Rebuttal To The “Name The Trait” Argument
NAME THE TRAIT
“What is true of animals that if true of humans would justify killing them for food?”
—AskYourself
“Name the trait” (NTT) is an argument and a dialogue process put forward by vegan YouTuber Isaac Brown, a.k.a. "AskYourself," (link at bottom of page). It’s purpose is to expose either a contradiction or a reduction to absurdity from non-vegan positions attributing moral value to humans sufficient enough to condemn killing them for food, while at the same time denying that sufficient moral value be attributed to non-human animals as well.
NTT begins as a dialogue wherein the interlocutor asks a series of questions. The first question asks whether we should have a moral system (a collection of ideas and principles that we accept for ourselves and apply to others based on the system of values which form the content of our overall moral perspective). The second question is raised only after affirming the previous question. It asks if the moral system we subscribe to should be logically consistent (if we could imagine some possible world in which the principles of the moral system could all be true). Lastly, a third and three-part question is raised, and again only subsequent to affirming the previous two questions. This question first asks if our moral system ascribes sufficient moral value to humans so to condemn killing them for food. If so, the second part of the question if our moral system likewise ascribes (not equal but rather) sufficient moral value to non-human animals. If not, the third and final part of the question asks us what is it that is true of humans that would have to be true of animals in order for us to ascribe sufficient moral value to condemn killing them for food.
The first question asks whether or not we, as individuals, subscribe to some sort of moral system. To be clear, a moral system is simply the set of ideas we hold as guiding moral principles. It is based on the particular values we have and help us in discerning right and wrong behavior. An example of such a principle is expressed in the following proposition: “Murder is wrong”. The proposition is also a logical reflection of a particular value: “Right to life”. Furthermore, the principle can be framed in a multitude of meta ethical frameworks. In deontological terms such as “Unjustified killing is wrong” or in terms of consequentialism “Behavior x is wrong because it results in unjustified killing”. Given this, it is clear that without a moral system to set the standard from which our behavior can be evaluated, and subsequently judged, that any behavior could (in principle) be allowed. This in-itself represents an absurd position because, as a society, we all desire to have some control over our life and wellbeing. Therefore, the only acceptable position would be the affirmative.
YES, I SUBSCRIBE TO A MORAL SYSTEM.
The second question tests our awareness regarding the implications entailed by a moral system that is logically inconsistent. A contradiction takes the form of “P and not -P” whereby a claim or belief and its negation are both held to be true. However, according to the principle of explosion, a moral system affirming that both a proposition and its negation are true, can thereby derive any conclusion. This means that if our moral system contains even one inconsistency it would allow for any act or consequence to be justified. Consider the following example of logical explosion: “P” (The suspect committed a murder) and “-P” (The suspect committed no murder) are both assumed true. If we use one of the terms of the contradiction to form a logical disjunction between “P” (The suspect committed a murder) or “Q” (The suspect deserves to be executed). Since we know that “-P ” (The suspect committed no murder) is both true and not true, and that at least one disjunctive term must be true, we can derive the conclusion: Therefore, “Q” (The suspect deserves to be executed).
The argument is of the form of “P” implies “-P”. Either “P” or “Q”. “-P” therefore “Q”.
[b]P and -P
P or Q
-P
Q[/b]
This is quite convincing of the importance of logical consistency within our moral system. Therefore, the only acceptable position would be the affirmative.
YES, THE MORAL SYSTEM MUST BE LOGICALLY CONSISTENT.
The third question is designed to set us up by affirming the assertion in premise 1 of the actual NTT argument. You either agree with the truth of the premises which means that the truth of the conclusion must necessarily follow from (thus conceding to veganism), or you otherwise must provide a counter argument for one of the supporting premises to NTT by naming which traits justify the disproportionate attribution of moral value between humans and animals. However, it is purported that every trait, or set of traits, named in attempt to justify the disproportion of moral value logically entails a commitment to an absurd moral position, and in denying the absurd moral position we thus form a contradiction. For example, if “intelligence” is the trait being named which is absent in animals, that if absent in humans would justify killing them for food, it would logically entail a reductio ad absurdum that killing the subset of humans with a comparatively low IQ to that of a cow or pig for food is justified . In other words, it justifies killing the population of humans afflicted with severe mental disabilities—which qualifies as a reprehensible and absurd moral position. Therefore, in the absence of naming which trait, or set of traits, true of animals that if true of humans would justify killing them for food—which also logically entails an acceptable moral position, we are either committed to veganism, or otherwise to denying that animals have sufficient moral value on pain of contradiction.
YES, ANIMALS HAVE SUFFICIENT MORAL VALUE TO CONDEMN KILLING THEM FOR FOOD.
Or, alternatively:
NO, THE ANIMAL LACKS SUFFICIENT MORAL VALUE TO CONDEMN KILLING THEM FOR FOOD NOTWITHSTANDING ALL TRAITS BEING EQUALIZED TO THAT OF THE HUMAN.
The NTT argument which is used to derive the conclusion that animals have moral value would go as follows:
NTT ARGUMENT
[b]P1 - If your view affirms a given human is trait-equalizable to a given nonhuman animal while retaining moral value, then your view can only deny the given nonhuman animal has moral value on pain of P^~P.
P2 - Your view affirms a given human is trait-equalizable to a given nonhuman animal while retaining moral value.
C - Therefore, your view can only deny the given nonhuman animal has moral value on pain of P^~P.[/b]
TRAIT EQUALIZATION PROCESSES
The trait equalization process is a thought experiment in which we imagine a hypothetical series of possible worlds in which the traits that differentiate between a given animal and a given human are being equalized. In the first possible world there is a human, whereas in the last possible world there is an animal. The possible worlds in between represent a series of hypothetical worlds in which a given trait (true) of the human is made equal to that (true) of the animal present in the last hypothetical world. In one such hypothetical world, for instance, the human trait of bipedalism (a method of using only two limbs for locomotion) is being equalized to the animal trait of quadrupedalism (a method of using all four limbs for locomotion). In other words, the bipedal being of the first hypothetical world is equalized to be quadrupedal—same as the being of the last hypothetical world. If such a trait was to be named, then it would entail that all humans who use a method of being on all four limbs for locomotion (which is observed in humans, especially by crawling infants) may be justifiably killed for food.
Moreover, in another such hypothetical world, we can imagine three traits that have been equalized: not being a member of human civilization, lacking moral agency, and not willing to reciprocate mutual cooperation with other humans. (Also note that in naming a non-differential trait—such as being alive, or inhabiting the planet Earth, or other properties already shared—we are simply committing a category error, rather than engaging NTT with intellectual honesty). In considering the named traits, we can easily imagine a scenario of beings who lack all these traits, and yet most would find it absurd to condone killing them for food. Suppose that we discover an indigenous population of humans who reside outside of modern civilization, have no shared group morality, and are openly hostile towards other groups of humans. Would it be acceptable to kill those humans for food? No, it would be absurd! Therefore, it seems that NTT presents us with a possibly insurmountable vegan counter argument by revealing the cognitive dissonance between our behavior and the moral principles predicated on the system of values most common to humanity.
THE CONSEQUENCE OF FAILING TO NAME THE TRAITS WHICH JUSTIFY KILLING ANIMALS AND NOT HUMANS FOR FOOD
Argument in support of veganism as a result of failing to name which trait is true of animals that if true of humans would similarly deprive the attribution of sufficient moral value necessary to condemn killing them for food
[b]P1 – Humans have sufficient moral value so that it is immoral to kill them for food.
