole is defined by the objective pole.
For others money, there are other most reliable pathways. There simply is not one path which is the only enlightened one, as much as it says to be so. I realize I'm cursing in church, but that's simply how it is.
Quoting Philosophim
Just replace "science" by "God"... Science is a tool, a worldview. If the most valuable remains to be seen. Sometimes it is, sometimes not. If a tool is valuable depends on the part of the world you apply the tool to, which in the case of science are rather abstract parts, like theory adapted experiments or statistical calculations. The rational arguments it uses to convince others won't work if you haven't already accepted its rationality.
Quoting AgentTangarine
To what end? You can play a word substitution game with anything. Why not replace God with teddy bear?
Quoting AgentTangarine
I'm not talking about rationality, I am talking evidence and results. Even the fundamentalist relies on the fruits of science when they have a ruptured appendix. Sure, they can claim a speedy recovery on God - but medicine did the hard work.
What do you think? To show there is no difference between the God story and the science story of course!
"You can lead a person to God, but it doesn't mean they'll accept Him. Generally to persuade people, you have to use rationality in combination with addressing their emotional feelings. Many people will often times reject rational arguments in favor of their own personal feelings, but that doesn't mean God is currently one of the most valuable tools we have to accurately assess the world.
So I do agree that God alone will not persuade or motivate most people. It it wants to do so, it must make great efforts at creating the positive emotions in people that will make them open to accepting the rationality that God has to offer "
I have seen this reasoning in the past, and in the present...
And that's exactly where opinions differ. And evidence and results are part of the scientific rationality. If you don't accept these, it won't work.
I'm fascinated by teleology, especially as it applies to psyches, and have found little to no metaphysical investigation of its possibilities and mechanisms outside of what Aristotle had to say. That mentioned, I'm myself not an academic scholar of Aristotle, and I haven't read most of his works (skimmed through De Anima ((loved the way he addressed deities as "universal anima")) and some of his Physics - all else I know of his ideas is second hand). So, in short, I have no informed opinion on the topic you mention.
As to being and becoming, I sense that we're approaching the issue from maybe very different perspectives. The notions you mention are quite interesting. I have the hunch that this topic would require a lot of discussion, but then there are metaphysical pre-judgments involved, at least on my part. For instance, arguably, the Aristotelian notion of "the unmoved mover", the Neoplatonic notion of "the One", and the Buddhist notion of "Nirvana" would each be considered (maybe, pure) being, this within their own worldviews, rather than processes of becoming. This though all else could be seen as becoming. Not sure if this is worth exploring, but I am acknowledgedly prejudicial in my favoring of such, or similar enough, views.
Quoting Joshs
I acknowledge the answer to the first question is "no". The second question is tricky, in that it seems to me to be beyond the relevant point of "laws of thought". A law/principle of thought, if it ontically occurs, would be a universal principle - i.e., a universal - applicable not to "a (randomly salient) contingent experience of momentary sense" but to all possible thoughts pertaining to all beings that have ever been, are, and ever will be. It would be a natural law, in other words, one that minimally applies to awareness, if not to everything that is (the latter being easily conceivable in systems such as that of objective idealism). The main point being, if a principle/law of thought, then it is universally applicable to all cognition and - as with any other natural law or universal - occurs very much independently of anyone's awareness of it. Hence:
Quoting Joshs
Discovering laws of thought does require reflection (granting that they occur), but the law of thought - like any other law of nature of other type of universal - would be ubiquitously applicable ... in this case, even to the reflections by which they might be discovered. Its not that we construct these laws from our inferences but - again, if they do ontically occur - that they govern everything which we cognize, again, including the inferences via which they become discovered.
So yes, what you address are indeed two different kinds of experiences. But we don't make the first into the second and thereby instantiate a law of thought. Rather the law of thought would be applicable to all experiences without any exception, including the two kinds of experience which you address.
Back to the law of identity: if indeed a law of thought, its occurrence would be independent of anyone's awareness of its being (e.g., a dinosaur's thoughts would be just as governed by this law as would be any humans) and, hence, its occurrence would be in no way contingent on reflections or comparisons. Only our discovery of it's occurrence would be contingent in on reflective comparisons.
(Sorry, too tired right now to edit this into something shorter.)
There's no 'of course' here at all. This seems to me to be a kind of content free assertion and lacks meaning. In what sense no difference? Details please otherwise it's just an empty aphorism.
Quoting AgentTangarine
Are you arguing against belief in gods now, or did you leave out a word?
The rest of your reply I am unable to follow, sorry.
Forget the "of course"... If you don't see what that means then I can't help that. Already now you start analyzing. It's just an expression used. To make you see you don't understand what I mean.
The quote is from someone here. I changed the word "science" in "God". Did you understand it when science was still in the quote? Probably yes, as that's how you (and I) are taught to think.
Because you speak one language only.
WHat language is that AT?
Well, if I change the word God back in "science", you probably understand. So it's the language of science that you understand. While non-scientific language is hard to understand if your language is the scientific mind (which I have myself!). I'm not arguing against science, but at the prominent role it plays in modern society. Like God in the old days.
My problem is the unclear English used and not whether this is science versus god language.
One last try then. When you said this for instance:
Quoting AgentTangarine
You didn't provide any kind of argument and simply made an assertion. This is not much use. And no one talked about 'enlightened' paths. I just said 'most reliable'. So what you need to do in a rebuttal is demonstrate how your different pathways provide reliable knowledge about reality - evidence would be useful.
What I mean is that we don't need science to arrive at knowledge.
And again:
"So what you need to do in a rebuttal is demonstrate how your different pathways provide reliable knowledge about reality - evidence would be useful"
This is exactly the jargon of science. You want evidence that the non-scientific approach gives less reliable knowledge? Then science itself is the best example.
Another assertion without evidence - what does that mean? What kind of knowledge are you referring to? If you mean there is knowledge that can be arrived at without science then I agree.
Knowledge about the world, indeed. Why should the scientific approach be the most reliable? It offers an image of the world that's pretty distorted.
For example, the structure of millions of proteins was predicted on the base of their coding in DNA. AI was used to predict this. The structures differed from the real structure. You could also use other means to arrive at the right structure. Closer to the real stuff.
You put the burden of proof on me. You contend though that a scientific approach is more reliable. Why? Because it offers a view on how it really is? That's circular.
I don't see why you are so averse to the idea that reason is the product of an evolved brain. This idea is consistent with most classical religions, and it does not conflict with the understanding of the immateriality of the soul. Furthermore, it is absolutely necessary to adopt a principle like this to account for the deficiencies in human reason, in its capacity to fully understand the material world.
The model adopted by Christianity, as described by St Thomas, is strongly based in Aristotle's De Anima. The various powers of the soul, self-nutrition, self-movement, sensation, as well as intellection, are all explained by, and therefore seated in, the material body of the living being. As potencies, powers, these features of living beings are dependent on the material body of the beings for their specific reality; the concept of "matter" accounts for the reality of potential. The various different potentials (capacities) of the various living beings, must rely on the material body of the particular being. And this is also why each living being is truly unique in its material presence, and in its capacity to act.
In most religious traditions, there is an original union between the soul and a material body. This is often portrayed as a handicapping of the soul, a punishment for original sin, or something like that. We must remember though, that this is to place the soul in relation to other immaterial beings, divine beings like God and the angels. The proposed divine beings have a different temporal relation to matter, they are prior to matter, being the cause of material objects. The living beings on earth are dependent on their material bodies, for their powers, and only the soul itself, as the first principle of activity, the first form of the living body, bridges that medium, called "matter", into the immaterial realm of the divine.
This is why St. Thomas is very clear to stress the reality that the human intellect, while it is united to the material body, cannot obtain an understanding of the divine realm of immaterial existence. Due to the fact that the human intellect is dependent on its material body, it has that handicap in relation to supposed beings of the divine realm. To deny the reality of that physical constraint imposed upon us by the material conditions of our existence is a mistake and a misunderstanding of the reality of our existence.
But when we accept this reality, and we turn this handicap around, as Aristotle did, and see that the physical constraints which have been imposed upon us, are actually potencies, our powers, capacities, the tools by which we conduct ourselves through this world, and flourish within it, then we have a completely different perspective on our material being. No longer do we see being united to a material body as a punishment, we see it as a blessing, something done as necessary to enable us with the capacity to understand material existence. However, it is crucial that we understand the limitations of that capacity to understand, because that is exactly what constitutes understanding material existence.
The issue is understanding reason as 'the product of' or 'constituted by'. Certainly h. sapiens evolved and one of the abilities that evolved was abstract thought and the ability to reason. But the theory of evolution is a theory of the origin of species, not a philosophical theory of the nature of the mind, and what can be known through the faculty of reason is not necessarily explicable from the point of view of biology. When such a rationale is introduced, then it invariably turns into consideration of 'what is advantageous from the point of view of survival and reproduction'. Such considerations can't help but be reductionist.
Humans are uniquely able to transcend their biological roots. As you're well aware, in the Western philosophical tradition, the soul is associated with the faculty of reason, which is thought to be uniquely associated with humans as 'the rational animal'. But as modern culture has on the whole abandoned the traditional understanding, then humans are understood through solely biological and even mechanistic metaphors. It's a popular belief that life itself is kind of a fluke event, an 'accident of nature', and that the mind is 'the product of' this accident. Even though modern people pride themselves in being 'rational', this is actually an irrationalist attitude.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
An important caveat!
We can accept the observed facts of evolution without accepting the hypothetical postulate as to what constitutes "advantageous". I'm sure you can see that "advantageous" is a value judgement. The obvious problem with the currently accepted evolutionary theory is that it takes the desire for survival, which is proper to an individual, and assigns this to a species. But there is nothing to ground the idea that there is anything advantageous to the continued survival of any species. In fact, we see that in living beings there is a vast variety of differences. And, having a huge multiplicity of variety is probably far more advantageous to "life" as a whole, in its capacity for existence, than is the advantage provided by the continued existence of any specific species.
So the issue here is that if we take the desire for continued existence, survival, which is proper to the particular, the individual, and assign it to something more general, then we need to move to the most general, life itself, instead of stopping at any particular species. The reality of "a species" as a particular object isn't really justified. So the commonly accepted theory of evolution, which assigns advantage to one species or another, does not grasp the whole picture in its conception of advantage. We need to look toward what is advantageous to life as a whole. And when we do this we see that simple survival is not what life is about.
Quoting Wayfarer
I agree that looking at the existence of life as an accident is a huge mistake. But I also think that calling for a radical difference between human beings and other animals is also a big mistake. This is the mistake of Darwinism in general, described above, which assigns special status to what we call "a species", as if a species was a thing, thereby separating the human species from other species. If we dissolve these artificial divisions within the unity of living beings, we can understand that it is by means of "the soul", that we and all other living beings participate in the realm of the immaterial. Then the differences between us are attributable to our material bodies, and it is not the case that a human being, through the use of reason, has any more participatory capacity in the realm of the immaterial, then any other creature. What is the case is that we have developed a way toward understanding the immaterial realm. But this is a way of understanding which is firmly grounded in our material existence, so it does not actually admit us into the immaterial realm where the soul itself has its roots. In other words, we have found a way to use the material body to turn inward on itself, in an attempt to understand the immaterial source of its existence, but the material body still has no direct access to the immaterial itself, except through that source, the soul.
I think the instinct for survival is assumed by biology, and that it's a safe assumption. The very simplest life-forms display the survival instinct. I would assume that any organism that didn't have the will to survive would not, in fact, survive.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It's a factual observation. Radical means 'at the root', and h. sapiens are radically different to other species, even to their simian relatives. Not in biological terms, as our kinship with the biological order is obvious and manifold, but on the grounds of attributes.
Interestingly, this is where Alfred Russel Wallace parted company with Darwin in his essay Darwinism Applied to Man (much to Darwin's horror).
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
'Species' are real, the term has a perfectly intelligible definition in biology, 'a group of living organisms consisting of similar individuals capable of exchanging genes or interbreeding. The species is the principal natural taxonomic unit, ranking below a genus and denoted by a Latin binomial, e.g. Homo sapiens.'
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You often refer to the classical texts, Aristotle, Aquinas et al, but what you say here is in direct contradiction to what they believed. According to them, rationality is the capacity to grasp the truths of reason and is the immaterial aspect or faculty of the soul. Google the rational soul:
Well, this is where we disagree then. I do not see an "at the root" difference between human beings and other mammals. I think the fact that they are all mammals indicates that they are the same at the root.
Quoting Wayfarer
That it has a definition does not make it something real. That goes to the very heart of the weakness of mathematics and logic. Because it is an axiom, and is accepted by the community of mathematicians, or logicians, does not mean that it is true. And, the fact that untruths can be accepted as fundamental premises in any field of science, turns this weakness into a real problem.
The problem with the definition of "species" which you provide, is that it does not allow for the reality of the creatures "in between" species which constitute an essential part evolution. This is the incompatibility between being and becoming, demonstrated by Aristotle. If for example, there is a process whereby members of species A evolve, breed, and become species B, then we need to account for what type of species the "in between" are. We cannot posit a different species between A and B, to account for these individuals, for obvious reasons. And, as they begin to differ from A, these individuals are still capable of breeding with A, but for a number of possible reasons do not. By your provided definition, they would not constitute the separate species B, until they cannot breed with A. So this definition does not grasp the true reality of this "section" of A, which is becoming B, by classing it as a part of A, when it has already separated itself from A by not breeding with A, and therefore ought not be classed as part of A. This "section" is both species A and species B by your proposed definition.
Problems like this, which demonstrate that a vast number of individual living beings exist as "in between" beings, demonstrate that this way of classifying beings as "species", is inherently faulty. It is a convenient form of classification for many purposes, but for the purpose of understanding the reality of evolution, it fails miserably. And since we adhere to this archaic system of classification, despite the fact that we recognize the reality of evolution, indicates that we live in a society which has very little, if any real understanding of evolution.
Quoting Wayfarer
Actually, as I explained already, this is very consistent with Aquinas. He explains quite clearly how the human intellect is deficient because it is dependent on the material body. And, the ideas and forms which are grasped by the human intellect are distinct from the independent Forms which are proper to the Divinity. The ideas and forms of the human intellect are not properly independent and immaterial, as the divine Forms of God and the angels are. This is because the human ideas are dependent on the material body, so understanding these ideas and forms does not properly bring the human intellect into the realm of the immaterial Forms which have a relation to material existence which is an inversion of the relation that human ideas have to material existence. Material existence is dependent on these Forms, whereas the ideas of the human mind are dependent on material existence.
If it comes to a dictionary definition versus your own, I will choose the former.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Such as?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Where does he explain this?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Show me where Thomas Aquinas says that the human intellect produces its own ideas and forms.
//edit// because universals are just that - they are universal. They're not peculiar to the human intellect, or they wouldn't be universal, as a matter of definition.//
Most universals are created. Only after the fact they are called universals. It depends on the people if they are valued or not. Correct me if I'm wrong.
I have found Dennett's 2017 writing good in some ways, but it is here that he does come up with the idea that consciousness is an illusion. This does seem as if it is taking the neurological aspects of understanding consciousness to the extreme. It denies the reflective aspects, but it is with language and concepts that human beings have freedom of thought and choices.
I have come across another book, which I have started reading by Steven Pinker, 'Enlightenment Now: The Case For Reason, Science, Humanism and Progress (2018). This points to the importance of reason since the time of the enlightenment. In many ways, science offers reason and solutions to problems in the world. This is important, so it may be about science which is bound up with values and their examination rather than as knowledge which is flat and unquestioning of the social order and politics.
We've been through this already Wayfarer, and I've provided the reference. Also, I explained to you how I understood this issue in a way very similar to the way that you do, in my earlier days of studying philosophy. I studied both Plato and Aristotle quite a lot, before moving on to Neo-Platonists and Augustine. I was completely under the impression that "universals" were understood to have separate, independent existence, as modern day Platonism holds.
But then I began to study Aquinas, and found that he explicitly rejects this theory, and he refers to Aristotle for the principles of his rejection. I was taken aback, and had to reread a lot of Aristotle's material to find where I misunderstood. The point of revelation for me was what is referred to as the cosmological argument. This is where he lays down the difference between potential and actual in a temporal framework. What he shows, Metaphysics Bk.9, is that actuality must be prior to potentiality in an absolute way. This is because any potential needs something to actualize it (efficient cause), So if potentiality was prior to actuality, in an absolute way, that potential could not ever be actualized. Therefore, he concludes that anything eternal must be actual. (This is a fundamental difference between Christian theology which holds the eternal God to be actual, and Neo-Platonism of Plotinus, which holds the first principle, the One, to be an unlimited potency.)
Then Aristotle proceeds to demonstrate that if ideas exist prior to being "discovered" by human minds, it is the activity of the human mind, which discovers them, that actualizes these ideas. The ideas only have actual existence after being discovered, and prior to being discovered they exist only potentially. But according to the cosmological argument, these "potential" ideas cannot be eternal. So this effectively refutes Pythagorean idealism, and what Aristotle referred to as "some Platonists" who posited these ideas as eternal.
That revelation inspired me to revisit Plato, and there I saw the seed for the division between human Ideas, which are passive potential, as tools in the minds of human beings, and the divine Forms which are separate, and active in the causal creation of the world. The material world, I now see as a medium of separation between the human minds seeking to understand reality, and the divine Forms which are separate, independent, and active in the creation of the material world.
If you look at Aquinas' Summa Theologica you'll see a section called "Treatise On Man", Questions 75-102. It is a long section, but I recommend a thorough reading to understand Aquinas' portrayal of the relationship between the soul, the human body, and the intellect, and how the human body is a sort of medium between the soul and the intellect, even though it is proper to attribute the intellect as a property of the soul. Understanding this relationship is very important and significant in understanding the distinction between the active intellect and the passive intellect.
I will direct you expressly to Q.84, "How the Soul While United to the Body Understands Corporeal Things Beneath It". Art.4 "Whether the Intelligible Species are Derived by the Soul from Certain Separate Forms". You'll see a discussion questioning why (the sufficient reason) the soul is united to a body. If the human intellect derives its intelligible objects directly from separate Forms, there would be no reason for the soul to be united with a body. However, the soul is united to a body, and uses the senses to "receive" intelligible forms. At Art.6 I believe you'll find what you asked me for, a description of how "the active intellect...causes the phantasms received from the senses to be actually intelligible, by a process of abstraction."
However, I will add that there is still the matter of the "passive intellect". So this explanation does not account for the totality of intellectual knowledge, it accounts only for the material cause, as Aquinas says. The "passive intellect" is the controversial aspect of Aquinas' portrayal. Something passive is required to act as the receptor, when we say that the intellect receives forms. But if we see this "receiving" as a misrepresentation, and portray the intellect as creating the forms entirely, rather than receiving some aspect of the form through sensation, then the issue is resolved.
It is the supposed separation between the senses and the intellect, coming from antiquity, which causes this problem. Due to this separation, the intellect must receive something from the senses, which in turn receive something from the objects, and at each step of the way there must be a passive and an active aspect. If we dissolve the separation between senses and intellect, and allow that the two are one thing with two parts, then the senses become the passive part, and the intellect becomes the active part, thereby removing the need for the controversial "passive intellect".
This distinction between receiving and creating forms, is the same as the distinction between discovering and producing ideas. In order to account for the reality of the fallibility of the human intellect we must allow that the intellect creates the intelligible forms which it utilizes, rather than representing the intellect as receiving the forms which it uses.
I'm still reminded of that passage I've quoted before:
[quote=Sensible Form and Intelligible Form;https://thomasofaquino.blogspot.com/2013/12/sensible-form-and-intelligible-form.html] if the proper knowledge of the senses is of accidents, through forms that are individualized, the proper knowledge of intellect is of essences, through forms that are universalized. Intellectual knowledge is analogous to sense knowledge inasmuch as it demands the reception of the form of the thing which is known. But it differs from sense knowledge so far forth as it consists in the apprehension of things, not in their individuality, but in their universality.[/quote]
It is the nous, the 'rational soul of man' that corresponds with the incorporeal element, is it not? (Regardless, I will try and slog through more of the Summae.)
I'm tellin ya, he's a lumpen materialist, an ultra-darwinist. Give him a miss. Pinker is more interesting, more cosmopolitan, but he's still basically the cheer squad for scientific rationalism. It has to have its reps, and he's a pretty high-profile one, but he's philosophically shallow. (Liked this review.)
This is interesting to me even as a lazy physicalist who has never taken much interest in idealism. Other than scholarly interest, how does this model of reality play out in your daily life? What value is there in accepting this version of idealism?
How does Aristotle demonstrate that if ideas exist prior to being "discovered" by human minds, it is the activity of the human mind, which discovers and actualizes these ideas? Do you have any views about how this model reflects upon the nature of the human mind? It seems to be something more than a receiver, but more of a collaborator.
https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1084.htm
It's extremely recondite, although I can understand more of it now than I would have ten years ago, due to the reading I've been doing.
My approach is not as detailed as that laid out by Metaphysician Undiscovered. It's simply defending the assertion that 'there are real ideas'. This means that there are ideas that are not dependent on some particular mind entertaining them or that are casually dependent on individual minds. It doesn't mean that these ideas exist in a separate domain, other than in the sense understood by expressions such as 'the domain of real numbers'. In that usage, I'm inclined to say that 'domain' should not be understood to exist temporally or spatially as an actual place, but is nevertheless real - hence, transcendent, or 'real in all possible worlds'.
[quote=Thomas Nagel: Thoughts are Real;https://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/thomas-nagel-thoughts-are-real]Physics is the question of what matter is. Metaphysics is the question of what is real. People of a rational, scientific bent tend to think that the two are coextensive—that everything is physical. Many who think differently are inspired by religion to posit the existence of God and souls; Nagel affirms that he’s an atheist, but he also asserts that there’s an entirely different realm of non-physical stuff that exists—namely, mental stuff. The vast flow of perceptions, ideas, and emotions that arise in each human mind is something that, in his view, actually exists as something other than merely the electrical firings in the brain that gives rise to them—and exists as surely as a brain, a chair, an atom, or a gamma ray.[/quote]
But the point is, such ideas are not objectively real, they do not exist as objects of perception, or in the realm of time and space, but as the constituents of the understanding - hence the link to the question raised in the OP. Whereas I think there's an implicit view that ideas, being the product of the brain, are at root understandable in terms of the physical constituents of being - that they're the product of a physical process. It's bottom-up vs top-down. I'm arguing that modern thinking in general tends to be implicitly oriented to the realm of objectivity, without being critically aware of the implications of that.
I believe it is the soul itself which is the incorporeal element. And this is the same for all living things. This is the Aristotelian structure. Then it is the various powers, capacities, or potencies, of the soul which define the type of living being. Plants have the power of self-nourishment, other things have self-movement, and some have sensation, while human beings are rational. Each of these powers, being a potency, is in that way incorporeal. But the specific nature of any particular potency is determined by the material body which it depends on. So the rational power of the human being differs from the power of thought which other animals have, because the human being's material body differs.
Quoting Wayfarer
What comes from the work of Plato and Aristotle, and culminates in Aquinas, is the reality of a completely separate domain of Forms. This is the realm of the divinity, God. These separate, or independent Forms are responsible for, as cause of, the material universe, just like human ideas are the cause of artificial things.
It is very important to acknowledge the separation between the independent Forms, and human ideas, because this is recognition of the fallibility of human knowledge. You can think of it as the idea that the laws of physics are meant to represent something which has causal influence in the material world, but how well these laws actually represent the independent Forms, is questionable. So as much as we desire to be God-like, it is fundamental to theology, that having the power of God is not possible for any human beings.
This lesson is told by Aquinas with reference to the fallen angels. Lucifer, or Satan, desires not only to be like God, but to be equal to God, or to actually be God. This required that Lucifer relinquish the belief that God is higher. But to position oneself as equal to God is the greatest sin.
This is why we need to maintain the separation between the independent Forms of divinity, and the ideas of the human mind. The former being properly immaterial, the latter being dependent on material existence.
Quoting Tom Storm
It helps me to obtain mental peace.
Quoting Tom Storm
Aristotle explains this by describing what he calls "geometrical constructs". We must assign some causality to the act of the mind which "discovers" the geometrical figure. But the principle discovered must in some way exist prior to being discovered. So he assigns actualizing to the process of discovery, and potential to the existence which the principle has, prior to being discovered. He proposes this as a way to avoid the difficulties which arise from Plato's demonstration of the theory of recollection.
But I don't think that any of those sources presume the radical division between the human and the divine that you are suggesting. It is precisely because of the ability of reason to discern the Ideas that differentiates humans from animals.
It seems odd that, on the one hand, you deny the radical difference between humans and animals, which traditional philosophy ascribes to reason, and claims is a fundamental distinction, but on the other hand, you wish to ascribe a radical difference between the human and the divine, when according to Christianity man is created 'imago dei'.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This passage seems to address this exact point:
[hide] [/hide]
Here, it is said 'the blessed who see God know all things in the eternal types'. The blessed are able to see something which the run of the mill do not. So again the separation from the human and the divine is by no means absolute.
As for being 'God-like', what is the meaning of 'theosis'?
[hide]
Of course, this is nothing like 'playing God' or man trying to elevate himself through his own knowledge, which of course is anathema to Christianity.[/hide]
I think you misunderstand classical philosophy if you do not apprehend this as a radical division. It is the division represented by Kant as the distinction between phenomena and noumena. It starts with Plato, who produced a vague outline in the cave allegory. Notice the difference between the fire in the cave, and the sun itself. Suppose the fire represents what people think is "good", then the sun represents the true or divine "good". This division, or separation between what people think, and what is the true, or divine Idea, is paramount in the method of Platonic dialectics.
Aristotle expounded on this separation, and firmly refuted the Pythagorean cosmology which held that the universe was composed of mathematical objects. This is the problem which occurs if we do not uphold the radical division. The principles of mathematics which are being applied at any particular point in history, being observed as extremely successful in their application, are assumed to actually be the constituent parts of the universe. This negates the possibility of truth as correspondence, because the principles are supposed to be the very thing which correspondence theory would say that they must correspond with.
Quoting Wayfarer
It is this differentiation by species of animal, that I am arguing is wrong. It fails in it's ability to account for the reality of evolution by falling into the trap of the incompatibility between being and becoming, which Plato and Aristotle exposed. This incompatibility is exploited in sophistry to produce all sorts of absurd conclusions.
Here's another example of this incompatibility. In the science of the psyche, the concept of a "state of mind" is often employed. But the mind is always active, and such a concept is a generalization which is very useful in many ways, but it doesn't truthfully represent the reality of an active mind. This is the same problem we have in representing life forms as "species". It is a very useful for many purposes to represent life forms as static "species" which exist at any moment in time, but it doesn't truthfully represent the reality of actively evolving beings because it doesn't properly represent the temporal extension.
Quoting Wayfarer
The divisions I propose are well justified. The divine Forms are temporally prior to, as cause of, matter, and all material existence. Living beings on earth are temporally posterior to matter, and material existence. That is a radical difference. There is no such radical difference between the individual species of living beings, as genetics and evolution demonstrate to us.
Where we need to impose divisions is with respect to types of matter, or substance. We have divine Forms, which as I explained are prior to, as cause of, matter and substance. But there are levels of priority, some types of substance or matter, are temporally prior to others. So Aquinas for example, posits angels to account for the different levels of priority. Then we have the soul, which is prior to, and cause of all the organic matter, or substance on earth, but not prior to other types of matter.
So in as much as I divide the divine from the living soul, by placing matter as the medium between them, I allow for different types of matter, some temporally prior to others. This is the complexity of material existence. Immateriality can be defined as temporally prior to matter, but since there is a temporal order to the types of matter, the living soul might be immaterial in relation to one type of matter, as temporally prior to it, but still posterior to other types of matter, placing the soul at a lower degree of immateriality than the angels and God. An immaterial being is required as cause of each and every material existence.
Quoting Wayfarer
To "see God", and to know that God knows, in no way implies that the person who sees God knows what God knows. And this is where the division between types of intelligible objects lies. If there was no way of knowing that there is anything at all on the other side of the division, it would not be a division, just a boundary, and we'd all be atheist. But since there is a medium between the immateriality of the living soul, and the divine immateriality, and the medium we know as matter, we understand matter as a divisor rather than a boundary.
//ps// one more thing - how do you interpret this definition from an online dictionary:
Definition of rational soul: the soul that in the scholastic tradition has independent existence apart from the body and that is the characteristic animating principle of human life as distinguished from animal or vegetable life
— compare ANIMAL SOUL, VEGETABLE SOUL
It's not a definition of "soul" which I would accept. I really try to steer away from online dictionaries, especially for philosophical purposes they're often pop oriented. Even SEP I find is heavily slanted in a direction heading toward popularism, in relation to IEP for example, which itself is quite deficient.
I completely accept the Aristotelian tradition, in which "soul" is defined as the animating principle, the first form of a living body, as the actual cause of existence of that material body. This is similar to vitalism. So, as "soul", there is no difference between the soul of a plant and the soul of an animal, or even the soul of a human being. And the soul is the immaterial base, being prior to the material body. Any other attribute of a living being is posterior to the material body, therefore not properly Immaterial in the sense of being independent from matter.
It is evident that what differs between the living beings is their material bodies. And, the difference between these material bodies is what enables the distinct and particular activities of the immaterial soul; rational thinking being one of those activities.
The level of immaterial existence, from which the soul comes, is unknown to us because we barely even recognize the reality of immaterial existence, let alone have a real understanding of the different levels of immaterial existence. Suffice it to say, that I believe all earthbound living beings are of the same level of immaterial existence, being like one big family. But unless we accept the reality of immaterial existence, and bring this idea back into mainstream culture so that proper study of it is appropriately encouraged, and we can achieve adequate education in this field, any suggestion of different levels to immaterial existence by you, I, or anyone else, are just statements of opinion.
In De Anima 413a23 Aristotle says there is a nested hierarchy of soul functions or activities
1. Growth, nutrition, (reproduction)
2. Locomotion, perception
3. Intellect (= thought)
This gives us three corresponding degrees of soul:
1. Nutritive soul (plants)
2. Sensitive soul (all animals)
3. Rational soul (human beings)
These are nested in the sense that anything that has a higher degree of soul also has all of the lower degrees. All living things grow, nourish themselves, and reproduce. Animals not only do that, but move and perceive. Humans do all of the above and reason, as well.
Note this is an hierarchical ontology. Critical point.
Maybe it is true that the 'anima' is the same in many forms of life. What Aristotle introduced is a correspondence of perception. Plants respond to other forms of life, but they cannot change location. Animals respond in various ways according to how well they move in response to others. Humans can wonder why things change and put such matters as problems for the mind.
From that perspective, the idea is not so much about what is stuff or not but what is the overriding design that keeps showing up in stuff.
Look closely at what Aristotle is saying here. These are called "powers" of the soul. They are not distinct souls, or degrees of soul, but capacities of "the soul". You'll understand this better if you read what he says about "habits" (I'm sorry I can't remember the references). The word "habit" is very closely related to "to have", in the sense of a property or attribute. So the capacities of the soul manifest in a way like habits. So these "powers" are not different "degrees of soul" as if one power makes an individual more of a soul than another, they are properties of the soul, as in what the soul has, as a habit. Habits, including intellectual habits are discussed at length by Aquinas.
The key point is the levels of dependency of the powers, what you call being "nested". The lowest power, self-nutrition is first, so it is dependent on nothing but the soul itself. Therefore we can say that this power is separable from the others, and not dependent on any of the others. But as we move to the higher powers, sensation and local motion, we see that they are not separable from the lower power, but dependent on it. And the even higher power, intellection, is not separable from the lower ones, but is dependent on them.
So, when we look at the rational being, with the power of intellection, we must conclude, by these principles, that the rational soul is not a separate soul from the nutritive soul, the rational part being dependent on the nutritive part, therefore inseparable from it, while the nutritive part is not dependent on the rational part, and is separable from it. Notice that this dependency is within the parts, the attributes of the soul, not the soul itself.
You'll see that at 413b25 he says the power to think "seems to be a widely different kind of soul...", but he proceeds to describe how this is contrary to the evidence already stated. Therefore I think we need to conclude that the rational soul cannot be a distinct, or separate kind of soul.
I've looked closely enough to know that Aristotle differentiates humans from animals on the basis of rationality, that we're 'the rational animal', and it's a difference that makes a difference. But unfortunately for you, it doesn't fit in with your wholly idiosyncratic intepretation, so you have to try and obfuscate it. That's all I have to say on it.
You're not seeing the big picture Wayfarer. "Human being" is a classification of animal defined as "rational animal". Therefore all human beings are animals, and it is illogical to separate "human being" from "animal". That would contradict the definition. Have you read Aristotle's "Prior Analytics"? The defining idea is said to be "within" the idea defined. So "animal" is a defining idea of "man", therefore the idea of "animal" is within the idea of "man". Human beings cannot be separated from animals in the way that you propose, because "animal" inheres within "human being".
In a similar way, both "plant" and "animal" are described as living, aka things with a soul. Just like it is illogical to separate "rational animal" from "animal", because "animal" is inherent within "rational animal", it is also illogical to separate "the soul" of the rational animal from "the soul" of the plant. This would be like saying that it means something different for a rational animal to be living (have a soul) from what it means for a plant to be living (have a soul). That would make "soul" mean something different for every different type of living being, defeating any logical attempt to understand the reality of the immaterial (soul) with the consequent equivocation. If we follow this route, ultimately "soul" would mean something different for every particular, distinct living being, and the real immaterial existence which is represented as "soul" would be rendered as unintelligible, meaning something different in every particular instance where it appears.
Instead, we ought to allow as Aristotle describes, that "soul" means the same for all living beings, thereby making "soul" something intelligible. So it is defined as the first cause of actual being of a living body. Therefore to say that "the soul" of a rational animal is something different from "the soul" of a plant is to contradict this definition.
De Anima went into why the different kinds of life are different from each other. The potentials of what can be experienced are sharply contrasted against each other. From that point of view, the observation:
"soul" would mean something different for every particular, distinct living being" is exactly the point.
How the universal works is harder to observe than the singular quality of each life as a life.
I've read "On the Soul" a number of times. Book two starts with a definition of "soul".
"That is why the soul is the first grade of actuality of a natural body having life potentially in it. The body so described is a body which is organized." 412a28
There is nothing to indicate that "soul" means something different for every different living thing. In fact Aristotle is very clear to say that he is asking "what is soul?", in general. And his answer indicates that he will use It always to mean the very same thing, the first grade of actuality of a living body, no matter what type of living body it is.
The capacity to perceive other beings reaches the highest level when a being is actually what they are in one's presence. That is possible because of the activity of the intellect. Other forms of life share in some aspect of that activity but are revealed by their partial involvement in the dynamic.
Your description lacks any vision of what such a capacity would be good for.
