An Argument for Conceptual Atomism
Conceptual atomism is the view that concepts have no internal structure. I will offer an argument for conceptual atomism:
(1) Concepts can be composed.
(2) If concepts can be composed, then conceptual atomism is the case.
Therefore, (3) Conceptual atomism is the case.
The premise (1) shows compositionality of concepts. For example, 'brown' and 'dog' compose 'brown dog'. The total structure of the argument above is modus ponens, i.e. logically valid one.
Defense:
Since concepts are compositionable, if concepts had internal structures, then concepts would not be composed accurately. Suppose that 'brown' has internal sub-contents such as 'color', 'brighter-than-black', and so on. Then we cannot expect the combination of 'brown' and 'dog' into 'brown dog', since we should know their sub-contents, or qualities in order to compose 'brown dog', etc. Therefore, concepts must be atomic in order that compositionality is the case.
(1) Concepts can be composed.
(2) If concepts can be composed, then conceptual atomism is the case.
Therefore, (3) Conceptual atomism is the case.
The premise (1) shows compositionality of concepts. For example, 'brown' and 'dog' compose 'brown dog'. The total structure of the argument above is modus ponens, i.e. logically valid one.
Defense:
Since concepts are compositionable, if concepts had internal structures, then concepts would not be composed accurately. Suppose that 'brown' has internal sub-contents such as 'color', 'brighter-than-black', and so on. Then we cannot expect the combination of 'brown' and 'dog' into 'brown dog', since we should know their sub-contents, or qualities in order to compose 'brown dog', etc. Therefore, concepts must be atomic in order that compositionality is the case.
Comments (49)
But atomism is disproven in physics now. And even in language use, it is clear that instead organisation and particularisation are created by contexts of constraint.
The word "dog" limits reference to a class of phenomenon fairly tightly. Talking of the brown dog restricts things even more.
So constraints can be combined reducing the freedom of the possible with any arbitrary degree of precision a situation might require. And there is an atomism of a kind in that composability. But concepts don't have to rigidly possess particular fixed properties as atomism implies. Instead they only need to restrict interpretations, and they don't even have to do that more than loosely much of the time.
What, for instance, is a Labrador? If it's (a) a dog, (b) with certain specifiable features, then it is a concept with, within it, relation between other concepts.
You'll need to explain what you mean by that.
What you didn't get is what philosophers of concepts usually talk about. Lexical concepts mean simple vocabulary concepts. 'dog', 'brown', 'cat', 'stupid' are lexical concepts. 'brown dog', 'stupid cat' are concepts composed. Most theories of concepts say that lexical concepts have lower levels of contents: for example, 'dog' is divided into 'animal', 'quadrupedal', 'mammal', and so on. Conceptual atomism rejects that concepts (i.e. lexical concepts) have internal structures.
You haven't shown this. You haven't even shown that concepts can be composed or that they can't be composed under different conceptions of "concept".
Do you not see that 'brown' and 'dog' compose 'brown dog'? Compositionality of concepts is one of the important characteristics of concepts.
What I am defending is that conceptual atomism is necessary for compositionality of concepts.
You misunderstood. I claim that concepts are atomic.
Perhaps the concept "dog" is actually made up of all the atomic conceptions of a dog. We could list a few of these atomic conceptions:
1. The black dog belonging to the butcher with three legs.
2. A poodle
3....
So, let's fabricate a "modus ponens"
1. Concepts are composed
2. If concepts are compositions, conceptual atomism is not the case
3. Therefore conceptual atomism is false.
Anyone convinced?
No. Do you think "quantum mechanics" and "general relativity" compose to "quantum mechanics general relativity"?
Is there a set of all atomic concepts?
Your example is not valid one. Of course, 'tuna', 'salad', 'tom' do not compose 'tuna salad tom' conceptually.
That used to be my nick-name at school, to differentiate me from the tom who didn't like tuna salad.
My friend has a nickname called 'quantum mechanics general relativity'.
...pretty much everything. The thing is that your argument is so simple structurally that it is either trivial or the real meat of the argument needs some unpacking.
Many theories of concepts say that concepts have lower level structures, and that concepts can be composed. Conceptual atomism says that concepts can be composed only when they are atomic.
Again, I understand this, but you are just asserting conceptual atomism rather than arguing for it.
It is however mildly ironic that the atomic concept of an atom isn't atomic any more.
I did, but you forgot.
In what sense are either not composed of multiple instances of experience?