P2 – There is no trait absent in animals which if absent in humans would cause humans to lack sufficient moral value so that it would be immoral to kill them for food.
C – Therefore without establishing the absence of such a trait in animals, we contradict ourselves by claiming that animals lack sufficient moral value so that it is immoral to kill them for food.[/b]
A SOUND REBUTTAL WHICH NECESSARILY AVOIDS ANY ENTAILED ABSURDITY
I fundamentally agree with veganism as an ethical position, and also find the NTT argument and dialogue tactics to be power tools well equipped with sound logic. However, I nonetheless try my best to mount an attack on NTT. This, if for nothing else, is to expose any weaknesses in its defense, or likewise in its counter arguments to non-vegan positions. Furthermore, I believe to have successfully done just that. I believe to have solved NTT and possibly to have produced an ultimate rebuttal. If the trait named which is true of the animal that if true of the human is the external property of the animal lacking vast social normality (as in conformity to the standard behavior of a group of humans, which is typical, accepted, and expected), then the entailed absurdity is not absurd at all. In fact, it’s tautological. If it was a socially acceptable—even expected—behavior which is typical of a society, to kill humans for food, then it would be a trait shared amongst the vast majority of the population. Given this, the high probability of an individual who is pressured to conform to the standard behavior of the society in which they live, to indeed conform to such behavior, is almost certain. So, in other words, the attempted reductio ad absurdum is reduced to a mere tautology. Proof of this can be seen in every human society. If an individual is a member of a social group, of which the vast majority of its population have been normalized to accept and expect the act of killing other humans for food, then the individual necessarily would have a high probability of likewise finding such an act acceptable.
[b]P1 - If killing humans for food is a behavior in which the vast majority of members of a human society are socially conditioned to accept and expect, then killing humans for food is a socially acceptable, and expected behavior.
P2 - In the hypothetical, the humans are members of a human society which is socially conditioned to accept and expect the killing of humans for food as normal behavior.
C - Therefore, in accepting the killing of humans for food, I am thus accepting what already is a socially acceptable, and expected behavior.
P1 - If a behavior is accepted and expected of a member of a social group, then it is not absurd for a member to hold the position that such behavior is acceptable.
P2 - In the hypothetical, it is accepted and expected of members of the social group to kill humans for food.
C - Therefore, it is not absurd for a member to hold the position that such behavior is acceptable.[/b]
The purpose of this essay is to draw out any criticism of my stance, my interaction with the hypothetical, and my rebuttal aimed at NTT, first here, in this forum. As I plan on presenting my rebuttal to AskYourself in person, criticism notwithstanding, on his Discord (link below).
https://m.youtube.com/channel/UCQNmHyGAKqzOT_JsVEs4eag
https://discord.com/invite/dUPFfby
“What is true of animals that if true of humans would justify killing them for food?”
—AskYourself
“Name the trait” (NTT) is an argument and a dialogue process put forward by vegan YouTuber Isaac Brown, a.k.a. "AskYourself," (link at bottom of page). It’s purpose is to expose either a contradiction or a reduction to absurdity from non-vegan positions attributing moral value to humans sufficient enough to condemn killing them for food, while at the same time denying that sufficient moral value be attributed to non-human animals as well.
NTT begins as a dialogue wherein the interlocutor asks a series of questions. The first question asks whether we should have a moral system (a collection of ideas and principles that we accept for ourselves and apply to others based on the system of values which form the content of our overall moral perspective). The second question is raised only after affirming the previous question. It asks if the moral system we subscribe to should be logically consistent (if we could imagine some possible world in which the principles of the moral system could all be true). Lastly, a third and three-part question is raised, and again only subsequent to affirming the previous two questions. This question first asks if our moral system ascribes sufficient moral value to humans so to condemn killing them for food. If so, the second part of the question if our moral system likewise ascribes (not equal but rather) sufficient moral value to non-human animals. If not, the third and final part of the question asks us what is it that is true of humans that would have to be true of animals in order for us to ascribe sufficient moral value to condemn killing them for food.
The first question asks whether or not we, as individuals, subscribe to some sort of moral system. To be clear, a moral system is simply the set of ideas we hold as guiding moral principles. It is based on the particular values we have and help us in discerning right and wrong behavior. An example of such a principle is expressed in the following proposition: “Murder is wrong”. The proposition is also a logical reflection of a particular value: “Right to life”. Furthermore, the principle can be framed in a multitude of meta ethical frameworks. In deontological terms such as “Unjustified killing is wrong” or in terms of consequentialism “Behavior x is wrong because it results in unjustified killing”. Given this, it is clear that without a moral system to set the standard from which our behavior can be evaluated, and subsequently judged, that any behavior could (in principle) be allowed. This in-itself represents an absurd position because, as a society, we all desire to have some control over our life and wellbeing. Therefore, the only acceptable position would be the affirmative.
YES, I SUBSCRIBE TO A MORAL SYSTEM.
The second question tests our awareness regarding the implications entailed by a moral system that is logically inconsistent. A contradiction takes the form of “P and not -P” whereby a claim or belief and its negation are both held to be true. However, according to the principle of explosion, a moral system affirming that both a proposition and its negation are true, can thereby derive any conclusion. This means that if our moral system contains even one inconsistency it would allow for any act or consequence to be justified. Consider the following example of logical explosion: “P” (The suspect committed a murder) and “-P” (The suspect committed no murder) are both assumed true. If we use one of the terms of the contradiction to form a logical disjunction between “P” (The suspect committed a murder) or “Q” (The suspect deserves to be executed). Since we know that “-P ” (The suspect committed no murder) is both true and not true, and that at least one disjunctive term must be true, we can derive the conclusion: Therefore, “Q” (The suspect deserves to be executed).
The argument is of the form of “P” implies “-P”. Either “P” or “Q”. “-P” therefore “Q”.
[b]P and -P
P or Q
-P
Q[/b]
This is quite convincing of the importance of logical consistency within our moral system. Therefore, the only acceptable position would be the affirmative.
YES, THE MORAL SYSTEM MUST BE LOGICALLY CONSISTENT.
The third question is designed to set us up by affirming the assertion in premise 1 of the actual NTT argument. You either agree with the truth of the premises which means that the truth of the conclusion must necessarily follow from (thus conceding to veganism), or you otherwise must provide a counter argument for one of the supporting premises to NTT by naming which traits justify the disproportionate attribution of moral value between humans and animals. However, it is purported that every trait, or set of traits, named in attempt to justify the disproportion of moral value logically entails a commitment to an absurd moral position, and in denying the absurd moral position we thus form a contradiction. For example, if “intelligence” is the trait being named which is absent in animals, that if absent in humans would justify killing them for food, it would logically entail a reductio ad absurdum that killing the subset of humans with a comparatively low IQ to that of a cow or pig for food is justified . In other words, it justifies killing the population of humans afflicted with severe mental disabilities—which qualifies as a reprehensible and absurd moral position. Therefore, in the absence of naming which trait, or set of traits, true of animals that if true of humans would justify killing them for food—which also logically entails an acceptable moral position, we are either committed to veganism, or otherwise to denying that animals have sufficient moral value on pain of contradiction.
YES, ANIMALS HAVE SUFFICIENT MORAL VALUE TO CONDEMN KILLING THEM FOR FOOD.