The soul, according to Aristotle, is the animating principle of all living things (hence the name of the text 'De Anima'). The soul is the principle that enables a body to engage in the necessary activities of life. The more parts of the soul a being possesses, the more evolved and developed s/he is. The three types of soul are the nutritive, the sensible, and the rational.
The nutritive soul is the first and common to all living things. For it can be said that anything that takes in nutrition, grows from this nutrition, and eventually decays over time has a soul. Plants possess only the nutritive soul, which is one of two or three parts of the soul possessed by animals and humans. The nutritive soul is what urges any creature to protect itself whenever possible, but also to produce offspring.
The sensible soul is the part of the soul by which the environment is perceived. It encompasses the senses but also allows the creature to remember, experience pain and pleasure, and have appetites and desires. Most animals and all humans possess the sensible soul while plants do not. Of course, not all animals have the same abilities of perception. Those who solely possess sense organs for a single sense can potentially not be actualized by the sensible soul and are more like plants, possessing only the nutritive soul, for instance insects or molluscs.
Aristotle believed that animals and humans both possess the sensible soul. However, he raises the question whether animals have the capacity for belief. Belief would seem to imply conviction. Conviction would seem to imply that a creature was persuaded, because one can not be convinced of something without being persuaded in some way. Accordingly persuasion would seem to imply a rational function of measuring possibilities and drawing conclusions, a function that Aristotle believed animals did not possess.
The rational soul belongs to man alone. The rational soul is that by virtue of which we possess the capacity for rational thought. Aristotle divides rational thought into two. The first is the passive intellect, the part of our mind that collects information and stores it for later use. This is almost an extension of the sensible soul in that it allows us to act upon the information gathered by that part of the soul.
The active intellect is the part that allows us to engage in the actual process of reasoning. It allows us to take our sensory input, combine it with our memories and skills and apply it to an end. Aristotle also believed that the active intellect was responsible for our ability to consider abstract concepts that can't be perceived by the senses. Through active intellect, philosophy becomes possible, and it is this ability that distinguishes humans from animals.
Needless to say, it is nowadays believed that all of this philosophy is archaic and has been thoroughly displaced by modern neuro- and evolutionary science. Nevertheless, if you wish to discuss Aristotelian philosophy, it is essential to acknowledge that Aristotle believed that the 'rational soul' belonged only to the human.
I don't understand what you're saying here. Could you explain?
Quoting Wayfarer
These are not called "three types of soul" by Aristotle. This is clearly a misreading, and he is quite explicit. These are stated as "powers" of the soul, potencies, or capacities. Also, it is questioned whether the soul is one and indivisible, as is commonly said of the "soul", or in what sense can these be said to be "parts" of the soul.
He explains why they are described as "potentials" (powers) when he discusses sensation. Rather than something actual, as the soul is, he explains how the powers are not always in activity. A being is not always eating, one is not always sensing (we sleep), so these powers are potencies which need to be actualized. The soul is the principle of activity, the actuality which actualizes the distinct powers. So there is necessarily a logical separation between the soul itself, and its powers, the former being actual, the latter being potential.
Now, "potential" according to the principles of Aristotle's physics and metaphysics, is the defining principle of "matter". Therefore we can conclude that the "powers" of the soul are proper to the material body.
Aquinas tackles this issue extensively. He questions where does the "habit" reside. A habit being a property which a living being has, which is the propensity to act in a specific way. He concludes that habits, including intellectual habits like reasoning, must be seated in the material aspect of the being. The free-will is a completely different issue though, which complicates the subject. The actions of the free will cannot be classed as habits. Free will is a capacity to act independently, even from the conclusions of reason, which is an habitual action.
This was one of the biggest problems Plato, Augustine, and the early Christian theologists faced. How is it that we can act in a way which is contrary to what we know is good, right, and reasonable? That principle provides the strength by which Plato attacked the sophists who proposed "virtue is knowledge", and claimed to be able to teach virtue. Augustine developed the concept of "free will" as the solution to this problem.
Are you familiar with Lamarckian evolutionary theory? Jean-Baptiste Lamarck proposed an evolutionary theory prior to Darwin. His theory delved deeply into the relationship between habits and the material body of a living being. He proposed that a living being developed a habit, and that the material body of the being evolved in such a way as to support the habit. You can see how this is somewhat contrary to Aquinas who concluded that a habit is only supported by the appropriate material body. And western science scoffed at Lamarck when Darwin produced an evidence based theory.
The problem of course is that scientific evidence is material, and material arrangements (organization), are apprehended as the cause of specific activities. So unless we include final cause (intent, desire, and want) as an immaterial cause of action, we cannot ever conceive of how the propensity to act in a specific way could produce a material body suited toward that activity. This is the problem which Lamarckian evolution faces.
So if we position "free will" (being the capacity to act in any way, free from the influence of material or efficient cause), at the base of the powers of the soul, then we have the principle required for such an evolutionary theory. We can say that the soul itself is a first actuality, which has the capacity to act freely from causal influence. However, then we still must account for intent, desire, and want. So we need to place final cause (intention) as inherent within the soul. This places what we call "free will" as fundamental to all living things, at the base of life itself, allowing that things such as desire and want may be responsible for the souls activities, and such activities may cause the existence of a material body to support habituation, and Lamarckian evolution.
Aristotle is very clear in Bk2, Ch4, to state that the soul is the cause of the material body. Where you and I seem to disagree is whether it is a distinct type of soul which causes a distinct type of body. I think that this would render "the soul" as unintelligible, being particular to a material object, and this is exactly what Aristotle was trying to avoid.
Quoting Wayfarer
"The nutritive soul" is a misrepresentation. Look at Bk2, ch2, 413a, 31-34, for example: "The power of self-nutrition... This is the originative power...".
A "power" is a potential, a capacity, as Aristotle explains. The soul is an actuality. So "nutritive soul", "sensible soul", and "rational soul" are all misconceptions. The powers which are described as nutritive, sensible, and rational, are all potentials, so they cannot be said to be souls, as the soul is something actual.
Quoting Wayfarer
And this is incoherent. You are saying the sensible "soul" is a part of the soul. If it's a soul, how can it be a part of the soul. That's why Aristotle calls it a "power". It is an attribute, something which the soul has as a property. But all these parts, being powers, capacities, or potentials, are all housed in the material body, which consists of parts.
I highly recommend that you read Aristotle's work yourself, to avoid the sloppy terminology you present here. That is the problem with most modern, popular representations of classical philosophy. The modern attitude has already dismissed the classics as irrelevant, so they are presented in a careless way which demonstrates this dismissal. Aristotle was very logical, and he was very clear to represent self-nutrition, self-movement, sensation, and intellection, as powers of the soul, not as distinct souls.
No. Aristotle says the rational soul is a power unique to the human which enables her to speak and think. You can write another 10,000 words of circumlocution but it won't make any difference.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
OK - 'powers of the soul'. The rational power is unique to humans. That is the point at issue, which you've spilled thousands of words obfuscating.
In modern-day language, Lamarck would have said that the organism is in control over the genes, while Dawkins (a Darwinist) says it's the genes that are in control. The whole of modern biology is based on the view that organisms can't influence the genes and that the real battle between the species is the battle between the genes. This central dogma of biology is set up specifically to keep up this image. There isn't a shred of evidence though. It's just a dogma.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That's a nice image. I once read that the ancient Greek saw the human body as loosely connected parts, instead of the harmonious whole it seems to be nowadays. Seems a whole lot closer to reality. In fact, it looks that my hands have some kind of life of their own, typing and holding!
Sorry to be blunt Wayfarer, but I don't think you've read the material. If so you wouldn't be saying "the rational soul is a power", you'd be saying that the soul has a power which is rationality. There's a big difference between these two. At Bk4 Ch.3 he turns to the rational "part of the soul". "Turning now to the part of the soul with which the soul knows and thinks...". And what he means by "part of the soul" has already been explained in BK3, as a power of the soul.
We cannot describe "the soul" as rational because "the soul" is the fundamental actuality of all plants and animals, but only human beings have rationality. And we cannot say that the soul of the human being is rational because the soul of the human being, as "soul" is no different from the soul of a plant.
But for Aristotle a soul is necessarily united with a material body, just like the union of matter and form in material things. So when we say that a human being is rational, we do not say this of the human being's soul, that it is rational, we say that of the union of body and soul, the human being is rational.
In relation to the soul itself, rationality is a potential, and this allows that the human being may act rationally and may not act rationally. We say the human being is a rational animal, but since rationality is related to the soul as a power, or potential, this means that the specified animal has the potential to be rational, but is not necessarily rational all the time. So we cannot describe the soul (the first principle of actuality) of the human being as "rational", because it is not rational all the time, it only has the power to be rational. If we defined it as necessarily rational that would be a false premise leading to unsound logical conclusions.
There is no mention of "the rational soul". That would be a completely different concept from "the rational part of the soul", which is what he is talking about.
Quoting Wayfarer
That the rational power is unique to humans is not the point of disagreement. I said that when we first engaged, it is unique, but as explained by Aristotle it is dependent on the lower powers. What is at issue is the relationship between the soul (which is actual) and the power (which is potential).
Quoting Raymond
I think the view was that the soul is what causes the body to hold together as a harmonious whole.
It doesn't make any difference to the point whether the rationality is 'a power of the soul' or 'rationality is a power'.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Of course it is! That is the whole point! You said:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is in direct contradiction to the understanding of rationality that is in both Aristotle and Aquinas. Reason, rationality, the power of abstract thought, is unique to humans. It is through that power that humans grasp the essence or forms of things, though in a limited way (except, as noted, for 'the blessed' who see in a way that the rest of us don't.)
Of course the rational power is specific to human beings. It is that way by definition. We have no disagreement with this. What I said is that the rational power is not separable from the lower powers, because it is dependent on them. Therefore we cannot separate a "rational soul" from a "sensitive soul", nor can we separate a "sensitive soul" from a "vegetative soul", though we can make the inverse separations. The higher power is dependent on the lower. That is the point which Aristotle makes at your reference. This has nothing to do with how we define the rational power as being specific to human beings.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Quoting Wayfarer
You've already demonstrated to me that you are not very well-read in either Aristotle or Aquinas, so the fact that you think what I say directly contradicts them both doesn't hold much weight for me.
Consider, that reasoning and abstract thinking are the way that we apprehend the immaterial, but this does not mean that reasoning and abstract thinking are themselves immaterial. Actually, they are clearly dependent on the material, as Aristotle demonstrates, and so they cannot be truthfully said to be immaterial. For both, Aristotle and Aquinas, the immaterial aspect of a living being is the soul, and this is the same whether the living being is a plant or an animal.
That the human being can grasp the reality of an immaterial soul which is proper to all living beings, as necessarily prior in time to the material body of a living being, does not imply that the tool used to apprehend that reality, the rational intellect, is itself immaterial. This leads us into the need for a duality, the passive intellect, and the active intellect. As Aristotle explains at 432a, no one can learn or understand anything in the absence of sense, as the activity of the mind depends on images which provide sense content.
[quote=Aquinas]I answer that, It must necessarily be allowed that the principle of intellectual operation which we call the soul, is a principle both incorporeal and subsistent. For it is clear that by means of the intellect man can have knowledge of all corporeal things. Now whatever knows certain things cannot have any of them in its own nature; because that which is in it naturally would impede the knowledge of anything else. Thus we observe that a sick man's tongue being vitiated by a feverish and bitter humor, is insensible to anything sweet, and everything seems bitter to it. Therefore, if the intellectual principle contained the nature of a body it would be unable to know all bodies. Now every body has its own determinate nature. Therefore it is impossible for the intellectual principle to be a body. It is likewise impossible for it to understand by means of a bodily organ; since the determinate nature of that organ would impede knowledge of all bodies; as when a certain determinate color is not only in the pupil of the eye, but also in a glass vase, the liquid in the vase seems to be of that same color.
Therefore the intellectual principle which we call the mind or the intellect has an operation per se apart from the body. Now only that which subsists can have an operation "per se." For nothing can operate but what is actual: for which reason we do not say that heat imparts heat, but that what is hot gives heat. We must conclude, therefore, that the human soul, which is called the intellect or the mind, is something incorporeal and subsistent.[/quote]
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
So, would you claim that Aquinas does not accept the immortality of the soul? This would put him in rather a tricky position as a Doctor of the Church, would it not?
That's a very good passage, and the sick man's tongue being affected by a bitter humour, is very similar to the tinted glass analogy which I think you and I discussed at some other time.
The fact that Aquinas holds "the soul" to be separate and immaterial is not at all debatable. That's what I've been saying all along, and it's consistent with how I interpret both Aristotle and Aquinas. The soul is necessarily prior (in time) to the living body, therefore it is not dependent on matter, it is separable in theory, and is therefore an immaterial principle.
The issue at hand is in what way the intellect is related to the soul. The passage you have provided states "...the human soul which is called the intellect...", so it equates the "human soul" with "the intellect".
I don't know where that passage is from, but a thorough reading of the section of the Summa Theologica, which I referenced, will demonstrate to you that we cannot equate "the soul" with "the intellect", as is demonstrated by Aristotle and accepted by Aquinas. Now, "soul" here in your passage is qualified with "human", which is a descriptive term of a living being with a material body. Therefore if there was a type of "soul" like the one referred to as "human soul" it would be dependent on a material body, the human body, and this dependence would negate the principle by which we say that the soul is immaterial, i.e. that it is prior to, and therefore not dependent on a material body.
In other words, saying "the human soul", implies that the soul referred to is dependent on the human body. And, if it is dependent on the human body, then the "soul" defined in this way as "human soul" cannot be immaterial by the principles employed to demonstrate the immateriality of the soul.
That is the problem which Christian theologians have with the type of immortality promised by Jesus and his disciples. I believe it's Paul, who offers a lecture on 'personal' immortality following human resurrection. This idea of personal resurrection, and personal immortality, is basic to early Christianity. It is however fundamentally inconsistent with Aristotelian principles which assign the uniqueness of the individual person to material accidentals, therefore one's personality is attributed to one's material existence. So when we release the soul from its material confines, which provide for the material descriptive terms, "plant", "animal", "human", "Wayfarer", etc., to allow for the true immateriality of the soul, we also lose personal identity (under Aristotelian principles). The soul cannot be immaterial, and also personal.
So Aquinas had a fine line to walk here, between two completely incompatible doctrines, personal immortality, as a traditional tenet of the Church, and the immateriality of the soul according to Aristotelian principles (science?). Aristotelian immateriality is based in the concept of "prior to matter", and assigns particular, individual, and personal identity to an object's material presence, posteriority. This directly conflicts with the classic Christian teaching of personal resurrection. What is prior, the immaterial soul, cannot be postulated as posterior, to support personal resurrection.
If you look closely into Aquinas' metaphysics and theology, you'll see that ultimately he chooses the Aristotelian doctrine, as it is more scientific, and consistent with the evidence. Take a look at the first line from your quoted passage. "I answer that, It must necessarily be allowed that the principle of intellectual operation which we call the soul, is a principle both incorporeal and subsistent." This is consistent with Aristotle. The soul, as the source of activity, actuality, is the first principle of intellectual operation. This is the very same for all the powers of the soul. The soul is the first principle, as the source of activity, for self-nutrition, sensation, and self-movement, each and every power of a living being.
So we have no substantial difference between "the soul" as the principle of intellectual activity, and "the soul" as the principle of sensitive activity, and "the soul" as the principle of self-movement, and "the soul" as the principle of nutritive activity. This is very consistent with Aristotle, and vitalism in general, where the soul is the first principle of actuality of a living body. Where the difficulty for Aquinas, and the Scholastics in general, arises, is that this actuality, or first activity, which is responsible for, as cause of the activities of the living body, requires something passive, something receptive, to receive that immaterial activity which is proper to "the soul", and be 'actualized' into motion by the soul.
In the case of the power which is called intellection, this calls for "the passive intellect". And here begins the debate. We have two distinct approaches to the passive intellect, analogous to top-down, and bottom-up, each of which provides an understanding in an 'opposite way' to the other. The Aristotelian approach is most properly described as a bottom-up approach, because "the soul" is understood to be at the base, prior to the material body, and the material body is constructed by the soul in a bottom-up manner. The power of intellection is therefore something produced by the soul through the means of the material body. The top-down approach starts with intellection as a direct activity, derived directly from the soul. There is no medium of passivity between the soul and the intellect, and the intellect is an active part of the active immaterial soul.
You can see that the top-down approach has the intellect directly united to the soul, immediately active, with nothing passive between the soul and the intellect. Then the intellect itself is directly active, and the passive element is the forms, ideas, phantasms, etc., which are derived from the senses. The bottom- up approach has the biological, material body, as a medium between the soul and the intellect. The material body therefore serves as the passive element, which receives the activity of the soul. Under this view, the intellect itself is essentially passive, a potency or power, which is actualized by the soul. And you can see how there is a medium of separation (matter) between the activity of the soul, and the activity of the intellect. In this way the intellect can passively receive the actual forms, phantasms and images received through the senses, and also be receptive to the actuality of the soul. This makes the intellect itself the divisor between the two distinct types of actuality (substance dualism) described by Aristotle, the immaterial actuality of the soul, and the actuality of material objects.
A thorough analysis will reveal that the bottom-up way of understanding is more consistent with the evidence and the scientific understanding which we have. We can learn this lesson from Plato's description of vision in the Theaetetus. Here, sight is described as an activity, a motion which is emitted from the eye, and meets with the object, similar to a bat's sonic sensing. This is analogous to the top-down understanding of the intellect within which the intellect is directly united with the activity of the soul, acting on things. In reality though, we need to understand the intellect as a passive receiver, just like the eye is a passive receiver, and it is acted upon from both sides, the forms which it receives, and its primary actualization from the soul.
If you proceed onward in your study of Aquinas, toward understanding the appetites, you will see more clearly why it is necessary to posit this separation between the soul and the intellect, to account for the reality of the will. The will must be placed as higher than the intellect, in an absolute way, to account for the reality of the free will. That the rational human being can move and think in a way which is irrational, is very clear evidence of the medium between the soul and the intellect. And to postulate that the intellect always controls the will is simply an unreal representation.
I think the issue starts with how we define “soul”, “intellect”, and the way they relate to one another.
If we separate the intellect from the soul, for example, we run the risk of falling into a similar trap to when we say that the soul has "separate" parts.
Equally problematic are the hypotheses that the soul constructs the body, that the body is a medium between soul and intellect, etc.
We would need to explain how the soul “constructs” the body, etc.
The soul does have separate parts, that is well explained by Aristotle. That is why one soul has many different powers, what we might call different faculties. One soul cannot have distinct powers if it doesn't have distinct parts. So a living body is a composite of parts and I think it would be impossible for one soul to be the principle of actuality for many different material parts, if it did not have corresponding immaterial parts itself.
Quoting Apollodorus
This is exactly the problem which the science of biology has yet to resolve. Yes, "we need to explain" it, but we do not have the capacity, just like we do not have the capacity to explain how the universe was "constructed". Of course the biological problem ought to be easier to resolve than the cosmological problem, being nearer to us in space and time, but we can't even figure that one out yet.
Aristotle does explain, but I think what is essential is how we read "parts" (mere or moria).
For example, he says:
Basically, Aristotle holds that the soul is divisible into many souls, as can be seen, for example, from plants and certain living creatures that carry on living after being cut into segments, but that each soul is not divisible into soul-parts.
In other words, each soul would retain its three aspects described by Plato in the Republic, i.e., reasoning (logismos), emotive (thymos), and sensual (epthymetikon or eros).
The difficulty arises when we separate the intellect or intelligent spirit (nous) from the soul (psyche).
If, pure, unaffected intelligence (nous) is separable from the soul (psyche) on the death of the physical body, then there is no possibility of divine judgement.
Moreover, if experience or state is impersonal and identical in all cases after death, then Philosophy or spiritual practice during embodied life becomes redundant.
Clearly, this separation is possible, warranted and not a difficulty, because plants have a soul, but no intellect. Therefore intellect is not an essential part of the soul, and it is not necessary that the intellect be a part of the soul. So we must allow a separation between the intellect and the soul. This is explained by the hierarchy of powers. The intellectual power is dependent on the sensitive power, which is dependent on the nutritive power. The nutritive power is not dependent on anything but the soul itself. Therefore those other lower powers can be seen as a medium between the intellect and the soul.
We can see a similar description in Kant. Knowledge is dependent on the a priori intuitions of space and time. Those intuitions are a medium between the soul, as knower, and knowledge, as property of the mind. The soul knows through the medium of those intuitions, it does not have direct access to the thing known.
Quoting Apollodorus
The point being, that there is no such thing as "pure, unaffected intelligence" in human beings. Human beings do not make divine judgements. The evidence is clear, intelligence is "affected". So setting up a model in which human intelligence is not separable from the soul, for the purpose of supporting the concept of "pure, unaffected intelligence" in human beings, is a mistaken intention, therefore a mistaken representation.
To be quite honest, the idea of the higher depending on the lower sounds a bit strange to me. Either the soul has powers or it has not. If it has, then it has them by virtue of being a soul, i.e., a living intelligent being endowed with powers.
If the intellect depends on the soul, how does it survive becoming separated from the soul?
Aristotle’s division of the soul into “parts” seems to be theoretical because he also divides the rational part into two as he does with the irrational part.
So I think it is perfectly possible, in fact likely, for the “intellect” (nous) and “soul” (psyche) to be one indivisible entity.
The difference between souls may consist in one part or aspect of a soul being more dominant than the others. Among humans, for example, one in whom the nous is dominant would be “spiritual”, one in whom reason is dominant would be “intellectual”, one in whom emotions are dominant would be “emotional”, etc.
The fact that one aspect is dominant does not necessarily mean that the others are absent. They can be less active or dormant.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
In that case, humans can never attain higher states of consciousness either through Philosophy or by any other means.
Moreover, if the “intellect” continues to be affected even after being separated from the soul, what is the difference between an “intellect” with and an “intellect” without soul?
What is the purpose of Philosophy or spiritual practice?
How does the soul “construct the body”?
etc. ....
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
By "divine judgement" I meant that on Plato's account, as in Christianity, souls are judged after death - by some divine authority, not by other humans.
If the "intellect" is all that remains after death, this poses a problem for those systems that believe in after-death judgement.
This is not what I expected this thread to be about but I have some thoughts on this idea so I will verbalize them.
I have decided if there is life after death it will be the result of what we have done in our present incarnation and the accumulation of past incarnations. That is not a judgment of any being, but more directly the result of our earthly actions and thoughts. Either we learn math or we do not. We learn to manage our anger without being destructive or we do not. We become enlightened through the effort of doing so, or we do not. The essence of our being is what we make it and we are the one who decides what will follow, just as we decide which books to read.
I think I was a prostitute and a crimal who shared life with another woman and two men who were most certainly criminals. Stealing and killing was just a way of life. As the wolves also have their way of life.
My consciousness in this incarnation is different, so are my opportunities different. Like if there were a god in control and one who judges us, certainly if He gives us lives that bring out the best in us, instead of lives that will surely bring out the worst in us, we would do much better. What we experience is not just a matter of free will. It is also a matter of circumstances that we can not control. Granted I am may have never had that incarnation, but what seems like a memory of it very strongly influences all of my thinking and notions of justice.
Well, I for one can see nothing wrong with that.
If humans have a conscience, it seems probable that in the after life when they no longer are distracted by mundane matters, conscience will play a larger role.
In which case, those who have committed wrong actions will be "punished" by their own feelings of guilt, etc. and will thereby be prevented from being happy, which would be equivalent to "hell".
In contrast, those whose conscience is clear will be able to enjoy the soul's natural state of happiness, which would be equivalent to "heaven".
In other words, the "divine judgement" as described in some religious traditions may be metaphorical.
But even then, the suffering or happiness as a result of wrong or right actions, remains real ....
I don't see why this is difficult for you, it is simply a statement by Aristotle of what has been observed. We cannot think without some kind of images which are derived from sensation. And without nutrition we lose the capacity to sense. Therefore the intellectual power is dependent on the sensitive power which is dependent on the nutritive. It's very consistent with the evidence of evolutionary development, so unless you reject evolution I don't see why it sounds strange to you.
Quoting Apollodorus
The fact that people can obtain different levels of consciousness does not imply that a person can obtain "pure unaffected intelligence". It's like you are arguing that if a person cannot obtain the status of 'the biggest thing possible', people cannot differ in size. That there is a limit to the human intellect which makes it impossible for a human being to obtain pure unaffected intelligence, does not imply that there is not different levels of intelligence within human beings.
The point is that it is impossible for an intellect to exist without a soul, but not impossible for a soul to exist without an intellect. So the intellect is dependent on the soul but the soul is not dependent on the intellect. The mode of dependency is what is described above; intellectual capacity is dependent on sense capacity which is dependent on the nutritive capacity which is dependent on soul. Therefore there is a medium of separation between the intellect and the soul, i.e. the intellect is not directly dependent on the soul, it is dependent on what lies between it and the soul, and this in turn is dependent on the soul.
.
You are saying that "it is not necessary that the intellect be a part of the soul". But some souls apparently do have an intellect. In their case, the intellect is part of the soul. The intellect cannot be at once part of the soul and separate from the soul.
This means that the parts of the soul have no separate existence from each other . The "separation" is only hypothetical.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
It doesn't exclude the possibility, though. Who decides that "humans cannot obtain pure unaffected intelligence" and on what basis?
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This only means that the intellect is dependent on the soul. And the soul is a form of intelligence, as is the intellect. So it boils down to intelligence depending on intelligence, i.e., on itself.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The theory of evolution states that intelligence evolved from physical matter. Yet you are saying that "the soul constructs the physical body". How does the soul do that?
Sure, but if we go in this way, then as Aristotle shows, the separation of the soul from the body is only hypothetical.
However, the hypothetical separation is shown to be consistent with the evidence of temporal priority. The sensitive power is prior to the intellectual power, in time, therefore it exists independently of the intellectual power, at that time, so the hypothetical separation is scientifically proven by evidence. Likewise, the hypothetical separation between the nutritive and the sensitive power are proven by evidence.
There is no evidence though, to support the reverse separation. At no time does the intellectual power exist separately from the sensitive. And at no time does the sensitive power exist separately from the nutritive.
Therefore the hypothetical separation is very real, proven and true, when taken in one direction, but it is disproven in the other direction. The separation is evidently time dependent, and only the base powers exist separately from the higher powers, not vise versa.
Quoting Apollodorus
This is the exact point of the discussion I was having with Wayfarer. This is what Aquinas explains, through reference to Aristotle's principles. The fact that the human intellect is dependent on the material body (by the principles described above) renders the human intellect as deficient. Human beings will never obtain pure unaffected intelligence because their intellectual power is dependent on the material body.
Quoting Apollodorus
No one knows how the soul produces the living body. But the same principle which is derived from the hierarchy of powers, along with the principle of the cosmological argument, demonstrate that the soul is necessarily prior to the material body (being an organized body), as cause of it.
The powers are demonstrated by Aristotle, to be potentials, because they are not always active and potential is the feature of matter. Since there must be an actuality which gives actual existence to any potential which is actualized(the cosmological argument), there must be an actuality which is prior to the material living body, giving it existence as an actual organized body with powers. This actuality is the soul. So the cause of the material body having actual organized existence with powers, is the soul. Since it is prior to the material body as cause of it, (therefore separable by the principles above), it is immaterial.
[quote = Harr]
[T]he essences of human cognitive processes and structures are semantic networks, webs of meaning held together by ordered sequence of analogies. Metaphor and simile are the characteristic tropes of scientific thought, not formal validity of argument...
"Scientific rationality" may be no better, indeed it may be even worse as a general ideology for regulating the relations of people one to another and to the natural world than lay rationality.'
[/quote]
I find the centrality of metaphor highly plausible, so no issue there. But what exactly is 'lay rationality'? If not less disciplined serious rationality? Is science something like refined common sense
partnered with specialization?
To me anyway, statistics just makes sense. Controlled experiments, p-values, etc. Can someone show me a more convincing way to establish trust in an empirical thesis?
Let's also consider a group of specialists all trying to impress and compete with another. A consensus among them could still be wrong, but what's the better alternative?
Maybe I'm wrong, but I suspect that anti-scientific feeling is primarily generated by the threat that a scientific worldview poses toward traditional forms of spirituality. Darwin's idea of the blind watchmaker ( as Dawkins calls it) is particularly offensive. Recently I've been reading the strange and mostly forgotten Back to Methuselah by Shaw.
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/13084/13084-h/13084-h.htm#link2H_4_0003
As you might sniff out, Shaw is trying to get around Darwin, and his play presents the religion of 'Creative Evolution.' The problem is that the 'willful' creativity Shaw wants to read into nature seems to be as easily explained by Darwin's Blind Watchmaker. Given all this, I'm tempted to understand 'lay' rationality as traditional religious claims, horoscopes, conspiracy theories, etc. Why not 'lay' plumbing? Or the 'lay' version of any specialization that doesn't touch on sacred matters? Because, perhaps, it's easier to think more clearly on such matters.
The way I read Aristotle, he believes that the soul depends on the body, belongs to the body, and therefore it perishes with the death of the body (De Anima 414a20ff.)
If we are saying that the intellect depends on the soul, then there can be no intellect after the death of the body-soul compound.
On the other hand, Aristotle refers to the intellect as “divine” and as the “true self” of man.
He also implies that the intellect is immortal, when he says that man must put on immortality and live in conformity with the highest within him (Nic. Eth. 1177b30).
However, his position on the intellect is ultimately not entirely clear.
He is equally evasive on the divisibility of the soul. In discussing the soul as having a rational part and an irrational part, he says:
So it isn't just a matter of the intellect being "deficient". Aristotle himself does not seem the most reliable writer on this topic. If Aquinas accepts everything Aristotle says, he may find himself in conflict with his own Christian views.
I think it would be more consistent to see reality as a hierarchy of intelligences and both soul and body as created by a higher intelligence, as in Platonism and similar systems.
Darwin's so-called "explanation" is incomplete. It is explained here how the animals which survive are the ones which happen to have longer necks, but it does not explain why they happen to have longer necks. Therefore it does not account for the "cause" of giraffes having longer necks. Lamarck's theory on the other hand addresses the issue of "causation". He says that a being's inclination to repeatedly act in a specific way affects its material body in a way which may be passed on to its offspring. Here, we can see that Lamarck accounts for the cause of existence of "animals who happen to be an inch or so above the average". Darwin simply takes this condition for granted, and produces an evolutionary theory based on the evidence of this reality.
So there is no fundamental and significant incompatibility between Lamarck's theory, and Darwin's theory, until we get to the idea of "chance", "accidental", or "spontaneous variations". Lamarck attributed such variations to the desires of the individual beings (notice that "desire" also includes sexual orientation).
But I think we ought to consider that Darwin has posited the cause of variation as unknown, not as "chance", or "random". This idea of chance or random variation might be an interpretive fallacy. The problem with Lamarck's view, which Darwin exposed, is that variations appear to be as likely to have a negative affect as they are to have a positive effect.
[quote=Charles Darwin, The Origin of Species, Chapter XV: Recapitulation and Conclusion] Under domestication we see much variability, caused, or at least excited, by changed conditions of life; but often in so obscure a manner, that we are tempted to consider the variations as spontaneous.
...Variability is not actually caused by man; he only unintentionally exposes organic beings to new conditions of life, and then nature acts on the organisation and causes it to vary.
... As geology plainly proclaims that each land has undergone great physical changes, we might have expected to find that organic beings have varied under nature, in the same way as they have varied under domestication. And if there has been any variability under nature, it would be an unaccountable fact if natural selection had not come into play. It has often been asserted, but the assertion is incapable of proof, that the amount of variation under nature is a strictly limited quantity. Man, though acting on external characters alone and often capriciously, can produce within a short period a great result by adding up mere individual differences in his domestic productions; and every one admits that species present individual differences.
...Variability from the indirect and direct action of the conditions of life and from use and disuse: a Ratio of Increase so high as to lead to a Struggle for Life, and as a consequence to Natural Selection, entailing Divergence of Character and the Extinction of less-improved forms.[/quote] https://infidels.org/library/historical/charles-darwin-origin-of-species-chapter15/
The problem with this interpretation is that you are not accounting for the order of dependence of "the parts" which Aristotle clearly explains.
[quote=Aristotle On the Soul 413a,3-6]From this it indubitably follows that the soul is inseparable from its body, or at any rate certain parts of it are (if it has parts) --- for the actuality of some of them is nothing but the actualities of their bodily parts. Yet some may be separable because they are not the actualities of any body at all. [/quote]
The higher powers, sensitive and intellectual, are very clearly not separable from the material body, being dependent on it. But when we get down to the very basic powers, self-nutrition, and self-movement, these may be separable. And the soul itself is clearly separable, in the way I described. As cause of the material body it is prior to the material body, therefore it existed independently from the material body at that time.
[quote=415b, 7-12]The soul is the cause or source of the living body. The terms cause and source have many senses. But the soul is the cause of its body alike in all three senses which we explicitly recognize. It is (a) the source or origin of movement, it is (b) the end, it is (c) the essence of the whole living body. [/quote]
It appears to me like you are not respecting the temporal order, and priority explained by Aristotle. So you say, that a soul cannot exist after the death of a living body, therefore a soul has no existence independent from the body. However, Aristotle clearly explains how the soul has existence independent from the body prior in time to the body. Therefore we cannot conclude that "the soul depends on the body". The "parts" of the living being which are prior are not dependent on the parts which are posterior. The soul itself, is the first in temporal priority, and as the cause of the material body, its existence is temporally prior to the material body, so it is separate and immaterial. However, the parts which are posterior are dependent on the parts which are prior, so no posterior part can have independent existence.
Quoting Apollodorus
Correct, and this is why I disagreed with you in the other thread, when you discussed independent intelligence. I believe that independent immaterial existences, such as God and the angels in Aquinas, which account for the necessity of assuming immaterial and separate Forms, ought not be called "intellects" or "intelligences". These immaterial existences are prior to material existence whereas the human intellect is posterior to material existence. That is why there is a huge separation (the medium of matter) between human intelligible objects (concepts and ideas) and independent Forms. So I conclude that referring to these independent Forms as intelligences is very misleading because the immaterial Forms are temporally prior to matter while intelligible objects are posterior to, and dependent on matter.
Quoting Apollodorus
That's what I said already:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The point being that the Aristotelian view was more scientific, and consistent with the evidence. So Aquinas lead his church in that direction, with his metaphysics, saying just enough concerning personal resurrection and immortality, to appease those with the ancient religious views, and maintain good standing relative to the authorities of the Church. His work of thoroughly analyzing the metaphysical perspective of Aristotle did very much to lead western society out of the dark ages of ancient tenets, into the scientific era.
