Parmenides, general discussion
Western philosophy began with ontology. It was a mighty turn away from Homeric myth to secular explanations, if not yet what we would recognize as science.
A contentious issue for pre-Socratic philosophers was about whether the world is made of many things, as it appears to be, or if our senses lie and the world is actually an undifferentiated whole.
Parmenides supported the latter view, along with the famous paradox maker, Zeno.
In Plato's Parmenides, a 19 year old Socrates explores the unity/plurality issue with Zeno and Parmenides.
After a discussion with Zeno, in which Socrates explains that the theory of the Forms does away with the necessity of Oneness,. Parmenides offers five reasons to doubt the theory of the Forms, and then concludes with a way to affirm the Forms that Socrates had missed
One way to read Parmenides would be to start with
1. Reviewing the ideas of Parmenides and Zeno.
2. Read Plato's Parmenides up to the launch of the 5 arguments
3. Go through the arguments,
4. Finish up the dialogue.
5. Discuss the way we look at these same issues today.
@Manuel Does that sound ok? Anyone else want to join?
A contentious issue for pre-Socratic philosophers was about whether the world is made of many things, as it appears to be, or if our senses lie and the world is actually an undifferentiated whole.
Parmenides supported the latter view, along with the famous paradox maker, Zeno.
In Plato's Parmenides, a 19 year old Socrates explores the unity/plurality issue with Zeno and Parmenides.
After a discussion with Zeno, in which Socrates explains that the theory of the Forms does away with the necessity of Oneness,. Parmenides offers five reasons to doubt the theory of the Forms, and then concludes with a way to affirm the Forms that Socrates had missed
One way to read Parmenides would be to start with
1. Reviewing the ideas of Parmenides and Zeno.
2. Read Plato's Parmenides up to the launch of the 5 arguments
3. Go through the arguments,
4. Finish up the dialogue.
5. Discuss the way we look at these same issues today.
@Manuel Does that sound ok? Anyone else want to join?
Comments (88)
Sure.
Here a link to the dialogue:
http://classics.mit.edu/Plato/parmenides.html
I think for the purposes of reading Plato's Parmenides, we can settle for what Plato seems to think he believed: that the world is truly an undivided, eternal, unity.
Just to touch briefly on of his reasons: he thought that heading into the future means journeying into a void. There is no void, so time must be an illusion. I think this makes more sense than it might appear.
Logically, the present and future have to be separated. Imagine that everything is time stamped. We can't have the now-moon existing simultaneously with the future-moon. What separates the present from the future? Apparently nothing, or a void.
We know the ancient Greeks lacked the concept of zero. Zero probably originated with Babylonians as a result of writing down abacus results. Further, the Greeks hated the idea of a void, which if you think about it, is kind of self-contradictory.
Thus the flow of time has to be an illusion. Obviously the report of the intellect is over-ruling the testimony of direct experience.
Thoughts?
As I read more and finish, and re-read, this may all radically change.
A lot of it is made more difficult due to the fact that we are in very different intellectual/cultural climates, so it's hard to understand why there should only "the one":
"if, on the other hand, one were in itself, it would also be contained by nothing else but itself; that is to say, if it were really in itself; for nothing can be in anything which does not contain it."
that which contains must be other than that which is contained? for the same whole cannot do and suffer both at once; and if so, one will be no longer one, but two?
It seems to me as if "the one" postulated here is rather rigid concept, such that anything which could possibly show a flaw in the concept of the one would be taken as part of the one, but the one cannot have parts.
Then we have the problem that a subject can think of the one, while being of the one, so the person cannot escape being part of the one.
I'd say the subject is one thing, the thought of the one is a different thing, while admitting that, in some very obscure sense, everything is part of a single "thing".
This thing could be the universe, or quantum fields or even the-thing-in-itself.
So initially, it looks like whatever this one is, for it to be rendered intelligible, must be the kind of thing which appears as many. And as appearances, they are different and multitudinous. So in this sense one could say that there are many things which at bottom belong to one.
These are my initial thoughts anyway.
Funny that I saw your reply as I was typing, otherwise I would keep postponing.
By this point, it's impossible not to have our ideas contaminated by modern theories and other philosophers. I think that what can help with this distinction of time being an illusion vs time feeling very real to us, is that one is how time is independent of us (in some respects) and the other is time, as we experience it.
We obviously add much to time, that is not found in the universe. Ideas of "slow", "fast", "before" and "after" are meaningless to the universe. But not to us.
I agree, we fill in the blanks. I think Aristotle agreed with your assessment of Parmenides: that he thought things are one in essence, but plural in phenomenon, so his monism amounts to saying there is only one substance.
They respected him deeply.
I suppose the appeal here is that the idea of one-ness is simple and difficult to argue against. Like if someone says there are many. Yeah, ok, but what about them? We look for similarities.
Do you think that it's possible to argue against the idea of "the one" as presented by Parmenides?
Wow. That's a good question. The One is an idea that goes on to haunt philosophy all the way down to Schopenhauer.
It's hard to address Parmenides be without using Schopenhauer and Neoplatonists as a crutch. It's not just a matter of arguing against mysticism. It's more like arguing with Zeno about his famous paradox which seems to show that motion is irrational.
One answer would be that just because X is irrational, doesn't mean it's not true. Instead if doubting your senses, maybe doubt your intellect?
I'm gonna have to ponder. :grin:
I read Parmenidies' important surviving fragment that is often called 'On Nature'.
Parmenides is a generous monist in that he allows the Unity to have multiplicity when it need not; however, I easily note that the One cannot be still or not anything would have happened.
He banishes 'Nothing' as what cannot even be meant; thus the mandatory existent as the One again easily ensues, which can't be denied, plus the Fundamental Arts dictate that the One cannot have parts, thus it having to be continuous (no spacers of 'Nothing' allowed in it, anyway).
Not able to be still, the One is ever energetic; the elementary particles and whatnot can only be as disturbances/excitations/rearrangements of it, for the One is all there is as the only real and lasting thing. It must ever remain as itself and so it can't make anything different than itself. All else as the events of multiplicity are temporary, even our entire universe. The One persists before, after, and during our universe, for it is Permanent. Thus, there is no Big Bang from 'Nothing'.