Or, alternatively:
NO, THE ANIMAL LACKS SUFFICIENT MORAL VALUE TO CONDEMN KILLING THEM FOR FOOD NOTWITHSTANDING ALL TRAITS BEING EQUALIZED TO THAT OF THE HUMAN.
The NTT argument which is used to derive the conclusion that animals have moral value would go as follows:
NTT ARGUMENT
[b]P1 - If your view affirms a given human is trait-equalizable to a given nonhuman animal while retaining moral value, then your view can only deny the given nonhuman animal has moral value on pain of P^~P.
P2 - Your view affirms a given human is trait-equalizable to a given nonhuman animal while retaining moral value.
C - Therefore, your view can only deny the given nonhuman animal has moral value on pain of P^~P.[/b]
TRAIT EQUALIZATION PROCESSES
The trait equalization process is a thought experiment in which we imagine a hypothetical series of possible worlds in which the traits that differentiate between a given animal and a given human are being equalized. In the first possible world there is a human, whereas in the last possible world there is an animal. The possible worlds in between represent a series of hypothetical worlds in which a given trait (true) of the human is made equal to that (true) of the animal present in the last hypothetical world. In one such hypothetical world, for instance, the human trait of bipedalism (a method of using only two limbs for locomotion) is being equalized to the animal trait of quadrupedalism (a method of using all four limbs for locomotion). In other words, the bipedal being of the first hypothetical world is equalized to be quadrupedal—same as the being of the last hypothetical world. If such a trait was to be named, then it would entail that all humans who use a method of being on all four limbs for locomotion (which is observed in humans, especially by crawling infants) may be justifiably killed for food.
Moreover, in another such hypothetical world, we can imagine three traits that have been equalized: not being a member of human civilization, lacking moral agency, and not willing to reciprocate mutual cooperation with other humans. (Also note that in naming a non-differential trait—such as being alive, or inhabiting the planet Earth, or other properties already shared—we are simply committing a category error, rather than engaging NTT with intellectual honesty). In considering the named traits, we can easily imagine a scenario of beings who lack all these traits, and yet most would find it absurd to condone killing them for food. Suppose that we discover an indigenous population of humans who reside outside of modern civilization, have no shared group morality, and are openly hostile towards other groups of humans. Would it be acceptable to kill those humans for food? No, it would be absurd! Therefore, it seems that NTT presents us with a possibly insurmountable vegan counter argument by revealing the cognitive dissonance between our behavior and the moral principles predicated on the system of values most common to humanity.
THE CONSEQUENCE OF FAILING TO NAME THE TRAITS WHICH JUSTIFY KILLING ANIMALS AND NOT HUMANS FOR FOOD
Argument in support of veganism as a result of failing to name which trait is true of animals that if true of humans would similarly deprive the attribution of sufficient moral value necessary to condemn killing them for food
[b]P1 – Humans have sufficient moral value so that it is immoral to kill them for food.
P2 – There is no trait absent in animals which if absent in humans would cause humans to lack sufficient moral value so that it would be immoral to kill them for food.
C – Therefore without establishing the absence of such a trait in animals, we contradict ourselves by claiming that animals lack sufficient moral value so that it is immoral to kill them for food.[/b]
A SOUND REBUTTAL WHICH NECESSARILY AVOIDS ANY ENTAILED ABSURDITY
I fundamentally agree with veganism as an ethical position, and also find the NTT argument and dialogue tactics to be power tools well equipped with sound logic. However, I nonetheless try my best to mount an attack on NTT. This, if for nothing else, is to expose any weaknesses in its defense, or likewise in its counter arguments to non-vegan positions. Furthermore, I believe to have successfully done just that. I believe to have solved NTT and possibly to have produced an ultimate rebuttal. If the trait named which is true of the animal that if true of the human is the external property of the animal lacking vast social normality (as in conformity to the standard behavior of a group of humans, which is typical, accepted, and expected), then the entailed absurdity is not absurd at all. In fact, it’s tautological. If it was a socially acceptable—even expected—behavior which is typical of a society, to kill humans for food, then it would be a trait shared amongst the vast majority of the population. Given this, the high probability of an individual who is pressured to conform to the standard behavior of the society in which they live, to indeed conform to such behavior, is almost certain. So, in other words, the attempted reductio ad absurdum is reduced to a mere tautology. Proof of this can be seen in every human society. If an individual is a member of a social group, of which the vast majority of its population have been normalized to accept and expect the act of killing other humans for food, then the individual necessarily would have a high probability of likewise finding such an act acceptable.
[b]P1 - If killing humans for food is a behavior in which the vast majority of members of a human society are socially conditioned to accept and expect, then killing humans for food is a socially acceptable, and expected behavior.
P2 - In the hypothetical, the humans are members of a human society which is socially conditioned to accept and expect the killing of humans for food as normal behavior.
C - Therefore, in accepting the killing of humans for food, I am thus accepting what already is a socially acceptable, and expected behavior.
P1 - If a behavior is accepted and expected of a member of a social group, then it is not absurd for a member to hold the position that such behavior is acceptable.
P2 - In the hypothetical, it is accepted and expected of members of the social group to kill humans for food.
C - Therefore, it is not absurd for a member to hold the position that such behavior is acceptable.[/b]
The purpose of this essay is to draw out any criticism of my stance, my interaction with the hypothetical, and my rebuttal aimed at NTT, first here, in this forum. As I plan on presenting my rebuttal to AskYourself in person, criticism notwithstanding, on his Discord (link below).
https://m.youtube.com/channel/UCQNmHyGAKqzOT_JsVEs4eag
https://discord.com/invite/dUPFfby
Comments (87)
And why does it have to be one trait to be named in the first place? Why can’t it be that when multiple traits are possessed then it becomes justifiable to kill the creature in question for food? For example: “Is not human and is not at a particular level of intelligence and is not…..”
Quoting khaled
Suppose we genetically altered a subset of the human species so that they could no longer bear fertile offspring, thus making them a distinct species. Would it be ethical to kill them for food? I would think most would say no.
Quoting khaled
It doesn’t. You should read the post in its entirety.
"Human" doesn't necessarily mean homosapien. We had other cousins like neanderthals, who we would also call "human". It's a certain level of intelligence, bone structure, brain size, and a bunch of other factors.
Quoting Cartesian trigger-puppets
Missed that.
Quoting Cartesian trigger-puppets
I find this very difficult to believe. What about the trait "Is a cow"? That would entail a commitment to the position that it's justifiable to kill cows for food, and nothing else. I don't see how it can lead to absurd positions.
Quoting Cartesian trigger-puppets
Quoting Cartesian trigger-puppets
But these people don't lack moral agency, they just don't have a shared morality. They don't lack all the traits.
Quoting khaled
In the hypothetical, the term "human" will be defined as modern homosapien.
Quoting khaled
The indigenous humans indeed lack all three traits. They don't have a personal sense of morality, nor a social sense of morality. Instead of trying to alter the hypothetical, why don't you just interact with it as it is stated. Perhaps my wording is a bit confusing, however I do clearly state that they do not possess any of the three traits.
Quoting Cartesian trigger-puppets
Quoting Cartesian trigger-puppets
human =/= homosapien.
Point is: There is countless ways to specify certain traits that don't lead to absurdities.
Homosapien is the binomial name and taxonomic grouping of the genus Homo, and the species Sapien to sometimes refer humans with all members of the genus, however in common usage it generally refers to Homo sapiens, the only extant member. The prefix "Homo" (from Latin root hom? 'man'), affixed to the suffix "Sapien" (from Latin root sapi?ns 'one who knows, is wise, sensable').