Quoting Apollodorus
The problem though is that this is not scientific, i.e. not consistent with the evidence. Which do you think is better for metaphysics, to try and twist around the meaning of words like "intelligence" and "soul", to produce consistency with advancements in science, or to change fundamental principles of metaphysics to maintain consistency with new collections of evidence?
Plato laid out, exposed and explained all sorts of ancient (ancient to him) metaphysical principles concerning soul and mind and their relations with matter and human intentions. Many of these were inconsistent with the science of the time. So there was a great project to determine the fallacies of the ancient metaphysics, as well as the fallacies of the contemporary science. When there is such incompatibility, it is not a matter of choosing one side or the other. So we need to take the evidence from the scientific side and the theories from the metaphysical side, which make a match.
The evidence shows that intelligence is a product of the living body, dependent on it, therefore posterior to the body, while the theory shows that the immaterial soul is prior to the living body. So we have that temporal separation between soul and intellect. It makes no sense to bring the posterior (intellect) around to the prior (soul), and start talking about prior immaterial existences as if they are intellects, just for the sake of appeasing some ancient ideas. This only creates an inability for proper education of the subject matter, and consequently confusion. Therefore we must establish new, distinct terms for the immaterial existences, Forms, which are prior to matter, rather than calling them intelligences.
Well, this is why I said from the beginning that it is necessary to properly define the terms used like "soul", "intellect", etc.
If we are saying that intelligence is a product of the body, then we will need to define "intellect" (nous) as something other than intelligence, not just the Forms. And the problem with that is that nous is used in the general sense of "intelligence" as much as in the sense of "intellect", "reason", or "mind".
But I think the main problem with Aristotle is the vague language he is using. Presumably, he largely agrees with Plato, as otherwise he would indicate disagreement. But the way he puts things tends to leave a lot of room for doubt.
Regarding the soul, Aristotle says that its powers are infinite in number, and that the division into “parts” is only for the sake of convenience.
Regarding the intellect, Aristotle says:
The answer seems to be that Aristotle posits a “material intellect” and an “active intellect”. The material intellect is the soul’s faculty of thinking. It is capable of being affected and perishable. In contrast, the active intellect is not a part or faculty of the soul but is independent of it. As such it is immaterial, eternal, imperishable, and self-existent, and it makes thinking possible. Aristotle also calls this intellect “divine” and “impassible” (De Anima 408b13, 430b5).
The exact relation of the immortal intellect to man is not entirely clear, though. Also unclear is whether it is individual or collective/universal.
In any case, the only intellect available after the death of the body-soul compound seems to be something that is impassible and unaffected, and has no faculties of thinking, feeling, memory, etc.
This would make the surviving element of man (if this is what Aristotle's "immortal intellect" is) quite incapable of being judged in the afterlife and of experiencing pleasure or pain as a result, as I said. So yes, this is definitely one thing that renders attempts to harmonize Aristotle with Platonism and Christianity problematic.
Another thing we need to bear in mind is that many of Aristotle's works are lost. If all of his writings were available to us, we would perhaps have a more complete account of his views.
I don't think his language is very vague. It just requires a very thorough reading of much material, to get a good grasp of how he is using the words. He was very careful in his attempt to maintain an interdisciplinary consistency through all the fields he discussed. This is a type of consistency which is quite lacking in modern science.
Quoting Apollodorus
The active intellect, for Aristotle, is not separable in the way you describe, from the passive intellect. The active and passive parts are united as one intellect, both being required for intellection. The two parts are described in Bk3, On the Soul, as being active, and being act on. The human intellect requires both, to be active in discernment and judgement, and also to be acted upon by sense images.
So there are two parts to the human intellect, and if we were to separate a lower power from a higher power, the lower part would be the passive, in its relation with the senses. By the principles already stated, a higher power (the active intellect) cannot be separated from a lower one (the passive intellect) which it depends on. So for instance, if the active is portrayed as top-down causation, and the passive is portrayed as being acted on from the bottom-up, the top-down activity is fundamentally dependent on the bottom-up, and cannot be separated from it. However, the bottom-up is separable because the soul is positioned at the bottom. It's counter-intuitive because we want to believe that the conscious mind has control over the material body, in the Platonic way, because that is the illusion we get from the perspective of the conscious mind. But in reality the material body has a fundamental grip on the mind. This is evident in certain chemical imbalances which affect one's capacity for rational thought.
So despite your voluminous posts about metaphysics, you're actually materialist?
The statement of Metaphysician Undercover's that I took issue with was this:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Whereas, as I see it, the whole point of the scholastic 'doctrine of the rational soul', was that it was the power of reason to see the forms that represents the incorporeal soul, the very capacity that differentiates humans from animals.
Of course it's true I've only read synopses, extracts, essays, etc, I haven't read Aristotle and Aquinas in totality. But I think as a synoptic view that what I'm saying is consistent with the texts.
I found a passage from a textbook on Aquinas which is relevant, it can be read here:
I'm interested in the view in ancient and medieval philosophy of reason as both a faculty of the mind, and an ordering principle of the cosmos.
Haha. How many times have I said, that the soul is immaterial, in this thread? I simply recognize the reality of a material separation between the soul and the intellect. It's what Aquinas taught, and fundamental to most reasonable philosophies of the mind. Otherwise we]d have no way to account for material existence prior to the human mind, and we get mired in panpsychism.
It's a mistake to separate "intellectual knowledge" from "sense knowledge" in this way. As Aristotle explained, intellectual knowledge requires images received from the senses. And the images received from the senses are already distinct and fundamentally different from the form of the thing itself (as per Kant). The "accidents" inhere within the material thing. So the separation is properly represented as existing between the senses and the objects sensed, while the intellect and the senses are united in the activity of producing knowledge, as described by Aristotle.
Quoting Wayfarer
This is an ancient idea which was outdated and archaic any time posterior to Plato. Plato laid the foundation for the proper separation between "the mind" as a feature of the human being, and "the ordering principle of the cosmos", as the reason why there is inherent order within all material existence. Understanding this separation is crucial to understanding the full extent, and incredible magnitude, of the fallibility of the human mind, and human knowledge in general, that is including the so-called objective sciences. This is why many follows of Plato appropriately turned to skepticism.
If it is an “illusion”, then Aristotle himself contributes to it in no small measure by making frequent references to the mind being controlled by the intellect which is the “divine” and “guiding” principle in man.
Unfortunately, the effect of chemical imbalance on the human brain does not seem to throw much light on the subject.
I think more important is the question of whether the intellect, soul, or any other part of man survives the death of the physical body.
There may well be two aspects of the intellect, one active and one passive. There is no reason why there shouldn’t be.
But the point is that according to Aristotle one aspect is perishable and another is not.
So we have one aspect of man, the “active intellect”, that is immortal and survives the death of the body-soul compound. Thus far Aristotle is in agreement with Plato. It is generally accepted that Plato posits a part of the soul, the intellect or nous that is immortal. There is some disagreement on whether the whole soul is immortal, as in the Phaedrus, or only the intellect, as in the Timaeus. But there is no dispute that at least the intellect in Plato is immortal.
So I think it is safe to say that Aristotle and Plato agree on the intellect being immortal. A question that would remain to be answered as I said before is whether the immortal intellect is personal or impersonal.
For Plato, immortality is clearly personal. The intellect that survives the death of the physical body has distinctive personal traits including memory, etc. In fact, there is some indication that this is what led later Platonists to introduce the concept of an “astral body” (ochema) that the soul uses as a vehicle during disembodied states and that serves as a link between the soul and the physical body during embodied states.
In contrast, Aristotle seems to favor an impersonal conception of immortality.
Therefore:
1. If Aristotle agrees with Plato that the intellect is immortal, as he seems to be doing, it is difficult to argue that the intellect is dependent on the body as this is clearly contradicted by the intellect’s ability to exist without the body.
2. If Aristotle thinks that the surviving intellect is impersonal, its only activity is the contemplation of eternal intelligible objects (such as Forms etc.).
On the Platonic model, which Aristotle seems to agree with, it may be said that man has five basic aspects:
1. Intuitive-Contemplative (Nous a.k.a. “Intellect”)
2. Reasoning or Thinking (Logismos)
3. Emotive (Thymos)
4. Desiderative (Epithymetykon or Eros)
5. Physical or Somatic (Soma)
The intuitive-contemplative aspect or nous is that which contemplates or “sees” eternal intelligibles (noeta) like itself, this being its defining function.
Aspects one and two can also be described as "active" and "passive" intellect, respectively.
In any case, the nous is the real self of man. It is associated with the four lower aspects in different states of embodiment or disembodiment.
So in one sentence you're basically dismissing Aquinas' hylomorphism.
Hylomorphism is a dualist philosophy, the duality not being Descartes matter and mind, but Aristotle's matter and form. (In another thread yesterday I posted an excellent bibliography of contemporary hylomorphism. I'm intending to try and access some of these texts this year so as to understand it better.)
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
But, the ability of the intellect to discern the forms is a separate faculty to the sensory. In the Aristotelian scheme, nous is the basic understanding or awareness that allows human beings to think rationally. For Aristotle, this was distinct from the processing of sensory perception, including the use of imagination and memory, which animals possess. Nous is what grasps the universals, which is what endows the human with rationality and what enables them to grasp philosophy. But this has also been already denied by you. In fact you're dismissing the tenets of hylomorphic dualism whenever you mention it.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Notice that is the opposite of what is stated in that textbook I quoted.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
:chin: I think I finally understand, but don't agree.
Quoting Apollodorus
I am sceptical of the use of the term 'survives' in this context, for the same reason that I'm sceptical of the use of the term 'exists' in respect of any purported higher intelligence. The kind of reality that the soul has, and the kind of reality that a higher intelligence might possess, are of a different order to what we understand as existence. Existence pertains to what is separated from its true being, to exist is to 'stand apart'. Within the finite realm issues of conflict between, for example, autonomy (Greek: 'autos' - self, 'nomos' - law) and heteronomy (Greek: 'heteros' - other, 'nomos' - law) abound (there are also conflicts between the formal/emotional and static/dynamic). Resolution of these conflicts lies in the causal realm (the Ground of Meaning/the Ground of Being) which humans are at once separated from but also dependent upon. Plato's anamnesis is of the 'recollection' of the 'fall' from that state of unity to the state of separate self-hood which constitutes being born.
Because of the way modernity is oriented, only 'what exists' in an objective sense is taken to be real (which is entailed by naturalism.) There is no equivalent in naturalism to the 'uncreated ground of being', because the primordial distinction between creator and created has been obliterated; modernity believes that 'nature creates', which would have been an absurd suggestion to Plato. Conversely, from the perspective of naturalism, it is absurd to suggest that there can be anything that 'survives death' as we are defined as natural beings. Many big questions and aporia here, I acknowledge, but I wanted to start spelling it out.
Darwin stopped at what he didn't know. I read his bio lately, and he was exceedingly careful when making claims. His Origin is a fraction of the book he wanted to write.
Lamark's explanation belongs a pre-Darwinian style of evolutionary theory that tended to be mixed with mysticism. For Shaw, something like God is creating itself through various biological forms, climbing from the lower to the higher animals where 'higher' means toward omniscience, omnipotence, and (perhaps) dematerialization.
[quote=Shaw]
Since the discovery of Evolution as the method of the Life Force the religion of metaphysical Vitalism has been gaining the definiteness and concreteness needed to make it assimilable by the educated critical man. But it has always been with us. The popular religions, disgraced by their Opportunist cardinals and bishops, have been kept in credit by canonized saints whose secret was their conception of themselves as the instruments and vehicles of divine power and aspiration: a conception which at moments becomes an actual experience of ecstatic possession by that power. And above and below all have been millions of humble and obscure persons, sometimes totally illiterate, sometimes unconscious of having any religion at all, sometimes believing in their simplicity that the gods and temples and priests of their district stood for their instinctive righteousness, who have kept sweet the tradition that good people follow a light that shines within and above and ahead of them, that bad people care only for themselves, and that the good are saved and blessed and the bad damned and miserable. Protestantism was a movement towards the pursuit of a light called an inner light because every man must see it with his own eyes and not take any priest's word for it or any Church's account of it. In short, there is no question of a new religion, but rather of redistilling the eternal spirit of religion and thus extricating it from the sludgy residue of temporalities and legends that are making belief impossible, though they are the stock-in-trade of all the Churches and all the Schools.
Correct. But the sense in which terms like "survives" and "exists" are used becomes clear from the context.
Intellect or Nous is self-reflexive intelligence or consciousness.
At the highest level, i.e., at the level of God (or Aristotle's Unmoved Mover), the activity of intellect is one in which subject and object or knower and known are identical. In other words, intellect “contemplates” or “thinks” itself.
As Aristotle says:
At the individual, human level, the intellect has two aspects:
1. A higher, non-discursive, intuitive-contemplative one which directly “contemplates” or “sees” eternal intelligible realities (noeta) that are like itself, divine entities, or God.
2. A lower, discursive, reasoning one that grasps reality indirectly, by means of thoughts, images, and memory (memory being a function of the lower intellect’s image-generating faculty).
Aspect 2 is the intellect as reasoning faculty as it normally operates as part of an embodied soul.
Aspect 1 operates to full capacity outside the embodied soul, but it is also active in the embodied state, e.g., by illumining or inspiring the lower aspect, during moments of intuition or insight, or when contemplating higher realities.
This is why Aristotle urges self-identification with the higher intellect as the only way to experience higher realities and enjoy the happiness associated with that experience.
Basically, despite “disagreements about Forms” there is substantial agreement on core teachings between Aristotle and Plato.
I agree that Aristotle is inconsistent on this point, as he sometimes is. This is probably why the Scholastics had so much disagreement concerning the active and passive intellect. However, I find that Aristotle is for the most part very consistent and logical. So I think the best way to understand him is to adhere to the principles and logic which he has laid down in an overarching structure, and when points arise which are inconsistent with the overall logical structure, to simply dismiss them as oversight on his part.
Quoting Apollodorus
So I would dismiss this point as inconsistent with his overall logical structure. Clearly, the higher powers of the soul are dependent on the lower, and the active intellect is described as a higher power than the passive intellect. So if he happened to mention at a couple places that the active intellect might exist separately from the body, I would simply dismiss these mentions as inconsistent, and therefore mistaken. Notice his use of "it seems" at your referenced paragraph: "The case of mind is different; it seems to be an independent substance implanted within the soul and to be incapable of being destroyed. If it could be destroyed at all it would be under the blunting influence of old age." 408b 18.
Quoting Wayfarer
Aristotelian "hylomorphism" refers to the duality of matter and form in a material object. Each particular material object consists of matter (the potential to be or not be what it is), and form (what the particular object actually is). In the existence of a material object, as present, the two are not separable. But the form of the object is necessarily prior to its material existence, just like the soul is prior to the material body. So I do not see why you think my statement denies hylomorphism.
By Aristotelean principles, when a human mind abstracts the form of a material object, it does not take the very same form which exists in the object. The form in the object has inherent accidents and the form in the mind does not grasp those accidents. This marks the separation between two senses of "form". First, the sense of what exists within the human mind, as formula and essence, and "form' in the sense of independent Forms, which are responsible, as cause, for 'what the particular, material, object is'. The latter being the form of the particular. Since the mind doesn't actually receive the forms of the material objects, we can conclude that the forms which the mind has are created by the mind. This leaves an open question of what exactly do the senses and mind receive from the material object, when these powers are "acted on". That's the passive part of the intellect, being acted on, and the active part is the creation of the forms, formulae and essences.
Quoting Wayfarer
Grasping universals, by the active intellect, is what Aristotle calls "actualizing" them. This is the process whereby the formulae and essences receive actual existence. Prior to this they only exist potentially. We might say that the intellect creates them, Aristotle calls them "constructions". This is very clear in Metaphysics Bk9. And, it is here, where Aristotle distances himself from the Pythagoreans and Platonists.
I really don't understand why you think I deny hylomorphism. It seems like you might not have a clear understanding of it.
Quoting Wayfarer
I'm not fond of philosophy textbooks. They are generally the lowest level of secondary source, very unreliable.
Quoting Wayfarer
Take your time. Continue with your studies. It took me probably twenty years of studying philosophy before this reality set in. The biggest piece for me was understanding Aristotle's so-called cosmological argument. This really put the actual/potential relation in perspective, revealing the need for two completely distinct types of actualities (forms). Consequently I'm a true dualist.
Thanks.
Agree, with the caveat that how we nowadays understand 'existence' is very different to how it is understood in those texts, which is animated by the sense of there being levels or a hierarchy of being. In the absense of that 'vertical dimension', nothing about those quotes makes any sense. Take a look at Eirugena's 'Five Modes of Being and Non-Being'. (Also noteworthy that Eirugena's theology is suspected as being too near to pantheism for the authorities - New Advent says 'the errors into which Eriugena fell both in theology and in philosophy were many and serious'.)
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Because of statements such as this. You quote this passage:
"if the proper knowledge of the senses is of accidents, through forms that are individualized, the proper knowledge of intellect is of essences, through forms that are universalized. Intellectual knowledge is analogous to sense knowledge inasmuch as it demands the reception of the form of the thing which is known. But it differs from sense knowledge so far forth as it consists in the apprehension of things, not in their individuality, but in their universality". This is from Thomistic Psychology: A Philosophical Analysis of the Nature of Man, by Robert E. Brennan S.J., which I take to be a reputable source.
But you repudiate that:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
So, you're saying that Brennan and therefore Aquinas are 'mistaken' in this analysis, are you not?
Previously, you also say:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
When the 'rational soul' is precisely said to be 'incorporeal' in nature, as I've already demonstrated with references, and which the quotations from @Apollodorus also support.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Your basic conflict is that you adopt the modern (for most here, the superior) point of view, that the mind is the product of evolution. There is no way in your view to understand how 'ideas' or anything of that nature could pre-exist evolutionary development. So ideas are 'a product of' that evolutionary process - which is where we started this debate. You can't see (quite logically, I suppose) how there could be ideas before there were any people around to have them.
This shows, basically, the sense in which evolutionary naturalism and Platonist idealism are basically incommensurable - as Lloyd Gerson says. You're trying to accomodate Platonism from a point of view which assumes that naturalism really has displaced Platonic idealism, and then re-interpreting it through that naturalistic perspective. That's how I interpret your interpretation.
Whereas I am trying to re-interpret the Platonic doctrine of ideas in such a way that it is not incommensurable with the facts of evolution (which I do not dispute).
It is not clear at all to me that the higher powers of the soul are dependent on the lower.
If the soul or any other part of man preexists the body then it can equally well postexist it.
Aristotle’s frequent use of phrases like “it seems” is one of the reasons why I said that I find some of his statements “vague” or “evasive”. If they are “inconsistent” that makes it even worse, not better.
In this particular case, I can see no reason why he would have suddenly decided to “contradict” himself. If the statement was obscure it would be a different matter. But it is quite clear.
So I think it would be better to ignore the “it seems” bit and take the rest of the sentence as it stands.
Yes I repudiate it. It's a nonsensical passage. It starts with ""if the proper knowledge of the senses is...". Knowledge is not proper to the senses. The senses have no knowledge so there is no knowledge proper to the senses. This is described in Bk3 On the Soul, where he discusses whether there is a sixth sense. Knowledge is proper to the thinking part of the being, not the sense-organs. The phrase "sense knowledge" is used numerous times in the passage, and it really has no intelligible meaning. That's what I mean about textbook type quotes. They tend to be of the lowest level of reliability.
Quoting Wayfarer
No, I am just saying Brennan is mistaken. The passage shows a complete lack of understanding.
Anyway, I don't see how that passage relates to hylomorphism.
Quoting Wayfarer
Right, human ideas are a product of human minds, which are a product of evolution. But this is a very small part of reality remember. We still have the soul, which is prior to evolution, and prior to the material body as cause of it, therefore immaterial, to try to understand. And, we still have what some refer to as Divine Ideas, or separate Forms, or God and the angels, which are the cause of all material existence in general, therefore prior to it, and just like the soul, immaterial, to try to understand. So life on earth, evolution, human minds, and the ideas which they have, is just a small part of reality .
So, all I request is that you respect this separation, between the ideas produced by human minds which are posterior to, and dependent on the material body of the human being (therefore imperfect), and the truly immaterial things, (separate Forms, God and the angels), which are prior to material existence, as cause of it. Is this too much to ask for? Can you apprehend the truth of this principle, that if there was some sort of Divine Ideas, which were here before there were any people to have them, they were most likely radically different from the ideas which people have? The ideas that people have are a feature of the human condition, just like the ideas that other animals have are a feature of their conditions.
Plato demonstrated this to us. Think of The Republic where he asked for the definition of "just". The different human beings asked, each have a different idea of what "just" means, but it is implied that there ought to be a divine idea, the true idea of "just". But no human being knows it. You are quite fond of numbers, and you probably think there is a difference between ideas like "just" and ideas like "2". But how many different types of numbering systems do you know of? Natural, rational, real, imaginary, complex, how many more are there? If there are so many different ways to conceptualize numbers, what is the true, divine way?
So Aristotle and Aquinas just built upon this basic fact which Plato exposed. We approach ideas as if they are some sort of immaterial entities. But when we examine them very closely we see that they fail in bringing to us the true immaterial existence which we seek. However, they do demonstrate to us, through the use of logical reasoning (cosmological argument for example) the reality of the true immaterial existence. The problem is that being only human, we haven't determined a way to get our minds into that true immaterial existence.
Quoting Apollodorus
This is what Wayfarer and I discussed to some length in this thread already. It's fundamental to Aristotle's treatise On the Soul. The power of sensation is dependent on the power of self-nutrition, and the power of intellection is dependent on the power of sensation.
Quoting Apollodorus
I do not deny that, I haven't discussed the soul after the body, at all.
Quoting Apollodorus
The problem is that taking the sentence as it stands is what is inconsistent with the conceptual structure he has laid out in the book. That's why It's better to recognize the "it seems", and notice that this might be an idea which is actually being refuted.
I said he was S J, Jesuit, but actually he was a Dominican. But again, I favour his interpretation, I think it's accurate, and is from a standard textbook used at Catholic universities.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I can't agree with it, because I think it's mistaken. Ideas such as mathematical ideas and scientific principles are not the possession of the human mind, but are discoverable by any rational intellect.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You're speaking from your own perspective, not that of others. I've previously referred to the passage on Augustine on Intelligible Objects. Note this comment:
That’s pretty well what happened in my case when I realised the truth of mathematical Platonism.
Well, you are saying that you "do not deny it" but you are also saying that it is an "idea which is actually being refuted". So what exactly is being "refuted" and how?
It is generally accepted in the literature that Aristotle believes in some form of immortality. He seems to reject the immortality of the whole soul but accepts the immortality of that part of the soul referred to as "intellect" or nous.
Gerson says:
- L. Gerson, Aristotle and Other Platonists, pp. 54, 286
We must bear in mind that the immortality of the nous was central to Plato’s teachings and that Aristotle was Plato’s long-time pupil. If Aristotle had disagreed with Plato on such an important point, he would have made this clear in no uncertain terms. But nowhere does he do so.
On the contrary, at De Anima 408b18-29 he clearly says that the intellect “seems not to be destructible” and he gives a reason for it:
What he is saying here is that in the same way old age is experienced by the body and not by the soul, the destruction at death is of the body-mind person, not of the intellect which remains unaffected.
And because the mind that remembered and loved is destroyed with the body-mind person, the sole remaining element in man, the intellect, “does not remember or love”, memory and affection belonging to the mind that has been destroyed.
Aristotle asserts the immortality of intellect again later on:
He does not say "it seems" here. Clearly, the active intellect is an uninterrupted contemplative activity that is immortal and eternal and that endows the passive or thinking intellect (a.k.a. reasoning faculty or logos) with the power to think when in the embodied state. In contrast, when separated from the body, it reverts to its essential, contemplative state.
These are not some obscure and random remarks that we can lightly dismiss. On the contrary, the more we look into it, the more we see that they are consistent with Aristotle’s overall framework.
In any case, since the intellect according to Aristotle is capable of existence in separation from the body, I don't think it can be argued that it is dependent on the body in an Aristotelian context.
Would you argue that I am not human and I do not have a rational intellect? I could not proceed beyond basic arithmetic and geometry in high school math. I tried algebra and trigonometry because other members in my family were very competent in mathematics. However, my mind seems to understand by using a type of imaging system which left me incapable of understanding these abstractions. The abstract correlations were beyond my capacity to imagine, and I could not understand. Rather than taking for granted the principles which the teachers fed me, memorizing them, and moving along with the rest of the class, I tried my best to understand the principles. I could not rapidly make sense of them, I got left behind, and I dropped out of abstract math.
This is the problem with your stated principle. It's just a matter of defining terms in a way which is simply begging the question, and completely ignoring the actual evidence. The evidence is that all sorts of different animals think, and therefore have some type of mind, But these animals do not seem to apprehend mathematical ideas, therefore you would say that they do not have a rational mind. However, the classification "mathematical ideas" encompasses a huge expanse of conceptual structures, and the majority of human beings are not capable of "discovering" the majority of them.
So your stated principle "mathematical principles... are discoverable by any rational intellect", requires that we draw an arbitrary boundary (drawn only for the purpose of supporting your principle) between simple math and complicated math, the latter being unintelligible and undiscoverable to many human beings, who appear to be otherwise rational. But then we need to draw another arbitrary boundary at the other end, to ensure that other animals which seem to comprehend the difference between two objects and three objects are excluded from the category of "rational". In other words, we need to completely distort the concept of "rational intellect", as well as completely distort the concept of "mathematical ideas", in a way designed to support your principle, which ends up being nothing other than contriving definitions for the purpose of begging the question.
Quoting Wayfarer
I do not deny that we can "see" the reality of the incorporeal, or immaterial. What I deny is that we can grasp the essence of it, "the whatness", of the immaterial. Do you see the way it's described in this passage? "By focusing on... eternity and immutability" "Augustine came to see that certain things... cannot be corporeal." Eternal and immutable refer to things outside of time; time and change being categorized together, as the corporeal.
The reality of what is outside of time and change, outside of material existence, is what Aristotle's cosmological argument brings our attention to. It shows by logical necessity, that we must conclude an "actual" reality which is outside of material reality, as prior to it. The reason why I say that we are incapable of understanding the essence or "whatness" of the immaterial, is because it appears to us as incomprehensible or unintelligible by way of contradiction. We can "see" it as a logical necessity, but we cannot understand it. The priority described by Aristotle is a temporal priority defined by causation; it is necessary to conclude the immaterial as the cause of the material. The logical demonstration shows an "actuality", as a cause, which is temporally prior to the material realm of time and change. So this appears incoherent to us, because we are now talking about an actuality, as cause (a temporal term) which is temporally prior to time itself. There lies contradiction.
But when we accept the deficiency of human conception, we see that what this really reveals is the deficiency in the human conception of time. We fix time to material change. Material change is what defines and measures the passing of time for us. When the logic of the cosmological argument shows us an 'actual' cause which is outside of time (by this conception of time), we have no capacity to understand this logically necessary 'activity'. It is impossible for us to say "what" it is, because it is already contradictory to talk about an activity with no time. The only way which I see to rectify this problem is to rebuild the conception of time, such that the passing of time is represented as occurring outside the realm of material existence, rather than as dependent on it. Then we bring that realm of activity, which is outside the realm of material existence, the actual immaterial, into the realm of intelligibility by resolving that contradiction.
I find it ironic that we have essentially reversed our positions from the last time we approached this issue. Then, I argued that God is fundamentally intelligible, and you said that human beings cannot understand God. Now you are arguing that the immaterial is intelligible to us, and I am arguing that we haven't the capacity to understand it.
Quoting Apollodorus
The idea that the active intellect (or mind) is completely immaterial, and directly united with the soul, is what is actually refuted by Aristotle's principles. The active intellect is a higher power of the soul, and the higher powers are dependent on the lower powers, therefore, the lower powers and the material being, are a medium between the active intellect and the soul, and the contrary idea, that the active intellect is completely immaterial and directly united to the soul, is refuted.
Aquinas actually demonstrates this very well with reference to free will, and the power of self-movement. The active intellect with its power of discernment using immaterial principles cannot ultimately control the will. We often do what we know is wrong. That was an issue for Socrates and Plato, who used this argument to defeat the sophists who claimed virtue is knowledge and therefore could be taught. It was also a significant point of interest for Augustine, the soul's capacity to act contrary the intellect, to do wrong when it was known to be wrong. What is shown is that the soul's power of self-movement, which is a most base power, comes between the soul and the active intellect.
Quoting Apollodorus
That disagreement is made clear in Metaphysics Bk9, what is called the cosmological argument.
Quoting Apollodorus
As I said already, these statements of immortality of the intellect are inconsistent with the logic of Aristotle's overall conceptual structure, and ought to be dismissed as oversight, or mistake.
Quoting Apollodorus
The problem is that we can use Aristotle's own conceptual structure to refute this idea, as Aquinas demonstrated. So the validity of that idea is highly doubtful. And since we cannot perform the reverse, to take this disputed statement and overthrow Aristotle's conceptual structure, because the conceptual structure is well supported by evidence, we ought to dismiss this disputed idea as inconsistent with reality.
Quoting Apollodorus
So far, all that I've seen in this thread, to support the notion that this idea is consistent with Aristotle's overall framework is some quotes by Wayfarer, of secondary sources, bearing extremely poor representations of Aristotle's "overall framework", like Brennan's discussion of "the proper knowledge of the senses".
Quoting Apollodorus
Have you not read "On the Soul"? It's made very clear in the first half of BK2 that the higher powers of the soul are dependent on the lower, despite the fact that he says "...the mind that knows with an immediate intuition presents a different problem." Read it, because I will not explain it again.
The relevant question is not whether it can be argued that the intellect is dependent on the lower powers. The hierarchy of powers is well described, so the argument is inevitable. The relevant question is whether a mind can know with "an immediate intuition". This is what supports the opposing idea which you hold.
Your account reflects the distinctions Aristotle is making. But the phrasing of this remark should be reconsidered:"
In contrast, when separated from the body, it reverts to its essential, contemplative state."
The intellect as the actuality bringing the potential into being is unchanged during generation and corruption as described in Metaphysics Book Lambda, chapters 6 and 7.
Your account of what Aristotle says the intellect depends upon confuses this question. Yes, a living creature who has the capacity to know is only possible because they also have other capacities needed by other living creatures. Yes, the more advanced forms of life depend upon the structure of the more basic forms. But this is not to say that what is possible for the more advanced form is framed only by the possibilities available to the less advanced. Otherwise, there would be no point in distinguishing between them.
There is a relationship between the types of soul that conditions what is possible and Aristotle describes this in a manner that addresses your question regarding 'immediate intuition'. From Posterior Analytics:
The active intellect's immateriality, immortality, and independence in relation to the body-soul is not refuted at all, it is affirmed as the passages I quoted clearly show, and as acknowledged by scholars like Gerson.
You said that “there is no such thing as "pure, unaffected intelligence" in human beings.”
Yet Aristotle says that the intellect is “pure (unmixed) and unaffected”.
You said “it is impossible for an intellect to exist without a soul”.
Yet Aristotle says that the intellect is separable from body and soul, and immortal.
You said that “the higher intellect depends on the lower intellect”.
Yet Aristotle says that it is the lower (thinking or reasoning) intellect that depends on the higher intellect (that only “thinks” or “contemplates” itself).
You said that you "do not deny the postexistence of intellect".
Yet you say that Aristotle refutes it.
Etc., etc.
Aristotle clearly says that the intellect is truly itself only when separated from the body and that man must “put on immortality” by self-identifying with the immortal intellect, for the obvious reason that there is no other way of becoming immortal and supremely happy.
The very definition of intellect according to Aristotle is “that which thinks itself” as stated at Meta. 12.1074b and as quoted earlier.
So there can be no question of the intellect “depending” on anything other than itself.
This is precisely why Aristotle refers to the first principle of all as an intellect.
You said yourself that you are dismissing Aristotle's own statements:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
And it looks like you are also dismissing the views of respected scholars.
So the question seems to be whether you are dismissing a point as inconsistent with Aristotle’s overall logical structure or as inconsistent with your interpretation of it ....
"Reverts" in the sense of no longer being a "higher", non-discursive and a "lower", discursive intellect, but just intellect itself as it really is when separated from the body-soul composite.
No, only that I disagree with your understanding of hylomorphic dualism and Platonic realism. I was looking through a scrapbook from the old forum, 2011, we were having the exact same argument then, so there's no point thrashing over it again and again.
I was beginning to suspect something on those lines, but I think that clarifies everything .... :smile:
Yes, I completely agree with this. And if you think that what I said confuses the issue, I apologize for that, it was not my intention.
Quoting Paine
Thanks for the reference Paine. He also addresses the issue of intuitive knowledge in Nichomachean Ethics. He places it at the highest level, then questions whether it is innate or acquired. There appears to be intuition which is proper to theoretical knowledge, and also intuition in practical knowledge. His conclusion here is consistent with what you've quoted. He seems to say it is a combination of both innate and learned.
I must admit that I do not agree with how Aristotle has characterized this type of knowledge. Notice that he says this is how "man knows the primary immediate premises". And he assigns to this the highest form of knowledge. So he will later claim that the logical process leads us from the more certain, to the less certain. But I think that he has this backward. The primary immediate premises, grasped by intuition only, are not proven, and cannot adequately be proven. So this inability to know with certainty, the truth or falsity of primary premises, is what really brings uncertainty into our knowledge. It is not the source of certainty. The logical process provides us with a very high degree of certainty, and we can know without a doubt, the validity of the conclusion. So uncertainty in the conclusion is primarily the result of uncertainty in the premises.
Therefore I believe that Aristotle has this all backward. Direct intuition does not give us the highest level of knowledge, with the highest degree of certainty, it gives us the base for our knowledge, the lowest level, and the base has the lowest level of certainty. To understand this, all you need to do is look at the hypotheses of modern science. These are derived from intuition. However, they are unproven, therefore the hypotheses, as hypotheses, have a very low degree of certainty. Then we take the hypotheses and find practical ways to test them. If an hypothesis proves useful we keep using it, because nothing has falsified it, and it has passed the test of usefulness. As we use it more and more, we build logical structures on it, and it becomes a "primary premise". But just because it has not yet been falsified, doesn't necessarily mean that its status, as having a relatively low degree of certainty, has changed significantly. Then it becomes built into our structure of knowledge, and since it is a base premise for all sorts of different procedures, we suffer from the illusion that it has a high degree of certainty, when actually the opposite is the case. Because of this deficiency at the base, problems arise. Only when the problems from unsound conclusions become so unbearable, that people are inclined to revisit the base premises, is the uncertainty exposed, and the primary "intuitive" premises are dismissed. Kuhn described this phenomenon as the paradigm shift.