The One as partlesss needs be simplest, which we also know because it forms only tiny, simple elementaries at first. Because all the elementaries of a type are identical, we even further know that there has to a One as the structure beneath them responsible for their uniformity. For some reason, there is less and less stability on upwards of the elementaries, although even the elementaries don't last forever but can still be very long events.
I would ask how is it possible to not argue against such an idea. "The One" appears to me, to be presented by Parmenides as being self-contradicting in every possible way. It is a demonstration of the problem which arises from the assumption of independent Forms.
Parmenides describes to Socrates how we see in visible things the existence of opposites. Visible things change, therefore they pass from 'is..." to "is not..." in different ways. The Form itself, if we assume such a thing, must contain both of these opposites. But how is that possible for a thing (the Form) to both be and not be) in the same sense at the same time.
So I believe that the One is presented by Parmenides as an example, of how opposites can coexist in one Form. So the question we ought to ask would be whether this is an acceptable presentation or not. Does Parmenides provide a good demonstration of the Idea of One, one which cannot be argued against.
Recall that for Parmenides, it doesn't really make sense to say a thing is not, because if X is not, then how were you just talking about it?
:up:
It was a disaster for the religious to realize that the One of necessity that could not not be there made 'God' unnecessary and irrelevant. Like the proposed 'God' it was there without ever having been created, but in a simple form. Their template that the lesser had to come from the greater, which was ever haunted by regress, had to be thrown out, although they went into denial. It is that the lesser leads to the greater, but temporary, just as we can plainly see in our universe.
Then science came through to show it as the 'vacuum' that isn't empty and its quantum fields that we can get onto later to show it as the One.
I selected what I thought were the best translations of Parmenides' 'On Nature' that improved the style but didn't leave out any points, and then illustrated it, and then made a video of it:
The intro from the Stanford Philosophy seems to be mostly OK but for it referencing two substances. An electron, for example, is still constituted of the One (and only), as a rather stable quantum of it.
Quoting frank
What I do is to put in quotes what cannot be or even be meant, such as 'Nothing'.
But this is the point which Parmenides makes at the end of 135, when he speaks about visible things, and "their wandering between opposites". He says to Socrates, who he views as young and full of potential, yet untrained: "...If you want to be trained more thoroughly, you must not only hypothesize, if each thing is, and examine the consequences of that hypothesis, you must also hypothesize, if that same thing is not."
He says this because visible things come into being and go out of being, they pass through opposites. We can say of the same thing that "it is X" at one time, and "not X" at another time. And so, "among visible things, it's not at all hard to show that things are both like and unlike and anything else you please."
[quote=Parmenides]Ex nihilo nihil fit (nothing comes from nothing.[/quote]
Since ex nihilo nihi fit, Parmenides rejected becoming; after all becoming implies an initial stage of nonbeing which in Parmenides universe is either nothing or too close it for comfort.
Hence, Parmenides endorsed eternalism but then how do we explain aging of men, women and children, the flux of rivers, motion, the ripening of fruits, seasons, day & night, and so on? "Simple," says Parmenides and his disciple Zeno, "change is an illusion." It has to be, right?
What's fascinating is how Parmenides and Heraclitus contradicted each other. The latter claimed that change is the only constant. For Heraclitus, panta rhea.
Most philosophers and that includes Socrates, Plato, et al were, my hunch is, uncomfortable with the Heraclitean position because it has sophist written all over it. After all, to a philosopher veritas numquam perit (truth never expires or, positively rendered, truth is eternal). Given this view of truth is non-negotiable to a philosopher, Parmenides, for the reason that he subscribed to eternalism, was viewed as toeing the official line and thus favored.
It's definitely Plato's hardest dialogue.
His One of Necessity has no beginning; it is ever and always. Did the One make our universe that has time in it linearly or did the One make it all at once and then replay it slower so as to be experienced in time? Or did the One always have everything in it, such as our universe, and then plays it slower.
The elementaries are tiny lightweights, which shows that what formed them is also lightweight. Thus, the Basis as the One is simple.
The One, being energetic, is never still (or all multiplicity would never arise). Thus it has a energy value at every point that fluctuates. The short name for this is a field. The temperature field in one’s home has a degree value at every point. Fields are simple, not mysterious.
Let us look into the field that forms electrons, since they are familiar to us. Its points tug at each other, ever making for varying lumps in it, similar to those in an ocean, so the field wavers.
Why do electrons last? Why don’t they just slosh away like lumps in water?
All electrons are identical in volume, integer energy level, and charge, and so that defines how they have to be, as stable. Any other wanna-be bump in the electron field doesn’t make an electron or a fraction of one, although these may turn out to be the virtuals that collapse in an instant.
An electron bound in an atom can jump to a higher orbital cloud level if it gets the right amount of energy from a photon, say, as double what it has. This is known as the quantum jump; simple, but we haven’t yet gotten to what a quantum is yet, but that’s the kind of happening that led physicists there, as again no fractional allowed to be lasting. A quantum is a specific energy level that can last in the field that is everywhere, it then being able to move anywhere in the field. It’s sort of like a kink in a rope; it travels but the rope doesn’t.
Can we derive the math of an electron quantum field to see if that matches it?
Victor Toth says, [i]We decompose the field into harmonic oscillators, since that’s what the field does, with its moving points, though a Fourier-transform, each point now as a quantum harmonic oscillator whose energy comes in quantized units.
The lowest energy state is not zero when we sum for all possible values so we get an infinite result.
When a theory is renormalizable, there’s a mathematically sensible process to discard the unwanted infinities but still account for finite differences, which are responsible for observables. We may sum energies to some finite cutoff value, and use it to compute physically observable values; in the limit of the cutoff going back to infinity, the physical prediction doesn’t change.[/i]
There are 25 types of quantum fields, one for each entry in the Standard Model. The fields overlap and can affect one another, making for one overall quantum field, this complicating the math. The Higgs field even has a much higher rest energy than the other fields.