Quoting khaled
Ok, name a few...
"Is a member of the Homo genus". Or: "Is not a cow/pig/chicken". Or: "Is a member of the great apes".
Quoting Cartesian trigger-puppets
So if a Neanderthal appeared tomorrow you think people would say that they're not human and so, for instance, are not entitled to human rights?
It commonly refers to homosapiens because that's the only existing member. If other members existed it would refer to them too.
Also, this whole bickering about what "human" means is beside the point. The characteristic could simply be "Is a member of the Homo genus". Or slightly wider: "Is a member of the great apes". What's the ridiculous conclusion in this case?
This is the main premise I reckon. Animals or humans can either possess/lack a trait.
Ergo, the questions are,
1. Which trait that's missing in animals if also absent in humans would justify the killing of humans in the same way we kill animals?
OR
2. Which trait that animals possess if also a human trait would give warrant to kill humans as we kill animals?
Answers,
1. Self-awareness is cited by many as sufficient grounds to distinguish humans from animals but, intriguingly, if a human lacks self-awareness (brain damage, mental retardation) we don't kill that human. Nonvegetarianism fails.
2. Trickier to answer because most arguments for nonvegeterianism are premised on a missing quality in animals (see answer 1). We wouldn't, for example, think of killing an organism more self-aware, more pain-sensitive, so on, than us. Would we kill god(s)? We did crucify Jesus but the Buddha lived to be 82 or thereabouts and died of dysentery and not at the hands of others. He was actually given protection just like how high-ranking government officials are provided with security.
Not if it reaches childhood at least. We let life take care of that.
More broadly, there was a time when man needed to eat animals to survive, perhaps before agriculture and when berries and nuts were scarce. It's already hard coded in our DNA. Sure, it can be changed. But who wants to go ahead and do that. Animals on the other hand, never needed humans to survive. Long story short, we needed them (in our stomach) to survive more than they needed us to do the same, which means they have the responsibility to be eaten. Heavy hangs the head. Besides, we can't eat each other. You'll catch "the kuru".
So, it's permissible to kill a brain-damaged human? So, someone could go to a special needs school and spray bullets inside the classrooms and nobody would bat an eyelid?
Quoting Outlander
Red herring. Focus on the question/issue. What's a trait animals lack that if humans too lack it, killing humans for whatever would be permissible? I'm waiting, sir/madam, as the case may be.
Quoting khaled
The question asks: what is true of an animal that if true of a human would justify killing them for food?
Your answers include: “Is a member of the Homo genus” this is a category error, but I’ll be charitable and presume you meant it the other way around. We covered this already and it entailed the absurdity that It is ethical to kill genetically modified non-human humanoid beings; “Is not a cow/pig/chicken” again, category error, but conversely it entails all sorts of absurdities, namely that all non-cow/pig/chicken beings are immoral to kill for food (what of plants or bacteria?); "Is a member of the great apes" so it’s ethical to kill Dolphins, Orcas, conscious androids, genetically modified hominids, extra terrestrial beings with greater sentience?
Quoting khaled
Indeed. Especially when I have already defined the term.
What you did was impose a definition that favors you when I'd already stated what I meant by it.
Quoting Cartesian trigger-puppets
How so? What category am I mistaking with what other category?
Quoting Cartesian trigger-puppets
If they are not of the same genus as us, they're not humanoid....
Quoting Cartesian trigger-puppets
The point of the example was to show that one could simply add anything they wanted to kill for food to the category. The list is expandable.
Quoting Cartesian trigger-puppets
No, but it's becoming a lot less ridiculous very quickly huh?
"Is a member of the great apes or possesses intelligence or consciousness comparable to humans". Now what?
We can keep doing this and I'll just take whatever valid exceptions you come up with and modify the set of traits accordingly to include them. Which is why I find it difficult to believe that one cannot come up with a set of traits that result in a non ridiculous morality.
Quoting TheMadFool
Morality. Animals take no issue with killing other animals for food. If Humans did not possess any moral compass whatsoever all would be permissible.
Maybe. I think it could be argued though that since animals lack self-reflection (as far as we can tell) that their behavior relies more on instinct or socially learned behavior through modeling than any sort of cognitive decision making. As such, whatever patterns we may observe in their behavior is not the result of any type of rule following, or moral reasoning. Therefore, it isn’t actually morality they possess.
Alternatively, whatever the root to general aversion to cannibalism might be the root of this as well.
It was an innocent (enough) quip at case-based abortion and neglect of the mentally ill in society. Not a quip per se more of a satirical statement that promotes awareness.
Quoting TheMadFool
It's partially relevant.. but, sure. Let's see.. I'm sure there's a fancy singular word for it but in the absence of it from my vocabulary.. unconditional savagery. Men and dogs have this trait or lack of it thereof in common, they're generally the product of their environment, more or less depending on the breed, though that's contested.
Almost seems like something of a trick question that's really not that deep. Why not what's a trait humans possess that makes killing them objectionable?
It's why burning an effigy of someone is offensive, it's not the person but it's like the person. It's psychological among other things. In a sentence, ability to make known it is an intelligent equal capable of love, pain, and fear. Which may or may not justify anything as ability to make known does not equal anything but. Again, psychology.
:ok: Sorry, I took it literally.
Quoting Outlander
Interesting. We usually don't kill carnivores (unconditional savagery).
It might not be absurd for someone to hold a socially-conditioned belief (i.e. we can make sense of why they believe what they believe), but it does not make the belief correct (e.g. it would not have been absurd for an Aztec to believe that without human sacrifice, the rain-god Tlaloc would curse the next harvest; but that does not mean it is right).
None. There was no deliberation or rationalization that took place when humans first started eating other animals for food. There was no justification, period. And there isn't' one now.
Quoting khaled
I’m representing someone else’s argument. It is clear what they mean by it and I extended that clarity to you. If you do not wish to engage in a critique of my rebuttal, then that’s fine, but I’m going to spend my time with those who do.
Quoting khaled
The question that was originally given asks you to name the trait, or set of traits, true of the animal that if true of the human would justify killing them for food. So the trait true of the animal (on your account) is “being a member of the genus Homo”. As I said, it’s fine and easy to confuse. It can work the other way around as: what trait is true of the human that if true of the animal would make it so we attribute it sufficient moral value necessary to condemn the act of killing it for food?”. However, to answer your question (quoted above) bluntly, we are supposed to be taking the traits true of the ANIMAL and equalizing it to the human. So, to name the trait “Is a member of the genius Homo” is making a category error because an animal does not possess the trait of being a member of the genus Homo. Being a member of the genius Homo is not a trait true of the animal.
Quoting khaled
They are by definition a “humanoid” (Having an appearance or character resembling that a human). This is getting too tedious.
Quoting khaled
The example was given as support for your objection to my statement that many people find that any trait named entails a reductio ad absurdum. You said many such traits can be named which aren’t absurd. I asked to provide a few. (Remember the traits we are naming are those true of animals that if true of the humans would justify killing them for food). So, basically, what you were saying, however probably not your intention, was that in having the trait of not being a pig, cow, or chicken, that you have sufficient moral value so not to be killed for food. Or on the converse, that it the trait of being a pig, cow, or chicken, that makes it justifiable for animals to be killed for food. On the latter answer, what if we imagined the person who you love, or enjoy, tolerate the most was turned into a pig, cow, or chicken. This applies the same logic, that if a being is a cow, pig, or chicken, then it is morally acceptable to kill them for food. So if the person you care about the most was turned into one of these animals would you thereby kill them for food. And this is a general question, asking if you would do so simply because you are a bit hungry and of all there is to eat you would choose your most adored person who has been turned into a farm animal. Not some instant of starvation with no other choice, as that would be a very small subset of the general question.
