Cognitive closure and mysterianism
Wittgenstein: 'in order to draw a limit to thinking we should have to be able to think both sides of this limit' (which is impossible, by definition). I have to agree with Wittgenstein here, and it seems that this idea has many important implications. I'd like to suggest that it has implications for the theories of cognitive closure and mysterianism, as well as other related theories.
This is my interpretation of Wittgenstein's argument:
1. In order to detect a limit, you must be able to see both sides of it.
2. By definition, we cannot think thoughts that are on the other side of a limit to our thinking.
3. Therefore, we cannot detect limits to our thoughts.
So, if we cannot detect the limits of philosophical and scientific understanding, then it follows that cognitive closure and mysterianism can never be disproved or proved. Explicitly, if there are limits, which would mean that cognitive closure and mysterianism are true, we cannot detect the limits. Therefore, we cannot verify the truth of cognitive closure and mysterianism. And if there aren't limits, which would mean that cognitive closure and mysterianism are false, we could never be sure of that since, from our point of view, it's impossible to know that we aren't being limited by an undetectable limit. Therefore, we cannot verify the falsity of cognitive closure and mysterianism.
Thoughts?
This is my interpretation of Wittgenstein's argument:
1. In order to detect a limit, you must be able to see both sides of it.
2. By definition, we cannot think thoughts that are on the other side of a limit to our thinking.
3. Therefore, we cannot detect limits to our thoughts.
So, if we cannot detect the limits of philosophical and scientific understanding, then it follows that cognitive closure and mysterianism can never be disproved or proved. Explicitly, if there are limits, which would mean that cognitive closure and mysterianism are true, we cannot detect the limits. Therefore, we cannot verify the truth of cognitive closure and mysterianism. And if there aren't limits, which would mean that cognitive closure and mysterianism are false, we could never be sure of that since, from our point of view, it's impossible to know that we aren't being limited by an undetectable limit. Therefore, we cannot verify the falsity of cognitive closure and mysterianism.
Thoughts?
Comments (10)
Complete self recursion is impossible, this is what causes the hard problem of consciousness, the illusion of free will, and the ego
If you say “everything is stasis”, I say “everything is flux”. And having identified the complementary extremes of what could even be the case, we thus secure the spectrum of possibility that arises within such limits.
Our metaphysics is organised by any number of such dichotomies or symmetry breakings.
Matter-form, atom-void, chance-necessity, discrete-continuous, infinite-infinitesimal, one-many, local-global, structure-process, so on and so forth,
Either I know what I'm enquiring about OR I don't know what I'm enquiring about.
If I know what I'm enquiring about, there's no need to enquire.
If I don't know what I'm enquiring about, how can I enquire?
Late Donald Rumsefeld:
1. Known knowns
2. Known unknowns
3. Unknown unknowns
4. Unknown knowns
In math, we can actually prove whether a given theorem is provable/not (knowable) - undecidable - or not within some axiomatic system. In a sense, we've arrived at a limit.
I haven't encountered undecidables in philosophy if we ignore the fact that certain versions of agnosticism assume precisely that. Skepticism, some varieties, claim that all knowledge is impossible: self-refuting, might need to keep that in mind.
:up: I couldn't parse that so I left it out. You explain it well. I edited my post to accommodate your point.
Memory, it seems, needs to be included in our definition of knowledge because one way I won't know I know is if I forget what I know.
There are two kinds of memory failures:
1. Just yesterday, I forgot the biological term spandrel. After a coupla minutes of Googling I managed to find it. It felt familiar. Information retained in memory. The problem is inability to access it.
2. I met a man a few weeks ago whose name I knew a few months before but had forgotten. I politely asked him to refresh my memory. He gave me his name but it felt new, there was no "Oh yes, I remember now." Information erased from memory. Not a memory retrieval issue.
I can't know I know is type 1 memory failure (vide supra).
Socrates and Meno's slave.
It would be a big help if you defined your terms.
Quoting clemogo
I don't see why this is true. I don't need to see the other side of a wall in order to be stopped by it. Yes, I know, you're talking about thoughts. Can you give an example of the kind of situation you are talking about.
I don't think this follows, nor do I think it is the correct way of approaching this problem. A few examples should suffice: we cannot conceive, conceptualize, the size of the universe. Heck, we have serious trouble thinking about how far away Pluto is from Earth, not to mention the universe.
We run out of brain power if we think about how long it would take us to travel to Proxima Centauri. We can write down "4.26 light years", but it's way beyond our capacity to grasp, unlike say, I have three flowers or lemons in my hands.
The others are far easier to point out: we have no clue how the brain produces thought. Nor how willed action is possible.
So we already see things we can't proceed in our understanding of, but there are ways to work within these limits. Beyond that, we can't even ask nor even frame sensible questions, which might be sensible to another species.
because you know you dont know
— Agent Smith
because you know you dont know[/quote]
Meno's point is enquiry implies you must know (something) about what you're enquiring about - a starting point so to speak - but that's what you don't possess.