Quoting Apollodorus
Right, it is "affirmed" in those specific passages, but it is refuted by the principles and the logic laid out in the rest of the book. This is common in philosophy, that what is proven in a particular piece of work, differs from what is asserted in it. As part of the discipline, we learn to differentiate between these two.
Quoting Apollodorus
This is wrong. That is not the definition of "intellect", it is the definition of "divine thought". And your earlier quote says " but we ought, so far as in us lies, to put on immortality, and do all that we can to live in conformity with the highest that is in us". The whole point of this discussion between Wayfarer and I, for me, was to stress the difference between the human intellect, and the divine. Such misquotes, and misrepresentation of what the quoted passage actually says, and your conflating of the divine and the human, do nothing for your purpose .
I was putting forth an alternative view. Neither of us should apologize for saying what we think.
It doesn't really seem to be an alternative, because it's completely consistent with what I was saying. You simply proceeded to turn around, looking ahead at the possibilities, rather than looking backward at the actuality, as I was. But this opens a completely different subject not addressed by Aristotle, and that is the question of how possibility is directed by the soul.
Consider these points. The higher power is dependent on the lower power. Each power is a development of potential, which opens possibilities to the soul, as the principle of activity. So the question is, what does it mean to develop potential. We don't want to say that it means to give oneself possibilities, because then we go in a circle. So we must answer by looking in the other direction. What does the soul do to develop potential? And here, we must turn to the material body, matter being the principle of potential for Aristotle.
Then the question becomes how does the soul use matter to open up possibilities for itself, and this is how we can approach the reality of the vast variety in living beings which we observe, and evolutionary theory in general. The beauty of life is not found in the sameness which constitutes "a species", but in the difference which constitutes an individual. Each material difference constitutes a difference in possibilities.
Quoting Paine
The apology was not for saying what I think, but for what this caused, confusion. That was not the intended consequence, so there must have been a mistake made.
Well, that's where you are wrong again. The intellect is the divine element in man as Aristotle clearly says! And what is divine has divine thoughts.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I disagree. Aristotle affirms it because that is his position. He doesn't say anywhere that he refutes it. And it is not inconsistent with the rest of the book at all. As I said, it may be inconsistent with your interpretation of Aristotle, but that is a totally different issue.
If you think about it, if you make for yourself a pair of shoes and use them for walking, you might be right in saying that you depend on your shoes for walking, but it would be wrong to say that you depend on them in an absolute sense.
The same goes for the “intellect” or “nous”. It may partly depend on the body-mind or body-soul compound in everyday life. For example, the soul’s sense-faculties will depend on the physical sense-organs for sensory input from the surrounding environment, and the soul’s reasoning faculty will depend on the data supplied by the sense-faculties.
However, the intellect or nous does NOT depend on either soul or body to exist as intellect. At the most, the soul’s reasoning faculty depends on the intellect, and the intellect depends on the reasoning faculty, etc., in the performance of certain functions in the embodied state (in the same way you depend on your shoes to walk on the street or on your car to drive from one place to another).
But the intellect does not depend on either soul or body in an absolute sense, being separable from the body-soul compound and being its true, eternal and unaffected self when so separated, as Aristotle clearly says.
Unlike the body-soul compound (syntheton) which is destructible, the intellect is indestructible and unaffected:
Unlike the body which is destructible and the parts of the soul which are inseparable from one another and destructible, the intellect is separable from body and soul and eternal:
The intellect is separable, unmixed, impassive, immortal and eternal:
The intellect is divine and superior to the body-mind compound, and so is its activity and its happiness:
The intellect being divine, its happiness is divine and separate from the moral happiness of the composite person (body-soul compound):
Therefore the philosopher must strive to become immortal (in this life) by acting in conformity with the intellect which is immortal and divine:
Clearly, these statements and many others are not isolated “mistakes” or “inconsistencies”, they form a consistent and coherent whole with the rest of the book - and with Plato's own position.
I won't bother with this, it's so blatantly inaccurate. Plato clearly held a distinction between the earthly, and the divine, and so did Aristotle. And they both said that we ought to try to approach the divine as much as humanly possible, as evidenced by the quote I just gave you, from your own reference: " but we ought, so far as in us lies, to put on immortality, and do all that we can to live in conformity with the highest that is in us".
Quoting Apollodorus
This is an unacceptable analogy. Aristotle is talking about how one power, for its actual existence as a power, depends on another, more base, or lower power. So if the higher power of walking depends on the lower power of muscles, it would be wrong to say that one could walk without muscles.
Quoting Apollodorus
It's not a matter of "partly depend on". That doesn't even make sense. You are not considering the difference between contingent and sufficient. If A, B, and C are all required for X, then X is fully dependent on A. There is no X without A. And X is not partly dependent on A, it is fully dependent on A, as it is fully dependent on B, and fully dependent on C. Notice that "partly" and "fully" are qualifiers of "dependent", and there is no such thing as "partly dependent", that is incoherent. Either A is required (X is dependent on A) or it is not. You appear to be trying to give "depend" an incoherent meaning.
Quoting Apollodorus
Thanks for all the quotes, I see now where the problem lies. Aristotle proposed a first principle of physical (material) existence. This was the eternal circular motion. Motion in a perfect circle can have no beginning nor end. And the orbits of the planets were supposed to be those eternal circular motions.
But this fundamental "first principle" of actual physical existence, the eternal circular motions, is demonstrably wrong. The orbits of the planets are not eternal circles. And there is no such thing as a perfect circular motion which would continue in perpetuity forever. Also, the divine thinking which is a thinking on thinking, which Aristotle proposed as the immaterial support for the eternal circular motions, is equally wrong, being derived from that faulty principle. So the idea of a divine intellectual activity, as a thinking, thinking on thinking, which was devised by Aristotle to support the eternal circular motions of the planets, is fundamentally flawed.
The divine thinking on thinking, was an intuitive principle which Aristotle came up with, because he was under the false impression that the orbits of the planets were eternal and perfect circles, and this was proposed as a matching circular thinking. The passages you have quoted are derived from these faulty descriptions of "eternal activity", the circular motion, and the thinking on thinking.
The logical necessity for the existence of "eternal activity" is derived from his cosmological argument. But these descriptions demonstrate a misunderstanding of what is implied by the cosmological argument. What is implied is an actuality which is "outside time", as is consistent with the Christian understanding of "eternal", and this is very distinct from "eternal" in the sense of infinite extension of time. So Aristotle's intuition as to how to describe something which is actually eternal, was wrong. And some statements he made which are related directly to this intuition are also wrong. Therefore these passages you have quoted, which were derived from that intuition, ought to be dismissed as misguided.
It looks like you are dismissing a lot of passages there. In fact, far too many for your argument to hold. :smile:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Of course both Plato and Aristotle say that the philosopher ought to try to approach the divine as much as humanly possible, this is precisely why I quoted Aristotle on it!
Quoting Apollodorus
How do you reckon the philosopher is supposed to "approach the divine"? Surely, not with the body or mind that according to Aristotle perish at death? He can approach the divine only with the intellect or nous which Aristotle clearly says is immortal, eternal, pure, and divine.
This is exactly what Plato states in the Phaedo and elsewhere when he says that only what is pure can approach the pure.
So, I would suggest you stop "dismissing" passage after passage that contradicts your interpretation and try to look at the contradictions in your own statements.
You said that “there is no such thing as "pure, unaffected intelligence" in human beings.”
Yet Aristotle says that the intellect is “pure (unmixed) and unaffected”:
When we are in deep, dreamless sleep, for example, our intelligence is pure and unaffected by thoughts, emotions, or sense perceptions.
Moreover, as can be seen, Aristotle himself defines active intellect here as an “activity”, which is “uninterrupted thinking”.
And since the active intellect, when separated from the body-soul compound (syntheton), is its true self and nothing else, the only thing it can “think” about is itself in an act of self-reflexive awareness. Self-reflexivity is a defining property of intellect or consciousness. There is no self-reflexivity in any other part of the soul, be it sense-perceptions, emotions, or thoughts.
Incidentally, this self-reflexive awareness is to some extent present even in deep sleep, i.e., it is ever-present and ever-active, as Aristotle says.
In any case, it is clear that the whole discussion is about thinking in the human soul – the whole book is entitled “On the Soul” (Peri Psyches) – and that Aristotle uses the intellect’s self-reflexivity to argue for its incorporeality and immortality. He does NOT "refute" this anywhere.
Of course, God or the Prime Mover is also intellect or consciousness but he is Universal Consciousness whilst a human being's “active intellect” is individual consciousness.
However, the two are essentially identical and the recognition of this identity leads to the self-realization of individual intellect or consciousness.
This is achieved "as far as humanly possible" during embodied existence and more fully after death when, as Aristotle says, the intellect, nous, or spirit is separated from the body-mind compound and therefore free to unite with the divine.
"Approaching the divine" is nothing but "unity with the divine" when once all factors that separate the two divine elements, the individual and the universal, have been removed.
Pretty simple and easy to understand IMO. And it doesn't require dismissing any passages either from Aristotle or Plato ....
OK, now approaching the divine is quite distinct from being the divine. Do you agree that before we can say how a philosopher might "approach the divine", we need an idea as to what the divine is. Otherwise we could send the philosopher in any random direction, and claim that is the way "to approach the divine".
Quoting Apollodorus
Such a statement is completely unsupported. In order to say how we are supposed to approach the divine, we must first determine what the divine is. And that's where Aristotle's intuition fails us. He had an incorrect idea of what it means to be divine, and this is obvious. So he sent us in the wrong direction. His divinity was an eternal circular motion. So he proposed a type of circular thinking, a thinking on thinking, as the way for human beings to approach the divine. This type of thinking would be an eternal circular thinking activity. But circular thinking is vicious.
Quoting Apollodorus
Sorry Apollodorus, I do not mean to offend you, but if the principle expressed is based in some ridiculous nonsense like eternal circular motion, I will dismiss it. That is how Aristotle described the "divine", and it is clearly mistaken. Likewise, his circular thinking, as the way human beings might engage in an activity which would approach the divine eternal circular motion, possibly providing the basis for an immortal intellect, is also mistaken. Therefore you, and every other rational human being ought to dismiss it as well.
Quoting Apollodorus
You can't be saying this in seriousness. You've spent this whole discussion with me trying to find ways to dismiss the principal part of On the Soul, the dependencies of the powers of the soul, because this is not consistent with what you preach.
I think it’s the other way round. I am reminding you of the points Aristotle is making throughout the book and that you choose to dismiss. Here is your own statement:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
And I am definitely not “preaching” any more than you are. In fact, I am not preaching anything, I am simply pointing out the inconsistencies in your position.
You said “there is no such thing as "pure, unaffected intelligence" in human beings.”
But I have demonstrated to you that your claim is contradicted by Aristotle and by observable facts.
You admitted that both Plato and Aristotle said we ought to try to approach the divine. Here is your own statement:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Yet you are now trying to dismiss Plato and Aristotle by claiming that they “don’t understand the word divine” whilst you of course do. :smile:
As a matter of fact, the term “divine” (theios) as used by Ancient Greek authors has a number of meanings including “super-human”, “extraordinary”, “excellent”, “perfect”, “pure”, “immortal”, etc., without necessarily having any “religious” connotations.
What Aristotle is trying to convey by his description of “God” or highest reality is eternity, perfection, etc.
Far more important, and what you apparently choose to ignore or deny, is his description of God as an intellect, i.e., as intelligence or consciousness or, otherwise put, his description of intellect, intelligence, or consciousness as “divine” and as the supreme goal of philosophic life.
No one can deny that man himself has intelligence or consciousness, which is precisely why man can approach God. or a higher intelligence or consciousness.
Man approaches the divine by first approaching the divine in himself and by self-identifying with it. In other words, by elevating himself to a higher mode of experience or state of consciousness. It is only from that higher state that an even higher state can be approached.
You cannot stay at the foot of a mountain and have an all-round perspective from the top of the mountain at the same time.
If you start from the premise that there is nothing higher in you, it is the same as saying that you have no ability to climb the mountain. And if you haven’t got the ability, or believe not to have it, there is no point trying or even thinking about it. In which case, there is no point reading Plato and Aristotle!
As they say, where there is a will, there is a way. Philosophers like Plato and Aristotle are merely pointing in the right direction. Higher states of consciousness or modes of experience can be attained only through that faculty or power of consciousness, the nous, that has the capacity to experience those higher states.
Obviously, this faculty or power is more developed in some individuals than in others, in the same way some have a natural ability to experience lucid dreams, for example, i.e., states of consciousness in which the subject is aware of both the dream and of themselves as a consciously dreaming subject. If in that state you focus on the awareness itself, then you will be very close to the “pure unaffected intellect” described by Aristotle.
The fact is that most people on this planet do not read Plato and Aristotle and even if they did, they wouldn’t understand a thing in the same way they wouldn’t understand a book on advanced higher math or formal logic without some previous training.
So it all comes down to (a) natural ability and (b) training, both of which are the reader’s problem, not the writer’s.
My own position is that humans cannot know what a higher reality is unless and until they have actually experienced it or at least they have had an inkling of it. If humans are conscious, intelligent beings, then it makes sense to try to find out if there is a higher intelligence “out there” or, indeed, within us.
This is why Plato and Aristotle are not “misguided” at all, their intuition is spot-on.
Knowledge is essentially self-reflexive. A knowing subject cannot know unless it is aware that it is in a state of knowing. On a higher level, when the intellect or consciousness is separate from all other things, consciousness is at once object and subject.
This is what Aristotle is pointing to when he speaks of “two intellects”. There is a discursive intellect (dianoesis) and a higher, non-discursive intellect (noesis). And the two are further reducible to one. Similarly, the individual intellect and a higher intellect can be united into one.
Plato doesn’t just say “to approach the divine” but to become like the divine or be assimilated to the divine.
If Philosophy (in the Ancient Greek sense) is love of and quest for truth, and the truth is a higher form of consciousness, intelligence, or knowledge, then this is what man ought to assimilate himself to.
When we really want to achieve something, we want to make that achievement ours which implies a degree of identity with that which has been achieved. For consciousness to desire to experience a higher state of itself is entirely natural and logical.
Some people claim that God is an old man sitting on a throne in the sky. How exactly is that any better or more logical?! If “circular movement” makes no sense to you, I would focus on the intellect bit and see what can be discovered in the process. If you choose to not even try, that is a different matter. But then you can’t say that Plato and Aristotle don’t know what they are talking about.
It seems to me that you are taking a dogmatic and not very philosophical position, which is why you are “dismissing” the whole Platonic tradition, as well as the opinion of top scholars, and even of Aristotle himself. If, as @Wayfarer says, you have been doing this since 2011, then perhaps it is time for you to take a fresh look at things. The choice, of course, is entirely yours.
I've addressed this. I think Aristotle is wrong on this point, for the reasons I've already expressed. And I don't believe you've provided any observational evidence of "pure unaffected intelligence".
Quoting Apollodorus
Did I say I know what the divine is? Just because I claim to know what the divine is not, i.e. eternal circular motions, because such a thing is known to be impossible, doesn't mean that I claim to know what the divine is.
Quoting Apollodorus
Obviously, eternal circular motion, and a thinking, which is thinking on thinking, serves as a very poor description of "eternity and perfection", if that's what "divine" is supposed to mean. So if one might be inclined to accept eternal and perfect as the features of divinity, they also ought to be inclined to reject Aristotle's proposal, as a failure to properly represent "eternal and perfect".
Quoting Apollodorus
I don't believe this at all. The closest we can get to the divine within ourselves, is the soul itself, as the first principle of activity of a living body. But we cannot "self-identify with it" by elevating to a higher mode of existence, because it is at the base, providing for the lowest mode of living. Therefore the closest we can get to self-identifying with it would be to lower ourselves to the most basic, most humble form of living. And you have this all backward.
Quoting Apollodorus
It's actually very easy to understand the concept of a higher reality. All one has to do is look at lower beings, to understand the principles of hierarchy. When we know those steps well, (where we came from), then we might be able to figure out how to construct the steps to go higher. But this implies that we do not get knowledge of any higher reality simply by imagining it with the mind (thinking on thinking), we get it by understanding the different levels of the lower being. And to grasp these lower realities we must allow our minds to unite with, and become one with the lower beings, in order that we might understand them, and the levels. Until we unite ourselves with the lower beings, as the source of our own being, any talk about a higher reality is just pie in the sky.
Quoting Apollodorus
Again, you have this backward. The closest the human intellect can get to the divine is through understanding the soul itself, which is the source of our being. And the way toward understanding the soul is to accept the reality that we are all dependent on all those lesser beings who are responsible for bringing us into existence. Therefore we must assimilate ourselves with them, not with some imaginary pie in the sky "higher form of consciousness".
For example? Do you mean other primates? Other animals? Fish? And that would put us the top of the hierarchy would it not?
Yes, all other life forms, because "soul" refers to the first principle of life in general, and as Aristotle explains it is an active principle. That active principle has caused the existence of a vast array of different individual things. To me, the ability to create a seemingly endless quantity of different things, each one active in its own way, is incredibly awesome. Consider the beauty in a garden of different coloured flowers on a summer day. Just the number of different colours which living beings can create is phenomenal.
But within this example, we have also the influence of artificial (human) manipulation (domestication). That human beings have the capacity to, and freely do, manipulate the differences, and have been doing this for thousands of years, is evidence that we may be at the top of the hierarchy. But here's the problem I see with constructing such a hierarchy. And notice that I say "constructing", because any such hierarchical structure will be based in values, and is going to be created on values which we impose, from our human minds.
This is the problem we cannot get beyond. Any proposed value principle, from which we might create a hierarchy, is going to be derived from an individual person who proposes it, and so it will be as unique and idiosyncratic as a colour is to a flower. And just like we gather flowers of the same type, and say that their colour is "the same", we gather a bunch of humans with the same value principle, and say that their value system is "the same". What we really do is say that human beings are equal. Now, since we have agreement amongst a sect of human beings who say that they are each equal, they can proceed to say that they have an "objective" value principle. The problem is, that in doing this, they place the conformity which is created by "the agreement", and is therefore artificial, as higher than the fundamental and most base capacity of the soul, which is difference, as mentioned above.
So, we have to look at this artificial, created value structure, which is produced through agreement, and which we tend to call "objective", as actually backwards, upside down. It holds agreement and conformity as the highest principle, because that's what it sees as required for our release from the subjective idiosyncrasies of the individual, allowing us to obtain an independent objectivity. But this "objectivity" is not a true objectivity because the independence is not a true independence, it is still a feature of the subjects. So we're forced right back to the observed highest principle of the soul itself, in a search of true objectivity, and this is the capacity for variance, variation, which is a feature of true independence. I'll note that this is consistent with Plato's description of "just" in The Republic, where each an every individual has a unique role to play in society.
So the question of whether we are highest or not, has nothing to do with whether we have rational intellectual capacity or not. That's just outer fluff, a general feature, like the chaff which blows to the wind. The significant thing is the unique individual seed, which lies within. This is why Aristotle places "intuition" as the highest feature of intellect, because this is where we find individuality. So a society which forces human beings to conform to some so-called 'objective principles of rationality' does not put them higher in the hierarchy, it lowers them by restricting what is the natural highest principle, variation. While a society which allows freedom of individuality provides a higher place in the hierarchy for human beings.
Therefore we cannot say that "human beings" as a whole, or a species in general, is highest, because what is highest is a principle which negates the value of a "species" in general, making species themselves as something lower, which we need not consider.in producing the hierarchy. Providing for the capacity of freedom, variation, and difference within the unique capacities of individual beings is the highest principle. So a group of human beings may either be high in the hierarchy, or low on the hierarchy, depending on how they restrict themselves. That this is true is evident from the very real possibility that if human beings attempt to restrict themselves (the entire species) to rigorous rules of conformity, dictated by some supposed principle of "rationality", they are likely to bring extinction upon themselves. So that cannot be how we base our value structure, allowing that a species which is likely to go extinct to be high in the hierarchy.
Well, it looks like you may have surpassed even yourself there. :smile:
I think we already are at a higher level than most other creatures. If you seriously believe that man can elevate himself to higher levels of consciousness by identifying with earthworms and snails, then perhaps your real difficulty is not metaphysics but psychology.
Anyway, all I’m saying is that Aristotle can be interpreted in more ways than just according to Aquinas or Marx.
The fact is that Aristotle has a lot in common with his teacher Plato, which is only natural. He even got the idea of the “Unmoved Mover” from Plato who says that the soul is a principle of self-motion.
In respect of the soul, Plato and Aristotle have very similar views.
Essentially, what Plato is saying is that the embodied person is an image of its own disembodied self, and the disembodied self is an image of Creative Intelligence or Creator-God.
The first step in the ascent of the soul to Creative Intelligence (Nous Poietikos) is self-identification with the disembodied self which is the intellect or nous. As true knowledge is available only to the nous, it is easy to see why.
I have already given lucid dreams as a clear illustration of how man can consciously ascend to higher cognitive states by transcending lower ones. And in exactly the same way the subject can stay awake and conscious during a lucid dream, it can also do so during deep, dreamless sleep, the result being pure unaffected awareness.
In fact, with some practice, this can be achieved even during the waking state. Awareness is always there, that’s why we are conscious, intelligent living beings. All is needed is to pay attention to it instead of focusing on thoughts, emotions, and sense-perceptions. Admittedly, it does take some practice but it is absurd to claim that consciousness or intelligence is incapable of self-reflexive awareness.
What we need is not to experience the consciousness of a mollusc but a consciousness that is higher than the one we already have. As I said, consciousness is always there. The only thing that changes, like changing images on a screen, are objects and states of consciousness. And they all depend on two factors, (1) attention and (2) identification. These in turn depend on the will-power of the subject. Any conscious subject has the power to choose between objects of attention and self-identification, and by doing so, to move up and down on the awareness scale.
If by ascending to the level of non-discursive consciousness man attains true knowledge, or at the very least he knows more than before, it is nonsense to claim that philosophy in Plato’s and Aristotle’s tradition “sends people in the wrong direction”.
IMO such claims are an expression of the prevalent prejudice against Classical philosophy that is part of the growing international effort to deconstruct, cancel, and erase Western culture.
There seems to be a general perception that ancient philosophers didn’t properly understand the concept of knowledge, so they couldn’t possibly have conceived of anything like self-reflexive thought, consciousness, awareness, or truth.
The truth of the matter is that philosophy begins with consciousness or awareness. Socrates himself tells us that:
Nihilists and other anti-philosophers choose to see nothing here but an admission of ignorance. But they do nothing but demonstrate their own ignorance and lack of understanding. For in reality, the key words are not the denial of knowledge but the affirmation of awareness: “I am aware” (synoida emauto). What matters is awareness. Awareness that there are limits to our knowledge implies awareness of the existence of some things that we have no knowledge of.
This is the beginning of philosophy in the original sense. The awareness that there are realities “out there”, i.e., outside our everyday experience and knowledge, that we don’t know and don’t understand and that it is our task, as intelligent beings endowed with awareness and understanding, to inquire into these realities.
Though some claim that consciousness is a modern concept, Ancient Greek philosophers had several terms that expressed the idea of consciousness or awareness and of being conscious or aware, which shows that they knew far more than is commonly assumed. Aristotle himself uses terms like aisthanomai (“to have cognitive awareness or consciousness”) and by the time of Plotinus many related words were in use in the Greek language, e.g., synaesthesis, synesis, syneidesis.
What most of these words, including Socrates’ synoida have in common is the particle syn (“with”, “together”) – that later appears as con in Latin conscius and its modern European derivatives – which expresses the union or bringing together of separate cognitive elements as to produce consciousness or awareness and understanding.
It is thanks to this unifying property of consciousness that man seeks to unify, organize, and expand his knowledge of himself and of the world around him. Self-knowledge or self-awareness is the core around which consciousness establishes its entire field or sphere of awareness and knowledge. This applies to human consciousness as much as to divine consciousness.
Aristotle’s logic is as follows:
(A). God is thinking what is best.
(B). God is best.
(C). Therefore God is thinking himself.
And, as above, so below. Substitute "higher consciousness" for "God" and you get the idea.
Consciousness, therefore, and in particular self-reflexive awareness, is absolutely central to all intellectual effort and particularly to philosophy as a practical, spiritual endeavor.
Self-knowledge, i.e., knowledge of one’s true identity is, after all, the ultimate goal or telos of philosophy - as per the Delphic maxim that was universally acknowledged throughout the Greek world. And the means to achieve self-knowledge is self-reflexive thinking which is an introspective activity of consciousness.
This is why it is imperative to look beyond appearances and, in particular, beyond later propaganda and disinformation and understand the true meaning of ancient philosophical works like those of Plato and Aristotle.
My personal view is that every philosophical work can be, and should be, interpreted on more than one level according to each reader’s intellectual and spiritual capacity.
However, as I said before, those who choose to see nothing in Aristotle aside from superficial and irrelevant things like “circular motion” are free to do so.
There's no room in your rambling account for what Aristotle would call the 'prime mover' or first cause, later understood to be God. In other words, your account is entirely naturalist. It is utterly devoid of metaphysics.
[quote=Nichomachean Ethics] But if happiness [??????????] consists in activity in accordance with virtue, it is reasonable that it should be activity in accordance with the highest virtue; and this will be the virtue of the best part of us. Whether then this be the Intellect [????], or whatever else it be that is thought to rule and lead us by nature, and to have cognizance of what is noble and divine, either as being itself also actually divine, or as being relatively the divinest part of us, it is the activity of this part of us in accordance with the virtue proper to it that will constitute perfect happiness; and it has been stated already* that this activity is the activity of contemplation [?????????].[/quote]
It's all hot air to you, ain't it?
The goal of "higher levels of consciousness" is your principle, not mine. It's the one I dismissed as unacceptable. So this statement is not at all relevant. I do not seriously belief that man can, or ought to try, to elevate himself to higher levels of consciousness.
Quoting Apollodorus
I really don't see how an embodied person be can an image of a disembodied self. Embodied and disembodied do not at all resemble each other, so one cannot be an "image" of the other. Think of a physical sign, like a word, or a numeral "2'' for example. The physical symbol is in no way an image of the immaterial idea. That the material is an image of the immaterial is a misunderstanding. Yes there is a relation between the material and the immaterial, and we may say it's a type of representation, but it is not a relation of imaging. This is just a continuation of your backward way of looking at things.
Quoting Apollodorus
Your phrase was "pure unaffected intelligence". Lucid dreaming is simply a matter of a person having some conscious control over one's dreams. How is this even related to "intelligence"?
Quoting Apollodorus
There's a big difference between being conscious and being intelligent. Not all cases of being conscious involve being intelligent. That's the difference between other animals and human beings, which Wayfarer refers to. I don't deny the reality of this difference, I just deny the significance which Wayfarer assigns to the difference. If you want to make being conscious the same as being intelligent, then on what basis would you even start to talk about different levels of consciousness?
Quoting Apollodorus
This doesn't make any sense to me. If consciousness is always there, as a property, how can you assume a higher consciousness and a lower consciousness? Suppose green is always there, there are things which are always green. What would constitute a higher green and a lower green?
It's having consciousness plus something else, intelligence for example, which produces something higher. So if we want something higher than consciousness plus intelligence, it's not a higher level of either one of these that we are looking for, but another power, a new power, to add on to these.
Quoting Apollodorus
It appears like you do not even distinguish between consciousness and self-consciousness. Perhaps if you did, you would see that these two are not different "levels of consciousness", but self-consciousness is just a special type of consciousness. You have stated no value principle to show that self-consciousness (being conscious of oneself) is higher than consciousness of any other type of object. A bird is conscious of the twigs it builds a nest out of, a beaver is conscious of the logs it builds a dam of. Why would being conscious of oneself be a higher type of consciousness? What purpose does this serve?
Quoting Apollodorus
Obviously, that's a vicious circle created by begging the question. The higher consciousness only thinks about what is best. The higher consciousness is best. Therefore the higher consciousness only thinks about itself. Notice the premise which begs the question "the higher consciousness is best". You've presented selfishness as if it were good.
Quoting Apollodorus
The problem with your position is, that you reject the volumes of intelligent, logical, scientific, and philosophical principles Aristotle put forward, because they are inconsistent with the principles you accept, principles derived from the irrelevant and faulty intuitions of circular motion and circular thinking.
Quoting Wayfarer
As I explained, Aristotle's "prime mover", as eternal circular motions, is a faulty intuition. And my account is not devoid of metaphysics, it is a naturalist metaphysics, just like Aristotle's is if you dismiss the nonsense of the unmoved movers. Since the natural is prior to the artificial, and the artificial is dependent on the natural, as a feature of it, (according to what has been already explained), then any good metaphysics must be based in the natural rather than the artificial. But this does not mean that we cannot take principles learned from the nature of the artificial, like final cause, free will, and intention, and apply then toward understanding the natural. Afterall, the artificial is a feature of the natural.
Quoting Wayfarer
Yes it is all hot air, because there is a faulty premise in this passage, and that is that the intellect is the divinest part of us. It's not, the soul is the divinest part. And, as I've argued in this thread, by Aristotle\s own principles there is a material separation between the soul and the intellect. The soul is prior to the material body, the intellect posterior. Once we recognize that this premise is faulty, then we cannot say that the virtue proper to the divinest part is contemplation, because the intellect is not the divinest part. And when we look at the soul as the divinest part, we see that the virtue proper to it is the creation of potential, as the vast array of possibilities which we observe to inhere in all the different life forms as their various powers.
So when we look at the human being, we see that contemplation contributes to the creation of potential, but it does not fulfill this on its own. The human being must act on its thoughts, through the means of its material body, to actual produce any potentials which are thought about. Therefore contemplation itself, cannot be the highest virtue.
I could never understand this claim. What does it actually mean? The mirage of a pool of water in the scorching sun of the Sahara is an illusion (there's no pool of water).
So, if consciousness is an illusion, it's like the mirage i.e. there's no such thing as consciousness. If so, what we believe is consciousness is either not consciousness as defined (whatever way it's defined) or that consciousness is simply a word with an empty extension no matter how we define it.
Plus, consciousness is wholly subjective i.e. your experience may differ radically from mine and others'. In that case consciousness is an empty word, it refers not. Illusion?
Designating the intellect as the part of the human being nearest the divine, rather than assuming the soul as nearest the divine, is a very good example of the mistake described by the classic saying of "putting the cart before the horse".
I think you are deliberately misinterpreting my statement, as well as ignoring the arguments presented by Aristotle in the relevant sections of the text.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Of course self-consciousness is a type of consciousness. But self-reflexive consciousness or consciousness being aware of itself is on a higher level than objective consciousness or consciousness being aware of things other than itself. Aristotle himself distinguishes between "active" and "passive" consciousness and clearly classifies the former as higher than the latter.
Anyway, a major plank in the anti-Western and anti-Classical disinformation campaign is the supposed opposition between Plato and Aristotle, Aristotle being variously styled an anti-Platonist champion of Christianity, Islam, and “progress”.
Among the claims made on behalf of Aristotle is that he rejects Plato’s key teachings, the immortality of the soul and the Theory of Forms.
These claims have long been refuted by scholars like Fine (On Ideas) and Gerson (Aristotle and Other Platonists) yet they are still being recycled and promoted by the anti-Platonist brigade.
As Gerson has pointed out, this has reached such absurd dimensions that views clearly espoused by Plato in his works are dismissed as “Aristotelian” or, even worse, as “Neoplatonist”.
The truth of the matter is that none of these claims are correct. Aristotle does seem to reject the immortality of the lower part of the soul (psyche), but not of the higher part called “intellect” (nous). On this point he is in agreement with Plato who holds that less evolved souls are subject to rebirth but that in evolved souls what remains after the death of the physical body is the intellectual or spiritual part which is the seat of consciousness.
Similarly, Aristotle does not seem to reject the Forms as such but only certain interpretations of the Theory of Forms, several versions of which were discussed within the Platonic Academy. In fact, Aristotle does not reject eternal intelligibles and he posits a “Prime Unmoved Mover” whose eternal thinking is of eternal intelligible objects which are similar or identical with Plato’s Forms. He certainly treats the terms “intelligible object” (noeton) and “Form” (eidos) as synonymous:
The intellect’s capacity to “think itself” identifies it as a form of consciousness and highlights the similarity between Plato’s and Aristotle’s conception of intellect or nous. It is this close similarity that enables those familiar with Plato to correctly understand Aristotle.
In the Republic, Socrates gives examples of hierarchies of beauty and knowledge (or truth).
As examples of different kinds of beauty he lists a beautiful girl, a beautiful horse, and a beautiful lyre (Hippias Major 287e-289d).
“Beautiful” in this particular context means pleasing to the eye. Obviously, one may argue that in addition to her pleasant looks, a girl can be pleasing to other sensory faculties such as touch, or she may have a beautiful voice. A horse lover might say that the horse, in addition to beautiful shape and color, also possesses power, speed, and a pleasant grassy-earthy scent. The music lover might insist that in addition to being beautifully crafted, the lyre produces beautiful sounds, etc. But for our present purposes, we will limit ourselves to sight and say that all three are equally beautiful.
Having shown that there are different kinds of beauty, Socrates next proceeds to show that there are different degrees of beauty, saying that even a beautiful girl would be “ugly” compared to a Goddess. So, basically, the beautiful girl is more beautiful than the average girl, the Goddess is more beautiful than the beautiful girl, and Beauty itself is the most beautiful of all.
The same applies to knowledge. There are different kinds (e.g., astronomy, mathematics, logic) and different degrees:
1. Illusion (eikasia)
2. Right belief (pistis or right opinion doxa)
3. Knowledge based on reason (dianoia)
4. Intuition or insight (noesis).
Similarly, as stated before, there are different states of consciousness and degrees of wakefulness such as waking, dreaming, deep sleep, etc., and different substates within each of them that may be classified according to the prominence of different elements of cognition.
As Plato says:
“This reality, then, that gives their truth to the objects of knowledge and the power of knowing to the knower, you must say is the Form of the Good, and you must consider it as being the cause of knowledge and truth, and an object of knowledge“ (Rep. 508e1-4).
Here we have all basic elements of cognition:
(1) Object of knowledge
(2) Power or means of knowledge
(3) The knowing subject or knower
(4) Knowledge or awareness itself.
1. WAKING STATE. If we take visual perception in the waking state as an example, the cognitive element in the first stage is the object of sight, when objective consciousness predominates.
But if we defocus our vision from the object (as when gazing into midair) and mentally focus on the act of seeing, the object becomes less clear and instrumental consciousness takes over, giving rise to a second stage analogous to the dream state (as in daydreaming).
As we draw our attention further inward, the object of perception becomes even less clear and subjective consciousness becomes more prominent.