Quoting khaled
I’m entertaining your category errors… the nonhuman animals we tend to eat are those of industrial animal agriculture. They do not have the trait of “Being a member of the great apes”. (In continuing such entertainment) I mean, sure, some people eat apes—also some people eat humans, however this is a minuscule, fractional subset of the general consumption of animals. To narrow down and focus on such an irrelevant subset of the general, more broader concern is to try to trivialize it, when what WE ARE CONCERNED WITH is THE BROADER VIEW. It’s analogous to objecting to arguments made that killing humans is wrong, by appealing to the fact that we kill humans who are murderers and child rapists. Just as the former argument is concerned with the broader consumption of animals, the latter argument, implied by my example, is concerned with the general killing of humans—not of those we find most deplorable and are most hazardous to society.
Quoting khaled
Just name the trait or traits true of animals that if true of humans would justify killing them for food. You can revise your position all you want. You just cannot alter the hypothetical. If my hypotheticals are far-fetched, then I admit they have less force but they nonetheless are problematic in the sense that if one appreciates the dilemmas produced, one cannot easily solve them.
That, I'm afraid, is not going to do the job. By your logic, we should be killing immoral people but that just doesn't seem the right thing to do. Yes, we do execute a certain class of criminals (mass murderers, serial killers, etc.) but I believe capital punishment is losing support and fast - soon, it'll be a thing of the past.
So many wish to engage with the NTT argument rather than critique my rebuttal of it. Sure, fine, I suppose I could use the practice of steelmanning it.
Remember, it’s first a dialogue geared towards teasing out a non-vegan position, then a line of questioning. The argument is included in my post as well, and deduces that one cannot deny moral value to the animal while also failing to which traits justify one and not the other, since in the absence of naming a trait, it follows that the human and animal are trait equalizable. And if they are trait equalizatable (which just means they share all relevant traits, not that they are now the same thing, as that would violate the law of identify), then it is a contradiction to attribute moral value to one and not the other.
Let’s just begin with your answer to the following question: What is true of nonhuman animals that if true of humans would justify killing them for food?
I can find none, I suspect the same goes for anyone and this exposes, completely, the fact that non-vegetarianism is not, in any sense of the word, rational/justified. We don't kill each other (humans killing humans) because there's a good reason (trait not found in animals) not to but "because" we just don't like it (utterly arbitrary). In short, to ask for a
justification for non-vegetarianism is like asking for semen from a woman, N/A.
Quoting Outlander
This is what kind of argument you are making:
P1. If our ancestors believed that a behavior was necessary for their survival in the past, then that behavior is justified.
P2. Our ancestors believed that the behavior of eating animals was necessary for their survival in the past.
C. Therefore, the behavior of eating animals is justified.
Ready for the reductio to this view? Just think of all the things our ancestors believed necessary for their survival: world conquest, human sacrifice, slavery, etc. The list goes on.
Quoting Cartesian trigger-puppets
I'm coming up with another rebuttal. One that does not require one to think that cannibalism is ok.
Quoting Cartesian trigger-puppets
Ah I see. My bad then. I don't understand why that needs to be the question though:
Quoting Cartesian trigger-puppets
Any trait difference should suffice. As in, if I can name a trait that humans possess, that animals do not OR a trait that animals possess that humans do not, either should be usable as justification for the different treatment no? In any case, it's very easy to convert one to the other.
So instead of "Animals are ok to eat because they are not great apes", it becomes "Humans are ok to eat once they are no longer great apes".
So the trait true of animals that if true of humans would justify killing them for food is: "Is not a great ape and does not posses an intelligence or consciousness comparable to humans"
Quoting Cartesian trigger-puppets
How exactly did this turning occur? If they lost their intelligence, personality, memory and body, with no hope of being turned back, then the person I care about is already dead. What's left is just a chicken.
Quoting Cartesian trigger-puppets
Quoting Cartesian trigger-puppets
I am implying that people who do such things are wrong. I'm not saying that "since some people eat apes eating animals is ok". I am saying "since these animals are not a great ape AND they do not possess an intelligence or consciousness comparable to humans, it's ok to kill them for food".
Quoting Cartesian trigger-puppets
"Is not a great ape and does not posses an intelligence or consciousness comparable to humans"
What's the ridiculous conclusion?
Which reminds me of an old joke by Pierre Desproges: "Animals are more tolerant than we are. For instance, a pig would have no problem eating a Muslim."
1. No trait absent/present in animals which if absent/present in humans would justify the killing of humans.
Ergo,
2. Killing animals (if based on the absence/presence of some putative trait) is completely unjustified.
3. The Name The Trait argument assumes that differences result in differential treatment.
Ergo,
4. We don't kill each other because humans are like each other.
In what way are we like each other that makes us reluctant/unwilling to kill each other?
5. The only shared trait that seems to matter is life itself.
Ergo,
6. Humans hesitate/refuse to kill each other because we're alive.
7. Animals and plants too are alive.
Ergo,
8. We should not kill any living organism (plant, animal or otherwise).
Quoting khaled
Ok, so only in being a member of the great apes, and to have an intelligence or consciousness within the range of average humans (comparable is subjective, thus too arbitrary) does a being have sufficient moral value necessary to not be killed for food.
Btw, a large minority of humans are within the range of intelligence or consciousness comparable to that of agricultural animals. I’m not sure if framing it that way wouldn’t be another category error, but we’ll go with it anyway.
Well, an easy one to start would be a god-like being, or an alien species with much higher intelligence, and probably the vast majority of sentient life throughout the universe, supposing there are some. Either way, I could cook up so many hypotheticals that I don’t know where to start.
OK, how about a population of super intelligent humanoids which never evolved the sensory organs for vision, audition, gustation, or olfaction, but nonetheless have a highly sensitive somatosensory system, especially nociceptors in which we can and (hypothetically) have measured via neuropathic technology their entire central nervous system and it couldn’t be more clear that they experience a thousand times greater pain than the average human.
Now, without such sensory organs they necessarily will not have similar consciousness and they are by definition non-great apes, and have comparable intelligence to us as we have comparable intelligence to an ant. Oh and by the way they came here to help us in saving our planet, end hunger, end disease, end poverty, etc… So, you would say it’s fine to kill them for food right?
Quoting TheMadFool
You realize that species normality is a trait, right?
Quoting TheMadFool
Ok, so we should stop breathing, eating, drinking water, brushing our teeth, occupying space, and in other words, just stop living? You must be an antinatalist. Bacteria, viruses (kinda), insects, parasites, plants… we kill them in the trillions of trillions.
So, on your view, there should be no morality at all because there was none once upon a time in our evolutionary past? That is what is entailed by that logic.
But it is acceptable relative to our contemporary cultural and societal normalities? If so, that is all that matters when it come to reductio ad absurdum like this. It’s how you are perceived by the audience, not the other interlocutor, or future acknowledgments.