You might mean that words, to behave in "the right way" - act like a conjunctive arithmetic - would have to be treated as atomistic particulars ... even when they are actually general umbrella terms. But it is clear that being atomistic is not what word meanings actually are.
You have said both:
"Many theories of concepts say that concepts have lower level structures, and that concepts can be composed. Conceptual atomism says that concepts can be composed only when they are atomic."
"(2) If concepts can be composed, then conceptual atomism is the case."
It's about semantics of concepts. Informational semantics says that meanings of concepts are information.
Uttering "dog" is an atomistic act. As a noise we might hear, we know its not someone saying log or bog or dig or dob. But as a concept, dog seems informationally open. We could either generalise or particularise its semantics by adding or subtracting information (or constraints).
Are we talking about a dog or the dog? The Platonically ideal canine, or that little mutt snapping at our ankles?
Atomism kind of works because we can leave the contexual information implied and unsaid. But that doesn't make word interpretations foundationally atomistic. It is of the essence of words that their boundaries of reference are porous or vague. Atomism is relative as semantics is essentially open even if syntax does try to create a closed compositional structure that is meant to keep all the meanings trapped securely inside the spoken sentence.
According to informational semantics, concepts are mental particulars representing information about objects. For example, concept 'dog' is a mental particular representing information about real dogs.
So meaning is use. The utterance of "dog" stands as a sign mediating a habit of relation with the world. Thus while the vocal act is particular, it only has meaning by virtue of the coordination it might bring between a mind and the world (the world including other minds that might have an interest in being likewise oriented to the world beyond themselves).
You talk about mental particulars (concepts, ideas, impressions?) representing information. But informational semantics seems to be making the same point that they don't. What signs buy as the mediating mechanism is the possibility of an externalised habit of coordination rather than an internalised state of information.
So "dog" as a concept is not the representation of a doggy essence - something closed and internally represented - but instead the anchor of a habit of coordination between self and world. Doggyness characterises all we might do, think and say in a "doggy situation". So as a "concept" it is creatively open ended - while also being still usefully or pragmatically constrained enough to function as a lexical unit, a syntactic element, of some "propositional" sentence.
Do you have no comment to make on your inconsistent statements:
1. "Many theories of concepts say that [...] concepts can be composed."
2. "If concepts can be composed, then conceptual atomism is the case."
Many theories of concepts say (1) concepts have lower level structures, and (2) concepts can be composed, "both at the same time".
The premise 2 above is different from 'many theories of concepts'. The premise 2 does not say (1) concepts have lower level structures, but says (2) concepts can be composed.
Do you see the difference???
You have stated that there are opposing (non-atomistic) "theories of concepts" which also assert that concepts can be composed. This makes your premise 2 false.
Conceptual atomism asserts (1) concepts can be composed, and (2) concepts can be composed only if concepts are atomic. (2) can be restated as: (3) concepts *cannot* be composed if concepts have lower level structures (i.e. they are not atomic).
More precisely:
(1) If concepts are not atomic, then concepts cannot be composed.
(2) Concepts can be composed.
Therefore, (3) concepts are atomic.
Modus Tollens.
You're contradicting yourself. You said earlier: "Many [opposing] theories of concepts say that concepts have lower level structures, and that concepts can be composed."
Now you are saying: "If concepts are not atomic, then concepts cannot be composed."
You said earlier that "some theories of concepts might say that 'dog' is divided into 'animal', 'quadrupedal', 'mammal', and so on." So, why isn't this an example of "dividing" the concept of 'dog' into other concepts? That is, why don't those other concepts compose the concept of 'dog'? Why can't this be done?
It's because dividing concepts into lower levels causes to make compositionality of concepts fail. Infinite regress of dividing concepts into parts and parts and parts...
How does it fail?
This is how.
Conceptual atomism model:
'Brown' and 'dog' compose 'brown dog'. It's easy and simple.
Opposing theories model:
'Brown' is composed by 'color', and 'brighter-than-black', and so on. 'Dog' is composed by 'animal', and 'quadrupedal', and mammal', and so on. ... 'Brighter-than-black' is composed 'lighter-than-black' and 'color' and so forth. ... 'animal' is composed by 'living thing' and 'biologically constructed' and so forth. ... ... ... ... and 'quark' is composed by 'physical' and 'small particle', and so on. Is there an end?
Compare two stories.
That is not a question. Explanations are sufficient. I recommend you to go back to this thread to make up what you need to get.
It certainly is a question, but if you're unable to answer it then perhaps you should reconsider your argument.
My answers are certainly answers. If you are unable to accept this fact, go to the grave.