Quantum Field Theory (QFT) is the most firm and successful theory in the history of science.
Yes, as in a DVD playing.
Another illusion might be that temporary 'things' are things, and separate even, not events of the One as the One. All that goes one is the One as the One's transmutations.
You got some pretty strong stuff written all over! I sense a strong feeling of unity radiating from your words. Great!
Ahh! I'm slow in getting started. Got busy. I'll get back to it this week.
This is not how Plato represents Parmenides in "The Parmenides", as indicated by the passage I've referred to above, at 135.
It is not that Parmenides rejected becoming, clearly Plato represented him as accepting the reality of "becoming". He just presented the extreme difficulty of understanding "becoming" logically. This is the same situation we find with Zeno's paradoxes. Zeno does not reject the reality of motion, he just demonstrates that the principles employed to understand motion, at that time, were insufficient to provide a real understanding.
After all, now we read the story from the writings of those who opposed the ideas, even if (hopefully) treated them respectfully. But it still begs the question if Eleatic School's view is represented in a negative light or some interesting view is not discussed. That Zeno came up with the problem of mathematical limits (or the infinitesimal) is no small matter. Starting from an indivisible atom has it's obvious problems as is putting natural numbers as basis of all mathematics.
And still, we take infinity as an axiom and yet these questions are raised for example in this Forum thousands of years afterwards.
Perfect, I'll likely do the same then. :up:
You will go crazy reading about all their 'likes' and 'unlikes' portrayed in umpteen ways.
All multiplicity has to be like the One and that's that.
I recall that the main point was being hammered over and over again, but that was a few years ago. I'll refresh my reading, if I get the same feeling again, then I'll just go with my impressions.
But good to know other people think the same.
(One of the maiden Goddesses of Parmenides' 'On Nature')
After all, such as electrons are not something else that is weaker that got quantized; electrons are directly the quanta of their lasting field. Well, either they get annihilated or they wear out eventually perhaps because there can't really be any infinite precision, meaning that everything temporary leaks. The One ever moves, too, this maybe somehow also contributing to the destined demise of its forms.
Stability decreases on upward: molecules are neither inclined to stay together nor to instantly break apart, stars burn out, cells have to get replaced, the tips of DNA tear off a bit during every division, eventually ripping into the good part, like a fraying shoelace after the protective end has gone away.
All the temporaries are doomed! The fate of all their epicness is to fade. The great statues crack and crumble; only the pedestal of the One remains intact.
Heaven’s Great Wheel e’er whirls its energy,
It having to turn and return, to be,
Transmuting, as ne’er still—eternally,
Into life’s temporary pattern-trees.
Change in the Eterne dooms forms’ permanence;
But the time required for their constructance
Restrains for a while the shapes’ destructance;
Thus they can slowly traverse life’s distance.
The chain is forged that links a thousand deaths
To a thousand future-generated breaths—
When lips ripe as fruit gently part in pain:
The smile of a corpse is life touched by death.
There are a number of views to be sure due to the lack of clarity of the original text. Some is just poor writing skills in expressing an abstract subject matter (I sympathize with that). But the philosophical details were also too complicated to be clearly laid out this early by possibly the originator of formal logic. What there is is enough for Parmenides to have become the father of formal philosophy.
Parmenides' philosophy starts with Truth, the basis and proof for certainty of genuine knowledge. Of course, Truth is not a goddess but a singular value of evaluation. It is One or its Form of One. This Form cannot be in motion, change, come-to-be, perish, or lack uniformity.
I haven't the slightest idea.
So he did. Parmenides (and Plato) divided the 'World' of the philosopher into (I) what can be known with certainty and (II) what is mere opinion. (Part I) Certain knowledge can only be formal according to and following Parmenides' deductive logic. For formalism only, what is is, and what isn't be cannot possibly be or be thought of, because premises and deductive logic says so with certainty. If the number 1 is then it is, otherwise nothing can be said because anything else goes. Green is green, not-green is either unspeakable (Parmenides) or everything else in the rest of the formal world (Plato).
I think the Sanford Encyclopedia on Parmenides is better than the dialogue.
In any case Parmenides is urging reason above sense data, which is a good point. Unless your reasoning clouds the way you interpret the world. In this case, his "the one" is a kind of trap. I can understand the appeal of this logic thousands of years ago, but today, there are better ways to articulate issues of monism and change or non-change.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8K9bes5UcjA
It's really not, and a fair amount of the argumentation seems silly to me. I keep looking for what I'm missing.
The idea of the One is something I kind of live with. It emerged from my own thinking, so I'm attracted to philosophers who use it (or something like it, like the Absolute).
It's like: the mind always breaks the world into halves: light, dark, near, far, etc. These halves are dependent on one another for meaning.
It's a theory of meaning, sort of: meaning arises from oppositions. But when we think of the meaning of Unity, and note that it's dependent on the idea of Plurality, a second, transcendent unity appears, one where all thought ends.
As far as this dialogue goes, I'm in favor of putting it aside. What do you think?
I think that we can put it aside and leave this thread as a general discussion of Parmenides, that way if someone wants to speak about him, whether his own Poem, or different articles, they can do that.
Sounds good.
Plato's Parmenides character is not Parmenides. Uncovering the foibles of the primitive logic of opposites and pluralities and how this evolved from Parmenides to Plato is what reading Plato's Parmenides is mostly about. The proof of this is in the 'unreadable' and controversial lesson of the second half of Plato's dialogue. The IEP and SEP are the best intro for starters.
The absolutes of cosmology and cosmogony are elsewhere.
I was explaining why the One and it's related issues are familiar to me.
I think this dialogue is about challenging the concept of the Forms. Do you want to look at some of the arguments?
That's true, but without logical clarification that challenge is incomprehensible. Parmenides only has one Form. Then that Form is kicked around quite confusingly from logic to proposition to ontology to the Absolute. Plato's middle period Forms are many little ones yet the unexplained Good mimics the great One. If this expansion doesn't work for Plato then why not?