I see, so that's how you want to wiggle out of my trap. :grin:
Here's a variation of the Name The Trait Argument: Name the species-specific trait that makes one human killing another human being impermissible? You can't say being human because we've already seen from the original Name The Trait argument that there's nothing special about being human that serves as a reason to not kill them. In other words, the reason for not killing a human has nothing to do with the species h. sapiens. I'm not sure but it appears that you're begging the question.
Quoting Cartesian trigger-puppets
[quote=Tertullian]Certum est, quia impossibile (It is certain, because it is impossible).
Credo quia absurdum (I believe because it is absurd).[/quote]
God is great! He asks us to do the absurd and the impossible!
It wouldn't be a category error it would be a logical error.
I'm saying it's ok to kill X for food if X is BOTH: Not a great ape (~A) AND Not within the range of intelligence (~I)
So it's ~A&~I = Ok to kill for food. So negating this (IE, the things that are NOT ok to kill for food are:) A OR I. As in one must either be a great ape, or possess the specified intelligence level. De morgan's law.
I'm pretty certain this large minority belongs to the great apes. So it wouldn't be ok to kill them for food.
Quoting Cartesian trigger-puppets
Really? Ok, "Is not a great ape and does not possess an intelligence or level consciousness comparable to or higher than humans."
That should also deal with your alien hypothetical.
Note: Originally I wanted to write "greater than or comparable to" but got too lazy because I thought "There is no way he'd bring aliens into this right?"
No, not really. But at the same time that doesn’t mean your friends cat understands right from wrong or good from bad.
Quoting tim wood
What other type of morality is there other than human? At the very least I would think any morality must include conceptual understanding of right/wrong, good/bad.
Quoting tim wood
If you care to explain what it is you’re suggesting they possess I may agree with you.
You’re misunderstanding. Firstly, you’re applying it to individuals rather than species. I’m not saying any individual without morality is ok to kill. Secondly, being immoral isn’t the same thing as lacking the capacity to understand moral concepts, which is what I’m concerned with. Thirdly, were you to apply this to the entire species, it wouldn’t feel wrong to you. How could it?
I’m asking you to be more precise. As it stands now, morality is a term that describes aspects of human thinking and behavior. You’re positing that non-human morality exists, but haven’t explained what that is. You point to behavior, is that all the criteria needed to qualify as morality?
Quoting tim wood
Simply because animals act in this way doesn’t mean they possess ideas. That requires a higher order of cognition than has been shown they possess (at least for the majority). Their behavior can be instinctive, and I’m arguing usually is. How can you confidently say that mother bears know what they’re doing and why, just by observing their behavior?
You're, I'm afraid, mistaken. There are two issues at stake:
1. The difference between animals and humans (interspecies). [The Name A Trait Argument]
2. The difference between one person and another (intraspecies).
Why do we not or, at the very least, are reluctant to kill each other?
The answer to that should aid you in understanding what I said.
How did you come up with this conclusion? Read your question below again, please. Did I say there's no morality? Do not generalize.
Quoting Cartesian trigger-puppets
I said none -- because there is nothing that is true of animals that if true of humans would justify killing them for food. So, let me rephrase that. There was no justification given before for eating animals. Humans just did. And there isn't gonna be one now. There is no justification that is sufficient that would allow eating humans for food, and nothing for animals either.
Yeah but belief isn't fact, people died from starvation and malnourishment without eating animals. No one died because some empire didn't conquer Antarctica, a man wasn't thrown into a volcano, or a people weren't enslaved, though they may have believed that, it doesn't make it so whereas yes eating is literally a biologic need that if unaddressed is more or less immediately fatal.
More broadly though, I think it has to do with size. No one cares about an ant or a roach or a flea, but a great blue whale or bear even (though the hostility is a factor) is so majestic it's an objectionable tragedy that will get you scolded on social media. Again, more psychology. Kind of ridiculous but it seems to be a combination of observable intelligence, size, and being able to relate to. You can hear a dog or cat whimper or scream in pain, as do we. Something that can't communicate in the way we do just seems like a lesser being. It also helps if said creature doesn't try or is unable to kill you.
Very true. I always take the easy kill. Low risk, high reward...? :grin:
The name the trait argument asks what is X? Clearly, offing a human is a no-go area i.e. X doesn't exist (set aside for the moment that humans do kill each other and consider only the fact that no person, save some deranged individuals, ever really wants to kill another person).
What does that mean?
Examine closely what trait X is. Trait X is:
1. A trait either present in animals and absent in humans or absent in animals and present in humans. (implied is a trait difference)
2. This trait when carried over to within the human family gives us a reason to kill humans.
There are two components to the definition of trait X (vide supra).
Non-vegetarians can now claim that the nonexistence of X (1 + 2) in no way affects their reason for eating meat (1).
:chin: :chin: :chin:
Is that the pc term for carnivore?
Non-vegetarians could be omnivores (not meat only). Carnivores feed exclusively on meat. I dunno!
Yes, of course. I am mistaken.
Just to clarify, (I am not trying to be antagonistic here) but it is not vegetarianism, but veganism that refuses to eat "animal products" in general. Vegetarians only refuse to eat certain specific animals.
:grin: It's a complicated argument for me. Sorry if my volte-face offends you. Not intentional.
It is impossible for TheMadFool to offend merkwuerdich
Quoting khaled
This is another category error. And it is because we are trait equalizing the traits true of a given human to that of a given animal. So the category error would occur when you try reverse equalizing what is true of a given animal to that of a given human. This one because we are taking the differential traits of an animal to replace those of a human such as lower intelligence (the being we imagine is a human but with the intelligence of a cow or pig, for instance), or not of the genus homo (we are removing the genus of the human we are imagining with that of the animal, which is necessarily not homo sapien). Therefore, when you name "is a human," or "is of the genus homo," it is taking from the wrong category of traits because the human already has that property, and thus it cannot be given to them, and likewise the animal doesn't have the property, thus they cannot offer it as a trait to give.
Quoting Caldwell
That entails a contradiction in itself. If you remember the line of questioning at the beginning of the dialogue process of name the trait, where we were asked if we subscribe to a moral system, then if the system is consistent, subsequently whether or not the system includes the believe that humans should not be killed for food, and finally if the system includes the belief that animals likewise should not be killed for food. You only get to the 'name the trait' equalization process by answering: yes to the moral system, yes to its consistency requirements, yes to the view that humans should not be killed for food, and NO to the extension of such a view to nonhuman animals. So, by answering that there is no trait, you are saying both that there is and is not a set of traits which gives humans moral value but not non-human animals. if there are no such traits to make the difference, then the animal would have moral value so not to kill and ear them. However, by engaging in the name a trait process, you are taking a stand against the position. The vegan would just welcome you aboard, or explain what a proposition and it's negation are.
That this is how both you and this AskYourself person see a "moral system" in this way can be seen in how hypothetical moral stances are framed, attacked and defended. Your opponent doesn't even consider a simple proposition such as "it is acceptable to eat animals" or "it is wrong to eat humans" - likely because such specific maxims don't seem like they belong in a simple axiomatic system. No, ethical principles ought to refer to something general and abstract, such as "intelligence," from which specific instances can be derived.
Then there is an expectation of clear distinctions and intolerance of moral ambiguity, which is exemplified both in the "trait equalization process" and in your debate with @khaled. The objection to the soundness of my naive maxims would be that one can imagine a series of hypotheticals in which humans become more and more animal-like or animals become more and more human-like, blurring the boundary between the two categories and leading to moral ambiguity. To which I say: So what? Yes, boundaries can be blurry, and moral ambiguity is a fact of life. If that disqualifies my ethics from being systematic, then so be it.