Finally, the object of perception fades into a barely perceptible, indeterminate mass of color, and knowledge or awareness itself becomes the dominant element. It is at this point that we get a first glimpse of Aristotle’s “pure and unaffected intellect” followed in descending order by cognizing subject, means of cognition, and object of sensory cognition.
The "pure and unaffected intellect" is consciousness in itself prior to the emergence of cognizing subject and other elements of sensory cognition.
2. DREAM STATE. The next-higher state is the dream state proper, where instrumental consciousness is the dominant element and takes the place of the objective consciousness of the waking state. In this first stage, consciousness of the physical world is dormant and memory and imagination take over, creating a dream world in which subjective consciousness is completely submerged.
In the next stages of the dream state, as the instrumental and subjective aspects of cognition take over, the subject can become aware of the fact that it is dreaming. It is at this point that lucid dreams and precognitive dreams occur.
It now becomes clear that the “intellect” or nous, i.e., consciousness itself, generates or projects the subjective, instrumental, and objective elements of cognition.
It is only when we have reached this stage that we become aware of the true power of consciousness and we begin to understand statements to the effect that “intellect thinks itself”, “intellect (nous) and intelligible object (noeton) are identical”, etc. (Metaphysics.1072b21).
Though mostly ignored by scholars of Classical philosophy, dreams played an important role in Ancient Greece and in later Hellenistic culture, and prominent Platonists like Proclus are known to have experienced visionary dreams.
I have no idea if any of this can be corroborated by strict scientific methods, but Classical philosophy is about practice and personal experience and IMO those who take the time to find out for themselves are likely to know more about these matters than those who don’t.
So we'll just have to agree to disagree. No big deal. I'm sure @Jack wants his thread back, anyway, and I've got other things to do .... :smile:
Quoting Apollodorus
Before you take off, I’d be grateful if you could to whatever extent confer or else repudiate this interpretation of Ancient Greek thought:
Regarding contexts such as those just quoted: We nowadays best interpret nous as intellect. Intellect to us most always connotes thought as reasoning, which by its nature ratios givens into differences. I associate this with Ancient Greek logos. However, in the context of “an intellect/nous holding its very self as the object of focus”, intellect/nous seems to me to be more primarily addressing what we nowadays would call the faculty of understanding - rather than the faculty of rational thinking - such that, while we humans gain most of our understandings through reasoning/logos, there yet remains a fundamental difference between “a reasoning” and “an understanding”, the latter for example being the aim of the former. Hence, in the context of God is a thinker thinking him/her/itself, instead of translating Aristotle to say that God is a reasoner reasoning him/her/itself, I’m currently persuaded to think it more accurate to translate this as God is an understander understanding him/her/itself. Knowledge of self in the sense of gnosis rather than JTB … gnosis being more akin to our understanding of “understanding” rather than JTB which, due to having justification as part of it, will always in part address reasoning/ratio-ing/logos (something not necessitated of gnosis).
In this same vein, all animals use reasoning/ratio-ing/logos to some extent so as to live their lives but humans are worlds apart from all other animals in our qualitative magnitude regarding the capacity of understanding/nous. Here again, "intellect" in the sense of "understanding".
Where do you see support for this interpretation in Aristotle? It sounds like you are saying the Nous, as a principle, is a substance of some kind.
Also do a search for the term union of knower and known for a smorgasbord of references, many to Thomism. The first ref is quite useful if sketchy.
The basic idea behind all of this is that of hylomorphic dualism - that the psyche (soul) has two aspects, sensory and intellectual. Intellect is what sees the forms/essence/ideas and it does that by in some sense becoming one with it. Obviously there is no such union on the level of sensory interaction but there is on the level of the intellect.
This is actually a remnant of non-dualism that is preserved in classical philosophy, although it has died out everywhere but in neo-Thomism.
Thanks for the references. I'll check them out. I'm familiar with hylomorphic dualism. I do prefer the term "anima" to "soul" due their differing connotations, thought they can end up meaning the same thing. But yes, I'm in agreement with this perspective.
Still, I grant that I haven't familiarized myself with Thomism very well.
Anyway, what I suspect at back of all this, is that ‘nous’ has a meaning which modernity, generally, literally can’t understand. It’s something that was lost in the transition to modernity, to understand it requires a shift in perspective.
:grin: Yes, I suspect the same thing.
The difference between the active and passive aspects are described as the difference between acting, and being acted on. This does not correlate to the difference between being conscious of other objects, and conscious of oneself. So if the active part of consciousness is higher than the passive, this does not mean that self-consciousness is higher than consciousness. Since the consciousness in self-consciousness is acted on, because it is thinking on itself, it cannot be purely active, i.e., it is the (passive) object of thought just as much as it is the act of thinking.
I agree though, that both Plato and Aristotle posited self-consciousness as a higher level of consciousness. What I've been arguing is that this was a mistake. It is not consistent with the bulk of Aristotle's principles. There is really no principle given which justifies the idea that being conscious of oneself is higher than being conscious of others. And, since all the basic principles of morality are derived from respect for others, rather than from a selfish self-consciousness, we ought to be extremely wary of this proposal, that self-consciousness is higher than consciousness.
Furthermore, we find that empirical evidence, from the sensations of external objects, provides the strongest support for any knowledge. That's why "science" is so successful. Since we have both moral philosophy, and science, as proof that consciousness of external objects is "higher" than self-consciousness, if we are inclined to class levels of consciousness in this way, we need to dismiss the way proposed by Plato and Aristotle, as mistaken. The idea that self-consciousness is higher than being conscious of other things, is simply inconsistent with all of our knowledge.
Quoting Apollodorus
What you say here, "to correctly understand Aristotle" is not really true, because you latch on to a small point here, the immortality of the intellect, which is inconsistent with all the parts that I pointed at, and you claim that this is the correct understanding.
Quoting Wayfarer
Aristotelian hylomorphism is the idea that all material objects consist of a duality of form and matter, the form is the cause of the matter being what it is instead of something else. In the case of a living body the form is the soul.
That's exactly where the problem is. Reading Plato and Aristotle was always done in the Greek original, even in the Roman Empire and later of course in the Greek-speaking Eastern Roman Empire (Byzantine Empire) down to modern times.
The problem started with attempts to translate Ancient Greek terms into Latin that (even more than modern English) had no equivalent philosophical terminology. In fact, many Latin words were calqued on Greek ones, not always with the best results. This is how we ended up with English "intellect". French "esprit" or German "Geist" is much closer, denoting the intelligent life principle in man that has a wide range of faculties aside from thinking or reasoning.
"Nous" in Ancient Greek has a wide range of meaning, including consciousness, intelligence, reason, mind, understanding, soul, etc., always depending on the context. Among other things, nous is also the soul's faculty of intuition, insight, contemplation, and higher perception or experience.
This is why it is best left untranslated, otherwise we get results that are more confusing than enlightening, as with phronesis, another term with no equivalent in modern languages which is more like "wisdom" but is often rendered as "prudence"!
My advice would be not to try to translate it but to try to understand it. So yes, "understanding" is the key to it in that sense.
Quoting Paine
Depending on how you define "principle" and "substance", nous can be either, none, or both. However we choose to define it though, Aristotle calls it "immortal", "eternal", "separable" (from the body-mind compound), etc.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That's why we must agree to disagree.
No one argues that Aristotle and Plato are identical. The point is that there is similarity and a high degree of harmony between their views, as shown by Gerson and others, not to mention the whole Platonic (or "Neo-Platonic") tradition.
Some key points in common are:
1. Priority of intelligibles to sensibles.
2. Eternality of Forms.
3. Forms (eide) are not the same as universals (katholou). (There are similarities and differences.)
4. Forms in the intelligible realm.
5. Form instances or “images” (eikones) in the sensible realm.
6. Forms make cognition possible.
7. The cognizing subject is the “intellect” or nous.
8. Immortality of “intellect” (nous).
9. Identity of “intellect” or nous and man’s true self, etc.
Though philosophy aims to attain knowledge or wisdom (sophia or phronesis), the ultimate goal of philosophy is the source of knowledge or wisdom itself which is consciousness.
Consciousness is always aware of itself and this self-reflexive awareness is an activity of consciousness that is already there as the background of other activities of consciousness.
In other words, normal activity involves change. The self-awareness of consciousness is an activity that does not involve change as the awareness is of the same changeless consciousness.
When self-aware consciousness (that is already "active" in an act of self-reflexive awareness) becomes active in the ordinary sense, e.g., as in an act of sensory perception, there is awareness of (1) perception, (2) perceiving subject, (3) means of perception, and (4) (external or physical) object of perception.
The perception is the equivalent of knowledge, and consciousness qua consciousness the equivalent of the source of knowledge.
At the highest level of perception (knowledge) consciousness is cognitively identical with the perception. Therefore, the highest form of knowledge is self-knowledge which is knowledge of oneself as consciousness or nous.
This means that the source of knowledge can be discovered only through introspective inquiry or internalization of consciousness. This is not only logical, but also a matter of experience as detailed in my previous posts.
If consciousness is the source of knowledge, then that source is to be found within consciousness itself, at the center of experience which is logically within us as conscious beings. And the way to that center passes through the same states of consciousness we experience naturally, i.e., waking, dreaming, and deep sleep, with self-aware consciousness always in the background of all experience.
Whether we like it or not, because they are an important (and usually neglected) aspect of consciousness, dreams will become more prominent in this process, especially lucid dreams, precognitive dreams, and dream-visions. This is why all philosophers in the Platonic tradition, for example, from Socrates to Proclus and others had precognitive and other dreams in which certain truths were revealed to them.
The bottom line is that humans and other intelligent beings are communicative because the consciousness or intelligence in us is communicative. If we pay attention to consciousness and communicate with it, it will communicate with us and teach us things we did not know before. In any case, we have nothing to lose and everything to gain.
If, on the other hand, we insist on claiming that consciousness does not exist, or that the way to truth is through the study of physical matter, or through the consciousness of lower forms of life, then it's a different story. Either way, as I said before, the choice is yours. Nothing to do with me.
I was asking for references in Aristotle that supported your suggestion that a soul survived death as a particular unit. When I said: 'It sounds like you are saying the Nous, as a principle, is a substance of some kind.', i was only referring to how the idea is put forth by Aristotle. It is certainly the case that other writers had different views.
Then it seems you agree with me on this point. If consciousness is always self consciousness, then self-consciousness is the lowest, most base form of consciousness, being a part of every form of consciousness. And consciousness as an awareness of external things is a higher form of consciousness, consisting of that lower form with something else added.
Quoting Apollodorus
Now where do you draw this conclusion from? In no form of knowledge is the knowledge identical with the thing known. This is where the error lies. If the thing known was the very same as (identical to) the knowledge, the knowledge would be absolutely perfect. But there is no such thing as perfect knowledge, hence the need for skepticism.
This is why the method you describe is faulty. You assume that perfection in knowledge can be obtained through a direct unity between knower (soul), and thing known (intellect or consciousness). The problem is that you neglect the reality of the medium which exists between these two (the material body), which makes such a direct unity, and perfect knowledge, impossible.
Quoting Apollodorus
So you deny the need to understand physical matter, and lower life forms, because you think perfect knowledge will be obtain by the direct unity between soul and intellect. But if you would understand the true metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle, you would see how the material body affects the way that the soul uses the intellect to know itself, rendering such perfect knowledge as impossible. And, you would see the need to understand physical matter and the lower life forms, in order to grasp how these affections taint our knowledge.
I think this is BS. If a modern can understand the assumptions underpinning the idea of nous that were made by the Ancient Greeks then one can understand the concept as it was understood by the Greeks. If moderns cannot find out what those assumptions are, then sure, moderns could not understand them, and consequently could not understand what nous meant for the Greeks.
Those assumptions are either accessible to the modern mind or not; if not then, as some claim, it is simply impossible for us, due to anachronism, to understand nous as the Greeks did. But in that case, we literally could have no idea how they understood nous, and could not justifiably saying anything positive about it at all; including making claims about the Greek understanding being "higher or lower".
You need to be mindful of Aristotle’s term ‘ousia’ which is translated as ‘substance’. it has a different meaning to what we mean by ‘substance’ i.e. a material with uniform properties. ‘Ousia’ is a form of the verb ‘to be’ and is nearer in meaning to ‘being’ or ‘subject’ than what we call ‘substance’.
You haven't said what you think that "implicitly different understanding" consists in. If you can't say what it consists in, then you have no evidence that such an understanding existed. If you can say what it consists in then there is no barrier to understanding it now. Of course, understanding it does not entail agreeing with it; although you do often seem to conflate understanding with agreement.
Scientific reasoning has it's limits. Those are often ignored by some using scientific knowledge. Science, for example, has nothing at all to say about what we ought do in some circumstance or another. Since so much of our interdependent lives rely heavily upon such considerations, science simply cannot tell us what to do. It can, however, inform our reasoning with relevant facts.
I rather like the Wikipedia entry on Nous https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nous particularly paragraphs 2 and 3. When I say the meaning of nous has been forgotten, it is because the kind of understanding it describes is associated with Platonist and Aristotelian philosophy which has generally been rejected with the advent of modernity which is predominantly empiricist and nominalist.
Quoting Wayfarer
What is required when looking back like this, is to develop the mindset of a lesser developed intellect. This is what I've been trying to explain, the way to a higher understanding is through understanding the lower, and this reveals the types of changes which occur in the passage from lower to higher. As we see here, the passage from lower to higher was a turning outward of the mind, from self-consciousness to consciousness of one's environment. And this is contrary to what Appolodorus is proposing here, that the way to higher intelligence is to turn the mind inward.
The turning outward of the mind is fraught with problems of inversion. Inside we apprehend the soul as inhering deep within, and activity flows outward. Outside we see activity in all different directions. We've tried to posit a Soul as the source of this activity, but we do not see the inward-outward flow of activity in external bodies, so the Soul seems out of place. But of course we cannot see (sense perception) through the material bodies to apprehend this activity within, and this leaves the Soul of other material bodies as inapprehensible. Therefore the Soul is dismissed because the motion it causes is not perceived by the senses. And when we turn back inward we are inclined to dismiss the inner soul as well, because its activities have not be objectified (i.e. determinism). And so we are lost, incapable of the first degree of understanding, which is derived from self-reflection.
Back from the digression. We cannot start with the assumption of a higher intellect, describe it, and proceed to direct our minds toward obtaining this position, because that higher intellect is outside the realm of possibility of our own intellects. Therefore we cannot describe it, and we know not where to go. But we can look backward at the lower levels of intellectual capacity, understand what was already understood, come to apprehend the changes which have occurred to produce the higher level, and derive some direction in this way. This method of looking backward to obtain direction for the future, is very well demonstrated by Plato.
Aristotle distinguishes between soul (psyche) and “intellect” (nous). He says that the soul is perishable and that the nous is separable from the soul and immortal, eternal, unaffected, etc.
All I can say is that it is generally assumed - since antiquity - that Aristotle’s nous postexists the death of the physical body (and associated lower soul) as a particular unit. In any case, I am not aware of any statements to the contrary.
Quoting Janus
Of course moderns can understand the Ancient Greek concept of nous if it is explained to them, or even better, if they read Plato and Aristotle and see the various senses in which it is used.
The problem is when readers take nous to be synonymous in all respects with modern words like English “intellect”. Depending on the context, nous can mean intellect, but its range of meaning is much broader than the word “intellect”.
Quoting Wayfarer
Correct. This is why ousia (from eimi, “to be”) is also translated as “essence”, i.e., the inherent nature of a thing. “Essence” itself is derived from Latin essentia which Cicero coined to translate Greek ousia.
The same happens with Plato’s Forms being mistaken for “universals”, etc. Without a proper understanding of the terminology used we can't get very far.
I agree that it seems to the modern mind that the ancients (in their ignorance or innocence) reified ideas like goodness, beauty, virtue, justice and so on, and this is the extra "dimension" that nous has that the modern conception of intellect lacks. Where I disagree is that you say this tendency to reify ideas has been "forgotten", rather than giving what I see as a more accurate description, that would say it has (at least been thought to have) been overcome (although obviously not entirely, since probably more than half of humanity still think this way), seen through, transcended or whatever.
Of course you can disagree that this overcoming has been a step towards greater understanding; that argument is always going to be open-ended, and which pole you support will depend on your basic presuppositions concerning the nature and provenance of the human imagination and intuition,
Yes, the nous is seen as a principle of actuality that does not perish. The question is how to understand the relation of that principle to a composite being such as a man. Aristotle frames the existence of principles generally through distinguishing the potential from the actual rather than describing particular beings to be participating in a Form:
The distinction made above appears again a little bit later in Book Lambda where the soul as a cause is distinguished from the individuals composed through its activity:
At this point, it is natural to wonder in what manner an "individual' can said to remain if the intellect continues after death. What distinguishes one human life from another must largely be the result of the 'composition' as one of the three kinds of being. As for the individual remembering themselves, Aristotle's Memory and Reminiscence (453a) places much emphasis upon memory involving corporeal elements in parallel with what makes sense-perception possible.
Step back a bit. 'Objective consciousness' is a relatively new development. At the outset of the scientific revolution, a decision was made that science would treat only of those attributes which were amenable to objective measurement and quantification. This omits or occludes the qualitative dimension of existence as a methodological step. But from there it's a very short step to declaring that the world is 'devoid of meaning'. If it's devoid, it's because it's been voided! But now this becomes regarded as 'scientific fact', when really it's the product of an attitude - an attitude which won't be acknowledged, because of the blind spot that it engenders. (This is the subject of Husserl's Crisis of the European Sciences.)
Quoting Paine
There's a recent book that addresses this idea, Surviving Death, Mark Johnson. And thanks for those excerpts, they're very interesting.
Empirical science cannot deal with meaning; it was not that, at some point, a "decision" was made to abandon it. The irony is that you seem to see physical existence as meaningless; whereas as I see it as being replete with meaning. That makes it look to me like you have swallowed the common notion that matter is lifeless and meaningless.
It's not a blind spot for science, but an acknowledgement of its limitations. The fact that there are some people for whom what science can examine, analyze and understand exhausts the Real doesn't entail that such an attitude is in any way essential to science itself.
I’m pointing it out, I’ve by no means ‘swallowed’ it. It’s been swallowed whole by your mate Dennett. ( :clap: for the capital ‘R’, though!)
I'm not sure Dennett would agree with you about what you think he thinks. In any case if you haven't swallowed the idea that the physical is lifeless and meaningless, then you would have no need of the transcendent as a source of meaning, and nor would you have any problem with physicalism. So, I must admit, I'm finding your position a wee bit puzzling.
Sounds interesting. Please give a passage or two that reflects the situation as Aristotle framed it.
Correct. Aristotle’s interest in Forms appears to be tied in the first place to attempts to explain intellectual processes. What he seems to suggest is that higher, non-discursive intellect contains Forms that are accessed by lower, discursive intellect by means of images (or mental copies of Forms) and used as a basis for discursive thinking and cognition.
However, like Plato, Aristotle offers no detailed explanation for how exactly the higher intellect relates to the soul or description of what the intellect is and does after the death of the body-soul composite.
I think the reason for this is that the main concern in both Plato and Aristotle is to prepare the philosopher for life after death and this seems to imply the conscious self-identification with that in man that is said to survive death.
When seen in this way, the ultimate purpose of Forms is not to explain the phenomena of the sensible world which are going to be left behind after death anyway, but how consciousness generates experience on higher planes of existence, knowledge of which may enable the individual consciousness to elevate itself to higher modes of experience or existence.
So Forms seem to fulfill a multiple explanatory function:
1. As eternal, unchanging entities, they explain the possibility of knowledge in an ever-changing world.
2. As immaterial, ontologically prior entities, they explain the phenomenon of identity in difference.
3. As principles of order, they explain how universal consciousness, creative intelligence, or divine nous organizes itself in order to generate the intelligible and sensible realms.
Of course, it may be argued that Aristotle does not always make the same metaphysical claims as his teacher Plato. However, in practice, Aristotle was seldom studied in isolation. As a general rule, students of philosophy would study the writings of Plato, Aristotle, and other leading philosophers, and would form their own opinion as to which views or combination of views were the most logically and philosophically satisfactory.
This is precisely why the philosophical system that came to be known as “Platonism” is a synthesis of several philosophical schools. Aristotle’s own system consists of Platonic and other teachings combined with his own views.
This is a stretch of your imagination. Aristotle has volumes of material concerning knowledge of the physical world, criteria for correct judgement, etc.. The question of life after death has only a few passing mentions. Even his ethics is based in "happiness" which is a description of the human being's earthly condition. It is not based in a higher existence after death, heaven, hell, or anything like that. Plato is quite similar, and although the issue of life after death takes a more prominent position than in Aristotle, it is incorrect to say that it is "the main concern".
Where do you read this notion in Aristotle?
What is clearly stated in Aristotle is an interest in understanding causes of events and the reality of actual beings. There is a consideration of the sciences of the first things and the cosmology of eternal objects. But the study of nature as Fusis is also accorded the rank of a theoretical science. Experience in the world is a necessary condition of knowledge.
Forms clearly play a role in human intellection and cognition:
Of course Aristotle is also concerned with the sensible world. But the fact remains that the intelligible world is higher than the sensible, and the higher part of the soul is higher than the lower. What is higher takes precedence over the lower. This is why Aristotle urges the philosopher to identify with the higher element (nous) in him:
Identification with the highest element in man is the whole point of Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophy. The highest happiness comes from the highest activity which is contemplation (theoria):
According to both Plato and Aristotle the main function of nous, in addition to self-awareness, is contemplation of higher realities.
This means that once the nous has become separated on the death of the body-mind composite, and is “itself by itself”, there will be little activity left other than contemplation.
As the act and experience of contemplation of higher realities is the same in all cases, this means that “personality” in the normal sense of the word ceases to exist.
Gerson writes:
At the end of the day, the ultimate goal of philosophy is self-knowledge. If self-knowledge is the highest form of cognition, and the philosopher is serious about achieving his or her true identity, then this can be done only through some form of introspective inquiry or self-reflexive thinking that has the nous (i.e., self-aware consciousness or intelligence) itself as its central focus.
Gerson assumes an answer to my question when he says:
The issue I raised is whether the active principle of the intellect is a person as one who experiences themselves as such after that principle is separated from the composition of a living individual. Plotinus' view of the soul differs sharply from Aristotle's regarding what elements are being discussed:
There is no trace of the hylomorphism on display in De Anima. Aristotle is specifically concerning himself with the 'local separation' that Plotinus dismisses here. Plotinus rejects the notion of the "composition" as being any concern of true philosophy. The 'lower part" of the soul being named the 'sole agent' negates the distinctions of causes whereby the generation of living creatures can be recognized and studied. The view is not only uninterested in a cosmos outside of the psychology of our experience, it gives a tinge of disrepute to such interests.
Gerson's description is perfectly in tune with the philosophy of Plotinus. It is a questionable form of expression in the language of Aristotle.
The issue seems to be what it means to be "the highest". If we go by logical priority, the soul is the highest, as first cause of the living body, and what is required (necessary) for the activities of all the various potentials of living beings. However, we are generally inclined to place the soul, being first cause, at the base, the foundation, and we perceive the base as lower. On the other hand, you place the intellectual capacity, being the soul's ability to know itself, as the highest.
In Plato there is definitely a conflation of the soul and the intellect. Mind, as the power of reason, and soul, are often interchangeable. This is primarily because Plato had not thoroughly worked out the passive/active division. Aristotle worked out the passive (potential)/actual division, and gave "soul" a proper definition as the active cause of the living body. From this it follows that the capacities of living beings are the soul's potentials. We might ask the further question, as Aquinas does, how does an actuality (the soul) have potentials as properties.
So it really doesn't make sense for you to say that "identification with the highest element is the whole point of Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophy". It would be better said that a chief point in both of their philosophies was an attempt to identify the highest element, thus recognizing that the highest element had not been properly identified.
Well, Plotinus is entitled to his own views like everyone else. Plato doesn’t say that his followers must follow him ad litteram. But the quote from Gerson is not about Plotinus. He very clearly says what he thinks are Plato and Aristotle’s views on the subject of the intellect’s “survival” or “transcendence” after death:
According to Gerson, for Aristotle the “surviving” or “transcending” part of man is a type of impersonal intelligence. Gerson’s interpretation sounds reasonable enough to me.
The impersonality of the nous following physical death is I think one of the reasons why Aristotle urges philosophers to self-identify with that higher element in man as opposed to lower elements belonging to the body-mind compound.
As pointed out in my previous posts, it wouldn’t make sense for a philosopher to identify with parts of him that not only are not his true self, but are perishable.
Obviously, if the nous is man’s true self, true knowledge and happiness are attained through identification with the nous and its contemplative activity, as Aristotle says.
But the point I was trying to make is that the way I see it, it is imperative to look at things from a synoptic perspective. And this necessitates not only an ability to see through the anti-Platonist propaganda and disinformation, but also taking into consideration Aristotle’s Platonic background.
As Plato says in the Republic, the Good is the source of all knowledge and of everything that is good, therefore, the Good is the “highest lesson” or the “highest thing to learn” (Rep. 505a).
Similarly, Aristotle begins his Nicomachean Ethics by stating that “the Good is that at which all things aim”:
He then says:
And he eventually comes to the conclusion that the highest happiness comes from the highest activity which is contemplation (theoria) of higher realities.
Plato also says that the Good is the cause of everything good and that it makes the universe good like itself by imposing order on the universe.
Aristotle says pretty much the same thing:
Aristotle also says that the universe is created by an Intellect in conjunction with Nature:
If we take an unbiased look at the larger picture, I think a clear Platonic pattern begins to emerge:
1. Supreme principle of goodness.
2. Divine power that orders and holds together the universe.
3. Divine Intellect as cause of the universe.
4. Forms.
5. Immortality of individual intellect.
6. The best life is a life lived in harmony with intellect.
7. Contemplation of higher realities is the highest form of activity, etc.
We can see that, despite differences, Aristotle operates within paradigms that are largely Platonic. This is why IMO we need to bear this in mind in order to understand him correctly.
In any case, it is clear that the nous as an immaterial, eternal and unaffected intelligence plays as much a central role in Aristotle’s system as it does in Plato and Platonism.
Gerson is a scholar whose focus has long been on Plotinus and your description of 'Platonism' is very close to his view. Gerson used the expression "disembodied self." There is source for that expression in Plotinus. I am not aware of a source for that language about self in Plato. Perhaps Gerson throws some light upon that topic somewhere.
The purpose of my comparison between Plotinus and Aristotle was not to challenge an overarching theory of what the different authors might agree upon regarding eternity and immortality in general but to ask what Aristotle imagines the Nous continuing after death entails. There are plenty of notions where the immortality of the soul is not a repetition of a lived identity. None of your observations approach the question framed as such.
A question that might be considered is whether 'survival' and 'transcendence' entail the same kind of state. 'Survival' seems to imply persistence of some elements, whereas 'transcendence' might imply an aspect of the self that is not subject to the vicissitudes of being born and dying. That latter interpretation is something found widely in various forms of the perennial philosophies.
Excellent quotes by the way.
By way of a footnote, even though Christian theology appropriated many of Plotinus’ philosophical views in support of its own, it always distinguished between the supposedly impersonal union with the One described by Plotinus (henosis) and the divine union of Christ (kenosis).
Aristotle's conception, a divine mind thinking on thinking, as the source of eternal circular motion, and the cause of heaven and earth, is demonstrably incorrect. This ought to cast doubt on his entire conception of divinity, the proposed highest good, the way that order is imposed, etc..
Plato did not make this same mistake, saying only that "the good" is the highest, and that a divinity caused the order in the universe. But you can see that Plato has a gap between "the good" as something passive, and the act itself which moves to bring into reality, the good, which is order. So Plato only avoids the problem because he didn't go far enough to properly attempt a solution. Aristotle excelled in demonstrating that the actual is necessarily prior to the passive potential, in the absolute sense.
And this is where Plotinus failed, he assigned to "the One" the nature of absolute, pure, potential, in the Platonic tradition. But he also said that the One is responsible as cause, of the manifestation of everything else. And this directly contradicts Aristotle's demonstration, showing that a pure potential cannot actualize anything. We can conclude that both Aristotle and Plotinus failed in resolving the problem raised by Plato, though Aristotle gives us better direction. But I don't think it is the direction which you have chosen to take from Aristotle.
If there is a distinction to be made between "impersonal union" and what the Christian view proposes, what is to be made of Gerson's reference to a 'disembodied person?'
(It's also worth noting that the supposedly 'impersonal' nature of enlightenment in Buddhism was frequently employed in Christian polemics against that religion, even by Pope John Paul II in his somewhat controversial depiction of Buddhism in Crossing the Threshhold of Hope.)
So are unreason, irrationality, and concrete thought. Why isn't it through that power we grasp the essence of things?
I believe it was Paul who really pushed onto Christianity the idea of personal resurrection. It's in his letters or something like that, I can't remember now. But Paul (Saul) was Jewish, and was appealing to the ancient Jewish traditions for acceptance, so the more modern Greek science based principles might have been neglected by him.
Paul also strongly promoted the idea that Jesus was Son of God, rather than Son of Man as Jesus professed. It was only through this twist that the crucifixion of Jesus, by the Jews could be justified. This was the way which was revealed to Saul, as to how to produce consistency, unification between Christians and Jews, ending the continued conflict between them. He could propose both, that Jesus claimed to be Son of God, thereby justifying the crucifixion, and also that Jesus actually was Son of God, thereby supporting the Christian sect. Paul obviously had a great influence on the course of Christianity by conceiving of this unity between the Jewish and the Christians.
But we must remember that Paul was preaching to Jewish people, and so was influenced to say what they needed to hear, to produce acceptance of Christianity. This made Christianity the 'higher' religion, because it had the Son of God as its leader. But Christianity itself suffered by being overwhelmed with the ancient Jewish traditions, some of which it was trying to distance itself from. The result of the merger was that the Jewish religion seized power through application of its existing structure, taking the name from the Christians, while the 'true' Christians lost the capacity to dispel unacceptable ideology So a large portion of the more "true" Christians ('true' at that time, prior to The Church defining 'true Christian') retreated into the mysticism provided for by Greek philosophy. You can see how Augustine comes from the mystical side, rather than the structured religious (Jewish) side.
That should read as the beginning of the conflict between them. Paul's Letter to the Hebrews was an eviction notice.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
There was plenty of mysticism around for all involved. Greek philosophy, it should be remembered, also provided a vision of a natural order that the Christian vision divided into separate realms. Augustine forged a third product from the legacies of the Greek and Jewish world, claiming ascendency over both. The City of God is a masterpiece of appropriation.
Quoting Paine
Gerson doesn't focus just on Plotinus, though he does refer extensively to him. This is (1) because Plotinus was the first to attempt to systematize Plato and (2) because Plotinus, like other Platonists, sometimes uses Aristotle to interpret Plato - and for very good reasons given that Aristotle was Plato's pupil for twenty years!
As shown in my previous post, Aristotle's framework is largely Platonic, which refutes the modern scholarly perception of Aristotle as an "anti-Platonist". I am quoting Gerson because he does a good job in exposing the flaws in the consensus perception and because I believe that any objective inquiry into the authentic teachings of Plato, Aristotle, and other ancient authors ought to begin by first eliminating the propaganda and disinformation.
Plato may not have a technical term for "disembodied self" but he does use phrases like "soul itself by itself", Aristotle speaks of "separable nous", etc. And since that soul (psyche) or (nous) – the terms are often used interchangeably - is said to be man's "true self", both by Plato and Aristotle, I think it is legitimate to refer to it as "disembodied self".
Gerson attempts to answer questions such as whether the surviving element is personal or impersonal, etc. in Knowing Persons: A Study in Plato.
To begin with, what is certain is that both Plato and Aristotle posit an immaterial, eternal entity that (1) forms part of embodied man’s person, (2) is man’s true self, and (3) survives the death of the physical body.
Among questions that still need to be settled is (1) how impersonal this surviving self is and (2) what is its exact relation to other such selves.
In other words, (1) does the surviving self retain any traces of “personality” such as memory and emotion, and (2) does it continue to exist as a separate unit or does it merge with other such selves or with a higher principle or entity?
In order to throw some light on this, we need to start from the stated assumption that this immaterial and immortal self, the nous, is a form of intelligence that has certain capacities or powers, such as consciousness, happiness, will-power, knowledge and action.
At the very least, as a live entity, the nous has the capacities to know and to act. Certainly, for Plato true knowledge is possible only in a disembodied state. This makes the disembodied nous a knower by definition.
As Gerson says:
This seems to be Aristotle’s position too. Not only because Aristotle’s framework is largely Platonic, but also if we consider the prevalent view at the time.
The general view in Ancient Greek religion was that part of a person’s embodied soul did indeed survive death, but that there was a big difference between different souls’ postmortem existence. Whilst ordinary souls lived a shadowy life in the darker recesses of the underworld (Hades), those who had distinguished themselves through extraordinary actions or knowledge, such as heroes and wise men led a happy and bright existence in the sunlit Isles of the Blessed (or Elysian Fields).
Knowledge and action, the very powers of the embodied self that determine its fate, are the same powers that define it once death has separated it from the physical body. Plato defines death as the separation of soul (nous) from body (Phaedo 67d ff). And at the level of separation from body, i.e., disembodied, intelligible existence, knowledge is a form of action and action is a form of knowledge.
Knowledge is the key to happiness both in this life and the next. Hence the emphasis both Plato and Aristotle place on knowledge and, in particular, self-knowledge, i.e., knowledge of one’s true identity as self-conscious (self-aware or self-reflexive) intelligence endowed with the powers of knowledge, action, and the rest.
As Gerson says, for Plato “self-knowledge consists in the recognition of one’s true identity as a subject of thought” and “even while embodied, our lives are all about being knowers”.
Obviously, those who have attained a state of self-knowledge, self-recognition, or self-realization, will experience a state not only of knowledge, but also of supreme happiness as unhappiness is merely the awareness of not being oneself. This is why Plato describes death for the self-realized philosopher not only as separation from body but also as a state of “release” (lysis). Indeed, he defines the practice of philosophy itself as “release and parting of soul from body”:
As Gerson observes, Plato here uses the ambiguity between metaphorical and literal dying to make a point that is central to his teaching:
Being oneself and being free from unhappiness are inextricably connected as is suggested, for example, by the happiness experienced in the state of deep sleep when the subject is completely free from worries and thoughts related to things other than itself.
Another way of testing this is to identify ourselves in thought with that in us that is “immortal, eternal, unaffected, perfect (i.e., not lacking anything), divine, and free”. The mere thought of it tends to result in a state of enhanced peace and happiness. Clearly, if this is the case when our consciousness is still overwhelmingly dominated by the physical surroundings, body, emotions, and thoughts, it will be even more the case when our consciousness is dominated by an actual awareness of ourselves as the immortal, unaffected, perfect, divine, and free intelligence or nous that is our true self.