Quoting frank
Yes, for this One, not-One cannot even be thought of. As in looking at the Universe subjectively, from within there is nothing else, there is no outside.
Plato's view is an objective view from the outside. There are many Forms and there are some opposites to talk about. In fact, for any single 'one', others, whether opposites or not are unavoidable.
So let's back up and see the problem the Forms are solving for us:
Zeno says plurality is flawed because it means we have things that are like and unlike at the same time.
So think of horses. They're obviously all the same (horses), but different (individuals).
Socrates explains something that's so ingrained in us that it's practically automatic:
Separate the form, universal, category, species, etc. from the sensible, particular, object, representative.
Voila:. problem solved. I guess this solution was an aspect of language and thought and Plato just brought it forward for consideration?
Really, the Forms are not an invention. It's just recognition of the way we think, correct?
I think this step seems intuitive to us but it isn't the direction that Plato took. In his view the Forms were all that existed and the only things about which we could have knowledge. The particulars are shifting impressions and are the objects of perception and opinion merely.
Why did he conclude that?
There are many reasons. One which I'll offer to this thread has its roots in Parmenides's own words. The Greek word 'esti' - used by Parmenides in crucial lines in the Way of Truth - can mean interchangeably:
It is [something] (as in 'It is blue' , 'It is round')
It exists
It is true
The 'is' of predication, the 'is' of existence and the 'is' of truth-attribution are not here distinguished. So the expression 'ouk esti' (= 'it isn't') yields (for Parmenides) a paradox. You tell me that the ball is round and that therefore the ball is not square. The 'is not' of 'is not square' seems to be telling me that the ball does not exist and that what I'm saying about the ball is not true. But if I cannot say the ball is not square then equally I cannot specify that it is round. And since the ball is something that other things are not then I cannot even specify the ball. I end up just being able to say of It (whatever It might be) that It Is.
(Seems weird to us. But if you smudge the distinctions between existence, predication and truth then you can think your way into the problem. And it took Aristotle to unpick it all the way we might approach it.)
Thanks! Informative post.
Zeno's plurality is flawed because he applies the deductive binary logic of the Way of Truth to the changing world of opinion without warrant. For a discrete Form, gradual change is impossible because change must involve repeated becoming and perishing of each object in time which a Form does not possess. Opinions which do change therefore must be indeterminate in every way, and must lack identity altogether.
Parmenides' One is a perfectly uniform closed (bounded, limited) sphere, an object that can be said to either exist or not exist because it has Identity. The alternative, raised by Melissus, is that the One is unbounded and open. (Analogously, think of a circular standing wave, or an electron that extends infinitely in the electron field.) Opinion is open, continuous, formless, and indefinite, where binary logic cannot apply. Therefore everything Zeno says has to say must be flawed.
Incidentally, whatever is mythical and mysterious is also vague, indefinite and unknowable, which makes it intriguing for speculative thought. Once it is bounded with attributes, it becomes less interesting.
Quoting frank
I think of it the other way around. Let's suppose that the Forms do not come from heaven but are a cultural heritage catalogued in dictionaries and encyclopedias. Now Ideas would take on much more meaningful reality for us. However, doing away with God's contribution would destroy the soul of Plato's Socratic philosophy which is absolute God-given morality.
I have difficulty following your posts. I probably just need to study a little more.
So do I. Parmenides and Plato are too dense a topic and I don't expand and slow down the exposition enough. For example, to Quoting frank , the direct Platonic answer is "No, not correct".
We think with our own private psychological conceptions of common cultural ideas. It isn't possible to have thoughts or conversations without using socially common ideas as these present themselves to suit specific occasions in our lives.
Ideas are cultural collections that are handed down to us. Ideas are catalogued in public dictionaries and encyclopedias. We don't personally invent any of them. We just learn them as children, or in schools, or through reading.
Plato arbitrarily takes these ideas and creates a class of mathematical or logical objects from them, called Ideas or Forms. Forms are only used to build Plato's abstract metaphysical models, and have no psychologically useful correlates.
Doesn't our experience with recognizing kinds, types, and universals in the realm of particulars count as 'psychologically useful' correlates?
Your description seems to suggest that the problems of Parmenides have all been surpassed by means of some complete explanation. Some of the effort in the dialogue is troubled by the consequences of complete explanations. Are 'we' beyond that now?
Like other academic endeavors, philosophy has a pure theoretical side. You may disagree with this sharp divide, but to me metaphysics should only be interested in building and examining models. Each and every ancient philosopher in our historical surveys had a unique metaphysical outlook. It is this variety that I try to capture.
I don't think you can support that mental constructs of pure philosophy are useful in any way to a person. They are like the layout and elements of an architectural drawing. They exist to provide a range of potentialities for applied philosophy. But if you just mean applied philosophy, then some ad hoc rules of wisdom do suggest useful mindsets or courses of action, like for example not eating beans, or the golden mean, or golden rule.
Recognizing material objects is a fact of sensation. But kinds, types, universals, particulars are made up for their own sake. They're the sort of stuff only we can talk about. Forms, like those others, only have meaning to some but not all philosophers. Psychology lives in each and every and person, and even in cats.
Quoting Paine
Unlike most science, good philosophy doesn't obsolete but its usefulness is limited to the metaphysical venue where it belongs. Parmenides was a very great philosopher who linked a simple metaphysics to a simple metaphysically loaded logic and then implied aggressively a matching (false) ontology. The One 'is or is not'. Plato expanded that not only to 'if not A then B', but also to 'if not green then not-green'. These were important steps in Western culture. All of them are valid given their premises, whatever those may be.
As far as I know, 'persons' are the only ones who might be possibly interested in these 'constructs.'
Your hunch is supported by Plato's Theaetetus, where the alleged Protagorean subjectivist theory of sense-perception is accused of secret alliance with Heraclitean universal flux. Since the same theory is reiterated in the Timaeus, it becomes obvious to readers of both books that this unseemly subjectivist theory is Plato's own, uncomfortably adopted, whether borrowed or invented.