Excellent post.
I could just name: "Is not a great ape" as the trait that animals possess that makes them ok to kill for food. There is no fundamental difference between saying something lacks X trait, and saying something has the trait "not X". For example: I could call someone "lazy". Or I could say they are "not productive". Exactly the same thing.
Let's say "Killable" is a trait that means: "Is not a great ape and does not possess an intelligence or level of consciousness comparable to or higher than humans."
Now I say that the trait that animals possess that makes them ok to kill for food is that they're "killable" as defined above.
Quoting Cartesian trigger-puppets
Now it doesn't have the above problem. Humans do not have the property killable, and animals (the ones we eat for food) do have the property killable. See how easy it is to convert between these supposedly different categories? "Lacks trait X" is just another way of saying "Has trait Y". It's purely a language thing.
There aren't two separate categories here.
I wouldn’t go that far. Some animals have demonstrated a sense of self, so it isn’t like they’re cognitively dead. It’s more of a continuum.
Quoting tim wood
I’m open to this being the case. I just can’t understand what something analogous to morality would be. That’s why I’ve been asking you to clarify. Do you mean an innate sense that motivates their behavior? Instinct? Emotional systems like guilt or regret that cause them to act in certain ways?
This is what my post was addressing. Humans possess morality, whereas animals do not.
Quoting TheMadFool
I’m not sure what this matters. Are you looking for justification for why we don’t endorse cannibalism? This justification, whatever it may be, doesn’t have to be related to the justification for eating non-human animals. I think we’re just biased towards our own species. We naturally react negatively to harming others (with some exceptions).
Quoting TheMadFool
I would say because we’re members of the same species.
:ok:
Quoting Pinprick
It matters for the simple reason that the difference between animals and humans (moral sense is your example) can be found as a difference betweeen one human and another (saints & sinners). Ergo, if you kill animals because they lack moral sense, you can kill sinners as well. We do kill sinners (death penalty), at least we aren't hypocrites but...capital punishment is losing support all over the world or so I hear. Ergo, we shouldn't kill animals based on the absence of a moral sense. Isn't it intriguing how human issues spill over into our relationship with other forms of life?
Returning to the name the trait argument, what we have to find is a trait, X, such that it's present/absent in animals and if X is present/absent in a human, we can kill that human.
In other words, X justifies the killing of animals and so X in humans too should, to avoid a contradiction, be reason enough to put those humans to death.
Definition of trait X:
1. A trait present/absent in animals that gives us a reason to kill them.
2. The trait above when applied to humans gives cause to kill humans.
Alright. Let's get serious then.
First, you assume that implicit in our moral system, that is, if we believe we have a moral system, implicit in this system is condemning killing humans for food. Correct?
Second, if we have a moral system, does it ascribe sufficient moral value to animals?
Third, if we do not extend this moral system to animals, then what is it that we possess that animals don't? (Or the reverse, what is true of us that is also true of animals so that we also condemn killing animals for food).
Let me rephrase: We fucking hate being killed for food. Do you remember the last time you were hunted for food? It was fucking annoying, to say the least! And we hate it because we are moral agents. We have morals. Yet, we fucking love killing animals for food. What is it that separates us from animals so that we're okay eating them, at the same time condemning killing humans for food.
And my answer is this: our moral system does not have a built-in justification for following convention or practice by tradition. Please do not confuse acting with license to do something with being moral. There is a difference. We do not always behave morally. The problem with your OP is that you are already making conclusions before you even perform any examination of the moral system you're talking about. The "consistency" you're requiring is misplaced. What is true of humans that is also true of animals so that we do not kill animals for food? The will to live! Animals want to live. Which means, they recognize fun, entertainment, grief, family, and belonging. They have a sense of sustenance and comfort. I mean, the way humans treat animals -- Good Lord!
I would conclude that there is no “human morality” as compared to “non-human morality.” Morality is a trait just like any other that a species either has or doesn’t. And this isn’t saying nothing, it’s pointing out a difference (perhaps a significant difference) between humans and other animals.
Quoting tim wood
Sure, we all do, but scientific evidence should also be part of the equation.
But I’m not applying it like that. It has to apply to all members of the species. So, for example, if it is demonstrated that one cow actually possesses morality, then it wouldn’t be permissible to kill/eat any cows. I think that’s just erring on the side of caution. If one cow has morality, maybe others do as well, so we shouldn’t kill any of them just in case.
So with humans it’s the same thing. The only way it would be permissible to kill/eat them would be if no humans had morality, which includes human doing the killing in the hypothetical example. So if no humans possessed morality, then no humans would object to killing/eating other humans.
You claim that we can kill animals because we know for a fact that they don't have morals.
I'm taking that to its logical conclusion: If I know for a fact that a person X lacks morals then, by the reasoning above, I should be allowed to kill X. This person X is like an animal (has no morals). Like should be treated alike, no?
Let's check what this means for the name the trait argument. For you this trait = lacking morals
1. You can kill animals because they lack morals. Ok!
So,
2. Can we kill humans if they lack morals?
No, you can't (the death penalty is not all that popular these days).
What explains this inconsistency?
On the one hand you kill (animals) because they (animals) lack morals and on the other hand you don't kill (humans) even if they (humans) lack morals.
We have to generalize this point. Suppose T is the trait such that it's present/absent in animals which if also present/absent in a human justifies the killing of a human.
Trait T is,
1. T is present/absent in animals (defines animals)
2. T if present/absent in humans permits the killing of humans.
Condition 1 is fulfilled - there are many traits that define animals. Condition 2 can't be satisfied.
For brevity, all I'll do here is point out that the name the trait argument works if we take traits singly, one by one that is but fails if we take all traits together. In the former case, the difference in traits is diluted by the similarities (human still) but in the latter, no similarities remain to compensate for the differences (nothing human left, the human has transformed into an animal).
It's something like what happens to us when we grow up. We are, at one point, definitely children at another positively adults but there's an in-between phase when we're neither children nor adults - teenage years they call it. The name the trait argument operates in the grey zone between animals & humans (part-animal, part-human) while non-vegetarianism is based on a clear distinction between them (fully animal or wholly human).
Yeah, I never said the behavior was a trait.
Quoting tim wood
Ok, then what is it?
Only that’s not quite what I mean. If a species is without morality, then it’s ok to kill them. When applied to humans, it’s imperative that all humans lack morality. So for the above to be true, you would also have to lack morality, since you’re of the same species (human).
Quoting TheMadFool
My answer is yes, if all humans lack morality it’s ok for them to kill each other.
Quoting TheMadFool
That is a good point. Why is it that all the justification hinges on only one trait [rhetorical]?
The problem is when one takes traits that distinguish animals from humans one by one, we're sidetracked by the traits that we've failed to remove from the analysis - notice how we're talking about humans and how we might be justified in killing 'em given a trait that satisfies the conditions stipulated by the name the trait argument. No single trait may suffice to put the required distance between a human and, say, a cow (beef) to allow differential treatment. We need to take into account the entire trait set that defines humans and animals. Consider the simple example where the word "dog" represents animals and the word "cat" represents humans. So, one human is cat and another human too is cat. If I substitute "c" with "d" in one human, we get dat but dat still has something human, "at". Now, so long as you view the traits of animals (d-o-g) one at a time, there'll always be some human trait (c or a or t) to gum up the works. Only when you take all of the traits together as in dog or cat, will the two be distinct enough to require differential treatment.