But what happens in the case of those who fail to attain self-knowledge or correct self-identification?
Gerson says:
In sum, as in embodied life, everything in disembodied life, including happiness, revolves on the degree of self-identification with one’s true or ideal self. While this leads to higher states of experience, self-identification with things other than one’s true self lead to the opposite result and may involve repeated embodied life.
Aristotle criticizes the Pythagorean claim that a soul can transmigrate into random bodies, but it is far from clear that he rejects reincarnation itself, stating only that “as a craft must employ the right tools, so the soul must employ the right body” (De Anima 407b23). As reincarnation was a fairly widespread belief in philosophical circles at the time (which is why it appears in Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato), it seems likely that he accepted (or at least was not opposed to) some forms of the theory.
Quoting Wayfarer
Correct. And if an element has the capacity to survive, the same element might also have the capacity to transcend. The only difference being that ‘survival’ comes naturally, while ‘transcendence’ is something that needs to be learned or recognized. Plato refers to this when he emphasizes the need to detach oneself not only from the physical body, but also from sense-perceptions, desires, and feelings, and avoid attributing reality to them:
Though Plato here uses the word ‘soul’ (psyche), it is clear that when the self has detached itself from body, sense-perception, desires, and feelings, what is left is the rational ‘intellect’ or nous.
In any case, should a certain degree of detachment or ‘transcendence’ be not achieved, on the model of a just universe, this might render repeated embodied existence necessary. And if the transcendence process leads the self further and further away from what is not self, it is entirely conceivable that the final stage consists in some form of unity or union with a Higher Intelligence in which the individual self is itself transcended to give way to Ultimate Reality.
Correct. We mustn't forget that the Jewish world itself did not remain uninfluenced by Greek thought, culture, and language, which is why the OT was translated into Greek for Greek-speaking Jews and the NT was written in Greek for everyone who spoke Greek (i.e., the majority) in the eastern parts of the Roman Empire.
It's not the beginning of the conflict because Saul was already engaged in the persecution of the followers of Jesus, stoning them to death. The conflict began before Jesus was crucified, and his crucifixion was a part of that conflict. Paul acted to end that conflict by declaring to the Jews, of whom he was one, that Jesus is in fact the Son of God.
Quoting Apollodorus
There is another way to interpret this. The way I've been suggesting throughout this thread. And that is that human knowledge is necessarily deficient. The human being, as a soul united to a body, has a deficient form of knowledge, as the result of being united to a body. That is the interpretation which Aquinas gives us.
Quoting Apollodorus
This is inconsistent. If only a disembodied soul can obtain "true" knowledge, then the knowledge which a human being, with a material body, has, is distinctly different from the knowledge of a disembodied soul. So it's inconsistent to say that the embodied powers are " the same powers that define it once death has separated it".
In the citations I put forward on this topic here so far, Aristotle shows himself clearly interested in framing the question of mortality/immortality in the context of his own understanding of how causality works in the cosmos. He agrees with Plato (and others) on many observations but also works to see the agreements in terms he insists are better than his predecessors. Your citation of De Anima 407b is a good example of that practice because he is not directly challenging the Pythagorean idea of reincarnation there but the conditions necessary for it to be applicable:
Putting the matter that way means that Aristotle is not invested in naming every instance of the shortcomings of other thinkers. He is very interested in the borders of the eternal and mortal but demands that a particular order of logic and a lived experience of the world be brought into the discussion.
Quoting Wayfarer
How this issue relates to Aristotle is perhaps indicated here:
As far as the Aristotle quote goes, it's at least as plausible to talk about dogtricks being a 'substance' independent of the dogs that learn and eventually forget how to do these tricks. Dogs come and go, but a dog-culture of tricks remains, assuming no interruption of cultural transmission or the canine dog.
Similarly you can think of dancers and dances. An old body can lose its moves, but usually there's a young replacement body to keep the dance from dying, since the dancers can't be saved.
It is one thing to grasp the idea through skills living beyond a given generation but another to see how it applies to the very principle through which one understands themselves to be alive. Reproduce that.
That's the passage Appolodorus brought up earlier. The idea of the mind as an independent substance implanted in the soul is very doubtful. And, at this point, Aristotle is discussing in what way the soul moves, and in what way it might be moved. The last line, "that the soul cannot be moved is therefore clear from what we have said", seems to dismiss the idea of the mind being an independent substance implanted in the soul, which moves it.
It's not clear that 'principle through which one understands' isn't just some fancy word for the ability to learning. Will you grant an immortal substance to rats? Do direction-dancing bees get a piece?
That part of the argument relates to the overarching context of the passage which concerns how the cosmic status of the Soul relates to what is possible for particular individuals. In that regard, the concluding remark is not a qualification of the statements just made but the reverse. The limits of what is possible for composite beings informs the way universal principles work on the level of causes within the cosmos.
Yes, that is the way that the overall passage, and the concluding remark seem to fit into context of BK1 in general. But the remark is made at the end of that description of the relationship between mind and soul, and this description is oddly inserted into a discussion about how the soul can be the actual cause of movement, but it cannot itself be moved. Prior to your quoted passage, in Ch3, you'll see a discussion of Plato's Timaeus, and the idea of the soul being, or causing, a circular motion.
What is at question is how does the soul move the body. Aristotle gives Plato's account from the Timaeus, of harmonic numbers, and a bending of the straight line into circles. What I quote here is the end of the paragraph where Aristotle gives Plato's account, and the beginning of the next, where he proceeds to dismiss it. Pay particular attention to how he drives a wedge between "soul" as referring to the whole, and "mind".
[quote=On the Soul. 407a] All this [Plato's account] implies that the movements of the soul are identified with the local movement of the heavens.
Now, in the first place, it is a mistake to say that the soul is a spatial magnitude. It is evident that Plato means the soul of the whole to be like the sort of soul which is called mind --- not like the sensitive or desiderative soul, for the movements of neither of these are circular. Now mind is one and continuous in the sense that the process of thinking is so, and thinking is identical with the thoughts which are its parts; these have a serial unity like that of number, not a unity like that of a spatial magnitude. Hence mind cannot have that kind of unity either; mind is either without parts or is continuous in some other way than that which characterizes a spatial magnitude. How indeed, if it were a spatial magnitude, could it possibly think? Will it think with any one indifferently of its parts? In this case, the 'part' must be understood either in the sense of a spatial magnitude or in the sense of a point (if a point can be called a part of a spatial magnitude). If we accept the latter alternative, the points being infinite in number, obviously the mind can never traverse them; if the former the mind must think the same thing over and over again, indeed an infinite number of times (whereas it is manifestly possible to think a thing once only). [/quote]
Notice here that Aristotle has rejected Plato's description of the soul, as being like a "mind". Furthermore, he has rejected the whole idea of an eternal "mind" as fundamentally incoherent. To support the continuity required by the concept of "mind", the mind must either traverse an infinity of points, or think the same thing an infinite number of times. Both, as stated here, are impossible, therefore the concept of "mind" as such a continuity is incoherent. But he proceeds to discuss the possibility of mind thinking the same thing forever, as a type of circular movement, and demonstrates how this is not consistent with a description of actual thinking.
Therefore, I think that we can conclude that the closing sentence of the paragraph you quoted, is referring us back to the prior page, and this prior discussion of "mind". And, we can see that Aristotle is working to produce a concept of "soul" which is distinct from that earlier Greek concept of "mind", that he has found to be incoherent. The problem is exposed as describing the "mind", or the "soul" using spatial terms. Notice in the quoted passage that "serial unity" implies a temporal order, as the suggested replacement for "spatial magnitude".
Quoting Paine
So I believe that the reversal you propose here is quite mistaken. The difference between the knowledge which a material human being has, and the knowledge which a divine independent, separate soul is said to have, is the difference between universal forms, and particular forms. The human intellect, being deficient as united to a material body, understands through the means of universal forms. But the reality of the universe is that it exists as particulars. This marks the deficiency of the human intellect, the failure to grasp the accidentals which are proper to the uniqueness of the particulars of the universe. Aquinas proposed separate intellects, God and the angels, which being immaterial, and independent of matter, may apprehend the Forms of the particulars, complete with accidentals. He even proposed a temporal concept, "aeviternal", which serves as an intermediary between eternal and temporal, allowing for an actuality which moves the material world without itself being moved by the material world.
Therefore it is not as you suggest, "universal principles", which act as causes within the cosmos. "Universal principles" is the means by which the human intellect, a deficient intellect, being united to a material body, understands the cosmos. The true immaterial causes within the cosmos are, each and every one of them, unique and particular, and this is why each and every thing is unique and particular. And the human intellect understanding through universal forms lies trapped within this deficiency in its capacity to understand.
Sure. My point though was that he does not seem to reject the idea of reincarnation as such. Reincarnation was not a minor detail in the philosophical discourse of the time and it was closely linked to Plato's theories of immortality and the Forms expounded in the dialogues that were being discussed in the Academy. Had Aristotle rejected it, he would have done so explicitly.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The stated powers the nous has in the embodied state are the same powers it has in the disembodied state. The difference consists in the wider range those same powers can find application in the disembodied state, resulting in more accurate or "true" knowledge.
This is precisely why the body-mind compound is referred to as a "prison" or "tomb", as it prevents the nous from utilizing its powers to their full potential. For the same reason, separation from body-mind is referred to as "release" or "liberation" - which obviously implies release and liberation of the power to know and other powers already belonging to the released or liberated nous:
Otherwise said, once the power to know has been released from the restrictions or prison of embodied existence, it is able to know truly.
There is no "inconsistency" in this at all.
Doesn't this imply the homunculus behind the bodily prison bars? Isn't the noun then searching behind bars too?
The realistic interpretation is the one offered to us by Aquinas. A separate, independent, immaterial intellect, (a divine intellect), has a superior knowledge which is completely different from the knowledge of the human intellect, which is tainted by the human intellect's dependence on the material body.
Quoting Apollodorus
There is inconsistency in saying that the intellectual power which is united with a material body, is "the same power" as the intellectual power which is immaterial, independent, separate, and not united with a material body. That's like saying that the "form" which a material object has, which is united to that material object, making it what it is, as the unique and particular material object which it is, is the same "form" which is separate from the material object, existing in the mind of the knower. Notice that these two senses of "form" are distinguished from one another by the accidentals of material existence. The material object has a "form" as a particular, and within the human mind is a "form" as a universal. A particular is not the same as a universal, therefore we cannot say that they are "the same".
Well, you seem to have some kind of fixation with Aquinas. The reality, of course, is that Aquinas is a Christian who is trying hard to put his own spin on Classical authors. Plato and Aristotle are not Christians. There may be similarities, but their systems are NOT the same as Christianity. IMO it is delusional and dishonest to claim otherwise.
And no, there is no inconsistency in saying that the powers of disembodied nous are the same as those of embodied nous.
As you can see for yourself, the powers I was referring to are consciousness, happiness, will-power, knowledge and action:
Quoting Apollodorus
It is absurd to claim that embodied nous does not have these powers and only acquires them on becoming disembodied. If this were the case, (1) man wouldn't be human and not even alive, and (2) the analogy of the entombed or imprisoned soul would be nonsense and no one would speak of "release" and "liberation" as there would be nothing to release or liberate .... :smile:
Aquinas offers what I believe to be by far the most comprehensive interpretation of Aristotle, and possibly Plato as well, with comparison to numerous other ancient philosophers. He makes Gerson appear to be speaking from an introductory level of education. I'm sorry for being blunt, but it's rather obvious, and your comment implies that you do not notice this.
Quoting Apollodorus
You might assert this as many times as you like, but until you address the arguments, your assertions have no significance, impose no influence, and bear no fruit.
Quoting Apollodorus
What you have stated there, are the features of the embodied intellect, "consciousness, happiness, will-power, knowledge and action". What is absurd is to say that an immaterial existence, eternal and immutable, has these same features.
Of course you believe Aquinas to be "by far the most comprehensive interpretation of Aristotle and Plato". Hardly anyone here could have failed to notice your uncritical commitment to everything that Aquinas says.
However, something doesn't become fact just because you believe it. That's why Plato draws a clear distinction between belief and knowledge.
And it's got nothing to do with Gerson. It is simply a matter of reading the original texts as they are, without putting a spin on them or dismissing whole chapters for being "inconsistent" with the reader's preconceived ideas.
Your comments seem to imply that you are denying some basic and generally acknowledged facts. A person’s power of optic perception or sight, for example, may operate differently in different surroundings. In a prison cell, one might see some light through a small window, but outside the cell one will see the direct sun light and even its source (the sun) itself, together with all the objects it illuminates: the sky, the earth, the sea, and everything else under the sun.
Hence Plato’s Analogy of the Cave. The power of sight does not become a different power. What changes is its range and the object of sight which is seen “truly”, i.e., as it is in the real world outside the cave.
The same applies to the power of knowledge. The human nous according to Plato begins by having power of knowledge by means of which it has knowledge of higher realities such as Ideas or Forms. Next, it assumes embodied form which restricts its power of knowledge and range of things it knows. Finally, on escaping embodied existence, it can deploy its natural powers to their full extent. Hence Plato’s Recollection Argument and the tomb or prison analogy:
Obviously, if the soul or nous has knowledge prior to embodied existence, it must also have consciousness of that knowledge, otherwise it could have no recollection of it.
It follows that the powers of consciousness, knowledge, etc. are features of the nous whether embodied or not, exactly as described by Plato. Bringing Aquinas into it doesn't change anything about what the text says. Not only that, but if you deny to disembodied nous basic powers like consciousness and knowledge, you deny its very existence and your position becomes no better than that of the materialists.
There is a distinction being made here between nous and the psyche. To infer that is for the purpose of rejecting "the whole idea of an eternal "mind" as fundamentally incoherent" runs into the fundamental problem that Aristotle keeps referring to precisely that idea throughout his writings. The psyche is the active principle in living beings. Some forms of life are capable of intellect. Since that active element is said to be separable and eternal, Aristotle asks whether the inquiry of the psyche is for the "student of nature" or the "dialectician." At 403b he tries to sort out the overlapping areas of concern by saying:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
I am not proposing a reversal of a property but observing the role of the statement in Aristotle's argument. The passage I quoted at 408b starts with "The case of the mind is different." What it is different from is the argument that started at 408a30 which distinguishes the soul from the vehicle it is in. The vehicle can move in space but that is not the soul that is moving. Regarding the experience of man, the lack of motion of the soul is put thusly:
The sharp contrast between saying the nous is self-moving while the psyche is not, places the problem squarely in the wheelhouse of first philosophy while also not trespassing the causal formula Aristotle demands for 'combined' beings. The latter is the language which one can use to describe beings that "exist as particulars." That was the purpose of my previous entries of Aristotle, to point to the need to separate talk about combined beings from other ways to talk about Forms and Entities.
On the level of the cosmic order as a whole, the way that neither nous nor psyche can be made entirely the part of the other is recognized as a problem in the narrative of the Timaeus but not resolved there. Aristotle does not explain it away somewhere.
With the above distinctions applied to what 'universal principles' might mean, I don't understand your last paragraph. It seems to me that you are blowing past boundaries Aristotle went to great effort to put in place. He is trying to make the question harder for us, not easier.
Do you really believe that idealism is true. I thought that you were a physicalist. I am definitely not a materialist. Generally, I think that the relationship between mind and body is complex, and I do have some sympathy with non dualism. However, I do find that my thinking on the matter fluctuates and where I think that mind is the main source of everything. I definitely find Eastern philosophy helpful, although from what I gather there is dispute over mind and matter in Buddhism.
Within esoteric thinking there is a tradition of seeing mind as more real. Plato's idea of the Forms suggests that ideas exist beyond the physical world. Also, the physicist, David Bohm, considered that beyond the physical world, the explicate order, there is the implicate order, which is a bit like the idea of Plato's forms. From what I have read of science, it seems that it does come up with clear answers about whether the body or mind are more real. Physics, which is like the master of the physical sciences because other sciences are lead by it, seems to be about models and interpretations and it does seem that the metaphysical imagination comes into play in the process of theories being developed initially.
Previously in this thread I referred to a passage in a standard textbook on Aquinas, which I felt provided a pithy description of the meaning of hylomorphism in Thomist-Aristotelian philosophy. It was dismissed out-of-hand as 'wrong'. I asked a few more questions, but then decided not to engage further with this contributor. FWIW.
As you're an avid reader, check this out.
Thanks, I had a quick read through of the article and it is very interesting so I will probably read it again more slowly. I definitely like the term cognitive narcissism, because I think that it is applicable to the fascinating with psychology.
My main understanding of Eastern metaphysics was based on Hinduism which I did a term module on when I was a student and it was based on Theravada Buddhism. I am also influenced by Rudolf Steiner some theosophy and have read books by Benjamin Creme. Have you read anything by Creme, he has some extraordinary ideas, but I have attended workshops on transmission meditation. This was the meditation which he developed and even though I am not sure that it really involves channeling down energies from the Masters, I found it to be the best form of meditation I have come across.
:roll:
I have found this essay of Gerson's that works at giving an 'Aristotelian' basis for speaking of a 'disembodied person.' It is an impressive bit of scholarship and the footnotes taught me things I did not know. But I think he solves a problem (the two intellects versus one) that was never a problem if one understood identification of causes as Aristotle intended.
I actually meant Theravada Hinduism but there is a fair amount of overlap between Hinduism and Buddhism, which makes sense considering that Buddhism developed from Hinduism. I have read some of Hegel's writings. I have definitely got to the point of thinking that percep)tion is of major importance and hope to read more phenomenology.
I read Karl Popper's, 'Knowledge and the Body-Mind Problem' last week which looks at the complexity of the mind and body relationship. One main argument which he developed is based on the idea of emergent evolution. He suggests that, 'The novel structures which emerge always interact with the basic structure of physical states from which they emerge. The controlling system interacts with the controlled system. Mental states interact with the physiological states. And world 3 interacts with world 2, and through it with world 1.
You, Appolodorus have opted for the belief that the intellect , or "mind" is an immaterial power. Therefore the comparison with sight, which is a power dependent on the material body, will not work for you. If you accept the belief that the human intellect is a power dependent on the material body, as I've explained, then we can make the comparison with sight. However, by doing this we forfeit the idea that a human intellect, or "mind" can continue to exist after the death of the material body.
Since you make mind distinct from sight in this way, you cannot even claim to have an understanding of Plato's cave analogy, as you leave mind as being incomparable with sight. The comparison can only be made if you understand mind as a power of the soul, just like sight, but then mind becomes dependent on the material body, just like sight. That's why the intelligible objects, as intelligible, are dependent on "the good", and not absolutely independent.
Quoting Apollodorus
You are making the mistake of equating "soul" and "mind". Making the separation between these two concepts is exactly what Aristotle spends a significant portion of De Anima doing.
Quoting Paine
It is not a "fundamental problem", nor is it in any way strange or unusual, to refer over and over again to the idea which you are refuting or discrediting. Any idea to be rejected or refuted, must be fully exposed, and all of its weaknesses laid bare, well explained and left unprotected, in order that the idea may be properly understood, so that it may be rejected.
This we find in Plato's treatment of Pythagorean idealism. Plato draws out this form of idealism, explains the theory of participation which supports it, and in the meantime he exposes the weakness of participation. The untrained philosopher, who does not thoroughly read a significant portion of Plato's work, and perhaps along with a study of the work of Aristotle, who was a student of Plato, might think that Plato was doing what he could to support Pythagorean idealism. But this would be a mistake, not seeing that Plato, with the method of Socratic skepticism, was actually working to expose its weaknesses.
We see this in Aristotle's references to 'prime matter'. Many modern philosophers will insist that Aristotle supported the idea of 'prime matter'. But it's very clear from Bk9 of his metaphysics, in what is called the cosmological argument, that he rejects "prime matter'. And all those before him whom he has discussed as employing this idea, are dismissed as misdirected in this idea.
Now, It is clear from the passage I quoted from De Anima, that Aristotle rejects this idea of the mind moving itself through eternal circular motion. He attributes this idea of the mind moving itself to Plato's Timaeus, and he rejects it, for the reasons given in the quoted passage. The description is spatial, and that which is immaterial cannot be described in spatial terms.
But then, in Bk10-12 of Metaphysics, the same idea, circular motion of the mind, seems to be accepted. When I took a course on Aristotle's Metaphysics in university, the professor told us that it was debatable as to whether Aristotle actually wrote this part. He attributed the writing to some other (unknown) Neo-Platonist, and so we did not study it with the rest of the text.
Quoting Paine
You are neglecting the part which I quoted, which is at 407, prior to 408. Here, it is explained why "the case of the mind is different". The case of the mind is different because the mind is said to move itself, in an eternal circular motion. As such, it has no need for the soul, or psyche, as the active principle. The mind in this conception is properly independent, as self-moving. But this is the idea which Aristotle is rejecting. He wants to place the soul first, and not have the mind as independent sort of soul. If the mind is a self-moving sort of soul, then it has no need for the "soul" as Aristotle is defining, as the source of activity. That would separate "soul" in the sense of mind from "soul" in the sense of first actuality of a living body.
And it's very evident from the last line of the passage you quoted "That the soul cannot be moved is therefore clear from what we have said, and if it cannot be moved at all, manifestly it cannot be moved by itself." This is clear reference to the previously explained conception of "mind" as a self-moving eternal circular motion. And it excludes thus sense of "mind" from being a soul, rendering the concept useless.
Quoting Paine
But this expresses a misunderstanding. The Platonic notion of a self-moving nous is dismissed at 407a, in the passage I quoted, and it's discredited further through 407b. So the point at 408b is that the soul does not move the body in the way proposed by the Platonists, as a self-moving mind. This leaves the question of how the soul actually moves the body as completely unanswered. And we leave Bk1 in that condition.
Quoting Paine
As we proceed through Bk2 and 3, an explanation is provided. This is the actual/potential division. The way that the soul moves the body is by means of the powers, which are potentials. The potentials are not naturally active, they need to be actualized. So I do not think it is the case that we consider one to be a part of the other, but they exist in this relationship which is the active/potential relationship of hylomorphism, matter/form.
Quoting Paine
I don't understand this. What boundaries are you referring to? And why do think that Aristotle would want to make things more difficult for us? Do you recognize the two distinct senses of "form" in Aristotle, as I described?
Maybe I was too blunt, and I apologize for that. But I'm well informed on Aristotelian hylomorphism and it's not like what you were presenting. The problem with what you presented, concerning "sense knowledge", is that we do not ever get the form of the particular through the senses. (That's what Kant pointed to with the phenomenon/noumenon distinction.) We always get an abstracted form, and the form of the particular, complete with accidents, stays united with the material object. This is why our knowledge of particulars is always incomplete, as Kant pointed out.
[quote=https://www.britannica.com/topic/hylomorphism] hylomorphism, (from Greek hyl?, “matter”; morph?, “form”), in philosophy, metaphysical view according to which every natural body consists of two intrinsic principles, one potential, namely, primary matter, and one actual, namely, substantial form. [/quote]
Well hello, and to answer your question, it seems likely there are no absolute truths, only truths in context.
One of the biggest problems newer sciences have run into is that they don't meet the strict guidelines for defining 'scientific truth' as defined by Popper, that is, that hypotheses must be falsifiable. What I observed as the commencement of this in the USA was a particular effort by atheists to counter Creationist beliefs by extending the 'theory of evolution' so much it has in fact become unfalsifiable. With its most recent bells and whistles, such as 'soft selection,' there doesn't even need to be selection pressure to explain the evolution of characteristics with no competitive advantage. Thus it can explain everything, and nothing can refute the theory anymore. In prior generations that would have been regarded as transforming evolution itself into a religion.
However with the glut of people working in the sciences, there has also been a selection pressure on science to dissolve the necessities of corroboration of a hypothesis against results of a valid control group, because in 'soft sciences' such as psychology and sociology there exists no possibility of testing against a valid control. So now statistical variations are simply sought for their meaningfulness, and if a statistical result is shown not to be random, it is immediately touted as 'proof' for some new 'truth.'
Even so it's still regarded as the same 'scientific truth' as for Popperian hard sciences, which seems to me wrong. I was going to write a dissertation on that, but due to covid and declining health I had to abandon my hopes for returning to university. But I wish someone would pick up that cause, because 'truth' has become a real problem even in the scientific arena where it should have been the most secure.
Not blunt, as in brusque, but blunt, as in not sufficiently sharp. But, no apology required. :-)
I'd say blunt as in direct, not blunt as in something you smoke.
The question of how to understand the passive and active intellect is very interesting, and one I believe has never been satisfactorily answered. Aquinas wanted to hold the immateriality of the intellect, but there was a problem with the passive aspect of intellect, passivity being associated with matter. I believe he ended up proposing a passivity which is not material, to maintain the immateriality of the intellect, thus allowing for the disembodied intellect which Apollodorus clings to. Augustine has as good a representation of the human intellect as anyone, with his tripartite intellect (in comparison with the Holy Trinity). It consists of memory, reason or understanding, and will. I don't think he avoids the problem of passivity though because memory appears to be a passive aspect.
The assumption that there are "two intellects" occurs about as frequently as the assumption that there are "two (or more) kinds of knowledge" or "three parts of the soul", etc. Gerson does indeed debunk many of these misconceptions.
On the "two intellects", he says:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This isn't about me "opting" for anything. The nous is described as immaterial by Plato and Aristotle, and as having the powers mentioned in my comment.
You have admitted that intellect is immaterial and that it has the power of knowledge:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
And you are contradicting yourself by denying that the intellect has those powers:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
As for your dogmatic insistence on reading Plato and Aristotle through Aquinas, what can I say? Plato lived from 428 to 348 BC. Aquinas lived from 1225 to 1274 AD, i.e., more than a millennium and a half after Plato. It is absurd to claim that ancient readers of Plato and Aristotle were ignorant of what they were reading and had to wait more than fifteen centuries for Aquinas to tell them!
It is evident from Plato’s Timaeus (30a ff.) that Intellect (in the form of Creator-God) possesses the powers of consciousness, happiness, will, knowledge, and action.
1. It has consciousness as it is aware of the pre-cosmic chaos.
2. Will-power as it makes a conscious and purposeful decision to impose order on the chaos and create the universe.
3. Knowledge of the divine model on which he creates the universe.
4. Power of action which it uses to create the universe.
5. Power of happiness as it rejoices at its own creation.
Incidentally, the Creator-God’s divine model is often described in translations as an “intelligible animal”, “intelligible creature” or "living animal". However, the fact is that the word “zoon” here does not mean animal at all but model, this being the term normally used for an artist’s real-life model. The artist himself in Greek is called “zographos” (zoos-graphos), literally, one who paints or draws from real life (as opposed to one who draws from imagination). Therefore, the correct translation of noeton zoon (30c) is “(real) intelligible model”.
In any case, it is obviously incorrect to say that the immaterial and eternal has none of the powers that even embodied intelligence (nous) has.
Aristotle himself says that the Intellect’s activity is the cause of the universe (Physics 198a10-13), that the activity of the Gods which is supremely happy is a form of contemplation (Nicomachean Ethics 1178b20), etc., etc., all of which clearly indicates that intelligence has those powers, indeed, it is those powers.
As Aristotle puts it:
As I said, remove those powers from disembodied intelligence and you succumb to materialism. That’s where your “interpretation” of Plato and Aristotle takes you to. But do carry on, by all means .... :grin:
Hello, I think that you are new to the forum, so I welcome you and hope that you find a lot of helpful discussion. What is good here is that there is a lot of diversity of thought on what the 'truth' is. As you may have discovered if you have read some of this thread there is questioning of science rather simply people being blinded and mystified by its power.
As far as the the relationship between science and religion, it is complex, and I have struggled with it. I don't consider myself as an atheist but have a general interest in religious experience. When I first learned the story of evolution at school, by a teacher who said that he was an atheist, when I was about 9 or 10, I was horrified because I was being brought up by a Catholic family. I requested to be sent to a Catholic school and I stayed in Catholic schools until I was 18. But, what I discovered by about the age of 13 or 14 was that some of the Catholic teachers believed in evolution or were struggling with knowing how to evaluate it.
I found that the English teacher helped me to make sense of it. He explained how the nature of scripture and Biblical narratives are so different. 'The Book of Genesis' is not like newspaper journalism. It was based on mythical and folklore traditions, which were written down. The authors had not witnessed the creation of the world in 7 days and an actual Adam or Eve. So much is symbolic; but that represents a different kind of 'truth', rather than literal.
So, generally, I think that the story of evolution is definitely important, but it probably doesn't represent the whole truth. One of my own interest is in the evolution of consciousness and culture, and this is extremely complex. Science is important, yet all theories, like stories and metaphors are models. It is worth trying to modify them in line with empirical evidence, although it is important to be aware that they are only models and may have big gaps.
The resemblance between dreaming and idealism is interesting. It conjures up ideas of solipsim and the idea of 'Maya' and everyday 'reality' being an illusion. It does lead to the questioning of the philosophy of realism, and how ideas of objective 'reality' can be established. I see it as an interesting area of speculation, but I am sure that some people may come up with more 'definitive' answers.
If this is Aristotle's intention, why is it placed in Book 1 of De Anima, devoted to the criticism of his predecessors' views of the soul, and not in Book Lambda of the Metaphysics, where the immovable mover is shown to be the first principle of all? In chapter 6 of the same book, Aristotle approaches the models of his predecessors with this observation (1071b12): "So there is no gain even if we posit eternal substances, like those who posit the Forms, unless there is in them a principle which can cause a change" (translated by H.G. Apostle). On this basis, Aristotle says:
It seems like your interpretation should appear somewhere in this discussion if it is what Aristotle intended to say.
The separation you are calling for also makes it difficult to understand De Anima, Book 3, Chapter 4. In that chapter, the role of the intellect, as expressed in certain kinds of souls, is presented side by side with the view of an activity not conditioned by that role.
I am beginning to feel guilty about the extent I am discussing Aristotle on the basis of your OP. Would you prefer this sort of thing happen in a different tree house?
And you live in 2022. Why should I listen to anything you say about these ancient writers then?
Quoting Paine
I don't see your point. The nature of the soul, and its relation to mind is exactly what Aristotle is discussing at this point in De Anima Bk1. I gave you the quote. His discussion of the 'mind soul' and his dismissal of that idea of a self-moved, eternal circular motion, goes on for about three pages. He very clearly discredits this idea in a number of ways. It's right there for you to read, but you'd prefer to ignore it.
The text called "Metaphysics" consists of a scattered bunch of writings put together by others, long after Aristotle's death. That's why I said, it's debatable as to whether Book Lambda was actually even written by Aristotle. Some conclude it was written by an unknown Neo-Platonist. This is probably because it is inconsistent with Aristotle's dismissal of this Platonist principle, in "De Anima", at the point of my reference, and "De Anima" is known to be Aristotle's work, while this debated idea is clearly a Platonist principle.
Quoting Paine
Yes, this is the difficult part. Notice here that mind is potentially anything, but not actually anything until after it thinks. 429a,24 & 429b,31. But even after the man becomes a man of science, and the mind has thought a set of possible objects, such that the man can now exercise that power, "its condition is still one of potentiality, but in a different sense from the potentiality which preceded the acquisition of knowledge by learning or discovery: the mind too is then able to think itself." 428b 8-9. So even after learning, the mind is still described as a "potential".
Now we know that in Aristotle's physics, what has the characteristic of potential, is matter. And at "De Anima" Bk3, Ch4, he is comparing the mind's activity to sensation which is explicitly described as dependent on the body. But on this page here, Aristotle states that "...the faculty of sensation is dependent upon the body, mind is separable from it." 429b, 4. He provides justification for this statement, and I will say that his justification is weak.
However, this point, that the power of the intellect is described as a potential is also what gave Aquinas trouble, as I said in my last post in my reply to Wayfarer, because potential is associated with matter. Aquinas as well, wanted to maintain the immateriality of the intellect, and if I remember correctly his solution was to propose a type of "potential", distinct from matter. Notice in my quoted passage from Aristotle, there is two senses of "potentiality" referred to.
The problem now, is that by Aristotle's cosmological argument, anything eternal must be actual. So even if the mind is assigned some type of potentiality other than matter, it is still excluded from the category of eternal because it is a potentiality.
I don't object in any way to you discussing Aristotle here. His ideas are very important, especially in relation to science.
So, when we discussed Plato you derided me for interpreting Plato through an Aristotelian perspective. Now we discuss Aristotle, and my interpretation of Aristotle is what you call "through Aquinas". Let's just call it what it is, 'my perspective'. And the fact is that I've read a lot of material from many great philosophers, and I do not rely on one only, to produce my metaphysical perspective.
Quoting Jack Cummins
A significant way, in which science loses track of the truth, is that the scientific mind neglects, or even outright denies the importance of the individual. This has occurred as a very complex process, but we see first the trend toward understanding everything, even the actions of individual human beings, through universal formulae. Then, evolutionary theory has replaced the will to survive, which is evident in the individual, with a fictional survival of the species; the "individual" now being an individual species. But you can see how the will to survive cannot be logical transferred to a will of the species to survive. The desire of the individual to survive is expressed in ideas about an immortal soul, not in the longevity of the human species.
To make matters worse, mathematical axioms have been formulated which allow an interpretation which provides that if two things are equal they are actually the same thing. That's an interpretation of the law of identity which involves an inversion fallacy. The law of identity would allow that one and the same thing is equal to itself, but not necessarily that two equal things are the same thing. So we now lose the law of identity as fundamental to logic, and the principle which dictates the reality of a particular, individual, inanimate object is obscured to us. Therefore we have physicists who see a quantum of energy emitted here, and a quantum of energy absorbed over there, who insist that because these are equal amounts of energy they must be "the same photon", without being able to demonstrate the continued existence of said "photon" in the meantime.
"But all that can be made out of the elements of a quantum is a quantum, not a substance." Aristotle On the Soul Bk1, Ch5, 410a, 21
These mistakes in science lead to contradictory metaphysical principles by those who insist that science is the be all and end all of knowledge. A common expression of one such contradiction is a principle of pragmatism, stated something like "a difference which doesn't make a difference". You can see how this somewhat common philosophical expression is actually contradictory, because in order for someone to apprehend something as "a difference", it is necessary that it has already made a difference.
I have been disagreeing with your interpretation of its purpose in the text. It doesn't match what Aristotle says later in De Anima. You discredit references to cosmology outside the book where the differences between actuality and potentiality are discussed in detail in relation to first causes.
There is nothing more I can contribute to this discussion. I will put my efforts elsewhere.
You are simply refusing to accept the facts of what is written, and the logical conclusion derived from them. I've addressed what is said "later in De Anima". And, I've addressed what has been stated in cosmology "outside the book where the differences between actuality and potentiality are discussed in detail in relation to first causes".