Do you take this dialogue as a warning against complete, self-contained systems of thought?
We keep trying to get rid of Platonism (understandably, for all its faults) and it keeps coming back (understandably, for all its attractions). https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/goedel/
Aha!
That is unlikely given this writing is one of the first of its kind. I was referring to the willingness to have every proposition be challenged as such. The permission to hear new ideas. Why would one extend such an invitation?
Because of a belief that the truth is beyond words?
Yes.
Bingo! You nailed it, señor, you nailed it! I feel like a blind man whose sight has been restored! Can you please expand and elaborate this line of thought. Thanks a million. Urging is an understatement though.
Personally, I think that the Parmenides is one of Plato’s most interesting dialogues and it has held a central position in the Platonic tradition from antiquity into modern times.
Unfortunately, it isn’t the easiest to interpret and this has led to controversial views among scholars and ordinary readers of Plato alike.
The main strands of interpretation have been divided along logical versus metaphysical lines. The first tends to read the dialogue as an exercise in logical argumentation. The second takes it to contain some of Plato’s most profound thoughts about the structure of the suprasensory world of Intelligence. This is why Platonists like Plotinus have regarded it as a treasure trove of invaluable metaphysical insight.
One of the sources of confusion and misunderstanding seems to be the points raised against Platonic teachings like the “Theory of Forms”. Young Socrates is made to defend his (and Plato’s) position against Parmenides and Zeno’s objections and isn’t doing too well (129 ff.)
But it is Parmenides who declares that there must be Forms, because otherwise we will have nowhere to turn our thoughts to and this will totally destroy the power of dialectic (135b-c3).
Then comes Aristoteles’ turn (137c) and the discussion – consisting of eight arguments - revolves on the One and the Many. The final conclusion is that “if the One is not, nothing is” (166c).
So, I think that on the whole, the criticism is ultimately constructive and the dialogue is consistent with Plato’s position on the Forms and on the One as a first principle of all.
The metaphysical interpretation makes more sense in a Platonic context than the logical one.
One way of looking at it is that there were two forms of Heracliteanism. The "extreme" one held that everything was in flux in every way, which meant that things could not have properties. The "moderate" one held that there must be some permanence, otherwise the "eternal flux" itself would be impossible.
Plato obviously rejects extreme Heracliteanism. But he nevertheless holds that sensibles are always in some way becoming. This is why he contrasts the world of Becoming and the world of Being.
The Platonic world of Becoming (the world of sensibles) is similar to the Heraclitean world of flux and, therefore, less than real. The real world is the world of Being which is the world of unchanging intelligibles.
Reason is telling you one thing, that there is "the one", the senses are telling you there are many. When these are in conflict with each other, trust reason, no matter how absurd the consequences may be.
Today, we know that colours aren't in objects and that deep down, things aren't made of small impenetrable participles, but of probabilities and strange quantum vacuums. Our senses tell us this can't be right, just look at the world, but reason tells us to trust the evidence.
There's a lot more to say about this part, but that's the rough idea, as I understand it.
The only problem here is if you get stuck on the wrong idea, Einstein refused to believe QM was probabilistic, he had the wrong idea, though it's sensible, it's not correct.
Another pre-Socratic approach was to say that the Parmenidean One exists but there happen to be lots of them. Each 'den' ("thing" - made-up word, opposite of 'ouden' = no-thing) is indivisible, without parts, absolute being without specific properties such as colour or taste. They buzz around in the vacuum and make up the familiar world of sensible objects and properties. The result is Atomism.
I agree. Which makes the actual Parmenides interesting. Zeno's paradoxes are themselves interesting, highly popular and lead to math that surfaced far later.
And wasn't during this time the belief in Greece that all numbers were rational broken by the observations that not all geometric magnitudes can be expressed by rational numbers? Which also begs the question.
Apparently so. Plato was considered the leading Pythagorean as well as Eleatic of his time. His mathematical preoccupation at times obscures the main discussion making either difficult to separate and follow. Part II of the Parmenides is presented as an exemplary complete lesson in a version of binary logic. Our job is to adjust the premises to fit the conclusions.
Mathematics, due to the nature of deductive proof, has the good fortune to be able to build on all of its past achievements. Cultural advances in our education allow ancient specialized research topics to now read as childish or foolish.
Plato repeatedly honored the young mathematician Theaetetus who supposedly came up with the solution to the problem of incompatibility of geometric continuous lengths and rational representation. This work is presented as Book X of Euclid's Elements. But I am even more impressed by Plato's achievement in the Timaeus of constructing ontological elements by raising the dimensions of bound geometric objects from two to three. It has even been suggested that a complete rigorous proof for Platonic solids was the purpose of Euclid's Elements.
:100:
As far as I can tell, there are two issues:
1. Change itself. For example motion. [Changes]
2. The cause of change: The laws of motion. [Does not change]
Correct. It’s amazing how the “findings” of modern science were already anticipated thousands of years ago.
The only problem with Atomism is that, though it makes sense at atomic level, it takes something more than just atoms to explain anything bigger like, say, the Universe. That’s why Plato isn’t very fond of Atomism. And his Parmenides doesn’t seem to be a follower of Atomism, either.
Sure. It is difficult to tell what Heraclitus taught exactly. But if everything is in constant flux, then the flux itself qua flux must remain the same.
The water in a river may change between the times you step in it, but the river itself as a riverbed with flowing water is the same river - or changes its course sufficiently slowly to qualify as the same for practical purposes.
Heraclitus’ position, if our understanding of it is correct, seems to be similar to the Indian Theory of Momentariness (Kshanika-Vada).
Plato would agree that the physical world is in constant flux, but the intelligible world is changeless. Hence his theory of eternal Forms which Pamenides seems to endorse in the dialogue.
This seems to be the whole point of the dialogue.
Platonic texts are traditionally interpreted on several levels of meaning, (1) literal (logos), (2) moral (nomos, typos or doxa) and (3) allegorical (hyponoia). This multi-layered interpretation was already common practice by the time of Plato.