Sure, but why can’t that be considered a trait?
My argument is that most animals don’t have the ability to understand/create these rules. I don’t think they can alter or change their behavior “at will” so to speak. Essentially they behave as they’re programmed to behave.
I make a distinction between this and human morality, where we have the ability to contemplate our behavior, and adjust accordingly, and to modify our “rules” as needed.
:up:
Quoting SophistiCat
In Isaac’s defense, though his (subjectivist) moral system affirms the latter proposition, and denies the former proposition in your example, he is not arguing that either proposition cannot be an axiom within a logically consistent moral system. In fact, it is possible to have a consistent moral system that affirms such a proposition as “It is acceptable to eat humans (simpliciter)” so long as every other proposition within the moral system is compatible with it. The push-back on such a view would not be a logical one deriving an internal contradiction, but rather the push-back would be a pragmatic one deriving a reductio ad absurdum (showing that the view is reducible to position that most people will find intuitively absurd).
In naming the trait, you are simply agreeing that: 1) humans are different than nonhuman animals; 2) humans have sufficient moral value whereas nonhuman animals do not; which necessarily commits you to a position affirming that there is something true of nonhuman animals that if true of humans would converge your normative evaluation such that both lack sufficient moral value. The reason you are “necessarily” committed to such a view is because it is logically impossible to deny the proposition “There is something true of nonhuman animals that if true of humans would make it morally acceptable to kill for food,” whilst simultaneously holding the view affirming “Humans have sufficient moral value necessary to condemn killing them for food, whereas nonhuman animals do not have sufficient moral value necessary to condemn killing them for food”. This is the case because in saying that there is no trait true of the animal that if true of the human would make it morally acceptable to kill them for food, you are then saying that there is no morally relevant difference between the animal and the human. In other words, you are saying that humans and animals are identical with regards to the moral value we place on them on the one hand; whereas, on the other hand, you are also saying that humans have sufficient moral value, and animals do not have sufficient moral value. This is a contradiction.
In case anyone has noticed my lack of participation in this post, this is mostly due to objections or questions raised which position me to defend NTT which is Ask Yourself’s construction. I actually agree with veganism as defined by the vegan society, which goes something like “The minimization of animal suffering to the greatest degree practicable,” and have found NTT to be a useful tool in getting people to assess their own moral values, moral reasonings, and moral motivations. However, as I have argued for in the OP, I believe to have found an area of NTT vulnerable to attack, and would appreciate critiques directed at my rebuttal. I am most uncertain in my interaction within the hypothetical (trait equalization process) situation. I am not sure if I am interacting within it appropriately. The attempted reductio asks whether or not the act of killing humans for food in a possible world wherein the act is normalized is acceptable on my view. Now, if it is my perspective from the actual world I reside in, then my answer would be relative to the world in question. The actual world I reside in the act is not normalized, and my perspective from this (actual) world would likely reflect this, and indeed has, and is against such an act. Now, my perspective from this (actual) world, upon observation of this possible world in which the act of killing humans for food is normative, from the outside looking in, I would say relative to their values that I accept their behavior as it reflects their values in their world. Since in this respect I am afforded my own moral perspective from the (actual) world I am now, which places the common good of a society above the good of the individual. Therefore, given my perspective from this (actual) world is retained, I would agree with the act. As an alternative, if we say that my perspective from this (actual) world is not retained, then my evaluative analysis of the hypothetical world would depend upon the development of my perspective from the factors of influence within the hypothetical world. If the factors of influence within the hypothetical world give rise to an act which is universally normalized, then a bayesian approach would put it in terms of a high probability that I would accept the act.
Argument in support of my position being irreducible to an absurdity.
P1) If an act is normalized, then it is largely accepted by a groups moral intuitions;
P2) If acts that are largely unaccepted by a groups moral intuitions are considered absurd, then an act that is largely accepted by a groups moral intuitions is necessarily not absurd;
P3) The act of killing humans for food is normalized in the hypothetical world;
C) Therefore, the act of killing humans for food is largely accepted by the groups moral intuitions in the hypothetical world.
C) Therefore, the act of killing humans for food in the hypothetical world is necessarily not absurd.
Argument in support of my position being logically consistent.
P1) If an act is acceptable for the moral agents of a given world, and for an observing moral agent not of the given world, then the act is acceptable;
P2) NTT asks if the act of killing humans for food is acceptable if it is acceptable for the moral agents of a hypothetical world;
P3) NTT’s question is reducible to the presupposition as stated by the antecedent of the conditional statement “[If] the act of killing humans for food is acceptable for the moral agents of a given hypothetical world, [is the act therefore morally acceptable?]”;
P4) The act of killing humans for food is acceptable for the moral agents of a given hypothetical world;
(Note that this assertion is an explicit presupposition that is built-in to the NTT question: “If there is a hypothetical world in which killing humans for food is normalized, would you accept that killing humans is morally acceptable?” thus any objection to P4 by NTT can only be raised on pain of contradiction.)
P5) As the observing moral agent, I accept the act of killing humans as practiced by the moral agents of the hypothetical world;
C) Therefore, the act is acceptable.
(Note also that the argument is reduced to tautology in P1 of the argument.)
I don’t see my position, which answers the challenge of NTT, to derive a contradiction, nor to be reducible to an absurd moral position. I think that in answering NTT with the extrinsic trait of “being morally normalized to kill for food” (remember what is true of the animal that if true of the human) produces a tautology (true in all possible worlds, trivially true).
Is there anything I am missing here?
We’re not talking about intelligence. Animals are intelligent because they have the ability to learn; they can make associations between X behavior or other stimuli, and Y consequence. None of this has any bearing on their ability to comprehend morality.
A wolf, for example, may understand intuitively it’s status in the pack, as well as how it’s status affects it’s behavior, but this doesn’t mean it knows/understands that certain behaviors are “immoral.” It just associates certain behaviors with certain consequences. The alpha’s aggression towards other wolves when they do X behavior doesn’t mean it thinks X behavior is wrong/bad/immoral.
Whatever is considered wrong or bad.
Quoting tim wood
That’s for them to determine. I’m not an objectivist.
In this case by the wolves.
Quoting tim wood
I’m not claiming that. I’m claiming they have no concept of moral/immoral (I.e. they lack morality).
Quoting tim wood
Ok. So, here’s what I think. Complexity in species only develops when there is evolutionary pressure to do so. Worms, for example, are able to navigate their environment, reproduce, discern food from non-food, etc. They’re able to do all this without even possessing a brain or central nervous system. I think this points out an issue with observation. Were you to simply observe the worms behavior, you would likely conclude that the worm knows where it’s going and what it’s doing. It’s actions seem deliberate and intentional. However, there is nothing to suggest that deliberate and intentional behavior is possible without a brain/consciousness.
My sort of rule of thumb to remedy this issue is to ask yourself whether or not conscious deliberation is necessary for this animal to perform this action. Because if it isn’t needed, it’s very unlikely that the species even developed the capability to consciously deliberate. In short, if instinct or simple learned behavior suffices to explain the behavior, then there’s no need to posit a more complex phenomenon. I guess it’s basically an application of Occam’s Razor.
No. The point is that they can’t determine it (that’s why I say they lack it). Morality does not exist for a wolf.
Quoting tim wood
Ok, then how does complexity arise in species if not through evolution?
Yeah, that’s how change can occur, but if it isn’t fostered by evolution it isn’t going to develop complexity.