Personal Identity over time and Causal Continuity

Ignore,

The entire context of our physical environment is cause, so other people are part of that context and thus casual, which only means they affect you in some way, that you react to their existence. This is a process, the storyline of your life experience/ identity. The only way one can know the world is through one's body and the whole context of the outside world constitutes the materials of which you form the concept of your identity. So causual continuity is indeed the essence of identity, causual continuity is life experience which constitutes identity.

In a certain sense, cause-effect is seen as having something to do with personal identity. It's actually quite interesting how humans reason, perhaps unreason is more appropriate:

If an engineer builds a house and the house collapses killing everyone inside, this engineer is accountable/responsible. Yet, when people die of infections/disasters/etc., God is never brought to book for these...er...offenses. God is, after all, the engineer! (vide Act of God)

Reply to Ignoredreddituser I don't really have a stake in this argument, since I don't subscribe to the causal continuity theory of personal identity. As a metaphysical theory, I would even object to the presumption that identity has to be grounded (reduced to) something else. As a summation of its semantics (i.e. how the concept is ordinarily deployed in speech and thought) it doubt that it works well.

That said, it would be good to see a fuller exposition of the thesis before considering the criticism. Obviously, personal identity can't be all and only about causality, else it would entrain your entire past lightcone, let alone people around you.

As a possible defense though it could be argued that people and other influential events in (and even preceding) your life do contribute to the development of your personal identity and to how you and others perceive it.

Reply to Ignoredreddituser

Galen Strawson goes over this in his own philosophical thought, as well as proposing a good
(edit) interpretation (edit) to Locke's thought.

He distinguishes (essentially) between two types of "selves": diachronic and episodic. It seems these are the two poles in which people fit into and of course, some are in between.

Diachronic people take selves to be long lived periods of time, in which it would be intuitive for them to say "that was me 10 years ago on vacation".

Episodics, on the other hand, have no such notion of continuity in that, after doing any thing, they don't feel as if it was them who did what they did, or thought what they thought.

If this is the case for a good deal of people, there is no fact of the matter on these topics. What grounds personal identity includes many factors outside causality, including other people, culture, the type of person you are, etc.

Thanks, for replies guys let’s keep this going.

SophistiCat,

I can like the paper if you like, it’s in the context of Buddhist reductionism. I’m also not a reductionist, I prefer pluralist/structuralist views of personal identity.

Yeah Strawson’s view is somewhat similar to this problem but it’s more about selfhood in the sense one perceives oneself right? The objection from how I read it has to do more with an objective fluxing so it’s probably more in like with Strawson’s episodic view.

Quoting Ignoredreddituser

but it’s more about selfhood in the sense one perceives oneself right?

Yes. It's how it feels like to be a subject of experience, which is the only real clue we have of this idea, which we then attribute to other people.

Quoting Ignoredreddituser

The objection from how I read it has to do more with an objective fluxing so it’s probably more in like with Strawson’s episodic view.

It's hard. If you press me, I might say that it's not objective, not an "ontological fact". I think it's epistemic, pertaining to how we view this phenomena, which doesn't make it "less real", just that "selves" are not mind independent facts of the world.

In any case, I don't see how we can attribute "causal connection", strictly speaking, to a person. For it could well happen that a person who does something, in another instant can become another person, say they get hit in the head, or have multiple personalities or acts very differently in front of different people.

It's hard. If you press me, I might say that it's not objective, not an "ontological fact". I think it's epistemic, pertaining to how we view this phenomena, which doesn't make it "less real", just that "selves" are not mind independent facts of the world.

I think it’s real in the sense of a real pattern, but not real as like a ghost in the head, so to speak.

Here’s a copy of the paper, I responded to a post about it on Reddit

https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1391&context=comparativephilosophy

Quoting Ignoredreddituser

The objection is that we stand in causal relationships with over people, yet have no relationship of personal identity with them. For example, I can make my mother angry or make her remember last Christmas, yet we are in no way identical.

I have some questions:

I looked up "causal continuity" on the web and found references but no definition. You know if something doesn't have a Wikipedia listing, it doesn't actually exist. So, what does it mean?

What does "causal relationship" mean?

What causal relationship do I have or could I have with another person?

What would it mean for someone to have a "relationship of personal identity" with another?