The literal Platonic (or “Platonist”) reading of the Parmenides is that it represents Plato’s synthesis of Ionian and Italian (Eleatic) philosophical schools.
The moral interpretation is that the departure of Cephalus (the narrator of the dialogue) from his homeland in Clazomenae and arrival in Athens symbolizes the philosopher’s need to leave his native home (= the body) for the City of Athena, the Goddess of Wisdom (= intellect), in order to attain wisdom, the goal of philosophical endeavor.
The allegorical interpretation is even more elaborate and subtle. Ionia stands for the Physical World, Italy stands for Intelligent Being, Athens for the intermediate way upward that takes the awakened souls to their spiritual home in the Intelligible World. The visitors from Clazomenae represent the individual intelligences that are leaving the physical Cosmos on a journey to the One, the unifying first principle and cause of all under the guiding light of Wisdom cast by Athena (Parmenides and Zeno have come to Athens for the Panathenaea, the most important Athenian festival in honor of the Goddess).
As Proclus explains in his Commentary, Parmenides, Zeno, and Socrates represent the highest principles. Adeimantus and Glaucon represent guiding deities who lead the Clazomenaeans to their brother Antiphon who leads them to Pythodorus. And Pythodorus is the divine messenger who relays the inspiring discourses (logoi) taking place between Parmenides, Zeno, and Socrates. Parmenides himself stands for the Divine Intellect, Socrates as the youngest of the three represents the plurality of the Ideas or Forms, and Zeno, who is of an intermediate age between Socrates and Parmenides, the principle that unifies plurality in a drive toward the One itself (1.662).
In other words, Parmenides and Zeno, i.e., their views, are interpreted in a positive light and on par with Socrates’ (and Plato’s) own teachings. Proclus’ Commentary on Plato’s Parmenides, remained highly valued for many centuries both in the Greek East and, through Latin translations made in the 1200’s, in the Latin West.
It must be recalled that the dialogue relates a conversation between Parmenides, Zeno, and Socrates, that took place at Pythodorus’ house in Keramikos, a quarter of Athens whose notable features are an ancient cemetery and the Sacred Gate, the starting point of the Sacred Road from Athens to Eleusis, the route taken by the annual procession celebrating the Eleusinian Mysteries.
(We can see that the location already points to the metaphysical content of the dialogue, which supports its traditional interpretation.)
Zeno had written a book in defense of Parmenidean Monism and brought it to Pythodorus’ house for discussion. Pythodorus, who is said to have been Parmenides’ closest student, later related the conversation to Antiphon and Antiphon related it to Cephalus, who now narrates the dialogue.
The dialogue consists of two parts, a shorter First Part from 126a to 137c, which is between Socrates and Parmenides and revolves on the Platonic Forms.
The Second Part from 137c to 166c, is between Parmenides and Aristoteles (not Aristotle, but the similarity of name may suggest a connection) and is about the intellectual exercise needed for the correct understanding of the Forms.
When Zeno has finished reading his book, Socrates asks him about the meaning of the first hypothesis of Zeno’s first argument, “If the things that are, are many, they must be both like and unlike. But that is impossible as what is unlike cannot be like, nor what is like be unlike” (127e).
Socrates points out that Parmenides holds that “the all is one” and Zeno that “it is not many”, which is “beyond the rest of us”.
Zeno, a pupil of Parmenides who believes in the universal unity of being, attacks those who believe in a plurality of things. He says that his book intends to pay back those who criticize Parmenides, claiming that “If the all is one, many absurdities and contradictions follow” (128d).
Socrates retorts that there is a Form of Likeness and an opposite Form of Unlikeness and that the many participate in the two, which means that the many can be both like and unlike themselves and many and one, without contradiction.
On the other hand, if someone could show that separate Forms like Likeness and Unlikeness, Multitude and Oneness, Rest and Motion, could themselves be combined and separated, and demonstrate the same difficulties that Parmenides and Zeno have shown in regard of the perceptible many, then he, Socrates, would be very much astonished (129e).
Parmenides now points out the difficulties that arise from positing a world of Forms each of which exists “itself by itself” and a world of things that participate in Forms but are separate from them.
Argument 1. (130e–131e) If particular objects participate in the whole of a Form, then the whole Form is present in many objects. If the objects participate in only a part of the Form, then the Form would no longer be simple.
Argument 2. (132a–b) If we posit a Form of Largeness to explain the presence of that property in a group of large things, then we must also posit a second Form of Largeness to account for largeness in the group of things and in the first Form, followed by a third Form of Largeness to account for largeness in the first and second Forms and their corresponding objects, etc. As a result, the Form cannot be one, it must be infinite in number.
Argument 3. (132b–c) If, as Socrates suggests, a Form is just a thought in our mind and therefore single, not multiple, then each thing is composed of thoughts and all things either (a) think or (b) though being thoughts, are unthinking, which is unreasonable.
Argument 4. (132c–133a) If, as Socrates now suggests, Forms are patterns in nature of which the multitude of instances are copies or likenesses, then the Forms are like their instances and things are like by participating in the Form of Likeness, which results in another infinite regress as in Argument 2, above.
Argument 5. (133a–134e) If particular objects are separate from their corresponding Form, there can be no relation between the world of Forms and the world of perceptible particulars. Similarly, there can be no relation between knowledge of one world and knowledge of the other. God himself would be deprived of knowledge of our world, and the Gods would be unable to rule us.
Socrates admits that such an argument would be too strange to contemplate.
Parmenides says that only someone remarkably ingenious would be able to understand the Forms and even more so to teach it to another. On the other hand, if the existence of Forms were to be denied, there would be no stable concepts to turn to, and this would “completely destroy the power of discourse” (135 c).
It is clear that despite the criticism, Parmenides does not reject the Theory of Forms. His true objective is to show that Socrates has an incomplete understanding of the Forms. He has attempted to define Forms prematurely. This can be redressed through rigorous intellectual training which involves examination of the consequences of each hypothesis not only when we hypothesize “if a thing is”, but also “if that same thing is not”.