So, I'll recap below, (1) what is said at the disputed reference. (2) What is said later in De Anima. And (3) what is said in cosmology outside the book:
1) Aristotle discredits the Platonic idea of a mind soul, which is supposed to an eternal circular motion of a mind thinking of itself, "De Anima" Bk1 Ch3. The basis of this dismissal is that the proposed sort of actuality, a circular motion, is not properly non-spatial, and therefore cannot adequately represent an immaterial substance.
2) The human mind is described as a potential, both prior to learning, and after learning. "De Anima" Bk3, Ch4, 429b 5-9.
3) No potential is eternal. "Metaphysics" Bk9, Ch8: "But (b) actuality is prior in a stricter sense also; for eternal things are prior in substance to perishable things, and no eternal thing exists potentially. The reason is this. ..." 1050b 7
I never said you should listen to what I say. What I did say is that the original texts should be read as they are:
Quoting Apollodorus
By your own admission, you are dismissing everything in the texts that is inconvenient to your preconceived opinion:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Etc., etc.
IMO it is simply wrong to dismiss whole passages and chapters as "mistakes" and to call the author "misguided".
A more logical approach is to look into whether the passages you are choosing to dismiss can be read in a way that makes them consistent with the rest of the text. This is what Platonists like Plotinus and Proclus are doing and so do scholars like Gerson (see Aristotle and Other Platonists).
Unfortunately, you are unable to do that because you are committed to an "interpretation" of the text that requires dismissing too many parts of the text. This is why you aren't convincing anyone.
So, frankly, I think you are flogging a dead horse there. But, as I said, feel free to carry on. I’ve got other things to do …. :smile:
Well this is my bone lol. What has happened is a split between the Academy of Science and the AAS, emobied by this definition split in the Wikipedia:
i really object to the statement in bold. It's quite clear you understand why, lol.
I guess that what you are talking about is scientific fundamentalism which can be as concrete as religious fundamentalism. It just leaves no scope for further thinking. It may be that the process of evolution is nearer to what happened in the sense that it didn't take place in 7 days and there was no actual Adam and Eve. However, there is a lot which still remains unknown, especially the evolution of culture and language. It also appears that rather than some of the earliest people being 'primitive' some of the ancient people were very advanced, such as the in the civilisation of Egypt and Greece. As far as I am aware there is some evidence of a flood, and, of course, there is a lot not known, such as ice ages.
The matters are clear to you, so my objections are merely proof of my incapacity. I have no objection to that sort of rhetoric as such. I would have continued on that basis if I understood what you are convinced of.
When I piece together what you ascribe to Aristotle, I don't understand it as a thought by itself.
By way of contrast, I disagree with many things Gerson asserts. He is not around to answer my challenges, but I understand what he is saying. I don't understand what you are saying. You have a vivid image of something and I cannot make it out.
Hey, that's philosophy. When an author states unacceptable principles, we reject them, regardless of how revered the person is.
Thanks for the consideration. There are many different facets to the ideas at play here. The key principle is time. That's what validates the potential/actual distinction. Understanding the potential /actual distinction as a temporal distinction is the key point to the image I have. Notice in the passage I quoted from "De Anima" Bk1, Ch3, Aristotle rejected eternal circular motions because that was a spatial representation, whereas he said thoughts have a "serial unity". The serial order is a temporal order and the cause of the unity is something outside the order itself.
The "eternal circles" produces a conception of "eternal" which can be described as a never ending (infinite) process. But when we look to the serial order, as a temporal order, there is a need to assume something outside of time, as the cause of the temporal order. In this case "eternal" means outside of time. Metaphysically, these two are very different. And when we apprehend the need for a cause which is outside of time, we cannot avoid the need to reassess our conception of time. Being enamoured by the eternal circular motions makes us blind to that need.
To expound a little bit more, the question of what happens to the soul after death is premature from my perspective. It's a question which we cannot even look at, because we do not have the relevant knowledge required to even make it an intelligible question. The soul is seen as the cause of the body, in the sense of being what actualizes that potential. Therefore that question is like asking what happens to the cause, after the effect. Well, the answer is that the cause is in the past. Unfortunately, we do not have a conception of time which provides even so much as the minimum requirement toward understanding what it means to be in the past.
The closest thing we have, that I know of, is Aquinas' "aeviternal". If you read what he says about time and eternity, he distinguishes "eternity" as the measurement of being the same, "immutable", from "time" as the measurement of change. This distinction allows that we can understand an object or a being, as having both a permanence of being, as well as change annexed to it, in so far as it recedes from that permanence. In order that we can relate these two distinct types of measurement, (the logical permanence of being, or truth, having been demonstrated by Aristotle as incommensurable with change), it is necessary to posit a medium, or "mean", between them (in a similar way as Plato proposed passion or spirit as the medium between body and mind). So Aquinas proposed aeviternal as the mean, and this concept allows for the reality of, and the further development of "a point in time".
https://www.newadvent.org/summa/1010.htm
The final question in this referred section, whether there is one aeviternity or many, has important relevance. If all spiritual substances have an equality in relation to God, then each has its own distinct relation to eternity, thereby being a distinct aeviternity. But if there is a hierarchy of spiritual substances, one would be nearest to God and eternity, making that the one true aeviternity which all others are related to.
Aquinas chooses the latter on the basis of his understanding of "equality". He believed that the distinction between individual things proceeds directly from God, as matter is directly created by God. But I don't think his conclusion is sound. The reason for this, is that we need to account for the scale of higher or lower by which inequalities are judged to produce a hierarchy, higher or lower. If that scale is not related directly to God, rather than conceiving of it as relations between the various spiritual substances, then the relations become arbitrary, without a grounding principle. In other words, the "inequality" of being which proceeds directly from God, in His creation of matter, must have inherent within it, the principles for higher and lower because God as eternal, is the one principle which encompasses the whole of created being, or permanence. So the scale must be based in eternity or permanence, giving each spiritual substance a position relative to eternity, each constituting a distinct aeviternity as a mean between permanence and change, the points on the scale being each related to the overarching principle, rather than to each other..
Well, you can twist it as much as you want. :smile:
The fact is I wasn't talking about "unacceptable principles". I was talking about your admitted method of dismissing passages from one author because they are "inconsistent" with your spurious interpretation of other passages from the same author, while disregarding the very real possibility that the cause of the "inconsistency" may lie in your faulty interpretation.
Gerson shows how such misinterpretations can arise and how they can lead to passages or chapters being dismissed by those who misinterpret them. This has nothing to do with "philosophy" but with an inability (or unwillingness, in some cases) to correctly understand the authors in question.
More generally, you are using Aristotle to attack Plato, Aquinas to attack Plato and Aristotle, etc. This is a pattern we’ve seen before and I think we know where it is coming from ....
I was talking about unacceptable principles. When an author whom a person respects to a great level, proposes unacceptable principles, like eternal circular motions for example, then one must dig deep within that author's work to uncover the reasons for that mistake.
You can approach this with the attitude that eternal circular motions is completely consistent with all of Aristotle's work, in which case we'd have to reject all his work as being based in an unacceptable principle, or we can look to see where this principle is inconsistent with the rest of his work, and keep the rest. Or do you happen to believe that eternal circular motions is an acceptable principle?
Quoting Apollodorus
The fact that I back up my so-called "spurious interpretation' with reference to other well respected philosophers, and you do not, indicates that it is more likely that your interpretation is faulty, rather than that mine is faulty. And this is exactly the problem. You imply that referencing Aristotle when explaining Plato's philosophy, and referencing Aquinas when explaining Aristotle's philosophy, a procedure which indicates a well educated interpretation, is more likely to produce a faulty interpretation than a completely uneducated reading.
Quoting Apollodorus
It's possible that there is a misinterpretation, but it's also possible that the author is mistaken. Therefore, we refer to other well educated philosophers to consult with their interpretations. You seem to think that it's wrong to consider the possibility that the author is mistaken, and therefore wrong to consult the interpretations of others.
Quoting Apollodorus
This is nonsense, pure and simple. Each and every philosopher makes some good points and some bad points. We are all only human, and no human being can have perfection in one's philosophy. So we take the good points and we reject the bad. However, the good and the bad must be demonstrated as such, and this is called justification. That a philosopher like myself accepts the majority of another philosopher's work, yet rejects some fringe aspects, and produces demonstrations as to why these fringe aspects are inconsistent with the majority of the work, does not constitute a matter of attacking the other philosopher. It's just a realization, and acceptance of the fact, that no human being is perfect in one's philosophy. So we need to proceed with due diligence in our justifications.
That's exactly the kind of argument that Fooloso4 would come up with. Apparently, we had to accept everything he said because he had "the degrees to show that he was right". :smile:
You have backed up your interpretation with nothing but more of your own baseless interpretations and opinions which, as others have noted, are pretty incoherent and make no sense.
As I already pointed out a few pages back (page 6), there is no reason why Aristotle’s “eternal circular motion” should be deemed less acceptable than the Christian idea of God as “an old man sitting on a throne in the sky”, for example:
Quoting Apollodorus
You chose not to answer my point (and many others) for the obvious reason that an honest and objective answer would have instantly demolished your untenable position.
The fact is that if Aristotle’s principles are “unacceptable” from a Thomist perspective, Aquinas’ principles may be equally unacceptable from other perspectives, e.g., of modern science, Marxism, or Islam.
If your argument is that Aquinas is scientifically acceptable but Plato and Aristotle are not, your argument or claim proves absolutely nothing except your own personal bias. You may call it “educated interpretation”, but I think objective observers can see it for what it is, namely anti-Platonist and anti-Aristotelian disinformation and propaganda.
Except for one thing. He never would say something like this.
Quoting Apollodorus
Aristotle was ahead of his time! He already contemplated the perfect clock, present in the state of the universe before inflation.
I don't appeal to my "degrees" in my justification, I appeal to what has been written by respected authors, to justify my interpretation.
Quoting Apollodorus
This statement completely contradicts what you have accused me of, interpreting Plato through Aristotle, and interpreting Aristotle through Aquinas. Obviously, if they were my "own baseless interpretations and opinions, your accusations that I interpret one through another, would hold no weight. So which is it that you believe? Do you think these are my own baseless interpretations? Or do you think that I interpretate through reference to others? Or is it just the case that you are irritated and incensed by the fact that I've validly demonstrated your interpretations to be off the mark, and now you have nothing but ad hominem to resort to?
Quoting Apollodorus
I've yet to come across this Christian theology which talks about “an old man sitting on a throne in the sky”. Care to provide a reference?
Quoting Apollodorus
I didn't answer it because it's not part of any theology I've ever come across. And so I ignored it as a farce. Until you provide some respectable theology which portrays God in this way, I will continue to treat it as a totally ridiculous strawman.
Quoting Apollodorus
The unacceptability of eternal circular motions is described by Aristotle in De Anima Bk1, Ch3, in the passage I quote earlier. The reason given in that passage is that it is a spatial representation of something which is supposed to be immaterial. He also gives other reasons in that chapter, it's best if you read the entire chapter.
If you claim Aquinas' principles "may be equally unacceptable", then I'd expect you to give the reasons why. That is exactly what I did in my last post where I expressed my opinion that a particular principle stated by Aquinas appears to be wrong:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Quoting Apollodorus
Say what you like, but I think it's obvious that you see my expressions as anti-Appolodorus propaganda, and that's what pisses you off.
Now they are something else!
"A communist-catholic conspiracy"
"Juvenile deviationism"
"A disquieting sign of primitive mentality"
Bohm himself was said to be "a fool", "a Trotskiyte"
or "a traitor"... He was considered "slayed, not only philosophically, but physical as well". I wonder if Stephen Hawking would agree.
The words themselves, mmmh, maybe. In the analysis of how it's accepted or not. I I have the suspicion though that whoever wrote that piece you compare with, will subsequently use that knowledge to advice how we can get the scientific story established. Like the preacher can use this knowledge to get God established. Just replace Science by God, in the words you compare with F.
Aside from being an ad populum argument, that does not constitute evidence that your "interpretation" is correct.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This only shows that you got it all backward, which explains why you think that everyone else got it backward! :smile:
If you really were consistent in your criticism, you would also be critical of Aquinas. But you have this fixation with Aristotle’s “circular motion” to divert attention away from Aquinas’ – and your own – inconsistencies.
The fact is that the whole purpose of Aristotle’s writings is to present a unified vision of reality in which man belongs to the moving order of the universe.
By definition, the observable universe or cosmos (from Greek kosmeo, “to order, or arrange”) is an order. Another observable fact is the circular or cyclical motion of heavenly bodies - which are themselves spherical in shape, hence “harmony of spheres” - that forms the basis of the cosmic order.
This circular motion of the cosmic order may also be seen as analogous to the self-reflexive activity of intelligence or consciousness, both human and divine, which in turn is at the root of cognitive processes and ethical considerations alike. This is entirely in line with the Ancient Greek conception of the universe as “ruled by Intelligence”:
Clearly, far from being “inconsistent”, Aristotle is perfectly consistent on this point throughout his writings as well as being consistent with Platonic and pre-Platonic (or Ur-Platonic) views which he does a very good job in harmonizing with his own.
In the final analysis, philosophy in the Platonic and Aristotelian tradition serves a spiritual, ethical, and political purpose. In particular, what Plato and Aristotle are saying is that man can, and should, aim to attain higher knowledge or a higher state of consciousness on the basis of which he can have a better understanding of reality and of his role in the wider scheme of things.
In contrast, you are claiming that this is impossible and should not even be tried. Here is your own statement from page 6:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This was exactly Fooloso4’s position and the reason he went to extraordinary lengths to dismiss Plato, Aristotle, and anyone that had any views that deviated from materialism. And if, as suggested by @Wayfarer, you have been doing this since 2011, then I think it is fair to assume that you are doing it on purpose.
Anyway, IMO so long as Classical philosophy serves its stated purpose it is consistent with its own logic. There is no need for it to be absolutely consistent with strict logic.
If we were to apply strict logic to all philosophical systems, very few, if any, would be found to be without flaws. In fact, if we were to go by strict or pure logic alone, we would not get very far at all as not everything that is “logical” is also necessarily true, and vice versa.
This is precisely why we need science, philosophy, and even religion in addition to logic. And it is why Aristotle himself in Posterior Analytics clearly says that not every truth can be demonstrated. Some fundamental truths need to be grasped intuitively, with philosophy serving as nothing more than a pointer to those truths:
It follows that the fault does not lie with Aristotle’s logic, but with those who lack the ability or willingness to apprehend its true meaning ....
Well, I think the ancients were definitely far more knowledgeable than is nowadays assumed. It's just that we moderns like to believe that it was us who invented the wheel. And the clock. :smile:
Did he really talk about a never ending circular motion?
You obviously haven't read "De Anima" Bk1, Ch,3. I'll take your criticism seriously after you demonstrate that you've read and understood, what you are criticizing my interpretation of.
He does so in De Caelo or "On the Heavens."
He also makes reference to the cosmology in the Metaphysics.
Seems he even anticipated quantum mechanics!
Well, Aristotle argues that time and motion are imperishable. And since any motion other than circular would have a beginning and end, imperishable motion must be circular and the cause of that motion must be some immaterial principle such as an “unmoved mover”.
Obviously, there are many ways Aristotle can be interpreted (and misinterpreted). But here is a good article that elucidates some of the points involved:
Aristotle's Circular Movement as a Logos Doctrine – JSTOR
Or, if you have the time and inclination for a broader perspective, you can try Gerson's Aristotle and Other Platonists.
Who are you quoting?
Ah sorry! Forgot. Look here
Does the link work?
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&url=http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/16265/1/Aristotle_and_Quantum_Mechanics.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwjClNuQtsH1AhXWgnIEHWdKB6UQFnoECAQQBg&usg=AOvVaw3w6hUue67b4MdYIOLuSd6F
Ha! Nice title!
Yep. Aristotle was Plato's pupil for twenty years so there must have been some influence. Gerson argues that Aristotle was essentially a Platonist:
Thanks for the quote!
Can we say, very concisely, that the Platonic forms were sought on Earth, by Aristotle, instead of in out-wordly "mathematical heaven" where Plato positioned them?
Gerson's emphasis upon "who is a Platonist" here is misplaced. Aristotle's objections to Plato were not a "penchant for introducing terminological innovations to express old (i.e., Platonic) thoughts." The "innovations" were serious attempts to advance the discussion beyond the terms expressed by Plato. The numerous places where Aristotle says something like "Plato was not wrong when he said X" are the places where he is saying Plato was wrong in how the idea was expressed. And that difference was the important matter to pay attention to.
If the differences were not really a difference, the whole trajectory of Aristotle's inquiry can be written off as some kind of poetry slam.
Couple of recent essays on Platonic/Aristotelian philosophy of math
https://aeon.co/essays/aristotle-was-right-about-mathematics-after-all
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/science-nature/what-math-180975882/
In my view there is a huge amount of confusion about the sense in which forms, ideas, number, etc, exist. As I think I noted somewhere in this thread, Bertrand Russell points out that universals don't 'exist' but 'subsist'. They're attributes of the fabric of reality, not 'existent objects'. People seem extraordinarily confused about this distinction but it seems clear as day to me. There's some comment on that in the second of the above refs.
Think about, for example, 'the domain of natural numbers'. It would be odd to ask 'where is that?' because it's not literally some place. But there are numbers which are inside it, like 2, and those outside it, like the square root of -1, so there really is 'a domain' which includes some and excludes others. But what is its nature? In what sense is it real? That's the interesting question.
Do you have any other evidence to support this observation?
One Neo-Platonist, Plotinus, specifically objected to Aristotle's view of the Unmoved Mover on this point:
In this passage, Plotinus seems to be ignoring the clear reference to the importance of necessity in Plato's Timaeus. Nonetheless, it does undercut the idea that the Metaphysics was advancing a view of the cosmos that the Neo-Platonists were eager to support.
This corresponds to the perfect clock present before the inflationary phase in big bang cosmology. His eternal circular motion is a related concept too. The unmoved mover is considered a person though. Considering his view on motion, he would have been a hot theoretical physicist in these days.
I am mulling the article you linked to. It is interesting in comparing ideas of motion and the first causes.
But the universe Aristotle thought he lived in is vastly different than what is being revealed now. It makes me less inclined to make certain connections than more.
It's common knowledge that Aristotle's "Metaphysics" is a compilation of writings put together after his death. The part which supports the idea of eternal circular motions and the divine mind, directly contradicts what is said in "De Anima" Bk1, Ch3, where he devotes the entire chapter toward explaining why this idea, drawn from Plato's Timaeus, is unacceptable. Have you carefully read this section? It exposes and deals with the problems inherent in this conception, very explicitly.
The principal problem is the spatial representation of a "circle". Thought, Aristotle explains has a serial order, rather than a spatial order. It is evident to me, that "serial order" is based in "priority", which is substantiated by time. This is why there is a difference between cardinality (implying the spatial separation required for quantity), and ordinality (implying logical order) in modern mathematics. Therefore we must consider that "eternal", which is a description of the immaterial, relates to the material world through "time" rather than "space". (Did you read the passage from Aquinas on aeviternity which I referenced?) So the spatial representation of a circular motion, which is a material representation, is insufficient to describe an eternal being which is immaterial.
After explaining this problem, Aristotle proceeds to address the problems involved with the idea of a self-motion caused by self-thinking.
[quote=De Anima Bk1, Ch3, 23]For all practical processes of thinking have limits---they all go on for the sake of something outside the process, and all theoretical processes come to a close in the same way that the phrases in speech which express processes and the results of thinking.[/quote]
Notice the reference to Plato's "the good". Aristotle expresses "the good" as "that for the sake of which". When Plato describes "the good" as that which illuminates the intelligible objects, like the sun illuminates visible objects, it is because "the good" is what directs the process of thinking which causes the intelligible objects to become intelligible (discovered). (I bring this to your attention because Appollodorus accuses me of attacking Plato rather than accepting his principles).
The entire section "De Anima" Bk1 Ch3, is a refutation of the idea that the soul is a type of motion, or even a self-moving sort of thing. Motion is a spatial conception, consisting of a body (therefore matter), space, and time. If "the soul" is to be properly understood as the cause of existence of the material body, therefore prior in time to the body, and immaterial, it cannot be represented by a concept which is a material representation.
Quoting Paine
The "necessity", as I see it, is the logical necessity produced by Aristotle's so-called cosmological argument, explicitly Bk9 "Meatphysics". Through this demonstration he shows that if it were ever the case that there was a pure, absolute, infinite, or eternal potential, there could never be anything actual. Something actual is required to actualize any potential, so such a pure potential could not actualize itself, and it would forever be, pure potential. Pure potential is contrary to empirical observations. What we observe is actual beings. Therefore such a pure potential is really impossible. This effectively refutes both Pythagorean idealism (because Aristotle has demonstrated the ideas to exist as potential prior to being discovered), and also materialism which assumes a prime matter (matter is defined as potential). Materialism and such idealism are one and the same in principle.
So the necessity implied, is the logically necessary actuality produced by the cosmological argument, (what we call God, as per Aquinas' five ways). It cannot be a material actuality (matter & form), because it is prior to matter, therefore an immaterial Form. It's a bit of a tricky sort of necessity to understand.
Because of its temporal base, it is not a two way street, but only one way, as the conception of dependent, or "contingent", demonstrates. An effect necessarily has a cause, and this necessity is solidly substantiated in observation. This is the nature of contingency, or contingent existence, a cause is required, as a necessity, for the existence of any contingent being. But when we take the perspective of the cause itself, adopt that position of being prior in time to the contingent thing (as the perspective of a free willing being for example), then the nature of potential allows that the contingent thing is not necessary. Therefore this "necessity" is only applicable in a backward way of looking at time.
Plotinus did not quite seem to grasp the necessity of Aristotle's cosmological argument. In my opinion, Plato actually dismissed Pythagorean idealism prior to Aristotle's cosmological argument, replacing "the One" with "the good". I discussed this extensively with Appollodorus in another thread. Appollodorus refused to accept that Plato classed "One" as a mathematical form, and placed the good as prior to all forms. Therefore we have a separation between the good and the One. Appollodorus equates these two.
In placing "the One" as the first principle, Plotinus maintains its status as an idea, and therefore a potential. The One then, is a pure, absolute potential. But this is no different from prime matter, because as much as he posits all immaterial Forms as emanating from, or proceeding from, the One, he has no first actuality. This actuality is what has been demonstrated by the cosmological argument, as the necessity which is required as the first cause. Looking backward in time this cause is a necessity. So Aquinas firmly establishes the first Form, God, as an actuality, absolving the Neo-Platonists from the misrepresentation they propagated.
Quoting Raymond
You might compare the eternal circular motions to the Hartle-Hawking No Boundary proposal. It's a materialist/idealist representation which avoids the problem of having to accept a first cause to avoid infinite regress, through sophistry. It's really contradictory though, because it proposes a 'time' prior to time. So instead of going backward in time forever, we can talk of a cyclical repetition which makes the 'time' prior to time seem to dissolve into a different "time". This is the manifestation of the problem with representing the temporal concept "eternal" with a spatial representation, described by Aristotle at Bk1, Ch3, "De Anima". If time is not understood as prior to space, the problem cannot be resolved.
There are things I disagree with. The time in the Planck era volume can be considered not as a new clock but as a perfect clock by itself.
Briefly put, Aristotle’s arguments are as follows:
(A). Time and motion are imperishable.
(B). Therefore, they must have an imperishable cause.
(C). This cause is the Prime Unmoved Mover.
(D). To be a cause of imperishable motion, the Prime Unmoved Mover must be eternally in actuality and immaterial.
(E). That which is immaterial is incomposite.
(F). Therefore, the substance of the Prime Unmoved Mover is incomposite actuality or activity.
(G). That activity is thinking (noesis), i.e., the activity of an Intelligence or Intellect (nous).
(H). Therefore, the Prime Unmoved Mover is an Intelligence or Intellect or “thinking thinking about thinking”.
(I). That Intelligence thinks according to participation in the intelligible.
(J). Therefore, it also thinks about all intelligibles.
(K). Its activity is life.
(L ). Therefore, it is life and life belongs to it.
(M). Therefore, the Prime Unmoved Mover, which is Intelligence, is God and the first principle (arche) upon which the heavens, nature, and all other things depend.
If we consider the fact that Aristotle uses “intelligibles” (noeta) and “Forms” or “Ideas” (eide) synonymously, we can see that his “Unmoved Mover” is identical with Plato’s Creator-God (Demiurge) or Divine Creative Intelligence (Nous Poietikos) whose content are Forms and which generates the universe using Forms as paradigms to give shape to matter. This is confirmed by Aristotle’s statement to the effect that intellect is determined by the essences that are its objects (Metaphysics 1072b22).
Aristotle’s argument that (A) God is thinking what is best, (B) God is best, (C) therefore God is thinking himself, does not mean that God is thinking only of himself. He is also thinking of intelligible objects (= Ideas or Forms).
Both Plato and Aristotle describe God (Demiurge/Unmoved Mover) as “good” or “most good”. And what Aristotle means by “prime” is that the Unmoved Mover is prior to sensible substance, i.e., it is the absolutely primary substance.
All we need to do now is to add Plato’s One or Good which is “above substance” (and thus above the Unmoved Mover or Creator God) and we obtain the same ontological hierarchy as that found in Plato:
(1). The Ineffable One (the Good).
(2). Creative Intellect (Unmoved Mover) containing Ideas or Forms.
(3). Ensouled Universe.
This is all the more the case if we recall that Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics says:
Obviously, Aristotle is fully aware that his metaphysical framework is largely identical with that of his teacher Plato. The apparent disagreement between them and resulting confusion is caused (1) by what Gerson calls “Aristotle’s penchant for introducing terminological innovations to express old (i.e., Platonic) thoughts” and (2) by Aristotle’s criticism of views held within the Academy that are thought to be Plato’s but in reality (as Gerson shows) are often those of Speusippus, the Pythagoreans, and others.
To return to Forms. In Plato, Forms are immaterial “paradigms” used by the Divine Creative Intelligence to generate the material world (Timaeus 28a7). This Creative Intelligence (Nous Poietikos) is a form of consciousness, which is why Aristotle himself refers to it as "nous" and as "thinking" (noesis).
Though they are referred to as "objects of (divine) thought", the Forms, as @Wayfarer says, are NOT "objects" in the ordinary sense of the word, nor could they be as no such "objects" exist in the Divine Intellect.
This is why Forms can be grasped only intuitively, in an act of intuition or insight (noesis) which is different from the discursive thought (dianoesis) whose objects are, say, ideal geometrical shapes such as triangle.
The Form "Triangularity" is the principle that enables discursive thought to form the abstract concept of ideal triangle. The Form of "Triangularity" itself is grasped by the faculty of intuition or insight (nous) while the ideal triangle is conceived by the faculty of reason (logos or dianoia).
If we bear in mind the literal meaning of Greek eidos as "that which is seen (as a shape or form)" we can see that the Form or Idea is inextricably linked with the way in which what would otherwise be an indeterminate mass is shaped by the cognizing consciousness into objects of determinate cognition. The patterns according to which this "shaping" or "forming" occurs are the Forms.
So, essentially, Forms are principles of order which the Divine or Universal Consciousness uses to organize itself in order to generate determinate cognition and "project" the world into existence.
As determinate cognition exists, consciousness cannot remain in an indeterminate state.
Nor can it generate determinate cognition without organizing itself for the purpose.
And the principles according to which it organizes itself are Forms.
Aristotle need not define or describe Forms in every detail exactly as Plato does. But I think it is clear that their views are largely in harmony with one another.
This ignores the distinction between heavenly bodies and the "combined beings" of the sublunary sphere. The life of the latter is "ensouled" in a material basis that does not apply to eternal substances. The references to serial order of thinking relates to the distinction being made. What the actuality is for living animals does not completely include how nous is an actuality for those creatures. Aristotle says that the soul, as what makes creatures alive, is not self-moving. Something else causes it. Nous is said to be different in a way that requires more than the celestial model of Timaeus to explain. As Aristotle says: "The case of the mind is different; it seems to be an independent substance implanted within the soul and to be incapable of being destroyed."
In this section of Book 1, no mention is made of actuality and potentiality. That emerges when Aristotle begins his own inquiry after finishing discussing previous views. As the beginning of Book 2 says: "Let us start again, as it were from the beginning, and try to determine what the soul is and what would be its most comprehensive definition." Through his analysis on this basis, Aristotle recognizes the materiality of combined beings while also claiming that nous is not simply a property of such. In Book 3, Chapter 8 of DA, he lays out the boundaries. The following addresses the materiality you refer to:
This view does not conform to the either/or you see in Book 1. The insufficiency noted by Aristotle in Book 1 is now accounted for as a distinction of causes: These distinctions are used to clarify the different ways that desire and practical reason can said to move the living animal.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
That likely is the case. The observation does seem to support my doubt that Metaphysics Book Lamba is somehow a sneaky backstory for Neo-Platonists. Your description of Plotinus' argument puzzles me on a number of levels, I will refrain from going there because it gets closer to your vision of Aristotle that I don't understand.
He doesn’t say that. So you couldn’t have “quoted” it. You got it all backward as usual. :smile:
The truth of the matter is that Aristotle says that the heavens have an eternal and circular motion because circular motion is the only perfect and eternal one, as it has no beginning or end. What he objects to is (a) circular movement in an infinite body and (b) circular movement in soul.
In the De Caelo (Peri Ouranou) he says:
Therefore, it doesn't make sense to claim that he describes the “unacceptability of eternal circular motions” in De Anima or anywhere else.
What Aristotle does in De Anima is to criticize the idea that the motion is a property of the soul. He mentions the creation account in Plato’s Timaeus in which the Creator imposes circular motion on the universe “that it might move in harmonic revolutions”.
It is perfectly clear that Aristotle here does not object to eternal circular motion per se but only to that motion as a property of the soul, and he states in unambiguous terms that the soul causes the circular movement (without itself moving):
This is precisely why Aristotle introduces the idea of "Unmoved Mover". The Unmoved Mover (God) is unmoved yet is the cause of the movement of the universe ....
It's like the concept of charge nowadays. Charge is the cause of motion and it can be pure consciousness, or an fundamental form of it. His notion of the eternal circular motion is the predecessor of the modern concept of the ideal clock, which was the actually the pre-inflationary state of the universe. Add his pre quantum physics... Artistotle, my man! :cool:
This is not a distinction made by Aristotle in "De Anima". He is asking about how the soul is supposed to move its body. He describes the Platonic explanation of how the soul moves its body as being the same way that the heavenly bodies are supposed to be moved by a 'mind soul'.
[quote=Arostotle "De Anima", Bk1, Ch3, 405b, 31] 3. We must begin our examination with movement; for, doubtless, not only is it false that the essence of the soul is correctly described by those who say that it is what moves (or is capable of moving) itself, but it is an impossibility that movement should be even an attribute of it.[/quote]
[quote=Arostotle "De Anima", Bk1, Ch3, 406b, 26 - 407a,3] It is in the same fashion that the Timaeus also tries to give a physical account of how the soul moves its body; the soul, it is here said, is in movement, and so owing to their mutual implication moves the body also.
...
All this implies that the movements of the soul are identified with the local movements of the heavens. [/quote]
Notice that he describes the Platonic perspective as identifying the movement of the soul with the movement of the heavens. He is not trying to separate these two, make a distinction as you say, but to reject the entire description.
He does not deny the possibility that the same principle which acts as the soul in the living being could also be what acts as the cause of movement in the heavens. In fact, we can still make that comparison. The first actuality of the living body (the soul) is the cause of the material body, just like the first actuality demonstrated by the cosmological argument is the cause of the material universe.
So Aristotle is not making a distinction or separation, he is rejecting the whole idea, the description of the soul, as self-moved mover, and the cosmological description of eternal circular motions, which supports this description of the soul.
Quoting Paine
There is no such distinction being made. It is an imaginary one you are trying to force onto the interpretation. But if we assume such a distinction, for the sake of argument, then we'd have to look for the means by which the mind is implanted into the soul. We would now have something immutable, the mind, implanted into something, the soul, which cannot move or be moved i.e., is also immutable. And that makes no sense at all. If adding mind to soul makes no change to soul, then soul must always be united with mind as one mind soul. But this is exactly what you are claiming, that he is making a distinction between.
What Aristotle is showing here is that the Platonic conception of "soul" which has the soul move the body, in a way which is analogous to the way that the ancient Greeks believed that a "mind" moved the heavenly bodies, is mistaken. But we cannot proceed from this to make the distinction you claim.
Quoting Paine
I can't see the point you are making here, Paine. Aristotle clearly says that thoughts are dependent on images. It's at the end of your quote. And images are derived from the senses. So we have no basis for a "nous" which is independent of the senses, sense organs, and material body. It's true that Aristotle, at some points alludes to the appearance of a separate, independent mind, but such a thing is inconsistent with the principles he clearly states.
Quoting Apollodorus
Obviously you haven't read it yet. So I'm still waiting for an intelligent reply from you, concerning this.
Quoting Apollodorus
What do you mean? Your quote does exactly that, describes an infinite circular motion as impossible: "an infinite circle being an impossibility, there can be no circular motion of an infinite body". That is what he is proving here, the impossibility of an infinite circular motion. Notice in your quote: "Yet our eyes tell us that the heavens revolve in a circle". That is a fundamental principle from Plato, knowledge derived through the senses can be misleading. So when logic demonstrates that something which the senses leads us to believe, is actually impossible, then we must reject what the senses are telling us.
The accepted principle of the day, was that the orbits of the planets were eternal circular motions. This was supposed to be empirically proven, scientific knowledge. But Socratic skepticism taught us to doubt any knowledge dependent on the senses. The Copernican revolution was spawned by the revelation that the orbits were not circular, but elliptical. The slight discrepancies in timing which until then could not be figured out, were figured out to be the result of elliptical orbits, and the truth was revealed. This simple revelation made the solar system intelligible, but it had to be figured out. The first step was to reject the accepted science, that the orbits are eternal circular motions.
Quoting Apollodorus
One big problem with your account is that the orbits of the heavens are not circular. And this idea, that they were eternal circular motions is what Aristotle was rejecting. Look at your quote, circular motion is neither implied by the soul nor by the body. We ought to conclude therefore that it is unjustified, and likely, a mistaken idea.
As I said, it is obvious that you have it backward, and I'm beginning to think you are doing it on purpose.
Aristotle in De Caelo simply states that there is no circular motion of an infinite body. Finite bodies like the universe can and do have circular (or apparently circular) motion as Aristotle himself says!
The real issue is who or what moves something that has circular motion or motion in general. In the case of the heaven, it is God a.k.a. the Unmoved Mover who causes that movement.
De Anima is a separate discussion about the view that the soul is a self-moving entity. Aristotle takes up the definition of soul as “the primary actuality of a natural body with organs” and argues that this contradicts the claim that the soul is (a) a magnitude and (b) self-moving.