Causal Continuity is basically cause and effect like a tree is causally connected to a seed, or a person is causally connected to their previous self by the events of cause and effect.

Causal relationship means having a causal effect upon something or someone, or that’s how I took it in the paper.

You can make them feel emotions or something remember events, for example.

For identity, you can be held accountable for their actions or be identified as that persons.

Additionally, the objection section of the above paper mentions the same objection. It may have additional context if I kiss something in my explanation.

@SophistiCat I meant to tag you above, sorry still getting used to this site.

I don't see the sense in it. It's no explanation. It's simply a means of saying "It's complicated" and hoping for the best.

It isn't complicated. And there's no rhyme or reason. There's a surface level that throws all philosophy out the window, and if you can't attest to this you're a schmuck.

Sometimes, philosophize less.

Quoting Ignoredreddituser

The objection is that we stand in causal relationships with over people, yet have no relationship of personal identity with them.

1) What objection? Objection to what?
2) What exactly do you mean by "relationship of personal identity"?

Quoting Ignoredreddituser

For example, I can make my mother angry or make her remember last Christmas, yet we are in no way identical.

Why should you be identical? In fact, can anyone be identical to anyone else?

Quoting Ignoredreddituser

causal continuity cannot ground personal identity.

Can you explain "ground"? It normally means prohibit or prevent and I cannot see the meaning of the above statement.

@theRiddler I don’t know what your talking about, was that addressed to me.

@Alkis Piskas it’s in my OP it’s an objection that causal continuity isn’t enough for personal identity. In metaphysical parlance ground, as I understand it, explains the higher level facts.

Additionally, i linked the paper above so you see it in the objection section if something is unclear.

Quoting Ignoredreddituser

Here’s a copy of the paper, I responded to a post about it on Reddit

https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1391&context=comparativephilosophy

Well, the paper doesn't give any detail about the causal continuity theory beyond what you've summarized here, and I don't feel like delving into Buddhist philosophy to find out more. Perhaps there is a more tenable version of the model than just a hand-wavy "causal stream"? Otherwise it's hardly worth talking about.

@SophistiCat
Nah this is the only place I’ve heard this objection, I’ll just put in the bin then because even Parfit said any cause was fine host framework of personal identity.

Quoting Ignoredreddituser

it’s in my OP it’s an objection that causal continuity isn’t enough for personal identity. In metaphysical parlance ground, as I understand it, explains the higher level facts.

OK. One answer, 3 to go! :grin: (I had 4 questions)
Unforturnately though, I got another one from this reply of yours: What are "higher level facts"?

Reply to Ignoredreddituser I sometimes liken personal identity to the identity of a cyclone in the atmosphere. One can identify features of the atmosphere, eg jet streams and hurricanes. Without straying from causal continuity one can aver that the path of a hurricane is influenced by the jet stream. Yet the entities are vague, with undefined borders, and weather forecasters speak of such things 'losing their identity' with appropriate vagueness and handwaving.

In contrast to Buddhist Reductionists who deny the ultimate existence of the persons, Buddhist Personalists claim that persons are ultimately real in some important sense.

https://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1391&context=comparativephilosophy

I'm not sure if there is a difference between a hurricane reductionist and a hurricane personalist. It seems a matter of convenience of speaking.

@Alkis Piskas
Well what do you think I’m saying? Give me a take and I’ll try see what’s unclear.

Higher level facts are facts about people, places, things, that aren’t bottom level of analysis, like for example atoms, quarks, what have you.

Quoting Ignoredreddituser

Give me a take and I’ll try see what’s unclear.

I have enumerated my questions! You can read them (again) if you like at https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/633623

Quoting Ignoredreddituser

Higher level facts are facts about people, places, things, that aren’t bottom level of analysis, like for example atoms, quarks, what have you.

OK. Thanks. I didn't know that.

@Alkis Piskas
1 The objection to persons existing over time, basically it says causal continuity isn’t sufficient for personal identity.
2. We don’t identify people who causally influence us as responsible for our actions, nor think of them as us.

Reply to Ignoredreddituser
First of all, I'm sorry, I gave you the wrong link to look at: The right one, which was my response too your topic is https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/633941. Anyway, the thing has been carried on for too long. My bad. So let's drop it.