Socrates asks for a demonstration and Parmenides, taking Aristoteles for interlocutor, proceeds with his arguments. The Eight Arguments he now presents answer the problems raised by Socrates in the First Part. They revolve on concepts like Being, Unity, Likeness, Difference, etc., i.e., the critical elements that Plato uses in his definition of Forms.
Four of the Arguments (or groups of arguments) are based on the proposition that “the One is”, and four on the proposition that “the One is not”, and are constructed on the following basic pattern:
1. “If the One is, then the One is neither F nor con-F”
2. “If the One is, then the One is both F and con-F”
3. “If the One is, then the Others are both F and con-F”
4. “If the One is, then the Others are neither F nor con-F”
5. “If the One is not, then the One is both F and con-F”
6. “If the One is not, then the One is neither F nor con-F”
7. “If the One is not, then the Others are both F and con-F”
8. “If the One is not, then the Others are neither F nor con-F”
Where F = property and con-F = property contrary to the property of being F and properties and their contraries refer to parts-whole, limited-unlimited, same-different, like-unlike, motion-rest, equal-unequal, etc.:
Argument 1. (137c–142a) “If the One is” (i.e., if it is One), then the One neither has parts nor is a whole”.
Argument 2. (142b–155e) “If the One is, then the One both has parts and is a whole”.
Argument 3. (158b5-7) “If the One is, then the Others both have parts and are a whole”.
Argument 4. (154b-160b) “If the One is, then the Others neither have parts nor are a whole”, etc.
Argument 5. (160b–163b) “If the One is not, then the One partakes of both likeness in relation to itself and of unlikeness in relation to the Others”.
Argument 6. (163b–164b) “If the One is not, then the One partakes neither of the like nor of the different”.
Argument 7. (164b–165e) “If the One is not, then the Others both appear to be one and are not one”.
Argument 8. (165e-166c) “If the One is not, then the Others are neither one nor many”, etc.
In short, Argument 1 states that if the One is, then it has neither parts nor is a whole, has neither beginning nor end, neither limit nor shape, is neither in another nor in itself, is neither in motion nor at rest, is neither different than nor the same as itself or another, not equal to itself nor another, etc. but that these things cannot be true of the One.
On its part, the final Argument 8 ends in the conclusion (at 166c) that “if One is not, nothing is”.
We can see why Plato’s Parmenides tends to be regarded as something of an enigma. Key questions revolve around issues such as the identity of “One” and the meaning of negation.
Fortunately, we have traditional interpretations like those of Plotinus and Proclus that can provide valuable guidance.
One way of looking at non-being is to see it not as “nothingness” but as “otherness”. Similarly, the One itself may be distinguished from human thought about the One, etc.
In his Commentary, Proclus acknowledges the fact that some have been persuaded to take Argument 1 as meaning that the existence of the One is an impossibility. The problem with this is that it would be inconsistent both with Parmenides’ monistic views and with Plato’s belief in the One.
Proclus, therefore, writes:
Heraclitus wasn't blind to the fact that, for example, in a small stream, the form - the location and size of the wavelets on its surface - doesn't change even though the water is continually being replaced.
[quote=Heraclitus]Change is the only constant[/quote]
I also feel that this apparent paradox reflects what Wittgenstein referred to as "bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language" because replace "is the only constant" with "is continuous" in the above statement by Heraclitus and we get...
[quote=Heraclitus]Change is continuous[/quote]
Sorry, I've been busy. What did Heraclitus think the enduring, river is? An illusion?
If the world we see is an illusion, there still has to be someone experiencing the illusion. What did Parmenides think individual humans are?
Correct. As far as I am aware, Heraclitus believes in an immortal soul. So, presumably, the soul is the changeless element in the midst of a changing world.
Parmenides has a conception of the soul that is quite similar to Plato’s: the soul is immortal and divine and inhabits various bodies as it journeys through the cycle of death and rebirth.
Yes, language can create as much as solve problems. This is why some believe that truth is to be found in silence.
I see. So Heraclitus wouldn't have accepted the Forms?
:zip:
That is a great detailed summary you wrote, very clear. I have to admit I don't see where the dialogue is going -
Is it aiming to leave us in aporia, unsure whether there are Platonic Forms, a Parmenidean One or Many?
Is the structure - There cannot be One (because of contradictions), there cannot be Many (same reason), therefore there must be Forms?
One what, by the way? Substance, object, universe, thing?
I mean, even if by working terribly hard I could understand this dialogue, what's the point of it?
Plato's dialogues reflect philosophical problems discussed in the Academy. This can be seen, for example, from the way Forms are dealt with as if everyone involved was familiar with the topic.
Given the existence of the Academy, where discussion was ongoing, the dialogues do not provide solutions to all the problems raised.
The "aporia" here belongs to outsiders. The insiders, i.e., Academy students, presumably have a pretty clear understanding of what Plato is trying to say and I believe so does Proclus.
The dialogue starts with the discussion between Socrates, Zeno, and Parmenides, that takes place by the Gate to the Sacred Road from Athens to Eleusis, the seat of the Mystery Rites.
The Mystery Rites aimed to bring about the union of the initiates with the Deity, here represented by "the One".
So, the discussion of the Forms and the One is the intellectual equivalent of the Mystery Procession, i.e., the means by which the philosopher proceeds from Athens to Eleusis or from ordinary to higher experience.
As the Mystery Rites end in a vision of and union with the Divine, so the discussion or philosophizing must end in silent contemplation of the One which represents the Ultimate Reality of Socrates/Plato, Zeno, and Parmenides.
The Forms, of course, do exist because as Parmenides points out, dialectic or intellection would be impossible without them. But the point of the quest for Ultimate Reality is not to talk or think about it, but to experience it and to experience it means to be it.
And this can only happen by leaving dialectic and all intellectual activity behind, activity that actually creates an unwanted distance between philosopher and his goal, and enter a state of complete mental and emotional stillness, the only state in which the unity of subject and object, of Ultimate Reality and individual intelligence, can take place.
As Proclus puts it:
Quoting frank
Where do you base this assumption-statement on?