It is in this context that Aristotle mentions the creation account in the Timaeus, according to which the ensouled universe is given a revolving motion by God:
Aristotle himself concludes that “it is the soul (of the universe) which causes the motion of the body (of the universe)” and that “the reason why God made the soul (of the universe) revolve in a circle is that this form of movement is better than any other” (407b 21).
This is entirely consistent with the point Aristotle has been making which is that the soul does not move but imparts movement to the body and is in turn caused to move by God a.k.a. the Unmoved Mover.
Basically, (a) you didn’t provide the quote you said you did, because it doesn’t exist, (b) you are distorting the text, (c) you are confusing one thing with the other, and (d) you are using Copernicus and modern astronomy as a straw man to cover up your misinterpretation of Aristotle.
Is this why you call yourself “undercover”? :smile:
This inconsistency you refer to goes toward illuminating my inability to decipher what you think Aristotle is saying. You seem to be invested in claiming Aristotle is saying X. But you also are arguing against claims made by Aristotle when they do not support your interpretation of X.
How is a conversation about an author's intent to go forward under these conditions?
Right, what is discussed here in "De Caelo" is the possibility of an "infinite" motion. And it is shown that "the infinite cannot move". This supports the common interpretation of Aristotle, that any infinite must be potential only, and cannot be actual. Simply put, an actual infinite would require traversing an infinite amount of time, and that is impossible. Therefore any infinity is a potential infinity.
This is not relevant to the discussion of "eternal" circular motion in "De Anima", unless we establish some relationship between "eternal" and "infinite". If "eternal" is conceived as a type of infinity, then we see that by the discussion in "De Caleo", eternal circular motion is impossible, as an infinite motion (i.e. a motion which traverses an infinite amount of time).
But the issue is not so simple. In his "Metaphysics" Aristotle demonstrates that anything eternal must be actual (cosmological argument). This drives a wedge of separation between "infinite" (potential) and "eternal" (actual). What we can conclude, is that any actuality which is supposed to be "eternal", cannot be described as a "motion", because this would constitute an infinite motion which is impossible. Infinite motion is demonstrated as impossible in "De Caelo". So when he discusses the supposed eternality of the soul, or mind, in "De Anima", the idea of an eternal circular motion, as an actual infinite motion, is discredited as such.
Quoting Apollodorus
This passage is not at all as you present it. It is not what Aristotle is concluding here. He is presenting this as what is implied by those (Platonists) who present this position, and he presents this as an absurdity which must be concluded from that position.
[quote=Aristotle "De Anima" Bk1, Ch3, 407a,23 -407b,13] If the circular movement is eternal, there must be something which mind is always thinking; what can this be?
For all practical processes of thinking have limits; they all go on for the sake of something outside the process, and all theoretical processes come to a close in the same way as the phrases in speech which express processes and results of thinking. Every such linguistic phrase is either definitory or demonstrative. Demonstration has both a starting-point and may be said to end in a conclusion or inferred result; even if the process never reaches final completion, at any rate it never returns upon itself again to its starting-point, it goes on assuming a fresh middle term or a fresh extreme, and moves straight forward, but circular movement returns to its starting-point. Definitions, too, are closed groups of terms.
Further, if the same revolution is repeated, mind must repeatedly think the same object.
Further, thinking has more resemblance to a coming to rest or arrest than to a movement; the
same may be said of inferring. It might also be urged that what is difficult and enforced is incompatible with blessedness; if the movement of the soul is not of its essence, movement of the soul must be contrary to its nature. It must also be painful for the soul to be inextricably bound up with the body; nay more, if, as is frequently said and widely accepted, it is better for mind not to be embodied, the union must be for it undesirable.
Further, the cause of the revolution of the heavens is left obscure. It is not the essence of soul which is the cause of this circular movement -- that movement is only incidental to soul -- nor is, a fortiori, the body its cause. Again, it is not even asserted that it is better that soul should be so moved; and yet the reason for which God caused the soul to move in a circle can only have been that movement was better for it than rest, and movement of this kind better than any other. But since this sort of consideration is more appropriate to another field of speculation, let us dismiss it for the present. [/quote]
Notice, that Aristotle is saying that if it is true that the soul moves in this way, then the reason why God caused the soul to move "can only have been that movement was better for it", yet those (Platonists) who claim this, do not even assert "that it is better that soul should be so moved". So absolutely nothing supports that assumption, no logic, nor proposed good.
This is completely different from your representation, that Aristotle concludes "the reason why God made the soul (of the universe) revolve in a circle is that this form of movement is better than any other”.
Please Appollodorus, read the entire chapter, and quit with the false references. The fact hat you resort to false references to support your interpretation does not bode well for you. And I do not want to reproduce the entire section here, when you clearly have access to it, and the capacity to go read it for yourself.
Quoting Paine
I do not see how you can reduce a philosopher's intentions to one "intent". At any point in writing any particular passage, we might say that the author has a particular intent as to what is to be expressed by that paragraph, or even by a particular sentence. We might assume that each passage ought to fit together into a coherent whole, and from this coherent whole we might be able to produce an interpretation of the author's overall "intent".
But philosophy is not so straight forward. A particular individual might produce volumes of material over an extended period of time, and one's belief and understanding of fundamental principles can change considerably over that time. This is very evident with Plato for example. Such changes will produce inconsistencies when we view the philosopher's overall work as a whole, trying to determine the author's intent. Because of this, it might not be at all realistic to try and discuss the "author's intent", as if it were to be some principle which would unify the whole, in consistency.
However, if we look at Aristotle's "Nichomachean Ethics", we see that he considered the highest activity to be contemplation, and the highest form of contemplation to be contemplating "the truth". This is somewhat different from Appollodorus' proposal that the highest activity would be contemplating contemplating. But from this we might conclude that Aristotle's overall intent is "the truth".
When a philosopher contemplates "the truth", and the truth is not immediately evident to that person, then the person must consider all possibilities, prior to making a judgement. Such a philosopher, in the contemplation of truth, might continue to consider, and present in written form, numerous possibilities, constituting multiple proposals, without necessarily making any judgement of "truth".
This is why, for us in interpretation, it is of the utmost importance to determine inconsistency. Inconsistency is an indication that truth is not there, something is amiss. If the author's intent is "the truth", and we find inconsistency, then we know that there is some sort of mistake.
That's exactly what I'm saying. Your comments seem to be one straw man after another, with little evidence of "truth" given that they are inconsistent with Aristotle's statements .... :smile:
This is your own claim that you have repeatedly made here:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Of course I have access to the texts and I have read them many times over. Contrary to your claim, it is absolutely clear and well-known that Aristotle holds the first principle and primary reality to be eternal and immovable and to cause eternal circular motion in the universe.
He even says that he has proved that the planets have eternal circular motion:
The passages from the treatises cited include Physics 212b (“Therefore, the heaven moves in a circle”), De Caelo 277b, 286a, 287a-b, 293a, De Generatione et Corruptione 338a-b, etc.:
You admit this much yourself:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Aristotle certainly does not postulate "elliptical orbits" or discuss Copernicus. And far from rejecting eternal circular motion, he says in his own words that he demonstrates it!
Exactly. The soul. Aristotle does NOT reject eternal circular movement. He rejects the notion that the soul moves in a circle as part of his wider argument that the soul does not move itself but is caused to move by God.
He is clearly talking about the soul, which is why the whole book is called “De Anima” or “Peri Psyches”, i.e., “On the Soul”:
Moreover, I think you should notice that Plato explains exactly how the activity of soul is related to "circular motion":
Obviously, “circular motion” here is meant as a metaphorical image (eikon) which is said to most resemble or evoke the ordered activity of soul or reason.
It follows that Aristotle's criticism is directed at those who take Plato's metaphor literally.
In any case, it does not amount to "describing the unacceptability of eternal circular motion" by any stretch of imagination.
As I said, you are free to believe that Aristotle “describes the unacceptability of eternal circular motion”. But the rest of us are equally free to disbelieve that. And since you have provided zero evidence for your spurious claim, there can be only one conclusion ….
Quoting Apollodorus
Well then read De Anima Bk1 Ch3, and tell me what you think it says, if you disagree that he is obviously arguing against the rationality of eternal circular motion.
Quoting Apollodorus
This part of Metaphysics, I told Paine, is debatable as to whether it was even written by Aristotle. The "Metaphysics" is a collection of writings put together after Aristotle's death, and I have been told that there is good reason to believe that this section is not even his writing.
As I said, there is inconsistency in Aristotle on this matter of eternal circular motion. I do not at all deny that he talks about it it in many places. What I claim is that he discredits this idea especially at the place I refer to. You can see this clearly at the referred place in De Anima, if you would care to read it.
Quoting Apollodorus
He is questioning how the soul moves the body. He doesn't say the soul is caused to move by God, nor is the soul a self-moved mover. He says that the soul does not move; "... it is an impossibility that movement should be even an attribute of it." 406a2
The reason why the soul cannot be described by terms of motion, is explained. Motion is spatial, therefore bodily, and the soul is immaterial. Therefore, the idea of a soul or a mind moving in an eternal circular motion is unacceptable.
Further, he explains that there is no bodily evidence that any soul, or mind, causes any body to move in a circular motion, nor is there any reason (the good, the sake of which), given by those who profess this idea, why any soul, mind, or God, would cause a body to move in a circular motion.
Quoting Apollodorus
Are you saying that when Aristotle rejects this idea of eternal circular motion at "De Anima" Bk1, Ch 3, he just misunderstood Plato's meaning? Plato wasn't talking literally about the circles of the heavens, in Timaeus, but metaphorically, and Aristotle took it literally in his rejection of it? Are you serious?
Quoting Apollodorus
The evidence is clearly there, De Anima Bk1, Ch3. You just refuse to read it, in your continued denial.
You seem to confuse the heavens with soul, the circular motion of soul with eternal circular motion, circular motion in an infinite body with circular motion in a finite body, etc., etc.
Plato says that the heaven moves in a circular motion and so does Aristotle.
As explained in The Laws, soul is said to have a circular motion metaphorically, circular motion being the most ordered form of motion that symbolizes the ordered activities of reason.
As indicated by the title, Aristotle’s De Anima/Peri Psyches (“On the Soul”) is about the soul.
Aristotle argues that soul is not a self-moving entity.
As part of his discussion of different views, he briefly addresses the claim that the soul of the universe has a circular motion.
He concludes that soul cannot revolve in a circle and is incapable of self-motion.
However, this has NOTHING to do with eternal circular motion. He says that he proved it in his treatises on physics, and so he has if you take the time to read the many statements to that effect that I quoted above.
This is the claim that you have been making:
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
The fact is that Aristotle describes no such thing. He merely argues that the soul has no circular motion. The SOUL, not the heaven.
You admit Aristotle's eternal circular movement in your own statements!
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
This is exactly Aristotle's view that he says he has proved:
Etc., etc. ....
I agree with this. Now, do you agree that when we describe a motion as a circular motion, it is not necessarily eternal? And this is where the problem is, with the idea of an eternal circular motion. Eternal circular motion implies that the circle is absolutely perfect, and every point on the circumference, is the very same as every other point on the circumference, such that the motion can never have a variance, and no point can ever be the beginning or the end. You'll see in Plato's Timaeus, 35-36, how he refers to the orbits of the heavenly bodies under the categories of the Same, and the Different. The latter are the ones which are very obviously not perfect circles.
The impossibility of an actual, infinite circular motion, is discussed by Aristotle at "De Caelo" 272a, 272b. We see that such a motion would require an infinite amount of time, so it exists in potential only. And so it is an Idea only. As Aristotle demonstrates in "Metaphysics" Ideas have existence as potential.
At "De Anima" Bk1, Ch3, he looks at the immaterial "soul", and "mind", and explains why these things cannot be described by eternal circular motion, nor can they be said to cause an eternal circular motion.
Quoting Apollodorus
Have you read Aristotle's "Physics"? He says rotary motion "can be eternal" Here: "Again, a motion that admits of being eternal is prior to one that does not. Now rotary motion can be eternal: but no other motion...can be so." Physics Bk8, Ch.9, 265a,25.
[quote=Aristotle Physics, Bk8, Ch9, 6-9 "Our present position, then, is this: We have argued that there always was motion and always will be motion throughout all time, and we have explained what is the first principle of this eternal motion; we have explained further which is the primary motion and which is the only motion that can be eternal: and we have pronounced the first movement to be unmoved." [/quote]
Notice two points here, "our present position", implying that this position is not necessarily to be firmly adhered to, and also, that circular motion "can" be eternal, implying potential.
So when he moves forward to discuss the reality of the immaterial, in "De Anima", and "Metaphysics" he finds that this "present position" which was adequate for physics, is no longer adequate when discussing the principles of the immaterial, i.e., the non-physical. In Metaphysics, the cosmological argument demonstrates that anything eternal must be actual, and this excludes the eternal circular motion, as being described in his "Physics" and "De Caelo", as being potential only. And, at the referred part of De Anima Bk1, Ch 3, he provides a very good explanation as to why the idea of an eternal circular motion is truly an unacceptable idea.
Anything eternal must be truly immaterial, as matter is the principle of contingency. Any sort of motion, including circular motion, involves matter. So we see the material circle expressed here as a "spatial magnitude", and Aristotle explains why such a description, of a spatial magnitude, cannot be applied to something like a soul, or a mind, which is supposed to be truly immaterial, and truly eternal.
Therefore we can conclude that infinite circular motion, is an ideal only. Motion which exists "throughout all time", is a conceptual idea which forces us to reconsider the meaning of "eternal", which cannot refer to a sort of motion. And if we do not dismiss this Ideal, 'motion which exists throughout all time", and allow that there is "a time" for the immaterial; the immaterial being necessarily prior to the material; and therefore "a time" when there is no motion (motion being a material concept), then we are forced to make "eternal" refer to that which is outside of time, rather than that which exists throughout all time.
Absolutely not.
Aristotle states very clearly that, though finite, the whole universe is spherical and consists of spherical bodies revolving in circles with an eternal motion:
He also explains why:
Aristotle's whole approach has to do with his (and Plato’s) idea of perfection and of lower, imperfect levels of reality being a reflection of higher, perfect and divine ones.
Like Plato’s philosophy, Aristotle’s system has a political, ethical, and spiritual dimension, the spiritual one being the highest and the goal of human existence (as well as of philosophy itself).
Your failure to understand this prevents you from correctly understanding Aristotle (and Plato) and you get bogged down in unfounded and futile "interpretations" that can only lead to materialism in the best case and to psychological issues in the worst …. :smile:
While I disagree with many parts of Metaphysician Undercover's reading of Aristotle, I also disagree with your penchant to decide what the different interpretations lead to. I have no idea whether Metaphysician Undercover's interpretation leads to the results you portend. The categories you employ are not matters of fact but involve many unresolved questions of scholarship and reflection.
For instance, I disagree with a large number of Gerson's arguments that I have been encouraged to engage with here. I have no interest in pronouncing any judgement upon his views outside of agreeing or disagreeing with his statements about the arguments and intent of the text he puts forth.
What possible value could be derived from treating those disagreements as proof of an agenda not stated in the text?
Great. We all disagree then! :grin:
That's a position he's refuting at that point. I'm tired of your false references.
Quoting Apollodorus
There is no explanation there, only confused bits and pieces of a writing, which appears contradictory. Look at the contradiction, it says anything which moves in a circular motion must be finite. Then it says "the heavens" have a circle which completes and is therefore finite. So, the heavens have a finite circular motion which completes. Then it says the heavens have an eternal circular motion. An eternal circular motion is clearly defined as without beginning or ending.
I really think you are very sloppy in your referencing Appollodorus, And, I noticed in our discussion concerning Plato that you do not take the time to distinguish the ideas which the author is promoting, from the ideas which the author is condemning. You seem to be doing that again here. I fully realize that this form of judgement is much more difficult with Aristotle than Plato, because Plato generally had Socrates making the statements he agreed with. But you had trouble with "The Sophist" where we do not have the luxury of having Socrates making the statements. Aristotle however, will go to great lengths, paragraph after paragraph, describing someone else's principles, which he ultimately disagreed with. This is what Plato did in "The Sophist", described as thoroughly as possible, the position, to the reader, allowing the reader to apply rational thought to reject what needed to be rejected.
This sloppy reading of yours reflects in the overall attitude you expressed earlier in this thread. You tried to push the idea that Aristotle is completely consistent with Plato, and Neo-Platonism is consistent with both of these two. Of course, if you fail to distinguish whether a particular philosopher agrees, or does not agree, with the ideas of another philosopher which are being described, then you'll come away with the idea that everyone agrees with each other. However, you'll have to deal with multiple inconsistencies and contradictions within the writings of one philosopher, as you demonstrated in the quote above.
Quoting Apollodorus
When I have been taking great care to distinguish between the material and the immaterial, according to Aristotle's principles, how can you think that this can only lead to materialism? A circular motion is a description of an activity of a material thing. An eternal thing, being prior to time, therefore outside of time, (when time is a conception derived from material activity), is immaterial. It is your assumption, that a material body could have an eternal existence through circular motion, which is what is conducive to materialism. That's why many who interpret in ways similar to you claim Aristotle to be materialist, the self-moved mover becomes prime matter, with its fundamental activity of eternal motion. But this idea of associating "eternal" with circular motion is what Aristotle flatly rejected in "De Anima". It is rejected because it hinders us from producing a proper conception of "immaterial" because it associates "eternal" with something material.
No, I'm tired of it.
That's exactly what Aristotle is saying!
As clearly stated in De Caelo, the universe is spherical and it consists of concentric spheres representing the five primary elements. The earth which is at the center, is surrounded by the spheres of water, fire, air, and ether.
While the first four elements have a vertical (or radial) motion, the fifth, ether, has a circular motion which is without beginning or end, perfect, eternal, and divine. The heavenly bodies themselves are spherical, made of ether, and moving in a circle like the ethereal heaven where they are located, etc.
It should be obvious that Aristotle’s cosmology depends on eternal circular motion and that he cannot possibly describe “the unacceptability of eternal circular motion” as this would cause his entire system to collapse.
Aristotle’s main intention is to present a picture of the universe as a perfect, eternal, and divinely ordered reality the contemplation of which enables man to elevate himself to the higher realms of pure intelligence.
But you deny that this is possible, hence your insistence on putting a materialist spin on it as well as claiming that Metaphysics was not written by Aristotle and dismissing every passage that contradicts your spurious "interpretations".
As I said, you can believe anything you want. But if you expect people to believe what you say, that’s a different matter. Anyway, you seem to be talking to yourself, so good luck with that …. :smile:
I don’t think anyone is “monopolizing” anything. There wasn’t much of a discussion anyway.
And if you follow the thread you will see that Metaphysician Undercover started by claiming that Aristotle proposed the principle of “eternal circular motion” (page 6) after which he said that this principle is unacceptable and ought to be rejected (page 9) and ended up claiming that Aristotle himself describes the “unacceptability” of the same principle!
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
You pointed that out yourself:
Quoting Paine
Look closely at your quote Appollodorus:
Quoting Apollodorus
"Complete" here implies ends. And "ends" is incompatible with "without beginning or ending". It is very clear that he is arguing against the idea that the orbits of the heavens are actually eternal.
Quoting Apollodorus
This is exactly opposite to the reality of what Aristotle was doing. He is arguing that we ought to contemplate "truth", as explained in "Nichomachean Ethics". Therefore we ought to reject the idea that the universe is a "perfect, eternal, and divinely ordered reality". This idea is inconsistent with the observed reality, as described in Plato's Timaeus 35-37. And being inconsistent with observed reality implies that it cannot be "truth".
Quoting Apollodorus
Yes, this is a common procedure in philosophy. One proposes a principle (like eternal circular motion for example), which may be widely accepted in certain circles of society, then proceeds to demonstrate the falsity of that proposition. If you haven't read enough philosophy to recognize this fact, I am not to blame for that.
The issue is not "common procedures in philosophy" at all. It is what Aristotle does or does not say in his treatises. He does NOT say that eternal circular motion is "unacceptable" anywhere in the corpus.
Even in logical terms he couldn't say such a thing since he repeatedly says (a) that there is eternal circular motion and (b) that he has proved it:
Of course Aristotle says that "the heavens certainly revolve, and they complete their circular orbit in a finite time", as this is what he believes the heavens do. But he doesn't say that once the orbit is completed the heavens stop in their tracks and disappear. According to him the revolving motion continues eternally.
The idea is that the ordered structure and movement of the universe which is "perfect", "eternal", and "divine" enables man to elevate his thought above material reality and grasp the intelligible, noetic world by means of that in him which is eternal and divine, i.e., the nous.
Very simple and easy to understand, IMO.
Your claim can only stand if you insist that Aristotle "didn't write Metaphysics" and dismiss half of the corpus as mere "oversight" and "mistake".
If you follow your own method, you could equally discard your claim as "oversight" and "mistake" and let
the rest of the corpus stand as it is, which would be more logical, especially in view of the fact that Aristotle does not say what you are claiming he does .... :smile:
Yeah sure , "unacceptable" is an English word which Aristotle would not be in the habit of using. Logically, he proves that the principle is definitely a logical possibility. Then he demonstrates that the principle is not true, it doesn't correspond with anything real, neither in relation to the material nor the immaterial aspects of the universe.
Quoting Apollodorus
Spin it however you like Appollodorus, but what is described is that one finite orbit completes. You might insist that it is followed by another, but the next is different from the first, and the differences are described in Plato's Timaeus. And this is completely incompatible with "eternal circular motion" as the logical possibility described by Aristotle, which requires motion in a perfect circle, where one revolution is indistinguishable from another as exactly the same, forever.
Quoting Apollodorus
As I said earlier, "Metaphysics" is a bunch of separate pieces of writing, collected together long after Aristotle's death. I took a course on this text in university, and the professor said that it is debatable whether Bks10-12 were actually produced by Aristotle. It was his opinion that this part was written by some unknown Neo-Platonist. Evidently there is a difference in style.
He does NOT demonstrate that AT ALL and you have ZERO evidence that he does.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Aristotle uses the word "ETERNAL" (aidios) and as far as I am concerned he means just that, ETERNAL.
This is absolutely clear from his discussion in the De Caelo:
Aristotle simply states that an infinite body cannot revolve in a circle. But he has ascertained that one revolution of the heavens occupies a limited time and uses this to prove the finitude of the orbit and, consequently, of the body of the heavens itself. A finite body like the heavens can move in a circle and according to him it does so eternally.
What he is saying is:
(A). The infinite cannot revolve in a circle.
(B). Nor could the world (or heaven), if it were infinite.
(C). But the world/heaven is finite.
(D). Therefore the world/heaven can revolve in a circle.
(E). And this revolution is eternal.
Though an orbit is completed in a finite time, its completion does not imply cessation of motion. The circular motion continues as the orbit is completed over and over again.
If you drive your car around in circles, you complete many rounds, you don’t stop after one round. Or think of athletes running around a stadium, a horse running circles in a field, etc. Completing one round is not the same as ceasing to move altogether. The first is necessarily finite as you will eventually return to the point of departure. The second isn’t. THIS is what Aristotle is talking about.
The circular movement of the heavens was a long-established view going back to the Babylonians. For Aristotle, the system is geocentric, and he thinks of the universe as a sphere revolving around the earth.
So everything is based on spheres and circles, these being said to be perfect geometric figures. Even in Plato, the universe is said to be created according to a perfect divine paradigm and therefore constitutes an image or reflection of divine perfection.
Aristotle is obviously arguing that the heavens are (a) divine, (b) eternal, and (c) possessing an eternal circular motion:
Clearly, this is NOT an argument Aristotle takes up for refutation, but one the facts of which he positively asserts and the truth of which he urges the reader to convince himself of.
Aristotle, De Caelo
If I were you, I would seriously consider requesting a refund on that course you did .... :grin:
Yes, this is where the problem was, the idea that the movements of the heavens could be represented as "perfect geometric figures". In a nutshell, this is Pythagorean idealism, the activities of the universe are composed of such Ideals. Plato demonstrated the deficiency of such idealism. And it is evident in the Timaeus that the orbits are not perfect circles. Exceptions to the "perfect geometric figures" were well known. So Aristotle moved even further in the refutation of this Pythagoreanism. You clearly misunderstand both Plato and Aristotle, when you claim that they support this notion that the universe is composed of perfect geometric figures. They were actually both working to expose the problems with this idea.
Quoting Apollodorus
I honestly don't think that you even read the material, Appollodorus. You seem to just skim, in search of quotes to support your prejudice.
Read "De Caelo" Bk1 Ch9 please. He clearly defines "the heaven" as a particular material thing. It is perceptible and therefore consists of matter. It is one, and it consists of all physical or sensible bodies. No body is "outside" the heaven. Nor is there place, void, or time outside heaven.
But then he states what can be outside the heaven:
[quote=Aristotle DeCaelo 17-25] It is clear then that there is neither place, nor void, nor time outside the heaven. Hence whatever is there, is of such a nature not to occupy any place, nor does time age it; nor is there any change in any of the things which lie beyond the outer most motion; they continue through their entire duration unalterable and unmodified, living the best and most sufficient of lives, As a matter of fact, this word 'duration' possessed a divine significance for the ancients, for the fulfilment which includes the period of life of any creature, outside of which no natural development can fall, has been called its duration. [/quote]
Notice how he places the divine, the unalterable, outside the material "heaven". He then proceeds for a number of chapters to discuss the concepts of "generated", "ungenerated", "destructible" and "indestructible, in relation to "eternal". He considers the possibility that something generated could be indestructible, or that something ungenerated could be destructible. So we have to consider "eternal" in two senses, of two temporal directions. Plato for example, he says, thought the heaven was generated but indestructible.
We see then, in Ch12, 283a 25-30, the conclusion to Bk1, that anything destructible will at some time be destroyed, and anything generable was at one time generated. And we can conclude, that "the heaven", as defined by Aristotle, as a particular material thing, is therefore not eternal. Matter, of which the heaven is composed, is the potential for change ("Physics"). So he closes the book with: "Whatever is destructible or generated is always alterable. Now alteration is due to contraries and the things which compose the natural body are the very same that destroy it..." 292b 21. Of course, in Ch9 he describes "the heaven" as "one", a particular, being a natural body composed of matter. Therefore we must conclude it is not eternal.
Well, Mister “Metaphysician (Foolosopher) Undercover”, you keep recycling the same spurious claim under different guises and changing the goal posts every time.
The fact is that this is YOUR conclusion, not Aristotle’s. That’s precisely why you say “we must conclude”. You can’t say “Aristotle concludes” as you have no evidence.
Saying “read the book, the evidence is there!” is mere evasion and not an acceptable argument in any philosophical or logical method that I am aware of. Anyone can say that.
Aristotle clearly says “eternal” (aidios) when referring to heaven and its circular movement.
The heaven is NOT "composed of matter and therefore not eternal". It is composed of ether which is a divine and eternal substance. Therefore it is ETERNAL by definition.
Clearly, Aristotle is talking about the traditional four elements, earth, water, air, and fire, as being generated and therefore not eternal. This is precisely why he introduces ether as a fifth, divine and eternal element that has circular motion!
This enables him to argue that the heaven is a divine sphere consisting of ether and eternally moving in a circular orbit:
This is not my "prejudice" at all. It is elementary and generally accepted knowledge as can be seen from Wikipedia:
Aether (classical element) - Wikipedia
I think you really should ask for a refund on your “philosophy” course.
And while you are at it, you might as well return your "degrees", too. :smile:
That's right. As I explained, this is the way that many good philosophers like Plato and Aristotle write. They lay out all the evidence as clearly as possible, allowing the reader to draw the required conclusion. This allows that the conclusion is made by the reader, rather than being forced on the reader through stipulation, so that the reader truly believes the conclusion which is made.
Quoting Apollodorus
There is a type of philosophical writing, well exemplified by Wittgenstein, in which the author asserts something, then proceeds to demonstrates that the opposite of what is asserted is what the truth is. This is the Platonic method. Plato has Socrates' interlocutor make the assertion, then Socrates will proceed with the demonstration that what is asserted is not the truth. With Aristotle, we do not have the luxury of an interlocutor, to indicate the assertions which are to be proven as false. Without a very careful reading, an individual such as yourself, might not recognize which assertions are being proven to be false.
Quoting Apollodorus
You obviously did not read "De Caelo" Bk1, Ch9. It is very clear that "the heaven" is one, and is a material object.
[quote=De Caelo Bk1, Ch9]The world as a whole, therefore, includes all its appropriate matter, which is, as we saw, natural perceptible body. So that neither are there now, nor have there ever been, nor can there ever be formed more heavens than one, but this heaven of ours is one and unique and complete.[/quote]
Notice that "one" "unique", and "complete" are the defining attributes of a material body, a "particular". And at the beginning of Ch9 Aristotle explains carefully the difference between a particular thing, and a Form, or essential formula. The latter allows that there is more than one of the said thing.
That the heaven is a material body is also supported by your other quotes in which Aristotle demonstrates that anything which revolves in a circular rotation must be a material body.
Quoting Apollodorus
Let me get this straight. In this section, Aristotle discusses how the earth and heaven are made up of bodies, are generated, and are not eternal. But you are claiming that he introduces "ether" here to justify eternality. Where's the reference to ether? Aether is a Pythagorean principle, and Aristotle firmly rejects Pythagoreanism. You are now demonstrating again, your ability to stretch your imagination.
I'm afraid there is neither rhyme nor reason to what you are saying there.
Aristotle clearly refers to the principle beyond the four traditional elements as “ether” (aither) and correctly states that this is the name “handed down from our ancestors” (the philosophers and poets):
As already stated, he says that the heaven is divine, eternal, and has a circular movement:
He also explains why he thinks the heaven is eternal:
(A). If circular movement is an instance of simple movement,
(B). And simple movement is (a) simple and (b) of a simple body,
(C). Then there must be some simple body which revolves naturally and in virtue of its own nature with a circular movement.
(D). Generation and decay subsist in contraries.
(E). There can be no contrary motion to the circular.
(F). The body that has circular motion has no contrary.
(G). Heaven has (natural) circular motion.
(H). Therefore it has no contrary.
(I). Therefore it is ungenerated and indestructible.
At no point does he even remotely refute or reject the idea that the heaven is divine, eternal, and revolving.
Anyway, now that you finally admit that your claim is your own and not Aristotle's and that you have zero evidence to back it up, it should be obvious even to you that you are wasting your time trying to sell it to anyone.
So, good luck with that, but I'm not buying it .... :smile:
Notice two things here. First, "they gave...". Obviously, this is someone else's principle being referred to. Second, it's a primary "body" being referred to. Therefore it is material, generated, destructible, and definitely not eternal. This is another principle which Aristotle is demonstrating as faulty. Nice try Appollodorus, but you're clutching at straws now.
Quoting Apollodorus
Finally admit it? That it's my own believe is what I stated at the very beginning.
Quoting Metaphysician Undercover
Quoting Apollodorus
This is false though. You're so stuck in your own prejudice that you refuse to look at the evidence. I know I won't "sell it" to anyone so extremely compromised by prejudice, that they refuse to read the material.
It isn’t “someone else’s principle” at all. He presents it as generally accepted tradition!
As Aristotle himself says, it is a tradition “handed down from our ancestors” and he agrees with the idea, with the name, and even with the derivation of the name which he got from his teacher Plato:
What Aristotle is saying is that unlike the other four elements, ether is a divine (= eternal) substance and it makes up the heaven which is divine, eternal, and revolves in an eternal circular motion.
Aristotle obviously uses current philosophical tradition to justify his own position. There is no confusion there except in the mind of the confused.
As I said, you can try fooling someone else, Mr Foolosopher ….
He presents it as what was believed by "all who believe in the existence of gods", what he calls "our distant ancestors". If someone were writing today, about what our distant ancestors believed about God, would you consider it a fair representation of what is generally accepted today? Would you look at the traditions of the Catholic church, and say that these are generally accepted traditions? We know that Socrates and Plato spoke out against "the gods" considerably.
That’s a totally unacceptable misrepresentation of what Aristotle is saying.
He is NOT saying that it is a view held a long time ago. He says it is an ancient tradition that has come down from distant ancestors to his own day:
It is a long-established and at the time still current view which agrees with his own as expressed a few lines previously:
Ether and its etymological derivation of which Aristotle approves, indisputably occur in Plato’s Cratylus:
And in the Epinomis:
This is precisely why Aristotle brings established view up, namely to justify his own view. This is entirely consistent with the method of establishing fact on the basis of the three means of knowledge: (1) experience (gnosis), (2) reason (episteme), and (3) established, authoritative opinion (orthe doxa).
He has said that the evidence of the senses (gnosis) is enough to prove his case, but has also presented a reasoned argument (episteme), and is now adducing the evidence of established or right opinion (orthe doxa). In other words, he has established his position.
Aristotle here is not concerned with the Gods, but with the divine (theion) as a principle the existence of which he regards as “certain” and beyond dispute:
Plato (or Socrates) may criticize the way the Olympian Deities are portrayed in popular mythology, but not the Cosmic Gods or the Creator-God, and even less the divine in general.
But we’ve been through this many times already and I’m not going to waste any more of my time.
Regards to your alter ego ….
I think it is a very good analogy, just like today, many people believe in God and go to church. This is an ancient tradition which has come down from distant ancestors, just like what Aristotle refers to. The problem is in your claim that this religion is what was generally accepted, and even worse, your claim that Aristotle was promoting this idea which came down from distant ancestors.
You seem to be missing the basic facts of what Aristotle wrote. He refers to all these things, such as the heaven, and aether, as "bodies". He also demonstrates that although eternal circular motion is logically possible, anything involved in such a rotation, or revolution, must be a "body". Then he explains why each and every body, being composed of matter, is generated and will be destroyed. So it is very clear that he has indicated that although the "distant ancestors" believed these bodies to be eternal, he does not. Then, in De Anima he explains why anything truly eternal must be conceived of as non-spatial, immaterial.
Quoting Apollodorus
He actually brings up such established views to refute them. But Socrates got put to death for speaking out against such established views, so Aristotle is much more careful. He produces all the evidence required to prove such views as unacceptable, allowing the student to draw the conclusion, without himself directly speaking out against the establishment.
Quoting Apollodorus
Right, maybe you're now catching on. He is not directly speaking out against "the Gods", he is demonstrating that there is a real need for a conception of "divine". But in the process he shows that the established conception of "divine" is unacceptable.
Quoting Apollodorus
Yes we have already been through this, and you refuse to acknowledge what Aristotle actually wrote, skimming through the texts, quoting passages which appear to support your prejudice.
Novelists can write things that scientists and philosophers cannot. Science explains what is real and it's mechanisms, the novelist describes and brings to light what is hidden, often missed and embedded within reality. It is the interesting difference between the skilled artist of words and the scientist that poses formulas.