Quoting frank
From Homeric myth to what we know as Western philosophy a lot of things have happened. One cannot way that ontology was a (sudden) turn away or a separation or whatever from Homeric myth. They are two totally different worlds.
Much less can we talk about ontology and science, which have no relation whatsoever. If an ancient philosopher was closer to science, that would be Thales of Miletus, who is regarded as the father of Science. And he is also regards by most people as the philosopher with whom the Western philosophy has begun.
Parmenides was indeed one of the first philosophers who had ontological views on nature, but he had other fishes to fry, nothing to do with science neither have I found a reference talking about him or his ontology as the origin of Western philosophy.
The above are two simple ramarks I wanted to make on the introduction of the topic.
As for studying Parmenides' and Zenos' ideas to a point where I can talk responsibly about them, this will take quite long. So, unfortunately I cannot contribute to that at this point.
Thank you for your clear and patient explanation. Frankly, I had no idea.
To me, this is a new aspect on Plato. Perhaps I have the wrong view - or an incomplete view. I know him as a philosopher of big simple questions rooted in our lives. What is justice? How do we know anything? What happens to us when we die? What is love? What do the gods or god have to do with mortals? How can we distinguish appearance from reality? This seems to be a Plato of abstract mysticism, removed from life completely. Once we've eliminated dialectic and become one with the One, what is left? Perhaps we achieve release from rebirth in nirvana. Shantih.
Thales. Water.
Quoting Alkis Piskas
This is not true.
Have you made this up right now? Because you have not mentioned Thales in your description. It comes after a comment of mine. Anyway, you made it worse, because Thales is not connected to ontology. Parmenides, is. (Whom you did mention.)
Quoting frank
I can't compete with this! :smile:
:grin:
Good point. I agree that Plato is not to everyone’s liking. But there is no harm in trying to understand him on his own terms even if we don’t agree with everything he says.
Ancient Greece was a world of rival city-states and hostile foreign powers. Many philosophers sought to reinterpret established religion and were often regarded with suspicion in Athenian society, especially when they were involved in politics. For example, if Plato had taught about the Good or the One as a single omnipotent Being, suspicious minds could have interpreted this as an endorsement of absolute monarchy, dictatorship or, perhaps even worse, “worship of foreign Gods”.
It wasn’t just Biblical Jews who objected to foreign Gods. The relationship between man and Gods in Greece (as in much of the Ancient World) was contractual. The Gods protected the City if the City worshiped the Gods. Disrespecting the Gods or worshiping other Gods was considered a crime against the Gods and against the whole community.
So, Plato had to be cautious for political and religious reasons, aside from the fact that the metaphysical realities implied in his writings have to be experienced, not philosophized about. Even the Mystery Rites, though popular and respected, were secret.
The approach to Plato’s teachings took place on three levels:
1. The written dialogues served to introduce the readers to philosophical problems and modes of addressing them.
2. The Academy taught students certain dialectical methods such as dieresis and assigned problems to be solved by senior students as part of the curriculum.
3. Higher esoteric teachings were made available to the most advanced students who had developed adequate philosophic and spiritual aptitudes.
Platonism may indeed sound like “mysticism” to some, but the Platonic “nirvana” or liberation (lysis) is definitely NOT disappearance into Nothingness or into the Ultimate (however defined).
According to Plato, having attained the highest possible experience and knowledge of reality, the philosopher must come back down to earth, as it were, and do his duty to society. He must let his experience and knowledge of reality inspire, guide, and direct him in everything he does. In fact, he is compelled to do so as exemplified by Socrates.
The accomplished Platonic philosopher dedicates himself to the production of good and beautiful things as a poet, artist, teacher, craftsman, architect, town planner, law-maker, or politician, or in any other capacity (including as a parent), and in doing so, he brings down the One, i.e., Divine Creative Intelligence itself (or part of it) into the realm of matter in order to make the world as divine and perfect as possible in the same way he has made himself as divine and perfect as humanly possible.
So, basically, Plato takes the Greek ideal of striving to be good and beautiful in every respect and provides a metaphysical foundation for it.
In any case, the Road to Eleusis is open to all. The very Gate to it is but a few steps away from Pythodorus’ house in the Keramikos, where the best philosophers of Ancient Greece, handpicked by Plato himself, are discussing the way to Ultimate Reality. It is for the reader to decide how far he or she wishes to travel in the Platonic Way.
Yet, some believe creatio ex nihilo.
Of course there are many things that can be said but cannot be meant.
1. Why is there something rather than nothing?
2. Why is there something rather than everything?
Parmenides's Proem concludes with lines that might be aimed at the relationship between Parmenides' realms of Reality and Opinion.
But nevertheless, you shall also learn “these things,” how the “accepted/seeming things” should/would have had (to be) to be acceptably, passing through [just being] all things, altogether/in every way.(C 1.31-32) (IEP/Jeremy DeLong trans.}
This seems to be confounding the three major alternatives in ancient philosophy. Protagorean subjectivity in the plural (accepted) or singular (seeming), Heraclitean flux and relativity (altogether or in every way), and fixed static Forms (things).
However, to the point, Plato's Parmenides appears to attempt a logical demonstration of this profound synthesis of Opinion in the second part of Plato's dialogue.
Does this make any sense? If so, How does this project to Platonic Forms?
A big topic.
As it is Plato presenting the options in his dialogues, there is a large gap between Parmenides grudgingly admitting Forms might explain continuity and the Sophist (the Eleatic Stranger, a student from the Parmenides school) where the separation of Being and Becoming is called into question.
I don't know what the gap means or if it is only an accident of missing text.
Plato has Socrates not joining the put downs on Parmenides that he did not resist in Theaetetus when discussing Heraclitus. If we are to accept the text we have to consider, Plato was of more than one mind on the issue.
That being said, I will gladly read this to the best of my abilities when i get around to it:
https://classics.mit.edu/Plato/parmenides.html
who are you replying to?
It lines up with my current desire to keep studying the Greeks for entertainment; i just started reading the introductory material of an old version i have laying around of The Republic.